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A. Introduction 
 
NEW 
TOWNS  
ARE 
BACK 
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Abstract –  
From New Towns to NeoTowns 
“Our suburban architecture ... helps us to reveal the spirit and character of 
modern civilisation, just as the temples of Egypt and Greece, the baths and 
amphitheatres of Rome, and the cathedrals and castles of the middle ages 
help us to comprehend and penetrate the spirit of previous civilisations.” 
(César Daly 1864)1 
 
Public authorities planned the New Towns of the 20th Century. This was mainly the case 
in Europe, the US and in a number of developing countries such as Egypt and Iran. Al-
most all of the examples emerged in the post-World War II era of strong (Keynesian) 
states. It is commonly acknowledged that the epoch of modern New Towns ended with 
this period. 
Yet we are currently observing something unexpected: a rising number of privately 
developed New Towns. This trend is astonishing, as free markets are usually associated 
with anarchic growth and uncontrolled sprawl rather than with structured urbanisation. 
While the model is driven by the entrepreneurial logic of the corporate sector and while 
planning and design are playing merely secondary roles, the typology asks for a closer 
examination. Our underlying research speaks for the assumption that the phenomenon at 
hand may represent a new and offbeat typology. We propose to conceptualise this species 
as Neo Towns. 
In order to tackle this void it will be necessary to concentrate on the role of the private 
sector in expanding the generally accepted duality of the planned (public) and the ‘un-
planned (e.g. self-organised). Consequently this project seeks to explore the role of the 
private sector through three selected cases: Jakarta’s Bumi Serpong Damai, Mumbai’s 
Navi Mumbai an São Paulo’s AlphaVille-Tamboré, as it is believed that any theoretical 
model requires a tangible base.  
The detailed examination of the three cases elucidates significant processes and trends 
of contemporary urbanisation, which is increasingly privately driven. It demonstrates, for 
example, that urban forms themselves, as well as the strategies of urban production, are 
increasingly exposed to trends of standardisation, modularisation and diversification, as 
they become more and more integrated into a larger set of rationalised economic action. 
The examples examined also illustrate that while the city and its elements are becoming 
increasingly rationalised, abstracted, and typified. In this context questions of representa-
tion, identity, and appearance are becoming more substantial, while local histories and 
spatial contexts are tending to become hollowed out and fragmented. 
Yet, in addition to the set of general attributes and trends, the examples at hand also 
portray a series of specific lessons and innovations of chief relevance for the discipline of 
urban development, planning and design. The case of Navi Mumbai provides us with 
valuable experiences of resettlement and rehabilitation strategies, low income housing, 
public private partnerships, or market oriented planning tools; Bumi Serpong Damai 
provides valuable lessons on themed neighbourhoods, urban ‘festivalisation’, modular 
                                               
1 “L’Architecture privée au XIXe siecle sur Napoleon III”; Paris; quoted and translated by Robert Fishman’s 1987: Bourgeois 
Utopias: 3 
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turn-key design, or diversified financial products; and AlphaVille portrays precious find-
ings on process-based development, based on principles and codes, ‘automanagement’ 
(self-management), as well as strategies of life-style branding, corporate responsibility 
and ecological design.  
Finally, the cases discussed epitomise numerous complications brought about by con-
temporary trends: loss of traditional context, annihilation of meaning, the erosion of 
public space, or the alienation of the consumer etc, yet at the same time we are impressed 
by strategies which are less and less oriented towards geometry and form but more and 
more based on processes and rules, and astonished by the resilience, flexibility and 
adaptability private urban development can also represent. Still, the prospect that various 
processes of adaptation and transformation in the long run lead to a paysage de surprise 
on the ground is reconciliatory.  
 Illustration a-1: World map with expected NeoTowns 
 Illustration A-2: 13 NeoTowns and Paris (a-g) 
About this chapter 
The following chapter is introducing the research. Above all it provides the endeavour 
with a theoretical base. To achieve this goal it is composed of seven major parts: 1. The 
first part presents an overview and presents the relevance of the topic; 2. The second sec-
tion provides a brief introduction to the chapter; 3. The third section unveils the goals of 
the project including its assumptions, deliverables, the target audience and working defi-
nitions; 4. The fourth subdivision launches a comprehensive revision of the state of the 
art research. It comprises three main parts, contextualising our issue in studies related to 
I. ‘Contemporary space’, II. New Town research, and III. to ‘Urban debates’. This section 
closes with a conclusion of the knowledge gaps identified and with the demarcation of 
the own limitations; 5. The methodological spirit as well as the instruments are uncov-
ered in the fifth subchapter; 6. The sixth section clarifies the selection of the three study 
cases; 7. Finally the seventh part discusses the research design and introduces the struc-
ture of this undertaking. 
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Goals and objectives –  
Decoding private urbanism 
This research aims to contribute new insights to the question of 21st century urbanisa-
tion. Our contribution involves exploring the dynamics of privately driven urbanism and 
the question of the city as a venture. It follows the broad objective of confirming and 
bringing to date the 30 year old concept of ‘production of space’ in the context of 
worldwide urbanisation and the framework of a ‘new economy’. (Henri Lefebvre mainly 
developed this model in the 1960s and 1970s.) This general objective is explored through 
a comparative study. This is seen as a ‘via regia’ of theory formation, as it facilitates the 
generation of hypotheses and models.  
We identified a new generation of privately planned New Towns as the most appro-
priate study object. This typology is conceptualised in the term NeoTown (or NoT). We 
argue that NeoTowns reflect the spatial impacts of privatisation in a most direct and 
unfettered way.  
This species is currently emerging on a worldwide scale at peripheral Greenfield sites 
of mega-city regions in developing countries. It mirrors larger socio-economic shifts from 
an industrial to consumer-based society and echoes a process of collective individualisa-
tion. In order to set a practicable framework we have decided to compare three interna-
tional examples, Navi Mumbai (Mumbai), Bumi Serpong Damai (Jakarta), and Al-
phaVille-Tamboré (São Paulo) in order to track the changes of spatial production which 
occurred in the last 30 years (from Keynesianism to the New Economy). 
Objectives 
In the light of the aspirations stated above, this research follows three main objectives: 
Firstly, it seeks to provide a holistic description of the typology of NeoTowns; Secondly, 
it aims to understand the typology in the context of contemporary urban debates, re-
search and theory; And thirdly, it intends to develop implications comprising a research 
agenda, as well as the transfer of lessons and experiences. While the first goal relates to a 
conceptualisation of the subject itself, the second refers to the contextualisation of the 
topic in a broader framework, and the third part then refers to the operationalisation of 
the findings, issues and questions. In other words: The research intends to record and 
describe, to provide evidence and understand, and thus to generate meaning regarding 
this new urban typology and the processes involved.2  
Finally, our interpretative analysis in the form of a comparative study aims for “the 
scientific construction of an (ideal) meaning or context of a pure type (ideal type) of a 
frequent phenomenon”.3 
                                               
2 A discussion of notions of ‘meaning’, ‘interpretation’, ‘comprehension’, ‘evidence’, ‘rationalistic method’, and ‘ideal typol-
ogy’ goes back to Max Weber (1922: I, §I, I; 1ff). He states that: 
„All interpretation strives, like all science in general, for ‚evidence '.“ (1922: I, §I, I; 3ff, (transl. by the author): [“Alle Deu-
tung strebt, wie alle Wissenschaft überhaupt, nach ‚Evidenz’.“] 
“For the science which is concerned with the meaning of action, to ‚explain’ means: detection of the semantic context, as 
well as its subjective meaning, to which understandable action currently belongs.” (Cf. Weber 1922: I, §I, I; 5, (transl. by the 
author): [“’Erklären’ bedeutet also für eine mit dem Sinn des Handelns befaßte Wissenschaft soviel wie: Erfassung des Sinn-
zusammenhangs, in den, seinem subjektiv gemeinten Sinn nach, ein aktuell verständliches Handeln hineingehört.] 
3 “Comprehension means in all these cases: interpretive analysis: a) of the real meaning of an individual case (for a historical 
perspective) or b) of the average and approximate (for the mass of sociological observation) or c) for the scientific construc-
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If we look at the goals from the perspective of different knowledge spheres we can 
also state that the conceptual set of goals is mainly related to the generation of process 
knowledge (applied research), the contextual set of goals is aimed at the generation of 
system knowledge (theory), and the operational goal-cluster focuses on target knowl-
edge.4  
The conceptual part aims at a better understanding of the phenomena at hand. It 
works along a holistic and broad description of the examples intending to portray the 
whole complexity of contemporary urbanisation. The comparative approach seeks to 
disentangle the processes involved, extracting the relevant trends, problems, and innova-
tions. 
General goals 
In general, this project aims to contribute to a better understanding of the ‘production’ of 
contemporary urban space. We assume that NeoTowns provide essential insights into the 
interpretation of contemporary space in general. Consequently, the findings can contrib-
ute to models and theories of spatial production in the context of advanced market 
economies (also referred to as neoliberalism, or the new economy). Moreover, the results 
aim to provide evidence of a new typology of planned cities, namely the NeoTown 
(NoTs), as a novel creation of mega-city regions in the South, unprecedented in the in-
dustrialised West. Finally, the results will explore the question of ‘the city’ in general as 
well as the resolution of specific local problems. 
Specific aims 
The framework of general goals leads to two specific aims: a) to gain an improved 
knowledge of NeoTowns in their particular context, and b) to operationalise the findings 
through the extrapolation of general trends and conclusions. This is achieved by measur-
ing, categorising discriminating between and comparing the selected examples.5  
With this in view, seven objectives were identified as essential: 1) to gain knowledge 
about the historical and spatial context which characterises the respective locations; 2) to 
contour out the physical characteristics of the object of NeoTowns; 3) to delineate the 
profile of its ‘users’ (e.g. inhabitants); 4) to understand the role of the authors (e.g. in 
particular the private sector and their strategies); 5) to disentangle the part that planning 
and design plays in the process; 6) to discern the relevance of finance and capital (as a 
central moment of market-based urbanisation); and finally 7) to realise the significance 
of governance and control. A consequent part examines the commonalities and differ-
ences, as well as the contradictions and innovations embodied in the examples. This set 
of specific goals serves as a basis for formulating primary conclusions in the form of a 
research agenda along a set of hypotheses, as well as best practice implications. (Cf. be-
low: Structure) 
                                                                                                                                         
tion of an (ideal) meaning or context of a pure type (ideal type) of a frequent phenomenon." (Cf. Weber 1922: I, §I, I; 6: “ 
»Verstehen« heißt in allen diesen Fällen: deutende Erfassung: a) des im Einzelfall real gemeinten (bei historischer Betrach-
tung) oder b) des durchschnittlich und annäherungsweise gemeinten (bei soziologischer Massenbetrachtung) oder c) des für 
den reinen Typus (Idealtypus) einer häufigen Erscheinung wissenschaftlich zu konstruierenden (»idealtypischen«) Sinnes oder 
Sinnzusammenhangs.”) 
4 This is the terminology of the ‘young’ discipline of knowledge management (Cf. Moll, Peter; Zander, Ute. 2006. Managing 
the Interface, From Knowledge to Action in Global Change and Sustainability Science, Munich.) 
5 Behind the primary set of goals resides a bunch of implicit goals. These belong to the main motivation of this research and 
point to essential topics for an ongoing research agenda. The secondary goals are mainly related to a framework of interdis-
ciplinary urban debates. (Cf. the context section below) 
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Finally, the research at hand aims to achieve the following effects: 1) To integrate and 
discuss the intense local discourses on privatively driven New Towns; 2) To generate 
implementation knowledge in the form of ‘lessons’, in particular for planning and design 
of new settlements at global and local levels; and 3) To communicate and disseminate 
this knowledge to a broader public of stakeholders engaged in the production of urban 
spaces (scientists, practitioners, developers, community activists etc). 
Assumptions 
According to the underlying assumptions of this research, NeoTowns are: 
- A new and unexpected typology of New Towns, which is on the present agenda of 
urban development6; 
- A key to understanding the production of contemporary urban space; 
- Hitherto unknown in the West; 
- A global phenomenon; 
- Characteristic of mega-city regions; 
- Driven by the corporate sector; 
- Concentrations of new wealth in the developing world; 
- Demonstrating the effects of rationalisation and economies of scale in the real estate 
sector of the respective countries; 
- Adding to the increased complexity, spatial differentiation and heterogeneity of new 
mega urban regions; 
- Driven by entrepreneurs instead of planners or philanthropic reformers. 
Deliverables 
Considering the goals and objectives stated above, this work will produce the following 
deliverables: 
- Contribute to the discipline of urban science. This will be mainly done by: a) furnish-
ing the theories of spatial production with new data, and b) catering new knowledge 
to the field of new town’ research.  
- Delineate a research agenda on the new urban typology and phenomenon of 
NeoTowns. 
- Integrate and disseminate experiences and lessons (transfer knowledge). 
- Generate a set of general planning recommendations (process knowledge, implemen-
tation knowledge) 
- Produce a modular expandable databank with information on neo-towns (system 
knowledge). 
Audience, beneficiaries 
The project targets four groups of beneficiaries: 
- Academics: urban research, political economy, sociology, economics 
- Corporate sector: developers, investors, consulting companies, architects, and plan-
ners 
- Public sector: politicians, state planners, 
- Civil Society: residents, civil organisations, e.g. New Town Institutes 
                                               
6 Cf. Gotsch und Peterek (2001) 
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Working definitions 
The meaning of terms can be highly contextual. It can vary from place to place and from 
time to time. If no definitions are provided, the use of expressions can lead to misunder-
standing and confusion. This is the case in particular in urban and social sciences where 
concepts such as ‘city’, society’ and ‘culture’ have been the subject of debates for many 
years.7  
Consequently, the next section will provide explanations of the main terminologies 
which are fundamental for this work. This is done in order to provide a clear conceptual 
foundation, a clear delineation of the research, and basis for mutual understanding. It is 
important to understand these as working definition. A universal validity is not claimed. 
The series of terminologies was deduced from the title of this work. Accordingly, the 
most important of these terms which await clarification are: NeoTown, The South, New 
Town, Planned Settlement, Neoliberal Economy, New Economy, Challenges and Innova-
tions, Contradiction, Private Sphere, Public Sphere, Corporate Sphere, and Privatisation. 
Neo Town (NoT) 
The term NeoTown, or in its brief form also NoT, serves as the principal working defini-
tion within this work. The expression aims to conceptualise a new urban typology of 
planned settlements dominated by the corporate sector. It is a composite of the terminol-
ogies Neoliberal and New Town. 
The South 
The ‘South’ is a concept which refers to the common term North-South divide. It groups 
countries outside of the industrialised nations (e.g. the OECD). It refers to the predomi-
nant global socio-economic and political divisions. These comprise developing and 
emerging economies. It is used as an alternative and more neutral expression than the 
terms ‘Third World’, or ‘developing countries’.8  
New Town 
The present work uses the term New Town in the context of the post-World WarII Brit-
ish movement, which merged the concept of Garden Cities9 with modernistic planning 
principles (Cf. the Context section below).10  
                                               
7 Two notable examples from our context are the terminologies ‘New Town’, and Urban Landscapes. A New Town, for 
example, can be conceived as a planned city in general (Galantay 1975), as a decongestion type of satellite city (Phipps 
1987), a specific typology in post-World WarII Britain, a mix of the Garden City idea and modern planning, a result of the 
New Towns Act of 1946 (Cf. Osborne 1946: 26), or a traditionalist master planned settlement in the 21st century (Cf. 
www.newtownatstcharles.com/, r07.07.2009). In addition, Newtown is a common name for newly planned settlements and 
neighbourhoods in general, from Eschenbach in Bavaria (Germany), to Johannesburg, to Sydney (Australia), to Edinburgh 
(Scotland), to Williamsburg (United States).  
In the same way, the term Urban Landscape (Stadtlandschaft), depending on the perspective, is regarded as a classic paint-
ing genre, as a postmodern urban landscape, or as an ideal type of urban reconstruction developed by the German planner 
Rudolf Hillebrecht in the 1940s and 1950s. (Cf. also the remarks on the terminology of Garden Cities by Frederic J. Osborne 
in his 1946 edition of Howard’s “Tomorrow”.) 
8 The term Third World can be seen as a product of the Cold War era, representing the block free movement of states in the 
late 1950s. The expression ‘developing countries’ seems difficult to maintain, as the socioeconomic and cultural variety 
among the countries is constantly increasing. 
9 The term Garden City relates to the concept developed by Ebenezer Howard (1898) adopted by the British Garden Cities 
and Town Planning Association: “A Garden City is a town designed for healthy living and industry; of a size that makes 
possible a full measure of social life, but no larger; surrounded by a rural belt; the whole of the land being in public owner-
ship or held in trust for the community.” (Quoted in Osborne 1946: 26) While in 1946 Osborn was emphasizing Howard’s 
notion of Cities surrounded by a green belt, the author believes that today, the model should be more closely associated 
with the products of the post-World WarII Garden City movement. These are mainly suburban settlements of cities with 
gardens, designed along traditionalist ideals of the reform movement, mainly represented by the “Gartenstadtbewegung”. 
10 This understanding of New Towns is generally shared by the mainstream New Town organisations such as the Interna-
tional New Town Institute (www.newtowninstiute.org), or the European New Towns Platform (www.newtowns.net). 
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Planned Settlements 
This universal and widely applicable term refers to human settlements which are con-
trolled by a certain power and planned according to specific rationales (ideals). The ty-
pology stands in contrast to unplanned, organically grown, or emerging settlements. Both 
models have been central in the history of urbanisation. Planned settlements are not nec-
essarily equal to towns or cities. Only if these achieve a certain mix of use and size, they 
may achieve a complexity characteristic for the latter (Cf. below: context). 
Neoliberal (Economy) 
This term is generally used in relation to the renaissance of liberal economic ideals, 
mainly propagated by a group of scholars from the University of Chicago11. It is used by 
critics and proponents alike. Anti-globalisation movements, such as Attack, main-
streamed the notion to criticise the effects of an increasingly abstract and footloose 
global economy, as well as an naïve uncritical belief in the almighty power of the market. 
We use the notion in a more neutral way, pointing the chief characteristics of the late 
20th and early 21st century economy. 
New Economy 
New Economy is a more impartial term used to describe the specific characteristics of the 
contemporary economy. It emphasises the contrast to previous systems. The expression is 
used throughout this work parallel to the term neoliberal. In addition to these two terms, 
a vast amount of individual conceptualisations with different inclinations exist.12 Indeed, 
the struggle for new definitions points to a young and evolving subject that is difficult to 
capture with old tools. 
Challenges and Innovations 
The notion of challenges and innovations is used as a pair of mutually exclusive but in-
terdependent elements of a dialectical framework of contradictions. It characterises the 
approach underlying this research. While challenge stands as a synonym for problem, 
innovation is used an as equivalent to potential (Cf. the methodological framework of 
this research below). 
Contradiction 
The notion of contradiction is used as a concept which describes the tension in a dialecti-
cal framework, e.g. between thesis and antithesis. This understanding points to the fact 
that most processes imply ambiguous results implying winners and losers. Depending on 
the framework and the perspective chosen, the results may be perceived as gains and 
losses, problems and innovations. Example: When a new town is built, developers and 
residents are most probably on the winning side, while local villagers may be on the los-
ing side. When a person is driving a car, he or she is on a winning side, whereas the bee-
tle on the street is probably on the losing side. 
Innovation 
This work is largely interested in innovations in urban planning and design made by the 
corporate sector. Innovation describes a novel approach, which differs from existing so-
lutions and habits. It resolves existing problems and provides added value, responding to 
a framework of needs and relying on an enabling environment. While innovation may be 
interpreted as a synthesis of the above-described dialectical model, this synthesis is not 
without new contradictions.  
                                               
11 Such as Friedrich August von Hayek, or Milton Friedman. (Cf. below: Context) 
12 Some selected examples comprise: ‘Informational Economy’ (Castells 1989), ‘Late Capitalism’ (Jameson 1984), ‘Post-
Fordism’ (Harvey 1989), ‘Advanced Capitalism’ (Ward 2002), or ‘New Capitalism’ (Sennett 2006). 
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Private, Public, and Corporate spheres 
Among the essential conceptual means of this work is an equilibrium model of three 
spheres – the private, the corporate, as well as the public. This concept is based on the 
classical idea of a private-public nexus, which was extended by the sphere of the econ-
omy. It is based on the notion that in market-based societies, economic organisations 
develop into independent institutions. The result serves as an appropriate representation 
for the majority of stakeholders in capitalist societies. Weber 1922 (II, § 14) conceptual-
ises this development in distinguishing between the individual household and the capital-
ist corporations. (Cf. also the methods section below.)13 
Private sphere 
The space of individuals, households, and communities applies to the category of ‘private 
sphere’. This concept is also closely associated with the notions of civil society, or the 
everyday (as the sphere of daily life). Notably the term ‘private sphere’ must not be con-
fused with the term ‘private sector’. 
Corporate sphere 
The term ‘corporate sphere’ accounts for the economic sphere of enterprises, companies 
and corporations. These are non-personal and commercial institutions, which are fun-
damental elements of market based societies, and which are demarcated by an own inter-
est for profit (Cf. Weber 1922: II, §41). Other expressions for this domain are ‘market 
sphere’, or ‘economic sphere’.14  
Public Sphere 
This terminology points to traditional levels of society representing state powers, gov-
ernment institutions, formal administrations and public regulations. It is closely related 
to the ancient public political domain (For example the Greek ‘Agora Eleuthera’15, or the 
Roman notion of the ‘Res Publica’).16  
Privatisation 
The notion of privatisation is a concept closely related to the triangular model of the 
public, private and economic poles. In the context of this work, it is intended to describe 
an increasing domination of the corporate sector as opposed to the private or public 
spheres. The related term of Commoditisation points to an increasing colonisation of the 
private as well as the public (and the sacred) spheres by the corporate logic of exchange 
values. 
 Illustration A-3: Shift of equilibrium from Keynesianism to Neoliberalism 
                                               
13 Conceptualisations of different societal domains date back to ancient Greece. As early as 300 B.C. Aristotle had asked for 
a strict division of the public and religious sphere (agora eleuthera) from the economic operations represented by the market 
domain (the agora anagkaia) in the seventh book of the Politeia. 
14 The fact that this sector is also often called the ‘private sector’ points to the origins of economic action in the sphere of 
the ancient extended household structures: the Greek Oikos, or the Latin Familia. Oikonomia means the ‘rule of the house’. 
15 Cf. Aristotle, Politeia, Book 7 
16 The classical public domain had also comprised elements of the sacred and the ritual. These performed important discipli-
nary roles. Today these functions have been secularised. (For a discussion, compare for example to May Weber’s “Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft” [Theory of social and economic organisation], 1922. 
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Context –  
Space, New Towns and urban narratives 
Some people have strange ideas that they live by the circulation of coins. 
Whereas the world is mainly a vast leaf-colony, growing on and forming a 
leafy soil, not a mere mineral mass (Geddes 1949: 217) 
 
The following section presents the most important current scientific positions in relation 
to this project. This contextualisation of the topic not only reconfirms the originality of 
the research subject; it also clarifies the goals, the questions, the working methodologies 
and the organisation of this project. In other words, the examination of the existing re-
search provides the foundation of this project, providing the analytical tools and sharp-
ening the gaze for the analysis of the specific case studies. While this work seeks to intro-
duce a new species of planned cities, urban science and its environs have many narratives 
which are of relevance for this work and vice versa.  
Notably, three pillars emerge which are substantial for this project:  
- Theory and critique of space and spatial production;  
- Research on New Towns; and  
- A set of narratives investigating particular urban problems. 
The subsequent part highlights the key concepts, proponents, trends, the respective re-
search gaps and the questions of relevance. 
I. Research on contemporary space 
The subsequent part grounds Neo-Towns within relevant models of spatial production 
and current political-economic theories. This project began with the question of space in 
the age of the new economy. The most important cornerstones of this question are criti-
cal research and theory contributing insights to the production of contemporary space. In 
order to determine which particular elements within this discipline are relevant, we recall 
two of the central questions at hand: How is contemporary urban space, the human envi-
ronment, produced? Can NeoTowns provide a clue to a better understanding of the pro-
duction of contemporary space, e.g. space in the age of the new economy? 
These questions suggest that we have to take a broad, holistic and synoptic approach, 
as we have to perceive the city as a combination of space, economy and society. It also 
follows that our inquiry of NeoTowns has to be grounded in three important steps which 
will equip us with the necessary conceptual tools:  
- Firstly, we need models and theories relating to space itself; 
- Secondly, we need a better understanding of the economic sphere and its current 
condition;  
- And thirdly, we need clarity of the concepts which describe the interrelationships 
among contemporary space and economy.  
Indeed, the fundamental importance of these broad aspects becomes clear when we bring 
in our main operational hypothesis which presumes that: If Neo-towns are exceptional 
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paradigmatic species of neoliberal space, it follows that a comparative study of 
NeoTowns can contribute to the elucidation of the genus of neoliberal urbanism. 
Introduction – Theories of space 
The next part elucidates why we ask the question on space, which relevant theories and 
models of space exist, and why Lefebvre’s model is of central importance. 
A better understanding of the question of space is a central prerequisite for conducting 
urban research, including this study. The conceptual thinking of the French sociologist, 
critic and philosopher Henri Lefebvre is of fundamental importance for this work.17  
It can be claimed that Lefebvre developed a ‘relativity-theory’ in the social sciences. As 
Einstein’s theory linked space, time and energy, Lefebvre developed a relativistic model 
of space linking space, time and society. (Cf. Gotsch 2002) His work triggered a ‘spatial 
turn’ in the social sciences and had tremendous impacts in social and cultural science, 
political economy and urbanism.18 19 
The spirit of the ‘spatial turn’ implies that space is not a neutral container but a field 
of opportunity, spanned in time, marked by political and ideological conditions, and 
produced, colonised and appropriated by various stakeholders, and which in turn also 
reproduces the above.20  
Of particular relevance for our work is Lefebvre’s meta-narrative of spatial produc-
tion and urbanisation, which he developed in contrast to historical materialism.21 The 
other fundamental concept is Lefebvre’s dialectic model of space, which contrasts a linear 
logic that is often the base of technocratic positivist thinking. 
Lefebvre can be considered one of the first critics of modern globalisation as he de-
bated the impacts of rising commoditisation and urbanisation: observing that, in the 
modern world, space would be produced on a total and a global scale. Importantly, his 
critique addressed a culture that is disproportionately dominated by abstract organisa-
tions, such as the modern bureaucratic state, or the international business corporation.22  
Spatial concepts – from ‘absolutism’ to relativism 
“Every spirit makes his house, but afterwards the house confines the spirit.” 
 (Geddes 1915: 210) 
                                               
17 A good introduction to Lefebvre’s thinking and biography is represented by an obituary published in the journal Radical 
Philosophy. (Cf. Kelly, Michael 1992: Henri Lefebvre, 1901-1991; at: 
http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/default.asp?channel_id=2191&editorial_id=9838.php, r05.07.09). 
18 Lefebvre’s work was predominantly adapted in the “Anglo Saxon” world. His major oeuvre “La production de l’espace” 
was translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith and published in 1991 in the UK and the US. Authors such as David Harvey 
(1989), Edward Soja (1989), or Frederic Jameson (1984), among others, have spread the ideas.  
19 Nowadays the reception of Lefebvre’s thinking is widespread in geography, political science, critical theory, or post-
colonial debates: Castells 1989, Sassen 1992, Gregory 1994, Schields 1999, Dear 2002). Lefebvre’s ‘spatial dialectics’ also 
had implications for the post-colonial debates of Anthony King (1990, 2000) and Abidin Kusno (2002, 2006): „... space, 
through its spatial program, might articulate a unifying and dominating power... if we treat the formation and transforma-
tion of space as a basis for understanding history, we will then be able to question the tradition of historical understanding 
which has been based on the intrinsic development of time.“ (Kusno 2006: Space. Power and Identity in Urban Indonesia: A 
Historical Sketch: 1-2. 
20 Cf. Lefebvre, 'Reflections on the Politics of Space', translated by M.  Enders, Antipode 8, 1976, 31. 
21 The label ‘spatial materialism’ is sometimes used in the Lefebvre reception (for example by Cf. Shields 1999, or Cf. Lash 
2002). Lefebvre, however, never used this expression. 
22 The assessment was developed in an era of rising critique of abstract organisations, represented for example by Jean Luc 
Godard’s feature film Alphaville, or the Paris revolts of 1968. 
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What has been said about space? Before we return to Lefebvre’s models, the following 
section presents a brief summary of spatial conceptualisations. This is done in order to 
validate and verify our position. 
The majority of the existing debates on space are polarised. They are either focused on 
spatial determinism or on spatial fetishism. While the first position claims that it is 
mainly the content that determines the form (E.g. that societal structures lead to the 
structural formations of physical environments such as cities), the second position is in-
clined to see form as the predominant determinant of content (E.g. stressing the impact 
of spaces on societal structures). The first is traditionally prevalent in most of the social 
science disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies. In contrast, ar-
chitects, planners, engineers, geographers, and also ecologists emphasise the latter.23  
 Illustration A-4: ‘Form and content’ (figure ground) 
After all, the debates on the nature of space – between matter and spirit, or form and 
essence, or empiricism and rationalism – date back to the origins of science and philoso-
phy: Greek thinkers, such as Aristotle conceptualised the cosmos as a system of 
spheres24; in the 17th century René Descartes mistrusted the illusions of the mind and 
individual thought and confined all objects within a net of causal relations marked by an 
absolute coordinate system (1632, 1641); it becomes the container of Isaac Newton’s 
mechanics (1684); Immanuel Kant, in contrast, argued for space as an ideal transcenden-
tal concept (1746, 1755). The absoluteness of space (and time) is being deconstructed as 
modern 20th century physics develops the concept of a space-time-energy continuum (Cf. 
Einstein 1916), which also comprises highly uncertain phenomena (Heisenberg 1927).25  
Einstein’s and Heisenberg’s works mark a watershed: Their meta-science (re-) reaches 
significant metaphysical and existential boundaries. It heralds the end of the great narra-
tives of space and time, paralleled by global synchronisation, ‘space-time compression’, 
and the rise of absolute relativism. The notion is later portrayed by poststructuralist, 
deconstructivist, or postmodern thinkers such as Lyotard (1979: La Condition Postmod-
erne), Niklas Lumann (1984: Gesellschaftliche Systeme), Michel Foucault (1977: Of 
Other spaces)26, or Francis Fukuyama (1992: The End of History And The Last Man). 
At this point (synchronisation, end of history), it seems that meaning has to be created 
from the bottom: by individual and collective forms of cognitive perception and imagina-
tion. Spatial theories become re-focused on the interior cognitive space of the individual 
subject.27 As Werner Heisenberg notes prophetically: “The reality, that we can talk 
                                               
23 The sociologist Herbert Gans substantiates this debate when he writes in his introduction to “The Levittowners” that: 
“The impact of the settlement on the residents has a long tradition in sociology. The ecologists claim that the local eco-
nomic conditions and the geographical situation influence the behaviour of the residents. The sociologists, in contrast, think 
that the community as well as the behaviour of its residents is largely determined by the regional, as well as national struc-
ture of society.” (Translation by the author from the German version: Cf. Gans 1969: 21 quoting Duncan und Schnore) 
[“Der Einfluß der Siedlung auf die Bewohner ist innerhalb der Soziologie seit langem theoretisiert worden. Die Ökologen 
behaupten, daß örtliche wirtschaftliche Verhältnisse und geographische Situation das Verhalten der Bewohner prägen. Die 
Soziologen dagegen meinen, daß das Gemeinwesen sowie das Verhalten seiner Bewohner weitgehend von der regionalen 
und nationalen Gesellschaftsstruktur bestimmt seien.” (Gans in the German translation of 1969: 21)] 
24 Cf. David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1992. 
25 These theories demonstrate, among other things, that two parallels are able to meet, that light can travel around the 
corner, and that matter can be unpredictable and thus destroy the axioms of classical Euclidean geometry and of the New-
tonian mechanics. 
26 Luhman and his colleagues worked on the role of autopoietic (e.g. self-referential) systems and the relevance of difference 
in a polycontextural world. 
27 Only some late Marxist thinkers, such as, Frederic Jameson (1984), David Harvey (1989), or Manual Castells (1989) at-
tempt to rescue a great narrative of dialectic materialism.  
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about, is never the reality as such, but  … a reality which is formed and produced by 
us.”28 
The idea of this individually constructed and differential space reverberates in the 
metaphysical thinking of Martin Heidegger’s (1953: Bauen, Denken, Wohnen [Building, 
Thinking, Dwelling]), Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s ‘phenomenological space’ (1945), Gas-
ton Bacchelard’s ‘Poetic Space’ (1957: La Poétique de l’éspace), or Michel De Certeau’s 
‘Space of Everyday Life’ (1980: L'Invention du Quotidien). 29 The tendency is also por-
trayed by poetic concepts, such Rainer Maria Rilke’s ‘immersed reality’.30  
The following quotation of Merleau-Ponty portrays the rising importance of individ-
ual space: 
“... the question is to know how an object in space can become the speaking 
sign of an existence, and how on the contrary an intention, a thought, a pro-
ject can be detached from a personal subject and become visible out of him in 
its own body, in the medium where it is built.” 31 
From the space of the individual it is only a small step to a socially constructed model, as 
developed by Henri Lefebvre. Blending Marxist dialectics with the constructivist perspec-
tive of the individual, his concept of social and differential space becomes crucial for this 
work. 
Lefebvre’s ‘production of space’ – a metanarrative? 
Two major elements of Lefebvre’s work are of central value for this work. The first is his 
narrative of urbanisation, the second his dialectical and relational model of space. 
Following a materialist tradition, Lefebvre observes the fundamental conditions and 
trends, which underlie societal and economic organisation. He proposes, however, to 
abolish the historical materialism in favour of a ‘spatial dialectics’. He makes this sugges-
tion on the basis of the observation of tendencies such as urbanisation, globalisation, and 
commoditisation. These lead him to the conclusion that in our times the spatial relations 
of things (geo-politics) become more important, while the temporal relations (tradition, 
history) tend to lose significance32. He postulates for example:  
Today our concern must be with a space on a world's scale, as well as with 
all spaces subsidiary to it. The forces that shape this space – basically forces 
of production: market of commodities, labour, capital, technology, science 
and demographic trends-- are of a power, scope, and effectiveness hitherto 
unknown and unimaginable. (Lefebvre, 1974: 307) 
Trends 
Lefebvre’s observations are based on the method of identifying and discussing important 
trends such as growth and expansion, commoditisation, or abstraction. He recognises 
                                               
28 Die Wirklichkeit, von der wir sprechen können, ist nie die Wirklichkeit an sich, sondern […] eine von uns gestaltete Wirk-
lichkeit. (Werner Heisenberg, Physik und Philosophie, S. Hirtzel, Stuttgart, 1959) 
29 Elsewhere we compare spatial theories represented by the works of Kevin Lynch, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Henri 
Lefebvre (Cf. Gotsch 2002). 
30 As discussed by Peter Sloterdijk 2005: 301 
31 “... la question est de savoir comment un objet dans l'espace peut devenir la trace parlante d'une existence, comment 
inversement une intention, une pensée, un projet peuvent se détacher du sujet personnel et devenir visibles hors de lui dans 
son corps, dans le milieu qu'il se construit. » (Phénoménologie de la perception, p. 401, transl.. by the author). 
32 As a matter of fact Lefebvre actually reads human history as a record of spaces: from absolute, cosmological, symbolic, to 
abstract space (the older spaces continue to exist, new ones are superimposed on each other and add to the complexity of 
the system). (Lefebvre 1974: 31) 
Introduction     14 
that, in a modern world, economic activity, whether production or consumption, does 
not remain bounded to particular locations. In contrast, an expanding economical sphere 
colonises the globe and penetrates all aspects of life. In addition the force of commoditi-
sation subjects and abstracts every object on the Earth’s surface. This new condition en-
compasses a ‘total’ production of space. Every thing finds itself ‘thrown’ onto the mar-
ket.33 The whole cosmos of objects (whether persons, cows, leaves or rocks) is measured 
in terms of exchange value. While all places on the globe are being explored, pacified and 
becoming interconnected, the conditions of production turn out to be transferable. As 
spatial affairs become more important than the historic circumstances, space turns into 
the absolute product: 34 
 “Space is marked out, explored, discovered and rediscovered on a colossal 
scale. Its potential for being occupied, filled, peopled and transformed from 
top to bottom is continually on the increase: the prospect, in short, is of a 
space being produced whose nature is nothing more than raw materials suf-
fering gradual destruction by the techniques of production.” (Lefebvre 1974: 
p.334) 
Urbanisation and the ‘production of space’ 
Indeed, urbanisation emerges as one of the fundamental meta-trends of the 20th century. 
An all-encompassing economic colonisation leads to an urbanised globe.35 The narrative 
of spatial production materialises as the logical bottom line, resolving earlier contradic-
tions between city and hinterland.36 From here the questions on the production of a ma-
ture urban space and on the spatial relations of life move into the focus of Lefebvre’s 
investigations:  
“The ‘object’ of our interest must be relocated from objects in space, to the 
essential production of space”. (Lefebvre 1974: 37)  
At the same time as holistic urbanisation resolved a number of vital problems of the in-
dustrial age (e.g. the contradiction between the industrial and working class), it engen-
ders new contradictions (for example economy–nature, formal–informal, space–place, 
individual–collective, or perception–comprehension).37 Accordingly, the stage of global 
urbanism is a transitory process and not the end of history.38  
Effects in space 
In addition to developing a model of a complete ‘production of space’ and the general 
trend of urbanisation, Lefebvre also delineates particular qualities of contemporary 
space. He relates to a space, which is dominated by the rationalising logic of capitalist 
production as abstract space.  
                                               
33 To borrow an image from Vilém Flusser (1993) quoted in Gotsch 1995: 19. 
34 Parallels of this narrative can be drawn to Guy Debord’s “La Societe du Spéctaclé”, 1967, which at that time represented 
one of the most extreme scenarios of commoditisation. He states that: “Commodities are now all that there is to see  ... 
social space is continually being blanketed by stratum after stratum of commodities. ... With the advent of the so-called 
second industrial revolution, alienated consumption is added to alienated production”. (29).  
35 Lefebvre claims that the new urban age is dominated by a mainstream of middle classes, as opposed to the industrial 
classes, which dominated the previous era.  This is something that Marx did not envision (Ibidem: 485). 
36 “Capitalism has taken possession of the land, and mobilized it to the point where this sector [e.g. Space] is fast becoming 
central.” (Ibidem: 335) Or: "The entire area is treated on the model of private enterprise, of private property, the family of 
the reproduction of relations of production, in line with biological reproduction and genital" (Ibidem: 433).  
37 For a list of contradictions see Gotsch (1995: 93). 
38 "What many people take for a terminal period, the end of this or that (capitalism, poverty, history, art, etc). can be con-
ceived as a transition" (Ibidem: 469). 
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This space is affected by three fundamental trends: homogenisation, fragmentation 
and polarisation (Cf. Lefebvre 1974: 31): It becomes homogenised, as each locality is 
transformed in a container for commercial activities, and while all elements are sub-
sumed to a holistic network of economic exchange (Cf. Castells 1989). It becomes frag-
mented, as all associated compartments and particles become specialised, and as firm 
boundaries are needed to guarantee the identification of each part (Harvey 1989). Fi-
nally, it becomes polarised, as market economies explore, reproduce and reinforce differ-
ences.39 40 
Dialectic and relational model of space 
Lefebvre’s other concept, which is highly influential for this work, is his dialectical and 
relational model of space. In this model Lefebvre resolves the above-described duality of 
space and content, or spatial determinism versus spatial fetishism: Space is understood as 
a dialectical construct and placed between physical- and socio-economic poles. This con-
dition of space is also relational, as it is bound to a particular historical, cultural, eco-
nomic, and physical medium inherent to a specific context. A notable consequence of this 
dialectical model is that it itself allows for contradictions to emerge. Dialectical and rela-
tional space is a moment and a process, something that is actively produced, and since 
stakeholders engage in individual resistances, interpretations, and appropriations with 
this characteristic it is also political and ideological:  
“Space is political and ideological. It is a product literally filled with ideolo-
gies” (Lefebvre 1976: Reflections on the politics of space.) 
The dialectical model of space is composed of three particular spheres: firstly the con-
ceived (concu), secondly the perceived (percu) and thirdly the represented (vecu). While 
the conceived relates to an abstract world of thought, ideas, and plans, the perceived is 
rather portrayed by passive experiences, emotions, and the routines of the ‘quotidien’ 
(everyday life). The represented, then, depicts a sphere of re-actions, resistances, and ap-
propriations. In can be said that ‘concu’ and ‘percu’ for a classical dialectical pair of the-
sis and antithesis, and the ‘vecu’ describes the ‘creative’ moment of synthesis (Cf. Schmid 
2005).  
Lefebvre preferred Friedrich Hegel's dialectic over formal logic as early as 1939 when 
he published the work “dialectical materialism”. He believed that this concept tran-
scended both idealism and materialism. The resolution of contradictions was seen in 
practical activity and representation of the everyday.41  
In order to understand the context of this model it is important to keep the struggles 
of the 68’ movement and the Paris revolts in mind. Lefebvre applies this concept to criti-
cise looming contradictions of his time: The domination of daily life and individual crea-
tivity by an abstract and alienated state and economic apparatus. Regardless, the model 
                                               
39 Polarisation, for example, is accentuated by the emergence of new centralities (E.g. global cities), or the consolidation of 
the ‘other’ informal sector (Cf. Sassen 1989). 
40 The idea that abstract space homogenises, fragments, and polarises space is not new. Patrick Geddes’ narrative of a 
Paleo-technological age dwells on the notion that capitalist space is abstracted by economics and politics as well as on the 
production and exploitation of differences (Geddes 1915: 154). Lefebvre’s achievement, though, is that he formulates a 
concise model. 
41 Schmid traces back the three cornerstones of the model to the work Hegel, Nietzsche, and Marx, and notably these are 
authors that Lefebvre translated into French. In this context Marx’s materialism can be attached to the perceived, Hegel’s 
idealism to the conceived, and Nietzsche’s role of individual spirit to the represented (Cf. Schmid, 2005). 
Introduction     16 
is of such fundamental relevance that it can be applied for analysing almost any context 
of spatial production.42  
Implications of Lefebvre’s concepts 
Lefebvre’s concept of a global urban sphere has fundamental impacts for this work. His 
theory asks for an update and exemplification. Moreover it equips us with some funda-
mental instruments and methods for a holistically oriented examination of space. 
The French intellectual has rarely exemplified his models in concrete places or situa-
tions. Indeed, it seems highly relevant to verify his thinking through current examples. 
Moreover, his work asks for an update and revision: The ideas emerged in a time of an 
advanced and ‘saturated’ modernity, a highly bureaucratic state apparatus, large hierar-
chical economies of scale, and of standardised mass production. How can we remap 
these in regard to the impact of the informational economy, as well as a consumer-
oriented society along his narratives? 
While in the present day aspects such as labour division, economic rationalisation or 
international monetary flows have reached unprecedented dimensions, the concept of 
‘abstract space’ asks to be extrapolated. The remapping may also serve as a confirma-
tion. Can meta-trends such as urbanisation, abstraction and commoditisation be vali-
dated in today’s context? 
After all, Lefebvre’s models are of central methodological relevance for this work. He 
furnishes our research with valuable analytical perspectives of a space which is: 1) ac-
tively produced and reproduced by various agents, 2) formed by major trends, and 3) 
which is part of a dialectical framework. Moreover, the dialectical and relational model 
of spatial production constitutes a remarkable holistic and synergetic approach. It facili-
tates this research, which seeks to tackle the complexity of urban spaces and the frag-
mentation and specialisation of disciplines.  
The model sharpens our gaze for identifying contradictions which are emerging 
among the spheres such as conception, perception, and representation (concu, vecu, 
percu) and among the major stakeholder groups (public, private, civil society). Hence it 
will implicitly guide the process of the evaluation of our examples.43  
If Lefebvre would be alive today he would certainly be interested in the question of 
spatial production in an even more globalised and urbanised world of informational and 
networked economies – with an increasing restructuring of the corporate, the public and 
the private sectors. The work at hand proposes that privately developed New Towns may 
be among the paradigmatic spaces representing some key characteristics of the produc-
tion of contemporary urban space.44 
Yet, before this work turns to the exploration the imprints of current trends and 
forces at real sites, a closer look into the logic of the economic, as well as neo-economic, 
order will provide additional clues for the comprehension of current spaces. 
                                               
42 Christine Brunn, for example utilised it to elaborate conflicts of constructing mosques small German towns (Cf. Brunn 
2005). The Swiss research project "Die Schweiz – ein städtebauliches Portrait" utilised Lefebvre’s gaze to examine the urban 
systems of the Switzerland (2005). 
43 Some examples of questions related to Lefebvre’s concept include: How do developers conceive the new town in a rela-
tive void of public regulations and with the logic of the market? How do residents appropriate the space conceived by the 
developers? How does the NeoTown impact the daily life of locals and villagers? 
44 Christian Schmid’s (2005) scientific reconstruction of Lefebvre’s theories has provided important impulses for this work. 
Schmid thinks that the potential implications of Lefebvre’s analysis for social research has not been explored very seriously, 
and that the theoretical and empirical relevance of his theory is by far not exhausted (Ibidem: 13, translation by the author). 
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The spirit of the free market (capitalism) 
This time the neotechnic order, if it means anything at all, with its better use 
of resources and population towards the bettering of man and his environ-
ment together, means these as a business proposition. 
(Patrick Geddes 1915: 38) 
The following section proceeds in refining the analytical gaze of this research. It explores 
some relevant models and concepts on the contemporary economic sphere and deducts 
implications for this research45: In order to understand how contemporary urban envi-
ronments and societies work, it becomes crucial to grasp some of the basic principles and 
rationales, as well as the inherent language of our economic system (free market capital-
ism) in general, and the major aspects of the contemporary ‘new economy’ in particular. 
In addition, it will be important to verify the state of research of contemporary thinking 
on the relation between the ‘new economy’ and urban form. 
The exploration follows a dual set of goals: A better understanding of some general 
economic and socio-political principles of present times will enhance our perception of 
NeoTowns as new urban phenomena. On the other hand, a better grasp of new urban 
phenomena such as NeoTowns, will also help to elucidate some of the underlying logics 
of economic and political systems. While we want to explore the qualities of the new, or 
neoliberal, or informational economy, we have to know how this economy is different 
from the ‘classical economy’.46  
The general framework of this question is represented by reverberations of the histori-
cal transition from Fordism to Postfordism; Modernity to Postmodernity; Keynesianism 
to Neoliberal Economy; the Industrial Age to Post-Industrial Age; Machine-Age to In-
formational Age, or Industrialism to Consumerism.47 
For many scholars the new era is particularly characterised by new information tech-
nologies and communication networks48. Manuel Castells (1989), in particular, de-
scribed the emergence of a new informational society as a result of a combination of an 
‘informational mode of production’ with a ‘capitalist mode of development’.49  
 
General attributes of the free market economy 
"Capitalism, then, is by its nature a form or method of economic change and 
not only never is, but never can be stationary. ...  The fundamental impulse 
that seems to keep the capitalist engine in motion, comes from the new con-
sumers goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new 
markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitals enterprise 
creates."(Cf. Schumpeter 1934: 82, 83) 
                                               
45 The approach explored in this section can be called materialist, examining the economy as the bedrock of space and 
society. The theoretical framework as used in this work was predominantly formed from the works of Frederic Jameson 
(1984), David Harvey (1989), Manual Castells (1989), Siskia Sassen (1991), but also Jean Baudrillard (1993), or Richard 
Sennett (1994).  
46 The general question of spatial production in the informational age was elaborated as part of the masters’ thesis of the 
author (Cf. Gotsch 1995: The In-Formation of Space, Columbia University, New York N.Y.). 
47 The terminologies originate from various disciplinary debates from politics, sociology, economics, law, urban science, and 
cultural studies, among others. This work mainly draws on the concepts of critical theory, political science, sociology, cultural 
science, and urbanism. Daniel Bell (1974) and Alain Touraine (1971), for example, are accounted as the most prominent 
proponents of the term Post-Industrial Society, while the Post-Modern Condition is mostly associated with Jean-Francois 
Lyotard (1979). 
48 Cf. Machlup 1962, Drucker 1969, Tofler (1980), Sonntag (1985), among many others. 
49 Thereafter (2000) Castells revised his concept towards the notion of a ‘network society’, emphasising the importance of 
network principles for the economic operations and the constitution of contemporary societies. 
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The flexibility, elasticity and resilience of modern capitalist markets, their ability to sur-
vive crises and contradictions and to constantly reinvent themselves, points to the as-
sumption that the system must be based on a series of rules and principles, a genetic 
code, rather than a fixed framework. Indeed, core thinkers such as Adam Smith, Karl 
Marx, Max Weber, Josef Schumpeter, or John Maynard Keynes have explored various 
aspect of the underlying order of capitalism.50  
 
The 'invariant elements and relations' of Capitalism, as Marx puts it51, include:  
- The fact that capitalism is a distinct system52;  
- An inherent need for self-reproduction;  
- A set of basic rules;  
- The necessity for constant growth and expansion;  
- A related drive for the reduction of complexity, rationalisation, abstraction and 
technological innovation;  
- Governance: structures of management, command, power and control;  
- The objectification of power and exchange relations;  
- Companies as abstract, distinct, well-regulated, and contractual regimes53  
- The necessity to create, and explore differences;  
- The central role of money as a medium of exchange;  
- The transformation of matter into commodities, or man- and brainpower into 
services;  
- The fundamental role of private ownership;  
- The existence of markets and  
- A dependency on infrastructure and networks. 
 
We are familiar with the fact that a steady rate of growth is essential for the health of a 
capitalist economic system. Growth is perceived as progress, which is inevitable and 
‘good’. There is a necessity for generating a surplus and accumulating value. Lack of 
growth constitutes in this context a crisis for capital. In addition, the combination of 
power and private ownership leads to the distinction of haves and have-nots. Capitalism, 
for structural reasons, depends on the polarization and creation of the 'other'. The proc-
ess implies the necessity of generating differences through uneven development patterns. 
In order to secure a profit margin there is also a need for constant innovation. Today, 
technological and organisational innovation is becoming crucial for the perpetuation of 
the system.54  
The perception of capitalism as a self-organising system rather than a form implies 
that we can only trace its effects in space, while the logic, the programming of the system 
itself remain hidden to our perception. This implication is important, because it under-
lines our approach to examine the hidden logic of the system by exploring space. 
                                               
50 Geoffrey Ingham 2008 seeks to disentangle the key concepts and basic elements of ‘Capitalism’. George Ritzer 1993 
explores the validity of Weber’s account of economic rationality in the context of the service economy and coins the term 
‘McDonaldization of society’. 
51 Cf. Karl Marx "The Capital", Taken from Harvey, (1989), p.181 
52 Indeed in Luhmann’s (1984) language it could be called an autopoietic system. 
53 “Gesellschafen” as opposed to “Gemeinschaften”, (cf. Tönnies 1887, Weber 1922). 
54 Some of these principles have been explored and described in more detail by Gotsch 1995: 45. 
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Weber and the rational logic of capitalism 
The principle of a rationalising logic – corresponding to a system’s drive to reduce com-
plexity – is one of the most fundamental principles of capitalism. It has far-reaching ef-
fects on the spatial organisation of production, and in the age of a total production of 
space also on the entire urban form. In describing this property we are indebted to Max 
Weber who has elaborated the characteristics of formal rationalization.  
Weber traces the emergence of modern western society along a process of increasing 
rationalisation. The rationality he refers to is based on the supremacy of modern science, 
causal logic and technology.55 From this perspective the modern state as well as the capi-
talist economic apparatus are two consequent subsystems of increasing societal rationali-
sation. Both are organised along a rational logic which can be compared to that of ma-
chines.56 57 
Weber’s genus of formal rationalism can be classified into four interrelated subcatego-
ries: 1) efficiency, 2) calculability, 3) predictability, and 4) control. 58 
- The attribute of efficiency relates to: The employment of modern technology, 
standardisation and management techniques along the drive to optimize produc-
tion, decrease costs, and increase turnover rates and processing times. 
- The capacity of calculability is associated with the employment rational and stan-
dardised methods of capital accounting. It relates to practices of objectification, 
measurement, bookkeeping and quantification in order to produce ever better 
products with less money. 
- Predictability is associated with the ideal context of a free market (without any ir-
rational interference), as well as the presence of a reliable legal framework and a 
government capable of enforcing the law. 
- The ability to control relates to: the domination of all physical means of produc-
tion as the property of autonomous private enterprises, as well as the readiness of 
free labour to be employed or dismissed upon demand. 59 
Among the most significant implications of an increasingly rationalized economy are the 
four tendencies of growth, expansion, standardisation and diversification. In this context 
                                               
55 Altogether resulting from the transcendental drive of humanity. 
56 These rationalised regimes trigger an important social revolution: society is equalised, as every citizen becomes a legal 
object and a potential consumer. (Cf. Weber, 1922: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft; 1, II, § 30, and, 1, III, §2) 
57 Weber explores the concepts of economy, the state, and bureaucracy in the following key sections: 
 “Von Wirtschaft wollen wenigstens wir hier vielmehr nur reden, wo einem Bedürfnis oder einem Komplex solcher, ein, im 
Vergleich dazu, nach der Schätzung des Handelnden, knapper Vorrat von Mitteln und möglichen Handlungen zu seiner 
Deckung gegenübersteht und dieser Sachverhalt Ursache eines spezifisch mit ihm rechnenden Verhaltens wird. Entschei-
dend ist dabei für zweckrationales Handeln selbstverständlich: daß diese Knappheit subjektiv vorausgesetzt und das Handeln 
daran orientiert ist.” (Cf. Weber, 1922: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft; 2, I, §1 “Wesen der Wirtschaft”) 
Der „Staat“ überhaupt im Sinn einer politischen Anstalt, mit rational gesatzter „Verfassung“, rational gesatztem Recht und 
einer an rationalen gesatzten Regeln: „Gesetzen“, orientierten Verwaltung durch Fachbeamte, kennt, in dieser für ihn 
wesentlichen Kombination der entscheidenden Merkmale, ungeachtet aller anderweitigen Ansätze dazu, nur der Okzident. 
Und so steht es nun auch mit der schicksalsvollsten Macht unsres modernen Lebens: dem Kapitalismus. (Cf. Max Weber, 
Gesammelte Politische Schriften; Potsdamer Internet-Ausgabe; http://www.uni-potsdam.de/u/paed/pia/index.htm, 
r1207.2009) 
„Der entscheidende Grund für das vordringen der bürokratischen Organisation war von jeher ihre rein technische Überle-
genheit über jede andere Form. Ein voll entwickelter bürokratischer Mechanismus verhält sich genau wie eine Maschine zu 
den nicht mechanischen Arten der Gütererzeugung. Präzision, Schnelligkeit, Eindeutigkeit, Aktenkundigkeit, 
Kontinuierlichkeit, Diskretion, Einheitlichkeit, straffe Unterordnung, Ersparnisse an Reibungen, sachlichen und persönlichen 
Kosten sind bei streng bürokratischer, speziell: monokratischer Verwaltung durch geschulte Einzelbeamte gegenüber allen 
kollegialen oder ehren- und nebenamtlichen Formen auf das Optimum gesteigert“ (Weber 1922: Wirtschaft und Gesell-
schaft, 2, IX, §2: Wesen, Voraussetzungen und Entfaltung der bürokratischen Herrschaft; Online at 
http://www.zeno.org/Soziologie/M/Weber, r12.07.2009). 
58 These principles can be deduced from Max Weber’s writings, for example: General Economic History. New York: Collier, 
1961, Ch. 22, 27-30; online at http://www.spc.uchicago.edu/ssr1/PRELIMS/Theory/weber.html#WEBER5, r13.07.2009). 
59 George Ritzer (1993) applied Weber’s principles in the context of consumer-oriented economies through the example of 
the fast-food chain McDonalds and coined the process ‘McDonaldisation’. 
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firms increasingly seek to produce more products of better quality for larger and larger 
markets. This is, however, paralleled by ever-increasing turnover rates, and crises of 
oversaturation, which then spur the need for further innovation. And astonishingly capi-
talism has proved to be resilient beyond expectations. It has survived all crises and con-
tradictions, while refining the rationale of organisation and control has developed new 
modes of production.60  
The meta-trend of rationalised economic exchange, as well as the sub-categories as 
elaborated above, have fundamental effects on the production, organisation and on the 
appearance of space. The logic of efficiency and rationality, for example, was always 
driving processes of spatial concentration and deconcentration. While in the time of the 
steam engine factories tended to cluster around resources, such as ore, coal or water, in 
the era of the large Keynesian company (as well as the car and the electric grid) the avail-
ability of human labour became a major factor, and in times of informational production 
the availability of knowledge and talent has become crucial. 
It is important to note that, when we assume along the lines of Lefebvre’s models, that 
today worldwide economic processes have led to a hitherto unknown, pervasive, and 
holistic colonisation of space, Weber’s story will help us in qualifying the specific impacts 
that economic rationality has on places and localities. The general dynamics, such as 
homogenisation, fragmentation and polarisation, as well new dimensions of centralisa-
tion and decentralisation (Cf. Sassen 1991) confirm this observation. 
The two most important questions emerging in this context are: What spaces and 
strategies emerge when the major stakeholders producing space comply with the eco-
nomic logic of efficiency, calculability, predictability and control? And to what extent do 
contemporary urban typologies, like other commodities, conform to the logic of growth, 
standardisation, abstraction, and diversification? 
The ‘new economy’ and ‘neoliberalism’ 
As the last section examined the underlying logic, the ‘DNA’, of modern capitalism in 
general, this section examines the differences of the contemporary economic sphere in 
contrast to previous periods. This is done to clarify some fundamental terminologies, 
extract relevant concepts, and to facilitate the contextualisation of our research in state 
of research discussions. It is important to see to what extent the spatial effects of the in-
formational, neoliberal economy has been examined by contemporary research and cri-
tique, and to what extent theories of neoliberal space have been formulated. Moreover, 
to prepare an ongoing conceptualisation and theory formation it will be necessary to 
extract specific trends attributed to the contemporary (informational and neoliberal) 
market economy. 
Consequently, in the following aspects of the informational economy, the new econ-
omy as well as neoliberalism will be examined. The work of Manuel Castells (1989: The 
Informational City) will be used as a basis to describe the notion of the ‘informational 
economy’. The major concepts of neoliberalism are represented by figures such as Frie-
drich von Hayek (1960: The Constitution of Liberty), Milton Friedman (1982: Capital-
ism and Freedom), or John Williamson (1989: What Washington Means by Policy Re-
form [E.g. The Washington consensus]). At the same time, critical positions such as those 
of David Harvey (2005: A Brief History of Neoliberalism), Luc Boltansky and Eve Chia-
                                               
60 We argue elsewhere that today the rationalised logic of capitalism increasingly utilises the means of informational produc-
tion along the logic of electronic networks (Cf. Gotsch 1995: 58, 71). 
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pello (1999: Le Nouvel Ésprit du Capitalisme), or Patrick Geddes’ early critique in 
(1915: Cities in Evolution), help us to elucidate the topic from a critical side.61 
Informational economy 
While some central protagonists of our ‘post’, ‘late’, ‘after’, ‘neo’, and ‘hyper’ era have 
been introduced before, at this point we return to Manuel Castells’ (1989) concept of the 
informational society. This is crucial as Castells outlines the emergence of a new informa-
tional society as a blend of new information technologies (‘informational mode of pro-
duction’) and the modern market economy (‘capitalist mode of development’). For Cas-
tells, constant reproduction and continuous expansion are the most important laws un-
derlying capitalism.  
Box 1: Castells’ characterisation of the informational economy62 
For Manuel Castells the recent restructuring of capitalism has three major components: 
1) Expanding rates of productivity and exploitation63; 2) the restructured role of the 
state64; 3) and new dimensions of economic globalisation65. These “differentiate socie-
ties vertically and homogenise markets horizontally” (ibidem: 346). 
At the same time, the informational mode of production is characterised by: 1) an in-
tensifying concentration on knowledge generation66; 2) a flexibilisation and diversifica-
tion of a) labour (part time, informal, freelance), b) the reconfigured state (public-
private partnerships), and economies (economies of global scope, international division 
of labour); and 3) the restructuring of firms from vertical pyramids, to horizontal net-
works.67 
Castells validates the relevance of the general principles of capitalism, such as growth 
and rationalisation, as outlined in the previous section. He brings to the fore the rele-
vance of information and knowledge as the new ‘raw matter’ of contemporary econo-
mies. In particular, financial markets, as well as the stakeholders involved (e.g. banks, 
lawyers), emerge as the key players of this informational economy. Their use of modern 
technology not only engenders an unprecedented mobility of capital around the globe, it 
also facilitates the emergence of new virtual (secondary and tertiary) markets in a ‘space 
of flows’ (Cf. Sassen 1989, Harvey 2005). 
Notably, Castells addresses the question of space in the framework of diametric ten-
dencies of concentration and deconcentration, as well as synchronisation and fragmenta-
tion. A significant phenomenon which has a fundamental impact on contemporary space 
is the placeless ‘space of flows’. Notably, it is the intersection of this ‘space of flows’ and 
                                               
61 An overview of the most recent concept of neoliberal space is portrayed in the works of David Harvey (1982: Limits to 
Capital, and 1989: The Condition of Postmodernity), Neil Brenner’s (2002: Spaces of Neoliberalism, 2002: Cities and the 
Geographies of „Actually Existing Neoliberalism), Jason Hackworth’s (2007: The Neoliberal City), Erminia Maricato’s (2005: 
Globalization and Urban Policy on the Periphery of Capitalism); or Kiran Sandu’s (2006: Transformation or Transgression? 
Impact of Neo-urbanism Paraphernalia on an Infant Metropolis in the Developing World). Notably all of these works focus 
on large-scale processes and spaces, instead of on the dimension of local places and novel typologies. (Cf. also below) 
62 Cf. Gotsch 1995: 46 
63 Made up of factors such as: decentralization to cheaper locations, restructuring of work process, expansion of informal 
economy, or the restructuring of labour markets 
64 From a system of central authority, general supply and paternalistic planning, to a body which steers, enables, and regu-
lates decentralised processes, albeit securing its integrity. 
65 Which is defined as: “the accelerated internationalisation of all economic processes at the international level with the 
system working as a unit, worldwide in real time.” 
66 While information continues to be produced in highly hierarchical circuits, and access to knowledge and control of infor-
mation becomes a crucial variable, the core centres remain the only indispensable parts of the system while the peripheral 
supply networks become interchangeable. 
67 Along a variable geometry of corporate strategies 
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the traditional ‘space of places’ that engenders the historically unique condition which 
characterises contemporary space. While the ‘space of flows’ is represented by new forms 
of rationality, abstract exchange, new information technologies and communicational 
networks, the ‘space of places’ relates to the place of the cities, bodies and the ‘every-
day’.68  
 
Neoliberalism 
In the name of this scientific programme, converted into a plan of political 
action, an immense political project is underway (Bourdieu 1998) 
While models such as Manuel Castells’ ‘informational society’ stress the impact of new 
technologies on economic organisation, the concept of neoliberalism ponders the ideo-
logical and political rationales of contemporary economic systems. While globalisation 
was a buzzword of the 1990’s, neoliberalism became a catchphrase in the first decade of 
the new millennium. The term experienced a boom in the 1990s as an analogy for ex-
ploitative economic globalisation along unfettered markets. 
Neoliberalism is a school of thought, as well as a parallel critique on the ideology of 
this school. As a school of thought it dates back to new liberal economic ideas and poli-
cies, which thrived in several economic schools from the 1930 to the 1960s and be-
yond.69 Among the central figures and protagonists of the concept are economic scholars 
such as Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman. The economic theories and models 
developed by the school and its alumni provided the conceptual and ideological basis, as 
well as some manpower, for a new era of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation 
worldwide.70 In addition, the concepts have largely influenced the economic reforms of 
the Reagan (1981-1989) and Thatcher (1979-1990) eras (sometimes also referred to as 
‘Thatcherism’ and ‘Reaganomics’), and became paradigmatic guidelines of international 
organisations such as the The World Bank, the IMF and the OECD.71 
It has to be stressed that the success of the new doctrine was largely triggered by a 
combination of various push and pull factors. 72 In general, Neoliberalism can be seen as 
a strategic response to the global recession in the late 70s (Cf. Brenner 2002). Other 
causes relate to overbureaucratisation and a fundamental crisis of the Keynesian welfare 
state, the 1973 oil crisis, debt crises, or the 1974 deregulation of international financial 
                                               
68 Castells writes: “The historical emergence of the space of flows is superseding the meaning of the space of places. By this 
we understand the deployment of the functional logic of power-holding organizations in asymmetrical networks of ex-
changes, which do not depend on the characteristics of any specific locale for the fulfilment of their fundamental goals. 
(Ibidem 348) 
69 According to its origins, neoliberalism is an early-twentieth-century political philosophy. The term was coined in 1938 by 
the German sociologist and economist Alexander Rüstow. The label refers to a redefinition of classical liberalism, affected by 
the neoclassical economics. Neoliberal thinking became famous as a paradigm of several economic schools, such as the 
Freiburg School, The London School of Economics, and the Chicago School. The public use of the term became passé for 
the first time in the 1960s when Keynesianism became popular (Cf. Wilke, 2003). 
70 Among others, 25 Chilean alumni of the school have been instrumental for the economic reforms in Chile under General 
Pinochet (1973, Chicago Boys). 
71 “One of the most famous moments in neoliberal political history occurred when then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan's 
advisers successfully lobbied for the deregulation of the thrift industry, by convincing Reagan that deregulation would lead 
to increased growth and investment. Reagan signed the deregulation bill in 1982, saying, "All in all, I think we've hit the 
jackpot."” (Cf. Conason, Joe. 2004. "Reagan without Sentimentality." Salon.com, June 8.; quoted in Wikipedia at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoliberalism#cite_note-86) 
72 David Harvey comments: "The capitalist world stumbled towards neoliberalization as the answer through a series of 
gyrations and chaotic experiences that really only converged as a new orthodoxy of what became known as the 'Washing-
ton Consensus' in the 1990's” (16) 
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trade. 73 The 1989 ending of the Cold War in particular implied a major boost of neolib-
eral thought, for example along the lines of the Washington Consensus (Cf. Williamson 
1989).74 
These days, foundations and think tanks play a major role in promoting neoliberal 
thoughts. The US-American Heritage foundation, for example, seeks to "formulate and 
promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited 
government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national de-
fence.” 75 76 77 
The ideological core of neoliberalism is based on classical liberalist values such as: the 
amplification of individual freedom and happiness, private property and a free market, in 
a framework of a constitutional state with as few regulations as possible (E.g. the ab-
sence of the state).7879  
While Lefebvre has described the increasing commoditisation of the globe and all its 
aspects as a trend, for the proponents of neoliberalism this is a postulation. The neolib-
eral concept believes that the scarcity of goods could be prevented, or even overcome, if 
all recourses are efficiently tapped and utilised. One important prerequisite for this are 
global and free markets. The other is a privatisation of all public resources, such land, 
water and genes.80 Accordingly, neoliberal scholars such as Friedrich von Hayek are 
known for their critique of paternalistic and developmentalist states and centrally-steered 
economies (1960: The Constitution of Liberty). Milton Friedman became known for his 
opposition to the socialisation of natural monopoles and as a proponent of flexible cur-
rency exchange (1962: Capitalism and Freedom).  
Neoliberal critique 
Even more than an economic concept, neoliberalism is a notion that is constructed by the 
opponents of globalisation and economic internationalisation. Its critics come from a 
variety of political, disciplinary, and geographic backgrounds. They are united by the 
critique of the negative effects of an unbounded economic globalisation: a worldwide 
hegemony of international corporations, an increasing loss of state sovereignty, novel 
                                               
73 For Hackworth (2007: 9), neoliberalism: “is an ideological rejection of egalitarian liberalism in general and the Keynesian 
Welfare state in particular, combined with a selective return to the ideas of classical liberalism, most strongly articulated by 
Hayek (1944, 1960) and Friedman (1984, 1962).” 
74 Williamson's list of recommendations describes how Keynesian types of states should be reformed. The state comes forth 
as an element of control that must provide the essential legal and physical security, while the economy emerges as the 
major player generating development. The list includes the following formulae: Prudent oversight of financial institutions, 
legal security for property rights; fiscal policy discipline; public spending reforms (from supply side to demand side); tax 
reforms; privatization of state enterprises; deregulation of hitherto restricted markets; market-based interest rates and ex-
change rates; liberalization of trade and foreign investments. 
75 It has actively pushed for privatization, deregulation, cuts in social spending, and pre-emptive military strikes (cf. 
www.heritage.org/about, r12.07.2009) 
76 Other organisations such as the Cato Institute demonstrate that neoliberalism is a novel crosscutting paradigm that can 
not be clearly linked to traditional distinctions of right or left (www.cato.org, r12.07.2009). 
77 Think-tanks such as the Tellus Institute seek to address some of these contradictions by actively exploring future scenarios 
for a global citizenship, the reconciliation of individualism and equity, or the corporation of the ????? in the 21st century (cf. 
www. tellus.org; r15.07.2009). 
78 Harvey defines neoliberalism in the following way: “Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade ... it 
emphasizes the significance of contractual relations in the market place.” (Cf. Harvey 2005: 2, 16) 
79 A well-known reference quotes Margret Thatcher who once declared that “'no such thing as society existed, only individ-
ual men and women' – and she subsequently added, their families." (Cf. Harvey, 2005, P.23) 
80 Significantly, the vice president of The World Bank Anne Krüger suggested metaphorically that fluid capital may constantly 
increase productivity levels, and that such as rising flood of goods and finances may eventually also elevate the boats of the 
poor (Cf. Anne Krüger, 2002: “Lifting all Boats“; in Finance and Development; 9/2002, quoted by Oestereich, Jürgen 2004: 
Lokale Legitimität als missachtete Entwicklungsressource. Für ein Grundrecht auf kommunale Entwicklung und gegen „Pri-
vatisierung“. Unpublished manuscript).  
Introduction     24 
forms of atomisation and objectification of labour, the worldwide exploitation of ine-
quality, the privatisation of public space and communal resources, degradation of local 
cultures and communitarian values, or rising levels of environmental degradation by the 
unfettered excavation of resources etc. 
Some of the most significant critique is represented by: Pierre Bourdieu (1998: The Es-
sence of Neoliberalism); Noam Chomsky (1998: Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and 
Global Order), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2001: Empire. Globalization as a 
New Roman order, Awaiting its Early Christians); David Harvey (2005: A Brief History 
of Neoliberalism), Richard Sennett (2006: The Culture of the New Capitalism). Erminia 
Maricato, (2005: Globalization and Urban Policy on the Periphery of Capitalism) repre-
sents a critical voice from emerging economies, while Steven Slaughter (2005: Liberty 
beyond Neo-Liberalism: a Republican Critique of Liberal Governance in a Globalising 
Age) represents a discussion on the conservative, republican side.81  
For David Harvey, the "redistributive effects and increasing social inequality have in 
fact been such a persistent feature of neoliberalization as to be regarded as structural to 
the whole project." (Harvey 2005: 16). Moreover, Pierre Bourdieu regards the alienation 
of economy and society as the core of the problem when he characterises neoliberalism as 
“a programme for destroying collective structures which may impede the pure market 
logic”. Crucially that this “logic of contemporary markets”… “constructing, in reality, 
an economic system conforming to its description in pure theory” ... and  “a sort of logi-
cal machine that presents itself as a chain of constraints regulating economic agents” can 
be seen as a advanced stage of formal rationalisation, according to Weber’s narratives as 
described above. 82 
After all, neoliberalism in the informational age seems to lead to a new order. This is 
characterised by ultra-rationalisation through the introduction of novel technologies and 
electronic spaces. Indeed, it resembles more an organic and evolutionary order a la Dar-
win than a mechanistic world of machines, which is characterised by “the struggle of all 
against all at all levels of the hierarchy” ... “with the cult of the winner” (ibidem).83  
The critique of neoliberalism reflects the real-world effects the practice has on the 
ground: “...the world is there, with the immediately visible effects of the implementation 
of the great neoliberal utopia.” (Cf. Bourdieu 1998) 84 
Critics such as Bourdieu, as well as Harvey, unmask the political and ideological face 
of neoliberalism. Harvey (2005) circumscribes neoliberalism as a “global capitalist class 
power restoration project”. Bourdieu (1998) stresses the aspect of a technocratic and 
rationalist utopia: “What if, in reality, this economic order were no more than the im-
                                               
81 The critique of capitalism is older. Patrick Geddes refers to the industrial capitalist system as a Paleotechnic order, which 
must be overcome by a Neotechnic era. He writes: “The material alternatives of real economics, which these obsessions of 
money economics have been too long obfuscating, are broadly two, and each is towards realising an ideal, a Utopia. These 
are the Paleotechnic and the Neotechnic–– Kakotopia and Eutopia respectively. The first has hitherto been predominant. As 
Paleotects we make it our prime endeavour to dig up coals, to run machinery, to produce cheap cotton to clothe cheap 
people, to get up more coals, to run more machinery, and so on; and all this essentially towards ‘extending markets’. The 
whole has been essentially organised upon a basis of ‘primary poverty’ and of ‘secondary poverty’ (to use Mr. Rowtree‘s 
accurate terminology, explained later)...” (39) “The Paleotechnic philosophy is thus complete; and trade competition, nature 
competition, and war competition, in threefold unity, have not failed to reward their worshippers.” (41) Notably for Geddes 
the slum is among the essential ‘achievements’ of the Industrial (Paleotechnic) age. (Ibidem 58) 
82 All quotes from Bourdieu 1998 
83 Cf. the structural description of AlphaVille in chapter 4, and Cf. Gotsch 1995. 
84 Howell and Diallo, for example, describe the increasing polarisation of income levels in the US. According to the econo-
mists, neoliberal policies have contributed to a U.S. economy in which 30 percent of workers earn ‘low wages’ (less than 
two-thirds the median wage for full-time workers), and 35 percent of the labour force is "underemployed"; only 40 percent 
of the working age population in the U.S. is considered adequately employed. Another prominent example is the wide-
spread debate about the privatisation of water services in many countries worldwide, whether in Buenos Aires (Cf. Loftus 
2001), or Jakarta (Douglass 2005, Bakker 2008). (2007: "Charting U.S. Economic Performance with Alternative Labour 
Market Indicators”). 
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plementation of a utopia - the utopia of neoliberalism - thus converted into a political 
problem? One that, with the aid of the economic theory that it proclaims, succeeds in 
conceiving of itself as the scientific description of reality?” 85 
Consequently, for its critics neoliberalism emerges as an economic and a political pro-
ject aimed at reconfiguring class and power relations in societies: "Neoliberalization has 
not been very effective in revitalizing the global capital accumulation, but it has suc-
ceeded remarkably well in restoring, or in some instances ... creating, the power of an 
economic elite." (Harvey, 2005: 19). 
The “utopia of a pure and perfect market” ... “draws its social power from the politi-
cal and economic power of those whose interests it expresses”... “The doctrine is main-
tained by those agents who dominate economic relationships: big politics, international 
corporations, and beyond all the world of international financial institutions and money 
markets. Notably the “movement... is made possible by politics, such as action towards 
financial deregulation”.86 
The overview above provides us with a better understanding of neoliberalism as an 
economic theory as well as an ideological and political doctrine. It contributed to a better 
understanding of the logic of contemporary economies as well as on some of its societal 
impacts. At the end of the day, the contemporary neoliberal economy emerges as a con-
tradictory system that driven by a combination of ultra-rationalist organisational princi-
ples along ‘Weber’s lines’ in combination with new technologies, and an apparent ‘irra-
tionality’ on the part of the stakeholders driving the process.  
While the examination at hand has implicitly helped us to qualify many of the attrib-
utes and effects associated with a neoliberal economic mode, a specific spatial perspective 
on neoliberalism is still missing. The next section therefore draws some attention to a 
brief delineation of contemporary research and thinking on neo liberal space. Do con-
cepts of neoliberal space, or neoliberal cities exist? If not, which other models could pro-
vide us with the right conceptual elements for the development of such? 
Towards neoliberal space 
How does the structural logic of the market affect the logic of space? What is the spatial 
imprint of the liberalised and global market economy? Does neoliberal space hold a par-
ticular grammar? Which theories and models (of neo-urbanism) exist in this regard? 
The accounts presented above describe implicit trends and the effects of capitalist 
market economies on space. The most important of these concepts are: the framework of 
an abstract ‘space of flows’ versus a local space of places, the discussion of the centre-
periphery nexus, as well as the homogenisation, fragmentation, and polarisation of the 
urban fabric, caused by the forces of rationalisation and commoditisation. Notably none 
of the above concepts was centred on space. 
This part of the context chapter provides an overview of narratives on contemporary 
urbanism of relevance for our work. It will be important in particular to determine the 
most recent theories of neoliberal space. 
                                               
85 Other critics stress neoliberalism’s normative ‘religious’ character, describing it as a social and moral philosophy, which is 
qualitatively different from liberalism. (Cf. Treanor, Paul 2007: Liberalism, Market, Ethics). 
86 Monica Prasad asserts that the role of private capital is expanded through the state. A state-centric approach argues that 
the state maintains a critical role in enabling and reinforcing the system, as politicians are among the central actors of im-
plementation. (Cf. Prasad, Monica 2006: The Politics of Free Markets: The Rise of Neoliberal Economic Policies in Britain, 
France, Germany, & The United States; Chicago). 
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Neoliberal space 
Indeed, only a few models can be identified which directly conceptualise the impact of 
neoliberalism on space and cities:  
Among the few neoliberal perspectives on contemporary space are Neil Brenner and 
Nick Theodore’s (2002: Cities and the Geographies of Actually Existing Neoliberalism) 
and James Hackworth’s (2007: The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Devel-
opment). Brenner and Theodore attest that today cities and regions are more than mere 
passive recipients of trends. In contrast, the production of space as an economic good has 
transformed cities into significant motors of neoliberal capital accumulation. Urban envi-
ronments become the battleground for diverse experiments: place marketing campaigns, 
private infrastructure schemes, public private partnerships, superblock developments, 
regional terminals, deregulated investment zones, enclaves for elite consumption, or 
standardised urban typologies. The work of Hackworth verifies this view by describing 
exploring US American inner city revitalisation schemes as ‘soft spots’ of neoliberal mod-
ernisation. 
Finally, the work of the above, as well as their colleagues from the South, such as 
Kiran Sandhu (2006), or Erminia Maricato et al (2005), tends to focus on spaces and 
policies, while Hackworth’s perspective remains bound to the old core of the North 
American city as the ‘soft spot’ of neoliberalism. The most important contribution shared 
by all accounts is the portrayal of an ideological and political dimension of space. Indeed, 
this is something most other narratives on contemporary space still miss. On the other 
hand, the narratives tend to focus on spaces and processes, leaving out places and ty-
pologies.  
Indeed, we find that a theory of neoliberal space has not been established yet. What is 
also missing is a deeper examination of the very places and typologies which in return 
may lead to a better understanding of the entire genus.  
Space and the contemporary city 
While this first conclusion alone may underline the relevance of the present endeavour of 
a comparative study of NeoTowns, for now we will open the field for additional narra-
tives that examine the condition of contemporary space without being openly grounded 
to the terminology of neoliberal critique. We imply that these contain important elements 
and methodologies to facilitate a conceptualisation of neoliberal space and hence equip 
this research with various essential components. 
The narratives are explored in three steps. These correspond to different scales and in 
addition to some extent to a chronological order. They range from 1) models of the con-
temporary city which can be traced from the West Coast of the US, via 2) a perspective 
of global narrations, to 3) observations in particular global regions. An additional inte-
grated categorisation which emerges is that of materialist and idealist narratives.  
The US post-industrial city 
The cradle of conceptualisations of the contemporary – postmodern, post-industrial, con-
sumerist – city lies in North America. Jean Gottman’s Megalopolis (1961) informs us of 
the emergence of asymmetrical and polynuclear global city-regions. The urban designer 
Kevin Lynch (1960: Image of the City) teaches us that the perception and imagination of 
the individual may be one of the essential clues to comprehending contemporary urban 
landscapes. Melvin Webber (1963: Urban Place and the Non-place Urban Realm) ex-
plores the notion of urbanity beyond physical neighbourliness. Venturi, Scott-Brown and 
Izenour (1972: Learning from Las Vegas) examine modern cities as symbolic systems 
(iconographies) in the case of Las Vegas. Frederic Jameson (1984: Postmodern, or the 
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Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism)87, unlocks the fragmented and ‘autoreferential’ logic 
of the late-capitalist postindustral city through the example of Los Angeles. He also 
makes sense of the symbolic rhetoric of pastiche and nostalgia in a setting that is stripped 
of histories.88 
Spaces of globalisation 
A second tranche of narratives on contemporary space opens up the perspective to the 
global. The ‘materialist’ gaze of scholars such as John Friedman (1984), Saskia Sassen 
(1989: The Global City), Dorothy Massey (1985: Spatial Divisions of Labour), or 
Manuel Castells (1989: The Informational City) explores the interrelationships of eco-
nomic globalisation and spatial restructuring and diagnose that the new economic era is 
leading to new spatial constellations between the centre and periphery on global, na-
tional and regional scales: Forces such as homogenisation, fragmentation, and polarisa-
tion penetrate all spatial scales, while the national level loses significance, the regional 
level becomes more important, and the urban fabric undergoes a major restructuring. 
Peter Marcuse and Ronald von Kempen (2000: Globalising Cities: A New Spatial Order) 
study the reconfiguration of inner city neighbourhoods by global elites. Roger Simmonds 
and Gary Hack (2000: Global City Regions), among others, document and explore the 
arrival of the polynuclear metropolitan region on an international scale and introduce the 
notion of global city regions. Patsy Healey (2001: 205) introduces the terminology of the 
extended urban region, which is a terminus favoured by this research.  
 Illustration A-5: Patsy Healey’s ‘multiplex urban region’ 
Cultural and ethnographic bottom-up narratives complement the materialist top-down 
gaze on space in the era of neoliberal globalisation. Most of these draw the role of per-
sonal imagination, and the interpretation of cities as symbolic landscapes. Most notably, 
Marc Augé (1995: Non-lieu) explores the nature of new forms of abstract space (malls, 
terminals, virtual domains, hotel rooms, or highways) under the label of the ‘non-place’. 
These emerge as supermodern and ultra rational domains of ‘solitary contractuality’, as 
opposed to the places of the habitus. Moreover Augé’s elaboration on the role of the 
monument helps us to conceptualise the nostalgic revival of monumental forms as su-
permonuments (Cf. Chapter 5: Evaluation).89 
 Illustration A-6: Gursky’s ‘99 cent store’ as an example of the ‘non-lieu’ 
In addition, the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (1996: Modernity at Large) teaches us 
that individual imagination is not only relevant in the context of a multipolar urban re-
gion, but also highly essential in the context of a complex, asymmetric and multicultural 
global space. Moreover, Appadurai maintains that we must not only take into account 
individual, but also social imagination in order to understand the ‘making’ of contempo-
rary space.  
                                               
87 And other representatives of the Los Angeles School 
88 Which he develops in the context of Jean Baudrillard’s media theories (1976). 
89 Augé states in this context that: “The monument… is an attempt at the tangible expression of permanence, or at the very 
least duration. ... Without the monumental illusion .... history would be a mere abstraction. The social space bristles with 
monuments... which may not be directly functional but give the individual the justified feeling that, for the most part, they 
pre-existed him and will survive him ... Strangely, it [the monument] is a set of breaks and discontinuities in space that 
expresses continuity in time.” (60ff) “Perhaps the relationship with history that haunts our landscapes is being aesthetisised, 
and at the same time desocialised and artificialised” (Augé: 72) 
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View on the periphery 
Several scholars from the North as well as from the South explore the production of con-
temporary space in the global peripheries, thus adding another dimension to the global 
perspective. 
Notably it is Robert Fishman who discovers the ‘global suburb’ as the paradigmatic 
place of modernisation in the peripheries, in shifting his investigation to suburbs abroad 
(2002: Global suburbs).90 Anthony King and his peers (2002: Spaces of Global Cultures) 
develop the concept of ‘indigenous modernities’91. They reconfirm the strategic relevance 
of peripheral modernisation and discuss the specific significance of ‘Supraburbs’ and 
‘Globurbs’ in the age of a global modernisation (as opposed to the colonial modernisa-
tion). Moreover, we are informed by historical evidence that modernity has always been 
subject to indigenous transformation and adaptation. 92 
It is Terry McGee who points as early as 1991 (The Extended Metropolis) to the 
emanation of the Desakota region as a unique indigenous form of Southeast Asian (sub-) 
urbanisation. In addition, Peter Rimmer and Howard Dick discuss the emergence of a 
new species of New Towns in the region by the end of the 1990s – finding of major im-
portance for this work (1998: Beyond the Third World City). 
While Fishman and King fail to portray the specific ideological and political dimen-
sion of spatial production, this point is emphasised by a series of local scholars from the 
South such as Erminia Maricato (2005: Globalisation and Urban Policy on the Periphery 
of Capitalism), Flavio Villaca (2001: Espaço Intra-urbano no Brasil), Teresa Caldeira 
(2000: City of Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenshp in São Paulo), Kiran Sandhu 
(2005: Transformation, or Transgression? Impact of Neo-Urbanism Paraphrenelia on an 
Infant Metropolis in the Developing World). Their portrayals of peripheral cities under-
line the assumption that the effects of neoliberal practices in the South are more dramatic 
and extreme than in the North. The forces of economic liberalisation seem to have an 
easier play in postcolonial environments, which are characterised by unsettling growth 
and socio-demographic change and which tend to be governed by elite regimes. Indeed, 
the observations by most of the local scholars speak for the fact that the import of su-
permodern (or ultra rational) practices from the North in many instances reinforces ex-
isting contradictions and leads to super segregation and super fragmentation. Globurbs 
and Supraburbs, for example, become an element of an enclavic and insular urbanism. 
Finally, the typologies and mechanisms described above comply with a model of a 
contemporary space, which is generated by the principles of advanced economic ration-
alisation (along the lines of Max Weber’s formal rationalisation), in combination with 
the self-reproducing impulse of global and local elite regimes. The tendency is based on a 
trend towards collective individualisation and consumer-oriented lifestyles, and produced 
by the combined imagination of globally operating private corporate representatives, in 
combination with the dreams of the new bourgeois. Neoliberal space is an iconographic 
and contractual domain that is driven by the logic of codes and symbols. Its ‘solitary 
individuality’ (Cf. Augé 1995) rationalises (i.e. it subjects) individual behaviour and ex-
cludes social imagination. While it also remains to be adapted and appropriated by tradi-
tional forms of community and publicity, the term ‘indigenous supermodernity’ is a good 
label to describe the situation. 
                                               
90 Indeed this work expands this notion as it presumes that peripheries of the peripheries are among the most significant 
localities of modernisation in a general global context. 
91 Abidin Kusno as well as Jyoti Hosagrahar explore these concepts in Indonesia and India respectively. 
92 In addition King and his peers represent a significant methodological approach as they investigate the production of 
contemporary space along a multi-stakeholder approach. They also employ a plura-disciplinary perspective, in particular a 
combination of postcolonial and cultural studies. 
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Arrival at the ‘indigenous supermodernisation in the peripheries of the peripheries’ 
An important conclusion of the context presented above is the observation that the 
global suburb in the South emerges as the paradigmatic urban space of the 21-century. 
Indeed, we combine the concepts presented above we arrive at the bulky but fundamental 
notion of an ‘indigenous supermodernsation in the peripheries of the peripheries’. Hence 
the examination of the conceptual context affirms that novel typologies of Globurbs and 
Supraburbs, or as we say NeoTowns in the South, are among the most radical and unfet-
tered representations of privately driven urbanism.  
Hence, the above-presented context essentially reinforces the relevance of this re-
search. While it provides us with essential conceptual tools, it also brings to the fore 
some important gaps. We observe that a large amount of the models are concentrated in 
the West, and produced by western scholars, notably the US and Europe. While studies 
of (and from) third world cities exist, they remain isolated and fragmented. As a result, 
the question of how neoliberalism operates in the periphery remains open, and much of 
the alphabet which would make up a theory of neoliberal city is sill missing. 
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II. Legacy of New Town planning and research  
The benefits of new towns as opposed to ‘sprawl’ are that they provide for 
public space and amenities in one or the other way. (Alexander Garvin 1996) 
The following section is going to contextualise Neo-Towns into the framework of New-
Town research. This perspective is the second of the three conceptual pillars forming the 
base of this research. A third pillar is composed of a specific range of relevant urban dis-
ciplines and will be presented thereafter. 
We seek to address the question of ‘where we stand’ in terms of NeoTown research. 
The perspective of New Town research will provide us with the necessary definitions and 
classifications of New Towns and planned cites. It will enable us to address the question 
of whether NeoTowns are a new species in the genus of planned cities called New 
Towns. Moreover, the other cases will provide a first comparative background of inno-
vations, potentials, limitations and problems.  
Some of the relevant questions in this context are: How can we define Neo-Towns? 
What are the essential differences from traditional New Towns? Reform? Are Neo-
Towns a viable strategy of urban-regional expansion in our present time? 
Therefore the following section presents an outline of definitions, a historical perspec-
tive, as well as the latest in research on New Towns. It concludes with an exploration of 
local debates.  
Definitions 
Major characteristics 
Ervin Galantay’s 1975 classic “New Towns: Antiquity to Present” is a fundamental work 
on the topic of New Towns and planned settlements. The classifications and definitions 
used here serve as a fundamental orientation for this work. Nevertheless, some of the 
concepts needed fine-tuning in order to fit to the purposes of this research. This section 
therefore explores these definitions and exhibits the adaptations.  
Among the most notable differences between our work and Ganlantay’s is the fact 
that the latter uses the term new towns as a synonym for planned cities in general, while 
this work prefers to refer to this genus in reference to a typology, which mainly emerged 
the post-WWII Keynesian era (cf. below). 
Planned cities 
Galantay comes up with five major criteria for planned cities (in contrast to ‘organically’ 
grown settlements). He ascertains that these share: 1) a distinct vision, or an ‘act of 
will’93; 2) a central authority which is capable of implementing and controlling the pro-
ject; 3) a distinct moment of foundation; 3) a formalised rational plan; 4) quick imple-
mentation of a ‘critical mass’; 5) huge amounts of space and ‘virgin land’; 6) a quest for 
balanced communities; 7) a radically new and distinct identity; 8) and an independence 
and autarchy based on a social and economic mix (Cf. Galantay 1975: pp. 1).  
Our project agrees with most of the criteria as summarised above. Nevertheless, it 
gives a different weight and priority to the categories. As a result, we demarcate planned 
cities through three major characteristics: 1) urban dynamics (based on size and hetero-
                                               
93 Galantay refers to Edmund Bacon 1973 stating that a planned new towns with a preconceived form or master plan is 
creation of an “act of will” par excellence. (Ibidem: ft.1) 
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geneity), 2) central authorship and control, and 3) a moment of ideology and reform. 
While the fist and second characteristics relates to the aspect of the ‘planned’, the third 
aspect relates to the question of how a city and an urban space can be defined. (Cf. 
above: Definitions) 
1. When we speak of planned cities we prefer to refer to urban places. Urbanity is our 
basic general criteria which distinguishes a city or town from a monofunctional 
neighbourhood, or a village. We see urbanity as a ‘function’ that is predominantly, but 
not exclusively, based on heterogeneity and size. Urban life presupposes a basic hetero-
geneity of the elements resulting in an emergent dynamic that is larger than the sum of its 
parts. In other words, an urban dynamic implies an advanced economic specialisation 
(division of labour) as well as a mix of private, public, sacral, and economic spaces.  
And because various elements consume space, a city, at least in a traditional sense, 
also needs to be a certain size.94  
Furthermore, the above criteria are interrelated with the aspect of autonomy. This is 
important when we want to speak of a town or a city. Autonomy means that an urban 
place is relatively self-sufficient, e.g. that it provides for the basic daily needs of the popu-
lations (most notably by providing jobs). 
2. Indeed, a distinct body of authorship and control is among the crucial elements that 
distinguish planned from organically-grown settlements. They are: controlled and im-
plemented by a distinct authority (emperor, state, military, developer etc.); conceived and 
planned according to a master plan; take the form of a fixed project, with a beginning, a 
defined set of outcomes, deliverables, costs, size, boundaries and structural patterns and 
a certain rational logic behind it. 
3. In addition, planned cities reflect distinct visions and ideologies. They present a dis-
crete form, a constructed identity and a symbolic unity. As it is new and rapidly imple-
mented, a planned city portrays many of the ideals of its authors, as well as the major 
trends of a time in a direct and unobstructed way. Nonetheless, the reality is also a mix 
of idealism and ideology, because the main stakeholders act according to their own logic 
and agenda.95 
The above criteria are a necessary basis and point of departure for this study. They 
largely facilitate the refinement of our classification and thus the aggregation of appro-
priate examples of NeoTowns. It becomes evident that the examples selected have to 
comply to the criteria of size/heterogeneity, central authorship/control and ideal-
ism/ideology. 96  In our case the factors have been narrowed down to a maximum size of 
100.000 residents, to control by the private sector, and to a neoliberal ideology. (Cf. be-
low: Selection of cases)  
Categorical three 
Galantay’s categorisation of planned settlements suggests the placement of NeoTowns as 
a group that follows 20th century decongestion nodes. Planned settlements are placed in 
                                               
94 Apparently things get more complex when modern transport and novel information and communication technologies 
increasingly replace the logic of proximity with a logic of connectivity and access (Cf. for example Melvin Weber’s 1963 
discussion of ‘Community without propinquity’.) 
95 The last point is seen as very crucial. While it remains omitted by most examinations of planned cities, it has been added in 
this context in reference to the input provided in the theory section above. Our discussion of Lefebvre’s concept and neolib-
eral space above has affirmed the ideological and political status of space in general and of abstract and conceived space in 
particular. A further stimulus came from Mumford 1922, who stresses the relevance of the idealistic and utopian moment 
and from de Klerk 2007 who accentuates the moment of ‘reform’. 
96 For example, we expelled the case of Gökturk, a suburban cluster of gated communities in Istanbul, early on because it 
lacked central authorship. Likewise the case of Nordelta was dropped in favour of AlphaVille, after it became clear that 
Nordelta did not achieve a basic urban mix and heterogeneity (Cf. the definitions and the selection matrix.) 
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five major groups (and by a predominantly chronological order): Firstly: military camps, 
secondly: new capitals, thirdly: colonial cities, fourthly: industrial towns, and fifthly: 
decongestion nodes. A majority of 20th century projects fall in the two last groups. New 
Towns fall in the relatively young species of decongestion nodes. 
Illustration A-7: Positioning of NeoTowns in Ganlantay’s classification of planned cities 
Subsequently, decongestion nodes are ordered according to four sub-categories: a) paral-
lel cities, b) independent new towns, c) satellite cities, and d) alternate growth poles. The 
classes relate to the distance and day-to-day dependence to the mother city (Cf. Ibidem: 
53). 
 Illustration A-8: Typologies of decongestion nodes 
Planned cities as lighthouses of modernisation 
An interesting angle regards planned settlements and new towns as model projects of 
societal modernisation. Galantay observed that planned cities mark transitional phases in 
the history of human society, emerging at crucial turning points of history.97 The author 
regards planned cities as paradigmatic models and forerunners for the subsequent re-
structuring and modernising of the larger surrounding urban fabric. 98 In this context 
decongestion type new towns are related to the process of tertiarisation and the shift 
from an industrial to a service-based society.99 All of these findings are important for the 
context of this work. 
 Illustration A-9: Patty’s law (Reworked from Galantay 1975:2) 
Four central motives 
Among the reasons of the stakeholders to create as well as to relocate to NeoTowns, four 
major motives can be emphasised: 1) decongestion, 2) economic development, 3) secu-
rity, and 4) representation. We have deducted these from Galantay’s basic categorisation 
of planned cities (new capitals, colonial towns, industrial towns and decongestion nodes). 
Moreover we seek to revise them from the perspective of a contemporary demand side. 
Notably these drivers play a major role in each of the subchapters on the NeoTown 
population. (Cf. below) 
1) Decongestion and deconcentration: The development of new cities on the periphery 
of larger centres is a classical motive for easing spatial constrains of large metropolises. 
Historical examples range from Leonardo da Vinci’s proposal for 10 satellites for the 
medieval city of Milan100, Ebenezer Howard’s paradigmatic concept of Town Magnets 
(Howard 1898), to the post-World War II spread of satellite schemes from Europe to the 
                                               
97 This observation is founded on the models of the French economist Jean Fourastié, who cultivated the model of the three-
sector-theory, (e.g. agriculture, industry and services). The model is also referred to as Petty's Law. 
98 “New towns have been created throughout history by different civilizations, but not as a continuous activity. In explana-
tion of this phenomenon we may advance the hypothesis that the new towns arises at transitional phases in the evolution of 
society. Each “new tot wave” represents an effort to develop a new community structure that would correspond to the 
changed economic base.” (Galantay 1975: 2) 
99 “...the problem of decongestion of large cities by the creation of satellites and expanded towns heralds the transition 
from industrial to a post-industrial society oriented toward leisure and consumption, with a predominance of white-collar 
jobs” (Ibidem: 4). 
100 “Leonardo proposed to abate the congestion and squalor of Milan by building a group of ten cities of five thousand 
houses, limited to thirty thousand inhabitants each.” The plan foresaw a complete separation of pedestrian and horse traf-
fic, and gardens attached to a municipal irrigation system. (Cf. Mumford 1946, in to introduction to the 1946 edition of 
Howards ‘Garden Cities of Tomorrow’) 
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US, Japan, India, Egypt, Iran, or China. From the perspective of the inhabitants the quest 
for decongestion represents the desire for more space for less money. 
2) Economic development is a second important motive of developing new settle-
ments. The core examples here range from the masses of industrial townships from Ciu-
dad Guyana (Venezuela), to Nova Huta (Poland) and Magnitogorsk (Soviet Union). In 
combination with political control, the motive also plays a dominant role in the installa-
tion of colonial cities. These mostly developed as centres of business and trade. An im-
portant aspect of this work is the examination of the trend that today the profit motive is 
also becoming a central factor in the development of New Towns, as urban space in-
creasingly becomes the means of production. Notably the real estate of the NeoTown 
also becomes a means of economic investment from the point of view of the user and 
consumer. 
3) Security and segregation. This was a classical reason for the construction of mili-
tary towns, castles, and fortifications throughout all ages. It is represented by the parallel 
urbanism of many colonial centres, from Casablanca’s Ain-Dab, to Hyderabad’s Secun-
derabad, or Jakarta’s Menteng. Importantly, it appears that the motive of security is 
thriving again in many mega-city regions worldwide which are associated with high risks. 
It is closely interrelated with the quest for a higher quality of life, which is demanded by 
an increasing amount of affluent populations. 
4) Political control, power and, representation is the foremost motive of new capital 
cities such as Alexandria, Jaipur, Versailles, St. Petersburg, Karlsruhe, Washington, Is-
lamabad or Brasilia. However it was also an important factor for many colonial cities 
from the Roman Empire, to medieval Zähringer and Karolinger townships, Filarete’s 
Sforzinda, New Delhi and the cities mentioned above. ‘Global’ skylines represent con-
temporary significations of power and prestige from Dubai to Pudong (Shanghai) and 
Alsunut in Sudan. Notably these dynamic and rapidly developing technopoles of the 
South are among the places that portray the recent trends in the most clear and unob-
structed manner. Aspects of power, representation and prestige are among the most de-
manded aspects from the demand side as well. The new middle classes of emerging 
economies predominantly demand these. 
 
Research narratives 
Ideal cities and utopias 
Planned settlements are one of the most prominent and fascinating topics of urban and 
social debates. As ideal cities, these are closely linked to the idea of utopia, presuming 
that a perfect society must also be based in an ideal city.101 Among the most prominent 
narrative concepts of ideal societies are: Plato’s 400B.C Politeía, Tomas Morus’ 1516 
“Utopia”, Campanellas’s 1623 “City of the Sun”, or Herbert George Well’s 1915 “Mod-
ern Utopia”. The first opus of the famous architectural historian and philosopher Lewis 
Mumford (1922) is devoted to the “Story of Urban Utopias”. Mumford maintains that 
human history has always been characterised by the juxtaposition of the cluttered devel-
opments on the ground, and the idealistic longing for perfect societies.102 103 
                                               
101 ‘Eutopos’ in Greek means better place. 
102 Mumford discusses Plato's Republic, More's Utopia, Andreæ's Christanopolis, Bacon's New Atlantis, Campanella's City of 
the Sun, Fourier's Phalanxes, Cabet's Icaria, Bellamy's Looking Backward, Morris' News from Nowhere, and finally H.G. 
Wells' utopian fiction. 
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‘Real’ planned cities are not restricted to Western culture. The history of worldwide 
examples presents them as an integral part of human civilisation. The most prominent 
exemplars comprise: Mohenjo-Daro 4000 B.C (Indus valley), Akhetaten 1500 B.C. 
(Egypt), Xi’an 1100 B.C. (China), Kyoto 794 (Japan), or Tenochtitlán (Mexico) 1325.104 
105 106 
New Town between ‘Garden City’ and ‘Ville Radieuse’ 
„The end I venture to now set before the people of this country and of other 
countries is no less ‚noble and adequate‘ that this, that they should forthwith 
themselves to the test of building up clusters of beautiful home towns, each 
zoned by gardens, for those who now dwell in crowded, slum infested cities.“  
(Howard: 128) 
 
“... the old, crowded, chaotic slum towns of the past – will be effectively 
checked, and the current of population set in precisely the opposite direction – 
too the new towns, bright and fair, wholesome and beautiful.” (Howard: 111) 
This work operates with the concept of New Towns as the last major type of deconges-
tion nodes of the Keynesian era. This type of planned settlement is deeply modernistic. It 
emerged in the third quarter of the 20th century in Western countries, during a transi-
tional period between an industrial and a service-based society. The era was character-
ised by strong developmentalist states, many of these preoccupied with post-World WarII 
reconstruction and modernisation. Due to this set up, the era was also a high time for 
planners, architects, and engineers, which worked for the strong governments – from 
Constantinos Doxiadis, Le Corbusier, Oscar Niemeyer, or Robert Moses.  
A basic knowledge of New Towns is important, as they are largely considered the last 
‘dinosaur’ species of planned cities in history, and are associated with many problems 
and mistakes. (Indeed, this aspect makes the emergence of NeoTowns even more fasci-
nating.) Consequently the next section is going to elucidate the rise and fall and the im-
plications of modernistic New Towns. 
 Illustration A-10: Ville Radieuse and Garden City 
Howard and Le Corbusier 
Certainly Ebenezer Howard’s Town Magnet 1898 and Le Corbusier’s 1935 Ville Ra-
dieuse are two schemes which have had the greatest influence on the concept on post 
World War II New Towns.107 
Garden City 
The Garden City is among the most important and successful typologies of 20th Century 
urbanism. Ebenezer Howard’s 1898: “To-morrow. A Peaceful Path to Real Reform” 
became one of the most influential works of 20th century urban planning and the main 
                                                                                                                                         
103 Other accounts are provided by Rosenau 1959: The Ideal City; Reiner 1963: The Place of the Ideal Community in Urban 
Planning; Münter, 1930: Die Geschichte der Idealstadt; or Asesh Maitra 2007: New Town Movement in India and the 
Changing Paradigms of Development Explores the Indian Legacy of Planned Cities. 
104 Benevolo 1975, Galantay 1975, or Maitra 2007 list many more. 
105 Galantay states that the first planned towns in history were most probably the capitals of ambitious rulers (ibidem: 6). 
106 Of particular interest is also his exploration of ideal layouts based on codified and cosmological rules. These are mainly 
represented by the codes of the Chinese Chou-Li (China), the Indian Shilpa Shastra, or the Spanish Law of the Indies (Cf. 
Galantay 1975: 7,8,31). 
107 Fishman 1977 discusses these, and also Wright’s Broadacre city. 
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basis for the Western new town and garden cities movement.108 Howard sought to draft 
a blueprint for what he called a ‘Town-country magnet’. This ‘device’ was supposed to 
resolve the blight and squalor as represented by the central cities of the time.109  
The new solution is designed around the motives of light, air, and space110, which 
should be realised by the resources of modern science.111 Howard consequently proposes 
a compact city of 1000 acres (400 hectares) and 30.000 inhabitants. The town is based 
on railway and electricity and surrounded by an agricultural greenbelt of 2.400 hectares. 
The farthest walking distance to the city centre is 600 yards (550 metres). It thrives on 
communal land ownership and the reinvestment of profits, which elsewhere remain in 
the pockets of capitalistic landlords.112 
Howard has not only drafted the physical structure and functional contents of the 
garden city; of the same importance are his innovations of the financial and managerial 
setting of the Town-magnet. He strives for no less or more than a redistribution of 
wealth along a system a communal land ownership.113 The method is based on the idea 
of buying up cheap land in the suburbs and utilising the land appreciation triggered by 
development to build infrastructure and amenities. The surplus is reinvested in infrastruc-
ture and communal facilities of the highest standards: The city features 130metre avenues 
(lined by schools and churches), a modern rail system, three lined roads, and a crystal 
palace. Ample sites are provided for a town hall, museum, picture gallery, theatre, con-
cert hall, hospital, schools, churches, swimming baths and public markets. Every house-
hold has its own garden and access to electricity.114  
The financial feasibility of the format is demonstrated in great detail.115 Howard es-
timates, for example, that a school in the Town-country magnet can have a ten-fold size 
for the same amount of money as compared to in central London.116 Notably, Howard 
requires that Urban Design should play a predominant role.117 The town is managed by 
an administration, with “no sharp division between municipal and semi municipal enter-
prise.” (EH: 92, 96) 
Howard was the founder of the Town and Country Planning Association in 1998 
(succeeded by Sir Frederic Osborne). His concept has been implemented in two model 
projects in London’s periphery. Barry Parker und Raymond Unwin, two of the most re-
                                               
108 Levis Mumford refers to Howard’s concept as one of the two most important inventions of the 20th century – along with 
the airplane. (Cf. Mumford in his introduction to the 1946 edition of Howard’s book) 
109 This strong decongestion motive is best understood when Howard writes: "There is no thought of pride associated in my 
mind with the idea of London ... the heedless casualty of unnumbered thousands of men. A great Englishman, Cobbett, 
called it a wen. If it was a wen then, what is it now? A tumour, an elephantitis sucking into its gorged system half the life 
and the blood and the bone of rural districts.” (EH 1946: 42)… “It is the purpose of this work is to show how a first step 
can be taken in this direction by the construction of a town-country magnet... The construction of such a magnet, could it 
be effected, followed, as it would be, by the construction of many more...“(EH 1946: 48, 49). 
110 “so that a Garden City that, as it grows the free gifts of Nature – fresh air, sunlight, breathing room and playing room ... 
shall be still retained in all needed abundance, and by so employing the resources of modern science that Art may supple-
ment Nature and life may become an abiding joy and delight.” (EH: 127) 
111 Garden Cities represent the highest skills of the modern engineer and the best aspirations of the enlightened reformer. 
(EH: 152) 
112 “...though rents may rise, such rise will not become property of private individuals, but will be applied in relief of rates... 
it is this arrangement which will be seen to give Garden City much of its magnetic power”. (EH: 59) 
113 “…there is a broad path open, through the creation of new wealth forms... and in which the distribution of wealth 
forms so created will take place on a far juster and more equitable basis.” (EH: 130) ... “The land subsists, and the land is 
almost the only thing that subsists.” (EH: 132) 
114 This becomes a model for many other satellite schemes elsewhere (Cf. the Navi Mumbai chapter). 
115 “Its entire revenue is derived from rents... and one of the purposes of this work is to show that rents will be sufficient. 
(EH:58). 
116 The chapter on finance is among the central parts of the proposal. Howard calculates the price of land at 100 pounds per 
hectare, as compared to 20 000 pounds in central London. 
117 “A town, like a flower, or a tree, or an animal, should, at each stage of its growth, possess unity, symmetry, complete-
ness, and the effect of growth should never be to destroy that unity, but to give it greater purpose.” (EH: 76) 
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nowned British architects of the time, designed Letchworth Garden City in 1903.118 
Welwyn Garden City (WGC) was co-founded by Howard and designed by Louis de Sois-
sons. It became Howard’s and Osborne’s home. 
The destruction from the two world wars facilitated the spread of a garden-city 
movement throughout Europe and beyond.119 While the formal language of the garden 
city is becoming a successful brand, in most cases it is stripped of its layer of idealism and 
reform, while targeting the rising bourgeoisie: Early garden cities appear, for example, in 
Stockholm (1912: Bromma); Jakarta (1918: Menteng); São Paulo (1912: Ciudad Jardim); 
New York (1924, Sunnyside Gardens) and Buenos Aires (1944: Jardín Lomas del Palo-
mar).120 
Ville Radieuse 
The other fundamental component whose spirit has had an enormous impact on the 
post-World WarII New Town is Le Corbusier’s La Ville Radieuse. Indeed, this ‘Contem-
porary City for Three Million Inhabitants’ epitomises the spirit of the modern architec-
ture movement.121 The ultra rationalist scheme seeks to accommodate the six-fold popu-
lation of Paris of that time on 15 percent of the ground, providing more green and a bet-
ter transportation. Corbusier believes in the ideals of the sun, light, and air. Moreover he 
refers to organic metaphors, such as the lung, as key elements for living (Cf. Corbusier 
1935). Triggered by the advancements of modern science and the discovery of the human 
physique (e.g. by advanced microscopy), the body, as well as the city, are perceived as 
machines. As much as Howard, Le Corbusier perceives the industrial metropolis as an 
ailing and diseased body. 
Consequently, Corbusier proposes a tabula rasa scheme. La Ville Radieuse is com-
posed of green spaces and parks and megalithic skyscrapers. Each building of the largest 
cruciform species is supposed to accommodate five to eight hundred thousand people. 
Notably, the surfaces of the mega structures are folded in order to ‘bathe in light and 
air’. This is what Corbusier refers to as a ‘radiateur’, the French term for radiator or 
heater.122  
La Ville Radieuse’s ideal scheme represents a radical break with the traditional city. 
While it has proven too radical to be implemented, it influences Corbusier’s urban pro-
posals for Algiers, Barcelona, Buenos Aires, or São Paulo. Its essence has deeply affected 
the modern architecture movement well into the second half of the 20th century. 
Post-World WarII New Towns 
Howards and Corbusier’s concepts appear very contradictory. Yet, both are united a) by 
a radical idealistic moment of societal reform, and b) by their approach to modern sci-
ence and technology. Both break with the traditional industrial city of the time. More-
over they focus on certain trends: La Ville Radieuse can be seen as an epitome of indus-
trial rationalisation and scientific thinking, while The Town-Magnet aims to represent an 
holistic tool to reconcile the increasing alienation of economy, culture and nature. From 
this perspective it seems only consequent that the New Town planners of the post World 
                                               
118 Parker was also to design the first Garden City suburbs in São Paulo (Cf. the AlphaVille chapter). 
119 Hans Kampffmeyer, for example, founded the German Garden City association as early as 1902 in Berlin. (Cf. Hans 
Kampffmeyer 1909: Die Gartenstadtbewegung; Leipzig.) 
120 It is worth noting that Howard was influenced by models of colonial town planning stemming from Wakefield’s (1849) 
Art of Colonization (Cf. Howard 1946: 114). 
121 The concept was exhibited in 1922 at Salon d’Automne in Paris and published in 1935. The ideas also reverberated in 
various documents of the Congress International de Architecture Moderne (CIAM). 
122 Cf. Philipp Oswalt 1994: 'Wohltemperierte Architektur'; Heidelberg. 
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War II era, consciously or not, combine the benefits and eliminate the drawbacks of these 
two dominating concepts, while they are facing the actual task of reconstruction. 
The post-World WarII era has seen a worldwide spread of the New Town idea 
throughout Europe and beyond.123 The idea of building decongestion nodes to ease the 
increasing contradictions of large metropolises is spreading via the British New Town 
strategy.124  
The North American version of the Garden City idea spreads via the Regional Plan-
ning Association of America (Core members: Clarence Stein, Lewis Mumford, and Ben-
ton MacKaye, Henry Wright).125 The project of Radburn (1929), designed by Clarence 
Stein and Henry Wright126, emerges as the paradigmatic model on the North American 
continent. “The town for the motor age” combines automobile and pedestrian circula-
tion along a comb-like structure.127 128  Radburn is the precursor of more New Towns 
and planned cities. A study conducted by the Urban Land Institute129 lists 529 planned 
communities of mote than 300 acres".130 
Nevertheless, the North American history of master planned communities has also its 
own thread. Notably, this legacy goes back to the early 19th Century. It is essentially 
based on private entrepreneurs. Garvin stresses that in the US the demand of the market 
and profit driven private sector, rather than utopian ideas and ideology, was driving the 
process. He refers to Frederic Law Olmstead as the paradigmatic figure whose company 
was involved in the planning of 450 new neighbourhoods between 1857 and 1950.131  
Planned settlements in the US are dominated by corporate urbanism: from the Levit-
towns of the 1950s (Cf. Gans 1969), to the new towns of Irvine (1960) Reston, Virginia 
(1961) and Columbia, Maryland (1962); to contemporary urban design concepts such as 
Celebration, Florida. Nevertheless, these are connected to respective government incen-
tives and programmes. (Cf. AG: 99)132 
Legacy of private settlements 
Private settlements have a significant legacy in the context of western town planning and 
development. Yet most of the projects can be classified as neighbourhoods. Historic ex-
amples range from the Terrainbaugesellschaften in Berlin, to the case of Companhia City 
in São Paulo133, to the North American context of bourgeois suburbs and lifestyle com-
                                               
123 The idea is mainstreamed by Eliel Saarinen’s 1943 The City: Its Growth, its Decay, its Future, or Frederic James Osborn’s 
1946: Green Belt Cities – The British Contribution. 
124 Important milestones are Sir Patrick Abercrombie‘s Greater London Plan 1944, who proposed eight to ten new satellite 
towns and the preservation of a country belt in London as well as the passage of the New Towns Act in 1946 in Great 
Britain. Among the most important milestones are Stevenage, Aycliffe, Corby, Harlow, Runcorn or Milton Keynes. (Cf. 
www.englishpartnerships.co.uk/newtowns.htm, www.halton.gov.uk/newtown/links.html r12.07.2009; Also cf. Osborn 
1969: The New Towns, The Answer To Megalopolis, London) 
125 Cf. Stein 1951: Toward New Towns for America) 
126 Clarence Stein had spent a significant amount of time of his education in Paris, Wright originated in a Quaker family. 
127 Cf. Stein 1965 at www.radburn.org, r12.04.2009 
128 A momentous account of the US American situation is presented by Alexander Garvin 1996: „When senior Olmstead 
retired from active practice in 1895 there were five automobiles in America. In 1928, when Clarence Stein and Henry Wright 
started laying out Radburn, New Jersey, there were 21.3 million. (AG: 270) 
129 ULI 1965: Planned Communities, New Towns, and Resort Communities in the United States. 
130 Carol Corden’s 1977: Planned Cities, New Towns in Britain and America, represents a comprehensive overview of British 
and US American New Towns; Stanley Buder’s 1990: Visionaries and Planners. Garden City Movement and The Modern 
Community, examines the interrelated history of the British and the American Garden Cities movement. 
131 “America‘s suburban subdivisions, like urban neighbourhoods, vary in size and quality. But they look very much alike 
because virtually all of them are imbued with the design philosophy of one man: Frederic Law Olmstead, Sr.” (AG: 265) 
132 Garvin stresses in particular the relevance of the National Housing Act of 1934, which resulted in the FHA mortgage 
insurance system: "this legislation ... converted the desire of home ownership into consumer demand" (AG: 155) 
133 The case of Companhia City is presented in the AlphaVille chapter of this work (Ch.4) 
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munities (cf. Garvin 1996 and the table above).134 The North American context is par-
ticularly interesting for its form of life-style communities, gated and retirement resorts. 
Yet, with a few exceptions such as Suncity in Arizona (cf. the table above), the model has 
never achieved significant momentum and proportions. The box below documents the 
increasing diversification of private communities based on lifestyles and classes in the US.  
Box 2: Typologies of private communities in the US135 
Golf Communities, Retirement Communities, Oceanfront Communities, Neo-Traditional 
Communities, Equestrian Communities, Mountain Communities, Active Adult Communi-
ties, Communities with Marinas, Land Conservation Communities, Communities with 
Tennis Facilities, Communities with Boating, Lakefront Homes Communities, Communi-
ties with Fitness Centers, Communities with Fishing, Million Dollar Homes, Communi-
ties, Recreation Communities, Skiing Communities, Aviation Communities. 
 
Idealisation 
Indeed, in the third quarter of the 20th century, New Towns became an idealised para-
digm of urban development (Cf. Frieling 2007, Provoost 2007). In this context, numer-
ous big metropolises operate with satellite cities as the non-plus-ultra strategy of urban 
development. The satellite new town has emerged as the urban development tool of 
choice: from France, to Sweden, Russia, to Venezuela, Egypt and Iran. 
Selected examples include: Kebayoran Baru (1948: Jakarta), Vällingby (1950: Stock-
holm); 23 de Enero (1955: Caracas); Selenograd (1958: Moscow); Tapiola (1960: Hel-
sinki); Toulouse le Mirail (1962), Gropiusstadt (1962: West Berlin), Senri (1965, Osaka); 
Zoetermeer (1968: The Hague); Louvain la Neuve (1971); Marne-la-Vallée (1972: Paris); 
Egbatan (1975: Teheran); Marzahn (1977: East Berlin); Sadat City (1980, Cairo).136 
 Illustration A-11: Examples of 20th Century planned cities (New Delhi, Tama New Town 
Tokyo) 
With the advent of worldwide privatisation and liberalisation programmes in the 1970s, 
New Town programmes significantly lost momentum. Nevertheless, countless planners 
and new town organisations maintain the belief in New Towns as the non-plus-ultra 
mode for ‘good’ urban development.137 New Town development strategies at a large 
scale also continue to be en vogue with strong governments: most notably China, Korea, 
                                               
134 Cf. Christoph, Bernhard 1998: Bauplatz Gross-Berlin. Wohnungsmärkte, Terraingewerbe und Kommunalpolitik im Städ-
tewachstum der Hochindustrialisierung (1871-1918) emphasises the role played by private developers, or ‘Terraingesell-
schafen’, who developed entire neighbourhoods (Wilmersdorf, Grunewald) in the Berlin of the early industrial era. 
135 Cf. Looking for a Specific Lifestyle?; at www.privatecommunities.com, r02.08.2009 
136 This list is based on my own research mainly at: www.newtowns.net, www.halton.gov.uk/newtown/links.html, 
www.inti.net; www.villes-nouvelles.equipement.gouv.fr/; www.inta-net.org, www.newtowns.net, www.housing-
utility.gov.eg/english/conferance111.asp; Irion 1991: Neue Städte. Experimentierfelder der Moderne; Kravchuk, Jakov Ter-
entevch 1973: Formirovanie novych gorodov; Topfstedt, Thomas 1988: Städtebau in der DDR 1955-1971.; and Philipps, 
David R.; Yeh, Anthony G.O. 1987: New Towns in South-east Asia 
137 The International Urban Development Association (INTA) regards decentralised growth strategies by the means of Satel-
lite Cities as the best development strategies for Third World Metropolises (cf. Sudarskis, Michael 2006: New Towns as a 
Concept of Sustainable Development of Megacity Regions). Moreover, Len de Klerk, Professor of Urban and Regional Plan-
ning from Amsterdam states in the founding publication of INTI, the International New Town Institute in Almere (Holland): 
“It is my view that there will be a need for new towns in Asia and Africa, because most of the present megalopolises have 
the same kind of growth problems that our large industrial cities had at the end of the 19th century”. (de Klerk; Len A. New 
Towns Development Policy: An Introduction: 12, In Frieling 2007). 
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Taiwan, Egypt and Iran.138 139 Indeed, New Towns continue to be regarded as best prac-
tice ‘solutions’ from the West.  
Interestingly, the rationale of New Town development seems to merge well with the 
spirit of New Urbanism. Several projects for China and the Philippines drafted by Peter 
Calthorpe, one of the founding fathers of the Congress for New Urbanism, exemplify this 
case when they state: “Throughout Southeast Asia, and especially in metropolitan Ma-
nila, the effects of unbridled urbanization are written across the landscape. ... This New 
Town of 30 square miles and 500,000 inhabitants will establish a different path.” 
Critique 
The fact that New Towns remain to be seen as the best option for urban development is 
astonishing, because the concept of the modern satellite city is also regarded as a prob-
lematic solution. 
Most of the new towns of the 20th century are criticised as synthetic and anti ur-
ban.140 The expression of the ‘New Town Blues’ became widespread early on.141 Euro-
pean satellite cities in particular are stigmatised as hotspots of crime, segregation, social 
neglect, poverty, unemployment, and abandonment. Likewise, the functional destitution 
is topped by frequent economic bankruptcy (Cf. Garvin 1996: 343). As New Towns are 
seen as an unloved heritage of the post-war generation, a dinosaur species, experts are 
struggling with the question of how to resolve their growing problems.142  
Alexander Garvin (1996) unmasks the intent of most New Town schemes to resolve 
most of humanity’s problems as overstated and heroic143: "Building ... miniature utopias 
has nothing to do with fixing cities"(AG: 352); and that these should be regarded as one 
of several alternatives:  the "The new-town-in-the-country...  is simply a form of urbani-
zation...  it should be allowed to flourish wherever there are developers, investors, and 
lenders that are willing to risk their money... government should simply ensure that they 
do not damage out environment... and step out of the way...” (AG: 314). Moreover, he 
claims that in most cases small scale urban development may be at least as sustainable: 
"Planning a large piece of land as an entire new-town-in-the-country may not produce 
better results than dividing it into smaller sites that are planned and built by different 
designers and developers.” (AG: 352) 
The South has also received the strategy of planned deconcentration with an increas-
ing amount of critique. The Brazilian researcher Claudio Acioly, for example, unveils 
many of the shortcomings of the Egyptian new town strategies.144 Chengri Ding and 
                                               
138 Cf. Kirkby 1987; Yousry 1997; www.youngcities.org/, r12.06.2009. 
139 In an introductory chapter of her book on Navi Mumbai, Annapurna Shaw (2004: 28) describes the Satellite Town build-
ing experience in Asia: Tokyo’s Capital Region Development Law (modelled after the British New Town Policy); Hong Kong’s 
and Singapore’s development of largely residential Satellite Towns; South Korea’s ten Satellite Towns around Seoul; Shang-
hai‘s 9 satellite cities since 1957; India’s controlled urban expansion through the building of satellites represented by six ring 
towns around Delhi, four around Hyderabad, three new tows around Chennai and two around Kolkata...” 
140 Cf. for example: Mayer, Han 2007: What makes a new town a real town? (42), and Reijndorp, Arnold 2007: Growing 
pains of New Towns. 
141 (Cf. Time 1961: The City: New-Town Blues; at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,872684,00.html, 
r12.04.2009) 
142 Cf. Provoost, Michelle 2007: New Towns of the modernist experiment: expectations and experience (60), cf. also 
www.crimsonweb.org/spip.php?article90, r12.06.2009; Philipp Oswald’s at: Shrinking cities project at 
www.shrinkingcities.com/publikationen.0.html, 12.06.2009. 
143 Garvin states in relation to the legislation such of the US American Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970 that 
"New Towns were oversold as devices for reducing "inefficient and wasteful use of land", preventing "destruction of irre-
placeable natural and recreational resources", providing "good housing“, increasing "unduly limited options for many of 
our people as to where they may live", increasing "employment and business opportunities", supporting "vital services for 
all citizens, particularly the poor and disadvantaged", reducing "separation of people within metropolitan areas by income 
and race", and even increasing the "effectiveness of public and private facilities for public transportation." (AG: 343)  
144 Acioly 2000: Guided Densification in Brazil versus Informal Compactness in Egypt. 
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Kellie Bethke (2005) present another critical overview of “International Lessons on Satel-
lite Town Development Strategies”.  Evaluating case studies from South Korea, Egypt, 
India, Netherlands, and Singapore, Ding and Bethke find that new towns triggered a se-
rious imbalance in jobs, incomes and travel times. 
Finally, there are signs that the general spirit of idealising New Towns is changing. 
Several metropolitan regions, including the regions of our case study sites, Mumbai, Ja-
karta, and São Paulo, realise that they are overwhelmed by a new dynamism of urban 
growth. In this context, top-down planning approaches are increasingly replaced by stra-
tegic plans, urban management and market oriented planning.145  
Selected lessons 
The history of planned settlements and New Towns constitutes a vast mine of lessons 
and experiences. Some significant background research on these was made in the context 
of this project. However due to the limited scope of this research a detailed discussion 
and formulation of the results remains impossible at this stage. For this reason a short 
summary of the findings is presented in the table below. 
The examination reveals that today’s new cities exist in a long tradition of concepts 
and strategies: from landscaping, holistic urban design, and theming, to self-management 
by resident associations. 
Table 1: Selected milestones and lessons (with an emphasis on master planned communi-
ties in the USA)146 
City Location Date Authorship Innovations 
Karlsruhe Germany 1715 Markgraf 
Karl-
Wilhelm 
Economic privileges for the new 
residents, theming along the Ver-
sailles model 
Riverside  IL, US 1869 Olmstead 
Vaux and 
Company 
Railway community, blends park 
and settlement, valorisation by 
design (i.e. landscaping) resulting 
in a ‘village with character’, 
90,000 trees and pocket parks, 
Homeowner Associations handle 
maintenance and design approv-
als, use of gates & gatehouses 
Town Magnet England 1898 Ebenezer 
Howard 
New ‘third alternative’ between 
city and country, autarchic sys-
tem, social reform and commun-
al land ownership, reinvestment 
of profits, functional segregation 
of land uses, bedrock of garden 
city and new town movements 
New Delhi India 1912 Edwin 
Lutyens 
Mutation of Beaux Arts and 
‘Garden City’ and monumental-
ism, enlightened and ‘hygienic’ 
city model  
Beverly Hills US, CA 1914 Burton E. Vacation refugee settlement, Ho-
                                               
145 As a matter of fact, none of the Metropolitan regions as part of this work uphold a development strategy based on 
satellite cities. (Cf. Ch.5: Evaluation) 
146 The American examples are based on Garvin 1996. The author has explored the other examples. 
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Green tel development as trigger  
World Centre 
of Communica-
tion 
12 locations 
worldwide 
1915 Christian 
Andersen, 
and M. Jean 
Hébrard 
Idea of a global system of Beaux 
Art science cities and techno-
poles 
Coral Gables FL, US 1920 Edgar 
Merrick 
Lifestyle community with 
themed neighbourhoods and res-
ident associations 
Radburn NJ, US 1928 Clarence 
Stein and 
Henry 
Wright 
Garden city in the age of the au-
tomobile, clustered system of 
neighbourhood modules, comb 
structure, comprehensive design, 
Radburn Resident Association, 
‘superblocks’ and cul-de-sac 
bring savings which are used to 
finance communal spaces 
Palos Verdes 
Estates 
CA, US 1939 Olmstead & 
Cheney 
Theme and Vision of Amalfi 
coast, Self management by resi-
dent association 
Levittown NY, US 1947 Lewitt & 
Sons 
Industrial rationalised produc-
tion (80 steps to build a house) 
cost-optimised demand-driven 
design, privately developed mas-
ter plan, response to federal 
mortgage programmes. Mass 
suburbanisation of lower middle 
classes, gold-plating with ex-
changeable facades (in Willing-
boro), houses come with TV-
sets, flexible prototype design, 
one-step-purchase 
Irvine CA, US 1960 William 
Pereira 
Large inherited land bank, larg-
est privately developed master 
planned new town, modular sys-
tem of ‘urban villages’, relevance 
of design guidelines, synergy 
with University of California and 
tertiary sector spinoffs 
Sun City AR, US 1960 Del E. Webb Lifestyle retirement community, 
modularisation and mass custo-
misation of housing types 
Columbia MR, US 1962 James Rouse Clustered hierarchical design 
based on neighbourhood mod-
ules, network of open spaces 
Milton Keynes England 1968 Davies and 
Walker 
Decentralised cluster of nodes, 
‘community without propinqui-
ty’ 
Ethans Glen TX, US 1975 Hines First cluster developments 
(Planned Unit Development), en-
tire area is treated as one lot 
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Almere Netherlands 1975 Teun Kol-
haas 
Polynuclear structure, division of 
traffic modes, high quality design 
Sea-Side FL, US 1979 Plater-
Zyberk 
New Urbanism, ‘community of 
the post-motor-age’, modular 
design with eight building types 
Celebration FL, US 1996 Disney De-
velopment 
Company 
Theming, Neo-traditionalism,  
 Illustration a-12: Matrix of US American master planned communities 
 
The enigma of a new wave of planned cities 
The above discussion affirms the end of satellite cities and New Towns. They are ren-
dered obsolete as an integral part of a state driven urbanism that dominated many socie-
ties worldwide mainly in the third quarter of the 20th century (and which continues to 
reverberate in several nations, such as China, Iran, or Egypt to date). While ‘new’ New 
Towns are out of demand in the shrinking, or stagnating, societies of the West, the strat-
egy has been outclassed by the rapid development in the South.147  
While in the context of neoliberal economic and societal restructuring148 many states 
have retreated from the role of the developer and maker to that of an enabler and facili-
tator, it seems that the rug was pulled out from under the concept of planned cities. The 
concept of New Towns appears antagonistic to modern market economies, as these are 
commonly associated with a large number of stakeholders.  
Yet the experience on the ground suggests that new towns are on the agenda again. 
We observe that in the fast growing peripheries of emerging mega-city regions worldwide 
a fresh town species is thriving on the (idealistic) burial ground of Keynesian New 
Towns. This is very surprising from the perspective of the above context. 
Research on private New Towns in the developing world 
Our examination of the growth patterns in many mega-city regions in the South reveals 
that planned cities are on the agenda again. Notably, this time these are driven by the 
private sector. Their size and number suggests that the phenomenon may represent a new 
typology.149,150  
                                               
147 The Indian scholar Annapurna Shaw summarises the Asian experience of deconcentrated growth through New Towns as 
follows: “In the last forty years, urban development policies over much of Asia have shown a marked change with a shift in 
emphasis from metropolitan growth control strategies (new towns etc) to policies for diffusing urbanisation (Rondinelli 
1991) ...  Physical controls in the form of greenbelts and satellite towns have been some of the most widely adopted means 
to restrain and decelerate the expansion of large metropolitan cities in Asia (Rondinelli 1991, Simmons 1979). But attempts 
to halt the growth of large metropolitan cities have been either ineffective or extremely slow to produce results. This is 
reflected in the experience of satellite town development throughout much of this region. Satellite Towns, on the whole, 
have proven to be ineffectual in meeting original objectives... (Cf. Shaw 2004: 4) 
148 As political powers have been decentralised, public domains (such as infrastructure and services) privatised and markets 
liberalised, development strategies have shifted from a supply to a demand orientation during the neoliberal turn of the last 
30 years (Cf. the section on neoliberalism above). 
149 This observation was first made by the author in 2001 (Cf. Gotsch 2001). 
150 Original materials present the most interesting data and statements: Peter Calthorpe’s plan for a ‘Green City Manila’, for 
example, amounts 8 000 hectares and 500 000 inhabitants. The project description delineates the situation as follows:  
“Throughout Southeast Asia, and especially in metropolitan Manila, the effects of unbridled urbanization are written across 
the landscape. An economy that was mostly rural is now increasingly modern. Private automobiles are appearing by the 
millions, and housing is in short supply as a burgeoning middle-class strives for the “good life” on an enormous scale.” 
Calthorpe Associates from project description of Green City Manila at: 
www.calthorpe.com/projects_international%20master plans.html, r12.05.2009. 
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A closer look at the respective countries reveals a thread of western researchers who 
are engaged in the examination of new towns in the South, as well as an ever-growing 
amount of local experts. Nevertheless, most of the work remains focused on the respec-
tive regions, e.g. predominantly South East Asia. In this context it also stays isolated and 
fragmented. 
Richard Kirkby (1987) examines Chinese new town policies in the case of Shanghai 
(in Yeh 1987). Jo Suryadi Santoso, one of the first hour planners of the New Town of 
Bumi Serpong Damai in Jakarta inspects “The Relationship Between New Towns and 
Central Cities in the JABOTABEK Area” and “The Role of Private Sector in Urban De-
velopment in Indonesia.” (Cf. Santoso 1987 and 1989). An early example from Brazil is 
presented by Yolan Nagy’s 1989 study of closed neighbourhoods in São Paulo, which 
focuses on the quality of life in newly developed elite projects such as AlphaVille, Tam-
boré and its predecessors. Her colleague Fabio Gonçalvez 1998 compares São Paulo’s 
elite neighbourhood of Morumbi with the New Town projects of AlphaVille and Barra 
da Tijuca in Rio de Janeiro. 
The merit of works such as German Harald Leisch’s 2000: “Gated Paradise? – Qual-
ity of Life in Private New Towns in JABOTABEK, Indonesia”, lies in the fact that they 
combine research on gated communities and new towns and internationally disseminate 
the research results. Kelly Shannon (2000) describes the emergence of privately planned 
cities in Vietnam (Cf. Shannon, Kelly 2000: A Tale of Two Cities. Hanoi and Ho Chi 
Minh City). At the same time Gotsch (2001) examines the New Town Saigon South from 
the perspective of a neoliberal production of space. In addition, Michael Leaf (2004) 
explores” The New Town Impulse in Asia: Pathway to an Urban Future or Modernity‘s 
Last Gasp?” mainly through the example of Jakarta. 
Around the same time, Alex Borsdorf and Alejandro Hidalgo (2004), explore “New 
Privately Developed Megaprojects on the Other Side of the Pacific Ocean in Santiago de 
Chile”. Moreover, Gotsch and Kohte (2007) as well as Reinhold Baxi (2007) delineate 
the Indian context of privately developed megaprojects.  
Nevertheless, conceptualisations of novel forms of planned cities at a larger scale are 
rare. Only two studies stand out in this context: Peter Rimmer and Howard Dick (1988: 
Beyond the Third World City) have developed a basis for the discussion of a new cate-
gory South-East Asian new towns. And Gotsch and Peterek seek to lay the foundations 
for a global agenda on the topic of privately developed New Towns (Gotsch and Peterek 
eds. 2001: New Settlements; and Gotsch and Peterek: Neue Städte im Süden – Urbane 
Modelle für das 21. Jahrhundert?). 
Summary of the most recent developments in New Town research 
The previous section examined the state-of-the art context of New Town research. While 
first chapter of the context section established a perspective of NeoTowns as the para-
digmatic spaces of neoliberal urbanism, the above section has set up the panorama of 
NeoTowns as a novel typology in the legacy of planned cities. 
In this context, our research has been fixed with conceptual knowledge needed to 
classify the cases at hand. Moreover, the inquiry of research on New Towns throughout 
various generations has equipped us with important knowledge of lessons and experi-
ences, needed for a critical evaluation of three examples. 
The background of terminologies and typologies and definitions was largely based on 
the account of Ervin Galantay (1975). It was confirmed that all cases of planned cities 
are defined by a three-tiered set of criteria: 1) size and heterogeneity, 2) central author-
ship and control, and 3) idealism and ideology. Moreover, Galantay provided us with the 
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insight that new settlements can be seen as testing grounds of modernisation in particular 
times of socio-economic and political change, as was the case with the shift from agricul-
tural to industrial economies and societies. In addition, we found that NeoTowns, if con-
firmed as a new typology, will fall into the category of decongestion nodes. 
In the following we have concentrated in particular on the context of the New Town, 
as this is regarded as the model, and direct precedent of the NeoTown. This investigation 
has provided us with valuable experiences and largely reconfirmed the relevance of our 
research.  
Indeed, blending innovations from the Garden City, as well as from the modern archi-
tecture movement, New Towns emerge as an extremely prominent tool of urban mod-
ernisation. The strategy becomes a general paradigm of urban planning of the post-
World-War-II era. Alternative models have spread in Europe and the US. In the later case 
we can observe a merger with a tradition of private urban development.  
New Towns become a prominent instrument in the context of postcolonial moderni-
sation in many countries worldwide. However the paradigm of the modernistic New 
Town and the strategy of decentred concentration ends in parallel to the bankruptcy of 
the strong hand of the Keynesian welfare states (and other developmentalist regimes) and 
the parallel rise of free market reforms. Likewise, urban experts start to question the ef-
fectiveness of New Town policies. 
From this perspective the recent re-emergence boom of planned cities of enormous 
size, driven by the private sector, appears as an unexpected spin and a historic surprise. 
Has the western gaze overlooked the rising phenomenon while it was preoccupied 
with the resolution of the problems of the own New Town legacy? Are we overburdened 
with catching up with the conceptualisation of new phenomena in an increasingly chang-
ing reality? Or is the problem that NeoTowns developed out of the backyard of main-
stream elite research? 
A closer look at the new phenomenon of a new generation of planned cities in the 
South reveals that many of the examples have a longer history than expected, and that a 
significant amount of local research on the phenomenon exists.151 This fact notwith-
standing, our examination of the research context above confirms that the respective 
efforts are highly fragmented and isolated. In addition, we observe that a conceptualisa-
tion of the phenomena is lagging being the development on the ground. A large share of 
the recent boom of privately planned megaprojects in peripheral countries remains un-
derstudied: from India’s booming Integrated Townships, to Chinese New Town policies, 
to Chile’s ‘mega-ciudades walladas’. 
Hence it is important to conclude that, with the exception of one study on SE-Asia 
(Rimmer 1998) and the work of the author (Gotsch 2001), research has not taken notice 
of the phenomenon of privately developed New Towns. Indeed, a general conceptualisa-
tion of privately developed cities would largely enhance the understanding of this new 
urban typology and assist the resolution of problems on the ground. (At the same time, 
numerous hitherto fragmented and isolated approaches could acquire a new meaning 
when integrated into a holistic framework). Indeed, this finding largely reconfirms the 
objective of the research project at hand. 
                                               
151 Sometimes another terminology is applied, for example from research on gated communities or urban segregation (Cf. 
Nagy 1989, or Leisch 2000. 
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III. Urban debates 
NeoTowns originate in a framework of an urban dynamics that is global, regional, in-
formal, suburban, fragmented, postcolonial and thematic. 
The two sections above explored two fundamental theoretical pillars of this research: 
a meta-framework of theories and models on the production of neoliberal space, as well 
as the legacy of New Town research. The following section will present the third pillar: a 
context of relevant urban debates. While the first two pillars stand for important founda-
tions, the urban discourses represent a general set of questions of relevance for this pro-
ject. Moreover, they also comprise important elements for the formulation of a research 
agenda. 
The following approach of seven urban narratives seeks to capture the topic in a holis-
tic and interdisciplinary manner (cf. section of methodology below). For this reason a set 
discourses has been selected which covers a broad range of aspects from six thematic 
angles. 
The selected scientific discourses include: 1) global cities; 2) urban regions, 3) mega 
cities, 4) sprawl and suburbanisation, 5) spatial fragmentation and gated communities, 6) 
postcolonial spaces, and 7) themed landscapes. 
Evidently, this work is not capable of resolving the elaborate problems that are part of 
the debates. Rather, these discourses are designed to sharpen our analytical gaze, 
broaden our view and confirm the relevance of the project.  
As a matter of fact each of the themes embodies a central field of tension in which 
central questions and contradiction are inscribed: 1) global-local, 2) centre-periphery, 3) 
formal-informal, 4) urban-rural, 5) fragment-network and 6) homogenisation-
indigenisation. Our expectation is that these juxtapositions posed by the framework may 
have cross-fertilising effects.152 
As a detailed discussion of the seven discourses also overstretches the scope of this 
work, the presentation of the six thematic angles will be limited to a brief outline as well 
as a synoptic table. In addition to the seven urban themes, the table also summarises the 
first two theoretical perspectives on neoliberal space and new towns. It presents a sum-
mary of selected references, keywords, associated trends, research gaps, ‘to do’ points, 
and questions in the context of our research. 
 Illustration A-13: Framework diagram 
1. Global City 
Relevance 
NeoTowns are important terminals and interfaces of global economic and cultural flows.  
This perspective is important, because cities and regions are gradually more defined by 
various dimensions of global flows.  
Global city research explores the relationship between cities and novel forms of global 
processes, mainly from an economic angle. It describes the emergence of networked ur-
ban systems and new hierarchies of cities and urban spaces along the narrative of centre 
and periphery. Cities are nodes of control of innovation in dynamic globally networked 
systems and complex geographies of power (based on a new international division of 
labour). 
                                               
152 These angles represent a personal prioritisation. The range of topics is far from complete. Debates which are missing 
include discourses on semantics, semiotics, public space, modernity, culture, sustainability, urban land markets, or urban 
economics. 
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So far, the focus on global city research has been on places of production, such as of-
fice centres (global cities, edge cities, technopoles) rather than on places of daily life and 
consumption. While production and consumption become increasingly blurred and cities 
become products, the question emerges as to whether the focus of global city research 
must change? NeoTowns could be heralding this transformation, as they impersonate 
this combination of product and produced. 
References 
Milestones of global city research are represented by Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1979) ex-
amination of the “Capitalist World System”; John Friedman’s (1986) “World City Hy-
pothesis”. Moreover, Dorothy Massey’s (1984) “Spatial Divisions of Labour, Social 
Structure and the Geography of Production”, Saskia Sassen’s (1991) “The Global City”, 
or Manuel Castells’ (1989) “The Informational City” are some of the significant contri-
butions. Cicollela’s and Mignaqui’s 1992 account of the “The Spatial Reorganization of 
Buenos Aires” are among numerous ‘localisations’ of the global city narrative.153  
Questions 
The central questions in the context of global city research are inquiring into the role of 
NeoTowns in a system of global nodes, the impact of global and local forces, as well as 
the specific relevance of financial flows: 
Are NeoTowns a new form of centrality? What role do they play in the hierarchy of 
global nodes (as centres for the production and reproduction of globally oriented goods, 
classes, symbols, classes, etc)? Where to place them in the geography of advanced global 
production, the division of labour? What is the specific impact of global and of local 
economic trends and forces? Which networks, links, and divisions exist? ...to and from 
where? …visible, or invisible? What is the quality and quantity of money flows and 
prices, investments and turnovers? Which products are produced? Are NeoTowns a new 
form of fixed capital assets? What impact do globalised financial systems have? What 
relevance does a corporate real estate sector have? How is global culture produced here? 
2. Regional City 
‘Town’ and ‘city’ will be, in truth, terms as obsolete as ‘mail coach’... We 
may for our present purposes call these coming town provinces ‘urban re-
gions.’ H.G. Wells 1902154 
Relevance 
NeoTowns are integral elements of postindustrial ‘multiplex urban regions’. 
The discourse on the regional city, or multiplex urban regions, describes a new and ‘ma-
ture’ dimension of the city in the age of consumerism. The regional city is based on 
transport infrastructure (mainly for individualised mass transport). In contrast to un-
qualified sprawl, it comprises novel regional nodes (such as technopoles and edge cities), 
which compete with the former centre.  
                                               
153 Cf. also Sassen’s 1992 introduction to her volume “Global Networks/ Linked Cities: available at: 
www.journalinks.nl/Mijn%20webs/Locating%20Cities%20on%20Global%20Circuits.doc, r12.08.2009. 
154 Quoted by Garvin 1996: 283 
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References 
A major landmark of the narrative is Jean Gottman’s (1961) concept of the “Megalopo-
lis”, based on the notion of an urban corridor between Boston and Washington 
(BosWash). Jane Jacob’s (1984): “Cities and the Wealth of Nations” impressively de-
scribes the relevance and urban ecology of urban regions. In “Global City Regions”, 
Roger Simmonds and Gary Hack (2000), as well as Alan. Scott, John Agnew, Ed Soja 
and Michael Storper (2001) link the phenomenon to the narrative of globalisation and 
present a compendium of examples from an international context. Fu-Chen Lo with Yue-
man Yeung (1998) describe the rise of urban mega-corridors in the East and South East 
Asian context. Terry McGee (1991, 2001) focuses on typologies of the Desakota regions 
in this context.  
Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin (2001) describe the splintering urbanism of the 
novel regional city. In the same volume, Patsy Healey introduces the terminology of Mul-
tiplex Urban Regions favoured by this work. (Cf. Graham 2001: 205) 
Questions 
The questions of relevance for this topic address the relationship between NeoTowns and 
extended urban regions: Are NoTs substantial elements of the new geography of the mul-
tiplex urban region? How do these planned nodes drive and structure the process of re-
gionalisation? What is the mutual impact of local and regional infrastructure systems – 
both for the region, as well for the NeoTowns? 
3. Megacity 
Relevance 
NeoTowns appear as genuine products of mega-city regions. 
The third thread of urban discourse of importance for our research relates to the study of 
rapidly emerging Megacities in the South. Private New Towns in particular seem to be 
among the new typologies born in the context Megacities. 
Numerous observations speak for the fact that the urban environments of the third 
world more and more depart from the classical notion of the ‘third world periphery’. The 
urban agglomerations in the South are characterised by processes of change and growth 
of a hitherto unknown pace and magnitude.155 This occurs in a unique set of trends, 
problems, strategies and spatial typologies. The parallel rise in middle classes as well as 
informal populations in most of the locations represents one elementary tendency. 
In this context, cities of the South also embody a significant scope for unique practices 
of modernisation and innovation of which many are based on bottom-up informal proc-
esses. Yet, so far, most of the innovative dynamics, including new forms of private urban 
development, remain understudied. 
References 
International institutions such as the United Nations or The World Bank group contrib-
ute enormously to the state of research in mega city studies. An influential link between 
global and mega city research and the new urban challenges has been provided by Fu-
chen Lo and Yue-Man Yeung’s “Globalization and the World of Large Cities” in 1998. 
Milestone references include the flagship reports of the United Nations Centre for United 
                                               
155 The real estate consultancy Cushman and Wakefield (2008) estimates that developing countries received in 2007 500 
percent more international real estate investments than in 2002. 
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Nations Centre for Human Settlements on Urbanisation and Slums (UNHCS, 2000, 
2003), as well as The World Bank’s 2009 World Development Report. Peter Hall and 
Ulrich Pfeiffer also provide a basic elaboration of the context in their 2000 publication: 
Urban 21. Report on the Future of Cities. Janice Pearlman’s Megacity Project, a re-
nowned NGO seeking to promote the exchange of best practice experiences, underlines 
the pragmatic inclination of most of the publications on megacities.156 A scientific per-
spective with a long tradition of investigating urban phenomena of the Third World is 
mainly represented by the discipline of geography – a perspective which, however, is 
highly fragmented by experts on specific regions. Finally, an exemplary work is Karl 
Husa’s and Helmut Wohlschlägl’s (1999) collection of essays comparing Jakarta, Mexico 
City, and Bombay. 
Questions 
Facing the perspective of megacity research, we have to query the following issues: Why do 
Neo-Towns emerge in the peripheries of Megacities, and not in the Western context? Are 
these typologies bound to specific types of Megacities? Which roles do practices of bot-
tom-up planning and self-organisation play? What are the problems and innovations that 
may be of relevance for the larger framework? Do NeoTowns represent an aberration, 
which soon awaits normalisation? 
4. Sprawl and ‘Antisprawl’ 
Relevance 
NeoTowns appear as new centralities in the periphery. On the other hand they trigger 
new sprawling forms of urbanisation. 
The discourse on sprawl, suburbanisation, and ‘antisprawl’ accounts for one of the 
central debates of urban planning in the second half of the 20th Century. Like the phe-
nomenon itself, the dispute originates in the USA.157 In the meanwhile, the suburban way 
of life became the dominant form of urban life in many western societies. The forms that 
growth, as well as the reactions to it, engenders are called Sprawl, Zwischenstadt, Boom-
burbs, Edge-Cities, Peri-Urban Interfaces, Desakota, Urban Landscapes and New Urban-
ism etc.  
Today, the issue of suburban growth (and the forms this growth engenders) becomes 
increasingly relevant for the context of megacities in developing countries, as in most of 
the locations spatial expansion tends to outpace the immense population growth.  
State of research 
The suburb is one of the most contested terrains of issue planning and urbanism. It is 
tackled from a perspective of suburbanisation (pro-sprawl), and anti-sprawl (i.e. New 
Urbanism) as well as from a more neutral phenomenological perspective. In the context 
of the latter, the terminology of the urban landscape (Stadtlandschaft) becomes increas-
ingly important. 
An abstracted profile of the discussion spans from the visionary design of Frank Lloyd 
Wright’s (1932, 1958) Broadacre City, to Victor Gruen’s (1958) critique of the American 
“Citycape and Landscape”, Melvin Webber’s (1963) delineation of a ‘non-place urban 
                                               
156 Cf. www.megacitiesproject.org/, r12.08.2009 
157 While in 1940, 15 per cent of North American population lived in suburbs, half a century later that percentage had 
climbed to 46 percent. By 1966 single-family homes accounted for 77 percent of US American housing stock. (Cf. Garvin 
1996: 154) 
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realm’, Herbert Gans’ 1967 sociological studies of the Levittowners, Victor Gruen’s 
quest for a sustainable form of a ‘Cellular Metropolis’ (Cf. Wall 2005); Robert Fishman’s 
examination of urban (1977) and ‘bourgeois utopias’ (1987), Joel Garreau’s (1991) dis-
covery of the ‘Edge City’; to Peter Calthorpe’s (1997) pledge for a ‘next American city’, 
and Duany’s & Plater-Zyberk critique of ‘The Suburban Nation’ resulting in a Charter 
for a New Urbanism158, to the recent defence of the suburb by Robert Bruegmann’s 
(2005) ‘Compact history of Sprawl’.  
Indeed, while the sprawl and anti-sprawl debates can be regarded as ‘thesis and an-
tithesis’, the notion of a new ‘urban landscape’ emerges as a synthesis. Two examples are 
portrayed by Thomas Sieverts’ (1997) notion of the ‘Zwischenstadt’ (in-between-city), or 
Silvio Macedo’s (2003) account of the “Paigagismo Contemporaneo no Brasil”. Another 
more practical ‘synthesis’ is the ‘Landscape Urbanism’ approach coined by the landscape 
architect James Corner (2003).159  
Questions 
The above discussion suggests that it will be important to localise the phenomenon of 
New Towns in the framework of the suburbanisation, new-urbanism, and landscape 
urbanism debates. What kinds of element on the periphery are NeoTowns? Are they an 
alternative to sprawl, a part of sprawl, or a new type of sprawl? 
5. Private urban enclaves and gated communities 
Relevance 
Gated neighbourhoods, residential enclaves and their inherent organisational forms (i.e. 
Homeowner Associations) are among the most important components of NeoTowns.  
Closed neighbourhoods are one of the dominant contemporary trends in urban devel-
opment. This fact has also generated a significant scientific discourse. 
As with many other cases of contemporary urban trends, the typology was pioneered 
on the western coast of the US, as well as in Florida. About ten years ago, 8,5 million US 
residents lived in gated communities and more than 40 percent of all new residences were 
constructed behind walls (Cf. Blakely 1997). The trend is often associated with lifestyle, 
prestige and security motives. Affluent populations, as well as economic polarisation 
seems to be its most important triggers. Private enclaves and life style communities are 
not restricted to North America; they emerge in many rapidly developing economies 
world wide: from Brazil, Argentine, China, Malaysia and the Philippines, to Indonesia, 
Australia, India, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Bulgaria etc. Many of these countries have the 
highest income inequality in the world. The motives differ from lifestyle prestige to 
physical and financial security, to quality of life issues. Only central Europe seems to be 
more or less immune so far, despite the fact that is was referred to as the ‘largest enclave 
in the world’. (Cf.: Personal comment of an Argentinean student during a field visit to 
Nordelta in 2003). 
State of research 
The research on gated communities is based on a larger body of inquiry into socio-spatial 
segregation and urban fragmentation. This research narrative is represented by Castells 
and Mollenkopf’s 1991 study of novel trends of polarisation in the ‘Dual City’ of New 
                                               
158 http://www.cnu.org/charter, r12.08.2009 
159 A detailed bibliography of state of research discussions can be found for example at : 
http://lj.uwpress.org/cgi/content/refs/27/2/247, r12.08.2009) 
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York. The thread is expanded in 2000 by Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen in a 
volume on “Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order”. New patterns of inequality of 
segregation and fragmentation are also major topics of the UNHCS (2000) volume on 
“An Urbanising World“. Franz Josef Rademacher (2002) explores and refines the con-
cept of inequality benchmarks and stresses the scenario of ‘Brasilianisation’ for the de-
veloped world. The volume of Graham & Marvin (2001) investigates the relationship of 
infrastructure and a new fragmented condition of cities with the notion of „Splintering 
Urbanism“. 
A strong tradition of theorising the segregated city also exists in Brazil. Here Oscar 
Ribeiro (1997) and Flavio Villaça (2001) are among the pioneers. Among the overarch-
ing works are Theresa Caldeira‘s (2000) remarkable and complex study describing the 
“City of Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in São Paulo” and Abdu Maliq 
Simone’s (1997) account of the logic of polarisation and segregation in African cities. 
Research on gated communities is well organised. Its multidisciplinarity is notable (cf. 
www.gatedcommunities.de): Major landmarks include Evan McKenzie’s (1995) exami-
nation of “Privatopia: Homeowners Associations and the rise of Residential Private Gov-
ernment”; Edward Blakely’s and Mary Snyder‘s (1995) “Fortress America. Gated Com-
munities in the United States”; or Setha Low‘s (2003): “Behind the Gates: Life, Security 
and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America”. Glasze‘s and Webster‘s (2005, eds.) 
“Private Cities: Global and Local Perspectives” stands for a strong presence of scholars 
from central Europe. 
Meanwhile, the investigation of gated communities and residential enclaves enjoys a 
strong international presence: Richard Grant (2003) devotes his studies to „The rise of 
gated communities in Ghana“; the Argentinean context is explored by Maristella 
Swampa (2001); the Chilenean by Borsdorf and Hidalgo (2005); in the Brazilian context 
Oscar Ribeiro (1997) prefers to stress a historic legacy of segregation and closed residen-
tial enclaves.160 In addition, Maria Loffredo (2006) inventories the recent rise of ‘Con-
dominios Feachados’ in the metropolitan region of São Paulo; and Karina Landman 
(2002) promotes the South African case. 
In conclusion, it can be stated that gated community research provides a valuable 
background of studies and questions for our context. Once more our study of NeoTowns 
is reconfirmed, as many of the above studies describe large agglomerations of closed 
gated enclaves, and while a conceptualisation of large gated community agglomerations 
is missing. 
Questions 
The above discourse of urban segregation and gated enclaves brings to the fore the fol-
lowing riddles: Are NeoTowns a particular form of agglomerated gated-communities 
(Mega-enclaves)? Are self-controlled communities a ‘natural’ benchmark? What are the 
limitations of bottom-up initiatives and self-organised governance? 
6. Postcolonial spaces, hybrid cultures, new modernities 
Relevance 
“... the belief that the solutions of urban problems lie in starting anew before 
correcting old problems has been the most pernicious...” (Shaw 2004: 20) 
                                               
160 Cf.: Oscar Ribeiro 1997: Dos cortiços aos condomínios fechados: as formas de produçao da moradia na cidade Rio de 
Janeiro. 
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The sixth of the urban narratives presented here belongs to the discipline of postcolonial 
studies and cultural science. In addition to a context of globalisation, regionalisation, 
megacity dynamics, suburbanisation, and fragmentation, NeoTowns originate in a con-
text of postcolonial modernisation. 
In providing a perspective of the historical, political, cultural, local and imagined, the 
narrative of postcolonialism and cultural studies rounds up the other debates, in particu-
lar those based on economics and materialism. The perspective queries the political role 
of urban space in forming the identity of the individual, the collective and the nation. It 
scrutinises the role of modernisation, the impact of the global versus the local, and the 
centre versus the periphery, while interpreting urban spaces as power landscapes. 
The gaze of the postcolonial challenges simplistic models of a (western) centre and a 
(southern) periphery in favour of heterogeneous and complex models based on mutual 
dependency and cross-fertilisation. The discourse applies and mediates post-disciplinary 
concepts of modernity, capitalism and colonialism. While the dominance of the power of 
western concepts is not contested, a more complex picture is drawn and a more elaborate 
story developed.161  
State of research 
An important school representing this gaze is located at the Fernand Braudel Centre of 
the Universiy of Binghampton (NY). Anthony King is among the most prominent repre-
sentatives (Cf. above: Theoretical context). King (1990, 2004) has published extensively 
on the impact of colonialism, postcolonialism and globalization, on cities and the built 
environment, and on the social production of building form.162 The Indonesian scholar 
Abidin Kusno (2000: Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space and Political 
Cultures in Indonesia), as well as Indian Jyoti Hosagrahar (2004: Indigenous Moderni-
ties. Negotiating Architecture and Urbanism), are among the most prominent names 
from the school.163 
Another important thread is presented by cultural anthropology: For example Arjun’s 
Appadurai’s (1990) book on “Modernity at Large”, or Ulf Hannerz’s (1997) essay “Sce-
narios for Peripheral Cultures”. 
The wide scope of the topic ranges from Gewndolin Wright’s (1991) “The Politics of 
Design in French Colonial Urbanism”, to Edward Said’s (1993) “Culture and Imperial-
ism”, to Michael Hardt’s and Antonio Negri’s (2005) “Empire”. A postcolonial perspec-
tive is applied by Annapurna Shaw’s (2004) account of “The Making of Navi Mum-
bai”164. Finally, Richard Sheldon (1997: Migration and Development A Global Perspec-
tive) focuses on the complex geography of contemporary migration. 
                                               
161 From one to two centuries ago... local translations of European and especially British architectural paradigms helped to 
shape the architecture of the city centres and suburbs of both England as well as India, Egypt and elsewhere... From the 
1990‘s ... the rapidly expanding suburbs of particular Indian cities are currently being transformed by an equally historically, 
culturally and geographically specific interpretation of transnational culture. (King 2004: 130/131) 
162 For example in 1990: Urbanism, Colonialism and the World Economy. Cultural and Spatial Foundations of the World 
Urban System; and in 2004: Spaces of Global Cultures. Architecture Urbanism Identity 
163 An introduction to a conference organised by the Fernand Braudel Centre at the University of Binghampton in 1998 on 
Transmodernity, Historical Capitalism, and Coloniality: A Post-Disciplinary Dialogue reads: “Modernity will be problematized 
beyond Eurocentric definitions of reason, freedom, and progress, and in favor of a more contradictory, historicized, and 
plural understanding of the modern. Capitalism will be analyzed as an historical system of global reach, and an historical 
dynamic full of contradictions and contingencies, in light of the operations of changing processes and the actions of mul-
tiple agencies. Coloniality will be explored, not simply as a juridico-political relationship between empires (actors and institu-
tions) and colonized bodies (political and personal) but above all as a basic category for the explanation of the imperial-
colonial underpinnings of economic, political, and cultural relations in the modern world.” (Cf. 
fbc.binghamton.edu/transmod.htm, 412.07.2009) 
164 In particular in her introduction to the topic 
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Questions 
The discourse on postcolonial culture suggests an examination of the following ques-
tions: To what extent are NeoTowns products of the ‘periphery’, to which degree do they 
reflect the results of global modernisation? How does local adaptation and appropriation 
operate? Do NeoTowns contain novel forms of indigenous modernities? 
7. Theming and branding, tourism and the flaneur 
Relevance 
Thematic architecture and branded neighbourhoods appear as most important strategic 
elements of NeoTowns. While hitherto theming was commonly reserved for ‘extraordi-
nary’ locations such as theme parks, hotels, malls, or restaurants, New Towns appear as 
archetypes of themed environments of daily life.  
State of research 
A specific branch of (applied) urban discourses focuses on theming, branding and the 
leisure society: Wolfgang Sonne (2003: Representing the State. Capital City Planning in 
the Early Twentieth Century) tackles this question with the case of new capital cities. The 
phenomenon of theming is studied by architectural and urban theorists such as Rem 
Koolhaas (1978: Delirious New York), critics such as Michael Sorkin (1991: Variations 
on a Theme Park: Scenes from the New American City), geographers such as Mark 
Gottdiener (2001: The Theming of America: American Dreams, Media Fantasies, and 
Themed Environment), or ethnographers such as Scott Lucas (2002: The Themed Space: 
Locating Culture, Nation, and Self).165  
Dean MacCannell (1976: The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class) discovers 
the important perspective of tourism as a benchmark of modern society. His British col-
league John Urry’s lifts this perspective to a global context (1990: The Tourist Gaze: Lei-
sure and Travel in Contemporary Societies).166  
Naomi Klein (2000: No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies) approaches the tac-
tics of theming and branding from the perspective of a critique of economic globalisa-
tion. Klein’s work has influenced a large amount of peers. 
Other narratives are geared to the role of urban branding strategies and themed urban 
landscapes, such as the Daimler City und Sony Center Berlin, Migros Westside Bern, VW 
Erlebniswelt Wolfsburg, albeit from a Western and predominantly European perspec-
tive.167  
Questions/ To Do’s 
The debate underlines the importance of the systematic analysis of strategies of theming 
and branding. It also underlines the need for a detailed classification the semiotic vocabu-
lary of NeoTowns. The questions raised include: How can the semiotic vocabulary of 
New Towns be described? Which methods does the strategy of urban branding apply? 
                                               
165 See also Tagungsbericht Staging the Past – Themed Environments in Transcultural Perspectives. 23.04.2009-25.04.2009, 
Freiburg, in: H-Soz-u-Kult, 21.07.2009, at: http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=2699, 424.06.2009. 
166 Indeed this perspective, could also be red as an expansion of Benjamin’s flaneur, who has gone international and then 
global (Cf. Benjamin, Walter (1991): Der Flaneur, in: ders: Das Passagen-Werk. Gesammelte Schriften V.1+2, Hg. Rolf von 
Thiedemann und Herrmann Schweppenhäuser, 1. Bd., Frankfurt/M : 524-569). 
167 Cf. Höger 2007: City – Branding: Marken bauen Stadt, in Helmut Bott, Franz Pesch, Johann Jessen, Eckhart Ribbeck: 
Inszenierung, Branding, Stadtmarketing Stadtgestaltung in der Globalisierung; Stuttgart; Friedrich von Borries: 2003: Nike-
Urbanismus, Branding und die Markenstadt von morgen. 
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Which spaces and typologies are produced? Are NeoTowns the places of the ultimate 
spectacle? 
Other debates 
There are a series of additional debates which are both interesting in the context of our 
research and to which, in turn this research could provide useful insights. A methodo-
logical conceptualisation of these disciplines and perspectives, however, goes beyond the 
capacity of this work. The aspect of NeoTowns as benchmarks of modernity, or as a new 
form of lifestyle products, for example, could provide valuable contribution to debates 
on contemporary space and culture. An examination of sustainability aspects could sup-
port the solution of important problems on the ground. 
Actuality, Gaps, Limitations 
The above investigation of the current state of research demonstrates that this project is 
necessary and important. NeoTowns are worthwhile to be studied at two major levels: 
one in regard to system knowledge and theory formation, the other to operational 
knowledge and the exchange of best practices.  
NeoTowns give the impression of a new urban typology. For this reason they are in-
teresting from a scientific point of view. We need a better understanding and conceptu-
alisation of this typology, which emerges in a context of a unique historic constellation of 
global and local dynamics. Therefore, investigations need to be done into the motives, 
the urban form and typology as well as into the local impact of the phenomenon.  
Essentially, Neo Towns represent newly planned cities built from scratch on 
Greenfield sites under the guidance of the private sector. In this context they are particu-
larly well suited to reflect on the structural logic of the contemporary liberal market 
economy. In addition to enhancing our conception of contemporary space, the investiga-
tion of this unique typology will also provide valuable contributions to the sub disci-
plines of urban research, as presented above. 
Finally, our study is also vital as it facilitates the identification, discussion and transfer 
of the respective innovations and challenges on the ground. The research promotes a 
reflection on the experiences made and provides stakeholders with valuable implementa-
tion knowledge. 
Gaps 
The examination of the current state of research leads to the identification of a series of 
comprehensive research gaps.168 These comprise five aspects:  
- Firstly, the informational age lacks theories of spatial production;  
- Secondly, the debate on neoliberalism in particular is lacking a spatial side;  
- Thirdly, NeoTowns are not recognised as a new typology;  
- Fourthly, local debates remain isolated;  
- And fifthly, the ever-increasing specialisation and fragmentation of research con-
tradicts a deep understanding of complex problems.169 
 
                                               
168 Cf. also the ‘framework table’ of relevant research fields 
169 Obviously only the third and fourth gaps, as identified above, can be tackled directly, while the other three reassure the 
approach this effort has taken and establish a horizon of targets and objectives. 
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Models of production of space in the informational age remain marginal  
The inquiry into the concepts of the production of contemporary urban space reveals a 
lack of theories of spatial production in the informational age. Postmodern and post-
structuralist thought might state that we finally find ourselves in a parallel and synchro-
nised world, which allows for a multiplicity of simultaneous models. This research, in 
contrast, assumes that models such as Lefebvre’s theory of production of space have a 
viable potential for validation and update. We can even postulate that these concepts 
need to be updated within the framework of the neoliberal, or new, economy. 
To address the increasing contradictions produced in our era of ‘supermodern ration-
alisation’ new models of space are needed (Cf.: Context). While natural science (and phi-
losophy), went through a revolution of relativity and uncertainty about 100 years ago, 
this ‘revolution’ of thinking has not made its way to our conceptualisation of society and 
space. Yet, the relativity revolution in regard to space is still waiting to reach mainstream 
conscience and thinking. The real world remains to be governed by the mechanistic and 
technocratic principles of advancing rationalisation.  
As space is produced by a combination of these principles with the collective imagi-
naries of power elites, new solutions, forms and typologies are produced, but at the same 
time an increasing number of contradictions arise. We think that these contradictions can 
only be addressed when the character and the role of spatial production in the informa-
tional age is re-evaluated. The rising gap between an individual and collective imagina-
tion/production of space and its abstraction and institutionalisation (supermodern, ultra-
rational) can only be addressed by a comprehensive reform of the way space is under-
stood.170  
Neoliberal critique lacks a spatial side 
An important rift in the present debate on neoliberalism can be identified in that the de-
bate lacks a spatial perspective.171 This is important because we live in an era of space 
where every part of the globe is under economic control, and nowadays cities, bodies and 
lifestyles have become the central means of production. Hence, while the debate on neo-
liberalism unmasks important political and ideological aspects of socio-political devel-
opment, it is missing half of the reality: the essential spatial component. Consequently, 
we argue that what is essentially needed to understand contemporary space and society is 
a theory of production of neoliberal space. This requires a profound conceptualisation 
regarding the rise of new urban typologies, forms and places.172 
NeoTowns not recognised as a new typology  
The scientific and applied investigation of planned settlements includes various catego-
ries: military camps, new capitals, colonial cities, industrial towns, or decongestion nodes 
(Cf. Galantay 1975). These have many subspecies. The typology of modernist state-
driven New Towns and satellite cities is largely regarded as the most recent class. Some 
have also regarded it as a terminal class of planned towns, while a liberalised market 
framework was not believed to have the capacity to come up with its own typology of 
new cities. This work observes the opposite: it notices (and explores) the emergence of a 
significant number of privately driven new towns on a world wide scale and proposes to 
                                               
170 See also to Gotsch 1995 
171 Cf. below discussion of Brenner 2002 and Hackworth 2007 
172 We have seen that attempts to describe neoliberal space are only fragmented and mostly related to the western world 
(Brenner 2002, Hackworth 2006). Brenner and his colleague talk about the transformation of the relationships of geo-
graphical spaces and scales (nation, territory, and place), but not about a spatial logic and typologies. Jameson (1984), 
Harvey (1989), Castells (1989), Hackworth (2006), among others, are mainly describing processes, or specific examples (US 
American Downtowns, or the famous Buenaventura hotel in LA). What is lacking however is a theory or model in the back-
ground. Henri Lefebvre 1973 has laid out some of the essential grammar. 
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include this phenomenon as a new typology into the family of planned settlements. It 
proposes to name this new species NeoTown, because it is regarded as representing a 
paradigmatic original of contemporary space (whose production is unilaterally domi-
nated by economic institutions). 
Local debates remain isolated  
The examination of local debates brings to the fore a large amount of debates and dis-
cussions.173 Among the authors are interested scholars, unsettled architects, curious 
journalists, busy real estate representatives, concerned politicians, and socialising resi-
dents (Cf. references in the respective chapters). Yet, while each of the NeoTown exam-
ples has its own story (history), many of the local discussions lack a conceptual perspec-
tive. Moreover, most are not aware of the global framework. Few are aware that similar 
topics are being discussed at many other places worldwide. It therefore becomes part of 
the extended agenda of this research to conceptualise the matter in a global perspective 
and to provide a platform for linking the respective discussions. 
Specialisation of disciplines contradicts an integrated holistic approach 
The examination of the research context reflects that trends such as rationalisation, spe-
cialisation and diversification do not stop when it comes to research fields. The respective 
disciplines appear ever more focused and specialised (every urban aspects have their ex-
pert fields: informality, downtowns, suburban villas, malls, highways, etc). This increas-
ing specialisation leads to growing quantities of knowledge. However, a holistic, critical 
picture of the whole tends to get lost. This research seeks to address this gap by working 
with different tools and by combining several disciplines.174  
Limitations  
What this research cannot do. 
This project is an explorative study which seeks to demarcate a new track for research. It 
compares three selected examples of privately developed cities: AlphaVille (São Paulo), 
Bumi Serpong Damai (Jakarta), and Navi Mumbai (Mumbai). The research is motivated 
by the question of contemporary urbanism and the concurrent production of space. The 
issue is contextualised in state of research concepts. The work operates along a series of 
hypotheses and produces a research agenda. It aims to produces some essential theoreti-
cal as well as practical modules (system knowledge and operational knowledge). 
The above perspective allows us to clarify what the research cannot achieve:  
- This undertaking cannot provide a historical narrative. It compares NeoTowns in 
space. The comparative study seeks to contextualise NeoTowns in a present global 
context. It aims to verify whether the phenomena at hand constitute a new typol-
ogy. In contrast to this approach, the development of a systematic genealogy of 
NeoTowns in relation to other forms of planned settlements, in particular in rela-
tion to modernistic New Towns emerges as an attractive point for a future research 
agenda. 
- The comparative and holistic focus of this study does not allow an undertaking of 
profound empirical work at the respective places. Participatory field research, as is 
for example common in anthropology, is precluded at this stage. This is pitiable in 
particular when it comes to the examination of the imagination and the value sys-
                                               
173 The cases are explored in newspapers, scientific articles, PhD theses, books, YouTube videos, Internet blogs, or real estate 
brochures, and to a lesser extent by researchers. 
174 A specific long term-challenge challenge lies in the reconciliation of materialist economic perspectives related to eco-
nomic globalisation, and an ideal gaze, which investigates subjective imagination and cultural form. 
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tems of individual stakeholders. On the other hand, the hypotheses and the re-
search agenda produced will essentially guide and propitiate these modes. 
- Last but not least this study is not capable of producing specific local planning-
fixes. It can neither address local problems such as social tensions, lacking infra-
structure, environmental degradation etc., nor can it produce strategies and road-
maps for particular planning, technical, financial, ecological, management prob-
lems. The approach rather is to undertake a first step towards theory formation in 
generalising the basic findings of the comparative study. This enhanced conceptual 
framework can then facilitate a better understanding of particular problems. 
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Methods and tools –  
Postdisciplinarity rediscovered  
The goals of this project, to contribute to a better understanding of contemporary space 
in general, and to examine the production of privately driven new town typologies in 
particular, ask for appropriate formulae and instruments. The following section is de-
voted to the delineation of the techniques and instruments that are applied. What is at 
stake is not only a set of rational techniques, but a specific attitude of practicing urban 
science in a postmodern context deprived of meta histories and narratives. 
Methodological spirit 
The methodological spirit of this research can be circumscribed by seven principal attrib-
utes. These are: 1) postdisciplinary, 2) explorative, 3) theory based 4) comparative, 5) 
holistic-synoptic, 6) critical-dialectic, and 7) subjective. 
1. Postdisciplinary 
A vital point of departure for this research is a postdisciplinary perspective. While post-
disciplinarity includes interdisciplinarity, it goes further. Interdisciplinarity is a first step 
of addressing the dilemma of increasing specialisation in a context of increasing complex-
ity. Scientific disciplines, like other social systems, are predisposed to constrain their 
members in disciplinary mechanisms and micro-political issues. Postdisciplinarity, in con-
trast, makes an effort to operate beyond disciplinary constraints. Moreover, it favours a 
scientific approach that is guided by an overarching question, rather than by a discipli-
nary agenda. Instead of being bounded to the perspective of a particular discipline, it 
benefits from a combination of various approaches.  
In this context our project seeks to be a postdisciplinary platform, which maps out 
and combines different disciplinary approaches on the production of contemporary 
space. The content is approached with the code of different disciplines: architecture, 
planning, sociology, economy, anthropology, political science, social policy, philosophy 
etc. This combination of various analytical angles and disciplinary jargons reduces the 
risk of failure and increases the innovative potential, in particular when it comes to un-
ravelling complex and multilayered problems.175 
2. Explorative 
This research is also explorative. This follows from the post-disciplinary context as well 
as the fresh research field. A new field with many uncertainties and unpredictables sug-
gests an exploration of the topic. The domains of city and society are marked by a high 
degree of complexity: multiple stakeholders, various scales, diverse local conditions and 
historic narratives. Research becomes a true exploration that has to continually grope 
                                               
175 Arguments which discuss the issue of ‘post-disciplinary studies are presented by: Abbott, Andrew D. 2001: Chaos of 
Disciplines, London; Kosko, Bart 1994: Fuzzy Thinking: the New Science of Fuzzy Logic, London; Sayer, Andrew R. 2000: 
Realism and Social Science, London: Sage, Wallerstein, Immanuel 1999: The End of the World as We Know It: Social Science 
for the Twenty- First Century, London. 
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ahead. This tactic leaves space for adaptation and change during the process. Guidance is 
provided by the underlying theoretical base.176  
One example of the explorative strategy is the preliminary examination of various 
NeoTown samples before a set of three study cases is selected. Another example is the 
formulation questions from the examination of state of research.177  
The explorative approach includes the freedom to juxtapose contradicting positions 
and media and to explore the new reality these confrontations produce. In this manner 
our project explores: Scientific articles, blog entries, business reports, theory, you tube 
movies, own observations, Wikipedia entries, stakeholder opinions, fiction writing etc.178  
3. Theoretically guided 
The framework of this undertaking is delineated by theory. Our question of contempo-
rary space is embedded in a framework of theory. Theory is the point of departure and 
the goal, the base and the roofing. In order to achieve results, an explorative approach 
needs an orientation. Theory formation occurs through the identification of new trends 
and typologies and the formulation of hypotheses. Concepts of spatial production, basic 
economic models, neoliberal narratives, and also the genealogy of new towns are ana-
lysed and evaluated in the context chapter. These serve as the starting point. In addition, 
a matrix of disciplinary narratives is defined, which have an imminent relevance (re-
search on: global cities, megacities, regional cities, sprawl/ anti-sprawl, segregation/ 
fragmentation, and postcolonial studies). 
 
4. Comparative 
It is the most difficult thing to study an object alone. A juxtaposition of sev-
eral objects works better, as relative facts can be better established. ... A 
comparative study of the material is always beneficial. The search for similar 
cases in one civilisation, or one historic period, or several leads to the right 
track.179  
The major modus operandi of this project is a comparative study. A comparative study is 
the classical method of theory formation (Cf. Mills 1969). It allows for the identification 
of trends, typologies, and for the establishment of hypotheses.  
The comparative approach at hand is spatial. It compares a selected set of simultane-
ous examples from several of locations. In contrast, a historically motivated comparative 
study would compare a set of examples in time: For example Baroque settlements, with 
modernistic Satellite Cities and private Neo Towns. Both of the procedures are relevant 
and important. However, the spatial approach constitutes the first step in identifying 
general trends and typologies.180 
                                               
176 Cf. Simon, H. 1996: The Sciences of the Artificial. 3.ed., Cambridge). 
177 On explorative strategies cf. for example to: Churchman, C.W. 1971: The design of inquiring systems. 
178 The Situationists referred to the technique as détournement as: “… the flexible language of anti-ideology. It appears in 
communication that knows it cannot claim to embody any definitive certainty.” (Debord 1967: §208) 
179 Cf. Charles Wright Mills 1969: The Sociological Imagination; Translation by the author from the 1973 German edition. 
180 The approach was motivated by Patrick Geddes, among others, who as early as 1915 in his work on “Cities in Evolution” 
formulated a holistic approach of urbanism and planning: The book will show how trends and tendencies can be made 
evident by a survey of each city, and bring its ordinary citizens to an understanding of its possible future (Patrick Geddes 
1915: V) 
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The motivation to conduct a comparative study is also a product of the quest of a 
western researcher to produce a valid contribution when researching new urban phe-
nomena in the South. This external perspective allows the observer to take a relatively 
unobstructed position as an outsider. This is an advantage, as it allows for a relatively 
neutral evaluation of the subjects. The external view facilitates a fairly unbiased ap-
proximation of local debates, and eases the placement of the relationships in a greater 
global context. 
The core of this project is made up of the examination of three cases of privately de-
veloped New Towns. This number was considered minimal for a comparative study, to 
allow for the identification of trends, tendencies and for the formulation of hypotheses. 
On the other hand this was the maximum quantity to be handled in our capacity. 
A standardised descriptive framework facilitates this examination. It is modelled as a 
spatial system of multiple stakeholders and comprises six elements: 1) a general spatial 
and historic context (the atmosphere), 2) the form and structure (the playfield), 3) the 
residents (the players), 4) the developers and architects (the authors), 5) the finances (the 
ball as the means of exchange), as well as 6) the regulatory framework (the rules). (Cf. 
below: Structure) 
5. Synoptic-holistic  
The general principle is the synoptic one, of seeking as far as may be to rec-
ognise and utilise all points of view... (Geddes: 114) 
Town planning requires a synoptic vision of nature to enable a constructive 
conservation of its order and beauty in the development of the new wealth of 
cities (Ibidem: v) 
Our general post-disciplinary and explorative framework implies a holistic and synoptic 
approach. This entails a comprehensive or broad (e.g. synoptic) view from multiple ana-
lytical, conceptual and scalar angles. This tactic is diametric to reductive methods.  
The modus operandi model implies that planned settlements are regarded as urban 
systems that are more than just the sum of their parts. The method is closely related to 
ecological thinking, whose objects of study is composed of multiple and dynamic forms 
and processes. The concept of holism originates in Jan Smut’s thinking (1925: Holism 
and Evolution). The notion of a synoptic perspective relates to Patrick Geddes’ (1915: 
Cities in Evolution).181 182 
A holistic approach is aware that, independent of the number of perspectives used, the 
behaviour of the system can never be entirely predicted. Moreover, it takes into account 
that systems may produce surprisingly unexpected and paradoxical behaviours.183 These 
dynamics cannot be understood without a holistic and synoptic perspective.  
In our context, space in general and New Towns in particular are regarded as com-
plex emerging systems. These exist between past and present, form and content, matter 
and spirit etc. We deem that their problems can only be tackled by taking a holistic and 
synoptic approach. The approach corresponds with Lefebvre’s concept of a produced 
                                               
181 Smut, who is regarded as the father of the holistic approach to science, writes: “Abstract procedure with its narrowing of 
concepts and processes into hard and rigid outlines, and their rounding off into definite scientific counters, temporarily 
simplified the problems of science and thought... AMONG the great gaps in knowledge those which separate the phenom-
ena of matter, life, and mind still remain unabridged. The solution must therefore ultimately depend on  our more extended 
knowledge of these series and the discovery of interconnections between them (1925: 2,3). 
182 The concept is also influential in systems and complexity theories. (Cf. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, 1968: General System 
Theory. Foundations Development Applications. Allen Lane.) 
183 Cf. for example Thomas Shelling 1978: Micromotives and Macrobehaviour. 
Introduction     60 
space, as discussed above. It is also validated when Anthony King postulates that: 
“’Space’... implies the production of space ... and the economic, social, political, and 
above all cultural conditions in which space is produced.” (Anthony King 2004: 127) 
Only through a combination of histories, theories, morphologies, processes, actors, and 
rules, does the reality of the subject, the NeoTown, become tangible. 
6. Dialectic 
A dialectic approach is an essential methodological technique within this work. Notably, 
the concept is not used in an ideological sense. It is neither materialist not idealist. It is 
rather applied as a basic model to perceive complex, dynamic and contradictory systems. 
Despite the fact that a thorough description of the subject is an essential starting point 
and base, a complex matter such as the city cannot remain descriptive. (This is also true 
for the above-described methodological body). The processes and elements that compose 
and produce space are vibrant and conflicting. The city is a complex assemblage of eco-
nomic, cultural, political, individual subsystems.184 A balance of forces makes up the 
structure. Many of these have contradictory motives.  
Progress is often not linear, and occurs along turning points and creates contradic-
tions: Urban growth leads to the consumption of nature, the car creates mobility but 
destroys traditional urbanity, collective individualisation endangers a collective spirit, 
market economies create wealth, yet also difference, a new town which was meant to 
prevent sprawl may trigger more urban growth and sprawl, etc. In short, an approach 
aiming at an understanding of an urban system needs to take this ambivalence, contrari-
ness, and inconsistency into account.  
Yet, the use of dialectics in our context is very different from its employment as a 
rhetoric device. Rhetorical dialectics tends to produce results and construct argumenta-
tive lines based on argument and counterargument. This approach often follows a politi-
cal rather than scientific agenda. In this context, inconvenient and bothersome convolu-
tion tends to be blended out. The discussion of social and environmental problems is 
rarely the subject of real estate brochures: the critics of new privately driven projects 
rarely discuss the innovations produced by the real estate sector.  
A scientific point of view looks upon dialectical rhetoric with a sceptical eye. Here 
dialectics seeks to reflect a complex and contradictory reality. The method is based on 
the notion that truth can be best approximated through the inspection of difference. In 
this way the unfolding of the whole drama of contrasting realities is regarded as a pre-
condition for the projection of solutions.  
The dialectic approach is as old as science and philosophy.185 ‘Modern’ dialectics are 
particularly represented by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.186 Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels are renowned for having inverted Hegel’s idealistic dialectic, which resulted in the 
approach of a dialectical historical materialism. In particular the idea of contradiction, 
represented by class struggle, is central to Marxist dialectic thought.187  
                                               
184 A perspective which is represented for example by Michel Anglietta’s 1976: Theory of capitalist regulation. 
185 The ‘fluid’ philosophy of Heraclitus’ and Plato’s Socratic dialogues represent the ontological and discursive focus of the 
method. For Heraclitus the essence of being means becoming on the basis of contradictions, stability is a result of move-
ments, and form is an outcome of processes. (Cf. Pleines, Jürgen-Eckardt 2002: Heraklit. Anfängliches Philosophieren; 
Hildesheim.) 
186 Hegel’s 1807 work affirms the notion that, "dialectic" is the formula by which history unfolds: history progresses as a 
dialectical process. Dialectic can overcome the limitedness of the partial categories of understanding. (Hegel’s Science of 
Logic: at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlbeing.htm#HL1_82, r23.07.2009). 
187 Cf. Uchida, Hiroshi 1988: Marx's Grundrisse and Hegel's Logic, at: www.marxists.org/subject/japan/uchida/index.htm, 
r12.07.2009; and Engels, Frederick, (1883) Dialectics of Nature:II. Dialectics; at 
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/ch02.htm, , r12.07.2009. 
Introduction     61 
In the following, dialectic concepts reverberate in the work of Joseph Schumpeter188 
via Lefebvre’s spatial dialectics, to recent strategies of scenario planning189  
Dialectics is commonly regarded as the ‘lingua franca’ of critical theory.190 Guy 
Debord, for example, regards critical thinking as a social practice of its own.191 This 
work agrees with the main idea of this perspective, which stresses an evaluation of the 
findings. We believe, however, that its ideological and rhetorical gaze can also obstruct 
reality. 
Finally, the base line of this work is the concept of spatial dialectics, which was devel-
oped by Henri Lefebvre (cf. above). His relational and dialectical model serves as a major 
reference for the analysis of contemporary urban forms, the evaluation of contradictions 
and gaps that emerge in the process of production of novel spaces, and the identification 
of strategies to master these contradictions.  
7. Subjective 
Before concluding our delineation of the methodological spirit driving this project, it has 
to be stressed that the work remains subjective and personal. We think that in our time a 
scientific framework can only be relational. This holds in particular for cultural, political, 
urban and social sciences. Numerous eminent scientists and philosophers accept that 
science is socially constructed and that objectivity can only be an approximation.192  
This perception, however, does not preclude a ‘traditional’ approach to research. The 
object of study, including the methods and tools, can and must be scientifically deline-
ated. On the other hand the dependence of the system on other systems cannot be objec-
tively controlled. This is true for the content of the system as well as for the scientific 
project. The author/scientist is an integral part of distinct cultural and social systems. He 
produces these and at the same time he is also reproduced. These have, consciously and 
unconsciously, formed his perception, his views, and his personal integrity. In this con-
text the research at hand must remain constrained to the selected perceptive elements of a 
specific gaze. A large part of the reality remains excluded. What our work aims to 
achieve, however, is the maximisation of the likelihood of a common perspective. 
While it is seen as an advantage to conduct this research on NeoTowns in the South 
from an outsider’s view, the author cannot escape from his central European back-
ground. He is part of a distinct research culture and socialisation. This is part of his biog-
                                               
188 Who coined the concept of ‘creative destruction’, as a basis of economic development and innovation (Cf. Schumpeter 
1942: Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy) 
189 This is an increasingly popular toll used by the military, business and the economic world for drafting strategic long term 
plans. It is used in the context of volatile and dynamically changing systems. Examples include military battle strategies, 
global markets for oil, or the future constellation of the European Union. Cf. Schwartz, Peter 1991: The Art of the Long 
View). 
190 Critical theory has to be communicated in its own language –– the language of contradiction, dialectical in form as well 
as in content: the language of the critique of the totality, of the critique of history (Debord 1995 (1967): 144). 
191 “In the language of contradiction, the critique of culture manifests itself as unified: unified in that it dominates the whole 
of culture –– culture as knowledge as well as culture as poetry; unified, too, in that it is no longer separable from the cri-
tique of the social totality. It is this unified theoretical critique that goes alone to its rendezvous with a unified social prac-
tice.” (Debord 1995 (1967): 147) 
192 Hegel has stated in this context that: “Truth is not like some finished product in which one can no longer find any trace 
of the tool that made it” (Quoted by Debord 1968). The sociologist Herbert Gans affirms: “An investigation of livelihoods 
requires evaluations and personal judgements. I personally believe that there are multiple ways to achieve a good life and to 
cope with all kinds of problems.” (Herbert Gans 1968: 27). Bruno Latour has argued that science is socially constructed. 
Scientists actively promote the credibility of their research, and personal rhetoric, social beliefs, and technical artefacts play a 
predominant role in the construction of scientific facts (1979: Laboratory Life). In the abstract view of Niklas Luhman’s 
system theory (1984:) reality can only be constructed by the interior conditions. Cognition can only emerge from the inside 
of a system; this precludes any access to a greater ‘objective’ reality. The respective system is driven by the logic of its own 
reproduction (Autopoiesis). 
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raphy. Finally, it is up to the critical reader to approve or disapprove, to be fertilised or 
disillusioned – and to construct his own piece of reality on the basis of this enterprise.  
Synergies of methods and structure 
Whereas a combination of all of the elements of the methodological framework, as de-
lineated above, is valid for the research in general, specific components become particu-
larly important at various stages of the project. 
While the early contextual stage of this work is post-disciplinary and theory-guided, 
the question of spatial models plays a predominant role at this stage of our inquiry. 
Various disciplines are explored to approximate the ‘problem’. But Lefebvre’s spatial 
dialectics play an essential guiding role. 
The operational descriptive level makes up for the main and the most extensive part 
this research. Here three cases of NeoTowns are portrayed in a synoptic-holistic, descrip-
tive and explorative manner. The narrative panorama is composed of six positions: con-
text, form, user, author, medium, and rule. This design represents a basic structure of a 
‘game’ that efficiently allows for a combination of a synoptic range of lookouts.193 The 
aspects of ‘context and form’ provide a temporal as well as a spatial view, the two me-
dium elements, user and author, focus on the stakeholders, while the last two give atten-
tion to aspects of immaterial means and rules. 
Each of the angles is subdivided into a series of more distinct descriptive categories. 
The question of form, for example, is discussed at multiple scales from the urban region 
to the local building typology. The ‘rules of the game’ are examined in the framework of 
control in relation to stakeholder groups, as well as in regard to codes. This structure is 
used for each of the samples in order to facilitate their comparability. While various 
voices and materials are studied, the respective narratives of Navi Mumbai, Bumi Ser-
pong Damai and AlphaVille produce a unique indigenous variety and divergence. The 
complete structural body is presented in the ‘structure’ section below. 
The concluding phase inevitably merges the initial questions set out by theory models, 
New Town research and specific urban debates, with the base of holistic data, trends and 
typologies explored in the core. Consequently it allows for a generalisation of system as 
well as operational knowledge at a higher level. Here the trends and typologies, as well 
as ‘best practices’ and problems are identified. 
Tools 
The essential methodical instruments used to realise the goals of this research include: a 
review of secondary literature, the examination of a vide range of primary data (from 
various disciplines and in a multitude of media), expert interviews, rapid spatial appraisal 
and observation, analytical and explorative mapping techniques, databanks of informa-
tion and pictures, as well as a catalogue of privately developed New Towns. 
 
- The formulation the conceptual framework of this research is based on an inten-
sive literature review of theoretical concepts related to the ‘production of contem-
porary space’, political economy, neoliberalism, the state-of-the art in New Town 
research, and a set of related spatial disciplines (cf. the context section). 
- A comprehensive range of primary and secondary case data (from newspaper ar-
ticles to scientific papers, planning reports, legal documents, statistical reports, in-
                                               
193 The setting was influenced by game theory. We do not, however, intend to run a simulation. 
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vestor brochures, or Internet blogs, among others) constitutes the main information 
body and basis of the project. 
- Expert interviews with key planners, developers, and public sector officials pro-
vided essential expert knowledge from ‘behind the scenes’ and valuable input for 
the evaluation of the respective situation. As was mentioned earlier we have ab-
stained from methods of quantitative empirical analysis. These seem appropriate at 
later periods, on a general conceptual framework has been established. 
- Personal site visits and rapid spatial appraisal methods, as well as participatory 
observation provided further detailed information and helped to assess the other 
data. 
- The preparation of analytical and explorative maps, as well as conceptual draw-
ings, has been used as another means of improving the understanding of spatial 
and organisational data. 
- Two electronic databanks have been programmed and developed in the manner 
of file-cards, to facilitate the compilation and the evaluation of text and image 
data.  
- Finally, an electronic catalogue of privately developed new towns was developed. 
The databanks and catalogues are intended for use beyond this stage of the project. 
They will also serve as an informational basis for a website on the topic (www.neo-
town.org). 
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Selection of the cases –  
Three NeoTowns with a graceful age 
The three study cases have been selected out of a sample group of 16 shortlisted exam-
ples. These have been identified as representative and potentially paradigmatic examples 
during an extensive preliminary research phase. To be included in the general data bank 
an example had to comply with a majority of the NeoTown criteria, as established in the 
context section.194 These include: a minimum size and mix of use, the availability of own 
services and infrastructure, a dominant authorship and control by the private sector, and 
a distinct ideological moment (cf. to the context chapter).195 In this comprehensive data-
bank, Asia emerges as a clear leader for the quantity of the projects. Latin America and 
Africa come up in a distant second and third place. 
In order to select the three cases for the main study, the 16 most promising examples 
from the databank were selected and a comparative matrix was drafted.196 
 
 Illustration A-14: Comparative chart 
The three study cases were selected according to the criteria of size, mix of use, democ-
ratic context, private sector authorship, maturity, and project region. To be chosen, a 
scheme had to embrace more than 100 000 residents as well as a broad mix of land uses 
(with the exception of heavy industry). Moreover, a position in a democratic context 
associated with a free market economy was required. It was implied that in this context it 
would best epitomize the logic of the private sector. Moreover, the candidate was re-
quired to present a physical reality to be analysed, and thus manifest an advanced state 
of implementation. This was an important prerequisite to deducting fundamental trends 
and important lessons.  
Additionally, the location of the candidates was important: the three study cases were 
aimed at displaying a great geographic spread. The Asian region was differentiated to 
South-East Asia, India, China, and the Middle East, because it contained such an enor-
mous amount of instances.197 The criteria of project maturity reduced the choices to five. 
As two of these cases are Chinese (Anting and Shenzhen) these were abandoned and the 
number boiled down to three. The selection process along this filter leads to a clear iden-
tification of Bumi Serpong Damai (Jakarta), AlphaVille (São Paulo), as well as Navi 
Mumbai (India). This was affirmed in expert interviews and further qualitative investiga-
tions.198  
                                               
194 The initial process lasted more than one year. The result was a first data bank of potential NeoTowns, which is continu-
ously being expanded. In July 2009 the databank has more than 80 entries. This part of the research was based on intense 
reviews of primary and secondary literature, expert interviews. All available information sources and media have been used.  
195 The rule of being a component of a megacity region in the south played an implicit role. Yet it seems that it is a sufficient 
but not a necessary criteria. Our observations speak for the fact that phenomenon of NeoTowns is primarily emerging in 
extended urban regions of the South. The few contemporary capital cities such as Astana (Kazakhstan) and Abuja (Nigeria) 
are primarily triggered by the public sector. 
196 At first the chart also contained five reference cases from the West. Irvine was the most promising Western reference 
case. Yet the approach was dropped, as the addition of a fourth and possible fifth case would have ruined the feasibility of 
this project. Indeed, another comparative study of Irvine with NeoTowns comes out as a vital point for a future research 
agenda. 
197 The criteria ‘democratic context’ has ruled out hundreds of planned cities emerging in contemporary China, the criteria 
of ‘maturity’ dozens of Indian examples.  Both of these regions remain interesting for future studies! 
198 Nevertheless, the choice of Navi Mumbai appeared problematic and raised a series of questions. It is commonly known 
that the Indian state of Maharashtra is driving the project (Cf. for example Shaw 2004). Even so, the selection could be 
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 Illustration A-15: Selection chart 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
confirmed while it emerged that the developer is a non-profit company. It became clear that Navi Mumbai would be a 
particularly good example to demonstrate an ongoing proliferation of privatisation strategies. Yet the fact that Navi Mumbai 
is a semi-public venture has, in addition to the geographic diversity, also increased the disparity of authorship among the 
three cases. Bumi Serpong Damai is in the hands of a large industrial conglomerate, while AlphaVille was developed by a 
local real estate start-up. This composition, once more, promised a maximisation of findings and experiences. 
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Research design & structure – 
Games on theoretic turf 
The following section describes the structure that was selected to unfold and present this 
research. The model of the structure may be described as a three-story building. A core of 
three stories is framed by a theoretical basis and a conceptual roof. 
Research design  
The structure of this project thrives on the methodological esprit as described above. It 
emerges from the desire to contextualise the fresh topic in a theoretical framework, to 
operationalise the matter in a synoptic-holistic way and to conceptualise the results in 
formulating a research agenda and summarising the most important experiences. 
The research object of NeoTowns is contextualised within a framework of relevant 
debates. This is done to delineate a specific research context as well as to mark out the 
criteria (indicators) for a measurement and evaluation. Contextualisation is, in other 
words, the ’subjection’ of the research into a system of other objects – it describes the 
effort of integrating an object into an existing system. This is accomplished through a 
technique of differentiation. 
Opposed to this contextual method of differentiation, the operationalisation refers to 
a detailed, holistic description of the topic itself. The examination of the respective case 
study examples, the respective floors of the building, must propitiate the comparability of 
the three cases. It refers to the interior, to a description of the inner guts of a system. The 
goal here is to discriminate the sub-elements of a complex topic into manageable parts. 
Describing the object from as many angles as possible achieves this.  
The third step of conceptualisation refers to the act of giving meaning to something, 
the process of becoming conscious about an issue, its complexity and its implications. To 
conceptualise a problem, to ‘have a concept’, is in other words, the precondition that 
enables us to fully debate and criticise something. 
The synoptic and multidisciplinary view is inspired by Patrick Geddes (1915: Cities in 
Evolution), Herbert Gans (1967: The Levittowners), Henri Lefebvre (1974: The Produc-
tion of Space) and Alexander Garvin (1996: The American city. What Works, What 
Doesn’t).199 The approach of this work customises the descriptive angles of the above 
authors to fit the specific needs of this project. At the same time the layout of the struc-
ture is inspired by concepts stemming from systems and game theories (cf. above). The 
resulting structural prototype contains six major elements: 1. context, 2. form, 3. users, 
4. authors, 5. finances (media), and 6. control. 
 Illustration A-16: Elephant metaphor 
                                               
199 Geddes develops the methodology of systematic, holistic, and multidisciplinary surveys as a prerequisite for successful 
urban development (in the context of the early industrial city). The identification of trends and typologies plays a central role 
in his methodology. Gans analyses the suburban life in Levittown (Pennsylvania) along a multi-stakeholder perspective of 
planners, designers, politicians, and residents. He also uses discursive analysis unmasking the ideology of mainstream cri-
tique (in the context of the industrial city). Lefebvre comes up with a dialectical model of space, which is produced, experi-
enced and transformed by multiple stakeholders (in the context of the Keynesian city). Finally Garvin takes the gaze of 
developers into account when describing urban phenomena from the unorthodox but surprisingly effective holistic perspec-
tive of the market, location, design, financing, entrepreneurship, and time. 
Introduction     67 
 
Structure 
In order to contextualise, operationalise and conceptualise our topic the work was struc-
tured into five chapters: An introductory chapter, three chapters on the case studies, and 
a concluding evaluative chapter. (A building with three levels) 
 Illustration A-17: Diagram of research structure 
 Illustration A-18: Drawing of the narrative panorama inspired by game theory 
 
 
Introduction 
The opening chapter – e.g. this chapter – is composed of five parts: Part one establishes 
and communicates the goals of this research; part two explores the theoretical base of 
state of research, delineates the relevant research gaps, and affirms the relevance of this 
research.  
This is achieved respectively: A. by the perspective of concepts on contemporary 
space; B. from the angle of relevant questions and definitions of New Town research, and 
C. in relation to a selected range of urban debates with a strong relevance to the topic. 
The third section makes transparent the underlying methodological rationale and de-
fines the substantive tolls; part four defines and affirms the case study samples; and part 
five delineates the research design and structure. 
Central part 
Chapters two to four represent the core of this work. They enclose a systematic and syn-
optic description of the three cases.  
The structural set up of these sections is modular. On the one hand this facilitates an 
autonomous description of the particular cases, creating an individual narrative for each 
of the examples. On the other hand the methodical construction of the subchapter makes 
possible a systematic measurement and evaluation of the subjects.  
 Illustration A-19: List of comparative indicators 
 
Context 
The context subdivision provides the local referential framework and grounding for each 
case. It employs a multiscalar as well as historical technique: Firstly, a set of basic na-
tional and regional indicators is examined in order to get a better understanding of the 
context. Then the project is examined according to a set of comprehensive demographic, 
economic, cultural, and social variables. Special consideration is given to the identifica-
tion of relationships of the figures as well as to the elaboration of the essential spatial 
trends. Thereafter, a historical thread is established. This anchors the individual narra-
tives, both on a national as well as local scale. The gaze is further refined along a politi-
cal, economic and a spatial perspective, which seeks to identify the major milestones and 
historic trends of each project. The chapter concludes with an examination of the prede-
cessors and peers of New Town planning with a focus on the specific contexts.  
Only this panorama is able to inform us about the relevance of each of the cases in 
their individual situations. It makes it possible to understand whether privately planned 
Introduction     68 
cities as well as all their respective components are a norm or an exception; whether their 
population is well off or disadvantaged; if the technical features represent the mainstream 
or the avant-garde; whether to think of the strategies of imagination, survival, power, or 
profit as innovations or as standards. We become equipped to be able to name conspicu-
ous behaviour as corrupt or culturally constructed; and understand whether the pattern 
we observe is truly new, or only ‘old wine in new bottles’.  
Form 
The next level of the examination and comparison of the respective examples is devoted 
to form. It is composed of two main parts and follows a multiscalar technique. The first 
part examines the direct relationship between the case and its greater environment. The 
central question is of how the project integrates into the particular region. This is exam-
ined inter alia by examining the mobility and accessibility as well as the quality and 
quantity of infrastructure networks. Secondly, the inner morphology and physiognomy 
of the project is disentangled. Here we have reached an important watershed.  
At this point the interior logic of the project gets the full attention. Our analytical 
zooming technique reduces the level of the complete town, the neighbourhoods, as its 
main building stones and modules, down to the blocks and buildings and streets. The 
analysis is done along quantitative and qualitative criteria. Of particular interest are pa-
rameters, such as size, density and mix of use, but also the structural organisation, 
growth patterns, and land use, including their distribution. Specific attention is given to 
the development of key modules and specific typologies at various periods. These are 
then mostly examined through particular examples. The examination of forms also sug-
gests a first exploration of the design ideas.  
As a result, we seek to understand the structural logic of the particular scheme, and to 
discern the global and local factors of this system-process. Once more, only this perspec-
tive enables us to get a sense of the innovations and problems and empowers us to gener-
alise trends. 
Users 
While the second part is devoted to understand the formal logic of the system, the third 
section of each chapter aims to recognise the players and users in the system. Among 
these in particular are the residents, but often also significant on-site populations affected 
by the projects. The ‘user’ section provides an overview of the demographic, social, eco-
nomic and cultural profile of the residents. Moreover, it aims to understand the needs of 
the demand side and the particular set of motives of opting for new dwelling environ-
ments. Of specific weight is also the matter of bottom-up social organisation and control. 
How do the individual players, who are, in the case of a fresh New Town, foreigners to 
one another, co-ordinate themselves? And which top-down support do they obtain from 
developers and the public administration? These questions have been addressed by the 
inquiry for residence associations, or cooperative forms of bottom-up organisation.200 
Authors 
The fourth level of the portrayal of the three NeoTowns is an inquiry into the nature of 
the authors. This point considers the role and spirit of the private sector in particular. 
                                               
200 After all, it must be mentioned that the episode on the users and players is bound to remain on an indicative level. The 
scope of the work programme does not allow for empirical and participatory investigations on a deeper level, which is 
customary in the social sciences. Regardless, the perspective is a valid and essential part of the entirety. It can hardly be 
missed. 
Introduction     69 
Yet it also provides a reason for revisiting the role of spatial disciplines such as architects, 
landscape architects, urban designers, planners, or structural engineers.201  
Both developers and ‘spatial disciplines’ are studied at the level of persons, organisa-
tions and through the examination of value systems and ideologies. We are interested in 
finding out how contemporary New Towns are designed, marketed and maintained, and 
how the tactics of privately driven urbanisation relate to the strategies of the mainstream 
trade and industry practices. As in the other sections, particular attention is given to the 
identification of novel trends and innovations in both of the disciplines.  
Finance 
The fifth analytical angle of our comparative study deals with the role of finance. While 
money is the central medium of market-based economies, this aspect is also of central 
importance for privately driven entrepreneurial urbanism. Today, price tends to become 
a universal measure (even of good and bad). Profitability becomes the final benchmark of 
survival or default. Urban development becomes privatised. This is also true for New 
Town projects. Obviously money becomes a core matter of urbanism. 
From this perspective it becomes important to observe why privately developed cities 
do better than their public peers. Moreover, it becomes essential to learn about the 
strategies behind the apparent success, and to examine the question of the effects that 
financial logics and strategies have on space.202 
The section addresses this query by considering the demand and supply driven per-
spective of the buyers as well as the developers. The factors examined are cost, profitabil-
ity and the availability of financial means. Questions such as land prices, access to mort-
gages, spread of products, the availability of foreign funds, or the diversification of prod-
ucts in financial markets, are among the important components of the inquiry. More-
over, a distinctive emphasis is put on the evaluation of the impacts of the financial logic 
on the production of urban space.203  
Control 
One of the vital ingredients of a complex and self-organised system, including a planned 
town, is the existence of basic codes and regulations as well as of systems of control. 
Consequently, the sixth and last of the standpoints from which we look at our object of 
study is the examination of the regulatory framework and the question of power and 
control. Here the main focus is laid on the role of the public sector.  
In accordance with the problem, the material is divided in two sub-aspects: Initially 
we examine the power-landscapes of, and among, the stakeholders. Subsequently the 
framework of laws, rules and regulations is investigated. At both levels four essential 
scales of nation, state, region, and municipality are considered.  
In this context we seek to identify: Who has political control of the place? Whether 
hybrid organisational forms (such as public private partnerships) exist? Whether federal 
rules are significant? Whether official master plans are relevant? Which other local (for-
mal and informal) codes are of importance? And which official regulations have been 
developed in response to the projects? It is also interesting to discover how these aspects 
mutate in history and how they are related to a macro level of economic liberalisation.“ 
                                               
201 Indeed, the fact that the background of the author of this work lies in architecture and planning, and that planners are 
among the main target groups of this investigation, is also a reason for the increased focus on this topic. 
202 Alexander Garvin (1996: 352) declares the idea of the modernistic new town as bankrupt. He observes that Irvine re-
mains the only one profitable New Town on the North American continent (350). Garvin quotes the risks associated with 
long-term investment and down payment cycles as the most serious obstacles. He contends that: “new towns may be more 
costly than scattered development”. 
203 Once more it has to be stated that this investigation cannot replace a professional inquiry by experts in the field. 
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Evaluation and conclusion 
Whereas chapter one elaborates the basis of this work, chapter five represents the roof. 
This section aims to specify the common features as well as the specific characteristics on 
the projects discussed. Here the findings of chapters two to four are distilled and synthe-
sised. This is achieved by the same structural set up that was used before (context, form, 
users, authors, finances, and control). The findings are implicitly measured against the 
criteria of the theoretical base. Moreover, the major contradictions, problems, innova-
tions and paradoxes are summarised. Selected variables describing the major features of 
the three cases are contrasted in a common matrix. The chapter closes with the formula-
tion of a research agenda (system knowledge) and with a recapitulation of the major ex-
periences (operational knowledge).


B. Case 1:  
 
 
BUMI  
SERPONG 
DAMAI  
THEMATIC 
PARADISE 
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Abstract 
The New Town Bumi Serpong Damai, in the Tangerang District of the greater Jakarta 
region, is planned to reach a size of 6.000 hectares for 800.000 residents. This makes it 
the largest privately developed New Town (i.e. NeoTown) in developing countries. The 
project was conceived in 1984 by a group of private developers. Finalisation was planned 
for 2015 in three project stages. Ground breaking took place in 1989. Today, a first 
phase with 1.300 hectares and 100.000 residents is almost completed; the second stage 
went into implementation. The town’s developer BSD PT is a subsidiary of Sinar Mas, 
one of the largest industrial conglomerates of Indonesia. The superior motives of eco-
nomic development and life-style representation hitherto result in the emergence of an 
astonishing thematic landscape. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Key indicators – Bumi Serpong Damai 
Name of NeoTown Bumi Serpong Damai * 
Country, State, Region, District Indonesia, Banten, Jabodetabek 
(Jakarta Region), Tangerang 
Start date (planned completion) 1989 (2015) 
Phases (finished, total)  1 (3) 
Size (present, planned) 1.300 (6.000) 
Population (present, planned)  100.000 (600.000) 
Local Population (phase 1, II-III) 30.000 (120.000) 
Structures (number of houses) 21.000 (135.000) 
Developer (name of developer) Sinar Mas ** 
Major motive [ '1' = decongest; '2' = economic devel-
opment; '3' = security; '4' = lifestyle and representation] 
2, 4, 3, 1*** 
Type ['A' parallel city; 'B' satellite town; 'C' regional 
node; 'D' independent new centre; 'E' others] 
C 
 
*The name means ‘Peaceful Land of Serpong’ 
**Previously a joint venture of 3-10 developers. The composition has changed several times 
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Introduction –  
The New Town ‘par excellence’ 
The New Town of Bumi Serpong Damai1 in the periphery of the megacity Jakarta, is one 
the of the three main study objects of this thesis. The 'Peaceful Land of Serpong', accord-
ing to the meaning of its name, represents the largest contemporary New Town devel-
opment in the developing world in the hands of one private enterprise.2 If finished as 
planned, BSD may also become the contemporary New Town with the largest popula-
tion.3  
The New Town of Bumi Serpong Damai was the forerunner and role model of the 
unique New Town boom that occurred in Jakarta’s periphery between the early 1980s 
and the late 1990’s. With a planned area of 6.000 hectares and a planned population of 
650.000 it was also the largest New Town project that went into implementation. 
On the surface of it Bumi Serpong Damai is an example par excellence of the typology 
of Neo Towns. It was developed, implemented and it is run entirely by the private sector. 
As a result, it is highly affected by the principles of ‘market oriented strategic planning’. 
Hence, it appears to be a perfect case to study the question of how new urban spaces are 
produced by the dynamics of the new economy, when market-orientated state of the art 
business strategies and standards become localised and landed. 
In correspondence with the general approach of this thesis the following chapter seeks 
to generate a broad understanding of the various processes producing this case. While 
our methodology was termed holistic, comprehensive, synoptic and explorative, the in-
formation will be compiled from six different angles and dimensions. The resulting chap-
ter is an element that can be examined on its own, and which, in addition, serves as one 
basis element for the comparative study. 
In view of the synoptic method this chapter will be structured along the following top-
ics: A summary of 'key indicators' will be presented at the beginning; The first compre-
hensive vista on the phenomenon will be taken by the elaboration of the 'general context' 
of the project; Secondly, a full description of the 'physical structure' of the project will be 
given; The third position focuses deeply on the 'population profile', while the fourth per-
spective is disentangling the qualities and motives of the 'developers and planners'; 'Pro-
ject finance' constitutes the fifth viewpoint on the object of study; The sixth angle, fi-
nally, circumscribes BSD’s framework of control. A systematic summary of the findings, 
as well the presentation of important implications, concludes the chapter. 
*** Subjective ranking 
 Illustration B-1: Map of Indonesia 
                                               
1 The scheme will be in the following also referred to as BSD. Moreover it will be referred to as a New Town, as well as a 
NeoTown, the first pointing to the general typological family and the latter to its presumed species. BSD PT refers to the 
New Town enterprise. ‘PT’ Is the Indonesian abbreviation for ‘perséroan terbatas’. It means ‘Incorporated’. 
2 As far as size is concerned, the New Town of Irvine in California, run by the Irvine Company, takes the uncontested lead 
with a size of 21.200 hectares. 
3 Several planned New Towns of India’s Integrated-Township-boom amount to 8.000 hectares or more. (Cf. DNA India 
2007) 
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General context –  
Dynamic peripheries 
Introduction – Multidimensional metamorphosis of a nation 
Bumi Serpong Damai is a new urban element of significant size. It emerges in a specific 
spatial, political, historical, and cultural setting and cannot be comprehended without 
understanding the same. This section, therefore, elaborates the broader framework of the 
Indonesian NeoTown. Bumi Serpong Damai will be approached from a macro scale: step 
by step and from a broad, across-the-board perspective. 
Like other countries in a postcolonial development setting, contemporary Indonesia is 
dominated by several vibrant macro and mid-level trends. These have profound impacts 
on practically any new development: The country's demographic growth and rapid urban 
transformation are of historical dimensions. At the same time the forces of globalisation 
and privatisation are acting with an unprecedented vigour, but it is not only globalisa-
tion. From a historical perspective the country of 17.500 islands was affected by the 
dominance of the Javanese culture, a thriving Islam, as well by Dutch colonisation. Dur-
ing post-independence two authoritarian figures, Sukarno and Suharto have put signifi-
cant marks on the national landscape. The early 21st Century is marked by democratisa-
tion and decentralisation programmes. Indeed, it is correct to say that all these large-scale 
trends fuel a “multidimensional metamorphosis of a diverse nation...” (Cf. Sarosa 2006: 
159) 
According to the objectives of this section the following fundamental aspects, will be 
examined below: Firstly, a general set of key indicators of Indonesia’s history and politi-
cal system (politics, economy, demography, culture) will be presented; A second part will 
expose the (quite dramatic) sequence of historical milestones (epochs) fundamental to the 
development of Bumi Serpong Damai and other similar New Towns in the Jakarta re-
gion. A special consideration will be given to the characteristic spatial typologies of each 
era; The impact of Indonesian culture as well as a framework of risks and disasters will 
be marked out in the fourth and fifth sections respectively, while the legacy of urban de-
velopment in the Jakarta region will be presented in the seventh part. Thereafter specific 
attention will be given to the physical characteristics of the region, current problems and 
development trends, urban planning strategies, and the relevant political and institutional 
landscapes. Finally, the legacy of BSD's predecessors in the Indonesian context will be 
drawn.  
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Indonesia 
Profile 
Name of country Republic of Indonesia 
Year of independence 1945 
Political system at groundbreaking of NoT Dictatorship 
Political system 2009 Parliamentary democracy 
Urbanisation rate and growth  48 percent, 4,3 percent 
Population earning less than 2US$ per day 55 percent 
Literacy rate 91 percent 
Households with breadwinners in the formal sector 16 percent 
Average Income (GDPpc) US$ 814 
Economic growth rates (1998-2008) 4-6 percent 
HDI 72 
Year of liberal reforms 1991 
Cars per 1000 people 12 
FDI 72 
Number minority Chinese 1,8 Million (460000 in Jakarta) 
Table 3: Key indicators – Country-level Indonesia4 
 
Name, country 
Bumi Serpong Damai is located in Indonesia. The country has a population of 225 mil-
lion residents (Cf. Sarosa 2006). This makes it the fourth biggest nation in the world. A 
majority of the population, three fifths, reside on the island of Java. (Cf. Spreitzhofer 
2003) 
Urbanisation rate and growth  
Indonesia’s urban population is growing at 200 percent of the national growth rate. 
While the country's population increased by 1,15 percent per annum between 2005 and 
2007 (ADB 2007), the urban residents grew at a rate of 4,3 percent (UN-Habitat, Dorlé-
ans 2002: 41). With almost half of the country’s population (48 percent) living in cities 
(Sarosa, Asian Development Bank, UN-Habitat), the country reflects general urbanisa-
tion trends in the world.5 The proportion of people living in urban areas is predicted to 
reach 60 percent by 2025. Most city and county governments (Kabupaten) are over-
whelmed by the ever-increasing demand for urban services, infrastructure, housing and 
facilities, and employment (Sarosa 2006). 
Year of independence 
Indonesia declared itself independent in 1945. After a process, referred to as the Indone-
sian National Revolution, the Dutch accepted the declaration in 1949. (Cf. Reid, 1974) 
                                               
4 Cf. Appendix: Chart of comprehensive indicators 
5 According to the UN, in 2007 half of the world’s population was living in cities. India’s population is to 30 percent urban 
and China’s to 40 percent. 
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Political system 
Postcolonial Indonesia has a long history of struggle to define its identity. This is paral-
leled by a history of authoritarian governments. Only in 2004 under President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono did the country become a parliamentary democracy. 
Market attitude 
After decolonisation Indonesia's markets have been highly regularised. Under the regime 
of the first president Sukarno, the country focused on a nationalist strategy of export 
substitution. Indonesia's second president General Suharto started massive liberalisation 
and deregulation incentives in the 1980’s (cf. below: National milestones). 
Centralisation and decentralisation 
Since its unification by the Dutch colonisers, the country of 17.500 islands finds itself in 
a permanent struggle of centralisation versus decentralisation. Nevertheless, all efforts of 
decentralisation have only reinforced the importance of Jakarta as the centre of political 
power and as an economic node.6 7 
Migratory movements 
Enormous population movements also reflect the struggle of centralisation versus decen-
tralisation. Migration – if politically or economically motivated, forced or voluntary, for 
push- or pull factors – has always been a part of the dynamics of this diverse nation. The 
region has a unique culture of seafarers, traders and mobile ethnic groups. This fact has 
historically facilitated the spread of Islam, as well as the emergence of a modern multicul-
tural society (cf. Tirtosudamo, 2007). In 1990 for example, about 17 million people or 
9.9 percent of the total population moved across the country. 
Migration has always been a significant factor of Jakarta’s population growth. In 
1990, 39.9 percent of the total population in Jakarta were migrants (Tjiptoherijanto, 
1995). Significantly, Suharto’s regime that has tried to ‘clean’ up Jakarta and to counter 
this trend by promoting a programme called Transmigrasi. Many people, in particular 
the poor, were forced to relocate to other islands. Conflicts and waves of violence paral-
leled the process.8  
Infrastructure and services 
Indonesia features a stark divide in the provision of infrastructure and services: Only 39 
percent of urban areas are connected to formal water supply; Road density levels are 1.6 
km per 1000 people with 12 people in every 1000 owning cars; Electricity consumption 
is just 319 kilowatt-hours (kWh) per capita, with 45 percent of households not con-
nected to electricity; Only 3 percent of urban areas are served with fixed-line telephones, 
                                               
6 Also known as Batavia (Dutch name), or Jabodetabek (Name for the greater region). 
7 Efforts to decentralise the country date back to colonial rule. The Dutch enforced a Decentralisation Act in 1903. A Local 
Council Ordinance followed 1905 and strengthened the powers local governments. Since independence, the character of 
the country was stressed by the national motto of 'Unity in Diversity' (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) (cf. Nas 2002: 13). While Su-
karno’s ‘National Consolidation’ brought back a strong emphasis on centralisation based on Jakarta, Suharto's ‘New Order’ 
era, as well, relied on a unified nation state. Significant amounts of infrastructure were built in the country and various 
efforts were made to redistribute powers to regional governments. At the same time these activities, reinforced the suprem-
acy of the capital region. Only after the fall of Sukarno’s “New Order” policy the country is undergoing further decentralisa-
tion. 
8 Besides the intention of relieving population pressure... ‘Transmigrasi’ was aimed at promoting national integration and ... 
the protection of the relatively uninhabited borders of the archipelago. (Cf. Nas 2002: 8) 
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with only 27 lines per 1000 people (cf. Douglas 2005). The literacy rates in the country 
amount to 91 percent (ADB, 2008).9  
Economic framework 
GDP and average income 
Indonesia is a developing country and an emerging economy. Its economic growth rates 
are on a fast track. While the total GDP of the country was at 173 billion (The World 
Bank 2004)10, the average income per head (GDP) was a mere US$ 816 (The World Bank 
2004).11 In contrast, the average income per capita for the Jakarta region was estimated 
at about 4.667 US$ of GDP per year. This is 4 times as much as the average national 
gross product per capita.12  
National economic growth 
During the last years Indonesia’s economy was among the fastest growing in the world. 
Economic growth amounted to 6.3 percent in 2007 and 6.5 percent in 2008. (Cf. BPS, 
Jakarta; Goldman Sachs 2007). 
Change in share of, manufacturing, services, agriculture 
Indonesia is rapidly emerging into a service-based economy, reflecting mainstream 
trends. Between 1992 and 2002 the value added by agriculture decreased from 56 to 46 
percent, accordingly the share of services rose from 30 to 37 percent. Indeed, looking at 
the fast urbanisation and the peripheral development some authors see Indonesia among 
the countries which take a shortcut from an agricultural to a service oriented society. 
Rise of middle classes 
Like in other emerging economies, the middle classes are the segment of the population 
that is rising fastest. The life style of the new middle classes is increasingly oriented to-
wards a consumer society. (Cf. below: Population) This is reflected by the fact that the 
growth rates related to consumption grow at a much faster pace than population num-
bers and the rates on the production side. Unfortunately a large segment of the poorer 
population seems to stay behind. 
A good indicator for the boom of consumer society is the quantity of shopping space 
construction: Here, in last 25 years almost 100 new shopping malls emerged in the Ja-
karta region. Only in 2003 20 new malls were constructed (Douglass 2005: 4). Jakarta’s 
shopping space ratios per person are as high as Singapore’s.13 It is revealing to see that 
while the value of Jabodetabek’s Shopping malls amounted to IDR 20.000 billion IDR 
(20 billion US$) in 2005, at the same time ‘only’ IDR 15.000 billion went towards na-
tionwide commercial housing development (Cf. Hoek-Smit, 2005). 
Availability of cars 
Another indicator for the rising relevance of the middle classes is the disproportional 
growth in the ownership of cars. While only 1,2 percent of people actually own a car, the 
                                               
9 A massive program of education for all was launched in Indonesia in 1984. The literacy rate of population aged 10 years 
and over has increased dramatically from 59.6 percent in 1971 to 84 percent in 1990. (Cf. Tjiptoherijanto, 1995) 
10 Moscow’s GP is at 181 billion. The GDP of New York City is at 1.100 billion. (Cf. citymayors.com) 
11 In PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) the number was at US$ 3.500. 
12 Jakarta’s GDP was prognosticated to grow from 100 billion US$ in 1005 to 253 US$ in 2020. (Cf. Appendix: Table ‘Paral-
lel cities’) 
13 Three million square meters of new shopping space have been constructed since 1985. 
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number was growing at an annual rate of 10 percent in the last couple of years.14 Ja-
karta’s road networks, however, only expanded by a mere 2 percent per year.15 
Housing affordability 
Despite its status as a developing country, Indonesia’s general affordability level for 
housing16 is remarkably good. Households need to pay the 3 to 3,6-fold amount of their 
annual income for a house.17 
Middle- and lower-middle income households have a long tradition of receiving sub-
sidised fixed rate loans. Yet, the demand for mortgage debt for this group is artificially 
conditioned to the number of subsidised loans issued by government (Hoek-Smit, 2005). 
A typical starter house has a size of 36 square meters. The typical starter lot has about 90 
square meters. The current maximum income level required to qualify for a grant is IDR 
1.5 million per month (about US$ 150). The house-price is then limited to IDR 42 mil-
lion (4.200 USD). (Ibidem) 
The problem, however, is that an average Indonesian household, can barely afford to 
pay for a loan from the private market, even for a lot in a rather poor location. This is 
because the transaction costs for loans are extremely high. These account for 2-3 
monthly incomes. In addition, households have to allocate at least 30 percent of their 
income towards mortgage payments (Cf. Hoek-Smit, 2005). 
Income and distribution 
Despite the rapid growth of middle classes it remains unclear if the dynamic growth can 
trickle down to all segments of the population. Indeed, Indonesia, as much as other 
emerging economies, seems to be a path towards an increasing polarisation of incomes.  
Poverty and informality 
An enormous number of Indonesia’s population is poor: One fifth of the country’s popu-
lation lives below the poverty line18; 55,3 percent earn less than US$ 2 per day (UN-
Habitat, 2001). Moreover only 16 percent of the population is employed in the formal 
sector (Hoek-Smit 2005). Poverty is progressively concentrated in cities. Here more than 
40 percent of the population live below the poverty line19 and 43 out of 100 children die 
before reaching the age of five (The World Bank 2004).20 In addition, it is estimated that 
85 percent of Indonesia’s new housing stock is informal (Spreitzhofer 2003: 58). 
On the other hand, the number of people living below the poverty line decreases each 
year by about 12.6 percent. The fastest decrease is taking place in the rural areas (16.3 
percent per annum), while in urban centres the rate stagnates at 0.6 percent. (Cf. Tjipto-
herijanto) 
Gini index 
Indeed, Indonesia’s income gap seems to be widening. In 2007 a share of 10 percent of 
populations earned more than 30 percent of the total income. The country’s GINI index, 
                                               
14 At the same time GDP Growth was around 6 percent, and population growth around 2 percent. (Cf. The World Bank 
2004). The equivalent car ownership rate for Argentina was 16,6 percent, and for Germany 51,6 percent. 
15 Cf. Cowherd 2002: 20, quoting Dewanto 2000 and the Statistik Kendaraan 1997. 
16 E.g. the average cost of a house divided by the average annual income. 
17 Shortly before the 2008 credit crisis comparable levels in some western countries reached 11,5 (Orange County), and 7,7 
(London). 
18 Earning less than 1 US$ per day. 
19 Cf. The World Bank 2003, from Sarosa. 
20 This is twice the amount of China, and eight times as much as in Europe.  
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a UN measure on inequality, has climbed to a rate of 37 (United Nations Human Devel-
opment Report, 2007).21  
Internationalisation, foreign direct investments 
The rise of Neo Towns in the peripheries of mega-city regions worldwide is not only re-
lated to the growth of local middle classes, developers of large real estate projects such as 
BSD increasingly flourish on investment capital from global money markets. 
Indonesia’s real estate sector focuses on projects financed by equity investments and 
houses pre-financed by the owners.22 (Cf. Smit-Hoek 2005) 
Because the banking sector remains reluctant to provide large loans, industry compa-
nies are increasingly turning to the bond market to raise funds. Until 2008 a huge 
amount of money was available on global markets.23  
After a sharp fall as an effect of the Asian crisis, the flows of international investments 
have regained ground very fast again. According to data from the Investment Coordinat-
ing Board (BKP), the actual numbers for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) during the first 
six months of 2006 amounted to US$ 3.51 billion. This was a rise of 5 percent compared 
to the previous year (Jones Lang Lasalle 2006: 7).  
Notably, Japan remains the most important investor not only in Jabodetabek but also 
in the whole of Indonesia. It is followed by two other countries from the region: South 
Korea and Singapore.  
Indonesia has become one of the largest bond markets in Asia (Cf. Asia Sentinel 
2006b).24 Despite a dramatic development in domestic fuel prices and high interest rates, 
investors have bought up a record $3.5 billion in bonds as macroeconomic performance 
has improved and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has attempted to repair the 
government’s credibility. 
WB loans, foreign aid 
Indonesia currently receives annual credits of about 1,2 billion dollars from The World 
Bank and about 1,1 billion from the ADB (ADB 2007).25  
 
Culture 
“It is the operation of culture that remains the most complex and least un-
derstood aspect of how Jakarta and other cities have been transformed under 
the pressures of global economic expansion.” (Cowherd 2002: 38) 
To understand the context of Bumi Serpong Damai and Jakarta’s New Town boom, it is 
also important to have an impression about the region’s political and economic culture. 
                                               
21 The GINI Index is an index of income inequalities. A number of 100 represents total inequality, while a number of 0 means 
absolute equality. The GINI index for Germany is 30, Chile 57, US 41. 
22 The reason for this is the laissez faire experience that has lead to the financial crisis of the late 1990’s. (Cf. below) 
23 The Economist (2007) estimated that in the past four years the global supply of dollars has risen by an annual average of 
18 percent: “Worldwide, an abundance of liquidity has lured investors into riskier assets in search of higher returns.” Low 
returns in western bond-markets encouraged many investments in emerging market bonds, equities and property. Share 
prices have risen by 243 percent on average from 2003, in the large BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and 
beyond. (Cf. Goldman Sachs 2007) 
24 Trimegah Securities, Indonesia's biggest investor in corporate bonds, reckons the corporate debt market is worth over US$ 
7 billion. Moreover: “Government and existing corporate bonds have become primary investment options not only for the 
country's pension funds, but also for local and foreign mutual fund managers.” (Cf. Asia Sentinel 2006b). 
25 During the Suharto Regime Indonesia received a yearly amount of 1 billion dollars of World Bank loans. In reaction to the 
corruption government and the financial crisis of 1998 the Bank has reduced the loans to US$ 400 million for several years. 
(Cf. Perlez 2003) 
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At a first glance Indonesia looks like a homogeneous country, unified by a main lan-
guage, religion and a central government. On the other side, however, the country is very 
diverse. Its 220 million people are spread over 17.500 islands and speak some 300 lan-
guages and dialects.  
In his exploration of the development of urban space in Indonesia within the Suharto 
period, Robert Cowherd (2002) points to the role of culture as one of the critical ele-
ments in understanding the urban development. Cowherd thinks that while corruption 
and the economic speculation have arguably been the most significant forces in the trans-
formation of Jakarta, these were tolerated and to a great means carried out through cul-
tural means. (Cf. quotation above) 
Political culture – the Asian version of the new economy 
Indonesia’s political culture is founded upon common values such as order, harmony, 
tolerance, and syncretism. These are also built upon traditional hierarchies and power 
structures. On the whole, these ‘Asian’ values are one important, and a widely under-
rated factor, that largely contributed towards the liberalisation of the economy and that 
has led, as some experts assert, to the emergence of an Asian version of their own neolib-
eral economy. Characteristically, the combination of Asian values and neo-economic 
principles has been nurturing Monetarism26, without paying too much attention to prob-
lems related to human rights and democracy.27  
Like other Southeast Asians, Indonesians place a strong emphasis on a culture of 
‘harmony’ in political as well as in private life. As to all members of society ‘Maintaining 
ones face’ is very important, open critique is regarded as a taboo. The result is also a 
hierarchical society with a strong role of the ‘elders’ and authorities.  
However, despite the harmony-culture Indonesia has been rated as one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International, 2007), at the same level with 
Russia. 28 
A unique feature is Indonesia’s system of bottom-up governance on block and 
neighbourhood level. The block level self-government is called Rukun Tetangga (RT), 
while the neighbourhood unit is called Rukun Warga (RW)29. The system is valid for the 
whole country and for all segments of society and makes a certain level of bottom-up 
governance possible. 
Ethnicity, e.g. role of the Sino-Indonesian 
The capital region of Jakarta is Indonesia’s melting pot and international gateway. Six 
major ethnic groups make up the population: Javanese (35 percent), Betawi (28 percent), 
Sundanese (15 percent), Chinese (6 percent), Batak (4 percent), Minangkabau (3 percent) 
(cf. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 2003). The ethnic plurality is also reflected in the 
                                               
26 Economic theory stemming from the Chicago Scholl arguing that government should seek to control prices and inflation, 
but not the supply of money. 
27 Wust (2002) refers to an Asian version of Neo-liberalism represented by ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nati-
ons: “ASEAN vertritt die Haltung eines Asiatischen Liberalismus, der gemeinsame kulturelle Werten wie Ordnung, Harmonie, 
Toleranz und Synkretismus repräsentiert, der aber auch auf traditionellen Hierarchien und Machstrukturen aufbaut. Alles in 
allem haben diese ‚asiatischen’ Werte vor allem eine großen Beitrag zur Liberalisierung der Wirtschaft geliefert und den 
sogenannten Monetarismus gefördert ohne ihre Aufmerksamkeit allzu sehr auf Probleme wie Menschenrechte oder Demo-
kratie zu richten.“ 
28 Indonesia has been assigned the level 2,3 on a scale from 0= most corrupt, to 10 least corrupt. Cf. the CPI Index on the 
Transparency International Website (Retrieved in March 2008). 
29 The layout of the New Town Pulo Mas has been strictly designed along this hierarchy (cf. below: Predecessors). 
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spatial pattern of the city. Most of the groups, particularly the lower income sector, tend 
to cluster in their own communities.30  
The Chinese population is of particular importance for the understanding in our con-
text. This is the case because Jakarta is a hot spot for the Chinese community and many 
of Jakarta’s projects have been financed by Indochinese banks, developed by Indochinese 
conglomerates, and appropriated by Indochinese families. The Chinese arrived in Java as 
early as in the 13th century. They belonged to a class of merchants, artisans, and middle-
men collecting taxes from native populations (cf. Worden 1993). The Chinese lived for 
the most part in segregated communities, went to Chinese oriented universities and al-
ways maintained strong trading networks throughout SE-Asia and into their homelands 
(cf. Pratiwo 2002: 150). Many Chinese have always belonged to the high-income classes. 
Several of Indonesia’s largest corporations, such as Lippo and Sinar Mas are in Indochi-
nese hands. (Ibidem)  
Notably, the antagonism between the Chinese and Indonesian communities became an 
important factor during critical historical periods, such as the transition from the Su-
karno to the Suharto era, or the 1997 financial crisis.31 For example, the experience of 
Chinese residents of being targets of several violent riots during the 1997 crisis encour-
aged many wealthy Chinese to seek the security of New Towns and gated communities in 
the periphery (Cf. Dick and Rimmer 1998, quoted in Firman 2004:16).32  
                                               
30 Kusno 2006 describes threefold division of Indonesian cities during the Dutch occupation into European-, Chinese-, and 
‘other’ Quarters. 
31 Historically the Chinese were facing a considerable hostility from both Indonesians and Europeans, largely because of the 
economic threat they seemed to pose. “In 1740, for example, as many as 10.000 Chinese were massacred in Batavia appar-
ently with the complicity of the Dutch governor general”. (Cf. Warden). 
In 1959 Sukarno authorised a directive (PP 10/1959) forcing Chinese Indonesians to relocate from rural to urban areas. As 
part of the state’s enforcement of this law, in 1967 incident in Western Kalimantan, 42,000 accused separatists were 
slaughtered. (Cf. Purdey, Jemma 2002: Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996–1999; Melbourne, at: 
http://repository.unimelb.edu.au/10187/1022. r12.03.2009.)  
32 During the riots, the property of Indonesian-Chinese descendants was target of mobs and was looted and burned. The 
riots also included peripheral locations, e.g. when the Super Mall in Lippo Karawaci was burned. (Cf. Firman 2004:19) 
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Jakarta 
Table 4: Key indicators – Jakarta 
 
Population (Region / Centre) 21 / 9,1 million 
Size (Region / Centre) 6.900 / 660 km2 
Percent of FDI going to Jakarta 66 
Population growth  ~ 3 percent p.a. 
Peripheral Growth 1983 to 2003 300 percent 
Density (Region / Centre) 30 / 140 p/ha 
Metroshare of Country population 13 percent 
GDP (per capita) 4.667 US$ 
Share Metro-GDP of Country-GDP 19 percent 
Ratio GDP p.c City/Nation 400 percent 
House Prices (AAA, Centre) ~ 200.000 US$ 
House Prices (AAA, Periphery) ~ 80.000 US$ 
Affordability threshold of lower income groups ~ 5.000 US$ 
Mercer Quality of Life Index rank 150 of 215 cities worldwide 
Share of Informal Sector ~ 66 percent 
Number of High-rises 500 
Percentage of Sino-Indonesians 6 
 
 Illustration B-2: Map of the Jakarta Region 
City 
Jakarta is the nation's capital. It is the seat of the government and the countries main 
economic centre. It is a capital region, which is a province in itself. The city is divided 
into five municipalities and ruled by a governor. Most of Indonesia's largest banks and 
corporations and many headquarters of multinational companies are located in the city. 
(Cf. Spreitzhofer, 2003) 
The city is growing beyond the administrative boundaries of central Jakarta and forms 
a metropolitan region of 21 million residents on an area of almost 7000 square kilome-
tres. The region houses almost 10 percent of the Indonesian population. The metropoli-
tan region around Jakarta was named Jabodetabek. This is a combination of the initials 
of Jakarta as well as five of the main municipalities (Jakarta, Bogor, Dekasi, Tangerang, 
Bekasi). 
Population 
The present population of the greater Jakarta region of Jabodetabek is estimated at 22 
Million (Cf. Demographia 2007). Jakarta’s central district (DKIJ, or Daerah Khusus Ibu-
kota Jakarta) houses 9.1 Million residents. 
Growth 
From 1990 to 2000 the population of Jabodetabek jumped from 17 to 21 million, by an 
average of more than 800.000 people per year (Douglas 2005: 3). With growth rates 
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around 3 percent per annum (Santoso 2004, UN-Habitat 2001) another 50 percent of 
residents will be added in the next 15 years.33  
Structure of the region 
Jakarta’s urban system is a good example for the emergence of a multiplex urban region 
in the context of a developing country in Southeast Asia (cf. McGee 1991). The city de-
veloped from a mono-centric core to a multi-polar agglomeration of nearly 7.000 square 
kilometres (cf. Demographia 2007). Urbanisation has spread into the adjoining province 
of West Java engulfing some smaller regional centres (Douglas 2005). These ‘smaller’ 
towns, however, account for Indonesia’s largest cities.34 Two main development axes 
structure the regional urban system: a 120-kilometre corridor connecting Bekasi to the 
East and Tangerang in the West as well a 200-kilometre north-south corridor that from 
Jakarta’s northern districts towards Bogor and Bandung.  
While the country was decentralised, significant central functions of Jakarta have been 
reinforced.35 In this context, parts of the central city have been increasingly international-
ised and restructured into global business hubs. The trend is represented by an ongoing 
boom in the construction of office space i.e. skyscrapers36. These dot the urban fabric in 
a patchwork-like pattern. (Spreitzhofer 2000) 
Type of newly planned quarters 
Types in newly built quarters range from condominium towers, gated communities and 
open suburban arrangements. Apartment towers in central locations are most prominent 
for the higher income classes at the high end of the market (cf. Jones Lang Lassalle, 
Cushman & Wakerfield). Detached houses are the preferred dwelling forms for all other 
classes, formal and informal. 
Distribution of wealthiest neighbourhoods in the region 
It can be observed that Jakarta’s wealthiest neighbourhoods are mainly concentrated in a 
sector of affluent development from North to the Southwest, stretching from the central 
city to Kebayoran Baru, Pondok Indah and beyond (cf. below: Predecessors). This seg-
ment was also the focus of the highest infrastructure investments in the past (cf. Douglas 
2005; also cf. to the map of New Town predecessors below). 
Distribution of informal settlements 
In contrast, informal settlements and Kampongs are equally scattered around the region. 
They comprise the majority (around 85 percent) of all structures. 
Structure of the periphery 
Desakota 
Jakarta has a ‘tradition of low density urbanisation’. The mega-city region comprises 
relatively low urban densities of less than 30 people per hectare (Cf. Demographia; Ber-
taud 2004)37. Jakarta’s peripheral fabric was characterised by a mix of agriculture, vil-
lages, industrial estates, and half empty and unfinished New Towns (Firman 2004: 11). 
The intensifying regional development has created a new local peri-urban typology. The 
                                               
33 Under Dutch rule Jakarta was known as Batavia. The city served as the capital of the colony. It grew from 6,1 hectares at 
the time of occupation to 107 hectares in 1770. 
34 5 out of the 12 largest cities in Indonesia are in the Jabodetabek metropolitan region. 
35 The massive deregulation of banking and financial institutions between 1983 to 1988 (cf. below: Milestones, Suharto’s 
era) has lead to enormous injections of foreign capital into the country with an enormous focus on the capital city region. 
66 percent of all foreign investments of the 90’s went to Jakarta. 
36 Particularly in areas such as the ‘Golden Triangle’. (Cf. Cushman & Wakefield; Jones Lang Lassalle) 
37 These are numbers that can be compared to Western European Cities. 
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geographer Terry McGee (1991) named this urban form Desakota (desa= city; kota= 
village). The Desakota is based on a seamless transition of Java’s high density agricul-
tural into the urban service sector economies.38 McGee describes how, in the extended 
regions of Southeast Asian Metropoles, such as Jakarta, or Manila, rural lifestyles di-
rectly merge with urban typologies. This rural city, or urban village, thrives on the com-
bination of the advantages of rural self-organisation working for the post-industrial 
global economy. 
Sleeping land 
Large patches of idle, ‘sleeping land’ (‘tanah tidur) remain an important feature of Ja-
karta’s periphery. The landscape is dotted by thousands of undeveloped hectares. These 
lower the densities and result in a fragmented regional structure. The economic crisis of 
1996 had revived an appreciation for land in the rural areas, not only as a means for 
food security but also as an asset (Suhendar 1998: 60f. from Spreitzhofer 2003). Many of 
the land areas that had been acquired by then remain idle by today.39  
Box 3: Jakarta’s speculative land banks in the 1980s 
The megacity of Jakarta probably features the largest speculative land banks world-
wide. It is estimated that the area, when urbanised, could accommodate a population 
of 10 million. It could accommodate Jakarta’s housing market for several decades. 
Since the 1980’s land speculation has been both more intensive and more unfettered in 
Indonesia than in the rest of Asia. This has led to an amassment of private land banks in 
Jakarta’s periphery of historically unique dimensions. Suharto’s neo-liberal reform pro-
grammes, channelling-in global financial flows, had a deep impact on Jakarta’s land 
markets and consequently on urban landscapes. The metropolitan area of the capital, 
Jakarta, has been the particular focus of land transfers. The amount of land in the 
hands of private developers eventually surpassed the size of Jakarta’s central district. 
Encouraged by government programmes for privatisation, the real estate industry em-
barked on producing New Towns. With the support of generous grants by the National 
Land Agency (BPN) by the mid-1990s, there has been a massive land ownership transfer 
from the previous landowners, notably poor farmers, to the new developers supported 
by the government. Land became a scarce and contested resource. 
In the 80s and early 90s most of the land on the outskirts of Jakarta changed hands and 
became controlled by only a handful of private developers (Firman 2004: 8). Between 
1983 and 1988 over 48.000 hectares of Botabek land was held under Location Permits, 
mostly for housing development. A handful of conglomerates started to erect many 
New Towns and industrial estates. By 1988 only 10 percent of this land had been devel-
oped leaving the rest idle (Cowherd 2002: 33). By early 1990s about one-half of the to-
tal land area under land development permits was being held off the market by the 
developers (Leaf, 1991 and 1993, from Firman 2004: 10).40 From 1989 to 1992, the mu-
nicipality of Jakarta granted building permits to real-estate developers amounting to 
36.000 hectares. The transactions were estimated to be worth US$ 71 billion (Dorléans 
2002: 52).41  
                                               
38 Java Island has among the highest rural population densities in the world. Java’s population density of almost 1000 peo-
ple per square kilometre is more than five times New York State’s population density of 160 people on the same area. A 
paddy field of 1000m2 can nurture up to eight persons. 
39 World Bank consultant Maria Hoek-Smit (2005) ascertains that “...large tracks of urban land are held by public agencies 
and private developer land banks and are not coming to the market... Because much developable land in locations in need 
of residential development has been tied up, actual urban development is pushed further to the outskirts. Unfinished New 
Towns take a large share of the empty land and add to the problem. 
40 A study of the National Mortgage Bank (Bank Tabungan Negara) showed that the high demand areas of Botabek had a 
28 percent completion rate of housing projects, while the lower demand areas outside the region featured completion rates 
of 76. This indicates that higher demand was actually more likely to produce speculative practices than actual housing 
production (Fergusson 1993: 60, quoted in Cowherd 2002: 33). 
41 This amount must have been significantly exceeding the city’s GDP. The total annual GDP of Jakarta in 2005 was esti-
mated at US$ 100 billion (cf. Demographia). 
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According to the estimations (cf. below) the accumulated size of the land bank sur-
passed a size of 170.000 hectares by the 1990’s, making it almost three times as large as 
Jakarta’s inner city district. The value of the transactions has regularly exceeded Ja-
karta’s annual GDP. Tragically more than 50 percent of the respective land remained 
idle.42 43  
As a result the supply of developable land is severely constrained. This in turn affects 
the availability of the housing options for lower income groups. According to the Indo-
nesian government's own Ministry of Public Housing, by 1999 the amount of land 
brought into the market by ‘appropriational development’ was sufficient to meet the 
country's need for new homes for the next 100 years. In contrast, only 5 percent of Ja-
karta's population of 10 million people had access to clean water (Realtor 2001).44  
Centralisation vs. decentralisation 
Jakarta transformed from a centrally orientated city, towards a decentralised regional 
system. This development is reflected by migration trends. Central Jakarta’s (DKIJ's) 
population has doubled from 2,9 million in 1961 to 6,5 Mio 1981 to about 9.2 million 
at the turn of the century. Since the mid 1980’s, however, the focus of major growth has 
principally shifted towards the periphery. Populations that migrate to Jakarta from other 
parts of the country increasingly move to peripheral locations. An increasing number of 
households also move from the centre of Jakarta to the region. Consequently the popula-
tion of suburban Botabek (e.g. all parts without the centre) has increased by 300 percent 
in the last 20 years (Spreitzhofer 2003: 54). In the same period, the central district (DKIJ) 
featured negative growth rates.  
The numbers of newly constructed houses reflects the above trend. While in the year 
1981 almost half (48 percent) of all new housing was realised in the central district, the 
number has decreased to only 5 percent in 1993. In 1993 95 percent of housing (246.000 
units) has emerged in the region (Spreitzhofer 2003: 56).  
  
                                               
42 Pangestu (1998) noted that according to the West Java Land Office, the government has issued 122.000 hectares of land 
permits for housing until August 1996 – 112.000 hectares of these, or 89 percent were in Botabek, or the city’s periphery – 
the total area of central Jakarta (DKI) covers 66.000 hectares. A total of 720 square kilometres, or 12.500 hectares per year, 
of development permits were issued from November 1993 to July 1998 in the areas of Bogor-Tangerang and Bekasi (Bota-
bek) (cf. Firman 2004: 09, Pangestu 1998). 
43 Spreitzhofer (2003) reports that only between 1993 and 1998, the Indonesian Land Agency issued land permits to private 
developers accumulated to about 2500 square kilometres (or 250.000 hectares). 
44 The virtual capacity of this area would amount for a virtual population of 10 million residents. Assuming a density of 4000 
persons per square kilometre, a number slightly higher than the current average density of Jakarta region (Cf. Demographia 
2007 and, own calculations). Tommy Firman points out that this amount of land that is sufficient to house more than 8.5 
million people, assuming 60 percent housing coverage and a density of 200 persons per hectare. 
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Risks and disasters 
A general framework of risks greatly contributes to the desires and markets for secure 
spaces in Jakarta’s periphery. 
The landscape of the megacity Jakarta is not only rocked by economic and political cri-
ses. Daily catastrophes such as traffic jams, air pollution, frequent flooding, earthquakes, 
and terrorist attacks, produce a permanent state of emergency and lower the quality of 
life.45 Moreover during the 1998 crisis period, the city experienced a significant increase 
in the level of riots, looting and arson. (Cf. Spreitzhofer 2003:58). In this situation high 
quality urban space, secure and strategic locations, became contested and highly valued 
assets. 
Water and sanitation 
With 13 rivers flowing through the city, half of Jakarta’s land area is prone to frequent 
flooding.46 Less than half of the population of Jakarta has access to some kind of water 
supply service other than bottled water purchase or open river and only 1.9 percent of 
the population of Jakarta is served by a city sewage system (Anwar 2003: 2, quoted in 
Douglas 2005: 6). Yet, the whole city is experiencing continuously decreasing ground 
water levels.47 Indeed, from 1979 to 1991, land in some parts of the city, mainly North 
Jakarta, subsided at a rate of about 25-34 centimetres per year (Cf. Douglas 2005: 5). 
Infrastructure, traffic jams 
As many other Megacities in developing countries Jakarta suffers from a constant gap 
between the demand for basic urban infrastructure and the existing financial ability of 
the government to provide for it. This gap became extreme during the 1970s, when an 
economic crisis struck Indonesia during a decade of enormous population growth (cp. 
above). Pangestu (1997) estimates the gap at that time was about one third of all neces-
sary means.48  
The fact that Jakarta’s traffic transport is predominantly based on roads, results in a 
set of interrelated problems such as traffic congestion, air pollution sprawl, job accessi-
bility, and urban polarisation (cf. Hutabarat 2002: 57). Notorious are Jakarta’s traffic 
jams. Sometimes commuting times amount to a total of 4-6 hours per day.49  
                                               
45 Mercer Consulting’s 2008 quality of life index rates Jakarta at a score of 64 points of 100. The city is ranked at the 189th 
place of 215 cities (cf. www.imercer.com/golpr, r07.2008) 
46 Flooding in 2002 claimed 77 lives, damaged 50.237 houses and 529 schools. (Cf. Douglas 2005) 
47 Levels of groundwater in Jabodetabek have been decreasing by an annual rate of 0.03-2.95 cm/year. The water quality of 
the main water suppliers (e.g. the Ciliwung, Sunter and Krukut Rivers) is disastrous: 80 percent of groundwater in Jakarta is 
polluted with pathogenic, disease causing bacteria (cf. Douglas 2005: 5). 
48 During the Repelita VI, Indonesia's fourth five-year development plan 1984 to 1989, the demand for investment in urban 
infrastructure was estimated at IDR 30.1 trillion, whereas the amount available from the given sources was approximately 
IDR. 21.1 trillion. This resulted in a deficit of 29.8 percent. (Cf. Pangestu 1998) 
49 Typical middle class families have to start commuting at 5 a.m. in order to bring their children to the private school and to 
commute to the workplace. During the morning and evening peak hours, a 16-km journey to work may easily take 2 hours. 
During peak hours, a 20 kilometre commute from Bintaro Jaya to UKI can take as long as 2,5 hours. (Stakeholder report, 
personal observation) 
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National milestones 
Introduction 
The Indonesian archipelago was colonised, unified and ruled by the Dutch from 1619 to 
1945. In its quest for independence and identity the country was dominated by a history 
of strong authoritarian regimes. Under its first president Sukarno, the country embarked 
on an independent and introverted path of national consolidation and modernisation. 
After 1967 the second regime, of General Suharto, brought economic liberalisation and 
reforms under a pro western authoritarian rule. After a transition period of 6 govern-
ments in 6 years (1998 – 2004) Indonesia finds itself today in an era of post-liberal de-
mocratisation. While all of these postcolonial epochs are part of and ongoing process of 
dynamic growth and modernisation, every one portrays explicit architectural styles, 
planning strategies and urban forms. Significantly, these either paved the ground, or form 
the background of the development of Bumi Serpong Damai and Jakarta’s other New 
Towns. Accordingly, the next sub-section examines the characteristics of these periods 
(national, liberal and democratic), as well as their spatial representations. 
 Illustration B-3: Milestone chart Indonesia, Jakarta, BSD 
Dutch tradition 
Contemporary Indonesian town planning is highly influenced by the colonial tradition. 
The Dutch occupy Indonesia from 1619 to 1945 and they import the concept of the 
European City into the Indonesian context. The general Dutch planning legacy is famous 
for designing cities exclusively for the Europeans. These traditions remain highly influen-
tial after independence.50 51 
Sukarno’s postcolonial state project 1957 – 1966 
General 
On 17 August 1945 Sukarno52 along with Mohammad Hatta leader of the Indonesian 
Nationalist Movement, declares the independence of Indonesia. Sukarno is the first 
president of Indonesia and rules the country from 1957 to 1966. His era is referred to as 
a period of  ‘national consolidation’ and as a ‘nation building process’ (Kusno 2006: 9). 
Sukarno is a trained engineer and architect. He aims to develop Jakarta as a new centre 
of Indonesian Identity – as well as an eternal monument for himself (cf. Kusno 2006: 10; 
Leclerc, 1993). The young country is to be positioned on the world map. Consequently 
all elements of the national capital are shifted back from Bandung to Jakarta 
(Spreitzhofer 2003: 54).53 
                                               
50 The prevailing town Planning Ordinance (presented in 1938, legalised in 1948), the new Bill on Spatial Planning (pre-
sented in 1951), and the curriculum at the universities are all still based the Dutch models. (Cf. Kusno 2006) 
51 One of the most influential representatives of colonial planning traditions, and beyond, is Herman Thomas Karsten. His 
major achievement is the design of an extension area for the city of Semarang. Notably Karsten also devises first Kampung 
improvement programs. He presents a planning concept, which takes into consideration of the needs of all ethnic groups, 
including the indigenous populations. (Cf. Nas 1986 and 2002, Roosmalen, 2004) Abidin Kusno writes: “Karsten, translated 
the idea of „development“ into a spatial and physical form...“ ... „One major architectural input was the coordination of 
perspective in the urban space to enhance authority, discipline and function. The other was to change the way the city was 
organised from what was previously an exclusive racial-based spatial order into a space programmed according to class and 
status mobility (Kusno 2006: 9). 
52 It is very common not to have a first name in Java. 
53 Sukarno is one of the leading figures of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). During this movement several states seek to 
establish an alternative block, independent from the US American as well as the Soviet block. Essentially, this leads to the 
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Space – land reforms and modernist urban space, transformations of the 1950s and 
1960s  
Spatially Sukarno’s era is characterised by broad reforms seeking to transform space into 
a public good. It is marked by land reforms of a grand scale and the symbolic transfor-
mation of urban public spaces by modernist principles.  
Sukarno’s policy stresses ‘the social function of land’, and demonstrates a culture of 
the rejection of land as a commodity. Notably, during his time it becomes possible to 
expropriate lands from private ownership back into communal ownership.54 (A factor 
that should come to play a role in the context of Jakarta’s New Town development.) 
In addition to focusing on land reforms, Sukarno appropriates the city using a com-
bined language of modernism and symbolism. Urban symbolism serves as a method of 
building a sense of common nationality in a relatively short time. The regime believes in 
the creation of founding myths and symbols. As a consequence urban space is arranged 
in a theatrical way: harnessing traditional conceptions of space, however by the use of 
modern typologies (Kusno 2006: 10). This is done by the execution of a number of 
landmark projects, such as the national monument (Monas) and the Istiqqlal mosque, as 
well as a number of colossal statues, such as the Hanuman statue (Dirgantara). 
Indeed, the identity order and orientation are restored along lines that lets one sup-
pose that the president was a reader of Kevin Lynch (1960). In symbolic gestures Su-
karno shifts the zero meridian from Greenwich to Jakarta and also renamed the Indian 
Ocean to Indonesian Ocean (Vittachi, 1967 quoted in Kusno 2006: 10). The linga-style 
landmark structure of the Monas marks the epicentre of the universe.55  
While consolidating the country, Sukarno’s policy, also reinforces the significance of 
the capital city region as the seat of power. Consequently, in 1966 (shortly before 
Gegeral Suharto takes over the leadership of the country), Jakarta is pronounced a "spe-
cial capital city district" (Daerah Khusus Ibukota), gaining the status equivalent to a state 
or province. This act facilitates the channelling of large sums of capital into the region. 
Finally, Sukarno’s policy is not able to reverse Indonesia’s tradition of a spatial devel-
opment, which is produced by, and geared towards, power elites. By the dawn of Su-
karno’s time, a network of western style highways, prepares the ground for a period of 
urban regional growth and an intense exploitation of the peripheries (e.g. land specula-
tion), without being able to cope with the mainstream problems of megacity urbanisa-
tion. Hutarabat (2002:66) affirms: “By 1965, Jakarta had a chaotic array of freeways, 
roundabouts, monuments and skyscrapers, yet it had no effective transport services or 
sanitation for the bulk of its population.”56 
Suharto’s pro-western ‘New-order policy’ 1967 – 1998 
General – A Southeast Asian version of liberalism  
The direct history of Jakarta’s New Town begins with Suharto’s version of Southeast 
Asian Neoliberalism (cf. Wust 2002). A military regime overthrows Suharto’s govern-
                                                                                                                                         
development of the notion of the “Third World”. An important milestone of this non-aligned movement is the Bandung 
Meeting from 18 to 24 April of 1955. 
54 For this purpose a national authority (hak menguasai negara) is established. Land can be expropriated for the purpose of 
granting land rights to local authorities or traditional communities. The law is based on the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 
and the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960. It limits the size of private land holdings and ... protected local communities from 
negative impacts of speculative development. 
55 The Monas remains, by law, the highest structure of Jakarta for several decades, long into the Suharto era. 
56 Abeyasekere (1987: 222-230) reports that the American Secretary of State and Economic Affairs and American oil com-
panies (which had participated in the independence discussions) supported Sukarno’s highway projects. 
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ment in 1967 in the context of a rising pressure towards Westernisation (e.g. the West’s 
rising interest in Indonesia’s resources). From the late sixties to the late nineties (1967 to 
1998) General Haji Mohamed Suharto rules Indonesia. His ‘New-order’ period is charac-
terised by a strong focus on economic development policies. Indonesia opens to the West 
and deploys neoliberal strategies on a large scale (Spreitzhofer, 2003, Kusno 2006). The 
country becomes an early adopter of what becomes known as Market Enabling Strate-
gies. (Cowherd 2002: 22). A rising demand for natural resources (e.g. the oil crisis of 
1972) brings about a new focus on the own exploration of oil and other natural assets.  
Power elite 
Significantly Suharto’s period is characterised by new power elites. These are represented 
by certain industrial and commercial classes which form powerful alliances.57 58 Even the 
extended clan of the President’s family greatly participates in various undertakings.59 
Financial deregulation and liberalisation 
Suharto’s comprehensive deregulation and liberalisation of the finance sector aims to 
facilitate the outflow of products and the inflow of foreign investments.60 In 1988 Indo-
nesia adopts a comprehensive deregulation of the financial and banking sectors. As a 
result: “The banking system, non-bank financial credit and investment institutions, and 
capital markets see considerable expansion and deepening as well as increasing interna-
tional integration... ” (Hoek-Smit 2005)61 
Instrumental to the situation in the 1980s are neo-liberal The World Bank and IMF 
credit policies. A large New Town Conference, organised by The World Bank in Jakarta, 
contributes to an environment of easy credits and laid the foundations of large real estate 
ventures and New Towns. (Cf. Personal interview with Santoso 2004). When in the early 
seventies a consortium of developers around Sinar Mas sought to develop Bumi Serpong 
Damai, the president endorsed the project is person, against the vote of Jakarta’s Gover-
nor (Cf. Ibidem, cf. also below ‘Regulatory framework’).62 63 
                                               
57 Abidin Kusno (2006: 12) describes how, “Jakarta in the 1980s played an amazing drama of political and economy in-
trigues ... in the name of the market”, and how “the most remarkable aspects of the urban transformation of Jakarta were 
carried out by groups of investors working together with the president and his family...”.  
58 Asiaweek Journalist Salil Tripathi circumscribes these elite networks in the following way: “The power web of Suharto’s 
family is part of the new web of big capital: The family has teamed up with prominent Indonesian-Chinese groups such as 
Salim and Barito Pacific and with the armed forces. SocGen-Crosby Securities estimated the family's business assets in Indo-
nesia at about 11 trillion Rupiah (or US$ 5 billion). An estimate from the American CIA puts the family's total wealth at 
about US$ 30 billion. His eldest son, Sigit Harjojudanto, was running the Hanurata Group with his brother-in-law, Lt.-Gen. 
Prabowo Subianto. Second son Bambang Trihatmodjo controls the Bimantara Group, the biggest of all known family busi-
nesses. Youngest son Hutomo Mandala Putra, or Tommy, runs Humpuss. Suharto's daughters are also in on the act. The 
eldest, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, or Tutut, controls the Citra Lamtoro Gung Group, which includes the Jakarta toll road. 
Second daughter Siti Hedijanti Herijadi runs a finance company and chairs the Capital Markets Society of Indonesia, while 
youngest daughter Siti Hutami Endang Adyningsih is the co-owner of Tutut's Citra group.” (Cf. Tripathi, 1998) 
59 The president’s family is also part of the New Town business: In the 1980 a presidential decree facilitates the construction 
of a 30.000-hectare New Town project. A son of the President runs the consortium. The project is called Bukit Jonggol Asri  
(Beautiful Jonggol Hills) and is located South of Jakarta. If it were realised it would have been the largest project of its type 
in the region. (Cf. Firman 2004: 10) 
60 Winarso (2005:6) stresses the relevance of the 1988 financial, monetary, and banking reform. The Deregulation policies 
follow a neo-liberal agenda and aim at improving domestic savings, advancing resource allocation and developing a frame-
work for monetary management, in particular through indirect intervention rather than direct regulatory control (Hill 1996). 
In addition, the deregulation of the banking sector enables the entry of foreign banks in the form of joint ventures and 
encouraged genuine competition (Hoek-Smit 2005). 
61 Between March 1989 and June 1993, the number of private banks’ branches almost doubled, while the state bank in the 
same period expanded only by 24 percent. (Winarso and Firman 2002) 
62 Crucial is also the fourth Five Year Development Plan 1984 to 1989 (REPELITA IV), which promoted on export-oriented 
industrialisation and large-scale development of urban infrastructure. 
(http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb020/is_/ai_n28809719/, r20.06.2009) 
63 Essentially, the chain of events, that has ultimately also triggered Jakarta’s boom of New Towns, is not only related to a 
national framework of neo-liberal deregulation and privatisation policies of Sukarno’s era, it is also closely interrelated with a 
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Appropriational development, boom in real state and land speculation 
While the government facilitates land consolidation and housing finance, it seeks to har-
ness the dynamics of the private sector in order to construct housing and infrastructure in 
large amounts and with superior qualities. This strategy is characterised by the keyword 
‘appropriational development’. A massive development of housing led by the private sec-
tor began (Hill, 1996), as many investors start to diversify their investments away from 
banking and industry towards real estate projects (Douglass 2005: 4). As a result Land 
speculation becomes intense in Jakarta and Indonesian banks compete to provide credit 
for it. The banks make excessive loans to property firms; many of them belong to their 
own business groups (Winarso and Firman 2002).64 The real estate sector is attractive, 
because of its low regulation, the potential for huge speculative profits, and low land and 
property taxes.65  
Consequently, in the course of the 90‘s an enormous boom in real estate markets 
emerges. The number of registered land development companies triples.66 A total of 27 
thousand hectares of rural land in the hinterlands of Jakarta are urbanised. The number 
of housing sales rises from 91 thousand units in 1990 to 250 thousand units in 1997 
although most of these sales are speculative. (Cf. Simanungkalit, 2002: from Winarso 
2005).67  
Spatial aspects of Sukarno era 
The (re-) privatisation and commoditisation of urban land is a central element of the 
‘appropriational development policy’ of Sukarno’s era. Suharno’s process of public land 
reform was immediately halted. Urban land markets are to become an integral part of the 
economy and cities are to be developed along the ‘efficient’ logic of the market.68 Some 
critics compare the policies such as the ‘Kampong Improvement Project’, the ‘New 
Town’ and the ‘Transmigration’ programmes to strategies from colonial times. (Cf. 
Kusno 2006: 12) 
Finally, the country remains highly focused on the capital Jakarta. While Indonesia’s 
growth is based on the extraction of raw materials – mostly oil and timber – from the 
outer islands, Jakarta is reinforced as a centre of industry, trade and power. New power 
classes construct elevated highways, shopping malls, high-rise office buildings and con-
dominiums. Nevertheless, like in earlier periods the majority population is left behind. 
Crisis of 1997 
The chain of events from liberalisation policies, to huge sums of investments, to the real 
estate boom and its culmination in a New Town boom, triggers an avalanche, which 
eventually buries the initiator. A financial crisis, the Asian crisis of 1997, develops, be-
cause most of the property firms and developers over invest (using short-term money 
                                                                                                                                         
macro-framework of global events. Douglass (2005: 2) discusses how Japan’s bubble economy of the late 1980s eventually 
triggered a large wave of mega-projects in Pacific Asia. With the money flows from Japan drying out, many Asian banks 
were forced to turn to international Investments and started to accept speculative investments from around the world. 
64 By October 1998 property loans provided by Banks in Indonesia reached almost R. 73 trillion. This was almost 13 percent 
of the total loan volume of IDR 574 trillion in 1998. Almost three-fourth of these were non-performing loans (Properti 
Indonesia, December 1998, in Firman 2004: 11). 
65 Dorléans demonstrates that eventually only 0,1 of the property market value had to be paid (2002:53). 
66 From 907 companies in 1990 to 2312 companies in 1997 
67 Dorléans (2002: 54) describes how this unrestrained frenzy gold-rush: „The Municipality of Jakarta has granted business 
licenses to more than 150 real estate developers, but there are more than 250 developers doing business within the limits of 
Jabotabek. Some of them have purchased up to 3000 hectare of land ...while borrowing the bulk of the funds needed. 
68 Sometimes the principles of communal land ownership were turned upside down. This was the case when the argument 
for a ‘social use of land’ was used in cases when communities resisted selling their properties to private developers (cf. 
Aksoro 1994: 93). 
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with high market interest for long-term projects, including offshore loans). At the same 
time the banks disperse the money without putting much emphasis on the creditability of 
their clients and overstretching their lending capacities.69 In the following many develop-
ers are unable to repay the loans facing unpredicted risks and a wide field of competitors. 
Consequently the banks get into financial trouble.70  
Post 1998 crisis – ‘looseness at the centre’ 
In 1998 the East-Asian financial crisis hits Indonesia. The crisis results in the freezing of 
public projects, widespread social and political unrest, rioting, and the resignation of 
General Suharto. The country's GDP shrinks by 14 percent, the Jakarta stock market 
looses half its value and the inflation rate rises to 75 percent (Cf. Firman, 2004). The 
property business, which is mostly run by Sino-Indonesian conglomerates, is in chaos. 
More than 450 developers go out of business. Suharto resigns after weeks of violent pro-
tests (Hill 1996; Kusno 2000; Winarso and Firman 2002). In the following period the 
country witnesses three presidential successions in 6 years. During this time the relation-
ship of Government and population is undergoing a profound change. 
The turn of events strips away many areas of centralised control. Abidin Kusno 2006 
describes a profound change in the relationships between the population and the state: 
“The people of Jakarta today have been witnessing an unprecedented change in their 
relationships to the nation and its government... The upper middle class protected them-
selves and their properties day and night, often with firearms... the centre was falling 
apart... everyone was responsible for himself.” (Cf. Kusno, 2006: 15). 
Today, Indonesia finds itself in a post-liberal era. The country finally embarked on a 
process of the so-called „big-bang decentralisation” (The World Bank 2003) and subse-
quent democratisation (Sarosa 2006). September of 2004 sees Indonesia’s first democ-
ratic elections. Since the 20th of October 2004 Democratic President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono runs the country. 
In this post-Suharto era, the countries intellectual elites aim at a more regulated mod-
erate view on free markets and new economies, including the way urban planning is 
done: „Neo-Liberalism is dead, we need an integrated planning approach“ (Cf. Suryadi 
Santoso in a personal interview 2004). Yet, at the same time most of the peripheral land 
banks remain in private hands and the land issue waits to be resolved. 
Furthermore, with the large trends rolling on, the metropolitan region experiences 
new waves of laissez faire suburbanisation. Based on the existing freeway and toll road 
networks informal settlements as well as residential enclaves for the upper income classes 
mushroom more than ever. (Cf. Hutabarat: 68) In this context Jakarta’s New Town ven-
tures such as Bumi Serpong Damai face a loosened framework of fierce competition. 
Planning framework 
Introduction 
The examination of the historic milestones above reveals that while New Towns such as 
Bumi Serpong Damai were mainly planned and implemented by the private sector, the 
                                               
69 In the early 1990s the interest rates of the bank loans amounted to about 25-29 percent per year (Dorléans: 54). 
70 Apparently many of the “Banks had close ties with the real estate industry, which facilitated investment in the sector, but 
also caused less prudent underwriting of real estate projects.” (Hoek-Smit, 2005) This situation occurred not only in Jakarta, 
but also to many large cities in Southeast Asian countries, including Bangkok and Manila (cf. Quigley, 2001, or Firman 2004: 
11). 
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government played a decisive role as a facilitator and regulator of the trend.71 In this con-
text the following section examines the framework of public planning underlying Ja-
karta’s real estate and New Town boom of the 1980’s. Moreover, it elaborates on some 
of the respective implications and impacts on urban regional form and structure: A first 
part outlines the relevance of urban planning in presenting Jakarta’s master planning 
strategies, as well as the underlying urban planning paradigms; a second part recalls 
some of the decisive legal and financial instruments in the context the ‘market enabling 
strategies’ of Sukarno’s era; and finally a third part discusses some of the urban-
structural implications of the plans and policies. It emerges that, while legal and financial 
instruments were essential for the implementation and realisation of Jakarta’s New Town 
projects, the level of master plans and guidelines was less influential. 
Urban planning strategies 
From superblocks to New Towns 
Jakarta’s New Towns of the late 1980s were not only made by politicians, architects and 
planners also conceived the concept. Essentially, a combination of superblocks and the 
strategy of ‘bundled deconcentration’ resulted in Jakarta’s New Towns formula. The 
model was instrumental in devising Jakarta’s master plans and development strategies. 
The upgrading of inner city infrastructure as well a structured peripheral growth was 
to be achieved by the means of self-sustainable growth poles and sub-centres, or 'super-
blocks'.72  
The superblock strategy was institutionalised by the presidential Keppres-Decree 678 
in 1994. To qualify as superblocks areas had to have a minimum size of 20.000 square 
meters. In the periphery the strategy of superblocks was combined with a strategy of 
bundled deconcentration. Larger counter-magnets, or New Towns, were supposed to act 
as ‘self-sufficient’ nodes to the central area (DKIJ).73 The model served as an essential 
guiding principle for Bumi Serpong Damai and its peers. 
The concept of debundled concentration, however, was only short lived. It became 
clear as soon as the early 1990s that ongoing concentric urban expansion would cause 
too many problems in ecologically sensitive areas i.e. Jabodetabek’s the northern coast 
and the higher elevations in the South. As part of this paradigmatic shift a new develop-
ment strategy, the Pantura model, was developed in the late 1990s. This strategy priori-
tised the development of the region along an east-west axis.74 
Master plans 
The above strategic models have led to a series of formal planning documents. Jakarta’s 
framework of urban development is represented by national, regional and local structure 
land use plans. The following section will explore some of these. It will be important too 
                                               
71 Soegijoko confirms that „...new physical developments were clearly induced by government policy to deregulate the 
economy and to promote industrial estates as a necessary step to attract foreign firms“ (Soegijoko 1996: 406 from 
Spreitzhofer 2003: 56). 
72 This approach can be deeply grounded in Western urban planning traditions, e.g. Stein’s neighbourhood-unit based 
development for the Metropolitan region of New York (Perry, 1929), or the programmes by the CIAM movement. 
73 Western, mainly Dutch planning consultants have played a major role in this process. Cowherd (2002: 21) describes how 
the planners were affected by the Dutch Randstaad concept. They explored at least two alternatives patterns of placing the 
New Towns, a concentric, as well as a radial one. In the 1980s a cross pattern of sub-centres arranged along the spines 
connecting Jakarta’s centre with Tangerang, Bekasi, and Bogor was chosen as the underlying spatial development pattern 
for Jakarta. (Cf. also Giebels 1986, quoted in Leisch 2002: 100) 
74 The Indonesian name of the northern coast is Pantai Utara (Cf. Cowherd 2002: 22) 
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see, how the instruments are handled in the Indonesian context and whether these are 
important for Bumi Serpong Damai’s planning process. 
The first in a series of plans is Sukarno’s ‘Outline Plan for Jakarta’ of 1957. The 
scheme that was developed with the support of USAID and which emulated the US 
American Federal Highway programmes demonstrates an ongoing impact of the West. 
(Cf. Cowherd 2002: 19) 
Thereafter, from 1965-1985, Suharto’s Government developed several Metropolitan 
Development Plans with the support of The World Bank. Known as the Jabodetabek 
Metropolitan Development Plans (JMPD) these were elaborated under governor 
Sadikin75 (Cf. Cowherd 2002: 20). The documents recommended the development of 
state of the art infrastructure (e.g. highways) as a remedy to prevent further uncontrolled 
suburbanisation.76 Notably this was to be achieved by the involvement of the private 
sector (Cf. Spreizhofer 2003: 54).77  
More influential than Jakarta’s master plans was the Government’s version of five-
year economic development plans, the REPELITA (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun). 
The fourth Five Year Development Plan 1984 to 1989 (REPELITA IV), sought to diver-
sify the Indonesian economy (away from a one sided dependence on oil, focused on ex-
port-oriented industrialisation, and notably also fostered the development of urban infra-
structure.78  
In 1985 the Jakarta Master Plan was replaced with the Structure Plan for the Special 
Capital Province of Jakarta 1985 to 2005, or RUTRK Jakarta (Rencana Umum Uang 
DKI Jakarta Tahun 2005). The plan was approved in 1987 and served as the basis for 
many subordinate documents, also the basic land use plan for BSD.  
Notably, only a small part of the master plans were finally enforced. The implementa-
tion was obstructed, among others, by the fact that the region consists of different ad-
ministrative levels (DKI Jakarta, province of West Java, several districts, cities and vil-
lages). (Cf. Leisch 2002: 89) For these reason the plans never served as a legal basis for 
practical use. (Cf. Abeyasekere 1987: 222-230). 
Additional difficulties of the master plans have been related to the implementation 
and monitoring processes. Various critics assert that that the Indonesian master plans are 
too theoretical and complex and that this fact overburdens the local administrations.79 In 
addition, in most of the cases the plans were only drawn up on large scales, giving no 
concrete details. (Cf. Cowherd 2002: 30) 
In the case of Bumi Serpong Damai, the master plan for the New Town existed ahead 
of the structure plan for the respective Municipality (Tangerang). A group of consultants, 
partially related to the developer (Ciputra), drew the structure plan for the local govern-
ment.80 81 
                                               
75 Jakarta’s Governor in the Sukarno’s era, appointed in 1966 
76  The Jabotabek Urban Development Project was located in the Jabotabek metropolitan region. It was expected to cost 
about US$ 224 million equivalent and included expenditures for: (a) upgrading of primary and secondary arterial roads, (b) 
provision of development roads on the city periphery, (c) major intersection improvements and (d) traffic management and 
road safety measures.” (Cf. The World Bank Project ID: P003923). 
77 A consecutive programme, the Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Strategy was a means to stimulate urban 
development through integrated infrastructure improvement on a national basis. (Cf. Sarosa: 164) 
78 Cf.: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb020/is_/ai_n28809719/, r20.06.2009. 
79 For example: Indonesian land use plans are established at six levels of administrative hierarchies, whereas the British plan-
ning tradition has only two levels (Cowherd 2002: 22). 
80 Cf. Winarso 2000, footnote 31, quoted in Cowherd 2002: 31. 
81 The exiting plan for Serpong town foresaw a satellite city of 150.000 residents. To accommodate BSD’s 6.000 hectares 
the plan was revised at a scale of 20.000 hectares. Its name is Rencana Umum Tata-Ruang Perkotaan, or (RUTRP). In addi-
tion a detailed plan was drawn up for BSD. (Cf. Personal interview with Suryadi Santoso in August 2008) 
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Legal and financial instruments: ‘Market enabling strategies’ 
Whereas the above planning instruments helped to conceptualise Jakarta’s New Towns, 
two particular ‘market-enabling strategies’: A) Land permits and B) credit subsidies, have 
played a crucial role in their implementation. 
Location Permit – the green card for profit  
The legal instrument of the Location Permit turns out to be one of the most decisive ele-
ments behind the real estate boom and the prevailing success of the New Towns in Ja-
karta. In order to foster private housing construction Sukarno’s government developed 
land-purchasing programmes. The key tool within the land-purchasing programmes was 
the exclusive right to develop an area. The government’s approval is generally referred to 
as the Ijin Lokasi, while the actual development right is named SIPT (Surat Izin Pem-
basan Tanah).82  
With this permit the government granted the exclusive rights to purchase the land in a 
given project area to one developer. The instrument was an indirect way of price fixing. 
It protected the developers from speculative rises of the land price before the purchase 
(Dorléans: 54). On the other hand it has helped them to cash in on all the speculative 
rises after the acquisition. Other competitors were deterred, as the national land agency 
(BPN) banned the sale of singular plots until early 2000s.83 84 
Crucially, the developers were not penalised if they did not develop the land within 
the given period as contracted on the permit. As a result, soon large tracks of land were 
withdrawn from the market without additional costs to the new owners (Hoek-Smit, 
2005). This fact significantly contributed to the transformation of Jakarta’s periphery 
into one of the largest speculative land banks in the world (cf. above). 
Credits and loan subsidies 
The second important pillar of the market enabling strategies consisted of subsidised 
loans for the supply side. 85 Notably this practice was pooled with the land permit model. 
The programme linked Middle- and low-income housing developments to finance subsi-
dies at fixed interest rates. These included both construction and mortgage finance in one 
package. The state housing bank, Bank Tabunga Negara (BTN) dominated this subsi-
dised market and added implicit subsidies by accumulating high defaults. (Cf. Hoek-Smit 
2005, Winarso 2005: 6) 
Significantly, both of the above ‘strategies’ triggered a trend towards large-scale de-
velopment. The programmes focused on an integrated development of large tracts of 
land, as a rule from 50 to 800 hectares (BSD with 6000 hectares was therefore an excep-
tion). Hence, they required huge long-term financial commitments. These, in turn, could 
only be afforded by big private enterprises. 
                                               
82 These two instruments are closely interrelated. Ijin Lokasi is a recommendation issued by Land Management office (BPN - 
a central government institution) and Surat Izin Pembebesan Tanah is the exclusive permission to acquire and develop the 
land, issued by the local government. (Cf. Interview with Santoso August 2008) 
83 The official argument behind the permits was to discourage land speculation and in order to foster the development of 
New Towns. (Cf. Firman 2004: 13) 
84 The right of a Location Permit was initially grated for a limited period of three months, than for one year. It could be 
renewed, when the developer succeeded to purchase more than half of the desired land (Cf. Dorléans: 54, Cowherd 2002: 
31). However, it was common practice to extend Location Permits indefinitely, a practice that was made official policy in 
1997. (Cf. Harsono, quoted in Cowherd 2002: 33) 
85 Cf. also to the finance section below. 
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Conclusion: legal and financial planning instruments 
Crucially, the subsidised housing programs and the location permit supported a practice 
of using single-family homes (including luxury homes) as speculative investments. Critics 
refer to the land permits as the essential toll behind the excessive land speculation, the 
real estate boom, bank frauds and the later crisis (cf. Cowherd 2002). The Government is 
accused of having misused this legal instrument by allowing the private sector to acquire 
land far in excess of even the artificially inflated market demand. Indeed, from 1974 to 
1996 the private sector produced some 360.000 housing units, whereas at the same time 
the federally run housing company (Perumnas) produced only 86.000 houses. (Cf. Cow-
herd 2002: 31) Nevertheless, a large part of the privately developed entities were held off 
the market. Significantly, much of the private sector housing production, subsidised by 
the government, remained empty.86  Hence, as increased demand pressure further fed the 
escalating value of the properties, luxury housing became the most attractive investment 
opportunities available in Indonesia. 
Implications – New Towns as triggers of sprawl and fragmentation 
Opposed to the initial idealism and good intentions of the stakeholders it can be argued 
that Jakarta’s New Town boom has largely contributed to sprawl87, an increasing frag-
mentation of the urban structure and a continuing polarisation of the population (rich 
and poor, formal vs. informal). These results can be related to the respective dynamics, as 
well as the operational logic of the public and the private stakeholders. As a matter of 
fact, neither side was prepared to handle the complex job of urban development. 
New Towns and Sprawl 
The direct transfer of western concepts, here the strategy of New Towns as part of a re-
gional pattern of decentralised concentration has lead to results, which are completely 
different to those in Western countries. Indonesia’s public planners have tended to regard 
New Towns as non-plus-ultra strategies. Enforced by the policies of international lending 
bodies, the public hand delegated the strategy to the corporate sector. At the same time, 
however, it was not prepared to face the dynamics of the private stakeholders88  
The government was unable to develop and implement a proper regulative framework 
for the New Town developers. It also failed to provide for regional infrastructure in a 
timely manner. In addition, it did not succeed in safeguarding the environment.  
On the other hand, the private (real-estate) developers were faced with a regulatory 
void. The ‘invisible hand’ of the market was not able to generate integrated development 
on a regional scale. Instead, the unbundled dynamics of private stakeholders, resulted in 
monopolised, speculative, and also oversaturated markets. In a ‘gold rush’ situation, doz-
ens of projects (‘products’) were implemented side-by-side without proper coordination. 
Hence, the ‘noble’ intention of Jakarta’s planners to utilise counter magnets as a strat-
egy towards decentralised concentration was turned upside down. Therefore, it can be 
argued that Jakarta’s New Towns have actually triggered more sprawl and suburbanisa-
tion.89  
                                               
86 Preliminary investigations in several neighbourhoods found that occupation rates of 20 to 50 percent were not uncom-
mon.” (Cf. Cowherd 2002: 32) Bumi Serpong Damai’s neighbourhoods feature vacancy rates of 20 to 80 percent (Own 
estimations, cf. Physical structure, Neighbourhoods) 
87 Here seen, in a negative sense, as unregulated development. 
88 And the dynamics among the local governments (cf. below: Control, Stakeholders) 
89 Asian Development Bank Consultant Wicaksono Sarosa describes this land pattern when he writes: “It is clearly visible to 
anyone travelling on roads between the major cities that the conversion of land tends to be disorderly rather than carefully 
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Fragmentation  
In addition to fostering regional sprawl and decentralisation, Jakarta’s New Towns have 
also contributed to increasing patterns of socio-spatial fragmentation and urban divide. 
This is the case, because the projects, in optimising their respective profit strategies, have 
followed a self-perpetuating logic of ever-increasing size. Skimming the market for the 
most profitable higher income groups, required large sums to be invested in the New 
Towns in order to stay competitive.90  
... and polarisation 
Despite the vast investments and profits, Western Java’s lower-income and no-income 
groups continue to have a hard time to find appropriate housing. The lack of supply of 
serviced land and burdensome permitting procedures hinder developers to use available 
land for middle and lower-middle income houses. High costs and long delays in acquir-
ing subdivision and building permits add to the inefficiency of the land supply systems 
(cf. Hoek-Smit 2005). Indeed, the Centre for Indonesian Property Studies has estimated 
that in the course of Jakarta’s property boom 4.5 million people had to relocate from 
their homes between 1968 and 1998. The compensation to evicted homeowners was 
generally worth only one twentieth of the market value of the properties. 
                                                                                                                                         
planned. Industrial factories built on what used to be paddy fields are very common along the major roads, and making for 
a distinctive settlement pattern" (Sarosa 2006: 160). 
90 Peter Rimmer and Howard Dick (1998) precisely observe in this regard that:  “The solution of increasing competition in 
the 90‘s, was to buy up even larger tracts of land for integrated residential and commercial complexes. The externalities are 
therefore internalised....” Consequently: "A developer with 10 hectares can build a suburban block, with 100 hectares, an 
entire suburb, but with 1000 hectares a New Town.” 
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Local predecessors  
Box 4: Legacy of NeoTown predecessors in Indonesia 
Weltevreden, Jakarta (Daendels, 1809); European Quarter, Bandung (Algemeen In-
genieurs- en Architectenbureau, 1917); Menteng and Gondanglia, Jakarta (1918); Ke-
bayoran Baru, Jakarta (van Roermondt, Soesilo, 1948); Pulo Mas, Jakarta (Yayasan Pulo 
Mas Jaya,1957); Pondok Indah,Jakarta (Ciputra, 1974) 
Introduction 
The tradition of planned cities in Indonesia is as old as its urban history. The develop-
ment of comfortable enclaves has always served the needs of the ruling elite and consti-
tuted a tool of power and control. 
Despite being triggered by various international factors91, the typology of privately 
built New Towns in Indonesia has a long history of local predecessors.92 Most of the 
important cases cluster in Bandung and the capital. Jakarta’s New Town model can be 
traced along a line of affluent development from the North to the Southwest. Planned 
Urban settlements like Weltevreden, Kebayoran Baru and Pondok Indah stretch from the 
North to the South of the city and represent three different epochs. 
Pre-colonial and colonial traditions 
The ancient Javanese city 
Indonesia has a unique pre-colonial town planning culture with an emphasis on Java.93 
The island’s ancient aristocracy organised the Javanese city as a fixed centre of power 
surrounded by a flexible fabric. The centre consisted of the palace (Kraton) and a central 
square (Alun-Alun), a series of controlled quarters. (Cf. Nas 2002: 12, Kusno 2006: 3)94  
The European colonists (Dutch, Portugese, English)  
The European traders started to construct fortified New Towns (cf. Sujarto: 76)95. The 
Dutch power in Indonesia was based on a polar urban pattern of highly served urban 
enclaves for the ruling elite. From the very beginning, the efforts of controlling security, 
flooding, and disease led to a relocation of the European ruling class to alternative sites. 
This resulted in a dual urban form of colonial town and the ‘other’ (indigenous) city (Cf. 
Hutabarat 2002: 64). The bulk of the population was excluded from the provision of 
modern amenities. The fortified enclave of the early Jakarta neighbourhood of Messter 
Cornelis (17th century) stands for this approach. 
                                               
91 Such as the global oversupply of western money, the specific agenda of neo-liberal aid policies geared towards a market 
driven housing production, reformed lending policies, or demands the rise of new middle classes (cf. above). 
92 I can be observed that the Indonesian scientific debates on New Towns are largely confined to local narratives and histo-
ries. An awareness of similar parallel phenomena in other mega-city regions is rare. 
93 Cf. Werheim, 1958, Santoso 1983, Nas 1986, Zahnd 2005. 
94 Interestingly, Kusno (2003: 3) relates the flexibility of Indonesian’s vernacular housing typologies to the frequently chang-
ing power landscapes on Java: “With a periphery in constant flux in relation to the centre, the capital city was more a com-
plex of quarters rather than a single walled-in fortress town.“ In case of warfare... these houses are subjected to abandon-
ment and re-built in a matter of two days in different locations.” 
95 Islamisation and Chinese immigration since the 13th century have ‘only’ resulted in the import of regional urban typologies 
from South East Asia. (Cf. Zahnd 2005: 26) 
Bumi Serpong Damai     98 
Modern town planning 
The pre-war colonial period from 1900 until the end of the Second World War is re-
garded as the period of modern town planning. Rapid economic development during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries profoundly changed the lives of both Euro-
pean and indigenous residents. By 1930 Batavia had a population of more than 500000 
people. Surabaya had nearly 300000 people and other large cities – Semarang, Bandung, 
Yogyakarta, and Surakarta – had populations between 100.000 and 300.000 (Warden 
1993). During this time modern urban typologies (E.g. road systems, urban squares and 
boulevards, railway stations, museums, police, town administrations) were installed. The 
indigenous city became recognised as an integral element of the city (Cf. Wertheim et al. 
1958). The emerging hunger for raw materials led the Dutch to install estate towns 
around the country.  
The Dutch planner Herman Thomas Karsten in particular propagated the principles 
of scientific town planning and was the first to put the development of Kampungs back 
on the agenda. Karsten also participated in the design of about 30 New Towns of the 
early modern period (Santoso 2004).96 Kusno (2006: 9) delineates the linkages of this 
period of modernisation to the subsequent epoch of decolonisation: „As early as in the 
1920‘s, a ‘theory of modernisation’ in its aim of constructing a bourgeois middle class 
was already in place in the colony.., [the modern colony] in turn affects the subsequent 
imaginary of the utopian project of decolonisation.“97  
The Dutch and also other Westerners preferred to live in European-style urban areas 
with wide streets and abundant greenery (Warden 1998). The Dutch neighbourhood of 
Weltevreden98 is among the important examples in this regard. The enclave of the early 
19th century is based on estate typologies and open curvilinear street patterns. Here, at 
12 kilometres from Jakarta’s centre, the Europeans could find a serene life in the mid of 
the country.99  
European Quarter, Bandung  
The fact that in 1910 the Dutch decided to shift several ministries to the better climate of 
Bandung has created a number of significant models for Indonesia‘s New Towns (in par-
ticular for the early phase of Bumi Serpong Damai). The plan for the European quarter, 
an extension plan for the northern part of Bandung, was presented in 1917 by the Gen-
eral Engineers- and Architects Bureau100 (cf. Roosmalen 2004). The quarter exemplified a 
blending of modern and native architectural styles and several new city landmarks.101 
During the same period, in Jakarta (Batavia) in 1918 new highly influential layouts 
for the elite residential areas of Menteng and New Gondangdia were presented. Notably, 
these neighbourhoods represented various formal ideas of the Garden City movement. 
They consisted of villas, lots of green space and curvilinear streets lined by trees.102 
                                               
96 Cf. his paper ‘Indian Town Planning’ (Indiese Stedebouw) at the Indonesian Decentralisation congress in 1921 (Kusno 
2007) 
97 Cf. also: Bogaers, Erica (1983): Ir. Thomas Karsten: De Ontwikkeling van de Stedebouw in Nederlands-Indië 1915–1940; 
Doktoralscriptie planologie; Universiteit van Amsterdam. pp. 62. 
98 This means as much as ‘very satisfied’. 
99 Firman 2004: quotes Leaf 1996; Cf. also: Meyers Konversationslexikon aus dem 19 Jahrhundert: 
(http://www.retrobibliothek.de/retrobib/seite.html?id=101687, r12.08.2008). 
100 Algemeen Ingenieurs- en Architectenbureau – AIA 
101 In the 1930s, Bandung was known also as an architectural laboratory. Many Dutch architects made experimented with 
new architectural designs. Albert Aalbers added the expressionist architecture style to the Art Deco by designing the Denis 
bank (1936) and renovated the Savoy Homann Hotel (1939). C.P.W. Schoemaker was one of celebrated architects who 
strongly added native elements in his artworks, including the Villa Isola (1932), Hotel Preanger (1929), and the regional 
military headquarter (1918), Gedung Merdeka (1921) and ITB Rectorate Building (1925). (Cf. Wangsadinata 1995) 
102 The neighbourhoods are functional to date. 
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 Illustration B-4: Suburbs in Semarang 
 Illustration B-5: Villa in Bandungs’s European quarter 
 Illustration B-6: Plan of Menteng 
Jakarta’s New Town’s 
Kebayoran Baru 
After Indonesia became independent, all government functions were shifted back from 
Bandung to Jakarta. To accommodate the emerging housing need for civil servants, the 
government promoted the construction of the New Town of Kebayoran Baru in Southern 
Jakarta. The satellite city was the first systematically planned New Town of Jakarta in 
the postcolonial period.103 It turned rapidly into an integral sector engulfed by the mush-
rooming urban fabric.104 
Implementation started in 1949 with the idea to develop a model project for growing 
towns of Indonesia and other Asian countries that would demonstrate ‘the advantages of 
the planned town’. (Cf. Roosmalen 2004: 12). The plan was based on Karsten’s philoso-
phies. Significantly, the area was divided into blocks labelled along an alphabetical order 
(A to S) and the highest amount of housing remained reserved for civil servants (cf. Ja-
karta Post 2001). Each of the residential areas had their own identities divided by streets 
or green belts. While built-up space occupied half of Kebayoran Baru’s 730 hectares of 
land, the other half remained free for parks, infrastructure and services 12.500 houses 
were planned to accommodate about 100.000 inhabitants.  
Notably Kebayoran Baru represents several key experiences of New Town develop-
ment in the context of emerging Megacities: When the New Town was finished in 1954 
it did not fulfil the goals set at its birth. Initially designed for all income groups, the total 
area was ‘colonised’ by moderate and higher income groups as soon as it became clear 
that the location was very valuable.105  
The second feature that proved an illusion was the one kilometre green belt around 
the New Town. As soon as during the construction stage began, many new buildings 
mushroomed along the connecting four-lane road between Jakarta and Kebayoran. Only 
shortly after construction was the New Town engulfed by the growth of the remaining 
city and became another neighbourhood. The quarter remained recognizable no more 
than by its distinctive street layout. 
 Illustration B-7: 1950s dwellings in Kebayoran Baru 
 Illustration B-8: Kebayoran Baru ‘before and after’ 
Pulo Mas 
An additional planned neighbourhood of the early Suharto era with the lower income 
groups in mind was Pulo Mas. The project was intended to materialise the objectives of 
the 1957 Outline Plan for Jakarta (cf. above), namely the need for peripheral develop-
ments and for the creation of self-contained settlements at a reasonable distance from the 
centre (cf. Roosmalen 2004: 12-15).106 
                                               
103 Cf. Vletter; Voskuil; van Diessen 1997: Batavia/Djakarta/Jakarta: Beeld van een Metamorfose; Purmerend (NL). 
104 The idea was based on a Dutch scheme from the 1930. V.R. van Roermondt a professor at the Technical University in 
Bandung drafted the first general plan (Cf. Jakarta Post: Kebayoran Baru, RI's first housing complex, 18.08.2001; at: 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2001/08/18/kebayoran-baru-ri039s-first-housing-complex.html, r12.12.2008) 
105 Significantly, the Neighbourhood housed only 75 percent of the planned population, and of the planned houses only less 
than half (4.720) were built (cf. Roosmalen 2004: 12). 
106 Pulo Mas was a prestigious low cost housing project in the vicinity of Jakarta under Sukarno. It was intended to serve as a 
demonstration project of mass housing for low-income people. Notably it was the first modern settlement scheme in Indo-
nesia based on pedestrians. The project of 270 hectares intended to house approximately twenty to fifty thousand people in 
Bumi Serpong Damai     100 
As in Kebayoran, the implementation of the original plan proved to be illusory. The 
project was adjusted to the stark demand of middle- and high-income groups. Detached 
villas replaced a considerable number of high-rise and two-storey buildings. A horse race-
track substituted the central axis that was intended to become the ‘town centre’. As a 
result the density rate dropped by 80 percent, from an intended 500 people per hectare to 
100. 
Pondok Indah 
While Kebayoran Baru and Pulo Mas represented public schemes, Pondok Indah became 
the first privately driven urban extension without socio-romantic illusions. An outcome 
of Suharto‘s ‚New Order‘ policy, the 720-hectare project was entirely driven by the desire 
to make profits. Arranged around a golf club and equipped with modern shopping mall 
facilities Pondok Indah (beautiful home), was built by the private sector as a settlement 
for middle and high-income classes (Cf. Santoso 2004, Firman 2004). Located on a for-
mer rubber plantation, the new neighbourhood emerged in 1974 to the South of Kebay-
oran, on Jakarta’s ‚axis of wealth‘ (cf. illustration above). The low-rise area was sophisti-
cally planned and contained tree lined cull de sac streets. Access to the neighbourhoods 
was restricted. Consequently, Pondok Indah became a symbol of a wealthy residential 
area and an important role model for the New Town boom to come  (Winarso 2005: 
8).107 108 
 Illustration B-9: Map of Jakarta’s sewerage networks indicating Jakarta’s industrial and 
elite neighbourhoods 
New Town Boom 
On the basis of the greater trends and the specific policies as described above, Jakarta 
experienced a boom of privately driven New Town projects from the 1980s to the 1990s. 
The end of the 1980s recorded more than 10 New Towns of 500 hectares or more in 
Jakarta’s periphery.109 By the mid-1990’s already 25 large subdivision projects existed. 
These ranged respectively from 500 to 6.000 hectares. The total area exceeded Jakarta’s 
central district. Yet, by 2002, only about 60 percent of the projects survived the pro-
longed economic crisis (Cf. Firman 2004, Table 1; Graham and Marvin 2001). Only, few 
of the New Towns, e.g. Bumi Serpong Damai and Lippo Karawaci featured excellent 
infrastructure and service facilities, including schools, shopping malls, cinemas, and hos-
pitals (Cf. Firman 2004). 
 Illustration B-10: Map of Jakarta’s New Towns 
 Illustration B-11: New Towns before and after 1997 
 Illustration B-12: Focus areas of Indonesia’s real estate sector 
                                                                                                                                         
several neighbourhoods. The scheme represented Sukarno’s ideal of Indonesian society transformed in urban form. Each 
neighbourhood consisted of four housing units (rukun tetangga – RT) that formed one neighbourhood unit (rukun warga – 
RW). Four neighbourhood units formed one city quarter (keluruhan), and four city quarters formed one sub district (kecema-
tan). (Cf. paragraph on Culture). 
107 Bakker and Kooy 2008 describe that Pondok Indah was one of the few new areas of the city in the 1970s where the 
water network was extended on the base of existing network in Kebayoran Baru. This description thus supports a hypothesis 
that Jakarta (as much as São Paulo), in a situation of general demand for urban services highly surpassing the supply, devel-
oped along certain elite areas featuring the best infrastructure and services: “The installation of primary pipelines to direct 
urban water supply further southwards into this new area of residential development mimicked the development of Ja-
karta’s first upper-class residential development – Kebayoran Baru.” 
108 An early example of a public space developed by the private sector was Taman Impian Jaya Ancol, a large leisure and 
entertainment park in Jakarta’s North. ‘Ancol’ was the one of the first public private partnerships in Jakarta and made possi-
ble the recreational access to the sea in a city at the seashore without public access to the waterfront. The place was re-
cently renamed to Jakarta Bay City. 
109 Properti Indonesia, June 1995: 28, from Winarso 2005:9. 
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 Illustration B-13: Housing and land prices in selected Projects 
Summary BSD’s context 
The above chapter elaborates the greater historical as well as socioeconomic context of 
Bumi Serpong Damai. In order to achieve this, it firstly portrayed the social, economic, 
cultural and demographic profiles as well as the major trends in urban development of 
Indonesia and the Jakarta region. Secondly, a historical framework was established in 
delineating historical milestones as well as the respective urban forms. Thirdly, it dis-
cussed locally specific planning strategies and cultures and last, but not least, a substan-
tial tradition of local predecessors were presented. 
Indonesia 
Indonesia is a South-East-Asian nation comprising 17.500 islands and more than 300 
dialects. With a population of 225 million it is the fourth most populous nation of the 
world. The country is characterised by rapid and ongoing demographic and economic 
growth. Almost half of the population is concentrated in urban centres with a strong 
focus on Java-island (60 percent). The country’s culture is located between harmony and 
hierarchy. Informal practices in business and politics (from a western perspective often 
interpreted as corruption) are very common. 
Indonesia is a poor country: in 2004 the GDP per capita was 816 US$. While the 
economy is growing rapidly, more than half of the population earns less than US$ 2 per 
day. On the other side, less than 20 percent of the inhabitants have a regular formal in-
come. These middle-classes are playing a central role in economic development. As one 
of the consequences the consumption rates are expanding considerably faster than the 
population. 
Jakarta 
Bumi Serpong Damai was developed in the periphery of Jakarta, Indonesia's capital city 
and undisputed national powerhouse. The region of five municipalities and 21 million 
residents encompasses almost 10 percent of the national population. The metropolitan 
territory is called Jabodetabek, a composition of the initials of Jakarta and 4 regional 
districts. While the locale adds a million people per year, twice the velocity of the coun-
try, the public sector lags behind in providing sufficient infrastructure and services. 
In the last 30 years Jakarta was transformed thoroughly from a city orientated to-
wards the centre to a polycentral regional system. During this period the population of 
the urban region has increased by 300 percent. Notably, Jakarta’s periphery is character-
ised by locally distinct modes of urbanisation. This has been termed Desakota. Literally 
meaning village-city, the term describes a rural landscape, which has arrived in a service 
based epoch, leapfrogging industrialisation. 
Jakarta is Indonesia’s melting pot and international gateway. Six major ethnic groups 
make up the population. The Sino-Indonesian (ethnic Chinese) minority plays a particu-
lar role for Jakarta’s New Towns. The majority of the Jakarta’s New Town projects, 
including BSD was financed by Indochinese banks, developed by Indochinese conglomer-
ates, and appropriated by Indochinese families. 
The fact that the megacity Jakarta is also a framework of amplified risks, fuels the de-
sire for safe heavens and alternative life-styles in New Towns. The hazardous landscape 
is not only composed of periodical disasters such as the notorious earthquakes and flood-
ing, but also of myriads of everyday catastrophes, such as traffic jams, health hazards 
related to environmental pollution, crime, or financial insecurity. 
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In the last 25 years, the periphery has experienced a historically unique boom of large 
real estate projects and New Towns. This burst was triggered by deregulation and liber-
alisation policies of the so-called ‘New Order’ Era of the late 1980’s. Besides, Western 
paradigms of bundled deconcentration and superblock development have affected the 
official planning strategies.  
In spite of that, the ‘invisible hand’ of the private (real-estate) market was not able to 
automatically produce integrated development on a regional scale. In contrast, the un-
bundled dynamics of privatised real estate markets have resulted in very congested, com-
petitive, and monopolised markets. Significantly, in the late 1990’s private developers 
controlled a speculative land bank of 25.000 square kilometres in Jakarta’s periphery  – 
an area four times the size of central Jakarta with a capacity to house ten million resi-
dents. Indeed, throughout this process the initial goals of the regional plan were turned 
upside down. It seems that New Towns and other large real estate projects have left Ja-
karta’s periphery in a status of sprawl and fragmentation. 
Only on a macro scale, a ribbon shaped development along two criss-crossed axes can 
be observed: A 120-kilometre corridor connects Bekasi to the East and Tangerang in the 
West. A 200-kilometre corridor connects Jakarta’s seashore with Bogor and Bandung. 
The present master plans are inspired by this structure. 
National milestones 
Indonesia’s, and BSD’s, history is marked by a tradition of ‘strong’ authoritarian gov-
ernments – from the Javanese aristocracy, to the Dutch colonisers, and the authoritarian 
regimes of the post-independence era. Significantly, all of these stand out for their par-
ticular spatial representations, catering to the powerful elites of their times. 
The Javanese aristocracy founded an indigenous urban tradition and developed 
mechanisms of political domination and control by the means of urban form and spatial 
organisation. The Dutch made Batavia (Jakarta) their capital and refined the strategy of 
orchestrating space as a means of power and control and imported the principles of 
modern ‘hygienic’ city planning. General Sukarno Nation Building Programme consoli-
dated the country and strengthened the role of the capital as a national hub (and virtu-
ally, the centre of the universe). Jakarta became a ‘special capital district’.  
Indonesia's second president General Suharto embarked on a pro-western policy of 
economic liberalisation, deregulation and export-oriented industrialisation. The policy 
gave rise to a broad Bourgeois metropolitan class. Moreover, the era was characterised 
by influential alliances among industrial and political elites.  
Sukarno’s programmes were also affected by The World Bank policies. These pro-
moted a deregulation of the financial sector prompting enormous injections of foreign 
capital into the country, i.e. the capital city region. The privatisation of urban develop-
ment became an integral part of the new spirit. Yet, it resulted in a supply-side orientated 
production of housing by large conglomerates. This was the cradle of Jakarta’s New 
Town movement and importantly, Bumi Serpong Damai was one of the showcase pro-
jects.  
The fact that most of the fresh money was preferably invested into the ‘virgin’ real es-
tate markets, has led to the rise of the vast speculative land bank as described above. This 
has since then impeded ‘conventional’ urban growth. The bubble burst in 1997, as a re-
sult of over investments with short-term money at high interest rates for long-term pro-
jects.  
During the following national crisis the disaffected population overthrew Sukarno. 
The country embarked on a democratic path. The major trends, however, such as the rise 
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of the middle classes and their drift to the suburbs, continued. At the same time the real 
estate markets remain characterised by an unregulated and risky dog eats dog competi-
tion. 
Planning framework 
The government has played a decisive role in the emergence of Jakarta’s real estate boom 
and the relating New Town passion of the 1980’s. While the master planning level was 
influential for the formal conception of Jakarta’s New Towns, legal and financial instru-
ments were crucial for the implementation and the realisation of the projects. Jakarta’s 
master plans of the postcolonial era reflect western planning-paradigms geared at the 
combination of superblocks and the strategy of bundled deconcentration. This has even-
tually resulted in Jakarta’s New Towns formula.  
In spite of this, the formal documents faced several problems: The region was neither 
ever a political entity, nor had the plans of a legal basis for practical use. An implementa-
tion was also impeded by the complex and nested structure of the plans in combination 
with the lacking capacities of local governments. 
In contrast to the master plan documents, the two particular ‘market-enabling strate-
gies’ of land permits and credit subsidies, have played a crucial role in the implementa-
tion of the projects.  
The legal instrument of the Location Permits of the 1980s turns out to be one of the 
most decisive elements behind the real estate boom and the prevailing success of Jakarta’s 
New Towns. The permit granted the exclusive rights to purchase the land in a given pro-
ject-area to one developer. The fact that this instrument had practically no time limita-
tions significantly contributed to the transformation of Jakarta’s periphery into one of 
the largest speculative land banks in the world. In addition the developers also received 
subsidised loans, as middle- and low-income housing developments, were linked to vari-
ous finance subsidies. 
Critics refer to the land permits as the essential toll behind the excessive land specula-
tion, the real estate boom, bank frauds and the later crisis (cf. Cowherd 2002). As a re-
sult the subsidised housing programs and the Location Permit supported a practice of 
using single-family homes as speculative investments. Moreover, both of the above in-
struments have boosted a preference of large enterprises, because only these were able to 
meet the official requirements. 
In conclusion, it can be argued that, opposed to the initial idealism and good inten-
tions of the stakeholders, Jakarta’s New Town boom has largely contributed to further 
uncontrolled growth, an increasing fragmentation of the urban structure and continuing 
polarisation of the populations. While the job of building the city was given into the 
hands of the corporate sector, the public hand was not prepared to face the consequences 
of the private-market dynamics. The government was not only unable to develop and 
implement a proper regulative framework for the New Town developers; it has also 
failed to provide for larger scale regional infrastructure in a timely manner. Instead, in 
Indonesia, the unbundled dynamics of privatised real estate markets, have resulted in 
highly monopolised, speculative, and also inevitably oversaturated (competitive) markets. 
Predecessors 
New Towns in Indonesia have a long history of predecessors. Indeed, their common 
ground is, that all have been realised by governing elites. The early examples range from 
the Javanese cities as power centres, European fortifications (e.g. Meester Cornelis, fort 
of Batavia), or the Dutch suburban settlements, such as Weltevreden. An influential ref-
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erence point and experimental field for new architectural styles, modern infrastructures 
and low-density urbanisation is the European Quarter in Bandung.  
The New Town predecessors in Jakarta can be traced along an axis of wealth from 
the North to the Southwest: From centrally located Menteng, Jakarta’s early Dutch sub-
urb; the post independence New Town Kebayoran Baru (significant for Sukarno’s con-
solidation); to Pondok Indah, as an early example of a privately developed residential 
district with golf clubs and shopping malls (exemplary for Suharto’s New Order). The 
1980’s brought a New Town boom with dozens of projects such as Bintaro Jaya, Bumi 
Serpong Damai, and Lippo Karawaci, which are extending the axis. 
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Physical structure –  
A ‘new’ cluster planning approach 
Introduction 
After the wider framework of Bumi Serpong Damai is delineated, the following section 
seeks to examine the physical characteristics of this New Town. It will explore the spatial 
materiality and functionality of the case at hand along a multi-scalar analysis, which is a 
well established technique used by planners, geographers, designers and architects. Addi-
tionally the links and cross-references to the other perspectives of this chapter will remain 
essential. Consequently, in our context, the material characterisation of space serves as a 
dialectical antipode, a counterweight, to the other reference points (subchapters), which 
are focusing on the dynamics of the stakeholders (population, developers) and of proc-
esses (finance, regulation). 
The section is divided in to two parts. The first examines the relationship of Bumi 
Serpong Damai with its context. The second marks out the schemes inner structural logic 
and fabric. Here the project will be described at three essential scales: a) the Town, b) the 
Neighbourhood, and c) the Building. The presentation is enriched by the discussion of 
several significant neighbourhoods. In conclusion, the findings are summarised and some 
lessons are extrapolated. 
Regional context 
Share of metro population  2,9 percent 
Share of metro area 0.9 percent 
Number of other ‘New Towns’ in the Region 25 
Major interregional road arteries 2 
Number of Regional Malls (existing, planned) 3 (6) 
Universities and Colleges 1 
Distance to centre 25 km 
Commute to centre 40-120 minutes 
People living and working in BSD < 20 percent 
Major mode of internal mobility Walk, Car 
Major mode of external mobility Car 
Table 5: Key indicators – Bumi Serpong Damai’s regional context 
Relationship of the project to the region 
 Illustration B-14: BSD and its competitors 
 Illustration B-15: Photograph of BSD’s vicinity 
Location, environs 
Bumi Serpong Damai, or BSD, is located about 25 kilometres to the West of Jakarta. The 
Cisadane River, a major river in the region, divides the project area. The first existing 
phase of the scheme is located to the left of the waterway; the planned phases two and 
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three will be built on the right side.110 BSD’s surrounding area portrays a Desakota struc-
ture,111 a dynamic landscape of urbanising villages, featuring various services for the 
growing city. Until recently a strong focus was laid on materials for the booming con-
struction sector: e.g. the exploitation of building materials, such as sand and gravel.112  
Political boundaries 
Bumi Serpong Damai is part of the regency of South Tangerang in the Indonesian prov-
ince of Banten. The New Town emerges only a few kilometres to the North of the city of 
Serpong. Tangerang, the districts centre, is one of the four Municipalities that are part of 
the Jabodetabek region (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi). The first phase 
of the project is located within the sub-district (Kecematan) of Serpong.113 114  
Size in relation to the centre 
The 60 square kilometres of BSD make up a 0,8 percent share of Jakarta’s regional area 
(cf. Demographia 2007) and 9,1 percent of Jakarta’s central area (DKIJ) of 660 square 
kilometres.115  
Presence of other New Towns 
In addition to the Desakota structures described above, BSD’s surrounding is dotted with 
private residential enclaves ranging from gated communities to New Towns. The region 
of Jakarta has an extremely high occurrence of these, most likely the highest in the 
world.116 The area of all New Towns and industrial estates currently under development 
in the Jabodetabek region almost equals the total area of the central District. 117 
The New Towns and gated communities became an omnipresent mode of urbanisa-
tion. Rather than acting as counter magnets, or ‘urban acupuncture’, the developments 
tend to group. In this context today BSD is a part of a cluster of New Towns and Gated 
Communities, which are competing for the market of detached middle class family 
houses. At the same time, the smaller species are profiting from the central facilities (e.g. 
malls, schools, hospitals etc) of the larger sort such as Bumi Serpong Damai. 
The neighbouring schemes range from the 1.500-hectare New Town of Lippo 
Karawachi118, to smaller enclaves such as Ciba Raya, Gading Serpong, Alam Sutera, Vila 
Mela Timas, or Modern Land. An important competitor is also the 4.000-hectare large, 
agglomeration of residential clusters, Bintaro Jaya that is located in-between BSD and 
Pondok Indah.119  
                                               
110 The functional, spatial as well as ecological Integration of the river into the town will be a major challenge of the future 
urban development. 
111 Cf. above: Jakarta, Structure of the periphery; Cf. McGee 1991 
112 Significantly, the streets are filled with trucks transporting building materials and many of the sites are characterised by 
out of scale truck garages, which have been erected next to traditional village buildings (Cf. Own exploration in December 
2004). As, however, many of the supplies become exhausted a significant part of the population has to find new livelihoods. 
The Institute of Technology Indonesia (ITI) in Serpong studies the livelihoods of the local population of the area. Its planning 
lab has developed a concept of fish farms for hundreds of the gravel ponds. (Cf. Interview with Prof. Koesparmadi, of ITI 
Serpong in December 2005) 
113 Until October 2008 the area was regarded as Kabupaten (principally a rural area). Thereafter the city (Kota) of South 
Tangerang (Tangerang Selatan) was spilt up from Tangerang (cf. http://wapedia.mobi/id/Kota_Tangerang_Selatan; cf. 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/01/15/tangerang-close-forming-new-city.html, r21.06.2009). 
114 The phases two and three will belong to the subdistricts of Legok, Cisauk District and Pagedangan. 
115 Own calculation. (Cf. Appendix: Comparative Matrix) 
116  This hypothesis awaits scientific verification. 
117 The available data points to a number of 25 to 30 New Towns of 500 to 6.000 hectares with an accumulated area of 
more than 600 square kilometres. (Cf. Graham 2001; Firman 2004; Cowherd 2002; Cf. also to the sections on land banks; 
and the New Town boom above) 
118 Cf. McDougall 1996, Rimmer 1998, Loveard 2001, Vinh 2002. 
119 Cf. Tremmeling 1999, Matin 2000, http://www.jayaproperty.com. 
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Accessibility 
BSD has a linear distance of 15 kilometres to Jakarta’s western edge, 22 kilometres from 
the centre (Monas) and about 18 kilometres from the airport. The place features only a 
small number of jobs. Less than one fifth of the new residents work on-site. (On the 
other hand a significant number of service and educational facilities exist. (Cf. below)) 
The rest commute to Jakarta (cf. below Population). The major mode of transport is the 
car and depending on street conditions travel times to the main central destinations may 
vary from 30 minutes to two hours or even longer. The average commuting time from 
BSD to the city centre of Jakarta (CBD) is between 1-2,5 hours. This accounts for a bur-
densome 2-4 hours of commuting time per day, sometimes even more. (Cf. Interview 
with Santoso 2008) 
Jakarta is also connected by a railway link. The station is located between Serpong 
and BSD. However, the service is overloaded and is of a low quality, and hence predomi-
nantly used by lower income populations. Furthermore the management of BSD offers a 
private bus service to Jakarta. 
Notably, BSD’s first segment was completed in advance of the regional transport in-
frastructure. For a long time the only option to commute to Jakarta was the Jakarta-
Tangerang toll road, which had to be accessed via an 8-kilometre commute towards the 
North.120  
Finally, the accessibility of Bumi Serpong Damai is steadily improving. While new 
jobs, services, shopping, and recreation facilities are continuously added (cf. next chap-
ter), the New Town is gradually integrated into the region. In 2005, after long delays121, 
the Jakarta-Serpong toll road, a direct toll road connection to South Jakarta, was com-
pleted.122  
The connectivity will further improve when Jakarta’s third highway ring will be com-
pleted. This will run through the areas of phase 2 and 3. In addition, a plan to modernise 
the existing railway and install a dual-track system is fairly advanced. 
 Illustration B-16: Unfinished bridge of the Jakarta Serpong toll road (2006) 
 Illustration B-17: Access Map of the German Centre (2006) 
  
                                               
120 While the airport, for example, is only 15 bee-line km away, the current commute takes around 90 minutes via Western 
Jakarta, or Tangerang. 
121 Which were mainly caused by land disputes. 
122 The construction of the Serpong toll road started in 1996. BSD-City PT is one of the main shareholders of the venture (cf. 
below; and Pangestu 1998). 
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Local dimension 
 Illustration B-18: BSD, Town-level map (Phase-1) 
 Illustration B-19: Plan of the entire project 
Whereas the last paragraph describes the physical relationship of the New Town to the 
adjoining county, this paragraph focuses on the ‘internal’ physical characteristics of the 
New Town. The project is approached three dimensionally: Firstly as a whole entity; 
Secondly, at the scale of the neighbourhood; And Thirdly from the street-view angle of 
block and building. Finally, the examination of a number of ‘model’ neighbourhoods 
provides tangibility. 
New Town 
Table 6: Key indicators – Bumi Sepong Damai’s local context 
Size  1.350 (5.990) hectares 
Phases completed 1 of 3 
Population 100.000 (600.000) 
Houses 21.000 (135.000) 
Schools 41 
Commercial outlets 4.100 (e.g. most in Shop House Typology) 
Average density (per/ha) 81 (100) 
Area owner by devel-
oper 
85 (50) 
Residential land use 53 percent 
Village areas 14,3 percent 
Number of neighbour-
hoods 
80 (in 17 sectors) 
Type of neighbourhoods 70 percent gated enclaves (30 percent former non-cluster 
areas) 
Lots per neighbourhood 30 – 200 lots 
Size of neighbourhoods ~ 800 persons 
Density of neighbour-
hoods 
~ 70 persons per hectare 
Vacant lots 20 – 40 percent 
Major mode of local 
mobility  
Car and walking 
Size of average house ~ 60 square metres (starters 28 metres) 
Predominant FAR 1- 1,5 
Predominant housing 
type 
Themed turn-key villa, or row house 
Local Typology SE-Asian style shop houses 
Amount of public hous-
ing 
0 percent 
Milestone examples Sector 1 (Mixed development, 1989); Pavilion Residence (Low 
income scheme, 2006); Latinos and The Green (New cluster 
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approach, 2006) 
 
Basic data 
Bumi Serpong Damai was planned in the early 1980’s for a capacity of between 600.000 
and 800.000 people with 135.000 building structures, and 140,000 to 180.000 jobs on 
5.950 hectares. These days, in 2008, the New Town features about 100.000 residents in 
20.600 homes and has 4.100 commercial outlets.123 It offers around 16.000 formal jobs 
(BSD PT, 2003).124 Currently the project has an average population density of about 81 
persons per hectare.125 When finished densities are expected to climb to between 100 and 
130.126  
Growth pattern and status 
The project is supposed to emerge in phases.127 As of July 2008 the first phase BSD 
Timur (BSD East) is almost completed. The second stage, BSD Barat (BSD West) entered 
the implementation and marketing stage. The New Town was supposed to be finished by 
2005 (Winarso 2005: 10). However, the schedule has been continuously deferred.  
The growth of the New Town takes place in an incremental way, sector-by-sector, 
and neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood. The fact that the developers have exclusive rights 
to develop the land facilitates long-term planning. 
Structure 
Bumi Serpong Damai East is a system of 17 hierarchically clustered sectors and 80 
neighbourhoods.128 All in all the system follows the principles of modernistic town plan-
ning (e.g. hierarchies of circulation systems, segregation of land uses). Most of the new 
neighbourhoods are grouped in clusters. Each of these includes 30 to 600 lots.  
At a closer look, the structure displays a strong hierarchical arrangement.129 The town 
follows a strategy of functional separation that gives it a cellular appearance. The struc-
ture reflects a gradual transition from private to public spaces: Houses are based on the 
household’s private space; the Neighbourhoods are semi-private; the sectors semi-public; 
finally, the town is public. 
Indeed, the organisation of the town-system is based on the private car. A ladder like 
structure of boulevards structures the fabric of phase-I.130 In general two different street 
typologies are characteristic: semi-private, bended, or cul-de-sac streets serve the 
neighbourhoods, multiple-lane boulevards and toll roads generate higher network con-
nectivity. Notably, the semi-private streets are built along the facades of private homes, 
                                               
123 Cf. The Jakarta Post, May 10th 2008 
124 In late 2004 a steep rise in Jobs was reported. While in 2003 only 700 employers have been listed in the area, only one 
year later a number of 1.300 employers were reported (BSD PT, 2005). This was the year when a major new shopping 
centre opened (Cf. Neo Town, Infrastructure, ITC Shopping). 
125 Calculated with 100.000 residents on 1.300 hectares. 
126 This meets the density of residential neighbourhoods in central Jakarta (DKIJ). The region of Jabodetabek has average 
densities of 30 persons per hectare. 
127 1st stage: 1.300 hectares, 2nd stage: 2.000 hectares, 3rd stage: 2.700 hectares (BSD PT). 
128 The names of the 17 sectors are: Griya Loka (Sektor I), Anggrek Loka (Sektor II), Puspita Loka (Sektor III), Giri Loka 1,2 & 3 
(Sektor IV), Taman Giri Loka (Sektor IV), Taman Tirta Golf (Sektor V), Bukit Golf (Sektor VI & VII), Taman Telaga Golf (Sektor 
VIII), The Green (Sektor IX), De Latinos (Sektor X), Taman Tekno BSD (Sektor XI, Industri Area), Kencana Loka (Sektor XII), 
Nusa Loka (Sektor XIV), Griya Parahita, Griya Asri, and Griya Sarana (Cf. BSD AT, ‘faq’ section on ‘frequently asked ques-
tions’; accessed in July 2008). 
129 The cellular structure resembles the concept of cluster planning known from New Towns of the post-World WarII era (Cf. 
Gruen 1956, from Wall 2005). 
130 The steps of the ladder are Jalan Pahlawan Seribu, Jalan Letnan Sutopo. Its steps are Jalan Arten Barat Timur, Jalan Griya 
Loka Raya, and the Jalan Tol Jakarta. 
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while the lager road system strictly avoids building frontages at the roadside. The later 
brings access to the larger service facilities, which are arranged to the outside of the 
neighbourhoods and clusters. The industrial or commercial areas are located in respective 
clusters. Major facilities are arranged at important street intersections (e.g. the devel-
oper’s marketing office, or the new ITC Mall).  
Significantly, the structure for BSD’s planned second phase suggests an even more 
homogeneous character, strictly following the principles of organic ‘cluster design’. The 
neighbourhoods are designed as mono-functional cells of a confined capacity with 
bended interior streets. Service nodes are located outside of the clusters (Cf. BSD PT 
2006: 43). Moreover, a large edge-city-CDB with thousands of office jobs and six mega 
malls is supposed to become a regional centre. 
 Illustration B-20: Neighbourhoods from various periods 
Land use 
Prior to the project’s implementation the land was mainly used for agricultural purposes 
– palm oil plantations and paddy fields. Population densities amounted to less than 10 
people per hectare.131  
The contemporary land use is based on BSD’s strategy to portray a fully-fledged 
autonomous structure. To reach this objective the city is made up of five elements: 1) 
residences (Wisma), 2) industries (Karya), 3) public facilities (Suka), 4) infrastructure 
(Marga), 5) as well as social and environmental infrastructure (Penyempurna) (cf. BSD 
PT 2004). All of these have a land use dimension. 
The shares of the planned and the existing land uses diverge: The master plan foresees 
that about half of the land (52,7 percent) is taken up by housing, another quarter (25,3) 
is non-residential, and 7,7 percent is public. Significantly, local villages take up the re-
maining part (14,3 percent).132 In the newly developed area of phase-I: 80 percent is 
taken up by housing, 10 percent by commercial land use and another 10 percent by in-
dustries (BSD PT 2006: 25).133 
The low commercial share is mainly caused by the problems with the implementation 
of the Central Business District (CBD). This was delayed several times, for reasons of 
land acquisition and lacking demand.134 The industrial land use is represented by a mul-
tipurpose industrial area (Taman Tekno), which was designed to accommodate high-
tech, environmentally friendly industries and to create spin-off synergies with the Univer-
sity of Serpong. The area was among the pioneers in Indonesia to be implemented along 
eco-standards (BSD AT 2004). 
Infrastructure 
Modern infrastructure (Marga) of western standards is one of the essential building 
blocks of Bumi Serpong Damai (Cf. BSD AT 2004). The town features two toll-road 
access points, western standard drainage systems, around-the-clock water management, 
bus terminals, bridges, abundant electricity, a cable TV network, telephones and a super 
fast fibre optic telecommunication system. The infrastructure is frequently maintained 
                                               
131 Cf. Personal interviews with Santoso 2004; Interview with BSD Planning Staff in December 2005. 
132 Personal Interview with BSD Management, October 2004. 
133 The master plan for the finished town (phase 1-3) plans for 4.650 hectares (77,5 percent) of housing, 436 hectares (7,2 
percent) of commercial areas (7,2 percent), a central business district of 448 hectares (7,5 percent), and an industrial zone of 
270 hectares (4,5 percent, as well as a 150 hectare central park (2,5 percent). 
134 Currently a new CBD is supposed to take shape in West-BSD. It will contain a series of office high-rises and a ring shaped 
central public area that acts as a connecting element of six gigantic mega malls. 
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and upgraded.135 This results in a quality of life, much better than in any other part of 
Jakarta: Traffic is low, the air quality higher, the water is treated, garbage is collected, 
and the streets are cleaned.136 
In 2005 a series of new infrastructure projects was completed, causing the developers 
to proclaim a ‘break even point’ for the whole project (cf. BSD PÜT 2006): The year saw 
the opening of the Jakarta-Serpong toll-road, the new ITC mall (handled by Carrefour) 
and the BSD junction (a lifestyle-shopping centre). Moreover, several new products were 
launched: Most notably, a new generation of lifestyle neighbourhoods (The Green, Lati-
nos), and a large entertainment park (Oceanworld). In addition, the implementation of a 
double track railway to Jakarta started (BSD AT 2006: 23), and the second stage of the 
New Town with 2.000 hectares went into the marketing and implementation stage. 
Utilities 
In regard to the utilities such as electricity, telephone networks, water, sewage and waste, 
the developer has installed western style networks and facilities. Many projects were real-
ised in the form of public-private partnerships. The company cooperated with the public 
electricity agency PLN for the supply of electric power to the new city. BSD took up the 
job of building the distribution network. In regard to telecom the company Telcom sup-
plied a fibre optic network. In addition, BSD provided its own automatic central tele-
phone (STO) system. 
Three water treatment plants, that utilise water from ground and surface sources, 
serve the first part of the New Town. Currently, BSD is working with PDAM on the pro-
vision of a total clean water package for residential areas inside the BSD region. More-
over, areas along the Cisadane River have been equipped with flooding ponds in order to 
prevent flooding. 
During the initial years most of the garbage was exported outside of the area. How-
ever, informal dumpsites emerged in ecologically sensitive areas. Consequently, negative 
publicity has put the developers under pressure. Nowadays a waste recycling area was 
put in place to manage the city's waste products. Also organic matter is collected and 
composted. The final product is used to maintain the city's parks and trees (Cf. BSD PT 
2006, personal interviews). 
Services 
Bumi Serpong Damai is serviced by several parks, shopping centres, markets and cine-
mas, entertainment areas, cultural facilities, an internationally renown golf course, as 
well as places of worship. All these facilities are made available by the developer. (BSD 
PT, 2004) 
16 malls and shopping areas service BSD’s in the current area. Among the most suc-
cessful of these is a farmers market (Pasar Modern) at sector 1, as well a large Carrefour 
retail store at the BSD junction. Six large shopping malls are planned for the new central 
district of phase II (Cf. above). The New Town’s educational facilities for residents in-
clude over 40 educational institutions ranging from kindergarten to university level.137 
                                               
135 For example, recent restructuring efforts have focused on the pedestrianisation of some major streets. 
136 According to BSD PT, about 30 percent of the capital raised is re-allocated for infrastructure facilities (Cf. below: Finance) 
 
137 Among these are the Al-Azhar School, Santa Ursula, Ora et Labora, Stella Maris, Music School, the German International 
School, the Swiss German University and the Indonesian Institute of Technology. There is also a school for autistic children 
(BSD AT, 2004). Health services include international facilities such as the Malaysian Medica Hospital Group.  
Bumi Serpong Damai     112 
The developer has sponsored several sites for rituals and worship.138 Interestingly, he has 
also funded a new building for the public police. 
The offices of public service providers are situated in the Civic Centre. These include 
the State Electricity Company (PLN), the telephone company Telkom, the Tax Office, a 
security station, gas stations (office space). Various clubs, swimming pools, sports and 
fitness centres, bicycle lanes and jogging tracks provide recreational services. A new en-
tertainment park (Oceanpark) was recently opened. It is the largest facility of its kind in 
Indonesia. A landmark institution is the Damai Indah Golf & Country Club, with an 18-
hole golf course. It is designed by Jack Nicklaus and is internationally recognized. 
On the other hand, institutions such as public libraries, museums, theatres, or public 
swimming pools  (which may require more public investments) do not exist. 
Commerce and Industry 
Spaces for commerce and industry are an integral part of the developer’s ‘city strategy’. 
Meanwhile 16.000 jobs are supposed to exist. BSD’s industrial park Taman Techno is 
serving as an ecological model for the whole country (cf. above). Several international 
institutions like the German Centre, or companies like Premier (France), the Swiss 
school, or the Malaysian hospital serve as signifiers of an international flair and attrac-
tors of international investments (BSD AT 2004). 
Onsite villages 
Although not part of the official catalogues, villages constitute a significant element of 
BSD’s urban landscape. The villages exist as insular structures, which dot the New Town 
evenly. While comprising 14 percent of the developed area (BSD East), their population 
amounts to a notable 30 percent of residents. (When we assume that traditional village 
areas contain higher densities than single-family suburbs).139 
Notably, the strategies of Bumi Serpong’s Damai’s developers towards the existing vil-
lages are more than neutral. The villages are not only neglected but also actively isolated 
and camouflaged, by various spatial interventions. The on-site communities and project-
affected populations have been completely bypassed in regard to modern infrastructure 
systems such as boulevards, electricity, communications, water and sewage lines etc. For 
this reason we find parallel infrastructure systems and standards at many places. At some 
locations this arrangement even adheres to streets.  
It is critical, for example, that some of the new streets, constructed at higher levels, are 
acting as barriers and leading to periodical flooding of the existing villages. The village 
populations claim that this handicap was consciously planned by the management in 
order to force them to sell their land. In addition, whenever possible, the village areas are 
mantled by buffer zones. In many cases high concrete walls have been erected to conceal 
the ‘undesirable’ vista. These are then camouflaged by bamboo cushion.140 
 Illustration B-21: Parallel street system 
 Illustration B-22: Walled and camouflaged on-site village 
                                               
138 Similar to William Levitt in Long Island 50 years earlier. 
139 This number was be estimated assuming population densities of 100 to 150 people per hectare. An additional population 
of 100.00 to 130.000 can be estimated to remain on the undeveloped areas on the other side of the river. 50 percent of 
these areas of Phase I and II have not been acquired yet (Personal Interview with representatives of ITI-Serpong, 2004). 
140 This paragraph is based on personal observations and interviews with the residents, 2004, 2005, and 2007. 
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Informal and hybrid structures 
Even so, the village populations are innovative and take advantage of the situation. In-
formal service areas have mushroomed at the intersections of village areas and the major 
streets.141 Moreover, within the villages, various informal land speculation processes have 
started: For example, new structures and services are catering to the needs of the rising 
numbers of guest workers. In addition, more and more stylistic elements diffuse from the 
rich to the poor neighbourhoods, as village populations remake their own houses. In this 
way a new landscape of hybrid urban typologies and land uses is emerging that awaits 
further study, reflection and documentation (Cf. Gotsch, Kohte, 2007). 
While most of the households have 1-2 cars, the village residents mostly commute by 
motorbike or on foot. In his context, informal pathways are spanning some of the 
neighbourhoods, while official walkways do not exist. This occurs, for example when 
children commute between the village enclaves and public schools, enjoying a free right 
of way in some of the neighbourhoods. Some of the enclaves also allow for a ‘controlled’ 
operation of street vendors.142 
Notably, BSD’s new residents are also creative transforming and adapting the existing 
structures. Many buildings in the environs of the German-Swiss school and university 
have been transformed in to informal student hostels. 
 Illustration B-23: Informal housing typology for guest workers in the villages 
 Illustration B-24: Student hostel in adapted villa 
 
Neighbourhoods/ Clusters 
 
Basic data 
Bumi Serpong Damai today is made up of roughly 80 neighbourhoods. Each of these is 
composed of 30-200 lots for individual families. An average household size of 4,3 results 
in a number of 140 to 900 individuals per enclave.  
Structure of neighbourhoods 
The neighbourhoods feature a homogeneous building fabric and population distribution. 
The predominant type is the themed single-family villa. Most of the time, the circulation 
pattern is a closed system of curved streets and cul-de-sac arrangements. Notably, com-
munal clubs and playgrounds are placed inside the neighbourhoods, while other service 
facilities, such as commerce and retail, are located on the outside.143 Gates and walls de-
fine the clusters to the outside, providing (and representing) security and identity for the 
respective neighbourhoods. The entrance ensembles, in particular, serve as the main car-
riers of the respective lifestyle themes of each area.  
 Illustration B-25: Neighbourhood-level map: The Green 
 Illustration B-26: Neighbourhood-level map: Sector-1 
 Illustration B-27: Gate typologies 
                                               
141 Mainly at the main street to Serpong 
142 Personal observations see footnote above. 
143 Own analysis 2006; and PERFINDO 2006: Stock market information on BSD: 23. 
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Neighbourhood land use  
The controlled neighbourhood, whether residential, commercial, or industrial, serves as a 
fundamental module of the whole system. Whereas BSD’s sector level retains a relatively 
high variation of parcelling, the neighbourhoods portray high levels of homogeneity and 
design integrity. The neighbourhood-clusters principally concentrate on only one land 
use-category. Moreover, they are differentiated by distinct standards for various income 
levels. 
Uniformity is increased by the fact that the residential buildings are delivered as turn-
key products by the developer (who also provides for the open space design). Each clus-
ter is master planned. Buyers are obliged to respect specific guidelines and design princi-
ples. Significant alternations of the land uses, or the houses are banned. The developer 
dominates the process, now and then implementing alterations and changes without a 
consulting the residents. 144  
Neighbourhood infrastructure and mobility 
While clubs and recreational facilities are located in the sectors, service areas of greater 
relevance, such as schools and shopping districts are located to the outside of the 
neighbourhoods. These can be found at the levels of sector and town. 
Every ‘formal’ resident of Bumi Serpong Damai is dependent on motorised transport. 
The communal facilities inside the sectors can easily be reached by modes of non-
motorised transport (walking, bike). In contrast, all facilities outside the sectors require 
the use of motorised modes (motorbikes, cars, and busses). Walking or biking for longer 
distances is only common among the service personnel and the indigenous population.  
Early examples, 80’s, ‘non-cluster residential areas’ 
BSD contains a significant share of 30 percent of so called ‘non-cluster’ residential areas. 
In the early 1980’s, the ‘open’ urban neighbourhood model was preferred (cf. Santoso 
1992). This was based on a city containing private buildings surrounded by public spaces 
and open circulation networks. Consequently, the early neighbourhoods featured several 
access points, a variation of housing typologies, as well as graded and mixed land uses. 
(Cf. Santoso 1992, own observations in Sector I)  
Significantly, in the last decade, the shifting paradigms towards gated enclaves have 
led to a successive remodelling and renovation of the non-cluster areas. The results are 
ambivalent: The ongoing commercialisation of some buildings along main streets has 
been stopped and service and commerce areas have been shifted to the outside of residen-
tial clusters. Supplementary access points have been closed, even for pedestrians. More-
over, many open and green spaces have been rezoned and sold.145 (Cf. also  Illustration 
B-26) 
Recent trends 
In the first decade of the 21-century BSD features a new range of typologies (neighbour-
hoods, houses). These stand out for their grouping of several neighbourhoods into sub-
districts, as well as a novel blend of ecological and lifestyle themes. Notably, the cluster-
ing of neighbourhoods constitutes a new component in the urban hierarchy. Two notable 
examples are ‘The Green’, and ‘Latinos’ (cf. examples below). Both of these neighbour-
hoods are about 80 hectares in size and consist of a cluster of 8-10 walled or fenced en-
                                               
144 E.g.: A German expatriate known to the author has left the area after the town management has chopped down many 
threes in his neighbourhood to replace them with new buildings. 
145 Personal interview with a representative of the German Centre in December 2005; Cf. also BSD PT 2006: 75 
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claves. Each of these enclaves features a specific sub-theme, targeting a particular clien-
tele.  
Specific themes are commonly realised in the design of shared facilities and common 
spaces such as community buildings clubs, gates, parks, and ponds etc. Their leitmotivs 
used stem from the media and entertainment worlds. The private houses, in contrast, 
increasingly represent styles that are independent – mostly neoclassical, historicist, or 
‘neomodern’. 
Sleeping land 
A common feature in many of the neighbourhoods is the fact that a large share of lots 
remains undeveloped. The number is correlated with the income levels of the residents. 
While, in the upscale area surrounding the golf course a maximum of 10 percent of the 
lots are occupied (grazing goat herds dominate the landscape), most of the middle class 
areas feature occupancy rates of 60 to 80 percent.146 The areas of the lower-middle class 
populations, in particular the ones erected in the 1980’s, are fully occupied and thriving.  
The large amount of vacant space creates an astonishing pattern of vacant spaces as 
well as an accidental aesthetic of open firewalls. Moreover BSD’s neighbourhood design 
features a specific type of corner dilemma: An accumulation of vacant lots can be ob-
served in the corner lots. (Even in the 20-year-old neighbourhoods most of these corner 
locations remain undeveloped.) Surprisingly, no solution for this problem seems to be in 
sight. Apparently, the large amount of street frontage has a negative stigma among the 
population as it results in high maintenance costs.  
 Illustration B-28: ‘Bricolage’ of vacant lots and firewalls 
 Illustration B-29: BSD’s corner dilemma 
Individual adaptation of buildings 
Despite the fact that all structures are developed along a master plan (cf. above) individ-
ual adaptations do take place. The construction of new carports is a notable example for 
incremental changes at a small scale. In addition, a strong pressure towards the illegal 
commercialisation of housing types exists, whenever access to potential clients exists: In 
this context many ground floors of residential buildings have been converted to shops 
along streets. Elsewhere, houses have been remodelled to student apartments (cf. above 
 B-24).  
The town management struggles to reverse these changes. Moreover, it has reacted by 
reforming urban design principles: The new guidelines, for example, exclude the con-
struction of individual houses in direct accessibility of super-ordinate streets. In their 
place shop houses, fences, or extended green zones are applied. 
 Illustration B-30: BSD, Exemplary block-level map (Monte Carlo) 
Blocks and buildings 
Basic data 
BSD’s first phase comprises about 21.000 homes, some 4.100 commercial outlets (most 
of them shop houses) and several hundred office buildings, gates, and club facilities.147 
                                               
146 The phenomenon can be explained by the fact that rich populations are more likely to buy lots for speculative purposes 
and leave them undeveloped. (Cf. Own observations in October 2007; Cowherd 2002: 32; and the above section on plan-
ning framework, legal and financial instruments.) 
147 Cf. BSD PT Website: ‘faq’ (rMay2008) 
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Blocks sizes vary from one to several dozens of lots. It stands out that the blocks are 
structured in an extremely rational and efficient way. Lot sizes start at about 70 square 
meters and are rarely larger than 500 square meters – even in more expensive segments. 
Only few upper class estates comprise a thousand square meters or more. Most of the 
lots are only insignificantly larger than the house (20-30 percent).148  
While the average maximum built-up area is estimated at 0,8 (own calculation), the 
prescribed floor area ratio (FSI) ranges between 0,5 and 1,0 in most of the residential 
neighbourhoods.149 The parcelling type usually represents curvilinear subdivisions. The 
lots for the lower income segments, in contrast, tend to be arranged orthogonally.  
The 21.000 housing units completed in 2007 included 8.3 percent luxury houses, 27.1 
percent medium type houses and 64.6 percent small type houses. Each of the respective 
categories is principally located in separate neighbourhoods.150  
Housing sizes range from a maximum of 24 square meters for the smallest types 
(Category 1), 22 to 70 square meters for the middle segments (Category 2); and larger 
houses for the upper income segments of the population (Category 3).151  
Assuming an average house size of 100 square meters, 20.000 homes and 100.000 
residents, every ‘formal’ resident of BSD has a private area of 20 square meters at their 
disposal. (A clear indicator of middle class standards)152 
Housing type and style 
The prevalence of western urban models in BSD is very high. Shopping houses are the 
only regional, and distinctively SE-Asian building typology. 
BSD’s official housing typologies comprise row houses, twin houses, detached villas 
and mansions. All of these are based on homeownership. The unofficial models include 
rental apartments.153 
The housing styles portray a thematic architectural language, common for Indonesian 
middle classes. While the gates, clubhouses, parks etc are mostly designed along the life 
style motif of the cluster, the houses are rather designed along a more limited amount of 
the mainstream tastes of the clients. Among the most prominent styles are historicist and 
neo-modern appearances. 
It is eye catching that a majority of the buildings are modelled along international 
models and standards. Consequently, single-family houses are characterised by typical, 
small front gardens, garages, parking spaces as well as representative frontal facades.  On 
the other hand, we also find local adaptations: A large share of the BSD’s fabric is built 
in the form of modular row housing. In addition, the New Town is plastered with more 
than 4.000 shop houses.154 These line up at many of BSD’s streets and absorb all sorts of 
leftover places.155  
                                               
148 This may be explained by efficiency considerations as well as by the tropical climatic conditions of the site: In the equato-
rial climate, a private garden is more a representational feature than a place with use qualities. 
149 The smallest buildings usually take up half of the lot. Larger 2-story houses take up about the ground area of the lot. 
150 The ratio of 6:3:1 is a part of government regulations. Accordingly, in order to obtain land permits and construction 
credits, the developer was required to build three ‘small houses’ at 22 to 70 square meters and six ‘very small houses’ at 21 
square meters or less, for every luxury house. (Cf. below: Developers) 
151 According to the management until 2008, 8.961 units of Category 1 13.781 houses of Category 2, and 1.144 units of 
Category 3 will be completed. (Cf. BSD PT, faq, rJuly 2008). 
152 Jakarta’s urban villages (Kampongs) feature densities of up to 1.000 people per hectare. With an estimated built up 
space ratio of 1 and an open space amount of 30 percent, this results in seven square meters per person. 
153 For students, as well as for migrant workers (cf. above) 
154 This form of shop-house typology is unique for SE-Asia. It was derived from a vernacular type of Chinese shop houses, 
and is extremely popular around the region. 
155 According to rumours the shop-house typology often serves as a remedy for all problematic places. 
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 Illustration B-31: Examples of villa and shop house design 
Examples 
1989: Sector-1 housing – early example of modernistic zoning and ‘non-clustered hous-
ing’. 
In its initial Phase, the New Town of BSD had to fulfil a series of important public goals: 
most notably to contribute to regulated regional development, as well as to provide hous-
ing for all population segments. The initial phase of the project catered to lower income 
classes in particular, which were attracted as pioneer populations.156  
While the first sectors completed during the initial stage represent important para-
digms of the 1980s, they also established patterns which are valid to date: The first phase 
of the New Town has been structured into sectors and sub-sectors of 100 to 200 hec-
tares, which were linked to hierarchical road systems. The underlying paradigm was 
modernistic: e.g. that of private houses immersed in a sea of public space. Accordingly, 
the system featured an openly accessible circulation network, public infrastructure sys-
tems, centrally located service areas, as well as a mix of housing for various income levels 
in the same neighbourhood. Moreover, while the house design focused on individual 
home ownership, it portrayed a standardised mass approach, which was characteristic 
for the modern era. 
 Illustration B-32: Examples of Sector-1 housing 
A representative residential quarter of the first hour comprised 20 - 30 hectares. Com-
mon service facilities, as well as neighbourhood centres were planned for groups of 4-6 
sub sectors. Elaborate zoning codes, with increasing densities towards the centre, aimed 
to provide identity and coherence. (Cf. Santoso 1992: 38) 
Sector 1 is a particularly good example of housing for all income classes. The 
neighbourhood features a central area with small-scale retail facilities and public services. 
A public bus terminal was located at the western boundary. It was planned as an integral 
part of the larger circulation network and was accessible at several points (Perimeter 
walls did not exist at that time). Its main roads belonged to two categories: While linear 
thoroughfares provided the general accessibility, new ring arteries supplied local access 
and accommodated the major service facilities (cf. Santoso 1992: 38). 
In addition to being modern and expandable, the infrastructure was also intended as a 
tool for social integration: “to be used as an instrument to initiate the integration process 
between social groups in the New Town, as well as among the inhabitants of the New 
Town and the existing old settlement of Serpong” (Santoso 1992: 38). 
The approach to provide a ‘mixed pattern housing’ resulted in 4 types of residential 
areas: 1) lower income, 2) middle class, 3) upper class, and 4) reserve areas (‘so called 
‘land adjustment’). In this context lot sizes varied from 60 to 252 square metres and the 
respective house sizes from 21 to 54; 70 percent of the floor plans remained under 36 
square metres. The densities increased towards the centre along a ‘Stadtkrone’ approach 
from 40 persons per hectare in the peripheral upper income segments, to 100 persons per 
hectare in the middle class areas, to more than 200 persons per hectare in the central 
parts of the neighbourhood. 
                                               
156 Assuming that they would tolerate the hardship of an unfinished New Town, these were lured with comparatively low 
land prices. 
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Despite that fact that the scheme featured completely developed houses, three design-
ers sought to generate a variation by designing several housing types for each of the cate-
gories. Moreover, they developed three design standards (‘standard’, ‘medium’, and ‘ex-
cellent’), catering for various socio-economic profiles.157  
Unfortunately today many of the early ideas have been lost. The sector was adjusted 
to present-day ‘standards and features several problems: The number of access points 
was reduced; the central service areas portray extreme vacancy levels. While, upper in-
come neighbourhoods have segregated themselves, feature high vacancy levels, the lower 
income quarters consolidated and portray a thriving life. While, Sector 1 represents a 
showcase of the success of BSD’s early strategies towards low-income populations, it 
becomes increasingly marginal, as the developers today embark on different solutions 
(Cf. below: Developers). 
2006: Pavilion Residence 
One of the smaller residences in the southern part of BSD’s Phase-I is the Pavilion Resi-
dence. With a size of 3,5 hectares the scheme caters for young lower middle-class cus-
tomers. Its public spaces are reduced to the necessary minimum for circulation. The de-
sign style of buildings is ‘modern minimalist’. Lot sizes vary from 72 to 216 square me-
ters and the respective prices range from 30 to 50 thousand US$. 
 Illustration B-33: Picture and plans of ‘Pavilion Residence’ 
2006: ‘De Latinos’ 
The ‘De Latinos’ cluster is among the most recent products of BSD. The scheme is lo-
cated in the South of BSD Phase-I in close proximity to the Jakarta-Serpong toll road 
access. Its format exposes a strong themed strategy. 10 resident clusters amount to a total 
of 80 hectares. A large and colourful leisure and entertainment club facility is placed in 
the centre. The facility portrays colourful ‘castle in the air’ architecture and represents a 
new generation of BSD’s landmark structures. It operates as the symbolic as well the 
functional centre of the new cluster. 
The neighbourhoods present Latin American themes.158 The individual buildings are 
built as row houses and detached villas. They are delivered as turnkey objects of one or 
two storeys. The styles applied are neoclassical and modern. The ‘Latin’ motif is for the 
most part used in the public spaces and communal facilities.  
The ‘product’ caters to the tastes of Indonesia’s mainstream middle classes. Its lot sizes 
vary from a tiny 39 square meter house on a 72 square meter lot159 to a 234 square meter 
house on a 250 square meter lot160. The bulk of the buildings are represented by house 
sizes of 80 to 100 square meters on slightly larger lots.161 The respective costs range be-
tween 40.000 and 250.000 US$, with an estimated median of 90.000 US$. 
 Illustration B-34: Pictures of ‘De Latinos’ 
 Illustration B-35: Structure plan of ‘De Latinos’ 
                                               
157 Suryadi Santoso (1992), one of the initial planners of the scheme, sees this as proof that in contrast to the public sector a 
private developer was able to develop a high mixture of different neighbourhoods, representing many different quality 
standards and a variety of spatial concepts. 
158 These carry names such as: Bahama Resort, Brazillia Flamengo, Buenos Aires, Caribbean Island, Centro Havana, Costa 
Rica, Hacienda Mexicano, La Vintage, Pattagonia Village, and Santiago District. 
159 E.g. the Allende type in the Hacienda Mexicano Neighbourhood. 
160 E.g. the Nassau type in the Bahama Resort. 
161 E.g. the Botafogo type in the Brazillia Flamengo neighbourhood with 92 square meters on a 112 square meter lot. 
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2006: The Green 
‘The Green’ is a different brand of new neighbourhood that spreads on 80 hectares and 
contains 11 residential clusters. The scheme stands out for a system of recreational paths, 
a large playground and an artificial lake. An internal town centre features coffee shops, 
restaurants, office facilities as well as a new housing typology, with home-office ameni-
ties. 
The Green is located to the South of ‘De Latinos’ and the access point to the South 
Jakarta-Serpong toll-road only 500m from the railway station. It’s residential clusters 
carry names such as Banyan Village, Burgundy, Bellagio, Blossom Village, Chardonnay, 
Manhattan Forum, Mirage, Monte Carlo, Navarra, Tuscany, and Venetian. Lot sizes 
vary between 120 and 2500 square meters costing from 46.000 to 380.000 US$.162  
‘The Green’ is representing the taste of Indonesia’s emerging upper middle classes. A 
new balance of lifestyle and ecological themes portrays the current shift of customer 
tastes.163  
 Illustration B-36: Plan of ‘The Green’ cluster 
 Illustration B-37: Entrance of ‘The Green’ 
 Illustration B-38: Typologies from ‘The Green’ 
                                               
162 Interestingly the prices are also published in AED (United Arab Emirates Dirham). This points to the attractiveness of the 
projects as pure investments. 
163 Products for the higher income classes, such as Green Cove, Vermont Parkland, or Virginia Lagoon tend to concentrate 
purely on elegance and prestige topics. (Cf. BSD AT 2006, and website). 
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Summary 
Since the previous part describes the functional and morphological aspects of Bumi Ser-
pong Damai, this summary presents the results and outlines some of the ‘lessons’. 
Region 
Bumi Serpong Damai is located about 20 kilometres to the West of Jakarta. It develops 
as one central node of the rapidly developing ‘Desakota’ region. The environs of the pro-
ject is dotted with other private residential enclaves from gates communities to other 
New Towns. The 6.000-hectare area amounts to one tenth of Jakarta’s inner city. Two 
major toll-road connections and one single-track railway line provide access to the re-
gion. 
Town 
The town is designed to be implemented in three phases on 5.590 hectares,. It aims to 
reach urban densities of 80 to 100 residents per hectare. At this time, the first phase is 
almost completed. The structure comprises 17 sectors, or 80 neighbourhoods, which are 
organised along a central boulevard. A ‘new’ organic model develops as distinct hierar-
chies between public and private are articulated at various scales. The town, the sectors, 
the neighbourhoods, the blocks and the buildings, are arranged in a highly rational and 
hierarchic manner. Significantly, all of the sectors and the neighbourhood modules oper-
ate as closed systems. The gradual arrangement of the streets and the open spaces mirrors 
these codes. Housing is the predominant land use, amounting to half of the area. 
BSD was intended to become a fully-fledged and autonomous city from the beginning. 
Service facilities are arranged to the outside of the neighbourhood clusters, in communal 
areas of the sectors and along the main roads. The town’s 16 malls, several movie thea-
tres, 40 educational institutions, the world-class golf course, various houses of worship, 
as well as a new entertainment park cater for clients from the whole region. A future 
CBD, on 10 per cent of the project’s land, will eventually turn the location into a true 
edge city. 
A significant amount of local villages remain part of the area. While formally ne-
glected, they contain one seventh of the land with more than thirty percent of the popula-
tion. 
Neighbourhood 
The first phase of Bumi Serpong Damai comprises 80 neighbourhoods, or clusters. All of 
these feature homogeneous lot sizes and housing styles. (This can be attributed to the fact 
that the developer acts as a general planner and delivers turnkey houses, but also to the 
preferences of the main customer groups.) The internal street system is generally re-
stricted to a combination of curved streets and cul-de-sac arrangements. 
In the last 25 years BSD’s neighbourhoods have undergone a remarkable change: Dur-
ing the late 1980’s they were built as open systems with several access points. In contrast, 
all new quarters are formed as closed enclaves, featuring one guarded entry. While popu-
lation of the respective clusters is very homogeneous, the architecture portrays colourful 
lifestyle themes (of international motives). The composition of the quarters correlates 
with the age of the cluster and the income of the population. 
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Block and Building 
East-BSD, the first phase of the project, contains about 26.000 thousand formal, and also 
an additional 6.000 ‘informal’ building structures. The parcelling is predominantly curvi-
linear, sometimes rectangular. The project’s housing typologies range from row houses, 
twin houses, to detached villas and mansions, from 24 square meter starter houses to 500 
square meter luxury villas. Rental apartments (e.g. towers) are principally absent. 
Remarkably, all formal building structures (malls, offices or houses) are modelled 
along global typologies and standards. One remarkable local feature is the shop housing 
typology. It stands out that most of the residential buildings are densely packed; the regu-
lar footprint is barely 20 percent smaller than the lot. 
All common facilities such as gates, clubhouses, and parks have a distinctive rhetoric 
role, commonly reinforcing the lifestyle theme of the entire respective cluster. At the same 
time, the private buildings tend to communicate to a general set of mainstream prefer-
ences (historicism, colonial style, art deco, neo-modernism).  
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Population –  
Traditional modernisers 
 
“By then… the taste of the Indonesian middle class was cultivated, disci-
plined and refined via ... flyovers, the automobile, gated real estate housing 
in New Towns, high-rise condos and shopping malls to ensure their distance 
from the streets and the campaigns.” (Cf. Kusno 2006: 6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of residents  100.000 (600.000-800.000) 
On site villagers 30.000 (120.000) 
Share of Sino-Indonesians ≤ 50 percent 
Share of government officials ≤ 20 percent 
Jobs on site ~ 18.000 
Share of population employed in the formal 
sector 
66 percent 
Share of working population with higher de-
gree 
66 percent 
Household composition  Nuclear one generation families (4,3 per-
sons) 
Household income ~ 15.000 US$ p.a. (< 20 percent of Indone-
sians) 
Major motives Security, stability, life-style 
Major goals ‘Tradition’ (in the original sense of the word) 
Relevance of resident associations Marginal 
Table 7: Key indicators – Bumi Serpong Damai’s population 
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Introduction 
The previous subchapter examined the physical characteristics of Bumi Serpong Damai. 
These have been described using a multi-scalar analysis. Yet, the physical form is only 
one side of the coin needed to understand the (dialectical) production of human envi-
ronments.164 Social, cultural as well as economic processes represent the other side. Con-
sequently the following part of this chapter focuses on the residents of the novel settle-
ment. Apparently these users and clients of the lifestyles and the properties of Bumi Ser-
pong Damai belong to newly emerging consumer classes.  
A comprehensive socio-economic profile of the target population makes up the begin-
ning of this section. Thereafter, the values, motives as well as lifestyles of the residents 
are examined. A third part explores the relevance of collective self-organisation in the 
New Town. 
Population profile 
Basic data (formal population) 
The planned population of Bumi Serpong Damai ranges between 600.000 and 800.000 
residents (BSD PT 2006).165 Currently about 110.000 residents live in the town (cf. The 
Jakarta Post 2008). 
BSD’s average residents are young middle and upper class couples with up to two 
children, of Indonesian-Chinese descent.166 The average household has 4,3 persons. This 
is slightly less than Jakarta’s 4,7 persons (Cf. Winarso 2005: 10). 
So far only 17 percent of the formal residents, or approximately 16.000, are able to 
work on-site (Cf. Leisch 2002: 96).167 This low number implies that most of the residents 
have to commute. Notably the developer aims to achieve a ratio 70 percent of this (BSD 
PT 2006). Consequently the roads to Jakarta are clogged during the morning and eve-
ning peak hours.  
While 25 years have passed since the groundbreaking ceremony, the spectrum of 
BSD’s households varies from young starter households to fifty-somethings with grown 
up children.168 Most of the households comprise the one-generation family.169 This is a 
stark contrast to the traditional social fabric, which characterises the populations in the 
on-site villages and the surrounding areas. 
Statistics of the ethnic and religious composition of the population have not been offi-
cially released. Yet, various interviews and observations confirm that numerous clusters 
have a large share (> 50 percent) of Sino-Indonesians.170 In Jakarta the Sino-Indonesians 
make up for only 6 percent of the population.171  
However, it can be safely assumed that these numbers result from the demand side 
and that no pre-selection from the supply-side (developers) occurs. Indeed, it is the socio-
economic status of the clients that more and more determines the social composition of 
                                               
164 The underlying rationale this work understands human settlements in a dialectic context of conception (and construction) 
versus self-formation. (Cf. Chapter: Introduction on the relationships of space and social processes). 
165 The New Town could, in theory, accommodate one annual population increase of the region, as Jabodetabek’s popula-
tion grows at a rate of 600.000 per year (cf. BSD PT 2004). 
166 Cf. Firman 2004: 14; Cf. also Hogan and Houston, 2001. 
167 This number increases to approximately 30 percent, when we take into account the local population (own calculation). 
168 Many first-generation residents are sceptical towards the recent buyers and the intensification of private development in 
the New Town. (Cf. Personal interview with a group of residents in October 2006). 
169 Cf. personal interview with a group of residents in October 2006; Cf. Leisch 2002. 
170 Leisch (2002: 95) confirms that the residents of many of the neighbourhoods in BSD and Lippo Karawaci (another New 
Town in the district) are predominantly Christian. In Jakarta this is a good indicator for an ethnic Chinese population. 
171 Cf. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 2003. 
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the neighbourhoods. Whoever has the necessary money is able to buy a property in the 
project of their choice.172 
The education level of BSD residents is relatively advanced. Around two thirds of the 
working persons have a degree higher, or equal to the bachelor level (Leisch 2002: 94). 
More than two thirds of BSD’s residents are employed in the formal sector. Half of them 
are employees, the other half are entrepreneurs. Leisch (2002: 92) has observed that a 
significant amount (up to 19 percent) of government officials live in some of the clusters. 
The remaining non-working third of the formal population are housewives. Moreover, 
significant student populations populate some clusters close to universities.173 
BSD residents portray lifestyles modelled along western consumer societies. Almost all 
households have uninterrupted access to modern utilities. The majority are equipped 
with cars, TV sets, fridges, personal computers, and many other modern household 
gadgets.174 
A significant amount of daily life takes place in specialised places. Hence the everyday 
is divided between the household, the car, the office (or the school), the club, the mall 
etc. and the commute in between these locations. For the working part of the population 
the long commute is a central feature of daily life.175  
Opposed to western patterns, however, many informal and semiformal activities play 
an important role in the organisation of the consumption patterns of the residents. Cheap 
labour is widely available. Maids and servants are commonplace.176 
Preexisting population 
Before the New Town of BSD was implemented the area featured rural densities. 60.000 
persons populated an area of the 6.000 hectares, an average of 10 persons per hectare 
(cf. BSD PT, 2004). The existing population consisted mainly of farmers. Moreover, the 
area was in the process of transformation turning towards labour intensive production 
and service economies.177  
The current population in the villages engulfed by East-BSD amounts to 30 thou-
sand.178 This is a whole quarter of the New Town’s population. The people are largely a 
part of the economy of BSD. The former villagers exist by renting apartments for other 
migrants and guest workers, running street stalls and being employed in the maintenance 
and security services.179 
The population at the ‘virgin’ sites to the West of the Cisadane River amounts to a 
growing 120 to 150 thousand. It represents a large range of livelihoods. The locale ex-
periences a rapid regionalisation and urbanisation process in general. Large parts of the 
                                               
172 Only the places of the super rich follow their own rationale. A spectacular case can be found in Lippo Karawaci. Here the 
chairman of the Lippo Group James Riyadi lives on an artificial island in the centre of a golf course in the project’s centre. 
The land within his cluster can be bought by invitation only. 
173 E.g. in Angrek Loka, close to the Swiss-German university 
174 In many cases, however, the gadgets serve representative purposes and barely used. For example many of the middle 
class families cannot afford to run the air condition systems on a permanent basis. (Personal observation, interviews, 2006) 
175 The average commuting time between BSD to the centre of Jakarta (CBD) can consume between 1-2,5 hours. (Cf. Re-
gional context above) 
176 Their number further depends on the income and status of the employers. 
177 Cf. above; McGee’s 1991: concept of Desakota regions in SE Asia. 
178 This number was calculated by population densities of 160 persons per hectare on 14 percent of the total. 
179 More shadowy sorts of income are property crimes. In particular the southern part of phase one, an area where many 
rich and poor neighbourhoods coexist side by side, is supposed to have experienced a rising level of property crimes. How-
ever, locals assured, that not people from the local villages commit these crimes, since these work for the most part in the 
New Town (e.g. as security guards). The real criminals were supposed to originate from more distant places. (Cf. field visit 
and interviews at ITI-Serpong in December 2005) 
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land population are working in construction, materials and service businesses (Cf. above: 
from sand and gravel to fishponds).180  
Income 
The consumers of housing products in Bumi Serpong Damai belong to the middle and 
high-income groups (Leisch 2002). BSD’s house prices (cf. below) indicate that the aver-
age monthly income of the residents is far above a median monthly income in Indonesia 
(al least 300 per cent). As a matter of fact a household with an average income in the 
region of Jakarta can afford the cheapest house on sale in BSD. Winarso (2005: 10) esti-
mates that in order to buy a minimal house (36 square meters, US$ 12.000) in one of the 
cheaper clusters of BSD a household had to earn at least US$ 300 per month.181  
Distribution 
The typologies of houses as well as their costs in relation to the location indicate a very 
low variation of incomes within the clusters (cf. above section on Blocks and Buildings). 
Yet, by and large, the range of incomes increases at the scale of the whole town and 
compared to other private New Towns in Jakarta, the range of income groups in Bumi 
Serpong Damai is significantly higher. 
Motives, values, and role models of the target groups 
Main motives of target groups  
People who are moving to Bumi Serpong Damai seek a comfortable family oriented life 
in the green (Like many generations of middle classes elsewhere). Moreover, the option 
to appropriate and explore a modern lifestyle is an enormous crowd-puller. Most of the 
buyers belong to Indonesia’s new middle classes. These are constantly confronted with 
the global flows of media, finances, images, as well as goods – if in work, or in leisure. 
Western role models are widely available through ‘glocal mediascapes’ and, like else-
where, people who can afford seek to appropriate and explore these new ‘global scapes’ 
(cf. Appadurai 1996). Notably, the lifestyles that are on sale in the New Towns provide 
an easy way towards the exploration and appropriation of new identities. They do so by 
the means of consumption.182 Interestingly, often the symbolic value of lifestyle features 
is appreciated more than its actual use value. Most of the residents actually do not make 
use of the clubs, sport, and recreation facilities in their clusters.183 
In addition to comfort and lifestyle, the factor of security (cf. Context, Jakarta, Risks), 
is of highest importance. Evidently people seek to feel safe (perceived security), be safe 
from crimes and disasters (physical security), enjoy a healthy environment (environ-
mental security) and – mostly underestimated – embark on sustainable investments (fi-
nancial security).  
Because Bumi Serpong Damai caters to all of these needs, two-thirds of the residents 
like living the New Town and almost one-third are even highly satisfied with the new 
living environment (Cf. Leisch 2002: 96).  
                                               
180 Cf. site visit and Interview with ITI-Serpong in December 2005. 
181 The average income of residents of in the Jakarta metropolitan region is around US$ 500. 
182 For the exploration of the dynamic and complexity of cultural production by emerging middle classes in peripheral loca-
tions Appadurai (1996), Hannerz (1997), Bhabha (2000), King (2004) and Kusno (2000). (Cf. above: Introduction). 
183 Leisch (2002: 97) discovered that only seven percent of the people were members of the sport clubs. Interestingly he has 
also found out that, for a large share of the residents the environment was not ‘modern’ enough. 
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Values of target groups 
Despite the drive for the appropriation of all things modern, BSD’s target groups repre-
sent family oriented middle class attitudes and values. In this context stability, security, 
family integrity, and savings, are of primary importance. Moreover, traditional values 
such as local heritage, ethnicity and religion remain highly significant.184  The result is a 
blend of openness for the new, and conservative attitudes. 
From this perspective it can be debated whether, some of BSD’s most extreme fea-
tures, such as the Disneyesque themed neighbourhoods of the late early 2000’s may be of 
a transitional character. 
Resident groups and associations 
The new residents face a particularly challenging situation. Different from a convention-
ally grown neighbourhood, in a planned settlement everybody is a stranger. People have 
to launch networks and political relationships. Societal institutions, clubs and governance 
structures have to emerge.185 What happens in Bumi Serpong Damai? 
The level of self-governance in BSD is relatively low. So far, almost no resident groups 
and associations exist. Until the completion of Phase I, the developers controlled the im-
portant matters. Yet, the future seems to belong to self-governance schemes. Homeowner 
associations seem to be the instrument of choice in order to maintain a high level of ser-
vices. Neither the developers, nor the residents prefer the option of the finished scheme 
being transferred into public hands. 
As a matter of fact, while significant parts of the New Town have been completed, 
more and more issues are arising with regard to the upgrading and the maintenance of 
existing facilities and services. The management realised that the maintenance clusters is 
a costly and cumbersome business (cf. Formal regulatory framework). Consequently, the 
developer plans to pull out from maintenance and operation piece by piece. A new office 
for customer relations and social management, explores the development of public-
private community organisations. These are unique for the local context. As a first step, 
community meetings, social events, as well as charity and ecological awareness pro-
grammes are organised. (Cf. Interview with BSD officials in November 2004) 
                                               
184 Indicative for this trend may be the fact that an increasing share of the Muslims of Indonesia’s middle and upper classes 
celebrate the fasting month of Ramadan. 
185 The sociologist Herbert Gans was keen in describing this dynamics in Willingborough, a new settlement designed by 
William Levitt in the 1950‘s. (Cf. Gans 1967) 
Bumi Serpong Damai     127 
Summary Residents 
The first phase of Bumi Serpong Damai currently houses a formal population of 
110.000. This is about one sixth of the envisioned capacity of the entire scheme. In spite 
of that 25 to 30 thousand villagers and migrants exist in the first phase, off the record.186 
BSD’s average residents are middle and upper class families with 2 to three children. 25 
years after the projects start the age-spectrum of BSD’s population varies from fifty-
somethings with grown up children, to younger starter households. Many are of an In-
donesian-Chinese descent. A majority of the residents has a higher school education and 
almost all households have at least one breadwinner in the formal sector. So far only 17 
percent of the ‘new’ residents are able to work in the area. 
The cost of a house in BSD ranges from 14.000 to 200.000 US$, and beyond. The 
value points to an average monthly income of the residents far above (300 per cent) the 
monthly income of an average Indonesia urban household. This higher income facilitates 
the access to mortgages and credits. 
As much a many generations of bourgeois before, the people moving to Bumi Serpong 
Damai long for a comfortable and family oriented life in the green. Moreover the resi-
dents are attracted by the opportunity to appropriate and explore a new modern lifestyle. 
Still, it remains interesting that most of the residents do not use the clubs, sport, and rec-
reation facilities available.  
Self-governance in BSD is not very advanced. This is probably due to Indonesia’s con-
text between harmony and hierarchy and BSD’s legal framework. So far, almost no resi-
dent groups and associations exist. However, the future seems to belong to bottom-up 
schemes. Homeowner associations appear as the instrument of choice in order to main-
tain a high level of services. 
                                               
186 Another 100.000 to 120.000 local people are residing on the areas of phase II and III (tendency growing). 
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Developers and planners –  
Corporate brezel house 
Introduction 
After the portrait of the bigger context, the physical character, as well as the population 
of the ‘peaceful land of Serpong’ (the meaning of BSD), three more puzzle pieces are 
missing in the elucidation of this case. Consequently, the next three sections will present 
the authorship, the financial context, as well as the regulative framework of the venture.  
This section will focus on the main authors of the scheme: these are in particular the 
developers, but also the planners and designers. This perspective is particularly exciting 
because BSD is considered to be the largest New Town in the South that was completely 
planned, implemented and maintained by one individual private-sector entity. Indeed, the 
characteristics and strategies of developers appear as a clue to delineate the differences of 
NeoTowns produced by the private sector and New Towns generated by the public 
hand. 
Consequently the part progresses in: 1) introducing the developers of the project, 2) 
presenting their major objectives venture, 3) delineating the major development strategies 
and rationales, 4) and drafting the institutional geography of the venture. Thereafter the 
role of external consultants, planners, landscape designers and architects is presented. 
Finally, the modus of marketing and maintenance of the New Town is discussed.  
Developers – A market-driven planning concept 
Introduction 
The developers of Bumi Serpong Damai account for the most influential and active part 
of the production process of the NeoTown. They have acquired the land, conceived the 
plan, implemented the project, and in addition they are even running the town. As BSD’s 
developers have innovated in applying market oriented strategies and management prin-
ciples towards urban development, they have produced a new typology of New Towns, a 
Neo Town. 
Table 8: Key indicators – Bumi Serpong Damai’s developers 
Name of company BSD PT 
Name of developer Sinar Mas 
Type of firm Industrial conglomerate 
Quality management 
standard 
ISO 9000 (focus on quality management: customer relation-
ship, organisation of the process) 
Early goals Balanced regional development, 1:3:6 housing strategy 
Contemporary opera-
tional framework 
‘Market driven strategic planning’,  
Six ingredients of BSD’s 
success 
1) Land bank, 2) modular development plan, 3) phased and 
incremental approach, 4) from pioneer populations to accele-
ration and consolidation, 5) holistic design (own infrastruc-
ture and services), 6) corporate standards 
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Delivery strategy Reflects trend from supply to demand side oriented produc-
tion 
Planners, Designers, Ar-
chitects 
Pacific Consultants International Group, Doxiadis Associates, 
John Portman & Associates, SOM, EDAW, V2i 
Trends in design ‘Abstract localisation’, quality tailored environments, modular 
platforms, gold-plating techniques 
Trends in landscaping The new master discipline mediating between the abstract and 
the real 
Trends in open space Theming & branding, festivalisation, symbolic space, ‘neo-
pedestrianisation’ 
Trends in marketing New combination of theming, banding and life-style ap-
proach, CSR, Merging of design + marketing, new relevance 
of market research (customer intelligence), festivalisation of 
sales experiences 
 
Name and background of Developers187 
Bumi Serpong Damai is run by the enterprise BSD PT188, a subsidiary of the Sinar Mas 
conglomerate. The New Town enterprise was started in 1984 by a consortium of 10 real 
estate heavyweights. Among these were conglomerates, such as the Salim Group, Eka 
Cipta Wijaya (Sinar Mas), and the Ciputra Group – all Sino-Indonesian ventures.189  No-
tably the initial team of BSD’s developers was composed of the same people who con-
structed Pondok Indah, Jakarta’s first privately developed neighbourhood. (Cf. above: 
Predecessors; Winarso 2005: 9) 
The arrangement of BSD’s development team has changed several times since the 
foundation. In 2001 the Sinar Mas Group bought the majority of shares through its sub-
sidiaries (54 percent) and took leading control of the New Town enterprise.190 BSD is 
considered among the most innovative real estate products in Indonesia: the developers 
have won over 14 separate awards for of their business concept (BSD PT 2004). 
Corporate structure  
Bumi Serpong Damai PT is a licensed company that consists of five major departments. 
These are the planning and design group, the management section, a marketing and sales 
division, as well as the public service department (BSD PT 2006: 36). The departments 
are modelled along the lines of the ISO 9001 (2000) standards. This international quality 
management regulation relies on a process-oriented method assuring quality in design, 
development, production, installation, and servicing (cf. below).  
The New Town Bumi Serpong Damai is implemented and managed by the holding 
company Bumi Serpong Damai PT. Simasred, a subsidiary of the conglomerate Sinar 
Mas acts as the major shareholder.191 The industrial conglomerate Sinar Mas is one of 
the biggest and most influential industrial conglomerates in Indonesia and it is dominated 
by the Widjaya family. By investing the real estate sector, the mother company sought to 
                                               
187 The following information is largely based on data from the website of the Asian Journal “Asia Sentinel”. (Cf. John 
Berthelsen: Asia Sentinel 2006 a,b) 
188 ‘PT’ Is the Indonesian abbreviation for ‘perséroan terbatas’. This means ‘incorporated’. 
189 Another well-known and competing conglomerate is the Lippo group. It has built the well known New Towns of Lippo 
Karawaci and Lippo Cikarang. (Cf.: above; cf. Vinh 2002) 
190 The other two remaining shareholders were the Salim as well as Ciputra Groups. 
191 At least since the takeover of the majority of shares in 2001 
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diversify its portfolio of products (and this is its risk).192 The company thrived on Indone-
sia’s financial and real estate boom during Sukarno’s era. Unconventional support from 
the government helped to survive the crisis and to maintain the firm’s power structure. 
Box 5: Sinar Mas – ‘A bewildering corporate pretzel palace’ 
The Sinar Mas Group has a dramatic history that illustrates the economic as well as po-
litical entanglement of large conglomerates in Indonesia. The delineation of the opera-
tional strategies as well as the corporate environment of Sinar Mas casts some light on 
the development Bumi Serpong Damai.  
Sinar Mas is one of the largest Indonesian corporations. Its major businesses are paper, 
palm oil, and real estate. The firm is also highly active in the financial sector and has ex-
tensive stakes in other financial-services firms, banks, and insurance companies.193  
Eka Tjipta Widjaya, the head of the ethnic Chinese Widjaya family, is the founder and 
main shareholder of the enterprise.194 He started the business with the Asia Pulp & Pa-
per Company (APP), today an important part of Sinar Mas, in expropriating Indonesia’s 
vast forest resources for the growing Asian markets. Within this process the company 
has acquired vast land holdings around the country and became one of the world’s 
biggest paper companies.195  
The mother company of Bumi Serpong Damai operates in a highly complex web of 
global financial flows. This highly fluid and complex operational geography was re-
ferred to as a “bewildering corporate pretzel palace” (cf. Asia Sentinel 2006). Several of 
Sinar Mas’ subsidiaries are based on international financial-, and offshore centres. It 
masters the process of tapping international capital markets, raising money through 
bonds, convertible bonds, share offerings and loans. From a Western perspective some 
of its operations prior to the SE-Asian crisis of 1997 were on the edge of legality.196  
The firm flourished on the support by the relaxed lending policies and privatisation 
programmes of the Sukarno era (cf. above). In 1997, at the dawn of the financial crisis, 
the conglomerate owned the equivalent of more than a tenth of Indonesia's foreign 
debt.  
After the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 the affiliate Asia Pulp and Paper ran up the 
biggest corporate debt in the history of Asia. It defaulted on a debt of US$ 14 billion 
(cf. The Economist 2008: 81). Nevertheless, the firm was rescued with the support of the 
Indonesian government: In contrast to crashed companies in Thailand or Malaysia, the 
Indonesian government allowed Sinar Mas to write off its domestic debt while keeping 
its assets. (Cf. ibidem)197 
                                               
192 It can be assumed that being in the palm oil business facilitated the conversion of agricultural to urban land at many 
locations. 
193 Sinar Mas’ publicly listed property company is named PT Duta Pertiwi. In 2005 PT Duta Pertiwi had reported assets of IDR 
4.7 trillion in 2005. 
194 In 1996 the Forbes Magazine had listed Eka Tjipta Widjaya as the 45th richest man in the world, with a net worth of over 
US$ 5 billion (cf. Asia Sentinel 2006a). 
195 Sinar Mas subsidiary PT Sinar Mas Agro Resources and Technology (SMART), managed by Franky Oesman Widjaya, is the 
biggest plantation conglomerate in Indonesia. It owns palm oil plantations of 2840 square kilometres and employs 35.000 
persons. The company recently entered a joint venture with Chinese investors (Civic Group) to develop an additional 1000 
square kilometres of plantations in East Kalimantan. US$ 380 million of the US$ 600 billion invested came from the China 
Development Bank (cf. Asia Sentinel 2006a). 
196 Several corporations filed lawsuits in the US against APP, alleging fraud. The main thrust of the allegations was that APP 
was obscuring true information on the state of balance sheets to the shareholders (cf. Asia Sentinel 2006b). 
197 The journalists of Asia Sentinel (2006a) describe how this was possible: ”APP staged the largest default in Asian history in 
2001, stopping service on US$ 13 billion worth of debt. Hundreds of creditors laid siege to APP's offices in Singapore, Hong 
Kong and New York. Restructuring negotiations were coloured by controversy over a bewildering corporate pretzel palace 
that included a shadowy series of banks in the Cook Islands and Cayman Islands and countless legal challenges before an 
eventual debt workout that committed APP to paying back almost US$ 7 billion but only covering the debt of its Indonesian 
subsidiaries.” In addition Widjaya’s bonds served as a tool to “leverage the value of their companies and subsidiaries, raising 
funds in the capital market while retaining majority control by restricting the share issues.” (Cf. Asia Sentinel, 2006). The 
Economist 2008 names the complex structure of APP’s bonds as one of the main reasons for escaping the obligation to 
recompense its creditors. These were registered in the Netherlands and were to be disputed in New York. Only in the wake 
of the October 2008 financial crisis the Indonesian Supreme Court withdrew its earlier decision to back up rulings by lower 
courts that had supported Asia Pulp and papers status. 
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Sinar Mas’ property and real estate division is named Sinar Mas Real Estate Develop-
ment (Simasred). Simasred is one of the leading real estate developers in Indonesia and 
the SE-Asian region with links to more than 80 international companies, and hundred 
of projects around the world. Lead by Eka’s son Mochtar Widjaya,198 the company con-
trols some of the largest land banks in the Jakarta Region and holds a large share of 
real estate assets in Indonesia.199 In addition to real estate development, Simasred also 
engages in consulting, planning and design, as well as management services. 
Simasred became widely known for its highly successful development of shop houses. In 
addition, it has been focusing on middle-income housing and commercial space for 
small and medium-sized businesses. The firm has substantial interests in various under-
takings such as residential, apartments, commercials, shopping centres, hotels, office 
buildings, industrial estates, townships, as well as some Superblock - mixed-use devel-
opments (cp. www.simasred.com; r.02.08.2008).200  
 Illustration B-39: Corporate brezel palace of Indonesian elites 
Goals and deliverables of developers 
The present motto of BSD is: “Big City – Big Opportunity”. It can be found on every 
banner, any shopping bag and also on the website. The slogan points to the enormous 
potentials of bigness to create huge bargains for the buyers, developers and investors. It 
demonstrates outwardly that BSD seeks to represent the qualities of the corporate world 
– as opposed to the hassle associated with New Towns constructed by the public gov-
ernment. In other words, it signifies that BSD is an outcome of a market driven strategic 
planning. 
Back in 1984, different paradigms existed and the vision was distinct. A socially ori-
ented style marked the initial implementation phase of the project. The developers and 
major planning officials and agencies aimed to grow a vision for the whole society. In 
conjunction with the planners, the attempt was to implement a socially and environmen-
tally balanced scheme (cf. Santoso 1992: 37). In this context BSD was supposed to be a 
project steering regional growth and developing model solutions for housing (cf. Con-
text: Planning paradigms). It was also aimed to “support the twenty-first century's needs 
and demands for society, administration, business, and industry in the region.” (Cf. 
Pangestu, 1998)  
As a matter of fact, the developers had to agree to implement a balanced housing pro-
gram in order to qualify for the necessary loans and land permits.201 The government 
imposed a 1:3:6 housing strategy (cf. above: Blocks and buildings; cf. Firman 2004: 19). 
This implied that for every luxury house, three medium-cost and six low-cost had to be 
built, including very-low-cost houses.202 It was also planned at the beginning that the 
field should be opened up for more private sector players, after a certain level of devel-
opment was achieved. (Cf. Santoso 1992) Yet, this never happened. At the latest, with 
the crisis of 1997, an increasing profit orientation, and a specific business ethos began to 
                                               
198 „...one of the big real estate tycoons in Indonesia.” (Cf. Winarso 2005) 
199 In addition to the 6000 hectares of BSD, the firm controls another 3.000-hectare real estate venture named Kota Delta 
Mas. The properties it owns have been valued at IDR 13.8 trillion (US$ 1,38 billion) (cf. Asia Sentential). 
200 Several of the company’s real estate projects have been highly celebrated and became brands. Among these are well-
known real estate products such Kota Wisata; Manga Dua Shophouses; Bumi Serpong Damai, and Kota Delta Mas; PT Plaza 
Indonesia Realty Tbk, the Grand Hyatt Hotel; or the The KIIC Industrial Estate in Karawang. (Cf. www.simasred.com; August 
2008) 
201 An informal consortium of the developer and the government developed the initial set of goals. The most important 
principles agreed upon were: Housing for all income groups of society; Compliance with the development goals of the 
regional and local governments; Self-sufficient development (cf. Santoso 1992). 
202 At that time the cheapest houses started at US$ 2.500 (cf. Levitt). 
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dominate the rationales of the project. (Cf. Personal interview with ex-BSD planning staff 
2005) 
Development strategy 
Bumi Serpong Damai’s achievement is based on a combination of strategic elements, 
which are an elementary part of its profile and make it unique among its peers. The de-
velopment strategy was adjusted periodically: It ranges from a social growth pole model 
for the whole population in the early 1980’s, to a landscape of economic opportunities 
by the end of the 1990s. The following section is devoted to two important questions: 
What strategies did the private developers use to deliver the results and to implement the 
city? What is different from public sector strategies? 
From its very inception the New Town was aimed to become a self-sustained city, ca-
tering to all basic needs of the resident population. This goal required the construction of 
serious town level infrastructure and service facilities. Moreover, independent manage-
ment of the new city was planned. The town was officially approved and incorporated 
into Jabotabek’s strategic master plan (RUTRK) (Cf. above… Master plans) Conse-
quently the planners also sought to consider the regional infrastructure and the proximity 
to Jakarta.  
Later on, the attraction of global investments and international brands became impor-
tant.203 The developers sought to construct a cosmopolitan image and reputation by at-
tracting international institutions. Moreover, strategies of tactical analysis and mapping 
of competitors became an important part of the operational methods. (BSD 2006: 15) 
The largest paradigmatic shift in BSD’s history is marled by the 1997 financial crisis. 
This landmark represents the rise of corporate strategies. Among the important ‘ingredi-
ents’ of this context are: quality management, process orientation, specialized marketing, 
focus on upper middle classes, emphasis of symbolic values, spot on fencing and security 
features (cf. above: Physical structure).  
Significantly, nowadays the developer BSD is ‘unashamedly’ based on a market-driven 
strategic planning tools. (Cf. Pangestu 1998) The present strategy of the New Town is 
based on rules from a larger framework of business operations. The new spirit is con-
firmed by wording of the self-description of the developers: “Process quality manage-
ment”, “human resource attraction”, “visionary action plans”, “response to changing 
consumer needs and desires”, “creation of location inducing assets”, “synergies and alli-
ances”, “focus on lifestyles”, “a market for the next century”, “long term economic sus-
tainability”.  (Cf. Website of BSD PT, r12.08.2008) 
The present strategies point to an increasing relevance of 'learning by doing strate-
gies'. While BSD has experienced many risks and uncertainties in the previous 20 years, 
the developers are increasingly reluctant to set any definite benchmarks, other than sce-
narios and visionary images.  
Standardisation 
BSD PT was one of the first companies in Indonesia to apply the ISO 9000 norm to real 
estate projects in Indonesia. The rationales of this norm reverberate throughout all as-
pects of the scheme: from the institutional set-up of the management, to marketing and 
implementation strategies, to customer relationship tactics etc. 
                                               
203 Some of the results are the German Centre, Swiss School, The Swiss-German University, Medica Hospital, Carrefour, and 
Premier. 
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Box 6: ISO 9000 
Quality management standards were initially developed to solve quality problems in 
the production of munitions during the Second World War in Britain.204 
ISO is the International Organisation for Standardisation. It is a network of the national 
standards institutes of 162 countries. As a non-governmental organisation it sees itself 
as a bridge between the public and the private sectors. The name ISO is derived from 
the Greek ‘isos’ meaning ‘equal’. ISO only develops standards with a market require-
ment. Their implementation is voluntary.  
ISO 9001:2008 specifies requirements for a quality management system where an or-
ganization needs to demonstrate its ability to consistently provide product that meets 
customer and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, and aims to enhance 
customer satisfaction through the effective application of the system, including proc-
esses for continual improvement of the system and the assurance of conformity to cus-
tomer and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. All requirements of ISO 
9001:2008 are generic and are intended to be applicable to all organizations, regardless 
of type, size and product provided. (Cf.: www.iso.org, r12.05.2009) 
Implementation strategy  
The reflection of the strategies of the New Town generates the question of their imple-
mentation. In this context BSD’s achievement rests on six pillars: 1) Secured access to 
vast land resources; 2) An open master plan and development scenario; 3) A phased 
(temporal) and incremental (spatial) development approach; 4) A strategy of creating a 
momentum by attracting a pioneer population; 5) A provision of private infrastructure 
and services; 6) As well as a strict focus on generic standards and management systems. 
While the last of the elements was discussed above, the subsequent paragraph will ex-
plore the first five factors. 205 
One of the most difficult tasks of developing of a New Town is the generation of an 
initial dynamic, a momentum, which manages to attract customers and third party in-
vestments to the area. This aspect decides, whether the project remains a dormitory set-
tlement or, whether it manages to become a fully-fledged city. To achieve this momen-
tum, a balanced development of residents, as well as infrastructure is necessary. This is 
true in particular, when resources are limited.206 But how to start?  
1) Secured access to vast land resources 
Bumi Serpong Damai’s developers have generally operated with a phased development 
approach. The crucial exemption to this approach lies at the beginning: It is constituted 
by the fact that all of the land was granted to the developers in advance. Indeed, these 
land permits have been regarded as a fundamental base for the entire subsequent process 
of planning and implementation.207 
2) An open master plan and development scenario 
BSD’s master plan contained the formal development framework and structured the 
process of a phased development, it also served as the basis for the official planning 
                                               
204 Cf. http://www.systemsthinking.co.uk/3-1-article.asp, r03.09.2009 
205 Because the developers took the strategy of openness and flexibility quite literally, it is difficult to reconstruct all original 
intentions and only a retrospective perspective seems possible. 
206 Unless, of course, some party can pre-finance and maintain all infrastructures all at once, like Peter the Great has done in 
St. Petersburg, or the Brazilian government in Brasilia. 
207 Cf. the above section on land permits 
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documents.208 The open and modular structure of the plan also allowed for flexibility 
and permanent change, whenever macro developments made this necessary.  
3) A phased (temporal) and incremental (spatial) development approach 
Bumi Serpong Damai was developed in several strategic phases (time) and in incremental 
phases (space). In addition to the three spatially oriented project phases on both sides of 
the Cisadane (cf. section Physical profile) three temporal development phases can be dis-
tinguished209: 1) ‘introduction’, 2) ’acceleration’, and 3) ‘establishment’. The integration 
of the phasing approach with the strategy of incremental spatial expansion is very cru-
cial. The New Town was (and still is) developed phase-by-phase, sector-by-sector and 
neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood. 
4) ‘Introduction’: Strategy of creating a momentum by attracting a pioneer population 
A certain amount of residents were necessary to get the ball rolling. BSD’s key to success 
in this respect was an early strategy based on low-income households. In this context, the 
first phase (‘introduction’, 1989 – 1992) was aimed at building up momentum and creat-
ing a local market (cf. Interview with BSD’s planning staff 2006). This was achieved by 
catering to low-income populations. Notably, these acted as pioneer groups and ‘beta-
testers’ exploring the potentials of the project.  
At the same time, the developers counted on the fact that, by nature, low-income 
populations were attracted by the price of a house more that anything else.210 Hence, 
they would be more tolerant (resilient) to the various problems of a life on a large con-
struction site. Consequently, during the early phases of the mid-80s, the town catered to 
low income clients, featuring a mass of low-income projects. (Cf. above: Section on Sec-
tor-I). 
4b) ‘Acceleration’ and ‘establishment’ 
The second phase referred to as ‘acceleration’, aimed to explore the dynamic of the first 
one. In this context, from 1992 to 1998 an emphasis was laid on the development of key 
infrastructure and service facilities, as well as on the attraction of higher income house-
holds. The era saw the rise of many schools, shopping facilities and office infrastructures. 
During the final phase of “establishment” (1998 to 2015), a significant part of the New 
Town was supposed to be completed. (Cf. Interview with BSD’s planning staff 2004) The 
local experience demonstrates that everything progressed slower than expected. BSD has 
reached its break-even point about ten years later than intended, after many delays and 
unpredictable macro developments. 211 
5) Provision of infrastructure and services 
In order to become a fully-fledged city, Bumi Serpong Damai acted as a forerunner in 
constructing a wide range of urban infrastructure in a private way. (Cf. Pangestu 1998) 
Leapfrogging the general standards, the New Town enterprise provided its own networks 
(clean water, telecommunications, electricity) and services.212 Notably, many of the infra-
                                               
208 E.g. the legal development plans for the district of Tangerang and strategic master plans for the Jakarta region, or RUTRP 
(Cf. above). 
209 Cf. Interview with planning officials in Dec 2005  
210 An insight, which is as old as the business (Cf. Gans 1967) 
211 Most notably a surge of other competitors in the mid 90’s, the 97 crisis, a new management in 2001, the continuing 
tenacity of the village population to sell their land etc. 
212 In most of the cases the role of the public hand was reduced to provide the necessary approvals and to supply the net-
works. Importantly, it was agreed that the systems are to be handed over to the government upon completion (Pangestu 
1998). 
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structure facilities (such as the major internal roads) have been developed by the private 
sector without user charges “in order to ensure the sustainability of the development area 
as a whole.” (Cf. Pangestu 1998) In other words, the dynamics of scale enabled the de-
veloper to subsidise vital infrastructure elements. 
Moreover, it was also critical to connect the project to the greater region. To achieve 
this goal the developer operated with the tactics of joint ventures and public private 
partnerships. The construction of the Serpong-Jakarta toll road is one of the success sto-
ries: Here BSD PT teamed up with the developer of the neighbouring settlement Bintaro 
Jaya and the public toll road operator Jasa Marga. The highway was built utilising a 
BOT strategy (Build, Operate and Transfer). The consortium will operate the toll-road 
system for 27 years. After this period it will be returned to the public.213 
Land acquisition 
One of the most intricate parts of constructing a New Town is the question of securing 
the necessary land. Despite the fact that the project was secured by the legal instrument 
of land permits (cf. above) the locality was not a white sheet of paper. Being a part of 
Jakarta’s growing periphery, the area supported the livelihoods of 60 to 100 thousand 
people. The place had a history. It was brackish, colourful and complex. Naturally the 
people had to be persuaded to leave. How was this done? 
Today 15 percent of the areas within BSD’s phase-I remain occupied by on-site vil-
lages, another 50 percent of the land of phase II have to be acquired. The process of land 
acquisition was, and still is, a very long, delicate and cumbersome process. The actual 
land acquisition was delegated to middleman brokers (‘Calo Tanah’). These middlemen 
were knowledgeable of the local conditions and helped to maximise profit margins, 
sometimes by obscuring the real purpose of the transfer.214 Originally, the existing land-
owners were given the option to sell, relocate, or be a part of the land consolidation 
schemes of the New Town. The compensation amounted to about 1/20th of the land cost 
after development. Rural residents without legal property rights were the ones resisting 
most.  
When communities resisted leaving, the developers and middlemen often referred to 
the patriotic duty of the small man to oblige to the common good for all. It was argued 
that New Towns of the middle classes were a means towards increasing the overall pubic 
good of society.215 Many opposing landowners were exposed to continuous discrimina-
tion and pressure.216 People have capitulated, because on-site villages haven been cut off 
and neglected form infrastructure development. Some of BSD’s boulevards, for example, 
cause serious flooding conditions in the villages. (Cf. above)  
                                               
213 The PT Bintaro Serpong Damai consortium was in charge to develop the 7.2 km stretch from Pondok Aren to Serpong 
(7.2 km). PT Jasa Marga was in charge of the road development connecting Pondok Aren to Jakarta (5.9 km). While the 
project was to be completed in 1998, it only became fully operational in 2005. 
214Dorléans (2002: 55) comments on the land obtaining procedures: “The phase of the acquisition is quite delicate and 
troublesome... transactions have to be very discreetly effectuated by a group of apparently independent buyers... A 50-
hectare acquisition can take as long as a year... when the initial discreet phase of privately negotiated acquisitions is com-
pleted, the last obstinate residents must be expelled... In 90 percent of the cases, they do not possess any valid or strong 
property rights.... 
215 The concept of Basic Agrarian Law dates back to the 1960s of Sukarno, when the government confiscated significant 
amount of land. Now it was used by private developers and government officials to oblige otherwise unwilling sellers: “The 
argument was used that ‘development’ was a top national priority and that it was the patriotic duty of the small landholders 
and traditional communities to step aside. Within the context of Suharto’s culture of development, the argument was con-
vincingly made that developers were building luxury housing and golf courses for the common good of society.” (Aksoro 
1994: 93; Ferguson 1993: 51, quoted by Cowherd 2002: 34) 
216 This strategy was very common. Suhendar (1994, quoted in Firman 2004: 11) describes the eviction of about 1.400 land-
owning agricultural households from the area of the government New Town Tigaraksa. 
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Problematic impacts 
During our description of Bumi Serpong Damai an indigenous Southeast Asian version of 
neoliberalism unfolds, thriving on a combination of indigenous political cultures and 
global market principles, and at times also disregarding human rights and democratic 
principles. Indeed, we find that the same spirit has ignored the needs of local populations 
and also neglected the environment in BSD. Despite the most meticulous economic plan-
ning and process management mechanisms217, no studies on the project’s impacts on the 
existing environment, or the local population, have ever been undertaken (Cf. Personal 
Interviews with local planning representatives in 2004).  
Nevertheless, it is difficult to blame the developers exclusively. It was in particular the 
local government that was unprepared to handle a project of this size and quality. As the 
public sector did not require any impact studies and compensation measures, the devel-
opers naturally eluded additional costs. As a consequence the interests of the local popu-
lations and the environmental setting were seriously neglected.  
It can be claimed that the stakeholders acted according to the spirit of their time. The 
urban historian Abidin Kusno (2006: 4) circumscribes this attitude of local elites as the 
colonial tradition.218As a consequence the ‘colonisation’ and transformation of the exist-
ing locality has been quite aggressive.  
Though, things are changing: Only recently, as part of the slow process of democrati-
sation, after the usual protests and media reports, the developers embarked on social and 
environmental responsibility programmes. Local villagers, for example, have been 
granted exclusive rights to find jobs in the New Town venture. The initialisation of pro-
grammes of garbage separation is another ‘learning by experience’ example started after 
negative press coverage on awkward dumping practices. Even so, a general tension and a 
clash of interests remains, and sublime policies to ‘persuade’ the remaining local popula-
tion to relocate remain on the agenda (cf. above). 
                                               
217 As it is reflected in quotations like: “Careful and responsible city planning has resulted in the development of Bumi Ser-
pong Damai (BSD).” (BSD PTb 2004). 
218 “...the colonial ‘tradition’ of seeing the Kampong (as a problem for the „European“ city) has provided the unwritten 
basis for the municipalities of Indonesian cities to issue licence to real estate developers”, ... , and “to appropriate the Kam-
pong areas for development without suffering any ethical conflict.” (Kusno 2005: 6) 
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Designers – ‘Abstract localisation’ 
Introduction 
Developers alone did not conceive Bumi Serpong Damai. Many consultants participated 
in the development process. The experts came from disciplines, such as finance, law, 
marketing, business consulting, urban planning, design, architecture, landscape design 
and engineering. Their ideas were inspired by local predecessors, such as Bandung’s 
European Quarter, Jakarta’s Kebayoran Baru, or Pondok Indah (cf. above: Predecessors). 
Moreover, the developer has set up its own architecture and planning team. Its members 
travelled to Japan, Paris, and to California (Cf. Interviews with Santoso, 2005, 2007). 
Many of the features of Bumi Serpong Damai’s physical design, as well as other New 
Towns in the metropolitan region of Jakarta are predominantly modelled along western 
models, notably the US. Indeed, many of the structures are planned and designed by ex-
patriate architects, urban planners and property specialists hired by the local developers. 
(Cf. Dick and Rimmer, 1998: from Firman 2004: 12) Well-established international 
planning strategies and architectural typologies such as the gated community, the de-
tached suburban villa, the drive-in restaurant, the mall, among others, tend to be over-
taking locally grown solutions. Only a second look reveals adaptations and local differ-
ences (cf. King 2004).  
Focusing on the design professions, the following section reflects on the role and im-
pacts of these internal and external, international as well as local agents. 
Operational mode 
BSD PT works with its own planning and design department as well as with external 
consultants. External offices are contracted to elaborate principal solutions and guide-
lines (e.g. for new phases), or to design a special landmark structure. The design depart-
ment predominantly works on the implementation of guidelines and principles, on the 
variation of basic themes, and on the coordination of strategies. 
Planning and Urban Design 
The case of Bumi Serpong Damai demonstrates that private developers can build urban 
spaces and provide planning and urban design of a high quality. The developer has put a 
large emphasis on state of the art design at all phases of the project. The appearance of 
Bumi Serpong’s buildings and spaces, its ‘Gestalt’ was always a very important sales ar-
gument. The relevance of a good shape even increased in time, when competition by 
other projects became fiercer.  
Whereas the early design spirit was basically defined by the supply side, the latest ex-
amples demonstrate a rising focus of the demand side: The urban layout of the 1980’s 
was defined according to the experiences of the planners and designers. Today, the plans 
are increasingly drawn up according to popular taste. The present trends reflect the sig-
nificance of lifestyle theming and the importance of surfaces (Cf. Virillio 1994 quoted in 
Gotsch 2005). The facades emerge as the main media communicating this approach.219  
The planning and design history of BSD has three phases: The Indonesian Engineering 
Firm of Arkonin P.T. Perentjana Djaya in collaboration with the Japanese Pacific Con-
                                               
219 Simasred, the main shareholder behind BSD PT, was one of the forerunners of theming strategies in Indonesia’s real 
estate sector. The company became known for the development of themed residential projects, such as Kota Wisata (tourist 
city), or Kota Legenda (city of legends) which resembled Alice-in-Wonderland’s fantasy worlds. 
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sultants International Group (PCI) prepared BSDs first plan of 1985.220 (Cf. BSD PT, 
2004). About ten years later (1996) the office of Doxiadis Associates developed the sec-
ond plan.221 In this context the US American office of John Portman & Associates de-
signed the Central Business District.222 Nowadays the majority of international consult-
ants come from Australia. A leading firm in this context is Vision to Implementation 
(V2i) (Cf. Personal interview with BSD planning staff, 2007) 
 Illustration B-40: BSD’s master plans from various periods 
Master plan guidelines  
Bumi Serpong Damai’s master plan complies with international standards. It contains 
rules for the domains of landscaping, zoning, traffic and roads, as well as for sewage, 
electricity, street lighting, and garbage. Detailed neighbourhood plans regulate the spatial 
development within the clusters and neighbourhoods. The plan’s features include a 100-
year flood proof concept, as well as specific zoning regulations for informal vendors. 
Furthermore, a strong design framework intends to discourage the conversion of houses 
to commercial buildings (e.g. buildings are placed at a distance to main roads).  
Only a short time ago a considerable revitalisation and beautification programme was 
incorporated into the planning document. This programme includes the upgrading of 
representative public spaces, including new concepts for street furniture, pocket parks, 
jogging trails (hard to use in the tropical climate of Indonesia), signage and landscap-
ing.223 
Landscaping 
Landscaping plays a particularly remarkable role among the various authors of Bumi 
Serpong Damai. Whereas the underlying landscape is considered a tabula rasa, landscap-
ing becomes a crucial design discipline. As it takes on the role of mediating between ab-
stract space and concrete place, it evolves into the art of grounding ideal typologies. The 
discipline has always played an extraordinary part in designing New Towns, in particular 
if they are designed as low-density Garden City structures, as is the case in Bumi Serpong 
Damai.224  
Landscaping gives Bumi Serpong Damai a driving edge. Back in the early 1990’s the 
richest neighbourhoods of the northern sector of the town were arranged around a state 
of the art golf facility, designed by the famous golf star Jack Nicklaus.225 Moreover, land-
scaped features are essential elements of Bumi Serpong’s large representative boule-
vards.226 The practice is also essential in the clusters. Here, it can quickly produce a neat 
image, even if the majority of lots are undeveloped. This quick fix makes an enormous 
difference for the atmosphere and consequently the sales. Indeed, it is an invisible rule 
                                               
220 Notably, the first phase foresaw the development of a technological centre `Technopolis` in the eastern part of the area 
and a rural centre ‘Agropolis’ in the western part. (Cf. Santoso 1992: 37) 
221 Constantinos Doxiadis became known for the concept of a dynamically growing city (Dynapolis) in the 1950s. His office 
designed many urban development plans in Third World countries around the world (For example Khartoum, Islamabad, 
Baghdad, and Riyadh. (Cf. Doxiadis 1968) 
222 John Portman is widely known for the inception of the atrium hotel typology in the US. The Bonaventure Hotel in Detroit, 
the Renaissance Centre in Los Angeles, or the New York Marriot Marquis Hotel represents this typology. 
223 Designed side walks and pocket parks are extremely extraordinary in Jakarta and Indonesia. 
224 The origins of the garden city design date back to Frederic Law Olmsted. The designer of the Central Park in New York 
was the first who merged the design of parks and settlements. Paradigmatic for this approach are neighbourhoods such as 
Llewellyn Park (Brooklyn), or Riverside (Illinois, 1868-1869). Between 1857 and 1950 Olmstead‘s firm was involved in plan-
ning 450 subdivisions and new communities (cf. Garvin 1996: 265; Cf. also to Ch.1: Introduction). 
225 The 18-hole golf course and the BSD Golf and Country Club are renowned as best golf facility in Indonesia. 
226 As part of the recent process of restructuring, star offices, such as the US American EDAW served as consultants for the 
landscaping schemes. 
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that as soon as a new area was acquired, is it fenced and landscaped. Landscaped bam-
boo walls have been used to hide on-site villages (cf. above). Therefore, landscaping 
serves as a strategic act demonstrating appropriation.  
Design strategy – abstract localisation 
Abstract localisation 
While BSD’s developing strategy was described as a ‘market oriented strategy’, the design 
approach used can be illustrated as ‘abstract localisation’. The design strategies applied 
at different levels are chiefly based on international models and typologies. The New 
Town is a system ‘composed’ by ‘abstract’ elements, which have proved to be successful 
at an international scale. Among these typologies are shopping malls and supermarkets, 
suburban office clusters, the gated community, the recreational club, multiplex cinemas, 
entertainment parks, drive-in restaurants, and coffee shops, among others. Everything is 
connected by the means of motorised road transport. Landmark structures, such as the 
new ‘Sea World’, the ITC Mall, the German Centre, or the BSD Country Club enhance 
the image and identity, as well as giving the town cognitive hold. Normally, star archi-
tects are invited to design these (E.g. SOM, Portman, EDAW).  
Landscaping provides the glue to bind everything together and to anchor the abstract 
elements in place: “BSD provides well-built houses with quality tailored environments” 
(BSD PT, 2006). The other side of this method is that the place underlying the New 
Town, is rather used as a blank sheet than a locality. As it becomes ‘colonised’ by a proc-
ess of abstract localisation, its native, cultural, topographical, ecological, and historical, 
aspects, are ignored. Local place is used as a blank sheet unless major undeniable ele-
ments, such as the Cisadane River, or ‘partisan villages’ are in place. The new users are 
less proud of being a part of Jakarta’s periphery, than of being emerged in and of being 
able to consume a state-of-the-art western environment. As a result, local space gets fully 
synchronised along global standards. The environment is fully conditioned.227 In this con-
text Bumi Serpong Damai’s neighbourhoods exemplify that, and when landscapes are 
needed, they are rather designed from scratch, rather than being carved out of the com-
plexity of local features. 
Indeed, the developers of BSD innovate in employing a highly abstracted (place inde-
pendent) design process. The features of the New Town can, in theory and in practice, be 
conceived from remote locations, without ever visiting the site. Unless, of course, real 
problems, such as unpredictable ground conditions, flooding, or protests and riots are 
encountered. Yet, nowadays uncertainties of this kind are increasingly handled by like-
wise abstract insurance and risk management routines. 
Indeed, the design process of ‘abstract localisation’, as it is used in BSD, is a process of 
high predictability and reduced risks. The modular combination of a basic set of abstract 
elements and typologies (as listed above) allows for a wide range of products. The ap-
proach can easily be tailored to new styles and customer needs: “There are lots of resi-
dential options. Homes by the golf course, lakes and parks are all available” (BSD PT 
2004). 
                                               
227 Indeed, this idealised space of the New Town seems like a perfect illustration for Sloterdijk’s metaphor of the crystal 
palace. The German philosopher (2002: 265) describes, how, in post-historic times, a capitalist space of excess, security and 
comfort, becomes the ideal way of life for the rich thirty percent of society. 
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Life style and theming strategies 
The application of the lifestyle theming approach in the architecture and urbanism of 
daily life is one of the most significant and distinctive features of Bumi Serpong Damai 
and other privately developed New Towns in Jakarta’s periphery. The appears that the 
contemporaneous neighbourhoods of Bumi Serpong Damai’s and some of its peers repre-
sent the most radical application of themed strategies in the housing sector worldwide. 
BSD is among the pioneers to introduce the approach to the everyday life of middle 
classes. Heretofore, theming strategies have been applied at extraordinary locations such 
as Disneyworld, or Las Vegas, while lifestyle approaches nowadays became increasingly 
prominent in the world of post-industrial mass customised products such as Sport Utility 
Vehicles (SUVs), portable informational gadgets (mobile phones, iPod’s etc) and sneak-
ers. Predecessors of residential projects with theming and lifestyle strategies do exist: 
Among these, for example, are Disney’s Celebration (Orlando), or the early case of Coral 
Gables in Miami (cf. Behar 1997). The Indonesian examples, however, open a new chap-
ter, in combining both theming and lifestyle approaches and applying these to housing. 
They stand out in terms of their size, boldness and radicalism. The most recent, offbeat 
lifestyle and theming strategies are oriented towards green, and eco motifs.228 
Notably, the designers operate along the same principles on the level of the 
neighbourhoods as on the larger scale. The basic elements of the neighbourhood clusters 
are modular and abstracted housing typologies. Based on a few standard models, the 
housing models allow for individual customisation.229 The practice is known as platform 
design in other commodity sectors (i.e. the mobile phone, or automobile industries). In 
the case of BSD the approach is traceable to the requirement to deliver turnkey houses, 
which are based on the official regulatory frameworks (related to credit conditions and 
land permits).  
 Illustration B-41: Trends of rationalised space and prefabricated design 
 Illustration B-42: Luxury segment of high-rise condominiums 
 Illustration B-43: New generation of ‘Supermonuments’ from various Jakarta 
neighbourhoods 
Standardisation, rationalisation, and mass customisation 
The design teams work with a few standard models. These are geared to the major in-
come levels and household compositions (low income, low middle class, middle class, 
upper middle class, luxury class). Interestingly, this range of typologies actually resembles 
the product lines of car manufactures.230 The difference, however, is that the BSD houses 
are still manufactured. While cheap labour and traditional construction materials are 
cheap, the construction process has been streamlined towards simple working steps. It 
can be realised by low-qualified workers. 
Notably, the surface of the buildings is handled as an independent element. Its final 
appearance depends on the specifications of the cluster theme and individual require-
ments.231 What is remarkable is that despite the tendency of diversification and aug-
                                               
228 Indonesia’s forerunner in the respect of eco marketing seems to be BSD’s competitor Bintaro Jaya. Only recently, Jaya 
Property, the developer, inaugurated Kebayoran View: new cluster featuring “ECOmmunity lifestyle for better living in the 
professional’s city, Bintaro Jaya.” (Cf. www.jayaproperty.com, August 2008) 
229 An insight that was well-known in Levittown 
230 A brief inspection of the product lines of Daimler and Volkswagen reveals that both of these sell 16 categories of cars. 
231 Significantly, in 2003, the developer launched an experimental website, which enabled the interested buyer to configure 
his dream house in combining a set of basic modules. This practice has been dropped for unknown reasons. Possibly the 
Indonesian clients were overburdened, or the haptic dimension was underestimated. (This form of web based individual 
mass customisation has also not picked up with other products such as Nike shoes, Nissan automobiles, or Levi’s jeans. 
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mented choice, the current trend points to a reduction of the range of basic house mod-
els. While only five years ago buildings carried a design based on the leitmotiv of the 
respective cluster, this practice has been dropped. The present housing typologies are 
fewer and strictly orientated towards the direct preferences of the consumer.232 Crucially, 
this reduction of complexity also permits lower prices. It can be observed that, the lower 
middle classes favour modest and minimalist designs, the middle classes prefer Bauhaus-
minimalism and international theming, while the upper classes persist on a timeless ele-
gant “chic” or historicism.233 (Cf.  B-31, B-44) 
                                                                                                                                         
While these can in theory also be purchased using web based configuration tools, clients prefer a physical testing of the 
product. 
232 These are instantaneously monitored by market studies. 
233 Latest examples can be discovered in the clusters of  “The Pavilion”, “Latinos”, “The Green”, “Vermont”. cp. above 
section on neighbourhoods. 
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Marketing and sales – Lifestyle diversification 
“Contemporary urbanism equals marketing”234  
The subject of marketing and sales accounts for one the highest differences among public 
and private city builders. Bumi Serpong Damai’s developers concentrate on the concep-
tion, the packaging, and the advertising of their (real estate) products in a way unknown 
to public city planners before. The project reflects that, these days, successful marketing 
becomes a crucial prerequisite for the success of the whole business undertaking. When a 
market is increasingly saturated, as is the case in the middle class housing market of Ja-
karta, the marketing comes to define the distinctive competitive advantage.235 Accord-
ingly, the following passage will present some of the marketing and sales strategies that 
are characteristic for BSD’s New-Town-Enterprise. 
Setting of diversification 
Marketing and sales is an essential part of the BSD’s strategic business oriented model. 
While the portfolio of products of the ‘Big City – Big Opportunity’-town236 is increas-
ingly diversified, this basket of ‘goods’ is also aggressively marketed. 
Bumi Serpong Damai has distinguished itself as a business venture, which is catering 
to a diversified clientele: In the initial phase, the New Town pledged to ameliorate Ja-
karta’s housing and infrastructure crisis in providing housing to starter families. Nowa-
days, BSD has become an enterprise with a multiplicity of goals and a multitude of cli-
ents. In addition to the classical housing clients, the town’s management is also courting 
enterprises to set up a business venture in the scheme. It is also lobbying for the money of 
local as well as international investors. This framework of diversification leads to an ad-
vancing refinement of marketing. In this context, novel tactics such as competitive analy-
sis and market positioning and customised modes serving the wants and needs of specific 
customer groups are engaged. 
‘Demand-creating location inducements’ 
The saturated market leads to a series of notable innovations: Now, BSD’s developers are 
not only offering products according to the mainstream market demand, but are explor-
ing new (niche-) markets and techniques of active demand induction. The company not 
only aims to serve the markets, it seeks to shape consumer desires in a proactive sense. It 
is “putting an emphasis on product development and competitive niche-thinking to cre-
ate market demand, and investing in a diversified portfolio of demand-creating location 
inducements which are attractive to business, industry, and residential populations.” 
(Pangestu 1998) In studying the respective New Town’s catalogues and driving through 
the showcase neighbourhoods Indonesia’s ‘innocent’ consumer is taught what they need. 
Sales office 
It is important to note that despite the rising relevance of abstract planning schemes 
(cf. above), a haptic level of experience remains vital. BSD’s management, planning, and 
                                               
234 Comment by Adam Frampton, chief designer of OMA’s waterfront city, at the event ‘New Towns Abroad’, May 27th 
2008, Almere Holland. 
235 This trend occurs in the general framework of an increasingly commoditised space, standardised development and design 
methods and a growing relevance of the image as well as the surface (Cf. Virilio 1994, Baudrillard 1983, Flusser 1993, 
discussed in Gotsch 1995: pp. 19). 
236 Recent PR-slogan of the New Town venture 
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sales division were located in a landmark building, which marks the northern entrance of 
the New Town. The extended ground floor of the building is devoted to the marketing 
and sales department. Here up to 60 sales people are spoiling potential clients. Moreover, 
the space includes an enormous exhibition hall, which displays Maquettes and brochures 
on the newest real estate products. Despite the fact that the sales force has almost dou-
bled from 2003 to 2006, when BSD has fully shifted to a new “lifestyle-for-the-future" 
strategy, the space is bursting. 
Live, work, play... and invest 
The New Town is able to offer a broad, but also an integrated range of ‘products’ to its 
clientele. These goods range from housing, to business opportunities, and leisure activi-
ties. A recurrent leitmotiv of the undertaking, is the motto "Live, Work, Play". Yet, as 
the place intends to be even more than this physical chessboard, this slogan was supple-
mented by “The best choice for your investment” (BSD PT 2006). 
Quality, green, and social-eco orientation as marketing tactics 
BSD’s products reflect a business culture of highest quality standards and up to date 
style. Nowadays, tactics transporting ecological and social responsibility such as life-style 
branding, eco branding, and social branding become ingredients in this context. These 
tactics are relatively new to the real estate business and BSD is among the forerunners in 
their application. Recent advertising campaigns stress the town’s greenness and eco ori-
entation: “BSD will always remain an environmentally friendly city” (BSD PT 2006).  
A combination of social and community activities with environmental incentives is 
part of a package usually referred to as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Parts of 
the agenda in this context are for example: a town wide waste recycling campaign, a new 
compost facility, as well as a range of new social as well as environmental training pro-
grammes.237 (Cf. BSD PT 2004) The results not only feed the city’s parks with new soil 
but also the headlines of the local news: “A quality environment and a well-balanced 
social community have been created through sound and responsible development prac-
tices.”... “The new compost production plant recycles organic matter and the final prod-
uct is used to maintain the city's numerous parks and trees” (BSD PT 2006). Indeed, de-
spite the aftertaste that is created by the marketing hype there can be no doubt that these 
programmes do have a positive impact.  
Marketing media 
BSD’s marketing operates at two significant levels. It has a symbolic as well as a haptic 
side. While the first of these focuses in the media, the second is thriving on real events. A 
full spectrum of available media transports the New Town’s imaginary: A first orienta-
tion can be gained at the website; The sales office features mock-ups of the newest real 
estate products, the necessary personal contact and face-to-face communication; Detailed 
catalogues of each cluster, provide elaborate take-away product presentations; In addi-
tion, BSD’s advertisements appear in fashionable lifestyle magazines and are screened in 
aeroplanes.  
Visualisation, Emphasis on scenario generation, Image generation  
The visualisation of the products and the rendering of future imaginaries (scenarios) is a 
significant element of marketing (and design). On one hand, the mind of the contempo-
                                               
237 BSD is supposed to be the first city in Indonesia, which has implemented a garbage recycling system. (Cf. BSD PT 2006) 
Bumi Serpong Damai     144 
rary customer requires to be nourished with stylish renderings and images and, on the 
other, a new blend of marketing and design shapes new consumer imaginations along 
demand inducing strategies.238  
Yet marketing does not stop at an abstract front. The NeoTown embarks on an ex-
tensive theatrical culture. Manifold on-site events, spectacles, and temporary installations 
are staged as an integral part of the PR campaigns. Festivals play an important role in 
conveying the atmosphere of an energetic place, and in attracting the attention of chil-
dren. Essentially, the image of a permanent festival is transported by thousands of flags 
and banners on the main thoroughfares of the town. Moreover, the application of 
themed building typologies engenders a blur of the ephemeral and the real. BSD portrays 
itself as an unending festival. 
 Illustration B-44: Example of ‘modular’ villa typologies from one neighbourhood 
 Illustration B-45: Overabundance of Imaginaries represented by PR broshures 
 Illustration B-46: BSD’s PR culture of festivals and events 
Maintenance and operation 
Introduction 
Maintenance and operation, e.g. the management of the New Town, is a post that was 
not on the long-term plan of the developers. However, facing unfit local administrations 
and delayed deadlines, BSD’s managers had no choice than to bite the bullet and to run 
the project. The following section will explore the underlying causes of this development 
and examine the particular methods of running the town by the private town administra-
tion. 
Who runs and maintains the place and its parts? 
BSD is among the largest private New Town ventures in emerging countries that are 
managed and run by a single private sector entity. (cf. above: Introduction).239 At the 
start of the project, it was agreed with the government, that the developing company 
should be responsible for all management and maintenance operations during the con-
struction phase. Notably, the legal framework foresaw that the venture would become 
public after completion. Yet, this process is apparently delayed ad infinitum.  
Whereas it was planned to complete the first phase by the end of the 1990’s, 25 per-
cent of the lots remain unsold. As a consequence, BSD’s phase-I remains officially ‘under 
construction’. Indeed, neither the developer, nor the residents are interested in surrender-
ing the operational control into public hands, because it is well known that the public 
administration could not handle the job. In this context the developer had no choice than 
to embark on the business of running and maintaining the place. However, this job is 
highly unprofitable and the private Management has initialised steps to establish a pri-
vate body of governance. Therefore, it is highly probable that, in the future, resident as-
sociations, or another form of private administration, will be created to manage the daily 
business of the town.240 (Cf. below: Control) 
                                               
238 A philosophical context of general shifts and tendencies of rationalisation, abstraction, informational societies, the rele-
vance of images and surfaces has been elaborated elsewhere in the introductory chapter. 
239 When phase II and III are finished, Bumi Serpong Damai will become the largest New Town in the World in population 
terms. The largest New Town in the West is Irvine, CA. It has a population of 180.000 on 21.200 hectares and is run by the 
Irvine Company.  
240 As a matter of fact the developers of the New Town preferred a self-management solution from the very beginning. 
Santoso (1992: 37) writes on this respect that from the 8th phase of the project: “BSD should at this point establish an 
operation maintenance organisation, a kind of urban management agency, which is able to run the city without any subsi-
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The incentive is a new experimental ground of public-private community organisation 
in Indonesia (Interview with BSD PT planning staff in November 2004). If it proves to be 
a success, undoubtedly many peers and competitors will follow. (Cf. above; Population: 
Resident Associations) 
To deliver the best products possible, the BSD PT is using the same state of the art 
quality management strategies, which have been developed by military apparatuses and 
since applied by the most successful international conglomerates241 (Cf. above: Devel-
oper, Strategies, Quality standards and ISO norms)  
Challenges ahead 
Indeed, the management of the town now faces three important challenges: Firstly, the 
development of phase-I has to be consolidated and finalised (e.g. a large amount of un-
developed lots remain in the area); At the same time, the second stage of the New Town 
has to be started242; Moreover, the project needs more businesses in order to generate 
employment and thus improve self-sufficiency. Only then BSD will be able to defend its 
lead among the competing projects, which are predominantly residential.243 
                                                                                                                                         
dies from the developer. After this the developer is expected to move his development activities to the next 1000ha-
1300ha...” 
241 E.g. Edward Denning’s Toyota and Sony Corporations 
242 With 2000 hectares this stage will be even larger than the first one. The challenges ahead comprise the acquisition of 
another 50 percent of the land, as well as in the attraction of a sufficiently large customer base, facing a strong competition 
and a saturated market. 
243 Unfortunately the task of creating more jobs does not appear on the list of the developer’s goals. At BSD’s initial public 
offering in May 2008 it was declared that: About 30 percent of the capital raised was supposed to be allocated for infra-
structure facilities, another 25 percent was needed to refinance the company's IDR 600 billion bonds, 20 percent for financ-
ing the expansion of property projects, 20 percent for buying land and the remaining 5 percent for capital. (Cf. http://invest-
n-trade.blogspot.com/2008/05/bumi-seIDRong-damai-ipo-bsd-ipo.html; r.12.08.2008) 
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Summary and conclusion 
The developers of Bumi Serpong Damai are among the crucial (and most interesting) 
stakeholders. They have innovated in applying market oriented strategies and manage-
ment principles towards urban development. In this process a new typology of planned 
cities, NeoTowns developed. 
Developer 
The enterprise BSD PT is the developer of Bumi Serpong Damai. The undertaking is a 
subsidiary of the Sinar Mas conglomerate. It is a licensed company that consists of five 
major departments. Its structure has been modelled along international standards (E.g. 
ISO 9001). 
Simasred, the main real estate arm of Sinar Mas, is the major shareholder. The New 
Town enterprise was started in 1984 by a consortium of 10 large and experienced com-
panies. Since then the composition of the developers has changed repeatedly.  
The industrial conglomerate Sinar Mas is one of the biggest and most influential in-
dustrial conglomerates in Indonesia. The Widjaya family dominates the firm. The com-
pany is one of the world’s biggest paper producers and holds vast tracts of land around 
the country. It played a central part in Indonesia’s financial and real estate boom during 
Sukarno’s era. By then Eka Tjipta Widjaya, the clans’ head was briefly among the 50 
richest people in the world. Sinar Mas survived the crisis with massive help from the In-
donesian government. 
The mother company of Bumi Serpong Damai represents a ‘bewildering corporate 
pretzel palace’ that operates in a highly complex web of global financial flows, tapping 
international capital markets, raising money through bonds, convertible bonds, share 
offerings and loans. 
Simasred, the property and real estate division of Sinar Mas, is one of the leading real 
estate developers in Indonesia and the SE-Asian region with links to more than 80 inter-
national companies, and hundreds of projects around the world. Lead by Eka’s son 
Mochtar Widjaya, the company controls some of the largest land banks in the Jakarta 
Region and holds an immense amount of real estate assets in Indonesia. 
From the very inception BSD was to become an autonomous city providing for all the 
needs of the city’s population. This required the development of significant urban infra-
structure and service facilities. Likewise BSD was supposed to be a ‘social’ project steer-
ing regional growth and developing model solutions for social housing. In spite of this, 
the project has experienced diverse paradigmatic shifts over the course of the last 25 
years. Nowadays, the New Town represents an outcome of a market driven strategic 
planning process, with the motto “Big City – Big Opportunity”. The scheme is increas-
ingly founded on rules stemming from a larger (international) market driven framework 
of business processes. The developer BSD PT was one of the first companies to apply the 
ISO 9001 (2000)-quality management norm to real estate projects. 
It can be stated that Bumi Serpong Damai’s success is founded upon six strategic ele-
ments: 1) the entire land had been granted to the developer in advance; 2) a balanced 
development strategy of mixed land uses was applied; 3) BSD was developed in several 
strategic phases (time) and in incremental steps (space); 4) The necessary initial momen-
tum was achieved by attracting large pioneer populations, mainly from lower income 
sectors; 5) The project acted as a forerunner in constructing a wide range of urban infra-
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structure in a private manner; 6) And, not least, the town was organised employing state-
of-the-art corporate management mechanisms. 
Despite the exclusive land permits the process of land acquisition was, and still is, very 
slow, delicate and cumbersome. Originally, in the 1980’s, the existing landowners were 
given the option to sell, relocate, or be a part of the land consolidation schemes of the 
New Town. Since then, a large part of the resisting landowners has left, as the villages 
have been isolated in the development process. 
Naturally, the realisation of the project was more difficult than intended. The process 
of the New Town has not only disregarded the needs of local populations, it has also 
neglected the environment. Significantly, no studies on the project’s impacts on the exist-
ing environment, or the local population, have ever been undertaken. The site has been 
transformed and ‘colonised’ quite forcefully. Only recently, as part of the slow process of 
democratisation, and after the usual protests and media reports, steps have been taken 
and various mitigation programmes have been started. 
Designer 
The case of Bumi Serpong Damai demonstrates that the private sector is able to produce 
urban spaces of a high quality. The appearance of Bumi Serpong’s buildings and spaces, 
its ‘Gestalt’ was always a very important sales argument. The urban venture has its own 
planning and design department. In addition, internationally renowned offices – from 
Doxiadis, John Portman, or EDAW – were commissioned to elaborate the principal solu-
tions and guidelines or particular landmark structures. Whereas the early design princi-
ples were largely defined by the planners’ experience (supply side), the latest examples 
demonstrate a constantly rising impact of the wants of the customers (demand side).  
Nonetheless, the process of planning and design remains steered by the strong hand of 
the developer: A general master plan guides the progress of the whole town. Detailed 
neighbourhood plans regulate the spatial development within the clusters and 
neighbourhoods. Only recently was a considerable revitalisation and beautification pro-
gramme realised. 
This work portrays the design process of Bumi Serpong Damai as a process of ‘ab-
stract localisation’. The term refers to a design culture, which is reduced towards the 
systematic organisation of discrete and modular typologies and the synthetisation of the 
desired products. Notably, the approach works independent of scale. Among the various 
design disciplines, which are part of the conception and construction of the project, land-
scaping plays a noteworthy role: Landscaping works as the glue binding together the 
conglomerate of abstract typologies – as a strategic tool and quick-fix method of sym-
bolic appropriation and the symbolisation of a coherent image. Hence, it becomes the 
‘art of grounding ideal typologies’. The true potential of the discipline, however, remains 
largely underrated. Bumi Serpong Damai’s abstract design strategies tend to bypass the 
requirements of the location (climate, topography, culture, and ecology). The concrete 
complexities and uncertainties of the place are shunned.  
Marketing  
Marketing and sales are an essential part of BSD’s business oriented approach. As the 
scheme is offering an increasingly refined basket of products, as it is catering to a diversi-
fied clientele, and as it is facing increasing competition, the firms marketing is on the 
offence. Active ‘demand induction strategies’ are exploring new niche markets and dem-
onstrating the potential of the ‘products’ to inexperienced customers.  
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One of the main selling arguments is that the project is able to deliver an all-in-one 
package of “live, work and play”. In addition, the project is also marketed as an excep-
tional investment opportunity: “Big City, Big Opportunity”. Among the prominent 
trends at the interface of marketing and design is a focus on lifestyle theming. En vogue 
are ‘eco-labelling’ and ‘social responsibility’ tactics. Still, more than anything else, the 
product image is aimed to reflect a business culture of high quality standards and high 
quality products.  
Bumi Serpong’s public relation office applies a holistic range of instruments and me-
dia: from print, online, to television and broadcast. Techniques of rendering scenarios 
and product visualisation are of rising importance. However, the marketing practice also 
caters to many physical needs. Here BSD stand out for a remarkable culture of events 
and temporary installations (flags, banners, concerts, and festivals). 
Maintenance 
BSD’s developers face a multitude of challenges and are forced to develop sincere multi-
tasking capabilities. It’s most important assignments are: the realisation of the continu-
ous expansion (Phase II), the management of the ever-increasing construction site (Phase 
I), as well as the creation of additional jobs. 
Significantly, the first phase of the project is entirely operated and maintained by the 
private developer. This makes it the largest privately run New Town of a new generation. 
As long as the New Town is in the process of development, the developer is legally 
obliged to keep control of all management and maintenance operations. However, be-
cause this station is unprofitable, now strategies of establishing self-management mecha-
nisms are actively being explored. So, it is highly probable, that in the near future resi-
dent associations or a private management body will manage the town. 
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Finance –  
Liquid geographies  
Table 9: Key indicators – Bumi Serpong Damai’s financial indicators 
Supply side  
Cost of land in 1984 (plan)/ m2 2-3 US$ 
Cost of land in 1989 (groundbreaking) / 
m2 
8-12 US$ 
Cost of land in BSD phase I in 2008 / 
m2 
Up to 200 US$ 
Price of land in BSD’s environs 2008 / 
m2 
50 – 100 US$ 
Exp. cost of land in BSD phase II in 
2008 / m2 
5 US$ 
Government subsidies YES: Land permits, easy credits, back up during 
crisis periods 
Profit optimisation strategies Relative to the project stage: 80s purchase 
through middlemen, housing for low income 
starter populations, late 90s focus on luxury 
segment, 00s new financial market products, 
synergies from other subsidiaries of the mother 
firm 
Impact of FDI Only indirect through partnerships, bonds and 
stocks 
Debt to equity ratio 20 
5 years gross profit margin 35 percent 
Financial market products Convertible bonds (2003), BSD stocks (2008) 
Reinvestment of profits in development 
and maintenance of infrastructure and 
amenities 
~ 30 percent 
Demand Side  
Accessibility to mortgages in Indonesia 25 percent of the population 
Square metre price of built up space in 
BSD 
900 US$ 
Cost of a prime house in Jakarta > 200.000 US$ 
Cost of a house in BSD 14 - 200.000 US$ 
Maintenance fees paid by residents 12,5 percent of the real cost (500 IDR per m2 
per month) 
Introduction 
The following section will explore financial aspects of the development of Bumi Serpong 
Damai. Money is the central medium of market-based systems. It facilitates processes of 
material exchange by the means of abstract values. Privately developed New Towns re-
flect contemporary trends of a holistic commoditisation of space, while cities become 
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reduced to a role as financial products and investment opportunities. The New Town 
enterprise Bumi Serpong Damai appears as a forerunner in this regard.  
This section seeks to draw a financial profile of BSD and to examine the underlying 
strategies and trends. Of particular interest is the question of how private sector stake-
holders cope with the fact that New Towns are risky, long term undertakings, – an as-
pect which seems to contradict the essential dynamics of the ‘new economy’ (such as in-
creased acceleration and turnover rates). Indeed, it seems that the venture of Bumi Ser-
pong Damai was only able to survive to date, as it was nurtured by Government subsi-
dies and backed up by the parent company. However, this process does not mean that 
profits were never made. Our sketch of BSD’s financial dimensions is described from a 
demand, as well as from a supply side. 
Demand side finance 
BSD’s size of 6000-hectares and the delivery of houses as turnkey products reflect, par 
excellence, the inclination of Indonesia’s official housing strategy towards the supply-side 
and large scale all-in-one projects (cf. Hoek-Smit 2005; above: Context, Economy). 
System of ownership 
BSD is predominantly based on a system of private land ownership. The developer 
bought the land necessary for the New Town development. After the land has been up-
graded, the ‘product’ house plus land is sold to individual buyers. The developer realises 
additional profits by developing commercial buildings and by leasing big lots for sub-
developers (i.e. Premier from France). (Cf. Interview with Santoso 2008) 
Development of land costs 
The 6000-hectare area of BSD represents one of the largest urban land banks in Indone-
sia. (BSD PT 2006, Cf. above: Introduction). The developer was able to acquire about 
half of the land for a price as low as 1/20 of the price of developed land.  
When BSD was initiated in 1984 the agriculture land price was about IDR 1500 per 
square metre. This is roughly equivalent to 2-3 US$. Until the development started in 
1989 the price had risen by between 400 and 600 percent to 5 000-10 000 rupiah per 
square metre. By 2008 undeveloped areas in the environs sold for 200 000 to 500 000 
IDR per square metre, while land in BSD fetched more than 2 million IDR. This devel-
opment represents a 200-fold increase. (Cf. Interview with Santoso in August 2008) 
Prices 
BSD’s housing properties address a relatively wide spectrum of middle class families. 
House prices range from about 14.000 to 200.000 US$ and beyond. The market price of 
a square meter of built-up space for the medium income segment ranges between 600 
and 1.500 US$. The estimated average square meter price is around US$ 900. 244 The 
price is relatively low in comparison with inner city (DKIJ) locations.245 
House prices for a single family dwelling in BSD start at about US$ 14.500. The 
cheapest house type features two bedrooms, 28 square meters of space, on a 72 square 
                                               
244 The middle class segment of the population dominates the housing market in Jakarta with 70 percent. The luxury market 
covers a rather small share of 8 percent. (Cf. Colliers Int. 2004) 
245 Here, usually more than 200.000 US$ have to be invested. 
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meter lot, as well as a carport.246 This is close to the lowest amount that is applicable to 
qualifying for a housing loan (cf. below).247 
The prices are analogous to the prices of other New Towns (cf. Firman 2004: 16).248 
On the other hand they are comparably modest to central locations.249 BSD’s land prices 
are comparatively moderate. These start from 180 USD per square meter (cf. 
rumah123.com, rMay2008).250  
Affordability 
The above cost numbers indicate that one has to be among upper middle-income seg-
ments of the population to comfortably obtain a house in BSD. Indeed, the project prin-
cipally caters to 17 percent of the households in the country, which have at least one 
breadwinner in formal employment (cf. Hoek-Smit, 2005). Despite the fact that afforda-
bility levels in Indonesia are at comparatively low levels251, the houses on sale today are 
out of reach for the majority of lower-middle income, as well as lower income popula-
tions (Cf. also to Context, Economic framework).252 The Indonesian affordability thresh-
old for the lower income groups lies at 5.000 US$.253 
Access to credits 
BSD’s population represents the small share of Indonesia’s population, which is able to 
afford a suburban house in the formal market (cf. above: Population). Due to their 
higher income Bumi Serpong Damai’s residents enjoy an easier access to mortgages and 
credits on the private market. The residents of BSD benefit from the fact that Indonesia’s 
mortgage sector favours developer-built residential schemes and high-end residences (cf. 
Hoek-Smit 2005). But, as the amount of credits is limited254, even many richer residents 
have to finance themselves from savings, and if debt finance is used at all, it is in the 
form of short-term loans (ibidem). 
Taxes, charges and used fees 
The distribution of maintenance fees is a different indicator that the true party that is 
in charge of the place is the developer.  
In addition to paying public taxes, the residents of BSD are required to pay mainte-
nance fees. The developer, however, forced by the state of affairs, is currently subsidising 
a large amount of those fees: While one phase of the New Town is almost completed, the 
                                               
246 Own research at www.rumah123.com (July 2008) 
247 Firman (2004: 16) compares prices of various New Towns in the metropolitan region of Jakarta. 
248 Selling prices in Kota Wisata, for example, range from of IDR 270 million to IDR 1.780 million per unit (US$ 30.000 to 
200.000). (Cf. www.simasred.com, r12.08.2009). 
249 Central Jakarta features average prices of about US$ 2.000 per square meter, and South Jakarta US$ 12.000 (Cf. Colliers 
Int. 2007). Villas in Grogol, or Pondok Indah go for about US$ 200.000 (cf. Winarso 2005). Luxury inner city apartments in 
Central Jakarta go for 500.000 to several million US$. At the same time the cheapest house at Indonesia’s largest real estate 
broker rumah123.com goes for about USD 35.000 (Own research from 13.06.2008). 
250 In May 2008 land in a Kampong location of Western Central Jakarta (Tama Abang) was priced at 700 US$ per square 
metre. Industrial land in Bekasi, another regional centre, amounted to US$ 60, (Cf. Colliers Int.) 
251 The average cost of a house as a multiplier of annual income it at 3 to 3,6 (Hoek-Smit, 2005) 
252 Hoek-Smit (2005) estimates that only the titling costs for a moderate property amount to about IDR 1 million (US$ 
1.000). At the same time the Indonesian average annual income is lower than US$ 800. 
253 This implies that the majority of households can only afford a house below IDR 50 million (US$ 5.000). (Cf. Hoek-Smit, 
2005) 
254 Credit conditions in Indonesia privilege the 30 affluent percent of the population. This is the case because the share of 
fees and transaction costs rises disproportionally with lower amounts. In addition, apart from BTN (The National Housing 
Bank), there are no private sector lenders who serve the market for mortgages below IDR 100 million (US$ 12.000). At the 
other end of the spectrum the current maximum income level qualifying for a government subsidy is IDR 1.5 million (of 
monthly household income) and a maximum house-price of IDR 42 million (4200 US$). Consequently there is a gap in 
obtaining affordable credits for houses costing between 4.200 and 12.000 US$. This dynamic makes it impracticable for 
poorer borrowers to operate with loans and at the same time lenders to move downward the market. (Cf. Hoek-Smit, 2005) 
Bumi Serpong Damai     152 
next phase is in an advanced planning stage. Time is not ready for a public takeover, 
another 25 percent of phase one are waiting for an owner, and harsh competition from 
other projects draws away many potential buyers. Hence, the management decided to 
subsidise parts of the maintenance costs to attract further buyers and to keep living for 
the existing ones attractive.255 Nowadays, the residents are charged 500 IDR per square 
meter per month. It is estimated, however, that this amounts to only 12,5 percent of the 
real cost.256 Similar fees in other New Towns range from IDR 1000 to 2000.257 
Supply side finance 
Profits 
The observation that developing and running a New Town is a cumbersome and risky 
business does not mean that profits were never made. 
Indeed, the greatest profits in developing Bumi Serpong Damai (and other New 
Towns in the region) have been realised at the beginning of the process, between land 
acquisition and housing sale (Cf. Dercon 2004, see graph above). During that period a 
ten to twenty fold increase in land prices could be realised. The developers’ exclusive 
rights on the land facilitated windfall profits. These were further augmented as middle-
men bought the land at prices close to rural levels. (Cf. above Developer: Strategy) Cheap 
credits obtained from the government did the rest to shed the developers of financial 
risks at groundbreaking (Cf. above and Hoek-Smit 2005). In our time, profit margins are 
optimised as developers focus on affluent customers. 
Major lending bodies 
Bumi Serpong Damai was a part of the general real estate bubble, which was engendered 
by the deregulation and internationalisation policies of the Suharto era. The project 
thrived on the 1980’s growth and diversification of financial markets, which used in-
vestments in the housing markets at middle to high-income levels as a spatial fix 
(Dijkgraaf, 2000, form Firman 2004; cf. above: Context, National milestones). In this 
context, speculative international investments were channelled into the country and 
banks had been very liberal in their lending policies. Moreover, Bumi Serpong Damai has 
largely benefited from the fact that Sinar Mas, BSD’s mother company (cf. above), was 
highly active in the financial sector, including extensive stakes in other financial services, 
banks, and insurance companies. 
At groundbreaking, BSD’s developers profited from enormous government subsidies. 
Middle- and low-income housing developments were linked to finance subsidies at fixed 
interest rates that included both construction and mortgage finance in the package and 
were geared towards developer produced housing. Moreover, developers of middle- and 
high-income housing obtained short-term construction loans from commercial banks. 
The state housing bank, Bank Tabunga Negara (BTN) dominated this subsidised market 
and added implicit subsidies by accumulating high defaults (Cf. Hoek-Smit 2005, Wi-
narso 2005: 6). 
After the collapse of the mortgage markets in 1997/98 the developers started to diver-
sify their portfolio of products in the financial market and focused on owner equity mod-
els. The construction of New Towns became similar to the construction of other real 
                                               
255 Cf. Personal interview with BSD planning staff in 2004. 
256 See previous footnote. 
257  Extra maintenance fees at some other projects: Kota Wisata: IDR 500; Lippo Karawachi: IDR 2000; Alam Sutra: IDR 
1000; Fountain Bleu: IDR 120. (Own investigation, Nov. 2004) 
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estate (such as high rise apartment towers). Buyers were required to pre-finance a large 
proportion of the building costs (Cf. Hoek-Smit 2005). 
Security mechanisms, federal backup 
Bumi Serpong Damai was repeatedly on the edge of bankruptcy. This is indicated by the 
frequent change of the developers. In this context the government has played a decisive 
role for survival of the venture. Various security mechanisms backed up the project, as 
well as the holding company during crisis periods. BSD’s parent company Sinar Mas has 
survived the Indonesian financial crisis only on the base of heavy government interven-
tion (Cf. above section on the developers). The government was motivated to come to the 
rescue, because Bumi Serpong Damai was regarded as a lighthouse project –the national 
model of New Town Development. Among the most important public support mecha-
nisms were the above mentioned land permits, as well as several indirect subsidies (such 
as facilitated access to credits. Unquestionably strong personal relations among high-
ranking government elites and private sector representatives were also very helpful.258)  
Extra revenues 
Pangestu (1998) cites the following sources of additional funding for the developers: 
Funding from the local government (APBD); funding from the central government 
(APBN); loan funding; local government obligations; cooperation with private sectors or 
third parties; betterment levies; and development impact fees. 
The products 
The developers of Bumi Serpong Damai see the city as an economic venture. Yet, it is 
important to note that the undertaking does not remain focused on a specific product, 
such as housing. Instead it emphasises the entire processes of producing lifestyle envi-
ronments. In this context, the actual products vary in relation to strategic orientations 
and market demands.259 When, for example, after the 1997 crisis, money sources ran dry, 
the developer was forced to innovate new ways of raising the necessary finances. While 
housing sales provided increasingly lower margins over the past years, the company 
started to expand the product range to rentals, services and the development of commer-
cial property. 260 261In addition, a spectrum of financial products was added to the prod-
uct portfolio.  
Some of the products are developed in joint ventures with partners from the public, as 
well as from the private sectors. An example for this strategy is the Jakarta-Serpong toll 
road (cf. above: Developer: Implementation) or several housing clusters in collaboration 
with external partners.262  
                                               
258 Members of ruling families invested in the real estate sector, and controlled major infrastructure companies (cf. above 
Developer’s profile). 
259 This is a crucial difference to a public planning approach, as it was handled in the past. 
260 In the first quarter of 2004 BSD PT recorded a sales backlog of IDR 597.6 billion (US$ 64 million). While commercial 
property was deemed to contribute with 52.6 percent to this amount, the share of housing was 43.9 percent. (Cf. PER-
FINDO 2004) 
261 One of the examples for the commercial focus of BSD is the International Trading Centre (ITC) that was launched in the 
fourth quarter of 2003. It was expected that such commercial areas would have positive impacts on the demand of ‘landed 
residential properties’ in the vicinity. (Cf. PERFINDO 2004). 
262 The French developers of ‘Premier, Les Nouveaux Constructeurs’ have implemented Taman Provence and Fontainebleau 
Golf Residence at Bumi Serpong Damai. (Cf. http://www.premier-indonesia.co.id, August 2008) 
Bumi Serpong Damai     154 
The diversification of BSD PT’s products does not end at real estate properties. The 
Indonesian New Town venture offers an increasing range of products on financial mar-
kets. The most important of these are convertible bonds and stocks.263 
The company is widely praised to be a good investment and for its sound financial 
structure. Its debt was estimated at a sound 20 percent of its equities (Cf. PERFINDO 
2004), while many of the company’s peers are struggling with increased debt to equity 
ratios of 0,8 to 1,5. The company’s 5-year average gross profit margin amounted to 36.5 
percent.264 This robust financial performance also resulted in a massive conversion of 
BSD convertible bonds into equity with a capacity of IDR 505.3 billion (US$ 60 Mio) in 
2000 (PERFINDO 2004). The first public BSD PT bonds were offered by the year 2003. 
These five-year bonds intended to raise IDR 250 billion. (Cf. BSD 2006)  
While earlier on bonds were significant, today stocks become more important. Bumi 
Serpong Damai PT went public in June 5th 2008, since that time every person can be a 
New Town entrepreneur. The Initial Public Offering (IPO) of BSD’ shares “JAK:BSDE” 
was expected to raise around IDR 872 billion (US$ 94.42 million).265 The total capital 
generated amounted to IDR 2 trillion (USD 217 Million). A team of banks partially re-
lated to the BSD parent company Sinar Mas underwrote the issuance of the shares: PT 
Sinar Mas Sekuritas, PT CLSA INDONESIA and PT Nusadana Capital. 
 Illustration B-47: Stock quote of JAK: BSDE 
Synergies with the mother company 
BSD PTs operations are facilitated by synergies with the various subsidiaries of Sinar 
Mas. Its recent strategies to develop themed neighbourhoods, for example, were first 
developed in the smaller residential clusters of Kota Wisata and Kota Legenda.266 An-
other enterprise, which is part of Sinar Mas, the PT Duta Pertiwi Terbuka, has developed 
a portfolio around shop houses. Duta Pertiwi was also the first firm in Indonesia to sub-
divide retail projects among multiple owners. This strategy of ‘strata title sales’ was exer-
cised with the launch of Mangga Dua International Trade Centre (ITC Mangga Dua) in 
1989.267 Finally Simasred has an extensive experience with the financial dimension of real 
estate (Cf. above: Developers): Successful examples in this context are the stocks, op-
tions, and bonds of PT Duta Pertiwi Terbukan (DUTI.JAK). 
Infrastructure finance 
Exceptional infrastructure facilities are among the distinctive features and competitive 
advantages of Bumi Serpong Damai, as compared to many of its competitors. BSD’s de-
velopers thrive on the advantage of scale by reinvesting a significant share of profits to 
finance the town’s infrastructure. 
Usually the government has to provide all primary and secondary utilities, whereas 
tertiary utilities and related infrastructure are the responsibility of the community (Pang-
                                               
263 Indeed, a Google-search of ‘Bumi Serpong Damai’ in July 2008 resulted in a listing of the company’s share information 
above the information on the actual project. 
264 Competing companies have earned about 46.0 percent in the same time. 
265 Cf. Jakarta Post, Business Section, from May 10th, 2008. 
266 These are residential enclaves became well known using exceptional theming strategies. While Kota Wisata focuses on 
international lifestyle themes mainly from the West, such as Japan, Holland, France, and Germany, Kota Legenda offers a 
lifestyle that is oriented along the motifs of ancient civilisations, such as Egypt, Greece, or the Roman Empire. 
267 Duta Pertiwi was also pioneering some mixed-use superblock developments in successfully combining condominium, 
retail space and offices. (Cf. www.simasred.com, August 2008) 
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estu 1998).268 In BSD the developers have done a major part of this job: The developer 
implemented a large part of the local, urban, and of some regional-scale infrastructure. 
Accordingly the infrastructure investments make up a large percentage of the total ex-
penditures. Pangestu (1998) estimates that usually 30 to 40 percent of the total revenues 
are reinvested to develop and maintain new facilities. As the systems eventually become 
part of public networks and regional structures, they are of significant benefit for the 
greater public.269  
Summary 
The above observations confirm that building New Towns remains a risky business, not 
just operationally but also financially. Despite the fact that many parties largely profited 
from the undertaking, BSD was only able to survive the last 25 years financially due to 
enormous back up from the government, its own mother company Sinar Mas, and due to 
the general resilience and flexibility of its strategy. 
Undoubtedly, the New Town venture got a head start from the very beginning. The 
developers managed to secure the biggest land banks in Indonesia as well as enormous 
amounts of other subsidies (e.g. subsidised loans). Enormous profits were made during 
the initial phase of land development when the greatest gains from land speculation 
could be achieved. 
Strategically the continuous investment in infrastructure was among the most decisive 
factors of success. The developers constantly reinvested 30 – 40 percent of the profits in 
infrastructure development. 
With the monetary crisis of 1997 as well as an increasing democratisation the initial 
phase of windfall profits and high governmental subsidies ceased. The management 
adapted a new strategy of catering to the affluent middle-income segments of the popula-
tion. In this context pre-financing by the demand side, and international investments 
became important. (BSD started to issue bonds in 2000. The company went public in 
June 2008.) 
  
                                               
268 Budget allocation for financing the construction of basic infrastructure is usually undertaken by the local government, 
through the Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Programme (IUIDP). Funds from the government are limited to 
several components, i.e., water supply, solid waste, waste water, flood management, drainage, "Kampong" improvement, 
urban roads, and other supporting components such as technical assistance, advice, and supervision. (Cf. Pangestu 1998) 
269 A report on the investment of the capital raised at BSD’s IPO in 2008 estimates the share of infrastructure investments at 
30 percent (Cf. http://invest-n-trade.blogspot.com/2008/05/bumi-seIDRong-damai-ipo-bsd-ipo.html, r01.06.2008) 
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Control –  
Double standards 
 
Table 10: Key indicators – Bumi Serpong Damai’s regulatory framework 
Stakeholders  
PPPs, Joint ventures YES (schools, police, toll road construction etc) 
District South Tangerang 
Underlying power relations Government & corporate elites + local laissez faire 
environment 
Major stakeholder Developer 
Government approach during start of 
the project 
Centralist, liberal, stipulating New Town develop-
ment 
Major milestone, change of paradigm 1997/98 crisis (decentralisation, democratisation) 
Official goals of the government BSD as a showcase of urban, regional and social de-
velopment  
Impact international lending institu-
tions’ 
YES 
Regulations  
Official town status NO 
Social goals YES (balanced 1:3:6 housing strategy) 
Master plan at start NO (RUTRP, RUTRK, only implemented in retros-
pect) 
Global regulatory framework ‘Ijin Lokasi’ (exclusive development permits) 
Local regulatory framework NO (‘laissez faire’) 
Conflicts with the status of public 
spaces 
YES 
Introduction 
After we have delineated a) the general setting, b) the morphology and physiognomy, c) 
the profile and motives of the residents, and d) the contours and considerations of the 
developers and planners, e) the main features of the financial framework, the following 
sub-chapter f) focuses on the regulatory environment behind Bumi Serpong Damai. The 
role of the locally specific codes and regulation and stakeholder relations will be scruti-
nised in particular. The observations point to the fact that no project is possible without 
a distinctive formal setting – not even one built on the principles of liberal markets. 
Regulations – like spaces – are products, which are conceived and implemented by 
disparate stakeholders at various scales – from local to regional, to national, to global. 
Consequently this subchapter is also going to inquire on the role of the respective stake-
holders (and stakeholder-groups), the forms of internal and external governance and 
political control, the character of rules (e.g. formal planning instruments) and their im-
plementation, as well as the relevance of various administrative scales (local, regional, 
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national, global). Of particular importance is the question concerning whether the dis-
crete constellation of public, private, and civil interests in regard to BSD has produced 
novel forms of governance. The section concludes in drawing some ‘lessons’ and wider 
implications. 
Stakeholders 
Who owns the place? – Double standards 
The legal framework of Bumi Serpong Damai is relatively ambiguous. The project em-
bodies an ambiguous standard of ownership: While formally the town scheme is a public 
entity, it is actually under private control. The local government of South-Tangerang has 
the legal responsibility of maintaining law and order and providing the basic services for 
Bumi Serpong Damai. Yet, in practice, the private management office operates and con-
trols the place (Pangestu 1997, Gotsch 2004).270 This legal ambiguity is also reflected by 
the fact that public access to the space’s residential clusters is restricted. 
Legitimately BSD is supposed be transferred back in to public hands once com-
pleted.271 A tendency exists, however, to delay this transfer ad infinitum (Pangestu 1998). 
Therefore, it is realistic to assume that the future of BSD’s governance lies in the hands of 
a private town management, or resident associations or something in between. Indeed, 
the private management and the property-owners share a natural interest to protect the 
area. 
The picture becomes even more complex, as the town is not a homogeneous political 
entity. The different phases are part of different administrative districts. This results in a 
fragmented political geography. Indeed, the area that has just reached the mark of 
100.000 residents does not have any official town status. BSD is part of the regency of 
South Tangerang. The first phase of the project is located within the sub district (Kece-
matan) of Serpong. Phases two and three will belong to the subdistricts of Legok, Cisauk 
and Pagedangan.272 Consequently BSD does not have its own mayor, an individual city 
government, or an official planning body.273  
Yet, on the other hand the local administration lacks the necessary manpower, the ex-
pertise, and the essential technical means to provide proper planning and administration. 
For this reason the developer keeps operating and maintaining the place. (Cf. Above: 
Residents, Associations; Developer, Implementation).   
Indeed, in addition on its location on a ‘presumed’ Greenfield site, BSD was developed 
on a legal and administrational tabula rasa. The project was without precedents of pri-
vate real estate of this size and organisational complexity in Indonesia. Whereas the pub-
lic hand was pushing for a fast track to privatisation (cf. above: Context), at all times it 
lacked the means to control and mitigate the effects of the programmes and projects. 
Accordingly, to date, the developers are always on the acting side, while the government; 
if federal or local, always react. The town was incorporated into the district master plan 
                                               
270 On the list of current tasks of the private management office are jobs such as: land acquisition, cultural initiatives, envi-
ronmental programmes (e.g. garbage), fees and taxes, cooperation with the government, and urban planning (Gotsch 
2004). 
271 For example, all clean water provisions built by BSD will be transferred to the local government (Pangestu 1998). 
272 Despite the enormous urban character, the area was regarded as a Kabupaten (principally a rural area) until October 
2008. Thereafter it became part of the municipality (Kota) of South Tangerang (Tangerang Selatan), which was spilt up from 
Tangerang in 2008 (http://wapedia.mobi/id/Kota_Tangerang_Selatan, cf. 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/01/15/tangerang-close-forming-new-city.html., r21.06.2009). 
273 This is also a stark contrast from the master plan at the time of foundation, which intended to install Serpong and BSD as 
a new regional anchor in the mid 1980s. (Cf. Personal interview with Santoso in August 2008) 
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of Tangerang (RUTRP), only after implementation had started.274 The developers were 
neither asked to provide any environmental or social impact studies, nor to develop miti-
gation projects (cf. above),275  
Role of national, regional, local governments 
Bumi Serpong Damai emerged in a setting of semi-legality and political ‘distortion’. The 
New Town enterprise has not only thrived in a neutral ‘tabula rasa’ environment (legally 
and physically, cf. above), but bended and irregular cultures of politics played a major 
role as well.276 Linkages of high-ranking officials and business elites nurtured the project 
from this perspective. Furthermore, underprivileged local governments have nurtured a 
laissez faire atmosphere.277 As a result, the developer enjoyed exceptional competitive 
advantages. The Bumi Serpong Damai’s neo-urbanism therefore developed on a highly 
contested, semi-legal political terrain. 
National Governments 
Jakarta’s New Towns and private settlements would not exist without the Government’s 
authority. From the early 1980s, Indonesia’s administration was very active in promoting 
the growth of New Towns and in discouraging other ways of expansion (Cf.: Above, 
context).278 We have seen above that the federal government has played a decisive role in 
the process of obtaining the site. Sukarno’s liberalisation programmes, in particular, have 
promoted the privatisation of urban development. His government has devised land-
purchasing programmes geared to large developers in order to propel the development of 
housing and infrastructure. While a handful of developers were granted exclusive rights 
to obtain the necessary land279, the government actively discouraged the sale of private 
plots on a small scale.280 The National Land Agency (BPN), for example, has not allowed 
the sale of private plots for a long time (until early 2000s) with the argument of repelling 
land speculation.281 
Box 7: Role of international organisations 
In addition to the fact that BSD was regarded as a model project of urban development 
on a national scale and that its outcome was strongly moulded by the particular inter-
ests of power elites, the policies and programmes of The World Bank, the Asian Devel-
opment Bank and the IMF have played an indirect, yet decisive role: Suharto’s Govern-
ment was compelled to adapt to the standards and rationales of these international 
development institutions.  
                                               
274 The same consultants that have worked for BSDs developers prepared the public plan. (Cf. above) 
275 Requirements existed to provide a sufficient amount of low income housing along the ‘1:3:6 schemes’. (Cf. above) 
276  These practices may be classified as corruption from a Western perspective. (Indonesia’s corruption Index is one of the 
highest in the World. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for the country ranges is at the level of 
2,3 of a 1-10 scale. (Cf. above: Context, culture) 
277 It is evident that local Governments, badly equipped, understaffed and poorly paid, prefer to welcome additional re-
sources and keep their eyes closed on many irregular activities. 
278 Nevertheless, in detail, the developers were left alone to develop the site. Indonesia, to date, is lacking standards for the 
installation of New Towns. Therefore, the developers came up with their own rationales (Cf. Pangestu 1997). 
279 The land permits issued in the late 1980s were able to accommodate the housing supply until the year 2018 (cf. above). 
280 The federal Land Development agency has granted exclusive rights to buy all the necessary land to the developer. The 
land development permit (‘Ijin Lokasi’) implied that others were not allowed to purchase and develop land within the area 
unless they obtain the holder’s formal consent (cf. Firman, 1997). 
281 Another element of the strategy to discourage small-scale urbanisation was exuberant transaction and titling costs. Hoek-
Smit  (2005) estimates the titling costs for a moderate property at approximately IDR 1 million (US$ 1000). While the coun-
tries average annual income is lower than US$ 800. (Cf. Above) 
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BSD was set up as a joint showcase and experimental field for housing production and 
urban regional decentralisation.282 In this context, the regulatory setting of the project 
was accommodated to the rationales and guidelines of the international institutions. In 
return, the tap of international credits, infrastructure funds as well as development 
funds for model projects was opened. The developers benefited from exclusive land 
permits, subsidised and secured access to money markets and also direct infrastructure 
funds. (Cf. Above: Context, economy) 
Regional Governments 
The development of the Capital region of Jakarta is either driven by top-down strategies 
of the national government, or by the bottom-up dynamics of local stakeholders. Re-
gional politics tend to be overruled by federal decisions. It is illustrative in this context 
that Sukarno’s personal promotion of Bumi Serpong Damai as a national model was 
opposed by Jakarta’s governor Sadikin.283 An additional indication of the low impact of 
the regional level is the fact that an integrated regional plan for the area did not exist (Cf. 
Pangestu 1997, C.f. Above) 
Local governments 
Opposed to the regional government level, local governments played a decisive role in 
respect to the quantity and quality of New Towns and privately developed settlements in 
their area. The district of Tangerang, which comprised Bumi Serpong Damai in the 
1980s, has one of the highest densities of New Tows and Gated Communities in the re-
gion. About a fifth to a quarter of its area is in the hands of private developers.284  
Indeed, the opportunistic interests of local governments contributed to the fact that an 
oversaturated and predatory market of New Towns emerged. While local governments 
were unable to cope with the legal and managerial aspects of the newly emerging 
schemes285, they highly welcomed the new projects as cash cows, without imposing seri-
ous limitations. Any new settlements were a highly welcome source of economic devel-
opment and tax revenue. The developers brought in new services, infrastructure facilities, 
and jobs, and the new middle class residents highly welcomed tax revenues. In contrast, 
questions of a greater regional sustainability (social, environmental, economic) were not 
examined.  
Regulation 
Introduction 
In spite of the liberal context described above, the framework of rules and codes plays an 
essential role for the implementation and realisation of Bumi Serpong Damai. The fol-
lowing section examines the impact of the framework on public codes and planning regu-
lations on our New Town project. While the general planning framework is presented 
above, this part will only accentuate the essential ingredients (Cf.: Context, Planning 
framework).  
                                               
282 A New Town Conference, organised by The World Bank in Jakarta, has contributed to an environment of easy credits for 
large real estate companies and has laid the foundations of many of the large real estate ventures such as Bumi Serpong 
Damai. (Cf. Interview with planning staff in November 2004 
283 When in the early seventies a consortium of developers around Sinar Mas sought to develop BSD the president approved 
the project is person, against the vote of Jakarta’s Governor (Cf. Personal interview with planning staff, 2004). 
284 Cf. Interview in the Tangerang District Planning Office, October 2007 
285 Pangestu 1998 refers to the lack of management abilities in most of the local government offices. Firman (2004: 10) 
confirms that: “the capacity of the local government to manage and implement a spatial plan (‘Rencana Tata Ruang’), 
particularly for monitoring and controlling land conversion, has been notoriously inadequate.” 
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Role of master plans and other regulations 
BSD develops in a context of Jakarta as a special capital district, which was intended to 
become the precursor of modernisation for the entire nation. The spatial development 
plans for the region, Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plans (JMPD), have a tradi-
tion of promoting westernised strategies of debundled concentration and highway devel-
opment to be realised by the private sector.   
BSD developed on the basis of the Structure Plan for the Special Capital Province of 
Jakarta 1985 to 2005, the RUTRD (Jakarta Rencana Umum Tata Daerah). The master 
plan of BSD was approved by the department of planning and regional development of 
the district of Tangerang and was incorporated into the master plan of Tangerang Re-
gency (RUTRP Rencana Umum Tata Ruang Pekotaan). The detailed land use plan for 
the BSD was the RUTRK (Rencana Umum Tata Ruang Kota), which is a derivative of 
the scheme.286  
The RUTRD designated the municipality of Serpong as a regional growth centre with 
about 14.000 hectares as one of the growth centres of the Jakarta region. In addition to 
the model project, BSD foresaw an installation of a new research centre for technology 
and science (PUSPITEK) a new branch of the University of Indonesia (ITI), as well as the 
remodelling of the existing core city of Serpong. (Cf. Santoso 1992:36).  
Despite the fact that Indonesia has one of the most elaborate urban planning systems 
worldwide, the real situation looks more desolate. While spatial planning documents for 
the region exist at various details and scales they are rarely implemented. The above-
mentioned documents preserve an idealistic status. Their legal enforcement remained a 
problem. Significantly, Bumi Serpong’s land use plan was incorporated into the regional 
master plan documents only in retrospect.  
Indeed, in BSD’s case the impact of government regulations and subsidies in the form 
of ‘market enabling strategies’ was more crucial. In particular, exclusive land permits and 
credit subsidies have unfolded the dynamic of Jakarta’s New Town boom of the late 
1980s and played a crucial role in BSD’s implementation. (Cf. above: Context) 
Summary regulation 
The above chapter demonstrates that the political setting of the Sukarno era has been a 
decisive factor for the development of Bumi Serpong Damai. The New Town exists is an 
ambiguous situation of double standards: The urbanised area of more than 100.000 resi-
dents was a rural entity for a long time. Moreover, the scheme features a fragmented 
political geography. Its various parts belong to four different local administrations. On 
the other hand, the developer operates and maintains the place (what makes it the largest 
private New Town in the developing world).  
Bumi Serpong Damai has been realised on a legal and administrational tabula rasa. 
An integrated spatial plan for the area did not exist. While the public site was pushing 
for a fast track to privatisation (cf. above Sukarno’s reforms) it has lacked the means to 
control and mitigate the effects of the programmes and projects. Significantly, no proof 
was required for the environmental or social compatibility of the project. The project 
was only incorporated in the master planning and strategic documents later. 
The development of BSD was driven by a combination of top-down strategies of the 
national government, or by the bottom-up dynamic of local stakeholders. Yet, the 
amount of direct public intervention from all scales remains relatively low. While the 
                                               
286 The system of Indonesian spatial planning is described by Löffler, Ulrich 1996: Land Tenure Developments in Indonesia; 
Göttingen; (at http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib/00-0582.pdf, r03.09.2009) 
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developers take an active part, the public remains rather passive. The project is a testing 
ground for public-private community organisations in Indonesia. The future of BSD’s 
governance lies in the hands of a private town management body, a resident association 
or something in between.  
In conclusion it can be said that the New Town of Bumi Serpong Damai is thriving in 
a regulational context of pragmatism, flexibility, and adaptability (a spirit close to in-
formality). As long as daily business is thriving, the official questions, for example 
whether the streets in the clusters are private or public, remain secondary. 
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Preliminary conclusion –  
Summary, Lessons, Appraisal 
Brief Summary 
The above chapter described the privately developed New Town Bumi Serpong Damai 
(BSD). This was done to generate a comprehensive information package on the case. The 
elaboration intended lifting the knowledge on this project-case to new levels, thus prepar-
ing the ground for the comparative work in progress. The scheme was described from six 
viewpoints, as set out in the initial chapter of this thesis.  
The elaborated data supports the assumption that Bumi Serpong Damai represents a 
new typology of New Towns, a Neo Town287: Evidently the project was conceived as an 
enterprise. It reflects a clear market-orientated approach to planning and development, 
carrying much of the spirit of contemporary market economies. BSD’s developers inno-
vated transferring this distinct business ‘culture’ and operational modes, breeding innova-
tions beyond the capabilities of the public sector. Yet, while the project also represents a 
grounding of highly abstract principles and typologies, the implementation of the Bumi 
Serpong Damai, was, and is, not without problems and contradictions: The project has 
disregarded important aspects of the local environment. Moreover, place has been trans-
formed as if it were a neutral 'tabula rasa'. 
Lessons 
Unexpected outcomes 
The experience of BSD demonstrates that the completion of a New Town usually takes 
much longer than expected. The long-term process contains many incalculable elements: 
Certainly the planners did not foresee that the New Town would remain dotted by nu-
merous on-site villages and scores of undeveloped lots. 
Problems 
The delayed provision of regional transport infrastructure (e.g. the Jakarta-Serpong toll 
road, or the one-track railway) triggered a chain of problems, e.g. delaying the creation 
of jobs. BSD’s progress was also slowed by the unresolved task of acquiring the remain-
ing land for phase II. On the other hand, the environment and the local populations suf-
fer from negative externalities, neglect and forced isolation, the residents lack public fa-
cilities and pedestrian networks, while generally a house in the New Town remains af-
fordable for only few. 
Innovations 
Still, Bumi Serpong Damai also represents several success stories: The town is the most 
populous contemporary New Town in the hands of a private developer worldwide; 
about 30.000 structures have been completed, the region has gained a vast amount of 
state-of-the-art facilities.  
                                               
287 Cf. the criteria as defined in the introduction. 
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The framework of high competition, as well as the sheer scale of the project (a failure 
would be a disaster of regional/ international dimensions) compelled the developers and 
planners towards constant innovation. These chose the strategy to construct the town in 
an incremental manner and along the demands of the target populations, and did not 
forget to balance the development in providing infrastructure, services and amenities. (It 
can be presumed that no public agency would have been flexible and innovative enough 
to master all the difficulties and problems of the last 25 years.)  
Trends 
Neither a problem, nor an innovation, but an important trend to be observed is the fact 
that the project has not acted as a regional counter magnet. In contrast, it has attracted 
other, similar projects, triggering more suburbanisation and sprawl.  
Another notable tendency at the town level is the scheme’s pattern of hierarchical 
clustering. Antithetic to the open principles of modern enlightened city planning (and 
unsettling traditional architect and planners), the NeoTown is characterised by an in-
creasing privatisation of spaces and a fragmentation of the urban tissue. Remarkably, 
this trend leads to the emergence of a quasi-organic morphology. 
Indeed, Bumi Serpong Damai is an exemplary showcase of a city as an enterprise. The 
market based environment, with money as its main medium, features lifestyles and in-
vestments as the main commodities, while objects such as neighbourhoods and villas 
become flexible and adaptable instruments. Produced and conceived by the ultra rational 
spirit of the new economy, the built structures tend to resemble mass customised com-
modities. Significantly, housing types are developed as core products along the newest 
corporate standards and facades are individually adjusted to the actual consumer needs. 
Intermediate assessment 
A series of wider, more general implications arise from the issues discussed in the previ-
ous chapter. Conceived in the manner of a classical Neo Town, Bumi Serpong Damai 
represents a Greenfield experiment of neo-urbanism. The case of BSD illustrates how, in 
the context of Indonesia’s liberal market economy (and policy), a specific kind of urban-
ism is unfolding.288 The above case study may also serve as an illustration for the fact 
that neo-liberal economies have taken another important step. In a quest for diversifica-
tion and new markets, they have increasingly conquered a new domain: urban space.289  
Contemporary urban space is increasingly subject to the dynamics and the structural 
logic of a new economical and technological framework (new economy). In the process 
of rising commoditisation, spatial environments become an integral part of production 
and consumption systems. This process happens in a twofold sense: In a global horizon-
tal sense from centre to periphery (an increasing amount of localities is incorporated into 
globalised systems of production and consumption), and in a local (vertical) sense an ever 
wider range of objects become commoditised – from urban regional systems, the human 
body, to the soft spheres of knowledge and culture. The new economy, with its ideologi-
cal, its technological, and its economical means, ultimately succeeds in producing space 
with all of its aspects. And vice versa, urban spaces, cities and lifestyles become the ulti-
                                               
288 Importantly, it became evident above that, neo-liberal frameworks as well as regulatory frameworks play a decisive and 
crucial role. E.g.: Sukarno’s government has been decisive in setting out an enabling framework and actively supporting 
certain stakeholder groups. 
289 Indeed, new economies apparently add a new dimension to the tendency of spatial commoditisation, which was de-
scribed by Lefebvre (1974). (Cf. above: Introduction) 
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mate goods and commodities. (Space is produced at all scales, and at the same time it 
becomes the ultimate product.)  
Neo-urbanism reflects the unbounded dynamic and structural logic of market players. 
The term has been coined to describe this process and related urban typologies, produced 
in a neo economic framework (Cf. Ch.1., Hackworth, Harvey...).  
The above trends become visible most clearly in the localities where the forces and 
dynamics of neo urbanism are grounded in the most direct and unobstructed manner.290  
Neo-urbanism (the spatial materialisation’s of the new economy) in developing coun-
tries is different from the neo urbanism of the West. In particular, in some developing 
countries and emerging economies, situations emerge where regulatory voids meet unob-
structed market dynamics and then these dynamics unfold in a specific way. In this re-
spect, post postcolonial Indonesia offers a particularly good case.  
The New Towns currently emerging in the peripheries of dynamically growing mega 
city regions represent unique archetypes of privately developed cities cast from the same 
mould. Consequently, this work suggests coining the new generation of New Towns in 
the above context of the new economy of Neo Towns. 
These Neo Towns, such as Bumi Serpong Damai, represent the material crystallisation 
of post-industrial economies and cultures in a most direct manner. It remains open, 
whether these trends may become significant beyond the boundaries of the global periph-
ery of developing and emerging economies. The may come to include the Western sphere. 
BSD represents several of these neo-urban trends in an exemplary way.291 These are il-
lustrated in the list below. 
Firstly, NeoTowns represent trends of a general commoditisation and rationalised 
production. Their components tend to correspond with ‘conventional’ products and re-
flect the logic and dynamics of markets. The production of houses increasingly resembles 
other products, such as automobiles, or toothbrushes. Instead of bringing to the fore the 
rationality of centralised bureaucratic systems, and the minds of ingenious planner-
architects, NeoTowns represent the highly rationalised and standardised production sys-
tems of new economies. 
Secondly, it is not just a house; it is the community, and the lifestyle that are increas-
ingly important. In NeoTowns such as Bumi Serpong Damai developers have taken on 
this approach. They have innovated by putting urban lifestyles, as customised mass 
products, on the shelf. 292 
Thirdly, following a trend of increasing abstraction and virtualisation (as well the 
socio economic tendency from use values to exchange values) the actual product of the 
Neo Towns is reduced to the image. This observation is illustrated by: 1) the fact that 
marketing and media become decisive elements of entrepreneurial success; 2) the building 
surface, the facade, increasingly serves as an independent representational medium, more 
or less detached from the functional organisation of the interior organisation; 3) the in-
creased focus on representation in the communal spaces that brings along a spread of 
symbolic and iconic gestures. (BSD’s Gates, Clubhouses, monuments and statues symbol-
ise a detached and placeless iconography from the world travel brochures and global 
                                               
290  As opposed to more traditional urban environments such as historical cities, where many layers of history are usually 
superimposed onto each other. 
291 NeoTown developers have, unconsciously or not, innovated by combining several previously existing strategies: The 
Garden Cities/ New Town movement had merged urban and natural landscapes in a specific way. American suburbanisation 
programmes (e.g. Levitt) had optimised the house as a mass product. Historicism, Coral Gables, Disney, as well as the global 
travel industry, have related the life style approach to human environments. Nike and its peers cultivated branding strategies 
for urban spaces – to name a few only (cf. Chapter 1). 
292 Life styles are even pro-actively composed. (Cf. section marketing) 
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media). Accordingly, the NeoTown builders adapt state of the art strategies from the 
world of consumer products. Two of these tactics are referred to as symbol inflation and 
gold-plating.293  
Fourthly and fifthly NeoTowns have a Janus-faced ideology, while they are symbolic 
representations of individual dreams, at the same time they represent a strong belief in 
the supremacy of the market. Indeed, this ideological moment is different from the social 
(reform oriented) ideals of the previous Garden City and New Town movements. The 
‘fantastic’ appearance of the resultant typologies points to the fact that NeoTowns draw 
on an implicit world of individual dreams, fantasies and potentialities. Built on the stan-
dardised mental imaginary of contemporary individuals, they correspond to a bottom-up 
imaginary of individual consumers / buyers/ shareholders. Yet, this individuality is 
bounded to the choice of variations of the same product.294 The second part of the ideo-
logical moment of NeoTowns is the belief in the supremacy of market.  Here older ideals 
of socio spatial reform ideals have been abandoned in favour of newer convictions in the 
omnipotence of the liberalised market. 
  
                                               
293 Cf. Baudrillard 1976, Jameson 1984, Sennett 2006 
294 On mass customisation in a post-modern mass consumer society: Cf. Sloterdijk, Appadurai, Beck, Sennett et al). 
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Introduction –  
The supersized New Town version 
“Navi Mumbai ...is the largest planned new city in the world“ (Wikipedia) 
“...where a man could breath, and his family could play in the park and the 
schools opened their doors and welcomed his children.” (Times of India: 
2005) 
 
“Fortunately this place was nothing like we imagined it to be. Far from being 
a slice of America, it had India written all over it.”1  
 
”This is the first time we are building a city. So there are problems at every 
step. Every step is a learning process. The next city we build will not have so 
many problems.”2  
 
 
Covering 34.400 hectares Navi Mumbai is the largest of the cases discussed in the study 
and one of the largest New Town schemes worldwide. Indeed, the parallel city is almost 
the same size as the Mumbai peninsula. It is located on the mainland across the Thane 
creek to the East of the mother city. It is composed of a string of 15 interconnected 
nodes. Its infrastructure and public facilities are far beyond the standards of other places 
on the subcontinent. 
The city is also the oldest of the cases discussed in this thesis. The concept of extend-
ing Mumbai to the mainland has been around at least since Word War II. It materialised 
into a concrete plan after a group of three young architects and planners (Charles 
Correa, Pravina Mehta, and Shirish Patel) drew up and published their vision of the new 
city in 1965. The idea was successful and was taken up by the state government. An in-
dependent state run corporation was initiated to develop the New Town. The name of 
the corporation was Cidco, the City and Industrial Development Corporation of Ma-
harashtra. Cidco was an experiment that combined the security of a public agency with 
the efficiency of a private venture. The non-profit company drew up a development plan 
and started the project in 1974. The state government lent the necessary start-up capital. 
The development of the city was to be achieved in a phased manner using a revolving 
fund principle. The new city was divided into 20 nodes. Extra from the sale of a portion 
of the land, at market prices, was redistributed towards the development of the consecu-
tive phases and as a subsidy for low-income schemes. 
Navi Mumbai has undergone two significant waves of privatisation, one in the early 
nineties, and one at the dawn of the 21 Century. India’s New Economic Programme of 
the early nineties has triggered a shift from a supply side towards a demand side oriented 
housing development. As a consequence agencies such as Cidco were forced to operate 
similarly to private developers. The trend was increased with further reforms easing for-
eign direct investments. In real estate Integrated Township, IT-park and SEZ pro-
grammes represented these. 
                                               
1 From a blog by a resident of Navi Mumbai’s node Kopar Khairane at: 
http://ptblanc.blogspot.com/2004_06_01_archive.html; r12.10.2008 
2 Satish Magar, Cidco principal, in an interview with MoneyLIFE, Jan 2007 
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As a consequence, after long periods of stagnation and slow growth, today Navi 
Mumbai’s surrounding areas experience a boom of privately developed housing and 
commercial schemes. Of highest significance for the area are two large Special Economic 
Zone (SEZ) projects. The Navi Mumbai SEZ and the Mumbai SEZ will jointly comprise 
6.800 hectares. Cidco as well has embarked on the SEZ boom and is developing two of 
Navi Mumbai’s nodes (Dronagiri as well as Ulwe) in this manner along partnerships with 
private developers. 
Hence, in line with the overall aims of this thesis, this chapter seeks to unravel the 
production process of Navi Mumbai. In this context specific attention will be paid to the 
rising impact of the private sector. While it will be important to establish a comprehen-
sive account on the structures and production mechanisms of Navi Mumbai in itself, it 
will also be vital to generate information useful for the comparative framework of this 
thesis. The chief tool to achieve these goals will be to use a synoptic method. As a result 
Navi Mumbai will be described from 6 various angles: 1) the general context, 2) the 
city’s urban structure, 3) the population, 4) the developers and designers, 5) the financial, 
and 6) the regulatory framework. 
 
Table 11: Key indicators – Navi Mumbai 
Name of NeoTown Navi Mumbai (& Navi Mumbai SEZ)* 
Country, State, Region, District India, Maharashtra, Mumbai Metropolitan Re-
gion, Thane 
Start Date 1954 
Ground breaking  1971 
Phases (finished, total)  14 (20) 
Size (present, planned) 4.377 (34.400) 
Population (present, planned)  1,7 Million (3 Million) 
Local Population  180.000** 
Structures (number of houses) 260.000 (700.000) 
Developer (name of developer) Cidco (City and Industrial Development Corpo-
ration of Maharashtra Limited) 
Major motive ['1' = decongest; '2' = economic 
development; '3' = security; '4' = lifestyle and 
representation]*** 
1, 2, 4,3 
Type ['A' parallel city; 'B' satellite town; 'C' re-
gional node; 'D' independent new centre 
A 
* Before 1995 the New Town was called New Bombay. 
** Approximately 10 percent of the total population 
*** Subjective ranking according to relevance 
 
 Illustration C-1: Map of India 
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General context –  
Planned society 
Introduction 
Navi Mumbai is located in the largest metropolitan region of the second largest country 
and biggest parliamentary democracy of the world. A large majority of the population 
still lives in a rural context leaving immense scope for development. Although the coun-
try’s literacy levels are only at the 60 percent mark India produces the largest number of 
engineering graduates in the world. 
The subcontinent’s urban centres are increasingly acknowledged as its economic-
growth engines. On the other hand an enormous gap in infrastructure and housing re-
mains one of the country’s biggest problems, leading to a continuous rise of the informal 
sector. In addition India’s cities are greatly affected by the economies and cultures of 
migrants at various (global and local) scales. 
The country’s general attitude of how to handle the market economy is in an ongoing 
process of transformation. For a long time it was dominated by a central planning ap-
proach. Yet, in the last three decades the country has embarked on a path of liberalisa-
tion and decentralisation. This has triggered a parallel shift of political power from na-
tional to state and local levels, although at a price of a growing political complexity and 
rising regional disparities. 
Therefore, in the following chapter the new city will be approached across scales – e.g. 
from a national scale, to the regional context of Mumbai and also across time. Hence 
Navi Mumbai’s planning history will be anchored to national and regional milestones. A 
specific emphasis will be given to the overall planning framework and not least Navi 
Mumbai will be embedded in a tradition of regional precedents and peers. While the sub-
chapters on the national and regional context will present key indicators related to poli-
tics, economy, demography and culture, the section of Mumbai will consider the urban 
morphology and some major spatial trends of Mumbai’s metropolitan development. 
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India 
General facts India 
Table 12: Key indicators – Country level India3 
Name of country India 
Year of independence 1947 
Political system Parliamentary democracy 
Urbanisation rate and growth  30 percent, 1,5 percent 
GINI 38 
Population earning less than 2US$ per 
day 
86 percent 
Literacy rate 60 percent 
Average Income (GDP pc) 500 US$ 
Economic growth rates (1998-2008) 4 - 6 percent 
HDI 62 
Year of liberal reforms 1991 
Cars per 1000 people 6 
FDI 20 billion US$ 
Remittances 18 billion US$ 
Percentage of scheduled castes 30 
Diasporic population 22 million 
 
Population and urbanisation 
With more than 1,1 billion residents India is the second largest country in the world.4 
While it is increasing speedily the scope for development remains immense and 50 per-
cent of the population is younger than 25 years (China 33, Japan 43). 
While the majority of the population, about 70 percent (cf. The World Bank 2006), 
still live in a rural context, the country is on a fast track to urbanisation.5 Since the 
1940’s India’s cities have grown by an average of 3 to 4 percent a year.6 The country will 
have an urban population of more than 800 million by 2025 compared to the present 
less than 300 million (Maitra 2007).7 The National Council for applied Economic Re-
search estimates that a population of 380 million people, more than the entire population 
of the USA, will be added to India's cities over the next 40 years (cf. Skukla 2008). The 
trend also applies to the large cities. The number of metropolises with one million resi-
dents and more will increase from 30 in 2008 to 70 in the year of 2025. 
                                               
3 Cf. Appendix: Comparative Matrix 
4 It has about five times more population than Indonesia and six times more than Brazil. 
5 Nissel (1997) states that the real trek from village to town hasn’t started yet. 
6 Cf. India Core 2007: 4 
7 Indian urban population is, after China, the largest in the world. Indeed, more people live in Indian cities than in all aggre-
gated countries of the world except USA, China and Russia. (Cf. India Core 2007) 
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Political system 
India became independent from British rule on the 15th August 1947. Thereafter the 
country was partitioned into India and Pakistan. Three years later, on 26 January 1950 it 
became a republic and a new constitution came into effect. (Cf. CIA 2007) 
India is the world’s largest democracy. The country enjoys a relatively stable political 
situation. It is a socialistic, democratic and secular republic with a parliamentary system 
of government.8 While ethnic, political or religious conflicts are on the daily agenda, their 
level is relatively moderate when compared with some neighbouring countries. (Cf. Nis-
sel 1997) 
Market attitude in transition 
India’s general attitude towards market regulation is in a process of transition. For a long 
time the development approach focused on rural growth and central planning. Yet, since 
the 1990’s increasing problems and contradictions, for example the growing numbers of 
urban residents without proper infrastructure, have engendered a gradual change to-
wards deregulation and liberalisation policies and the attraction of foreign investments.9  
A continuous path of decentralisation in the last three decades parallels the shift in 
market attitude. While the early post-independence programmes were steered by the na-
tional government and reflected a central organisation of the country, the liberalisation 
and decentralisation programmes have shifted political power towards the states. More-
over the power of political planning and self-determination is more in the hands the local 
governments.10  
Infrastructure and services 
The dynamic growth of India’s economy and its rising focus on urban centres is paral-
leled by a widening gap in the provision of urban infrastructure and services.11 Notably 
this leads towards ‘insular’ urban development strategies such as Integrated Townships 
or Special Economic Zones. It has also brought into focus the lack of adequate transpor-
tation and power facilities across the country. (Cf. Ruth 2007) 
The country’s spending on infrastructure in 2007 amounted to roughly 5 percent of its 
GDP. At the same time the economy has grown  at a rate of 8,6 percent or more since 
2003. (Cf. Reuters 2007) 12 The most visible indicators of overstretched infrastructure 
are India’s congested highways, airports and ports.13 Significantly, utilities such as water 
and power are rationed in most locations and only a small fraction of the population has 
access to sanitation.14 The India Infrastructure Report estimated the annual investment 
needed for urban water supply, sanitation and roads at about 28.035 crore (US$ 6,67 
billion) for the next ten years.15  
The reasons for the neglect in infrastructure investments lie in the history of federal 
urban planning programmes. Infrastructure has a tradition of being handled as a public 
commodity. While "Jawaharlal Nehru took the decision of making urban infrastructure 
a monopoly of the public sector in the 60's”16, the positive aspects of cities as engines of 
                                               
8 Cf. http://www.indiacore.com/overview-main.html (r02.05.2008) 
9 Cf. below: urban policy, five year plans 
10 Cf. below: Milestones, 73rd, 74th Amendments 
11 Traditionally India’s population growth has always preceded the construction in infrastructure. (cf. Ruth 2007) 
12 At the same time, China has invested the double to triple amount of GDP (12 to 15 percent) in a proactive development 
of infrastructure (cf. Ruth 2007) 
13 The Economist (June 1st 2006: “The long journey“) delineates India’s medieval road infrastructure in describing an 8-day 
journey of a truck from Kolkata to Mumbai. 
14 (Cf. 3inetwork 2006; The World Bank 2004) 
15 (Cf. 3inetwork 1996 quoted in India Core 2007: 7) 
16 (KP Sigh Chair of DLF in Outlook Business 2007: 79) 
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economic growth were not much appreciated. Consequently the problems of urban areas 
were treated more as welfare problems. (India Core 2007: 11) 
The policy only changed at the end of the 1980’s, a report of the National Commis-
sion on Urbanisation confirmed that the trend towards urbanisation could not be re-
versed. This was also a time when urban government lacked capacities at all levels and 
when increasing numbers of the urban population suffered from poverty. One of the 
most important government strategies to address the infrastructure problems has been 
the Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission, or JNNURM. (Cf. Milestones below) 
Literacy rates 
India’s society represents a stark polarisation and immense contrasts. These are reflected 
for example by the levels in education. With adult literacy rates of 60 percent in 2003 the 
country ranges in the bottom quarter in the world.17 On the other hand the country em-
barked on a path towards a knowledge society: 50 million Indians have some form of 
higher education and 2,5 million complete a university degree every year (Kelly 2006).18 
Economic framework –New landscape of opportunity 
GDP and average income 
Along with Brazil, Russia and China, India is in the midst of the fast growing BRIC 
economies.19 The average Indian GDP per capita ranged at 500 US$ in 2003.20 At the 
same time the country’s total GNP exceeded 500 billion US Dollar. (Cf. Goldman Sachs 
2007)21  
While in 2007 India’s economy boomed with growth rates of nearly 9 percent, the eq-
uity markets featured return rates of approximately 49 percent, albeit helped by an ap-
preciating rupee. (Cf. Cushman & Wakefield 2007: 1) Further acceleration is expected in 
the future (Asian Development Bank, 2007).22 From 2001 to 2007 the stock market rose 
by an astonishing 499 percent. In contrast India’s share in world goods exports remained 
rather small – at 0,9 percent for 2005 (Ahya, Morgan Stanley 2006). 
Change in share of, manufacturing, services, agriculture 
In 2007 India’s GDP was composed of 17 percent agriculture, 30 percent industry and 
53 percent services (Cf. CIA 2008). In contrast 60 percent of the population worked in 
the agricultural sector, 12 percent in the industrial segment, and another 12 percent in 
services (Ibidem). 
As is the case with many other societies, India is on the way to being a services ori-
ented economy. Recently there has been a tremendous growth of the knowledge and ser-
vices industries. At the same time the industrial segment as well as low skill manufactur-
ing and agriculture tended to be bypassed. This is particularly tragic, as these sectors 
comprise the major population segments. (Cf. Harris-White 2002) 
                                               
17 While female literacy was at 50 percent, male literacy ranged at 70. (Cf Globalis, r12.10.2008). 
18 These numbers amount to 200 percent of the US-American, and 150 percent of Chinese graduates. 
19 “If things go right, in less than 40 years, the BRICs economies together could be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms. ... 
India has the potential to show the fastest growth over the next 30 and 50 years.” (Cf. Goldman Sachs 2001, 2003: 4) 
20 And 2.600 US$ in PPP measures (Cf. Globalis 2008) 
21 The economy made up for 25 percent of the Gross National Product of countries like Britain or Germany, India’s GDP was 
slightly higher than that of the city of London. Barbara Harriss-White (2002) notes that India’s economy is roughly the size of 
Belgium’s, but with 100 times the number of people. 
22 All the major sectors of the economy witnessed significant growth during the same period, with manufacturing at 9.3 
percent, construction at 8.4 percent and financing, insurance, real estate and business services at 11.6 percent. The indus-
trial production for February 2008 was 8.60 percent higher compared to the same period in 2007. (Cf. Cushman 
&Wakefield 2008: Mumbai Office Report 1Q08) 
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Role of middle classes 
”The largest democracy with population in excess of 1 billion presents the 
world's biggest middle class consumer market of 300 million people”23  
The ongoing strong economic growth (cf. Goldman Sachs 2001) has led to the rise of 
an Indian middle class and persistent growth of upper income segments. These are cur-
rently estimated to comprise a population of 51 million – a quarter of all Indians (cf. 
Reuters 2007, Farell 2007). In this context India is likely to become the world’s fifth-
largest consumer economy in the next 20 years (cf. McKinsey 2007). The middle-income 
population will grow (McKinsey 2007) to approximately 600 million by 2025.24 It will 
thus be substantially larger than its European and US American counterparts (cf. Nissel 
1997) 25 At the same time the upper income class will grow tenfold from 10 million, ac-
counting for a significant 20 percent of all consumption (cf. Farell 2007). 
The rising middle classes are carrying forward a profound modernisation of India’s 
society based on consumption-orientated lifestyles. Disposable incomes for this group 
have grown by 12 percent a year for the past five years. In the past decade the number of 
people per household has dropped from 5,52 to 5,1.As a consequence more and more 
couples, with fewer and fewer children prefer a life in one-generation households. For 
that reason the household budgets will shift from basic necessities to discretionary items 
(Cf. Farrell 2007), as more middle-income families are likely to have air conditioning, go 
for an annual vacation, and appreciate packaged foods. 
Indeed, the consumer sector has a great scope for development: India’s car ownership 
rates currently range at 6 vehicles per 1.000 residents. In 2003 only 7 of thousand resi-
dents had a personal computer. Compared to Europe people have only consumed 12,5 
percent of energy (The World Bank 2004).26 
Hosing affordability 
Formal Housing, without subsidies, is basically unaffordable for India’s low-income 
classes. At the same time middle class affordability levels27 are facing two digit levels. As 
this is the case in particular in the centres of large cities suburban locations are increas-
ingly explored. 
Indeed, only a very small, although rising section of India’s population can afford to 
buy a house in the formal market. The lower income segments cannot afford and sustain 
a house and are beyond profitability criteria from the perspective of conventional busi-
ness. Housing for US$ 2.000 to 10.000, which would be appropriate for annual income 
levels around US$ 500 to 2.500 (this would translate into affordability levels of 4), is 
practically unavailable.28 29 
                                               
23 www.navimumbaisez.com, accessed in June 2008 
24 The McKinsey Global Institute categorises the Middle classes along purchasing power and consumption potentials. These 
earn between 200.000 ($4,376) and 1 million INR ($21,882) (cf. Farrell 2007). The upper income segment contains people 
who annually earn more than INR 1 million. Significantly it is only this last group of the ‘global Indians’ that can afford a 
truly Western oriented lifestyle. It is essential to note that this income of the country’s middle classes is higher than the 
median family income in India that is approximately INR 4.500 a month (or about 100 US$). 
25 In two decades the country will surpass Germany as the world's fifth largest consumer market”. The respective House-
holds will see their incomes grow to US$1.1 billion, 11 times the level of today, and 58 percent of total Indian income. 
(Farrell 2007) 
26 Interestingly the number of ‘affluent‘ households in India (amounting to 31 million people in 2000) is estimated by the 
number of households that own a 4-wheel vehicle, as opposed to the 2- wheelers.“ (Cf. Weinstein 2005: 17) 
27 Housing affordability is the relation of the medium annual household income divided by the median cost of the house. 
Generally a value of 3 and below is regarded as ‘affordable’ while a value of above 5 is ‘unaffordable’. (Cf. 
http://www.demographia.com/dhi-ix2005q3.pdf, r12.09.2009)  
28 Given the other costs of livelihoods such as food, transport, health, education and clothing, low-income households are 
not capable of paying more than 15 to 25 percent of their disposable incomes on housing. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001) Conse-
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On the other hand the extreme rise of the country’s middle classes and the availability 
of cheap money30 have spurred a large rise in demand for housing for this segment. As a 
consequence the supply in some places, e.g. the large mega cities are lagging up to five 
years behind. The sharp rise of prices within the last five years that is widely referred to 
as an Indian housing bubble.31  As a consequence affordability levels for the middle-
income classes have sprung up to two digit levels, only known from the Californian and 
Australian housing bubble32 and housing prices in inner cities can fetch 50.000 US$ to 
200.000 US$. 
Poverty and informal economy 
Although India is “one of the world's hottest economies”33 , it also remains one of the 
poorest countries worldwide.34 In 2006, about 836 million people, or 77 percent, lived 
on less than two dollars a day. There are signs that the poor, as well as the rich, both are 
gaining from the economic growth – in the last 30 years poverty (e.g. the number of peo-
ple earning less than INR 12 per day) has almost halved. (Cf. Government of India, 
2007) On the other hand the proportion of urban slum dwellers has been increasing over 
the decades. It is exceeds half of the population in cities such as Mumbai. (Cf. Shaw: 2) 
Indeed, of a labour force of over 390 million only 7 percent work on regular wages 
and salaries, this means that 90-92 percent of India's total work force is engaged in the 
informal economy. In urban areas this figure is close to 65-70 percent. (Cf. ILO) 
Gini index 
In spite of this the indicators for income inequality still feature moderate levels. In 2007 
the country’s GINI index, a popular measure of income inequality, ranged at 38.35 The 
10 richest percent of the population had 34 percent of the income. (Cf. UN 2007) On the 
other hand the income disparities are widening. (Cf. The World Bank 2006) Comparable 
estimates of the 50th (1993-1994) and 55th (1999-2000) rounds of National Sample Sur-
vey data reveal that inequality in on the rise in rural and urban India. (Cf. Pal 2007: 25) 
36 Sen and Himanshu (2005, quoted in Pal 2007: 5) demonstrate that the consumption 
gap among the rich and the poor and between urban and rural India grew during the 
1990s, and more so after 1997. 
Liberalisation 
The year 1991 is a historic watershed in respect of India‘s internal development policy 
and its synchronisation with the worldwide economic system.37 Facing a growing bu-
                                                                                                                                         
quently, the maximum price for a house for a household earning US$ 800 per year, that could be repaid in 25 years, comes 
to US$ 2500. 
29 Preliminary studies in the 1970s by Cidco in Navi Mumbai have shown that less than 10 percent of the population had an 
income large enough to afford a house without subsidies. (Cf. Cidco 1973) 
30 Government reforms at the beginning of the century have caused low loan levels on the private market to fall to 7-8 
percent. (Cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_property_bubble) 
31 At some locations prices have soared up to 100 percent per year. “For the first time in India’s modern history, residential 
rental rates of certain high-end micro-markets in Delhi’s region, the NCR, overshot those of Mumbai indicating the rising 
value of property” (Cushman & Wakefield 2007: 1) 
32 The affordability for a flat of US$ 100.000 in Bangalore for a software engineer who earns US$ 8.400 per year is 11. 
33 Reuters (2007) quoting a report by the state-run National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS) 
34 Significantly, child mortality was among the highest in the world: 90 out of a thousand children do not reach the age of 
5. (Cf. The World Bank 2004). Mumbai’s child mortality was at 23 per mille. (Cf. Nissel 1997 quoting the WRI) 
35 The US has 41, China has 38 and France 33. 
36 Significantly, during the 1990’s, also referred to as the ‘reform period’, urban inequality in India was much higher than 
rural inequality for most of the states, and while the urban income gap was intensifying, the rural disparities were shrinking. 
(Cf. Government of India, National Human Development Report (2001), quoted in Pal 2007: 3) 
37 Indeed, the import of foreign economic policies (and standards) can be traced back as far as to the 18th century, when the 
British East India Company, ‘unified‘ the country along Mercantilist principles and regulations. (Cf. Thomas 1926, O’Rourke 
2002) 
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reaucratic gridlock, and a severe budgetary crisis, the country initiated a process of com-
prehensive reforms. These were principally modelled along the standardised recommen-
dations of the Washington Consensus.  
Kochhar (2006:18) summarises that: “The reforms of the 1990s ... included (i) the 
abolition of industrial licensing and the narrowing of the scope of public sector monopo-
lies; (ii) the liberalization of inward foreign direct and portfolio investment; (iii) trade 
liberalization including the elimination of import licensing and the progressive reduction 
of non tariff barriers; (iv) major financial sector liberalization, ...freer entry for domestic, 
and foreign, private banks and the opening up of the insurance sector; (v) and liberaliza-
tion of investment and trade in important services, such as telecommunications. ...” 
Internationalisation, foreign direct investments 
India was long out of bounds to institutional investors, particularly foreigners. That ap-
pears to be changing: 60 percent of Indiabulls Property38 is owned by Farallon Capital 
Management, a San Francisco hedge fund... Fidelity, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch 
were large Investors... Two forces lie behind the boom. First, investors are betting on the 
consumption driven growth of India‘s economy... The second factor is India‘s emergence 
as a hub for global outsourcing.39  
An important consequence of financial liberalisation is an augmented inflow of for-
eign private capital into India. In particular, net foreign exchange assets raised by the 
banking system became the most important source of new money supply.40 
Yet, the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in general increased by a startling 1.800 per-
cent between 1990 and 2003. The Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion lists 
accumulated FDI equity inflows of 86 billion US$ up till May 2008. (Cf. India FDI Fact 
Sheet - May 2008) 41 Moreover a rise of 91 percent was reported in the fiscal period of 
2006/2007 to 2007/2008 only (from 10,2 US$ billion 19 US$ billion). (Ibidem)42 
With an amount of 22 percent, the skill intensive services sector is attracting the high-
est share of cash. While computers and software score second with 12 percent, the con-
struction segment comes third with 7 percent. 
Attracted by special subsidies a large part of the in FDI inflow went into non-tradable 
infrastructure: Since the year 2002, for example, the Indian Government allows one hun-
dred percent of direct foreign investments if a project’s area is above 40 hectares, if more 
than 10 million US dollars are invested and if the number of new apartments exceeds the 
two thousand mark. In this way the government nurtures large schemes, aiming at the 
rapid modernisation of urban areas according to the newest world-class standards 
Effects of liberalization and international investments 
The amplified international investments and a relatively higher growth of GDP were able 
to restore the country’s budget deficit. The price to be paid, however, seems to comprise 
an augmented fragmentation and polarisation of society (cf. above Income distribu-
tion).43 Small and medium sized enterprises have been disadvantaged. The gap between 
                                               
38 A local securities broker firm 
39 The Economist August 27 2005: India Property. Another Boom. Why foreigners are so keen on India‘s property market 
40 The share of Net Foreign Exchange Assets (NFEA) with the Foreign Reserve Bank of India increased from 20.44 percent in 
1992-1993 to 65.01 percent in 2000-2001. (Cf. Pal: 21) 
41 China's overall FDI inflows totalled $69.5 billion in 2006 alone. 
42 Interestingly, the offshore financial oasis of Mauritius is the number one origin of investments. It comprises more than 44 
percent of all cumulative inflows from April 2000 to May 2008. That is 8 times more than money coming respectively from 
the USA, Singapore and the U.K. These amount to 7 to 8 percent. 
43 Harriss-White (2003) argues that India’s liberal reforms of the 90’s have rather strengthened local modes of economic 
organisation (social regulation). Hence, while existing power structures (along caste, religion, ethnicity groups, gender pat-
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rich and poor has increased. Urban informality is on the rise. (Cf. Harriss-White, 2003) 
(On a different plane, the reorientation of development strategies has led to a regionalisa-
tion of Indian politics. (Cf. Jenkins 1999: 76)) 
Whereas, for example, the inflow of FDI into India has only marginally improved the 
gross national capital formation, it has largely contributed to uneven development. As a 
consequence development has been confined to some small pockets, augmenting inequali-
ties in the country geographically and sector wise (Pal 2007: 25). The inter-state distribu-
tion of domestic and foreign direct investment (FDI) was particularly skewed. 44 Signifi-
cantly Mumbai leads the league while attracting almost 32 percent of all foreign funds.45 
Real estate boom and its dimensions – insatiable demand 
The enormous economic growth rates have led to a vast demand for land that can hardly 
be matched by the existing supply alone. The county‘s demographic growth, the deregu-
lation, and liberalisation policies along with a global framework of surplus money had a 
tremendous impact on the real estate sector, leading to a widespread boom. The 9-10 
percent economic growth foreseen increased the demand for homes, and commercial 
space. As a consequence many foreign funds moved into real estate, a sector that featured 
growth rates of 20 percent and more transforming the country into one of the “most 
appealing investment destinations for domestic as well as foreign investors” (Hirco Plc 
2007: 3). 
India‘s housing shortage was assessed at 22,5 million units and the demand was sup-
posed to rise to 80 million housing units over the next 10 years (Hirco Plc 2007: 3). The 
demand for new office space has grown from an estimated 3,5 million square feet in 
1998 to nearly 16 million square feet in 2004 and is estimated to amount to 66 million 
square feet between 2005 and 2008.46 
At the end of 2007 the Indian property market was estimated to be worth US$ 54 bil-
lion (Hirco Plc 2007: 3) and the real estate sector was expected to keep growing to US$ 
90 billion in 2015. (C&W 2007: 2). Notably, this represents an annual growth rate of 
over 20 percent. The urban residential sector was supposed to appreciate by another 15 
percent to 50 percent. (Cushman & Wakefield 2007: 3). Notably, a major share of the 
real estate funding originates from abroad. Till 2007 the share of foreign funds and insti-
tutions amounted to US$ 30 billion with an estimate of US$ 3 billion that has been 
committed so far. 
WB loans, foreign aid 
The gush of foreign finances does not only originate in the private sector. India is the 
single largest borrower of The World Bank Aid and International Development Assis-
tance (IDA).47 In 2005 The World Bank's support to the country aggregated to $ 2,89 
                                                                                                                                         
tern), organisational patterns and points of centralisation were reinforced, mainstream rural population segments had been 
bypassed. 
44 State-wise data on (aggregate) FDI approvals between 1991 and 2002 show that only a handful of states have managed 
to attract a very high share of FDI. From the figures, it can be seen that the top 10 Indian states attracted more than 63 
percent of total. (Cf. Pal 2007: 22, figure 8) 
45 The Capital Region of Delhi comes second with 19 percent, while Bangalore follows with a share a 7 percent. While 
Ahmadabad, Chennai, and Hyderabad take 5 percent respectively, no city other than Kolkata (1,5 percent) reaches the 1 
percent mark. 
46 The sector of Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) constituted 80 percent of the demand for commercial property in India. 
(Cf. Shrinivas: 19) 
47 The aggregate of the Bank's lending in India in the last 45 years was approximately US$ 42 billion. India has claimed 
about 15% of total World Bank lending – 9% of WB and 28% of IDA commitments. (Cf. International Economic Organisa-
tion: http://www.ieo.org/world-c2-p1.html; r28.08.2008) 
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billion.48 On the other hand it has to be noted that aggregated aid peaked in 1992 in the 
wave of the liberalisation reforms, and has not significantly increased during the last 20 
years – despite all demographic growth.49 Indeed, international aid has always played a 
political role, in particular within the Cold War era.50 
 
Culture – deterritorialised traditions 
The understanding of India’s cultural landscapes and the forces forming these is a pre-
requisite to the comprehension of the present and the emerging urban landscapes of the 
country, including all social, economic and spatial dimensions. “India is among the most 
stratified of all known societies in the world” (Srinivas 1992a, from Ananthakrishnan 
1998: 30). Its society and space are connected to questions of caste, class, religion and 
language. Moreover the subcontinent’s “social structures of accumulation” are deeply 
entrenched in party politics, religion, philanthropy and redistributive obligations (Har-
riss-White 2003). The large Metropolises in particular are places of difference, of ethnic, 
cultural, social culmination and juxtaposition – maybe by definition. Here a complex 
dynamic of internal and external migration between cities and the countryside, and re-
cently also along an urban-global nexus, adds to a rich, complex, and dynamic cultural 
fabric. 
Without a doubt the modern towns such as Chandigarh or Navi Mumbai, represent a 
form of resistance against the complex fabric of the traditional Indian city, also opposing 
the domination of caste, class and “corruption”. Yet at the same time these reform cities 
are also deeply embedded in a context of traditional and contemporary trends. Tradition 
and postmodernity remain important factors writing over and interacting with the pro-
gressive landscapes. 
Accordingly, the following section aims to highlight the impact of traditional ‘cultural’ 
factors such as caste, class, and religion. The issue of caste in Indian society will be 
briefly exemplified. Moreover some light will be cast on the subject of corruption in the 
nexus between tradition and modernity. Secondly the correlation of migratory move-
ments and the urban landscape will be outlined. Here it is of particular importance to 
discern the impact of ‘deterritorialised’ cultures, for example of new transnational elites, 
on the formation of contemporary socio-spatial landscapes. As a result Mumbai emerges 
as a resort of exaggerated differences, an ultimate landscape of dreams. 
Caste 
The influence of caste on India’s society and space remains pervasive, despite an ongoing 
modernisation. Almost all of the country’s spaces and economies are organised in forms 
that are directly or indirectly based on caste. Scheduled Castes and Tribes51 account for 
29 percent of the Indian population. (In Mumbai they make up for 7,5 percent.) While 
their literacy level is well below 60 percent they are twice as likely to work as casual la-
bourers, in agriculture and to be poor masses than any other cast members (Ibidem). (A 
Brahmani would never work as a labourer). 
                                               
48 India was also the largest recipient of IDA assistance, with credits totalling US$ 1.1 billion. This amounts to US$1 per 
capita (The Hindu 2005). Note that The World Bank Number for 2003 is only 25 percent! (Cf. World Development Indicators 
2005) 
49 Cf. http://www.indianchild.com/foreign_aid_india.htm; r28.08.2008 49 
50 E.g. during the 1980 oil crisis the country received an IMF loan totalling US$5 billion. (Cf. International Economic Organi-
sation: http://www.ieo.org/world-c2-p1.html; r28.08.2008) 
51 Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes are socially handicapped groups listed in the Schedule of the Indian Constitution. 
(GoM 2008) 
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Barbara Harriss-White (2003) points out that nearly half Indian firms are caste-
homogeneous and that investments do not necessarily follow a rational logic. Instead 
clientelist relations among caste groups often remain the preferred basis for business 
partnerships. These days, backward castes are gaining ground as owners, while forward 
castes dominate the concentration of capital. (Ibidem) 
Corruption 
Fraud and tax evasion are part and parcel of Indian capitalism... in the economy in 
which 88 percent of Indians live, the state is so riddled with fraud and corruption that an 
enormous 'shadow' has grown up around it, which depends on it and feeds off it. 
(Harriss-White, 2003) 
The issue of fraud and corruption is an important element of developing cultures that 
is rarely reflected upon. Yet, the evaluation of the topic also depends on the perspective 
of the evaluating party. International agencies rate India as a relatively corrupt country. 
The country’s corruption perception index ranges at 3,5 (at a scale of 1=most corrupt to 
10=most corrupt). (Cf. Transparency International 2006) 52 
Yet, it is important to understand the matter more deeply, as it represents a frequently 
missed link to ‘other’ non-modern modes of societal development, which are deeply em-
bedded in traditional modes of collective organisation. Whilst corruption is indeed a complex 
ethical and criminological matter, our argument here is that the concept is also deeply 
related to the production of differences between the judge and the convict. 
While corruption can be seen as a violation of specific moral, cultural and aesthetic 
standards and values, any kind of planning intervention has to take into account the lo-
cal construction and valuation of the matter. Behaviour can be corrupt from the perspec-
tive of international business etiquette exactly because is it deeply embedded in local tra-
ditions and moral codes. In this context a person that acts in two worlds, e.g. the global 
economy (or high-ranking politics) and traditional society, can face a severe dilemma. 
When in 1977 the untouchable, K.R. Narayanan, became president, it was a historical 
landmark and revolution53), at the same time Narayanan’s government was well known 
for an extremely high amount of corruption. 
Migration 
“Deterritorialization, in general is one of the central forces of the modern 
world...  the overseas movement of Indians has been exploited... to create a 
complicated network of finances and religious institutions...” (Appadurai 
1990: 39) 
“More persons and groups deal with the realities of having to move or the fantasies of 
wanting to move...  men and women from villages in India think not just of moving to 
Poona or Madras, but of moving to Dubai and Houston, and refugees from Sri Lanka 
find themselves in South India as well in Switzerland.” (Ibidem: 32) 
The urban realities of India’s metropolises are highly affected by the post-
independence movements of migrants and refugees. To understand the contemporary 
fabric of Indian cities three forms of migration are relevant: Firstly, the movements of 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's), e.g. after the separation of India and Pakistan; Sec-
                                               
52 While this is significantly lower that Germany’s 7,8, or the USA’s 7,2, it is crucially better than Indonesia’s 2,3 or Somalia’s 
1,8. 
53 ”It was the greatest transfer of power in world history: the real devolution of power to a real majority of 1 billion people.” 
(Cf. Mehta: 43) 
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ondly the rural-urban migration, mainly by the poor; And thirdly, the transnational mi-
gration, largely represented by middle and upper classes. 
Mumbai, as the primary economic centre of the nation has always represented a chief 
magnet for migrants. In the main, the city served as a melting pot for large groups of 
migrants, while these were adding to the vibrancy of its urban life.54 
The rising rural urban divide, along rural droughts and discrimination, as well as ur-
ban opportunities and higher incomes, continues to attract large populations to India’s 
urban centres. After all people seem to “prefer urban squalor to rural hopelessness”. (Cf. 
The Economist 2007) In 1991 alone, 39 million people migrated in rural-urban patterns. 
Notably the migrants tend to flock to the large centres, as smaller regional towns do not 
provide the opportunities for integration. It is a common pattern to see large groups of 
poor migrants leaving their villages for metropolises like Mumbai, Delhi and Kolkata.55 
And while the capability of these cities to absorb the new population is limited, a dual 
city with a large informal sector evolves (Cf. Srinivasan 2007). Indeed, India’s rural-
urban imbalance in development provides part of the explanation for the enormous con-
temporary growth of large urban centres (including slums). 
As the complexity of existing patterns of migration is rising, some of its forms remain 
invisible for official statistics. People migrating to India’s large cities do not always end 
up in slums. First generation migrants often become pavement dwellers and appropriate 
the streets and other public spaces.56 In addition, throughout India’s cities a strong pat-
tern of seasonal urban migration is evident (including Navi Mumbai). The all-prevalent 
canvas villages of migrants working in the construction sector represent this trend. 
Global elites, social imagination and urban landscapes 
In addition to the traditional axis of rural-urban movement, the global-urban nexus en-
genders additional dimensions of people’s interchange. India’s diasporic population is 
estimated to total between l5 and 22 million. (Cf. Ramesh 2000) Most of these are classi-
fied as Non-Resident Indians, or (NRI's).57 While these are spread across the globe in 
136 different countries, billions of remittances and deposits in local banks have a signifi-
cant impact on the (sub-) urban trends at home. 
The Indian Diaspora can be grouped into five main clusters. The largest, and probably 
the wealthiest of the five groups, is a four million community in the USA58, the UK, Can-
ada, Australia and other western countries. In 1999 for example Indians were taking up 
almost 50 percent of the 200.000 highly sought-after US H1-B visas for professionals 
(Bose, 2000 from King: 2000). Skilled workers have also increasingly migrated to other 
countries in Asia and the Middle East (cf. Pal 2007: 25). An estimated 3,5 million are 
living in the Gulf region.59  
Different from earlier eras, where migration was an absolute and almost irreversible 
movement, today most of the NRI’s maintain close linkages to the mother country. Ap-
                                               
54 Inevitably the arrival of large foreign masses has also led to crises (violence, riots), the emergence of local resistance 
movements and a rising prominence of local populist parties such as the Shev Sena party in Maharashtra. (Cf. below: Mile-
stones: Postcolonial Mumbai) 
55 Mumbai’s population is made up of more than 40 percent of migrants. Of these, about 20 percent have settled in Mum-
bai during the past 10 years. (Cf. Parasuraman 2008, MMRDA 1999: 3.3.2) 
56 600 kilometres of Mumbai’s streets are supposed to be populated by street dwellers. (Cf. Tribhuvan, Robin David; Andre-
assen Ragnhild 2003: Streets of Insecurity: Study of Pavement Dwellers in India; New-Delhi.) 
57 Non Resident Indians are Indians who live abroad for a significant amount of time, but who hold an Indian passport. The 
Indian state has legislated two distinctive categories - the Non Resident Indian (NRI), giving particular privileges and guaran-
tees regarding the investment of property capital in India, and the PIO, Person of Indian Origin (with similar financial and 
legal privileges). Both of these categories carefully cultivate an Indian identity: one of belongingness to the state, but an-
other, transnational identity, that can operate in the market. 
58 In 1999 an estimated 1,4m Indians resided in the US. (Ibidem) 
59 Cf. http://www.nriol.com/indiandiaspora/indians-abroad.asp, r23.09.2008 
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padurai (1990: 35) describes the new geography of migration as novel non-isomorphic 
paths.60 Transmigration is the new condition (cf. King 2000) and migrants move regu-
larly between "home" and the "destination country", shifting capital ideas, and practices 
(Glick Schiller et al. 1992). After all it is important to see the social, spatial and cultural 
transformations taking place in particular urban centres such as Mumbai, Delhi, Hy-
derabad, Bangalore, etc., in the context of these processes.61 
New Trends in India’s spatial development 
The demographic, economic and social trends as described above are directly linked to 
India’s recent urban trends. Demographic growth, deindustrialisation, economic liberali-
sation and the growth of a new consumer class, to name the most important factors, 
have a deep impact on the existing and emerging spatial fabric. (Cf. Weinstein 2005: 6) 
While India’s population is increasingly migrating to large urban centres, the current 
time sees the emergence of 17 new urban corridors comprising a significant share of the 
growth. Generally the new growth is centred in the urban peripheries and India’s me-
tropolises experience an enormous regionalisation and suburbanisation. At the same time 
in the context of the greater economic reforms (cf.. above) development regulations made 
more flexible, public private partnerships are increasingly promoted and international 
investments are patronised. As a consequence a significant share of India’s new urban 
fabric emerges in the form of self-sufficient mega projects produced by international con-
glomerates. In this setting mainly SEZ-cities62 and Integrated Townships emerge as novel 
autochthonous urban forms and typologies. (Cf. below) 
Concentration of wealth 
India is marked by a fairly distributed pattern of networked urban centres. It has six 
megacities and more than 30 urban centres of a one-million-plus population.63 On the 
other hand clear patterns of concentration exist. Large cities evidently centralise a large 
share of economic growth. India’s mega-city regions comprise more than 60 million resi-
dents and centralise a large share of the country’s wealth. The four largest cities of 
Mumbai, Kolkata, Delhi and Chennai account for more than a half of the country’s 
revenue in income tax. Yet their population make up only for 5 percent of the total. (Cf. 
Nissel 1997) 
Polarisation and fragmentation among states 
As economic growth goes hand in hand with rising levels of spatial fragmentation India’s 
states increasingly continue to drift apart. These present a considerable divergence in 
growth and incomes and in the patterns of specialisation.64 In this context some states 
resemble autonomous countries (Ibidem: 25).65 This development implies a rising level of 
                                               
60 Exploring the large Indian Diaspora Appadurai 1990 writes about new global cultures, which increasingly loose attach-
ment to solid territories. He puts a particular focus on the role of imagination in cultural production: “The world we live in 
today is characterized by a new role for the imagination in social life. The imagination has become an organized field of 
social practices [not just for the elites]. ... The Imagination is now central to all forms of agency, is itself a social fact, and is a 
key component of the new global order.” (Appadurai 1990: 29) 
61 King studied property advertisements from the weekly magazine India Today International, with which developers tempt 
NRI's worldwide to invest in India’s growing metropolitan peripheries. (King 2000: 11) 
62 SEZ = Special Economic Zone 
63 Cf. above; cf. India Core 2007, cf. UN-Habitat 2001 
64 “In sum, both state level capabilities and state level policies and institutions seemed to start mattering in the 1990s. With 
the centre no longer enforcing inter-state equity, divergences in growth rates between states increased.” (Kochhar 2006: 
36) 
65 Apparently the country’s liberal reforms combined with the growing decentralisation of political powers (e.g. along the 
73rd and 74th constitutional Amendments; cf. below) allowed states to achieve their potential, instead of being controlled by 
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competition for cities such as Mumbai. At this point the impressive growth (mainly in the 
IT sector) in the Golden Triangle of Chennai, Bangalore and Hyderabad can be men-
tioned.66 
Suburbanisation and concentration in 17 corridors 
At the current stage of development, India’s large metropolises are experiencing a mas-
sive trend of suburbanisation. This course is largely based on the demographic growth of 
the population in combination with an economic and technological evolution.67 
The peripheries, however, engender own modes of centralisation: a large share of In-
dia’s urban growth concentrates at a handful of peripheral growth corridors. In this con-
text 17 new urban corridors have been identified as “strong investment destinations for 
investors with different risk appetites” (Cushman & Wakefield 2007b: 3).68 The majority 
of the ‘hot investment locations’, which are increasingly explored along “cost saving and 
risk diversification measures”, are in the suburban and peripheral areas.69 So Navi 
Mumbai is part of the Panvel and Virar corridor. 
 
Box 8: Policy towards large privatised urban enclaves 
In the last decade the Indian Government sought to steer peripheral urban develop-
ment by the means of large autonomous projects that are financed and developed by 
the private sector. In this context it made available various development tools such as 
direct subsidies, tax abatements, 100 percent FDI finance, relaxations of Urban Land 
Ceiling legislations, and flexible, market oriented development regulations.70 (cf. 
Cushman & Wakefield 2008, cf. Gotsch 2007) This policy has induced a trend of large 
private investors buying up large areas of India’s metro regions.71 While PPPs72 be-
come prominent vehicles for the development of urban infrastructure such as bridges, 
highways and IT parks, SEZs and Integrated Townships emerge as specific new urban 
typologies. India’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs) Policy was announced in April 
2000”.73  
                                                                                                                                         
the centralized “convoy” system (Ibidem: 26). Consequently States are now able to grow in parallel to their built-up skill 
base and institutional, as well as infrastructural, capability. 
66 The state of Andhra Pradesh has been one of the forerunners in terms of liberal reforms, economic growth and specialisa-
tion. In the mid 1990’s Hyderabad made headlines as the ‘most business-friendly place in India’. Former President Chandra-
babu Naidu had introduced massive fundamental liberal economic and governmental reforms. Andhra Pradesh became an 
internationally known liberal development model. Above all, Naidu’s policy focused on the attraction of new information 
technologies and related services (so called IT and ITES) by providing the right regulatory framework as well as state of the 
art infrastructure at selected locations. Andhra Pradesh is now India’s fourth largest exporter of software products. (Cf. 
Gotsch 2007) 
67 The Delhi’s Government alone plans to create 35 new satellite townships in the Southern periphery, on the lines of Gur-
gaon and Noida. Importantly these will be developed along public-private partnership (PPP) models. (Cf. The Economic 
Times, 1 Oct 2008: “35 satellite towns on PPP foundation”. Cities such as Hyderabad are planning for extensions up to five 
times their present size. (Gotsch 2007) 
68 The 17 corridors that reflect high investment potential are Hinjewadi, Manesar GST and Sriperembudur, Shamshabad, 
Devanhalli, Greater Noida, Panvel and Virar (Mumbai), Rajarhat Thane (Mumbai), Kokapet (Hyderabad), Bidadi (Karnataka), 
Chakan, Kharadi (Pune), Bantala and Tumkur Road. 
69 Cf. Cushmann and Wakefield 2007: Peripheral Locations High On Investment Opportunities; 3Oct., 2007; New Delhi 
70 In the setting of India’s current liberal market reforms an increasing flexibilisation of building regulations can be observed. 
This has had a major impact on the quality of urban scapes and places. ... This flexibilisation points away from the physically 
oriented statutes of master plans and is directed in favour of investor-friendly regulations and development strategies. The 
master plan at Hyderabad’s new airport for example defines only three density zones and allows for a general mix of usage 
– everything else has been standardised. (Gotsch, Kohte 2007: transl. by the author) 
71 In 2006 Mumbai’s Metropolitan Regional Development Authority had to examine 10 SEZ- applications at the same time, 
for example a 4.000-hectare z-television entertainment zone. (Personal Interview with Uma Adusumilli in August 2006) 
72 Public Private Partnerships are relevant at each end of the scale, from regional projects to street furniture. ... [While] the 
public administration is keen to reduce its role to that of a regulating and supporting body. The detailing of urban form is 
left to the forces of the private sector. (Gotsch 2007: transl. by the author) 
73 Webside of GoI: Ministry of Commerce, r.10.09.2008 
Navi Mumbai   183 
 
 
Box 9: Large projects – role of the state 
The trend towards large projects in the peripheries of India’s metropolises cannot be 
explained by the agglomeration dynamics of the private sector only. In contrast, the 
tendency to large projects largely relates to India’s central planning legacy and to a 
specific legal setting. In this context four important aspects can be detected which drive 
the trend: Firstly, as official rules turn the private transfer of land into an enormously 
expensive and long process, the transfer of small lots becomes complicated and expen-
sive; Secondly, in many places regulations still exist which limit the amount of land a 
private person is allowed to possess (e.g. the Urban Land Ceiling Act); Thirdly, the gov-
ernment is at an advantage because it is authorised to confiscate land for specific pur-
poses; Lastly, in many places as much as 30 percent of urban land is in the hands of 
various public institutions, such as the military, state and local administrations.74 (Cf. 
Gotsch, Kohte 2007, translation by the author) 
In addition a growing number of inner city areas are redeveloped in the manner of 
large private superblocks. One of the major problems of those schemes is the presenta-
tion of the accessibility of public space. An example is the Jupiter Mill Lands Project in 
Mumbai: While the initial master plans foresaw open space ratio’s of 30 percent and 
more, the developers have eventually reduced those areas to 3 percent. (Cf. Personal 
Interview with Charles Correa in August 2006) 
Box 10: Special Economic Zones (SEZ) 
Special Economic Zones are increasingly becoming autonomous elements of urban 
growth in India. Significantly SEZ are regarded more and more as real estate than as in-
dustrial projects. The mechanism is intended to furnish the subcontinent’s cities with 
necessary urban infrastructure.75 What is unique in the Indian context is that, as op-
posed to in China76 or Dubai, not only public institutions but also private sector stake-
holders are allowed to run SEZs. In addition the fact that Indian SEZ can also include 
residential and entertainment areas turns them into fully fledged modules of contem-
porary urban growth. Indian SEZs therefore represent a shift from pure zones of pro-
duction for goods and services into integrated urban elements with a full range of ur-
ban services.77 SEZ models also increasingly replace the public subsidies for IT and of-
fice parks.78 
Exempt from major duties, SEZs are tax havens where goods and services are produced 
for export markets. The Policy offers several fiscal and regulatory incentives to develop-
ers of the SEZs as well as units within these zones.79 They include a five-year holiday on 
profits tax, and exemption from import and excise duties and from some licensing. SEZ 
developers would also acquire infrastructure status, and thereby entitled to claim all 
concessions and incentives available to infrastructure players, under the Income Tax 
Act.80 (Cf. Navi Mumbai SEZ Website at www.NMsez.com) 
                                               
74 Cp. Bertaud, Alain: India – Urban Land Reform; o.O.; 2002; URL: http://alain-
bertaud.com/images/AB_%20India_%20Urban_Land_Reform.doc (12.08.2007). P. 3. 
75 Accordingly the Indian Government planned that SEZ would contribute to US$ 320 billion-worth of foreign investment in 
infrastructure between 2000 and 2005. (Cf. The Economist 2006) 
76 One of the major differences between India‘s SEZs and China‘s is their amount and size. India’s has many more, but 
smaller designated areas.76. While India has more than 500 zones, China had five SEZs and further 14 economic and tech-
nical development zones. While the minimum area for an Indian “multi-product“ SEZ is 3.9 square miles (1.000 hectares), 
Shenzhen, the biggest and most famous of China‘s SEZs, covers 126 square miles. (Cf. The Economist 2006) 
77 Similar observations have also been made in Vietnam. (Cp. Gotsch, Peter: "Saigon South: Parallel City in the South"; in 
Somma, Paola (ed.); at war with the city; Gateshead; 2004. 
78 The Indian Government is planning to terminate the subsidies for IT-Parks by the end of 2009. 
79 Cf.. Shaban 2005: 13, and http://www.sezindia.nic.in/, r23.09.2008 
80 Yet, SEZ are a quite controversial political issue in India. Even some investors think that the terms are too generous and 
that wealth would be better distributed without SEZs. (Cf. The Economist 2006)] 
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The SEZ policy has engendered a massive real estate boom. In September 2008 the offi-
cial charts of notified, approved, and nearly approved Special Economic Zones listed to 
944 projects.81 Morgan Stanley’s Ahya Chetan (2006) speaks of “the equivalent of a gold 
rush”. Hundreds of companies filed applications, from Tata’s car factory in Gujarat, to 
Reddy’s pharmaceuticals in Andhra Pradesh, to the Navi Mumbai SEZ. Maharashtra and 
Andhra Pradesh were the two states with the highest amount of projects. Both had 
more than 160 notified, approved, and in-principle approved propositions, making for 
an aggregated 30 percent of all Indian SEZs.82  
India’s SEZ strategy was not only the “most aggressive and far-reaching initiative to 
date aimed at attracting foreign investment (cf. Website of Navi Mumbai SEZ), the pol-
icy has also some far reaching consequences on urban development strategies and the 
emergence of new urban typologies. (Cf. below: Predecessors). 
In addition to an industrial section Indian SEZs are also allowed to offer integrated ser-
vice areas. While only 35 percent of the land area of a SEZ must be used for production 
(cf. The Economist 2006), the SEZs may also comprise a large internal residential area. 
Hence in this manner they can develop into fully-fledged neighbourhoods. Crucially the 
entrepreneurs are granted full autonomy of development regulations and the alloca-
tion and pricing of the land, facilities and services in SEZs are not governed by public 
regulations. (Cf. Navi Mumbai SEZ Website, r12.09.2008) As a consequence some large 
SEZ projects, such as Reliance’s83 Maha Mumbai-, or the Haryana SEZ are planned to 
emerge as fully-fledged and independent New Towns. (Cf. The Economist 2006) In addi-
tion many smaller projects will emerge as independent quarters, being integrated into 
Township projects.84 
Apparently SEZs can present whatever business they like, as long as they act as profit 
generating enterprises. Significantly the Essel Group has reportedly been re-considering 
their plan to open the Special Entertainment Zone in Gorai near Mumbai where they 
already have an amusement park (The Economic Times March16th 2008). Other inves-
tors have proposed to develop tourist areas as SEZs. 
Box 11: Integrated Townships 
In addition to the SEZ boom, a second novel urban Typology is mushrooming in India’s 
urban peripheries. Integrated Townships represent an important strategy of India’s 
Government to promote the construction of housing and urban infrastructure of high 
standards.85 The strategy is another element of the greater incentives of liberalisation, 
deregulation and privatisation. It complies with the drive to ever-larger autonomous 
privately developed enclaves. 
In Andhra Pradesh alone more than 53 such township projects were planned in 2004, 
mostly under the auspices of government agencies. (Cf. The Hindu, Business Line, Mon-
day, Oct 25, 2004) The company DLF-Nakheel, for example, a joint venture from Dubai 
and India, is currently planning more than 20 projects on a total area of 16.200 hectares 
all over India (mainly on the periphery of Delhi in Gurgaon). The total investment sum 
of these projects is more than 75 billion US Dollars.86 87 
                                               
81 The ‘notified’ category comprised 260 projects, 531 projects were granted a formal approval, and an additional 153 
schemes received in principle approval. 
82 Cf. GoI, Ministry of Commerce; „Statewise_Distribution_of_SEZ.pdf“; at: http://www.sezindia.nic.in/; r10.10.2008; cf. 
also The Economist 2006 
83 Reliance Industries is India’s biggest private sector company. 
84 Examples for this strategy can be found at the Lanco Hills, as well as the Magarpatta Township Projects. (Cf. Predecessors 
section) 
85 Via the Press Note No. 4 in 2001 the Indian Government (FIPB, Foreign Investment Promotion Board) permits to develop 
Integrated Townships with up to 100 percent of FDI including housing, commercial premises, hotels, resorts, city and re-
gional level urban infrastructure facilities such as roads and bridges, mass rapid transit systems and manufacture of building 
materials. The development of urbanisable land and the building of infrastructure are integral parts of these kinds of strat-
egy. (Cf. www.dipp.nic.in, r13.11.2008) 
86 Cf. Bundesagentur für Außenwirtschaft 2007: Privater Wohnungsbau boomt in Indien endlich; o.O. S.2; URL: 
http://www.bfai.de/DE/Navigation/Datenbank-Recherche/Laender-und-Maerkte/Recherche-Laender-und-Maerkte/recherche-
laender-und-maerkte-node.html (03.07.2007). (Website of the German Agency for External Investments) 
87 More examples are discussed at the ‘Predecessors and Role models’ section below 
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Integrated Townships clearly represent the current drive towards large projects. The In-
dian Government allows one hundred percent of direct foreign investments: If a pro-
ject’s area is above 10 hectares, if more than 10 million US dollars are invested, and if 
the built up area exceeds 50.000 square metres.88 Moreover, the regulations prescribe: 
That capital is fixed for at least three years, before the initial investment can be repatri-
ated; that the development is bound to be completed at least to 50 percent after a pe-
riod of five years; and that the sale of undeveloped lots shall be restricted.89 
Recently most of the state governments have elaborated more specific regulatory 
frameworks, Maharashtra’s Government has published a Special Township Policy in 
2007. (Cf. GoM 2007: 20) This policy supports the pooling of large amounts of land. 
Consequently it exempts Integrated Townships from the regulations of the Urban Land 
Ceiling Act.90; it streamlines the acquisition of land that is already in the public hands; it 
excepts developers of Integrated Townships from existing land use regulations; it intro-
duces floating FSI91 regulations; it cuts existing stamp duties and several other tariffs by 
half; at the same time it makes mandatory the development of comprehensive infra-
structure packages. In addition the state’s regulation also mandates the provision of at 
least 10 percent units for middle income, as well as another 10 percent lower income 
populations and promises additional FSI when additional units are provided (Ibidem: 
27). 
In consequence Integrated Townships became “a top asset class for real estate invest-
ment”, amounting for almost 30 percent of investments in private equity (Cf.. Cushman 
& Wakefield 2007). 
                                               
88 Cf. Press Note 2/2005 of GoI from March 3rd 2005, at www.dipp.nic.in, r12.10.2008 
89 Additional regulations specify that land for police stations, as well as milk distribution points is to be handed over to the 
public and sufficient playground and parks are to be provided. An appropriate amount is also to be reserved for schools, 
hospitals, and other communal services, which are to be developed by the private sector. After all local regulations codes 
and standards also remain valid. Yet, if a project falls into the category of a Special Economic Zone, the Foreign Investment 
Promotion Board (FIPB) may free it from any of the guidelines and restrictions. (Cf. GoI 2008, 52-56, at dipp.nic.in 
r14.11.2008) 
90 A law that usually limits the maximum amount of land one single developer is permitted to develop. (Cf. below Planning 
framework) 
91 FSI stands for Floor Space Index 
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Mumbai – Urbs Primus Indis 
Table 13: Key indicators – Mumbai92 
Population (Region / Centre) 19 / 7 million 
Size (Region / Centre) 4.360 / 470 km2 
Percent of FDI going to Mumbai 32 
Population growth in the region (1990’s) 8,5 percent pa 
Density (Region / Centre) 44 / 272 p/ha 
Metroshare of Country population 1,85 percent 
GDP (per capita) in PPP 6.700 US$ 
Share Metro-GDP of Country-GDP 6,2 percent93  
Ratio GDP pc City/Nation ~ 4,5 percent 
House Prices (AAA, Centre) ~ 200.000 US$ 
House Prices (AAA, Periphery) ~ 50.000 US$ 
Affordability threshold of lower income groups ~ 5.000 US$ 
Number of High-rises 1.200 
Informal Economy ~ 66 percent 
 
Abstract 
Due to its particular topography as a peninsula, Mumbai maintained a centrally oriented 
regional structure and resisted trends of suburbanisation and regional development for a 
long time. This was in particular the case with economic activities. Yet, while today the 
city reaches the 20-million population mark, the city is bursting at its seams. The capital 
of Maharashtra has probably reached a turning point. The economical base is changing. 
A new stream of international investments is arriving. In this context Mumbai is finally 
transforming into an extended and multi-polar region. 
 Illustration C-2: Map of the Mumbai region 
Profile 
The Greater Metropolitan Region of Mumbai is the largest urban area in India. It com-
prises 4.360 square kilometres. Greater Mumbai amounts to 470 square kilometres, 
while the rest takes up 3.890.94 (Cf. MMRDA 2008) 
Greater Bombay‘s population, currently 19 million (cf. Demographia 2008), is bigger 
than that of 173 countries in the world (Mehta: 16). 6,3 percent of all Indians live in the 
region. These 6,3 percent generate more than a tenth percent of the country’s GDP. (Cf. 
Appendix: Comparative Matrix) 
Population growth – ebbing up 
The population is growing at rate of 2,2 percent per annum (cf. UN-Habitat 2001) and is 
estimated to reach 22,3 million in the year 2011.95 While some projections state that 
                                               
92 Cf. the General Indicators Table in the Appendix 
93 Cf. Indicus.net, r23.94.2009 
94 Until 1968, the urban built up area of the BMR (Bombay Metropolitan Region) measured 235 square kilometres. The 
Regional Plan of 1973 had classified 523 square kilometres as urban land (including industries). Reflecting on various trends 
(e.g. informal growth) the revised version of the plan in 1999 defined 1.324 square kilometres as urbanisable. (Cf. MMRDA 
1999: 13.10.3) 
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Mumbai will overtake Tokyo as the most populous city in the world by 2025 (cf. 
Archnet), the relative growth rates are expected to decline in the future. (MMRDA 1999: 
13.5.1.) 
Population distribution – booming periphery 
Mumbai’s population increasingly chooses to live in the periphery. From the 1960s to the 
1980s the ratio of people living in the city and in the periphery has reversed. While in 
196l more than two thirds of the residents lived in the central city, and in the 1970s the 
ratio between city and suburbs was equal, in the 1980s 2/3 of the population is now re-
siding in the suburbs.96 (MMRDA 1999, 3.2.3, Nissel 1997) 
Today a third of the total population remains on the peninsula, 42 percent stay in the 
northern suburbs, and 18 percent in and around New Bombay. At the same time, how-
ever, 72 percent of the jobs remain in the island city compelling millions of people to 
commute.97 (MMRDA 1999, Mehta 2005: 122). 
Mumbai density 
Compactness represents one of the most striking features of Mumbai. The centre is one 
of the densest urban locations in the world. At the turn of the 21st Century the entire 
region featured average population densities of 44 persons per hectare. (Cf. MMRDA-
mumbai.org, r12.10.2008) The area of Greater Mumbai represented mean densities of 
272 people per hectare9899 and distinctive wards even comprised of as many as 1.600 
people per hectare. (Cf. MMRDA 1999) In this context central Mumbai’s ratio of open 
space per each resident is probably among the lowest in the world. “Amenity and open 
spaces for the Island City are strikingly poor and total less than 2 square meter per cap-
ita.”100 (Patel 2007: 2727) A striking number of two-third of all residents are crowded 
into just 5 percent of the total area, while a richer or more rent-protected 30 percent mo-
nopolises the remaining 95 percent.101 (Mehta 2005: 16) 
Zopadpattya – Informal settlements at historical peaks 
“Right now all the state has in its hands is a city in a very advanced state of 
pathological decay, going through the spastic death-throes which superficial 
observation mistakes for ‘energy’“. (Correa 1997 (1965): 315) 
“Failure of creating adequate housing stock has been the principal cause for 
aggravating problems of improvement of slums and maintenance and upkeep 
of existing housing stock. There is a shortage of 45,000 dwelling units per 
annum at present which is likely to increase to 59,000 by 2021 if the supply 
is not increased”. (Cf. MMRDA 1999, N-8: 34) 
                                                                                                                                         
95 Growth rates were highest in the 1950’s and 1960’s. In the decade of 1951-61 population of Mumbai rose by 40 percent 
and in the subsequent decade it shot up by 43.80 percent. (MMRDA 1999: 3.2.4) 
96 Accordingly the growth rate of greater Mumbai decreased from 4 percent in the 1970s to almost 2 percent in the 1990s. 
Most of the region, including Navi Mumbai, boosted growth rates of 6 percent in the 70s and up to 11 percent in the 90s. 
(MMRDA 1999: 3.2.3) 
97 MMRDA (1999) lists more than ten million daily trips by public transport. 
98 Cf. http://www.mcgm.gov.in, r12.10.1008, quoting the Census 2001 
99 New York’s metro region features average urban densities of 18 persons per hectare. 
100 Patel 2007, has compiled some density indicators for Mumbai: The average Built Up Area (BUA) of the peninsula, a 
measure of the ‘personal’ space per ‘user’ amounts to 7,5 square meter per resident and per job. The values decline to 2,5 
square meters is slum locations such as Dharavi. (Manhattans BUA ranges at the eight fold amount of 50 square meters and 
more). Mumbai’s Public Ground Area (PGA), a measure of open spaces per resident, amounts to an average of 6,5 square 
meters during day times. (Manhattans daytime PGA is 13,5 square meters) 
101 Population densities in Dharavi, the biggest slum in Asia, are estimated to reach 4.600 persons per hectare – less than 2 
square meters per person total ground space. (Cf. The Economist 2007) 
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At the same time as the densities and the rents on the peninsula are hitting records the 
informal sector is also reaching historical peaks. While the formal market accommodates 
28 percent of the working population, 72 percent are engaged in informal activities.102 
(Cf. Adusumilli 2001: 19) Around 74 percent of the total population in Greater Mumbai 
stay in one of the 2.355 slums (GoM 2008). The informal communities, or Zopadpat-
tya103, are packed onto five percent of the land. These numbers are even more dramatic 
as we have to remember that the share of informality was not always as high. Unofficial 
populations were almost non-existent in the 1940’s. They rose to a tenth of the popula-
tion in l966, and to 30 percent in 1977. Only ten years ago more than 60 percent of 
Mumbai’s population was classified as slum dwellers. (Katakam 2002, Adusumilli 
2001:19)  
Certainly, this ascendancy of Mumbai’s informal sector has to be regarded as an effect 
of the changing economic base (from organised industrialisation to high-value services), 
in combination with the ongoing migration. While Greater Mumbai features an annual 
deficit of roughly 45.000 houses, less than half of the gap is resolved. The consequence is 
a slum population growing by 22,500 each year.104 (Cf. MMRDA 1999) Densities are 
enormous. With around 4.000 people per hectare Mumbai’s slums take twenty times as 
many people as the city’s conventional neighbourhoods with 230 people per hectare. (Cf. 
above: Densities; Cf. The Economist 2007). 
Ambitious resettlement programmes are not lacking: The most famous redevelopment 
scheme is being implemented in Dharavi, which occupies a large central tract of valuable 
land on the peninsula (The Economist 2007, Bertaud 2008). Here, in Asia’s largest slum 
the permissible FSI has been raised to 4 and private investors are supposed to team up 
with the zopadpatti population to develop the land. Another program being implemented 
by the MMRDA’s Slum Resettlement Authority (SRA), all slum dwellers currently living 
on MMRDA land since 1995 will eventually be resettled into midrise apartment build-
ings in the same part of the city. Conservative estimates place the total population to be 
resettled at four million people (Weinstein, 2005: 2).  
                                               
102 400 to 500 thousand jobs are lacking. (McKinsey 2005: 19) 
103 Shantytown means zopadpatti in Marathi. The plural is zopadpattya. 
104 On the other hand an estimated number of 400.000 residences in the city remain empty. (Cf. Mehta 2005: 117) 
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Risks and disasters 
“Mumbai is a city in perpetual crisis.” (Sethi 2006) 
Similar to many other megacities in developing regions Mumbai is in a constant status of 
emergency. Responsible for the situation is no singular problem, but a generally in-
creased vulnerability level. At the same time this condition is an important motive for 
people to move to Navi Mumbai and other suburban locations.105 Mumbai is a scenery 
of big and small catastrophes and disasters. The global effects of climate change aggra-
vate the regular flooding. Low conditions of basic infrastructure increase the generally 
rising vulnerability levels. 
 Illustration C-3: Charles Correa’s boiling frog 
Mumbai’s land rises barely more than 10 to 15 metres above sea level. Its storm water 
drainage system is more than 100 years old. The city is prone to frequent flooding. This 
is the case in particular during the monsoon time. Aged or lacking canal infrastructure is 
aggravating the effects. The Maharashtra floods on July 26 and 27 2005 caused havoc in 
the city. More than 1.000 people died and the city came to a standstill. Major infrastruc-
tures broke down and transport services were suspended. While the same rain fell in 
Navi Mumbai the New Town was barely affected. 
The city‘s residents also suffer from severe air pollution. Particulate matter levels 
amount to an unsafe 1.000 micrograms of per cubic metre (mcm) while the WHO norm 
is 150 mcm. (Cf. McKinsey 2003: 18) Smog occurs in the heavily congested island city, 
and also in suburban locations. While motorised traffic is the main source of contamina-
tion in the centre, peripheral locations often suffer from garbage dumps and heavy indus-
tries. Navi Mumbai, for example, is exposed to high levels of toxic and carcinogenic 
chemicals released by neighbouring chemical industries. (Cf. Bathija 2005) 
Water borne diseases are on a constant rise, too.106 A significant percentage of water 
in the city is contaminated with excessive bacterial pollution and thus undrinkable.107 
Moreover the 90 million rats supposed to live in the city cause severe hygienic (and secu-
rity) problems mainly in the slum areas. (Cf. Kshirsagar 2006) 
Many of Mumbai’s (and India’s) daily risks and hazards are related to a precarious 
state of the country’s infrastructure: Commuter train cars take more than 500 people on 
an average, piped water in the city is limited to 180 litres per capita per day, one million 
people are supposed to share 17 toilets (in theory), only 10 percent of waste is properly 
disposed, and power cuts are on a daily agenda. (McKinsey 2005: 17) 
The list of urban risks is extended by traffic accidents.  The city recorded 25.000 traf-
fic accidents in 1994 and about 35 people per day die in accidents on the railroad system. 
Crime rates though are significantly lower than in other‚ world-class cities, despite the 
stark contrasts among incomes, ethnicities and cultures, and prevalent stories of mafia-
like wars (cf. Mehta 2005, Imhasly 2005). Only 20 crimes occur per 1.000 people per 
year.108 (McKinsey 2003: 18) 
                                               
105 Charles Correa 1989 compares this level of increased vulnerability to the condition of a frog in a hot pot that is slowly 
boiling to death in a state of euphoria, as it is unable to perceive the rising temperature. 
106 For the past 10 years, the city has been witnessing a seasonal increase in the number of cases of leptospirosis, malaria, 
dengue and gastroenteritis during the monsoons.” (Cf. Kshirsagar 2006) 
107 A study conducted by the Society for a Clean Environment for the MMRDA found bacterial contaminations in 20 percent 
of all samples. Significantly, some middle-class housing areas, which were surrounded by slums, had the worst water quality. 
(Cf. Sekhar 2003) 
108 There were a total of 360 registered murder cases in the whole city in 1996. (Cf. Bathija 2005) With more than 40 peo-
ple per 100.000 the murder rate of São Paulo of the late 1990‘s was more than 100 fold. (Cf. The Economist 2008) 
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On the other hand Mumbai is a hotspot of regular terrorism and riots, due to the fact 
that it is an ethnic melting pot and in the midst of national and global media attention. 
When communal rioting swept the city in 1992 along battles between Hindus and Mus-
lims, around 200 people were killed. During 2005 riots demonstrators burnt 30 state 
buses and damaged 576 more. (Cf. Imhasly 2005) 207 persons died on July 11th 2006 
when several bombs exploded in the commuter train network etc. 
Despite all the above problems Mumbai represents a context of relative safety, toler-
ance and solidarity. The low crime rates are associated with a cultural context of toler-
ance and passivity (cf. Vilaça 2002) and to the cosmopolitan flair of the mega city (Me-
hta 2005). The media finally produces much of the buzz around insecurity and crime. 
This mainly relates to highly sensitised levels of perception of certain risks and dangers 
and the neglect of others. 
Drivers of regionalisation 
Deindustrialisation 
Suburbanisation not only occurs in terms of population movements, jobs are migrating 
to the periphery as well. In this context Mumbai’s industrial sector has witnessed an 
exodus to the suburbs in the past years.109 
In the past the city was largely based on trade and industry. The port, as well as the 
cotton mills were an integral part of the core city.110 111 Yet, from the mid 60s onwards 
the total number of industries shrank from 250.000 to less than 40.000 today.112 Yet, the 
sites of the Cotton Mills and the harbour still dominate large parts of the southeastern 
peninsula. (Cf. MMRDA 1999: 6.1; D'Monte 1991, 2007) 
Economic performance 
In spite of this, Mumbai remains the undisputed ‘Urbs Primus Indis’, i.e. the most impor-
tant economic centre and the global city of India. (Cf. Nissel 1997) The new boom is 
based on the tertiary services sector. In particular, financial services are the foundation of 
Mumbai’s role as a world city.113 In this context Mumbai generates 25 percent of India’s 
Gross Domestic Product (cf. Demographia 2007), 70 percent of India’s stock market 
transactions and 38 percent of the nation‘s tax revenues (Mehta 2005: 17). Mumbai also 
attracts a large share of international capital.114The city’s 2007 GDP per capita of US$ 
6.500 amounted to 10 times the national number.  
Transportation and communication data reflect the financial weight: Mumbai’s Inter-
national Airport handles 40 percent of all international traffic to the nation. Moreover, 
the region accounts for 30 percent of India’s cellular line subscribers. (Cf. TECS 2003: 
30) The city’s stock exchange, the BSE, is Asia’s oldest and worldwide the biggest in 
terns of listed companies.115 116 
                                               
109 Navi Mumbai is facing one of the largest industrial zones in the region the Thane-Belapur Industrial Area (TTC). (Cf. 
below: Regional structure) 
110 In 1965 the cotton industry accounted for half of the industrial force. 
111 Today the region has a rising share of petro and pharmaceutical industries. 30 percent of Indian pharmaceutical products 
are produced in Mumbai. (Cf. MMRDA 1999) 
112 Cf. MMRDA 1999, 4.1; cf. Nissel 1997 quoting the “Indian Architect & Builder” 1997 
113 The Globalisation and World City Research Network verifies a relatively strong level of world city formation. (Cf. GaWc 
1999) 
114 In the 1990’s, for example, 42 percent Foreign Direct Investments from Germany went to the city. (Cf. Nissel 1997: 51) 
115 With a market capitalisation of US$ 1.79 trillion, it was the largest stock exchange in South Asia and the tenth largest in 
the world. (World Federation of Exchanges 2007: http://www.world-exchanges.org/publications/EQU1107.pdf; r28.08.2008) 
The market capitalisation in 1980 was 7,5 billion and in 1993 70 billion US$ Dollar. (Cf. Nissel 1997) 
116 Cf. Website of BSE India: http://www.bseindia.com/about/st_key/list_cap_raised.asp, r28.08.2008 
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Nevertheless in relative terms Mumbai’s economic supremacy is decreasing. While the 
current economic growth amounts to 2,4 percent per annum (Cf. Mc Kinsey 2005), 
competition with the Capital City Region of Delhi as well as the Southern High-Tech 
centres of Bangalore, Chennai and Hyderabad, is growing.117 (Cf. Gotsch 2007) 
Housing prices in Mumbai, affordability levels 
Mumbai is not only among the most densely packed; it is also among the most expensive 
places in the world. Indeed, today the exorbitant prices in the centre represent a strong 
factor driving significant numbers of the population to suburban locations. 
Land in Mumbai is a highly treasured commodity. Extreme topographical conditions 
– 70 percent of the peninsula has been reclaimed from the sea – along with the above 
described economic and demographic pressures have led to property prices on the island 
city being comparable only to those of prime locations in New York, London or Mos-
cow.118  
Residential apartments in South Central Mumbai may cost around US$ 10.000 to 
US$ 15.000 per square meter.119 Accordingly an apartment of 100 square meters can cost 
from US$ 50.000 to several millions. At the same time annual incomes range around US$ 
6.000.120  
Indeed, the difference between India’s prices for luxury homes and those for the aver-
age population is immense. The house price to income ratio121, reflecting the housing 
market in the most expensive locations, is an exorbitant high number of 1.200 per cap-
ita.122 (Cf. globalpropertyguide.com, r03.09.2008) 
And while average household incomes have grown by 15-25 percent annually during 
the last decade, prices for residential real estate have skyrocketed by 50 to 300 percent 
only between 2003 and 2007, before there was a correction by mid 2008.123 Conse-
quently the available supply largely targets high-end consumers with a household income 
of over INR 20 lakh (~ US$ 40.000) per annum (Ibidem). As a result, Mumbai is listed as 
Asia's third and the world's sixth most expensive location to rent a three-bedroom 
apartment.124  
Mumbai’s exorbitant property prices are also affected by a set of local regulations and 
codes. Alain Bertaud, an independent consultant for urban development claims that the 
1942 Rent Restriction Act in particular has contributed to the collapse of large parts of 
the housing fabric. And while in general the urban fabric had to comply with FSI regula-
tions of 1 it largely contributed to a supply gap and skewed land prices.125 
Real estate in the periphery 
While prime properties in the central locations remain popular, demand is also rapidly 
spreading outwards. Indeed, Mumbai’s peripheral locations are not only attracting poor 
immigrants and workers attached to relocated industries, but a recent focus of suburban 
development is targeting ‘new’ economies and middle-income groups. Accordingly the 
real estate prices reflect an inclination towards suburban locations where prices for resi-
                                               
117 International firms choose to invest in these locations, because the labour cost is abundant and cheap, government 
subsidies are generous, and labour costs and living expenses are significantly lower than in Mumbai. 
118 Recent data from the ‚Global Property Guide‘ (Cf. http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/, cf. Murchie 2007) 
119 INR 25.000 per sqf, Cf. http://www.globalpropertyguide.com 
120 In addition, astronomical deposit payments of 100.000 US$ and more have to be paid for rental apartments. 
121 The house price to income ratio is the ratio of the cost of a typical upscale housing unit of 100 square metres, compared to the 
country’s GDP per capita. (Cf. globalpropertyguide.com, r03.09.2008) 
122 This is almost 17 times of Indonesia’s and 11 times of China’s rate. 
123 Cf. Indiaproperty.com 2008, quoting a report by the market research agency Crisil 
124 Cf. http://www.buzzle.com/articles/the-ups-and-downs-of-mumbai-properties.html; r03.09.2008 
125 Indian cities feature the lowest Floor Area Ratios worldwide. (Cf. below; cf. Bertaud 2002, 2004) 
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dential space amount to 15 to 25 percent of the inner city locations.126 While demand for 
luxury apartments in the South and Central Mumbai remains buoyant, residential devel-
opments in Mumbai’s northern suburbs of Goregaon, Kandivili, and the peripheral loca-
tions of Vashi and the Thane – Belapur Road portray a rapidly rising demand. This is 
mainly due to lower capital values and better amenities catering primarily to middle in-
come populations. (Cf. Cushman & Wakefield 2008) 
Structure of the city and region – Unique ‘spatial’ dilemma 
„The special dilemma of Bombay is its structural pattern... Being an Island... 
Bombay has developed on a longitudinal axis... most of the problems arise 
from this longitudinal development... there is a heavy concentration on the 
South.“ (Correa 1997 (1965): 319)  
The most significant morphological feature of Mumbai is the fact that, like Manhattan, 
the central city is located on a longitudinal peninsula. Initially the area was composed of 
seven islands. 70 percent of the land has been wrung from the sea. The combination of 
the islands resulted in a longitudinal shape that is the primary determinant of Mumbai’s 
spatial development. Accordingly the city's infrastructure runs parallel to this North-
South axis and has provided a basis for settlement over the past two hundred years. (Cf. 
Archnet) 
Yet, in contrast to Manhattan, the city has almost no direct links to the main land on 
the East. For most of Mumbai’s history the regional structure has remained strongly cen-
tral. Only recent trends point to the emergence of a multiplex urban region. At the same 
time Mumbai remains a financial and political centre. Notably the new region can be 
conceptualised at two levels, as a pentagon and as a network.127 
Growth trend – bias to the Northwest 
For decades, Mumbai‘s spatial development has followed a mono-centric and linear 
pattern of growth to the North. Office and commercial activity were concentrated at the 
southern end of the city, whereas the industrial and residential development has spread 
northwards along the suburban rail corridors. (MMRDA 13.11.1) Notably Navi Mum-
bai was supposed to change this dominant pattern, yet it did not essentially succeed – 
mainly due to a lack of connecting infrastructure. Yet, this may ultimately change as ma-
jor East-West arteries are planned today (cf. McKinsey 2003), among them a 25 kilome-
tre trans-harbour-link from South Mumbai to the core of Navi Mumbai (cf. below). 
Following the general trend, Mumbai’s elite so far has moved along the prevailing 
South-North direction. As the harbour and the mills have taken up large parts of the 
eastern peninsula, Mumbai’s elite moved to the North, mainly along the Arabian Sea. A 
significant exodus of middle income and elite populations to the suburbs started in the 
1980s. Bollywood defined the direction. Bandra, Andheri and Juhu became in vogue lo-
cations. (Cf. Nissel 1997) 
New urban centres 
Recently Central Mumbai has seen the development of a series of interior centres. The 
shape of this arrangement resembles a pentagon. (Cf. MMRDA 1999: 13.11.1) While 
                                               
126 Cushman Wakefield reports for the first quarter of 2008 residential capital values in central locations of 30.000 INR/sqf 
(US$ 7.500 per square meter) and in peripheral locations at 7.000 INR/sqf (ca US$ 2.000 per square meter). (Cf. Cushman & 
Wakefield 2008: Mumbai Residential Report 1Q08) 
127 „Mumbai still dominates, but its growth shows signs of tapering off. The urban growth continues to move outwards 
primarily along transport corridors.“ (MMRDA 1999, 13.3 Emerging pattern of growth) 
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Navi Mumbai represents one of the five edges of this form, South Mumbai will remain 
the main edge and a central element of this structure. Other emerging nodes are the Ban-
dra-Kurla Complex, Vashi, CBD of Navi Mumbai, and the area around the J.N. Port. 
(MMRDA 1999: 13.11.1) 
The central pentagon is further linked to an exterior network of rapidly emerging pe-
ripheral centres.128 Besides Navi Mumbai the cities of Thane, Kalyan, Bhiwandi, Mira-
Bhayander, Vasai-Virar, or Panvel, and growth corridors along the Mumbai-Pune high-
way, will play a vital role in absorbing future urban growth. (MMRDA 1999: 13.8.1) 
 Illustration C-4: Mumbai ‘internal’ centre pentagon 
Form of the periphery – structured regionalisation, spontaneous sprawl and private 
enclaves 
Mumbai’s periphery can be characterised as a dynamically changing landscape of sur-
prise. (Cf. Gotsch 2007) This landscape is being generated by planning efforts of struc-
tured regionalisation versus a myriad of unauthorised and informal activities: major in-
frastructure projects, New Towns, development of existing settlements, existing villages 
and towns, informal developments, unauthorised construction activities, private enclaves, 
large scavenging areas for building materials, agricultural lands, forests, water bodies, 
marsh lands etc. 
Yet, all attempts to structure the peripheral development in a planned manner, e.g. to 
plan for a decentralised concentration and to maintain greenbelts, have, more or less, 
failed. Even the planners of the MMRDA have noted that urban growth takes a generic 
path. The urban fabric often follows major infrastructure arteries and develops to a large 
extent in a spontaneous and unorganised manner. As a consequence the city’s planners 
seek to adjust their planning regulations.129 
Unauthorised construction activity 
Mumbai’s periphery is characterised by a stunning disparity between plan and reality. 
One of the most serious features in Mumbai’s periurban hinterlands is the amount of 
unauthorised construction. This development points to a contradiction between town-
down and bottom-up dynamics. New today is that even the public authorities confirm 
that they have been overstrained by the magnitude of development in the peripheries.130 
So the MMRDA 1999 critically attests that “... the development control system in the 
region has remained weak. It has not been able to prevent undesirable development. ... 
The Collector‘s office is not equipped in terms of staff and technical knowledge to handle 
the complex task of development permissions, which sometimes involves large build-
ings”. (MMRDA 1999: 13.3.11) 
Unauthorised construction activities are characterised by the fact that they violate 
building forms or land uses as prescribed in the master plans and development control 
regulations. They can be divided into three groups: 1) informal settlements, 2) illegal but 
solid (pucca) buildings that violate land uses, and 3) solid buildings, which violate zoning 
laws and development controls. Notably unauthorised ‘solid’ (pucca) segments of activi-
ties consume the highest amount of peripheral space. Although slums house a large popu-
lation, they rarely occupy much land; their building structures are mostly non-permanent 
(kucha). The authors of the Regional Plan of the MMRDA confirm that: “Even if the 
                                               
128 All of these featured growth rates of 8 to ten percent in the 1980‘s and 1990‘s. (Cf. MMRDA 1999: 13.5.3) 
129 Growth is increasingly seen as a pointer to possible development pattern. (MMRDA 1999: 13.3.11: Outcomes of the 
Regional Plan – 1973) 
130 MMRDA 1999: 13.3.11: Outcomes of the Regional Plan – 1973 (Cf. below regulation) 
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phenomenal growth of slums, which is the single largest type of unauthorised construc-
tion activity, is not taken into account, the unauthorised construction activity in the re-
gion in the past two decades has been alarming.“ (MMRDA 1999: 14.3.1) 
While numerous New Towns, housing colonies and industries planned by the gov-
ernment failed to develop.131, many ‘unplanned’ locations have seen a boom of spontane-
ous construction activities:132 (Cf. MMRDA 1999: 13.2.1: Outcomes of the Regional 
Plan – 1973) In this context unauthorised industrial developments came up in Mira-
Bhayander, multi-storeyed residential projects in Vasai-Virar, Mumbra and Dombivali, 
informal shops, workshops, and hutments mushroom along the Thane-Belapur Corridor 
in Navi Mumbai. While the development around the Vasai-Virar belt has surpassed the 
expectations of the present Regional Plan by 8.500 ha, the land had to be reclassified 
from ‚G‘- (Green) to U- (urbanisable) zone (MMRDA 1999: 13.3.2). Indeed, it seems 
that planners and government authorities can hardly keep up in accommodating the 
changes in the official documents and become mere passive agents of change.  
Nonetheless other locations see the emergence of serious environmental and health 
risks caused by a toxic melange of new industries and housing. This is for example the 
case with the power loom industry around Bhiwandi and some rural villages at central 
locations which have managed to attract large-scale transport and logistics enterprises.133 
(Cf. MMRDA 1999: 13.3.3) In addition, informal excavation activities of building mate-
rials modify large parts of the regional landscape beyond recognition. 
Box 12: Examples from the G-Zones (Green-Zones) 
A strikingly high amount of unauthorised construction has been underway in the so-
called G-Zones, or Green-Zones of the metropolitan region.134 This development was of 
particular relevance because of its far-reaching impacts on regional eco systems. Plan-
ners and authorities have only recently overcome their lethargy pointing to the learn-
ing potentials of this development which “was to be seen as pointers to possible devel-
opment patterns“. (MMRDA 1999: 13.3.11: Outcomes of the Regional Plan - 1973) 
The exemplary typologies of unauthorised developments in the G-Zone are: expansions 
of village settlements, bungalow settlements on medium sized plots, logistics infrastruc-
ture and highway amenities, as well as various small-scale industries. The characteristic 
projects are many multi-storeyed residential complexes, second homes of the urban 
rich, petrol pumps, shops, restaurants, warehouses, parking spaces, and small-scale in-
dustries. (Cf. MMRDA: 1999, 14.3.3.) These types are mostly constructed in joint venture 
projects of villagers and private builders. The developments reflect the high land values 
and the scarcity of the land in the existing urban centres. (Cf. MMRDA 1999: 13.3.11: 
Outcomes of the Regional Plan - 1973) 
 
A different model emerging in the urban periphery is the large privately developed en-
clave. These are developed either with a residential, or a commercial use, or in a mixed 
manner. Most of these new projects are based on Integrated Township and SEZ pro-
grammes. These allow for 100 percent direct foreign investments, prescribe a minimum 
                                               
131 E.g. The Regional Plan-1973 envisaged these in the Kalyan-Ulhasnagar, Vasai Tehsil, at Rasayani, or to the North of 
Bhiwandi. 
132 E.g. in the Kalyan Complex, Mira-Bhayander and Vasai-Virar area 
133 On the South of Bhiwandi, just outside the Municipal limit, Purne and Rahanal villages have attracted warehouses, which 
have turned the area into an informal truck terminal. (MMRDA 1999: 13.3.3) 
134 A retrospect analysis by the MMRDA reveals that these areas were targeted by unauthorised developments, as there was 
no specific development authority that was in charge of controlling the spatial development of the zones (MMRDA 1999: 
13.3.11) 
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size of several hundred hectares, as well as an autonomous development of infrastructure 
and services. (Cf. above India: SEZs, Integrated Townships) 
This sort of development can also be described as unplanned and spontaneous, be-
cause almost none of the new projects were anticipated in the existing master plans and 
since the SEZ and township schemes are exempt from local development regulations and 
administered by autonomous management bodies. A more problematic issue of these 
private enclaves therefore is their seamless integration into the larger urban fabric as well 
monitoring of the negative externalities they bring about. (Cushman &Wakefield 2008: 
Mumbai Residential Report 1Q08) 
The structure of the newly planned quarters varies according to the economic status of 
the target group. Low budget unauthorised and informal developments mainly utilise 
plated schemes. Residential projects for the middle and upper income classes, as well as 
commercial high-tech service projects, are increasingly built as clustered enclaves.135 (Cf. 
MMRDA 1999) 
 Illustration C-5: The Mumbai-Pune growth corridor 
 Illustration C-6: Impression of the highway 
                                               
135 Which pattern will finally emerge along the prescriptions of the revised Land Regulations of 1999 remains to be seen. 
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Historic milestones 
In addition to a demographic, economic, and spatial profiling of the context, the in-
formed ‘holistic’ view of our topic requires a temporal thread. As a consequence the next 
section presents a chronologic perspective of significant milestones, which are relevant to 
understand the context of Navi Mumbai. The subject will be approached in three steps, 
from a national, a regional and a local perspective. 
 Illustration C-7: Milestone chart India, Mumbai, Navi Mumbai 
India 
India becomes independent in 1947. As with many decolonised nations the country em-
barks on a search to find a new (old) identity. Yet, at first the process headed for inde-
pendence nurtures strong central governments. The young nation is based on state cen-
tralisation, protectionist economic policies, and a tough social welfare system. In the 
1950’s India and Indonesia are among the founding members of the block free movement 
of third world countries. While in the succeeding decades population dynamics, eco-
nomic development and the growth of cities increase contradictory to the centralist ap-
proach, Rajiv Gandhi embarks on a parallel strategy of economic liberalisation and po-
litical decentralisation by the mid-1980s. When a financial debt crisis, triggered by a 
global rise of oil prices, shakes up the country at the end of the 1980s, this results in 
growing pressures to revamp the economic system by global monetary and trade institu-
tions. Prime Minister Narashima Rao initiates the New Economic Program (NEP) by 
1991 and largely advances the efforts of deregulation, decentralisation, liberalisation and 
privatisation. (Cf. Weinstein 2005: 15) In this context cities are more and more regarded 
as integral parts of the economic system and the engines driving economic development. 
As part of the reforms the government seeks to exploit the efficiency of the private sector 
in urban development. Moreover an ongoing quest for foreign investments leads to a 
second wave of liberal reforms at the dawn of the 21st century. Notably these reforms 
also facilitate 100 percent foreign investments in the construction sector and trigger a 
boom of autonomous urban enclaves in the form of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and 
Integrated Townships. 
1950’s: Post-Independence – Nehruvian Era – ‘social distribution of land’ 
The post-independence and post partition years are deeply marked by the charismatic 
leader Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru prefers the Socialist model of development and envisions 
an economy directed by the government. In principle the country maintains the govern-
mental structure of the colonial bureaucracy (archnet, r12.10.08). Under this model a 
Planning Commission is set up. The national Five Year Plan has a central role in Indian 
planning. It is regarded as the main mechanism to achieve a social use of land. (Cf. Shaw 
2004: 36) 
Indian Government of the early post-independence era aims to distribute all wealth 
and burdens equally among all regions of India. In a country of two million villages this 
policy includes a preference of rural areas over urban centres. Cities are handled scepti-
cally and restrained. The policy is entirely supply driven: the government acquires land, 
creates infrastructure and housing, and often builds entire New Towns (e.g. Chandigarh, 
Gandhinagar, Bhubaneshwar; cf. below).136 
                                               
136 The main reason for government intervention is to ensure‚ an optimum social use of land‘. ... Of the policy measures 
taken to achieve the goal of socialisation of urban land, the most important and widely used has been the direct govern-
ment investment in land development. (Cf. Rao 1990) 
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The 1960’s mark the beginning of a process of decentralisation and a more balanced 
development between urban and rural areas. The third national Five Year Plan (1961-66) 
contains an urban planning and land policy imposing norms for the development of ur-
ban land and housing. (Cf. chapter 33, § 27-29) Importantly it also contains a funding 
package for the preparation of master plans and town planning legislations on a state 
level. “At that time the Government was keen to direct the whole process of city building 
... by large scale public acquisition of land.” (Shaw 2004: 40). Navi Mumbai becomes 
one of the model cases of this government led urban development (Ibidem: 44). 
1960’s: Nationalist Era 
After Indira Gandhi becomes the Prime Minister in 1966, the importance of the central 
state apparatus increases even more. The state primarily remains a planner of growth and 
all foreign-owned companies, mainly in the banking and the refining sectors, are nation-
alised. During the seventies, India continues to move closer to the Socialist block. Devel-
opment is often realised in collaboration with the Soviet regime. When in 1974 (about 
the time of Navi Mumbai’s start), the first underground nuclear test is carried out the 
country rises to a nuclear power. 
Box 13: Urban land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act 1976 
The Urban Land Ceiling Act of 1976 represents a piece of legislation, which thoroughly 
represents the government’s rationale of social distribution of land. Depending on the 
location the act provided a limit on the amount of land that an individual, or a corpora-
tion, was allowed to own. The Act sought to prevent speculation based on the monopoli-
sation of urban land and aimed to establish land banks to be redistributed towards social 
ends (such as low-income housing). On the other hand it has led to a scarcity of land on 
the market and a stagnation of development. As a consequence exorbitant rises in land 
prices excluded large parts of the population from formal urban land markets in many 
areas. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001:15) 
1970’s: Increasing diversification and decentralisation 
In 1977 an untouchable K.R. Narayanan becomes president. The event is celebrated by 
some as “the greatest transfer of power in world history and the real devolution of power 
to a real majority of one billion people”. (Cf. Mehta 2005: 43) The date marks the end 
of the unilateral dominance of the government by the Congress Party and an increasing 
diversification and decentralisation of India’s political landscape.137 
1980’s: Volatility and transition 
The political landscape of the 1980’s becomes more volatile. After the assassination of 
Mrs. Gandhi (in her fourth term) in 1984, Rajiv Gandhi becomes the Prime Minister.138 
His government is the first to embark on economic reform policies, as the country is fac-
ing a debt crisis. India’s creditability rating becomes so bad that it was impossible for the 
country to borrow money on the world market.139 The period witnesses a gradual open-
ing up of trade borders and a focus on high technology. 
                                               
137 “The rise of single-state parties has contributed to important changes in national politics. It is an important factor in the 
declining salience of national issues and the growing importance of state-level issues in coalitional strategies.” (Kochhar 
2006 quoting Echeverri-Gent 2001: 30) 
138 ”The important features of R. Gandhi’s reforms in the 1980s are: 1) a relaxation of im- and export barriers, 2) tax incen-
tives for trade, as well as a better access to money; 3) a critical relaxation of licensing requirements for industries...; and 4) 
the deregulation of centrally set prices of intermediate materials”. (Cf. Kochhar 2006: 18) 
139 During the late 1980s India is increasingly dependent on foreign money. This trend leads to a repayments crisis in 1990. 
The annual GDP growth rates drop from 6,9 percent in 1989 to 4,9 percent in 1990 and to 1.1 percent in 1991 (cf. Shrini-
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1990’s Liberalisation and New Economy 
The first Gulf War in 1990 marks a watershed and the end of the nationalist era. The 
war causes oil prices to rise and brings the Indian economy, highly dependent on foreign 
oil reserves, to the edge of bankruptcy. In July 1991 Prime Minister Narashima Rao 
adopts a New Economic Program (NEP). The programme is based on a package of lib-
eral economic and policy reforms inspired by the Washington consensus. (Cf. Pal 2007: 
20) One of the most important elements of the reforms is the attraction of Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) towards an ever increasing set of industries, with special programmes 
geared in particular to Indians living abroad (NRI). This also has significant reverbera-
tions on the urban landscape. (Cf. above, India: Economics, Liberal Reforms) 
By now the Five Year Plans come to acknowledge the importance of urban centres as 
engines of economic growth. Informal settlements are continuously on the rise, and new 
policies seek to fill the housing and infrastructure gaps by mobilising the private sector.140 
(Cf. Ibidem) To liberalise land markets many states (including Maharashtra) repeal the 
Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act (ULCRA) in the year 2007. 
Box 14: 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments 
The 1993 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments are imperative legislations formalis-
ing the existing inclination towards decentralisation and diversification. The under-
standing of these reforms is an essential prerequisite of comprehending existing stake-
holder and power constellations in the Indian context. The Indian Government passes 
these acts facing severe and increasing economic, social and environmental crisis two 
years after the demise of the Soviet Union. The acts ultimately aim at transferring po-
litical and financial authorities (including the local governance) towards elected and 
self-sufficient local (urban and rural) bodies. 
They have severe implications for policy and urban planning: for the first time in Indian 
history every Indian person is allowed to vote, the exclusion of poor informal popula-
tions is no longer possible. (Cf. Shaw 2004: 4) The direct effect on Navi Mumbai is the 
creation of the Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation in 1992, with a board composed of 
2/3 of elected representatives, 30 percent of these reserved for women. (Cf. Anan-
thakrishnan 1998: 16) 
As a consequence contemporary India is marked by conflict and struggle among the dis-
tribution of political powers between the state and local levels.141 While the implemen-
tation of the regulations is consistent, it is also rather sluggish and slow.142 (Cf. Kochhar 
2006: 18) Common frictions, mainly on land issues, are on a daily agenda. (Cf. Shaw 
2004: 54) 
 
Box 15: 1994 National Housing Policy 
                                                                                                                                         
vas 2006). At the same time inflation hits 17 percent, foreign money reserves fall to 1,2 billion US$ (an import reserve for 
two weeks), while the national deficit reaches 10 billion (8,4 percent of the GDP). (Cf. Nissel 1997) 
140 At the same time state governments, facing the regress of federal money, increasingly compete with one another to 
attract new industries, particularly those involving foreign equity. (Cf. Shaw 2004: 54) 
141 The capacity for building permits is among the most debated issues. For a long time local government bodies such as the 
district or village councils (panchayats), had almost no influence when large projects were decided upon and implemented 
by the state. (Cf. below, cf. Gotsch 2007, transl. by the author) Their rising relevance, however, is demonstrated by the 
successfull anti-SEZ protests at many locations. Ongoing protests against the Maha Mumbai SEZ, for example, have led to 
the withdrawal of state support from the project, to the reduction of the zone from 10.000 hectares to 5.000, and to gen-
erous R&R schemes for the residents. (Cf. below: Developers, Strategies, R&R schemes) 
142 Weinstein (2005: 17) confirms, that the amendments contain neither inducements nor penalties for states and localities 
failing to implement the mandates; as a result states have been remarkably slow to pass and enforce their own state-level 
legislations. 
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In the context of the 1990‘s liberalisation programmes, the Indian Government formu-
lates a new demand driven housing policy in 1994.143 Housing is increasingly regarded 
as an integral part of a national economic system. The policy states that “the crucial 
role of government at different levels is not to build houses itself but to make invest-
ments and create conditions where all women and men, especially the poor may gain 
and secure adequate housing, and to remove impediments to housing activity.” (GoI 
from Adusumilli 2001: 13) 
2000’s: Second wave of liberal reforms and real estate boom 
The first decade of the new century brings a series of further economic reforms towards 
an even more open trade, increased foreign investment, continued deregulation of sanc-
tioned industries and an economic development that is increasingly privately driven. Al-
most all of these reforms have essential impact on urban development. (Cf. above India, 
Economic framework, and Real estate boom) 
Among the most prominent programmes are the 2001 SEZ regulations leading to the 
2005 SEZ Act.144 Inspired by the miracle of the Chinese economic boom India is one of 
the first countries that allows for private SEZs that are entirely foreign owned. The Mis-
sion Statement of Navi Mumbai SEZ distils this spirit when it states that, it seeks to “es-
tablish and provide first world business environment in third world setting targeted es-
sentially at transnational corporations operating in high growth sectors and new econ-
omy businesses”. (Cf. Special Economic Zone Navi Mumbai India 2007: 38) 
In addition to the SEZ programmes the government creates a major incentive towards 
the development of urban infrastructure and the alleviation of urban poverty by starting 
the national Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM).145 Importantly this 
programme implicitly aims to push forward the stagnating decentralisation reforms and 
to boost the role of local governments (e.g. Municipal Corporations). 
Mumbai – from ‘Bom Bahia’ to Mumbai 
Mumbai’s 450-year history is mainly influenced by the British occupation. Being a per-
fect natural harbour, the city thrives on trade and serves as the base of the East India 
Company. The seven islands are successively connected and major infrastructure systems, 
e.g. the railways, including the major terminals, are built. Early industrialisation brings a 
cosmopolitan and modern flair. In the new neighbourhoods the question of class be-
comes more important than caste, ethnicity, and language. The city’s population reaches 
650.000 as early as 1872, a number that is only topped by London.  
The urban landscape of post-independence Mumbai is largely shaped by migration 
movements, deindustrialisation, the rise of service economies, a continuous growth of 
slums and middle classes, ethnic riots, as well as regional growth and decentralisation. 
Eventually, the strategic advantage of the insular location, as well as conservative land 
regulations and rent laws, tends to restrain growth and development. Mumbai becomes 
one of the most dense and most expensive cities globally. When in the 1970’s the state 
receives new powers to project its own progress, it drives the regional development. Pow-
                                               
143 The policy brings improved conditions down to the level of housing of the groups that have some income (Low Income 
Groups). On the other hand the situation for the no-income Economic Weaker Section (EWS) of the population worsens. 
”With the State’s role diminishing in direct provision of housing, the field is left open without any players for provision of 
EWS housing.“ (Adusimilli 2001: 15) 
144 “The Special Economic Zones Act, 2005, was passed by Parliament in May 2005, received Presidential approval on June 
23rd 2005, and came into effect on February 10th 2006. It provides simplified procedures of application, establishment, 
operation and fiscal oversight and strengthened the elbowroom for State Governments. (Cf. GoI: Ministry of Commerce at 
www.sezindia.nic.in, r12.10.2008; cf. Ahya (Morgan Stanley), 2006) 
145 Cf. Ministry for Urban Development Jnnurm website: jnnurm.nic.in, r 16.11.2008 
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erful institutions, such as the MMRDA, MIDC, and Cidco, amongst others, appear as 
major players on the urban scene. Massive inflows of foreign money and exceptional 
economic growth rates lead to a major real estate boom, as a result of the national re-
forms. This urban burst is spearheaded by a series of private mega projects (such as the 
Maha Mumbai SEZ), large infrastructure schemes (such as the Sewri-Nhava Sheva trans-
harbour link), but also by an ever-rising mass of unauthorised mushrooming develop-
ments. The rapid dynamic transformation of the city to a multiplex urban makeup chal-
lenges conventional planning approaches.  
Portuguese occupation 
The Portuguese land in Bombay in 1538. 123 years later, in 1661, King John IV of Por-
tugal confers the seven islands to King Edward of England as part of the dowry for his 
daughter Catherine de Braganza. The city has a population of 20.000 (archnet.org, 
r10.10.2008). After 130 years of Portuguese occupation not much more than the Name 
“Bombain” (“good bay, Portuguese “bom bahia”) remains. (Cf. Nissel 1997) “Bombay 
is and remains the model case of a Metropolis formed by the British Empire.” 
British rule (1661 – 1947) 
The city emerges as as a global trading post, when in 1687 the East India Company shifts 
its base from Surat (Cf. Nissel 1997) The fact that the city has one of the best natural 
harbours triggers its exceptional success. The port is defensible and exceptionally deep. 
Due to the American Civil War (1861 - 1865) Mumbai becomes the leading market for 
cotton in the second half of the 19th century. The significance of the port city grows fur-
ther with the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869.  
Mumbai also becomes India’s global gateway in a cultural sense as the cradle of new 
media.146 
Postcolonial Mumbai 
Postcolonial Mumbai is characterised by large population movements. Formed by migra-
tion the urban scenery becomes a ‘migrational landscape’.147 After independence and par-
tition in 1947, Indian elites (mainly Gujarati and Parsi) start to replace the departed Brit-
ish in the prime areas of the city. Thousands of refuges from Pakistani territories arrive. 
At the same time growing middle classes start to descend to the suburbs. 
The massive inflows of foreigners trigger local opposition. In 1960 local political 
movements148 achieve the partition of Maharashtra and Gujarat (cf. archnet.org).149 1965 
is the founding date of the populist, locally oriented Shiv Sena ("sons of the soil") party. 
This group drives the change of Bombay’s name to Mumbai in 1995. Its success is mainly 
built on the rising masses of informal populations as well as the increasing relevance of 
local elections. 
While the state, as much as the national planning bodies, recognise the significance of 
a greater region, they continue to follow a deterministic planning approach. The 
BMRDA’s (now MMRDA’s) Regional Plan of 1973 reflects this spirit. The plan seeks to 
shape the urban structure by setting desired economic and demographic targets for dif-
ferent urban centres in the region.150 (Cf. MMRDA: 1999, 13.4.1.) 
                                               
146 The 1920’s brought with them a studio system and corporate finance. In the 1930’s Bollywood produced 200 movies per 
year. (Cf. http://www.filmeducation.org/secondary/Earth/Bollywood.html; r18.10.2008) 
147 The author sought to elaborate on this term in Gotsch 2005. 
148 E.g. the Samyukta Maharashtra Movement that was formed by the indigenous Hindu Marathi-speaking population. 
149 The new city of Gandhinagar is established as Gujarat’s new capital. 
150 The problems of this approach are listed below at: Regulatory framework, Regulations. 
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Being largely known as India’s tolerant melting pot, in 1992 - a year after the gulf war 
and the following financial crisis - the city is concerned by the eruption of violent riots 
amongst Muslim and Hindu populations.  
As a financial and trade centre, the city thrives on Prime minister Rao’s New Eco-
nomic Program. The 1990’s are marked as a global era. A new prosperity materialises in 
projects such as the Bandra-Kurla complex, a new cluster of office towers that hosts 
some of the most influential Indian and multi-national firms. The mid 1990’s experience 
a major real estate boom which ends in 1995. 
Mounting contradictions, rising rents and growing slum populations, mark the early 
21st century. As a consequence the government seeks to utilize the private sector in eco-
nomic, social and urban development. In spite of that, Mumbai’s progress remains driven 
by specific business elites. In 2003 the business consultancy, McKinsey, develops a list of 
proposals of how to transform the city into a world-class location along the benchmarks 
of London, New York and Singapore. The study is commissioned by the business organi-
sation Bombay First. (Cf. McKinsey 2003) Among its most important proposals is the 
development of major transportation ring systems to open up Mumbai’s and Navi 
Mumbai’s hinterland on the mainland (Ibidem: 15). 
Navi Mumbai 
The Navi Mumbai project, implemented by the Government of Maharashtra, is one of 
the largest planned cities of contemporary times. The proposals to accommodate the spill 
over and shift economic activities from the peninsula to the mainland have a record of 
more than 60 years. Generally Navi Mumbai’s planning history can be divided into two 
main stages which represent opposing features: firstly the new city was supposed to draw 
development away from the central city. Later it found itself pointing towards the 
sprawling metropolis. The early plans to develop a satellite town on the mainland were 
principally motivated by a centrally guided urban-industrial deconcentration and the 
redistribution of wealth towards the state. (These can be associated with the time span 
from 1947 to 1985.) In contrast, the planning approach of the more recent period (after 
1985) reflects a decentred and state driven policy that acknowledges the relevance of 
central cities as engines of economic development. In this context Navi Mumbai firstly 
was an alternative growth core in the environs of the mainland that was supposed to 
steer development away form the main city, before it became an integral part of the mul-
tiplex urban region that reinforces the role of the central city. 
The planning process of Navi Mumbai also illustrates seamlessly the appearance and 
development of state based regional planning institutions and regulations. It is not a co-
incidence that Navi Mumbai develops in the state with the first independent planning act 
(e.g. the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act (RMTP), the first state planning 
and development bodies (such as MIDC, Cidco), as well as the first Regional Develop-
ment Authority (BMRDA) in India. (Cf. below: Regulatory framework) 
Milestones 1940’s – 2000’s 
The late 1940’s and 1950’s are the years of consolidation of planning policies and in-
struments in Mumbai. The 1945 Post-War Development Committee officially recom-
mends the need for urban development on the mainland across from Mumbai Island. (Cf. 
Shaw: 63) 
Greater Bombay comes into existence after the Bombay High Court Act of 1945. This 
regulation encloses the town and island of Bombay, the Port of Bombay, the suburbs and 
42 villages in the new city limit. The Post-War development Committee of 1945 and the 
‘Master Plan in Outline‘ prepared by Albert Mayer and N.V. Modak influence the devel-
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opment of Greater Bombay for the next two decades. (Cf. Dwivendi and Mehrotra, 
1995; and Ananthakrishnan: 4) The Modak Mayer Plan is the first of many policy pa-
pers to propose development on the mainland to address the limits of Mumbai's natural 
geography and the challenges of its overpopulation. The scheme stresses a controlled 
development of the city, its suburbs and satellite towns, including an underground rail-
way, etc. While it has only an informal status, it was discussed in great detail. (Cf. Shaw 
2004: 63)  
In 1948, the Bombay Buildings Control Act provides for restrictions in industrial loca-
tions on the island, and thus prepares the ground for decentralisation policies to come. 
(Cf. Shaw 2004: 63) 
The 1951 Municipal Corporation Act introduces new zoning and land use regulations 
and reconfirms the former deindustrialisation policies. Moreover the 1954 Town Plan-
ning Act makes it mandatory for the local authorities to draw a development plan for the 
city. 
Before the Town Planning Act is approved in 1958, the state government appointed 
the State Study Group on Greater Bombay under S.G. Barve to re-examine the Modak-
Mayer Plan. The ‘Barve Report’ of 1961 recommends the ban of heavy industries from 
the island, confirms most of the strategies of Modak-Mayer, proposes the Bandra-Kurla 
Complex, a public housing programme of 25.000 dwelling units per year and the build-
ing of a public underground transport system. It also recommends developing the 
mainland across the harbour and to construct a bridge across the Thane Creek.151 
The 1965 MARG magazine quotes the most important passage of this ‘Barve Report’: 
“The Communications and Traffic Panel have therefore viewed the problem from the 
wider angle, and it is on this account that its first and main recommendation is to the 
effect that the error of history must be corrected and the handicap of geography must be 
overcome by developing a city on the mainland-side of the Bay. ... it would open up the 
possibility of the development of a new township, which would in time not only draw 
away from the island of Bombay the over-flow of the industrial units and residential 
colonies, but also enable the City to develop in an orderly manner... there is little doubt 
that the development of the mainland... would really be a master stroke.” (Barve Report 
(1961), quoted in Correa 1965(97): 324) 
In March 1964, in accordance with the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954, the Mu-
nicipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (MCGB) submits the Development Plan for 
Greater Bombay (DPDB). The plan implies the relocation of a considerable amount of 
industries to the suburbs.152 Yet it is sharply criticised for stopping at the municipal 
boundary and ignoring earlier recommendations.153  
An important milestone and mouthpiece of critique for Navi Mumbai is the 1965 is-
sue of MARG (Modern Architects Research Group). Here, three young architects as well 
as an engineer – Charles Correa, Pravina Mehta, and Shirish Patel – along with several 
senior government officials, seek to challenge the limitations of the Development Plan for 
Greater Bombay, drawing concrete visions for a new city on the mainland.154 MARG’s 
                                               
151 Anapurna Shaw (2004: 62) quotes Brahme 1977 who describes the extreme centralisation of the megalopolis Mumbai in 
the Maharashtra in the 1960’s: “Maharashtra,... in spite of being India‘s economically most advanced state, had a very 
unbalanced distribution of jobs and wealth. In the 60‘s 60 percent of all factory workers and 88 percent of all joint-stock 
companies were located in Greater Mumbai. In 1961, the per capita income of Greater Mumbai was Rs 1,025, and for the 
rest of Mumbai it was Rs 330... 
152 “The number of industries that would have to be moved to conforming zones in the immediate future is about 2.000 in 
the city and 400 in the suburbs.“ (MCGB, 1964, from Shaw 2004: 43) 
153 Cf. Correa 1965, Nissel 1997; Cf. Personal Interview with Shirish Patel from August 2006 
154 The relevance of the 1965 MARG document is stressed when Charles Correa comments in retrospect: “It is doubtful 
whether there has been any intervention in the development of a major city as decisive as that of the June 1965 issue of 
Marg.“ (Correa 1997: 312) 
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vision draws up for the first time a blueprint for a possible development on the mainland 
suggesting the creation of single town magnet of “equal prestige and importance”. (Cf. 
Shaw 2004: 71) 
The state government accepts the Navi Mumbai idea. (Cf. Shaw 2004: 74) In 1966 
the Maharashtra Economic Development Corporation (MEDC) appoints a study group 
(with Correa, Patel, Mehta) to prepare plans for the area. 
The idea for the development is diversified and refined as in 1966 the Gadgil (D.R. 
Gadgil) Committee Report proposes to move heavy industry to the mainland, to develop 
the area along a scheme of multiple nuclei, to pass a Regional Planning Act and to estab-
lish a Regional Planning Authority. As a consequence the state passes the 1966 Ma-
harashtra Regional and Town Planning Act (MR&TP Act) becoming the first state with 
a comprehensive planning legislation.155 
Later the MR&TP Act serves as an important legal basis for the definition of land 
uses and the dispossession of land by the state government in order to develop Navi 
Mumbai in the late 1970’s.156 
Maharashtra is also the first state to establish an independent industrial development 
corporation, the Maharashtra Industrial and Development Corporation (MIDC), with 
the aim of promoting a deconcentrated industrial development in the state.157 (Cf. Shaw 
2004: 61) 
A Draft Regional Plan by the MEDC group around the MARG group in 1970 ex-
plores various growth scenarios such as internal restructuring, a multi-town structure, 
development along linear corridors and the idea of an alternate magnet. Inspired by the 
widely circulated ideas of Ebenezer Howard’s Town Magnet the group recommends put-
ting forward the magnet solution. 
The state government, serious about implementing the scheme, decides to launch an 
independent implementing body in 1971. The City and Industrial Development Corpora-
tion, or Cidco, is conceived as a state owned enterprise. It is supposed to perform with 
the sovereignty and along the effectiveness of the private sector, but in a non-profit man-
ner.158 
Accordingly Cidco is set up as a public limited company under the Indian Companies 
Act.159 Designated as the New Town Development Authority for Navi Mumbai, it starts 
to draft a development plan for the new city in October 1971. (Cf. Shaw 2004: 83) 
The plan for the new city becomes fully institutionalised and legalised by its full inte-
gration in the first Regional Plan for the Bombay Metropolitan Region in 1973.160 (Cf. 
MMRDA 1999). 
In 1973 Cidco prepares a comprehensive Draft Development Plan for the new city 
combining the major principles, goals and implementation strategies. The plan is sanc-
tioned by the state in 1979. It remains valid to-date with only a hand full of minor 
                                               
155 Shaw (2004:79) confirms “The Gadgil committee‘s recommendations were landmark recommendations from the point 
of view of metropolitan planning in India.“ ... “The state of Maharashtra has been the first to pass legislation on metropoli-
tan planning.” 
156 Section 22 of the MR&TP Act regulates the acquisition of land while the power to define land uses is regulated by Sec-
tion 31Cf. Anathakrishnan 1998: 6 
157 As one of the first and major projects the MIDC planned and developed the Trans Thane Creek (TTC) Industrial Area 
(commonly referred as the Thane Belapur Industrial Area (TBIA). (Cf. Ghorpade) 
158 Shaw (2004: 72) traces this construction back to Howard’s ideas on the management and administration of his Town 
Magnet by an independent civic trust. 
159 More specifically Cidco is set up as a subsidiary of the State Industries and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra (SII-
COM). (Cf. Correa 1997) Charles Correa approves the insight of SIICOM’s principal Chini Srinivasan of setting up Cidco as 
an independent development body: “Chini Srinivasan (IAS officer and founder of SIICOM –) understood that: “the restruc-
turing of a great metropolis would require the kind of vision and decisive action that was beyond the reach of a conven-
tional government department.“ (Cf. Correa 1997: 314) 
160 This plan proposes to develop Navi Mumbai as an independent centre with an own economic base with a planned popu-
lation of two million to be achieved by the year 1991. (Cf. Ghorpade) 
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amendments. (Cf. Ananthakrishnan 1998: 7) Notably Cidco’s structure plan abandons 
the idea of a single town centre and plans for a string of 20 nodes connected by rapid 
mass transit. (Cf. below: Navi Mumbai, Structure) 
The opening of the Vashi Bridge in 1973 gives the plans for the new city a big push. 
The implementation of the first node of Vashi starts immediately and is sustained by the 
successful shift of  the regional wholesale market to Vashi in 1980. 
The 1980s and early 1990s are years of slow but continuous development. With a 
population of less than 500.000 in 1996 Navi Mumbai is far from the target of the 2 
million residents it had aimed to reach by 1991. An important factor is the fact that the 
government withdraws its plans to relocate to the new city – decision referred to as “a 
complete slap in the face of New Bombay” (Rahul Mehrotra quoted by Mehta 2005: 
121). The government, along with other prime businesses, instead heads to Nariman 
Point, a speculative development at the tip of the peninsula. Another important aspect is 
the moving away of the IT sector to newly emerging places such as Bangalore, Chennai, 
and Hyderabad. At the same time, in Navi Mumbai, the federal Environment (Protec-
tion) Act of 1986 introduces a 500-meter protection zone at the shoreline and makes 
necessary the replanning of major parts of the new city (e.g. the Ulwe node is almost 
eliminated). 
By 1992 a new rail link from Victoria Terminal to Belapur is inaugurated. Mumbai’s 
downtown is now within a reach of 40 minutes. The same year also marks the comple-
tion of several nodes in the northern part of the New Town, as well as the transfer of the 
nodes to the newly inaugurated Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation. 
Nationalist and populist movements mark the mid 1990’s. (Cf. Nissel 1997) Major re-
ligious riots occur in 1993. Shiv Sena as well as the BPJ political parties become more 
and more popular. In 1995 Bombay is renamed ‘Mumbai’ and New Bombay ‘Navi 
Mumbai’. In addition Cidco is forced to introduce special purchase quotas for the resi-
dents of Maharashtra.  
The 1996 repeal of the MR&TP Act marks an end to the strategy of the development 
of alternate growth centres and signifies that Mumbai emerges as a multiplex urban re-
gion which needs evenly distributed development. 
The late 1990’s and early 2000’s bring about a development oriented at the IT sector, 
privatisation and massive inflows of direct foreign investment. Cidco looses many former 
funds and subsidies as a result of the federal New Economic Programme that engenders a 
larger shift form supply driven towards demand driven housing policies.  
When in 1998 new coastal zone regulations161 become implemented a significant 
amount of Navi Mumbai’s developable land is chopped away. While only 8 out of the 
planned 20 nodes are completed the planned number is reduced to 14.162 (Cf. Shaw 
2004: 101) Nodes such as Ulwe are eliminated. Major areas are re-planned and the 
original land use distribution is significantly altered.163 
In the 2000s Kharghar, Ulwe, and Dronagiri are being developed for another 400 to 
500 thousand residents while the areas have the 3 to 6 fold size of the earlier nodes.164 
Acting increasingly along the lines of private developers Cidco embarks on the SEZ train 
in 2004. It teams up with various national and international corporations and develops 
Ulwe and Dronagiri in the manner of Special Economic zones under the umbrella of the 
                                               
161 E.g. the federal costal zones regulations of 1991 
162 Vashi, Sanpada, Nerul, Belapur, New Panvel, Kalamboli, Airoli, and Koparkhairane 
163 The Ministry of Environment and Forest, Govt. of India, by a notification issued under the Environment (Protection) Act, 
1986, has notified a belt of 500 meters from the high tide line along sea coast, bays, estuaries, river and backwaters as a 
Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ). (MMRDA: 13.3.14.) 
164 1.600 to 2.500 ha, older nodes had 300-600 ha 
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Navi Mumbai SEZ. Soon after the first fully private SEZ on the subcontinent, the Maha 
Mumbai SEZ, is planned on 10.000 hectares in the environs.165   
At the beginning of the 21st century Navi Mumbai emerges as an integral part of 
Mumbai’s thriving and multiplex urban region. The area and its environs (i.e. the Mum-
bai Pune corridor) experience a major real estate boom. The boom is based on several 
privately developed SEZ and Integrated Township schemes, but also on a huge mass of 
unauthorised developments. Several gigantic infrastructure projects of international rele-
vance increase the overall attraction of the mainland. Among these is a new international 
Airport, as well as a new trans-harbour toll road connection to downtown Mumbai. (Cf. 
below: Physical Structure: External Infrastructure). 
By 2007, after widespread protests in the country, the state government withdraws its 
unconditional support for the privately developed Maha Mumbai SEZ and limits the 
maximum size of the project to 5.000 hectares.166 
The international financial crisis of October 2008 leads to the end of the speculative 
real estate boom for the time being. 
                                               
165 Leading developer of the zone is Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance Industries, one of the largest Indian industrial conglomer-
ates. 
166 “Government on Wednesday said it has extended by one year the in-principle approval to Reliance Industries' Maha 
Mumbai SEZ but asked the promoters to cut the size of the zone to 5,000 hectares in line with the new rules”. ... Besides, 
the Commerce Ministry has also asked Mukesh Ambani-owned RIL to ensure that the land acquisition for the project must 
be done with the consent of the owners and the state government makes no compulsory acquisition. (Cf. kvcindia.com/blog 
2007, r12.10.2008) 
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Predecessors and role models 
“New towns are as old as the history of urbanization. Today‘s new towns 
are tomorrow‘s historic towns. And yesterday‘s new towns are today‘s his-
toric towns. The present is always transitory. We pay either attention to the 
past or to the future.” (Maitra 2007: 132) 
Box 16: List of selected New Town milestones in India 
Mohenjodaro, Harappa (2500 B.C.); Fatehpur Sikri (Mogul Akbar, 1571); Jaipur (1726); 
Delhi‘s 7+ capitals (1700 bc – 2008); Shimla (1834); Calcutta (1715); Jamshedpur (1920); 
New Delhi (Lutyens and Baker, 1929); Chandigarh (Le Corbusier, 1953); Bhubaneshwar 
(Koenigsberger, 1948); Durgapur (Stein, Polk, 1952); Rourkela (1958); Gandhinagar 
(Mewada, Apte, 1960); Auroville (Alfassa, 1968); Navi Mumbai (Correa, Mehta, Patel, 
1971); DLF City, Gurgaon (DLF, 1975); Vidyadhar Nagar (Doshi, 1991); Cyberabad (CDA, 
1997); New Town Kolkata (1999); Magarpatta (Magar, 2000); Hiranandani Gardens 
Powai (Hafeez Contractor, 1986); NMSEZ, Navi Mumbai (McClier, 2005).* 
* The brackets contain the name of the leading ‘author’ of the New Town (either the Architect, the Planner, or the Devel-
oper) as well as the date of breaking ground. 
 
Navi Mumbai is not only embedded in a spatio-political and economic context as de-
scribed above. The new city across the Thane Creek is also part of a long history of 
planned cities, in India as well as internationally. As a result, it combines cosmologic 
aspects of the traditional Indian City (e.g. Vastu Shastra), Mahatma Gandhi’s social 
principles, the scientific maxims of New Delhi and the modern aesthetics of Chandigarh, 
as well as important axioms of the British New Town movement. Moreover, the newest 
segments of the city (and its environs) are increasingly built as urban enclaves, affected 
by the North American typologies of gated communities, Chinese Special Economic 
Zones, Dubai’s skylines and contemporary Indian ‘Integrated Townships’.167 
In this respect it makes sense to break up Navi Mumbai’s models into the two groups 
of predecessors and peers. While the first segment contains the influential projects com-
pleted before the implementation of the new city, the second group relates to parallel 
typologies. The precursors are dominated by innovations in the planning and design. At 
the same time the peers are characterised by global economic and cultural trends. 
India’s New Town tradition 
It is possible to ground Navi Mumbai’s evolution in India’s urban history alone. India’s 
New Towns are as old as the subcontinent’s 5.000-year history. Cities such as Mohenjo-
daro and Harappa are among the oldest cities in the world. The subcontinent is one of 
the cradles of urban dwelling forms on our planet. If there is one main aspect that char-
acterises planned cities it is probably one of power. Throughout all of history rulers used 
new towns as instruments to enforce capacity and control. (Cf. Maitra: 2007) 
Ancient times – emblematic principles of Vastu, Shilpa and Shastra 
In ancient times city building in India is based on elaborate regulations and standards 
(Shilpa Shastras). After Alexander the Great conquers the subcontinent by the 4th cen-
                                               
167 Ananthakrishnan 1998 categorises the historical evolution of the built form of Indian cities into 5 phases: A) Hindu Phase 
(Temple, Square, Mandala, Caste System); B) Islamic influenced Phase (Mosque, Courtyards, Bazaar, ethnic enclaves); C) 
Colonial Phase; D) Postcolonial Phase & New Economy. (Ananthakrishnan:21; cf. also to Maitra) 
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tury B.C. and introduces an urban planning and design system organised along cosmic 
principles (e.g. the Chanakya‘s Arthashastra). (Cf. Maitra: 2007) The emperor sees the 
distribution of settlements along a regional hierarchy as the cornerstone of efficient ad-
ministration and military control (Ibidem). 
The structural organisation of the early planned settlements is based on a cosmic in-
terpretation of space and summarised in Shilpa Shashtras. These are used as planning 
codes and prescribe desirable characteristics for sites and buildings based on the flow of 
energy. Planning and design is based on paradigms of climate, soil, land use, building typol-
ogy, road layout and space division. The essential planning instrument is the Vastupu-
rusha Mandala.168 The mandala is basically a metaphysical diagram. It is employed in 
Indian site planning and architecture and represents essential formal arrangements such 
as hierarchically organised orthogonal systems of quadrants with a holy site at the centre 
(Ibidem: 131, 132). 
The principles of Vastu, Shilpa and Shastra remain highly significant in India’s urban 
planning tradition. They are mainly inherited through temple design.169 Navi Mumbai’s 
node of Kopar Khairane, the site of significant site-and-service projects, has been de-
signed in this way.170 Moreover, in our era of increasing global standardisation and ho-
mogenisation, the traditional Vastu principles experience a strong esoteric revival and 
reclaim mainstream popularity. Many contemporary buildings assert to be designed 
along the Vastu Shilpa maxim. 
Medieval times – Moghul monuments 
In the Medieval times new cities are constructed in a Mogul Islamic tradition. Fatehpur 
Sikri (1571) and Jaipur (1727) are among the prominent examples171. These are new 
capitals and centres of power. The architectural and urban planning tradition is geared 
towards monumental structures. The era produces a great number of India’s landmark 
buildings which form India’s contemporary ‘brand’ (e.g. Taj Mahal, the Red Forts of 
Agra and Delhi, the Ensembles of Jaipur and Fatehpur Sikri) inspiring the subsequent 
generations. 
Colonial New Towns – between Enlightenment and control  
A next generation of New Towns arrives with the colonisation of the continent. The Brit-
ish rulers import their own town planning traditions and construct several types of indi-
vidual settlements:  
- Civil lines‘ and ‚cantonments‘ (e.g. Secunderabad in Hyderabad) are built as de-
tached low density cities or New Towns (Ibidem: 137), and are the cradles of 
novel typologies such as the villa and the bungalows172; 
- Railway towns, such as Jamalpur, are aimed at the control and maintenance of 
new infrastructure. Importantly the origins of hybrid architectural styles have 
been established here (cf. Maitra: 138); 
                                               
168 Vastu – the site, purusha – the cosmic man, mandala – closed polygon 
169 Balfkrisha Doshi, one of the collaborators at Chandigarh and designer of the Navi Mumbai Node of Kharghar, has 
founded a Vashtu Shipla Foundation for Studies and Research in Environmental Design. (Cf. vastushilpa.org, r12.10.2008) 
170 Magarpatta, a cooperative new town project in Pune was also influenced by traditional Vastu principles. 
171 ”The city of Jaipur founded in 1727 AD is one of the finest examples of an Indian city planned according to the canonical 
texts and offers several lessons for contemporary city planning and building design practices relevant to the physical and 
socio-economic conditions of the region.” (Project description of Vidyadhar Nagar; from the Website of the Vastu Shilpa 
Foundation; vastushilpa.org; r12.09.2008) 
172 Anthony King discusses how the architectural typology of the bungalow emerges in colonial India before it is reimported 
to the West. (Cf. King 1990) 
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- Nainital, Shimla or Darjeeling etc, have been developed as hill stations, another 
novel urban typology;  
Harbour cities such as Calcutta, Bombay and Madras serve as crucial nodes 
bundling trade and finance;  
- Capital cities such as New Delhi import the principles of scientifically based 
hygienic urban design, in stark contrast to the existing urban centres173, and are 
based on monumental schemes; 
- The latter colonial era is also the cradle of India’s first independent industrial 
centres, such as Jamshedpur or Tatanagar. 
It can be safely presumed that planners of Navi Mumbai are greatly influenced by the 
rational efficiency of these colonial schemes. After all the success of the New Towns that 
serve as new capitals leaves the greatest impression. In one of the conceptual papers of 
Navi Mumbai, Charles Correa notes: “There have been several examples throughout 
history of significant cities created around governmental centres. ... Washington D.C., 
Chandigarh, Brasilia... Perhaps the closest parallel to Bombay would be the creation of 
New Delhi… 15 miles away from the old city… 50 years ago… today its benefits are 
unquestioned...” (Correa 1965 (97): 325) 
Modern, post-independence New Towns 
After independence in 1948 India embarks on large centrally steered programmes of in-
dustrialisation and national modernisation. When Jawaharlal Nehru lays out his vision 
for the country, the idealistic maxims of Mahatma Gandhi play a central role. Anan-
thakrishnan (1998: 18) argues in the post-independence context ”The design principles 
described in the Draft Development Plan were based on the philosophical reasoning of 
Mahatma Gandhi and the functionalistic approach of Modernism.” (Ananthakrishnan: 
18) New Towns are employed as fundamental instruments of this central planning ap-
proach. Significantly the 4th National Plan allocates budgets for some large New Cities, in 
particular Chandigarh, Gandhinagar174, Bhopal and Bhubaneswar175. (Shaw 2004: 49) 
Most of the New Towns are linked to heavy industries and power projects. “By 1971, 
the year when construction in Navi Mumbai began, there were already 112 New Towns 
in existence. [Yet] Only seven of them... had a population of over 100.000.” (Sivarama-
krishnan 1976-77, quoted in Shaw 2004: 7) Among Navi Mumbai’s most important 
modernist peers is a series of modern state capitals such as Bhubaneswar (1948), 
Chandigarh (1953) or Gandhinagar (1960), and also the steel city of Rourkela (1958). 
The modern post-independence New Towns introduce the principles of modernist city 
planning, such as functional separation, superblocks and vehicular traffic, based on an 
industrial society. While India is lacking a base of experienced professionals, most of the 
new settlements are planned by Western experts, as well as an increasing number of In-
dian architects trained in the West. Bhubaneshwar is the brainchild of Otto Koenigsber-
ger, Chandigarh one of Le Corbusier’s masterpieces, and Louis Khan was supposed to 
have designed Gandhinagar176. 
                                               
173 As in many other colonial settings, the British colonial planning practice is not only bringing modernity and hygiene, it 
also institutionalises and manifests deep disparities. While it celebrates the practice of formal planning, it is systematically 
leaving out the informal and indigenous ‘other’. (Cf. Shaw 2004: 8)“The belief that the solutions of urban problems lie in 
starting new before correcting old problems has been the most pernicious ... i.e. little was done for old Delhi while building 
new Delhi.” (Shaw 2004: 20, quoting Priya 1993) 
174 Gandhinagar was planned in the 1960’s as the new capital of Gujarat. It houses 200.000 residents on 5.700 hectares. 
175 Bhubaneshwar becomes the modern capital of the state of Orissa in 1948. It presently houses a population of 800.000 
on an area of 103.500 hectares. The gross density of 8 people per hectare representing the modernist scheme is notably an 
extremely low urban density in the Indian context. 
176 Before it was commissioned to two Indian architects H. K. Mewada and Prakash M. Apte. Both of whom had participated 
at the construction of Chandigarh. 
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Around the same time India’s rapidly growing super cities are seeking to ease their 
growth pressures by planning satellite extensions: Navi Mumbai is not a unique case in 
the 1960’s – Delhi is planning for Dwarka (1964), and Kolkata for Bidhan Nagar177 
(1958) – yet Mumbai’s parallel city is by far the largest of the projects on the Indian sub-
continent. 
Navi Mumbai develops at the height of modernism. The most influential role model 
of the time is Le Corbusier’s Chandigarh. The makers of Mumbai’s parallel city are 
clearly affected by numerous elements of this plan: the rational layout, the modern land use 
categories, the structural organisation by self contained and hierarchically arranged 
neighbourhoods (sectors), the hierarchical order of the roads178 and the importance of 
landmark buildings. While Le Corbusier’s elaborate urban design codes have most 
probably inspired Navi Mumbai’s Draft Development Plan of 1973, Navi Mumbai 
emerges as a self-confident and less rigid version of modernism. 
Chandigarh was planned along an idealistic scheme. Yet the underlying figure is nei-
ther the world nor the cosmos, instead the enlightened human being represents the city’s 
underlying Metaphor. Accordingly Le Corbusier placed the government at the head and 
the city’s centre at the heart of the structure.179 
Navi Mumbai, on the other hand, is less emblematic and symbolic. The parallel city 
was not required to represent a new state capital. Yet, what unites all New Towns of the 
era is their radical renunciation of the existing urban fabric – the chaos of historic city 
centres. All modern projects envision creating new environments, for a modern democ-
ratic society instead of reproducing caste, class, gender, and ethnicity. Moreover they are 
driven by the idealistic vision of representing cities without slums. 
What the authors behind Navi Mumbai consequently do is apply and interpret some 
principles represented by the modernist precursors. As a result, the various sectors of 
Navi Mumbai represent variations of modern themes. Whilst perfect geometric shapes, as 
represented in the traditional Vastupurusha Mandala, are not represented in the whole, 
they are portrayed in a variety of details. 
Indeed, Navi Mumbai follows a different ‘profane’ approach. Correa and his col-
leagues aimed for a more liberal perspective (cf. Chauhan 1998: 2632). Their architects 
have left more space for change and adaptation by individual architects in designing a 
more open and flexible (and resilient) structure. In contrast to Chandigarh’s idealistic 
formalism, Navi Mumbai represents a contextual approach of modernity. The architects 
developed a scheme that was deeply embedded in the conditions of local place. Far from 
being only universal, functional and rationalistic, the initial proposal for New Bombay is 
highly related to the experience of the sea, the perception of Mumbai’s peninsula, and the 
propinquity of the hills.180 
Indeed, Navi Mumbai represents a unique example of contextualism on an urban 
scale in India, as it applies modern principles in a pragmatic way and not as a ‘religion’. 
The other Western model, which was fundamental for the conception of the new city, is 
Ebenezer Howard’s model of the Town Magnet and the (resulting) British tradition of 
New Towns. 
                                               
177 Bidhan Nagar, or Salt Lake City, is today expanded under the name Rajarhat to 300 percent of its original size. The West 
Bengal Housing Infrastructure Development Corporation (HIDCO) along with private developers such as DLF and Keppel etc 
primarily drive the development. 
178 E.g. Defining seven categories of streets 
179 For more information on Chandigarh see: Evenson 1966; A preliminary account can also be found at: 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/5082, r12.10.2008 
180 This is true for both variations, the early monocentric scheme, as well as the later polycentric plan. 
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The Town-Country Magnet and British New Towns 
It can be stated without exaggeration that Howard’s concept of a Town Magnet as well 
as the resulting New Town tradition is among the most influential models for Navi 
Mumbai. The scheme has an indirect as well as a direct impact. Important variations of 
the Garden Cities tradition181 can be found in Mumbai. Back in the 1930’s the Bombay 
Improvement Trust had erected a series of Garden City style model settlements such as 
Dadar and Matunga in the northeastern suburbs of Mumbai. (Cf. Nissel 1997) Conse-
quently the planners of Navi Mumbai were familiar with these schemes and the related 
debates. 
Yet, some direct references of the British New Town movement appear even more in-
fluential. Several of the fundamental principles of Howard’s Town Magnet (1898) have 
deeply affected the concepts and guidelines of Mumbai’s satellite city. The new city 
across the Thane creek was conceived along certain structural and financial fundamentals 
of Howard’s brainchild. Without doubt Navi Mumbai’s structural concept as a system of 
confined centres that is linked by railway networks and separated by greenbelts, directly 
relates to the counter magnet idea. (Cf. Cidco 1973: 5 quoted in Shaw 2004: 72) Even 
more remarkable is Navi Mumbai’s utilisation of the principles of communal land own-
ership bundled with the transfer of development and management duties towards a 
communal administrative body. (Cf. Ibidem and Howard: 59) On a greater scale the 
New Town movement has played its role as well: Sir Patrick Abercrombie’s famous 1944 
Greater London Plan was straightforwardly pictured as a reference in MARG’s concep-
tual documents. (Cf. Correa 1965 (1997) 
New Town peers since 1973 
”Beginning in the 1980’s, we have seen the selective rebuilding of cities as 
platforms for a rapidly growing range of globalised activities and flows, from 
economic to cultural and political.“ (Sassen 2007) 
Navi Mumbai was not only fertilised by preceding prototypes. The city has a 40-year 
history and is far from being completed. As such it reflects planning paradigms of various 
eras and is used as an experimental ground to explore these.182 At the same time it has its 
own impact on other projects. In the following some of the most significant of the pre-
sent urbanistic approaches are briefed. These are dominated by a new wave of private 
mega projects in the form of SEZ-townships and integrated enclaves. 
SEZs and Integrated Townships – India’s first slum free cities 
India’s and Navi Mumbai’s contemporary urban context is characterised by a flood of 
privately developed mega projects of historical dimensions.183 The prototype of the large 
and autonomous urban enclave has become an integral part of the Indian real estate sec-
tor that is also influential in Navi Mumbai’s context. A significant share of urban growth 
in India occurs under the umbrella of SEZ schemes or in the form of Integrated Town-
ships (sometimes also referred to as Special Township Schemes). While the wave can be 
seen as a renaissance of New Towns and Satellite Towns, the Integrated Township type 
is a clearly homegrown, historically unique, and novel Indian urban typology. 
                                               
181 Cf. the initial chapter 
182 Cf. the range of examples in the chapter on structure below 
183 Various authors discuss the topic of insular urbanism as a typical Indian phenomenon in the November 2007 issue of 
Arch+185. 
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So far the Indian Government has approved more than 500 SEZs. (Cf. Gotsch 2007: 
62, cf. above) Mainly the peripheries of the major Indian metropolises are dotted by doz-
ens of these autonomous enclaves developed by the private sector. While SEZs mainly 
focus on industry and commerce, allowing for a certain amount of housing, Integrated 
Townships concentrate on housing allowing for supporting infrastructure, services and 
commerce. Notably the customised packages can be tailored, and both, SEZs and Inte-
grated Townships can be combined. In addition also Information Technology Parks or 
public housing schemes can be blended. 
Promoting pooled and organised development of urban peripheries, Special Town-
ships range between 40 and 10.000 hectares. Among the target groups are Indian resi-
dents residing in other countries (Non-Resident Indians, NRI), but also members of the 
local upper and rising middle classes. (Gotsch, Kohte 2007) The schemes are character-
ised by a complete package of high-end services to the interior, combined with a stark 
exclusion of the outer environment. They address the rising demand for western living 
standards in a context of lacking infrastructure, by providing a wide range of state of the 
art services and infrastructure including schools, hospitals, shopping malls, offices, and 
leisure facilities. An important aspect is a portrayal of western life styles. Indeed, 
bounded by high perimeter walls and secured by private guards these projects achieve 
what many modern town planning projects were dreaming of – to be the first real slum 
free cities. 
These contemporary peers of Navi Mumbai’s are mainly produced by international 
teams. Most of the projects are realised with international partners on board as autono-
mous and ‘integrated’ all-in-one packages. For this purpose subsidiary enterprises (Spe-
cial Project Vehicles) are generally created. In this context Indian real estate moguls such 
as DLF, Nirmal, Hiranandani, L&T or the Hindustan Construction Company team up 
with global heavyweights such as Emaar (Dubai), Nakheel (Dubai), Jurong (Singapore), 
to name but a few. In many of the top notch projects the package is further topped up by 
special brands such as Prudential Times Inc. (USA), Fraport Airport AG (Germany) or 
the Four Seasons Group. 
Essentially the boom of Special Townships and SEZs is based on federal incentives al-
lowing Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in real estate projects.184 The Special Township 
Policy Act of the Maharashtra Government allows for 100 percent FDI and exempts In-
tegrated Townships from all sorts of regulations (most importantly land use regulations). 
It promotes land pooling and the development of self-sufficient quarters by mandating a 
minimum area of 100 acres (40 hectares), and prescribes the development of public infra-
structure, such as roads, water, and sewage. In addition the projects are promoted by 
higher floor space allowances (FSI). (Cf. GoM’s Special Township Policy of 2007) 
As a result in 2004, 57 townships were supposed to emerge in Andhra Pradesh alone. 
In the capital of the state the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA) 22 such 
projects were promoted along the new ring road.185 A personal study revealed 6-7 of the 
projects entering the implementation stage, with Lanco Hills being the best known. Pri-
vate developers, e.g. the Delhi Land Finance Group (DLF) have also taken over the urban 
production at Delhi’s Southern periphery.186 (Cf. Martin 2007; Brosius 2007) 
                                               
184 Cf. GoM’s Special Township Policy of 2007; cf. Hindustantimes; 20.08.2005: “Integrated Townships to take off in a big 
way” 
185 Cf. The Hindu, Business Line, Monday, Oct 25, 2004, at: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/ 
2004/10/25/stories/2004102501591303.htm; r13.10.2008 
186 ”DLF City is a township spread over 3.000 acres in the Delhi suburb of Gurgaon. It is Asia’s largest private township 
spread over five phases with landmark constructions. It offers a comprehensive modern city infrastructure, encompassing 
basic amenities, social infrastructure including educational institutions, healthcare, hospitality, and shopping and entertain-
ment facilities. This is coupled with the prestigious DLF Golf and Country Club, the only night golfing course in the country 
and rated among the top ten in Asia, making it one of the top rated Integrated Townships developed by DLF”. ... “Forbes, 
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At the height of the 2008 real estate boom DLF and the Dubai based Nakheel also 
planned to place two gigantic 'Manhattans' of 8.000 hectare each on the Indian map. 
The cities near Mumbai and Gurgaon were supposed to be three times as large as Man-
hattan Island and attract investments of more than 20 billion US$. (Cf. Raj Nambisan 
and Priti Bajaj; in Daily News and Analyses India (DNA), March 2007) Mumbai-based 
real estate company Nirmal Lifestyle has announced plans to set up five Integrated 
Townships including three near Mumbai within the next three years. (Cf. The Hindustan 
Times; 20.08.2005) 
Some of Navi Mumbai’s current nodes are presently being developed along SEZ and 
Township schemes (cf. below Dronagiri, Ulwe) the environs, including the Mumbai Pune 
corridor, featurng gargantuan commercial and Integrated Township projects. 
The list of the new SEZs, Integrated Townships, commercial zones and large housing 
estates, promoted the along the Mumbai Pune axis includes large new Townships such as 
the Mumbai Manhattan (DLF and Al Nakheel, 8.000 hectares), and Aamby Valley (Sa-
hara India, 4.000 hectares) projects. Commercial and industrial enclaves include the 
Mumbai SEZ (Reliance, 5.000 hectares), Energy City (Gulf Finance House Government 
of Maharashtra, 240 hectares), as well as the Dhirubhai Ambani Knowledge City (Reli-
ance Telecom, 56 hectares). Gated communities comprise the Hiranandani Palace Gar-
dens Panvel (233 hectares), Magic Hills I and II (300 hectares), Bollywood City 
(Lakshish Group, n.n.), and the Arrow City (Arrow Engineering, 45 hectares) 
Box 17: Role model Dubai 
Dubai emerges as one of the most important regional role models. The city plays a 
prime role as an adopter and transporter of global life style models. 
It is interesting to observe that new urban role models transporting a globally oriented 
lifestyle do not necessarily come from the ‘first’ world. Instead these are often trans-
ported via a series of lighthouse nodes in developing countries and emerging econo-
mies. In this context Navi Mumbai’s contemporary urban role models are mainly repre-
sented and sanctioned by Dubai, Singapore and Shanghai. 
The anthropologist Petra Kuppinger (2007) attests that Dubai, more than New York or 
London, is now a focal point for Middle Eastern planners and investors. The Gulf city is 
emerging as the primary role model in Southern Asia and the MENA region (Middle 
East North Africa). While Cairo acted as the regions cultural capital for centuries, now 
Dubai (and increasingly also Abu Dhabi) act as early adopters, transformers, sanctifiers, 
and distributional nodes of (western) global life style models in the region, in particular 
the Islamic parts of it. In the context of contemporary geopolitics, cultural (and urban) 
role models are rather accepted if they come from Dubai than directly from the West – 
no matter how modern they may be. (Cf. Kuppinger 2007) 
Most Indians admire Dubai as a nearby success model in the region, as it has proved the 
feasibility of joining the league of global cities. Its success was made possible with the 
significant help of Indians. An increasing number of NRI’s live and work in the Gulf re-
gion. [Cf. above: India, Migration Patterns, NRI’s) While Dubai serves as an important 
base for successful Indian enterprises undertaking projects in the Middle East, the large 
firms from the Gulf are participating in a myriad of projects on the Indian subconti-
nent.187  
And so, as Indian metropolises such as Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Chennai, 
or Kolkata are increasingly drawn into the maelstrom of global movements (of people, 
goods, and symbols) they become part of a new landscape of new and alternate mod-
ernities. (Cf. Brosius 2007: 67) 
                                                                                                                                         
known for ranking world's billionaires, in its issue of March 24, 2008, has ranked Dr. K.P.Singh as the richest real estate 
baron and the eighth richest person in the world, at a net worth of US$30 billion.” (Promotional texts from: www.dlf.in 
r12.10.2008) 
187 Cf. the websites of Hiranandani, Nirmal, Emaar etc 
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Impact of new projects on Navi Mumbai 
It is highly probable that the new trends as described above will strengthen Navi Mum-
bai as a regional centre. The new city finds itself increasingly submerged in a process of 
urban peripheral transformation. This may engender new spatial and economic prob-
lems. Yet, as the new projects are going to draw on the existing framework of Navi 
Mumbai’s landmark infrastructure and services, most probably the city’s central role will 
also be strengthened and will likely emerge as an important regional node. 
Two alternative role models 
Navi Mumbai’s latest internationally oriented, globalised and privatised project peers are 
not without contradictions. While they attract streams of money and know-how they 
also foster a concentration of urban development in the hands of few developers. More-
over, they are highly dependent on, and conditioned by, international markets.188 The 
local impact of the September 2008 market crash remains to be seen. And not least they 
engender problematic (homogenised, fragmented, polarised) urban landscapes. 
While contradictions fortunately produce counter movements and innovations, several 
alternative models are currently emerging on the Indian market which may be of increas-
ing importance for the future development of regional cities. The two models that will be 
presented in this context are Vidyadhar Nagar and Magarpatta. While the first represents 
a new post-Chandigarh planning approach, merging tradition and modernity, the second 
explores a model of communally developed Integrated Townships. 
Vidyadhar Nagar 
Vidyadhar Nagar represents an urban model that merges traditional and modern plan-
ning approaches. The plan is the result of a study of Doshi’s Vastu Shilpa Foundation 
(VSF) for a parallel city of Jaipur in 1992. Vidyadhar Nagar is named after the architect-
planner of Jaipur and is located about 3,5 km Southeast of the existing centre. The 
scheme is supposed to accommodate 120.000 people on 600 hectares (e.g. a notable 200 
people per hectare). In merging the ancient canonical planning principles of Vashtu 
Shilpa with modernist codes, the planners sought to develop a new model for contempo-
rary planning in India. The method was called the post-Chandigarh Approach (VSF at 
vastishilpa.org, r12.10.2008).  
This approach rationale is significant for Navi Mumbai as it was applied in preparing 
the master plan for the Kharghar node that was also prepared by the Vastu Shilpa Foun-
dation. As a consequence the contextual scheme of Kharghar works with the potentials 
of the local situation. In actively seeking to resolve the present trends of homogenisation 
and segregation, it develops an integrated urban area that is based on a highly mixed 
urban fabric and generous infrastructure and open space networks. Therefore it follows 
the ideal of a city that is composed of private spaces engulfed in a sea of public space. 
While Kharghar is not free from signs of ‘privatisation’ and deregulation – an 18 hole 
golf course is as much part of the scheme as a series of iconic landmark architectures (cf. 
below: Design strategies) – it seems that some the general problems usually related to 
purely private development have been addressed. After all, only the future will show if 
the scheme was successful. 
                                               
188 While developers seek to diversify their portfolios the speculative tail may be wagging the spot dog. (Cf. The Economist, 
Oct 11th, 2008: s18) 
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Magarpatta 
Magarpatta, a new scheme in Pune, takes the bull by the horns and develops remarkable 
economic and legal alternatives. It is the first Integrated Township based on cooperative 
land ownership. 
The neighbourhood was built in a rapidly urbanising peripheral part of Pune. The im-
plementation of the plan started around 2000. Its central location makes it more a ‘sub-
city’ than a satellite township. The city is planned along a ‘traditional’ scheme of an Inte-
grated Township with a whole range of self-sufficient infrastructure and service facilities 
and a few extra additions. The settlement comprises 140 hectares and was organised 
along a traditional mandala structure with nine squares. It is crowned by a circular void, 
the large central park. The park is surrounded by a series of office buildings, the Cyber 
City, while the themed residential areas are grouped in the periphery. 
The project will contain 20 office towers, as well as 300 residential buildings. 7.000 
residents plus many more employees will populate the township. The residents will be 
white collar IT professionals and IT workers, as well as land owner families. Offices as 
well as an SEZ will consume the majority of floor space (9 million square feet). Residen-
tial use will make up 1,4 million square feet. Moreover, open and green spaces will com-
prise a notable 30 percent of the area. Access is permitted to residents and guests only, 
and two large shopping malls have been placed outside the perimeter walls. 
Magarpatta’s major innovations are invisible. They are represented by the financial 
and legal set up. The city was developed by a cooperative of 200 landowners, driven by 
the vision of Satish Magar189, a major landowner in the area. The owners cooperative has 
installed an implementing vehicle, the Township Development & Construction Co. Ltd. 
A major strategic advantage was the fact that the national Housing Development Finance 
Corporation decided to support the project. 
While Mr Magar drafted the scheme in person, Hafeez Contractor, one of India’s 
largest and most prominent architecture consultancies, prepared the detailed plans190 
Moreover several artists have been invited to participate in the design process. 
Inline with other schemes, marketing plays a major role. Magarpatta motto is 'buy a 
house, get a city free.' The project represents an exemplary Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity (CSR) strategy. It involved local entrepreneurs and use of local materials whenever 
feasible. Moreover it pursued exceptional environmental standards resulting in an ISO 
9001191 certification. 
The owners have backed themselves financially by selling only the residential part of 
the development, while the office segment is being leased. This strategy secured the nec-
essary start up money that was used to establish a corpus fund, which guarantees long 
term security. 
Conclusion 
Magarpatta presents an impressive track record of resolving political, financial, envi-
ronmental, and legal drawbacks of conventional mega projects. On the other hand it has 
produced fewer innovations at a spatial level. Its role within the general urban tissue is 
questionable. The ‘subcity’ results in an isolated structure that has much in common with 
conventional elite enclaves. While new market principles are admired and most of Ebene-
zer Howard’s philanthropic ideas are realised, the project results in a distant world on 
the other side of the walls populated by 200 newly rich families. The benefits for a 
greater context are questionable. 
                                               
189 Mr Magar comes from a political, landowner background but had an urban, Western education. 
190 A Mumbai based design office with extensive experience in designing Special Townships that has also designed several 
schemes in Navi Mumbai. (Cf. below: Developers; Designers) 
191 The ISO 9000 certificate is a quality norm for environmental management. Cf. Below Developers 
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Special Development Areas (SDA’s) 
Particular examples of peripheral development that are not existent in Mumbai, are 
large scale Special Development Areas (sometimes also referred as Special Development 
Zones). Some of India’s second tier cities such as Hyderabad, Chennai, and Bangalore 
have exempted terrains of several hundred square kilometres from local development 
regulations seeking to construct large experimental cities. The development is mainly 
driven by state planning agencies. Hyderabad’s Special Development Areas Cyberabad 
and the Hyderabad Airport Development Authority (HADA) have a combined size of 
520 square kilometres. This is the 3-fold size of the central city area under municipal 
administration (MCH). The planning regulations of these cities are mainly driven by the 
principles of privatisation and deregulation and market oriented planning tools, e.g. the 
marketing of development rights. (Cf. Gotsch, Kohte 2007) 
Box 18: Example Cyberabad 
A particular pioneer of the typology of Special Development Zones is the project of Cy-
berabad in Hyderabad, the capital of Andhra Pradesh. The scheme is a result of liberal 
urban development strategies by the state government geared towards the information 
technology sector and was founded almost ten years ago as a ‘Special Development 
Zone’. Since then it has experienced rapid development. In some places the land prices 
went up as much as five hundred percent in less than five years. Almost all Indian IT 
companies as well as most of the international sector leading firms such as Microsoft and 
Google have large dependencies in the area. Several new townships, marked by a series of 
high-rise zones and topped by a 100-storey tower, are in the planning process. Notably 
Cyberabad houses Microsoft’s Cyberabad campus, which is the largest dependency of the 
firm outside the US with more than 12.000 employees (Gotsch, Kohte 2007: translation 
by the Autor). The office of Balkrishna Doshi along a locally sensitive contextual scheme 
designed the master plan. Yet, Doshi’s spatial ideas have been rapidly consumed by flexi-
ble building regulations and special development rights for IT firms (cf. Gotsch, Kohte 
2007). 
Conclusion predecessors 
The previous subsection sought to enlighten Navi Mumbai’s position in a context of 
planned cities. It became clear that the new city across the Thane emerges in a rich con-
text of regional and global, of historic and contemporary predecessors and peers. Navi 
Mumbai follows a contextual approach that largely works with the local place and 
adapts various role models, concepts and maxims, in the manner of a toolkit rather than 
in a dogmatic way. Indeed part of its success lies in the fact that it was conceived as a 
resilient and versatile structure, capable of adapting to the requirements of time. 
Two of the role models stand out in particular. While the principles of Ebenezer 
Howard’s Town Magnet have been decisive for the general organisation and some of the 
underlying property relations, Corbusier’s modernist solutions of Chandigarh haven been 
most influential in the elaboration of Navi Mumbai’s more detailed physiognomy and 
morphology. 
The city also reflects recent trends originating rather in the world of economics and 
real estate development than in planning and design disciplines. The internal and external 
development of the city is characterised by deregulation, privatisation, and the diversifi-
cation of finances and the impact of foreign investments. Regional role models such as 
Dubai, Singapore and Shanghai influence the style of the projects. Spatially it is repre-
sented by a huge amount of SEZs, Integrated Townships, IT Parks, large infrastructure 
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ventures and their hybrid forms. It remains open, if Navi Mumbai’s open structure will 
be resilient enough to accommodate these large interventions. 
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Summary 
India 
Navi Mumbai is located in the economic centre of the second largest country in the 
world. The majority of India’s population is young (< 25 years), rural (70 percent), poor, 
and informal. With adult literacy rates of 60 percent in 2003 the country ranges among 
the lowest 25 percent in the world. Yet urbanisation rates are immense, and Indian cities 
comprise more people than all aggregated countries of the world at once, excluding USA, 
China and Russia. 
National development policy 
The vast country became independent in 1947 and is today the largest parliamentary 
democracy in the world. Up to the 1980’s a rather socialist, central planning approach 
has been dominant. Since then a process of changing paradigms towards liberal markets 
and deregulation began. In particular since the fall of the Soviet Union, the country em-
barked on a paired process of political decentralisation to the inside and an opening of 
trade borders to the outer world. Decentralisation programmes (e.g. the 73 and 74th Con-
stitutional Amendments) have shifted political power increasingly towards the Indian 
states. The Economic Policies (NEP) engendered an economic boom of certain sectors 
and massive inflows of foreign investment. 
The year 1991 is known as a historic watershed in respect of India‘s internal devel-
opment policy and its increasing synchronisation with worldwide economies. Facing an 
increasing bureaucratic gridlock and severe budgetary crisis, the country embarked on a 
New Economic Policy. This package of comprehensive reforms was largely modelled 
along the recommendations of the Washington consensus.  
The liberal reforms resulted in a decent economic growth along with a high inflow of 
foreign private capital into India. Foreign Direct Investment increased by 1.800 percent 
between 1990 and 2003. During the same period remittance flows from the 22 million 
Indians living and working abroad grew by 800 percent (from 2.3 to 17.5 US$ billion). 
While the inflow of FDI into India has enhanced the greater economy, it has also con-
tributed to uneven development. (Mumbai alone attracted 32 percent of all foreign 
funds). The decentralisation and liberalisation programmes have led to expanding spe-
cialisation, but also polarisation and fragmentation. More and more India’s states resem-
ble individual countries, small and medium sized enterprises have been disadvantaged, 
and the income disparities between rich and poor have generally increased.  
Economic profile and trends 
India’s gross domestic product (GDP) is slightly higher than that of the city of London. 
The country’s share in world exports remains very small (at 0.9 percent for 2005). The 
country is still among the poorest: in 2003 the average Indian GNP per capita ranged at 
500 US$. In 2006, about 836 million people, or 77 percent, lived on less than two dollars 
a day. 
The country’s rapid economic growth has not been sufficient to offset the demands of 
demographic development. While India’s economy has grown by an average of six per-
cent and more since the 1990’s, investment in infrastructure has always lagged behind (at 
rates that only amount to a third of China’s investments). This gap has contributed to an 
increasing expansion of the informal sector. Of India's labour force of over 390 million 
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only 7 percent are workers on regular wages and salaries and slum population in major 
metropolitan centres such as Mumbai is anticipated to exceed half of the population. 
On the other hand, the subcontinent is among the most rapidly growing BRIC-
economies in the world. In 2007 growth rates amounted to 9 percent. Experts predict 
that growth will continue for the next 30 to 50 years. While incomes and the quality of 
life are steadily improving for all population segments, overall income disparities are 
constantly increasing. These trends have grown since the 1990’s economic reforms. 
While India is also on the way to a services oriented economy, it seems that here the 
shift occurs faster and earlier than in many other countries. The country is veering away 
from labour-intensive industries and large numbers of the population are bypassed by the 
leapfrogging development. 
A significant consumer class is emerging particularly in the large cities. This new mid-
dle class is expected to grow rapidly – from 50 million people today to 583 million peo-
ple in the next 20 years. By that time this group will probably outnumber its European as 
well as US peers. The middle class will carry forward a profound modernisation of In-
dia’s society. This will be mainly based on consumption-orientated lifestyles. (Car owner-
ship rates at 6 per mill, for example, indicate an enormous scope for development).  
The county‘s demographic growth, the deregulation and liberalisation policies along 
with a global framework of surplus money, had a tremendous impact on the country’s 
land and housing industries, leading to a widespread real estate boom. The 9-10 percent 
economic growth increased the general demand for homes and commercial space. Hence, 
attracted by special concessions, government subsidies, and spectacular high interest 
rates, a large part of the new foreign direct inflow went into the infrastructure sector. 
As a consequence of the liberalisation programmes the government has increasingly 
shifted from an active construction of social housing towards demand driven policies 
realised by the private sector. This policy has brought about major change for public 
agencies that were actively engaged in the development and construction of low-income 
housing (including Navi Mumbai’s developing agency Cidco). 
Yet, presently, the vast majority of India is too poor to afford a house on the formal 
market, and in contrast, the formal market cannot serve the low-income sector in a prof-
itable way. Less than 10 percent of the population have a sufficiently large income to 
afford a house without subsidies. Moreover, affordability levels for the middle and upper 
income classes in the large metropolises are disproportionately high (usually a house 
costs considerably more than 10 times the respective annual income). Consequently sub-
urban locations are increasingly explored. 
Culture 
India’s cultural context plays a significant role as well in understanding the social, eco-
nomic, and spatial dimensions of development. Clan, ethnicity, caste and religion con-
tinue to affect social, economic and spatial relations. (Members of scheduled castes are 
twice as likely to be illiterate and poor than other populations). New liberalisation reforms 
have shaken up old social boundaries, yet they have also triggered new waves of Clientelism 
and ‘corruption’. 
In addition, a new nexus of global ‘deterritorialised’ culture has a deep impact on the 
country’s urban landscapes. The large metropolises, and in particular Mumbai are mael-
stroms of people, goods and information – at regional, national, and global levels and 
along increasingly complex (non-isomorphic) paths. Innumerable rural-urban migrants 
continuously flock to the cities. At the same time populations moving on an international 
scale import a growing amount of global images and lifestyles. Indeed, as ‘transmigra-
tion’ and according ‘deterritorialised cultures’ have a consequential impact on the pro-
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duction of India’s urban spaces, Mumbai emerges as India’s ultimate urban node be-
tween global and local, rural and urban, tradition and modernity. 
Spatial trends 
India’s megacities centralise wealth and are engines of economic growth. The 4 large 
Megacities comprise only 5 percent of the population. Yet at the same time they account 
for more than 60 percent of all income tax generation. With the economy growing faster 
than the population, India’s metropolitan centres are experiencing a massive trend of 
regionalisation and suburbanisation. The growth concentrates particular in 17 national 
development corridors, mostly along major infrastructure spines. 
As cities appear to sprawl in an uncontrolled way, in the last decade the Indian gov-
ernment has sought to steer peripheral urban development by the means of large 
autonomous projects, mainly financed and developed by the private sector. For this pur-
pose it has developed various programmes and incentive schemes (e.g. for ITparks, SEZs, 
Integrated Townships etc.). Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are used extensively as 
vehicles for the development of infrastructure at various scales. A tendency towards big 
projects is nurtured by conservative Indian legal regulations as well as by economic dy-
namics of agglomeration. Various areas are special development zones experimenting 
with novel market oriented planning instruments. 
Importantly, at this point in history, Special Economic Zones and Integrated Town-
ships emerge as specific new urban typologies in the Indian context.  
As opposed to China or Dubai, in India, not only public institutions, but also private 
enterprises are allowed to run SEZs. The fact that Indian SEZ can also include commer-
cial, residential and entertainment areas turns them into fully fledged neighbourhoods 
and modules of urban growth. Crucially, the entrepreneurs acquire full autonomy of the 
development regulations. A second novel urban typology that is mushrooming in the 
peripheries of India’s metropolises are Integrated Townships. This typology represents a 
strategy of India’s Government to promote the construction of housing and urban infra-
structure of high standards in allowing up to 100 percent foreign direct investments. At 
many locations developers combine both SEZ and Integrated Township schemes. 
Mumbai – in the context of aggregated trends 
Mumbai, often referred as the urbs primus indiae is a demographic, economic, and cul-
tural centre of India. The 6,3 percent Indians that reside in the region, generate 25 per-
cent of the Indian GDP. The city features income levels 10 times the Indian medium with 
income levels recently rising by an annual average of 10 to 15 percent. 
Greater Mumbai’s population is currently 19 million and is growing at about 2 per-
cent annually. The Metropolitan Region of Mumbai comprises 4.360 square kilometres. 
10 percent of that area is taken up by Greater Mumbai (peninsula). The urban landscape 
is marked by the changes of the economic base from organised industrialisation to high-
value services. At the same time the city also faces increasing competition from second 
tier cities such as Chennai, Bangalore and Hyderabad (mainly in the IT sector).  
Compactness represents one of the most striking features of Mumbai. The centre is 
one of the densest urban locations in the world. While Greater Mumbai features average 
densities of 270 people per hectare, some of the locations comprise 4.600 people per hec-
tare and more. Even more striking is the additional fact that two-thirds of the (poor) 
residents are crowded into just 5 percent of the total area. During day times Mumbai’s 
Public Ground Area (PGA), a measure of open spaces per resident, amounts to an aver-
age of 6,5 squares meters. 
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Indeed, Mumbai faces a physical dilemma. The most significant morphological feature 
of Mumbai is that, like Manhattan, the central city is located on a longitudinal penin-
sula. While this location was optimal for a colonial port city, it also implies a sharply 
restricted amount of space. The city's infrastructure runs parallel to this north-south axis 
and has provided a basis for settlement over the past two hundred years. The majority of 
movements were orientated on a North-South axis along an impressive network of com-
muter trains.  
The low floor area ratio (FAR) of 1,5 and below, old rent controls (housing) and va-
cant industrial lands are among the factors that – along with novel trends – severely in-
crease the pressures on land uses on the peninsula. 
With central densities and rents hitting record highs a growing number of population 
falls out of the framework of the formal economy and housing market. Accordingly, the 
informal segment of Mumbai is at historical peaks and continues to grow. Today more 
than two thirds of the population work in unofficial jobs and reside in slums – with ris-
ing tendencies. 
Recent trends, however, point to the fact that today even Mumbai has reached a criti-
cal point leading to an increased decentralisation and the emergence of a multiplex urban 
region. 
Regionalisation 
Mumbai’s spatial (real estate), growth is disproportionately higher than its economic 
growth and both are disproportionately higher than demographic growth. Consequently, 
the city is experiencing an increasing trend of sprawl and regionalisation. From the 1960s 
to the 1990 the ratio of people living in the city and its periphery has flipped. Now two 
thirds of the population live in the region. A similar trend occurred in the industrial sec-
tor. In the last 35 years most heavy industries have declined and/ or migrated to the pe-
ripheries. At the same time the centre has become dominated by white collar services. 
While central Mumbai is among the most expensive places in the world, the available 
marginal supply of land and housing on the formal market is geared towards high-end 
consumers with a household income of over INR 20 lakh (~ US$ 40.000), and more, per 
annum. In contrast the property prices for residential space in peripheral locations 
amount to 15 to 25 percent of the inner city locations; Mumbai’s peripheral locations are 
not only attracting poor immigrants and workers from relocated industries. A recent 
focus of peripheral development is targeting new economies and middle-income groups. 
The current drive towards the suburbs is also spurred by the risk profile of the 
megacity. As with many other megacities in developing regions, Mumbai seems to be in a 
constant state of emergency (while at the same time also having a relatively safe and tol-
erant environment). Among the frequent and reoccurring dangers are natural disasters 
such as monsoon floods, daily health hazards posed by extreme levels of pollution and 
traffic accidents, risks posed by riots and terrorist activities and financial risks posed by 
volatile land markets. Apparently there is not just a single problem, but also a perception 
of a generally increased vulnerability level (mostly aggravated by the impact of the popu-
lar media), which is among the important drivers of people moving to suburban locations 
and Navi Mumbai. Yet, sometimes people fall out of the frying pan into the fire, as envi-
ronmental hazards in peripheral locations are not uncommon. 
Regional Form 
Mumbai’s periphery can generally be characterised as ‘a landscape of surprise’ that is 
characterised by a fragmented patchwork of major infrastructure projects, new town 
plans, existing villages and towns, slums, unauthorised construction activities, large pri-
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vate commercial and industrial projects, enormous scavenging areas for building materi-
als, agricultural lands, forests, water bodies and marsh lands, etc. 
Importantly in the course of regionalisation five regional sub-centres are emerging. In-
terconnected by major strings of infrastructure and transportation, they take the form of 
an open pentagon with Navi Mumbai emerging as one of these five centres. 
One of the most striking characteristics of the suburbs is the gap between plan and re-
ality. This is mainly represented by the amount of unauthorised construction (which is 
also typical for emerging megacity-regions). Bottom-up construction activities result in 
the production of a large number of permanent urban structures (which must be sharply 
distinguished from informal (kutcha) settlements). At many locations the mixture, com-
posed of industries and housing, causes highly speculative and risky situations, as much 
as it endangers regional ecosystems and violates ecological preservation zones. The public 
hand has largely failed to keep up with this dynamic development and tend to become 
mere ‘documentators’ of change. Yet, the last regional planning document (MMDRA 
1999) proposed seeing the new patterns of growth as pointers to possible solutions. 
Another ‘new’ type of development that is emerging in the urban periphery is the large 
privately developed enclave in the form of SEZs and Integrated Townships as described 
above. This development is likewise ‘informal’, unplanned, self-organising and spontane-
ous to the extent that almost none of the new projects were anticipated in the existing 
master plans, and also because the SEZ- and township areas are mostly exempt from 
general development regulations and administered in an autonomous manner. 
Milestones and planning framework 
India 
India becomes independent in 1947. Like in many decolonised nations the country em-
barks on the quest for a new (old) identity. Accordingly, this process towards autonomy 
nurtures a strong central government. The young nation is based on state centralisation, 
protectionist economic policies, and a strong social welfare system. In the 1950’s India is, 
along with Indonesia, one of the founding members of the block free movement of third 
world countries. In the succeeding decades population dynamics, economic development 
and the growth of cities increase contradictions to the centralist approach. Rajiv Gandhi 
embarks on a parallel strategy of economic liberalisation and political decentralisation in 
the mid-1980s. A financial debt crisis, triggered by a global rise of oil prices, shakes up 
the country by the end of the 1980s (as in many other places). The New Economic Pro-
gram (NEP), initiated by Prime Minister Narashima Rao in 1991, largely advances the 
efforts of deregulation, decentralisation, liberalisation and privatisation (cf. Weinstein 
2005: 15) along the lines prescribed by The World Bank, or the IMF. In the course of 
this development cities are increasingly accepted as the engines driving economic devel-
opment and regarded as focal parts of the economic system. In this new liberal context, 
the government increasingly exploits the efficiency of the private sector in urban devel-
opment. In addition, the quest for increased direct foreign investments leads to a second 
wave of reforms at the dawn of the 21st century. These reforms facilitate 100 percent 
foreign direct investments in the construction sector and lead to the boom of private 
mega projects (IT-Centres, SEZs and Townships). 
Milestones Mumbai 
Mumbai’s 450-year history is mainly influenced by the British occupation. Being a per-
fect natural harbour, the city thrives on trade and serves as the base of the East India 
Company. The seven islands comprising the city become increasingly linked. Major in-
Navi Mumbai   222 
frastructure systems, e.g. the railways, including the major terminals are built in the 19th 
century. Early industrialisation brings a cosmopolitan and modern flair. Accordingly the 
question of class becomes more important than caste, ethnicity, and language. As early as 
1872 the city’s population reaches 650.000, a number only topped by London. 
The urban landscape of post-independence Mumbai is largely shaped by migration 
movements, deindustrialisation, the rise of service economies, a continuous growth of 
slums and middle classes, ethnic riots and movements, as well as regional growth and 
decentralisation. The strategic advantage of the insular location, as well as conservative 
land regulations and rent laws, increasingly constrain growth and development. Mumbai 
becomes one of the densest and most expensive cities globally. In the 1970’s the state 
receives increasing powers to project its own progress. It drives the regional development 
and installs powerful institutions such as the MMRDA, MIDC, and Cidco, amongst oth-
ers, as major players on the urban scene. As the city thrives on the 1990’s economic re-
forms, massive inflows of foreign money and exceptional economic growth rates lead to 
a real estate boom. This urban burst is spearheaded by a series of private mega projects 
(such as the Maha Mumbai SEZ), large infrastructure schemes (such as the Sewri-Nhava 
Sheva trans-harbour link), but also by a mass of mushrooming unauthorised develop-
ments. One of the consequences is that conventional planning approaches are increas-
ingly challenged by the rapid transformation of the city towards a multiplex urban fab-
ric. 
Milestones NM 
The Navi Mumbai project, implemented by the Government of Maharashtra, is one of 
the largest planned cities of contemporary times. The proposals to accommodate the 
spillover and shift other economic activities of the megacity to the mainland have a re-
cord of more than 60 years. In general, Navi Mumbai’s planning history can be divided 
into two main stages, representing opposing gestures: Firstly, the new city is supposed to 
draw development away from the central city, while later on, it finds itself pointing to-
wards the sprawling metropolis. Plans to develop a satellite town on the mainland date 
back to the late 1940’s. These are largely motivated by policies of a centrally guided ur-
ban-industrial deconcentration in a supply driven approach. In contrast, the planning 
approach of the more recent stages, after 1985, a public policy increasingly acknowledg-
ing the relevance of central cities as engines for economic development. In this context 
Navi Mumbai evolves from an alternative growth core in the environs of the mainland 
that was supposed to steer development away form the main city, into an integral part of 
the multiplex urban region, thus reinforcing the significance of the central city. 
Predecessors 
Navi Mumbai can be interpreted as a Critical Regionalism elevated to a urban scale. The 
city Navi exists in a vast framework of planned city predecessors and maxims. The new 
city across the Thane creek combines cosmological aspects of the traditional Indian City; 
Mahatma Gandhi’s social principles, the scientific and monumental maxims of New 
Delhi, the modern rationalist aesthetics of Chandigarh, as well as important axioms of 
the British New Town movement. However the city is not a simple melting pot of ideas. 
Animated by what planning traditions have to offer, it is designed along a sensitive con-
textual approach and notions of place and location play a predominant role,  
India has a 5.000-year old history that reverberates up to present times, including 
some of Navi Mumbai’s elements. City building in India was based on elaborate regula-
tions and standards. Moreover, the principles of Vastu, Shilpa and Shastra have never 
lost significance at India’s urban planning tradition. The Mandala, basically a metaphysi-
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cal plan, represents essential forms of and architecture urban planning, such as hierarchi-
cally organised orthogonal systems of quadrants with a holy site at the centre. Today the 
traditional Vastu principles experience a strong esoteric revival and reclaim mainstream 
popularity. Significantly Navi Mumbai’s node of Kopar Khairane, an important site of 
site-and-service projects for the lowest income sector, has been designed in this manner. 
Moreover, Navi Mumbai’s approach towards landmarks can be related to a medieval 
tradition. The Islamic architectural and urban planning tradition of medieval India was 
mainly centred on monumental structures. A great number of India’s landmark buildings 
that are formative for India’s contemporary ‘brand’, originated at that time. With a rising 
number of global generic typologies monuments are of increasing importance for newly 
planned cities including Navi Mumbai. 
Another important predecessor is the British-colonial tradition of planned cities. The 
British constructed a large number of distinct settlements with a significant impact on the 
modern Indian planning tradition. As a result, the planners of Navi Mumbai were largely 
affected by the rational efficiency of the new cities that are increasingly moulded along 
the principles of functional zoning and the demands of modern infrastructure systems. Of 
particular relevance is also the success of New Towns serving as new capitals, such as 
New Delhi, Chandigarh, or Gandhinagar.  
Navi Mumbai emerges in the 1960’s as a model to decentralise the growth of ever-
larger metropolises. Significantly, it is not the only satellite city. Kolkata’s new town of 
Bidhan Nagar (1958), or Delhi’s sub-city of Dwarka (1964) represent parallel endeav-
ours. 
What clearly unites Chandigarh, Navi Mumbai and the other New Towns and urban 
extensions built at that time, are their radical renunciation of the traditional urban fab-
ric. All of the post-independence modern projects are driven by the idealistic vision of 
developing ‘modern’ cities without slums. While the many authors of Navi Mumbai’s 
various neighbourhoods have a single categorical role model, they constantly apply and 
interpret the instruments and methodologies of modern architecture. Indeed, Correa and 
his colleagues create a more resilient and open scheme, leaving space for change and ad-
aptation by individual stakeholders. In other words, Navi Mumbai represents a contex-
tual approach of modernity that is in contrast to Chandigarh’s idealistic formalism. The 
architects develop schemes that were deeply embedded in the conditions of local place. 
Among the most significant structural models for the new city across the Thane creek 
is Howard’s Town Magnet. Indeed, it represents, the fundamentals of confined centres 
linked by railways and separated by greenbelts, but also the principles of communal land 
ownership – bundled with the transfer of development and management duties towards a 
communal administrative body (e.g. Cidco). 
In contemporary times, an increasing amount of imaginary, money and expertise 
comes from new Asian role models such as Dubai, or Singapore. SEZ and Township ty-
pologies, currently prominent all over India, are among the most important current peers 
and role models for the new city. While two of Navi Mumbai’s nodes are developed in 
the manner of SEZs (Dronagiri and Ulwe) several additional schemes are emerging on the 
city’s periphery. As the new projects in Navi Mumbai’s environs largely profit from the 
New Towns infrastructure, they are likely to reinforce the new city’s role as an edge city 
that is part of the multiplex urban region. 
While the privately developed enclaves also produce contradictions, problems, and 
negative externalities (e.g. a fragmented and polarised urban tissue, restricted access, 
large eco-footprints) several models are experimenting with some innovative formulas: 
Model schemes at a national scale, such as Doshi’s Vidyadhar Nagar (the model for Navi 
Mumbai’s Khargar node) seek to reconcile the contradictions of tradition and modernity. 
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The Pune Township Magarpatta is a private project based on communal land ownership 
by the local farmers. 
Hence, while Navi Mumbai emerges in a rich context of regional and global, of his-
toric and contemporary predecessors and peers, the new satellite prefers a contextual 
approach. The scheme operates with the local place and adapts various role models in a 
non-dogmatic way. Behind Navi Mumbai’s success lies the fact that is a resilient and 
versatile structure capable of adapting to the requirements of time. 
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Form –  
String of nodes across the creek 
“The scale of the city is beyond anything so far undertaken in this country. It 
may well turn out to be the largest planned city project so far undertaken 
anywhere.” (Cidco 1973: 8-9, quoted in Shaw 1974) 
“Mr. Thakar explained to me: Normally, cities are built around people, here, 
in Navi Mumbai, the city is built first, the people will come afterwards.” 
(Times of India, 2005) 
Introduction 
Navi Mumbai is one of the largest planned cities on the planet. One of the most distinc-
tive elements of the new city is its urban fabric. It poses a stark contrast to India’s tradi-
tional cities. Indeed, 60 years of planning and 40 years of implementation remain a short 
period in relation to the total life of urban systems. This fact makes the urban forms and 
typologies of a planned city such as Navi Mumbai easily apparent. Yet, even this short 
history reveals important experiences and lessons. Moreover, the new city reflects larger 
socio-economic, political and cultural trends whether regional, national or global.192 
The inquiry into the dimensions of urban form is important, because it is one of the 
central prerequisites of this thesis that the physical form of settlements and societal proc-
ess have to be regarded as integral elements of a mutual (dialectic) relationship. Social 
realities can only have an existence as long as there is a spatial existence and vice versa 
(cf. introductory chapter). Every exploration of processes is only complete if it takes into 
account the sphere of space. 
Specific for our inquiry of Navi Mumbai’s is the fact that the structure was conceived 
in an era that handled space in an absolute way. Spatial determinism was an integral part 
of a modern planning and design approach. In this context the planners of Navi Mumbai 
believed that the design of modern spaces (and cities) could lead to an immediate trans-
formation of societal relations. Modern planning was regarded as the tool of choice to 
resolve the most pressing demographic, social, political, economic and ecologic problems 
in a technocratic and positivist manner. So it presumed, for example, that the problem of 
housing could be resolved by central planning of a sufficient number of apartments, or 
that the ‘tradition’ of caste could be ended by constructing modern neighbourhoods. 
After all, the presence of this contradictory background focuses our attention on the 
unplanned and unintended reverberations produced by the deterministically planned city. 
After having elaborated the wider spatial as well as historical context of Navi Mum-
bai, the following sub-chapter concentrates on the city’s physical reality. The chapter will 
describe Navi Mumbai’s form. This description of the material facts of the new city aims 
to establish a base on which other processes and flows can be explored.193 In describing 
the spatial characteristics of the place it will be important to evaluate to the results of the 
planned and of the non-planned reality. 
                                               
192 Since the early 1970’s: Bombay’s name was changed to Mumbai, the urban population more than doubled, the adminis-
trative boundary of the region increased several times, household numbers got smaller, the country survived a profound 
debt crisis, the economy became increasingly service oriented, the information technology sector boomed, populist parties 
became prominent, the share of informal settlements in the city tripled from one quarter to more than three quarters. (cf. 
above: Context, India; cp. above: Milestones chart) 
193 Accordingly the consecutive chapters will then explore the impact of the users, makers, finances and regulations. 
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Accordingly we describe the physiognomy and physiology of the new city from the 
perspective of different scales and from various angles. Our inquiry is divided into two 
parts: an ‘exterior’ regional and an ‘interior’ local perspective. The chapter starts with the 
regional setting. This looks at the various relationships between Navi Mumbai, the tradi-
tional centre (Mumbai’s CBD) and the region. Navi Mumbai’s physical portrait goes on 
with the description of the full New Town cluster and presenting a set of core character-
istics related to structure, size, land use, infrastructure, etc. The portrait then zooms into the 
particular properties of the nodes, clusters and blocks, in describing the main structural 
qualities such as size, pattern, use or density. 
The fact that Navi Mumbai is a New Town cluster combining 15 nodes, more than 
600 sectors and a history of almost 40 years, implies that this city presents a greater vari-
ety of approaches than the other two case studies (Bumi Serpong Damai and Alphaville) 
discussed in this thesis. Consequently a discussion of a number exemplary nodes and 
sectors with milestone character seeks to account for this variety. 
Regional context 
Table 14: Key indicators – Navi Mumbai’s regional context 
Share of metro population  11 percent 
Major regional infrastructure coming up in 
the vicinity 
Planned Sea Link, Planned international Air-
port, International Container Terminal 
Share of metro area 8 percent 
Number of Regional Malls (existing, 
planned) 
6 (8) 
Major interregional road arteries 1 
Percentage of project area owned by the 
developer 
95 percent 
Distance to centre 45 km 
Commute to centre 65 minutes 
People living and working in Navi Mumbai 60 percent 
Major mode of internal mobility Walk, bus 
Major mode of external mobility Metro rail 
 
In investigating the physical reality of a planned city the relationship of the project with 
its environs is of foremost importance. While the character of the greater region was de-
scribed in the context section above (cf. above: Context Mumbai) this subchapter focuses 
on the direct relationships of Navi Mumbai its environs and the greater region. 
Consequently the central questions are: What are the relationships between project 
and region? How is the new city delineated? How can the context of regional infrastruc-
ture be described and characterised? How is Navi Mumbai connected to this system? 
What is its relationship in terms of size and exchange? What happened in the immediate 
environs of the New Town? Has the new city triggered other developments? Are these 
similar or diverse, planned or unplanned? 
When the new city was planned it was intended to fulfil a certain role in the regional 
and local context: e.g. it was intended to become an alternate growth pole on the 
mainland. Yet, it seems that during the urban (social, political, economic) evolution of 
the last 40 years a new situation emerged. Navi Mumbai was swamped by the urban 
frontier and became an integral part of the greater region. Today the environs of Navi 
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Mumbai is characterised by rapid urbanisation. The section belongs to one of 17 major 
regional growth corridors currently emerging in India (cf. above).194 Featuring many new 
residential projects, Integrated Townships and SEZs, the area is also rapidly developing 
in a preferred location of the growing middle classes. (Cf. Cushman & Wakefield 2007b) 
Relationship of the project to the region 
Setting 
Navi Mumbai’s site has a longitudinal shape. It contains a coastal stretch of 34,2 kilome-
tres along two major creeks (the Thane and Panvel Inlets) and spans between the marshy 
edges of the sea and the 50 to 200 meter high Parsik Hills. The city is elevated at only 10 
meters above sea level with “the whole of India as a hinterland” (Mehta 2005). While 
the parallel city is part of the head of the Mumbai-Thane-Pune development corridor, 
several of Navi Mumbai’s nodes, such as Vashi or Belapur, emerge as regional centres, 
driving further urbanisation. 
Navi Mumbai expands across three administrative boundaries of the three ‘Talukas’195 
of Thane, Panvel and Uran. It also overarches two districts, Thane and Raigad. (Cidco 
2000) The project holds a significant share of 11 percent of Mumbai’s metropolitan 
population. It takes up 8 percent of the total regional terrain (cf. Appendix: Comparative 
Indicators).  
The developer, e.g. the City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra 
Ltd. (Cidco), owns 95 percent of the land of Navi Mumbai. Notably local villages own 
the other share.196 Most of the land upon which Navi Mumbai is erected was salty 
marshland. The locals were subsisting on fishing as well as some rice cultivation (Shaw 
2004). 
The project’s surrounding area is of a periurban character (cf. above: structure of the 
region). It is composed of a permanently mutating landscape of rivalling land uses: re-
gional centres (e.g. Thane, Panvel), industrial estates, commercial parks, urbanised vil-
lages, informal settlements, agriculture, marshy lands, and hilly terrains. (Cf. Shaw 2004: 
100, table 4.3.97.) An industrial area for chemical industries run by the Maharashtra 
Industrial Development Corporation bounds the northern part of the city. The southern 
edge faces Mumbai’s new harbour and numerous emerging industrial and commercial 
estates. 
Access and mobility 
While the new city spans a distance of more than 35 km from North to South, the linear 
distance to the central city ranges from 20 to 25 kilometres. At the same time the road 
distance varies from 35 to 45 kilometres (30 kilometres by train). A suburban train from 
the Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus (formerly Victoria Station) to the new node of Kharghar 
takes about 65 minutes and a car from Churchgate Station roughly one and a half hours. 
Bandra and Kurla, the next subcentre on the other side of the Thane can be reached in 45 
minutes, Mumbai’s international Airport is within 1 to 1,5 hours. 
These days the access to Navi Mumbai is rapidly improving. A whole series of new in-
frastructures are underway. When the new 22 km trans-harbour link (Sewri-Nhava 
Sheva) opens in 2012, travel times to the central city will shrink to 20 –30 minutes. 
                                               
194 The Mumbai-Thane-Pune corridor is the Industrial and Services powerhouse of India accounting for a total output of US $ 
35 million. (TECS: 30) 
195 Administrative level in South Asia, also Tehsil, close to a county 
196 Cf. Gotsch 2006: Interview with Cidco’s former chief planner Dinkar P. Samand in August 2006 
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Moreover a new international Airport scheduled for 2012 will reduce travel times to 15 
minutes. 
Information on work trips and travel times indicates the amount of independence of 
the new city and helps to understand the role of the project in the region. Indeed, com-
prehensive mobility data assembled by Cidco (Navi Mumbai’s developing agency) shows 
that the new city enjoys a high degree of self-sufficiency and independence. (Cf. Cidco, 
Socio Spatial Survey 2005). Featuring a high degree of walking and public transport, 
Navi Mumbai appears as an environmentally friendly and green city – at least from a 
European perspective.197 
Indeed Cidco’s survey reveals that 60 percent of the working population are employed 
in Navi Mumbai. The other most significant destination is the Mumbai peninsula while 
36 percent of all work trips head to the island city.198 This self sufficiency is underlined 
by the fact that more than half (52,3 percent) of all work trips take place within Navi 
Mumbai, and 24 percent of the trips are confined to the same node. Of the educational 
trips even 95 percent remain within Navi Mumbai (76 percent inside a node).199 The 
Cidco data presents Navi Mumbai as a city that is based on public transport and walk-
ing: generally, more than half of all trips in the new city are made on foot. The average 
duration of a one-way trip is about 28 minutes.200 Of the working population 30 percent 
uses the railway as their primary means of transportation, another 16 percent uses bus-
ses, and 16 percent walk.  
External infrastructure 
One of Navi Mumbai’s biggest assets is the availability of abounding service facilities and 
infrastructure networks. The location is extremely well serviced by all means of trans-
port, as well as water, electricity and power lines. The development plan of Navi Mum-
bai provides for integrated systems covering roads, railways, waterways and airways. 
The township is well connected to other parts of the state by railway and road networks. 
Navi Mumbai has six rail corridors and an independent mainline rail terminal con-
necting the city directly to other parts of the country.201 Their total internal length ex-
ceeds 157 km. The construction was made possible because Cidco formed a joint project 
with the national Railways.202 Streetwise the area is connected to the Mumbai-Pune 
highway (NH 4), one of the fastest growing development corridors of India (cf. above). 
Moreover several national and state highways pass through the area. Two bridges pro-
vide essential links to the Mumbai peninsula across the Thane Creek. The Vashi Bridge203 
(1971, 1995) and the Airoli Bridge (1999) provide inter-regional links to national desti-
nations. A new link between Nerul and Uran is under construction. (Cf. Cidco) 
An important landmark for the development of the region will be a new 22,5 kilome-
tre sea link from central Mumbai. The connection will join Sewri on the Mumbai penin-
sula to Nhava Sheva on the continent in less than 20 minutes. Referred to as India's big-
gest infrastructure project to date, the bridge will be completed in 2013.204 It is being 
                                               
197 Of course the situation is more complex, as the majority of the populations are not able to afford a private car. 
198 Only 1 percent works in other regional locations, 3 percent in the close regional centre of Thane-Kalyan. 
199 In regard to general mobility, 81 percent of all trips undertaken take place within Navi Mumbai. 
200 The principal modes of transport are walking (54 percent), railway (14 percent), bus (9 percent), autorikshaw (6 percent), 
electric buses and trams (3.5 percent). In addition 30 percent of all trips are work trips, 30 percent are made for educational 
purposes, and 16 percent for other reasons. 
201 The Konkan Railway that connects Central India to North Karnataka and Goa passes through Navi Mumbai. 
202 Personal Interview in August 2008 with Uma Adusimilli, Chief Planner of MMRDA and former Chief Planner of Cidco. 
203 The latest version of the Vashi Bridge is planned with 16 lanes. (Cf. http://20twentytwo.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-10-
lane-vashi-bridge-planned.html) 
204 The eight lane trans-oceanic bridge was compared to Shanghai’s Sutong Yangtze Road Bridge. (Cf. 
http://www.ameinfo.com/153121.html) 
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developed by the state Government at an estimated cost of around US$ 2 billion (INR. 
7.500 Crore). 205 
In addition to the exceptional bridge project a new International Airport is currently 
underway in Navi Mumbai. The Navi Mumbai International Airport will be built close 
to the Panvel node on a 1140 hectare site in a Public-private partnership. The public sec-
tion will hold 25 percent of the 1,2 billion US$ (INR 4.000 Crore) project and air traffic 
is supposed to commence in 2012.206 (Cf. Website of Cidco) 
An additional fundamental (and globally relevant) project in the environs of Navi 
Mumbai is the Jawaharlal Nehru Port (JNP). This harbour to the South of the Parallel 
City handles almost half of India’s maritime traffic. An entirely privately operated sec-
tion, the Nhava Sheva Container Terminal (NSCT), was inaugurated in 1989. (Cf. 
worldportsource.com; jnport.com, r03.03.2008) In the operational year 2006/2007 the 
port handled 3,3 million containers and was listed as the 29th largest port in the world.207 
The extension of the port area is still not finished. Currently further to the South the Re-
vas port, a new private harbour is being constructed by the driving force behind the new 
Navi Mumbai SEZs: Sea King Infrastructure. (Cf. below: developers) The port will be 
planned as a multi cargo deep-water port and is intended to become another gateway 
facility for the SEZ projects. 
In the future the element of water may also play an increased role for personal trans-
port via ferries.208 
As far as utilities are concerned Navi Mumbai stands out as a model of uninterrupted 
water supply. Cidco has developed its own fresh water reservoir (Hetwane) in the area 
with an existing capacity of 150 million litres per day (MLD). (Cf. Websites: Cidco, 
NMSEZ) The Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation extended the capacity to 450 mil-
lion by buying another reservoir (Morbe). The supply also helps to close gaps in the sur-
rounding region (cf. Times of India, March 7th, 2008) and will be marketed to the up-
coming SEZs.209 
The case of industry demonstrates that Navi Mumbai was not built on a green field. 
Industrial facilities in the environs of Navi Mumbai play an important and ambiguous 
role as employers and facilitators of infrastructure supply (e.g. roads, water, power) but 
also as competitors for space and polluters. (Cf. above: Mumbai, risks). Indeed, prior to 
the development of the New Town, the area on the mainland was a major target of the 
state’s industrial decentralisation policies. (Cf. above: Context, Milestones) These official 
efforts sought in particular to liberate the central city from heavy polluting segments such 
as chemical enterprises. The policy was steered by the Maharashtra Industrial Develop-
ment Corporation (MIDC), the same agency that generated Cidco later on. 
Development of industry in the Trans Thane Creek area started from the mid sixties. 
The total number of units in 1970 was 44; this number increased to 3.800 in 2006. No-
tably from 2001 to 2006 the growth of industries escalated by 35 percent, reflecting a 
                                               
205 There have been long and tedious negotiations to build the bridge as a Public-private partnership project. Yet, for politi-
cal reasons the Government recently decided to implement the project independently. It intends to finance the project by 
selling increased development rights at the ends of the bridge. (Cf. Phandis 2008, The Economist Jul 24th 2008) 
206 The project has got the important permissions in spring 2008. (Cf. The Financial Express, May 16, 2008) 
207 In 2007, Singapore handled more than 30 million TEUs (Twentyfoot Equivalent containers). Rotterdam topped the 10 
million mark. (Cf. www.aapa-ports.org) 
208 Cf. Times of India, February 15 2008 at http://www.mumbaimirror.com/net/mmpaper.aspx?page=article&sectid= 
2&contentid=2008020720080207021104484bdb5311b&pageno=1; During a previous development stage Cidco offered to 
use hover craft services to seven of the Navi Mumbai nodes, i.e. the CBD at Belapur (cf. www.Cidcoindia.com). Yet the 
project did not survive the start-up phase. Service had to be suspended due to lack of political commitment and insufficient 
demand. (Cf. Ghorpane) 
209 Water demand in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (BMR) is 3,026 MLD while demand in the suburbs is 1,307 MLD. (Cf. 
Bathija 2005) 
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boom of IT and service industries. A present survey by Cidco covers nearly 5.400 indus-
trial enterprises in the Navi Mumbai region. (Cf. Cidco 2007) 
The two main industrial areas in the vicinity are the Thane-Belapur Industrial Area 
(TTC) and the Taloja Industrial Area. The TTC Industrial Area is a classic backbone of 
Navi Mumbai's economy. A remarkable size of 2.562 hectares and nearly 4.000 enter-
prises have turned it into one of the largest industrial parks in India. The Taloja Indus-
trial Area covers 9.00 hectares with 1.200 plots. It employs 180.000 workers, 40 percent 
are informal sector labour.210 Since the 1990s the state government is dedicated to pro-
mote Navi Mumbai as an IT hub, addressing increasing competition from Chennai, Ban-
galore or Hyderabad.211 In this context Info-Tech Park at Vashi, the Millennium Park at 
Mahape and the new SEZ projects (Navi Mumbai SEZ, Mumbai SEZ) are aimed at gen-
erating desired economic momentum. 
Trends 
Indeed, after many years of slow and stagnating development, it can be observed today 
that the various infrastructure and service facilities of Navi Mumbai have a tremendous 
effect on the surrounding areas.  
Apparently a critical mass has been reached. Navi Mumbai’s abundant superregional 
infrastructure projects (cf. above), along with the commercial infrastructure of several 
technology parks, and the Navi Mumbai SEZ have triggered a real estate boom in the 
area.212 The real estate developer Hirco confirms that currently new push factors are 
driving out businesses and populations at an unprecedented scale: “The recent develop-
ment of Navi Mumbai has opened up new opportunities across the real estate spectrum. 
Limited land availability, infrastructure bottlenecks, and high occupancy costs have led 
to relocations by several companies from South Mumbai to suburban locations.” (Hirco 
2007: 18) In addition, is a widely acknowledged that: “The government bid for the 
Greenfield Navi Mumbai International Airport and Mukesh Ambani's Special Economic 
Zone (SEZ) are two big factors that are set to change the profile of Navi Mumbai.” 
(http://www.ameinfo.com/128242.html, r02.06.2008) 
Private projects in Navi Mumbai’s vicinity 
A new wave of speculation and private investment in Navi Mumbai’s vicinity yields vari-
ous projects. A large number of SEZs, Integrated Townships, commercial zones and large 
housing estates are being promoted and planned along the Mumbai Pune axis. The 
schemes range from township types, to commercial enclaves, to gated communities. 
Among the large new townships are the Mumbai Manhattan (DLF and Al Nakheel, 8000 
hectares), Aamby Valley (Sahara India, 4000 hectares). Commercial and industrial en-
claves include the Mumbai SEZ (Reliance, 5000 hectares), Energy City (Gulf Finance 
House Government of Maharashtra, 240 hectares), as well as the Dhirubhai Ambani 
Knowledge City (Reliance Telecom, 56 hectares). Gated communities comprise the Hi-
ranandani Palace Gardens (Panvel, 233 hectares), Magic Hills I and II (300 hectares), 
Bollywood City (Lakshish Group, n.n.), and the Arrow City (Arrow Engineering, 45 hec-
tares).213 
                                               
210 ”The total number of employees in the surveyed industries was 247.484 out of which 176.774 are regular employees 
and 70.710 are labourers (from secondary source), which is about 40 percent.” (Cidco 2007, Manufacturing Survey) 
211 Among the problems, however are the significantly lower labour costs of these Southern Metropolises. (Cf. above: Econ-
omy; Centralisation) 
212 These new projects can be seen as an effect of the national real estate boom, caused by liberal government reforms 
towards the real estate sector and construction sector. In addition they are directly based on the ongoing demographic and 
economic growth of the region (cf. above: Context). 
213 Cf. also to some ‘Examples’ at ‘local context’ below 
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The two largest and most significant projects are two large Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs). The Navi Mumbai SEZ and the Mumbai SEZ will jointly comprise 6.800 hec-
tares214 and are among the biggest SEZs in India. (Cf. below) 
 
Box 19: The Navi Mumbai SEZ-puzzle 
Despite, or due, to its young age the Mumbai SEZ appeared as a volatile and ephemeral 
construction. The study of newspaper articles on ‘SEZs in Navi Mumbai’ reveals a highly 
dynamic and controversial history. A confusing variety of names, ranging from NMSEZ, 
MMSEZ, MISEZ to MSEZ, points to this eventful background. 
Only eight years ago the combined SEZ comprised an area of more than 12.500 hec-
tares, equalling a third of Navi Mumbai. Cidco started to develop the Navi Mumbai SEZ 
at Dronagiri with a planned size of 2.500 hectares. Thereafter the private SKIL group, 
along with the Reliance Corporation, came up with the idea of a larger SEZ area called 
Maha Mumbai SEZ of 10.000 hectares. When it turned out that several project partners 
would be involved in both projects, plans were forged to join the two zones as the 
Mumbai Integrated SEZ (MiSEZ, cf. website of IL&FS). In the meanwhile however, after 
ongoing resistances and the withdrawal of state support, the planned size of the Maha 
Mumbai SEZ was reduced to 5.000 hectares.215 
                                               
214 About one third of this area remains to be acquired. 
215 Protests by the local villagers at the Maha Mumbai SEZ area had built up political pressure. Consequently all private SEZ 
developers were required to obtain the necessary land for their projects without governmental help. (Cf. websites of skil-
group.com.id; cidciondia.com; navimumbaisez.com; ilfsindia.com; nmsez.com; msez.id; all retrieved 12.09.2008) 
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Local form 
Table 15: Key indicators – Navi Mumbai’s local context 
Total Size (14 nodes) 33.400 hectares 
Size of the new Mumbai-
SEZ 
4.377 hectares 
Population 1,7 million 
Houses 210.000 
Average density 63 persons per hectare 
Residential land use 40 percent 
Share of open spaces 40 percent 
Number of Nodes 14 
Number of neighbourhoods 700 
Size of neighbourhoods 5.000 persons 
Density of neighbourhoods 300 persons per hectare 
On-site villages 80 
Major mode of local mobil-
ity  
Walking 
Size of average house 45 square metres 
Predominant FAR 1,0 
Predominant housing type 4 storey walk-up 
Amount of public housing 50 percent 
Milestone model projects Sect 1 Vashi (1979); BUDP-Site-and-service Scheme (1986); 
DRS Scheme (1987); Seawoods Estates (1996); Spaghetti Hous-
ing (2003); Kharghar Hill Plateau (2008) 
 
Introduction 
Navi Mumbai provides a comparatively high quality of life for its residents. It scores 
because of a low level pollution, decongested residential areas and its high proportion of 
open spaces and green belts. (Cf. Cidco 2008) Its authors designed Navi Mumbai as an 
‘open city’. All of the neighbourhoods were intended to remain open for all segments of 
society. Still, even before its completion the city portrays trends of an increasing privati-
sation of space and the corporatisation of services. Projects such as NRI Seawoods Es-
tates, Magic Hills or the SEZ at Dronagiri are tailored for exclusive customer groups. 
Therefore this section is devoted to the description of Navi Mumbai’s spatial forms 
and physical dimensions. It will focus on the spatial, physical and morphological charac-
teristics of this agglomeration of new settlements. Standing between the context de-
scribed above and the processes to be set down below the city’s form represents a pivot 
within our exploration of contemporary New Town formation. 
The section portrays the original project of Navi Mumbai as well as some important 
milestone projects representing its 40-year history in detail. Among the most recent of 
these projects are the Navi Mumbai SEZ and a series of Integrated Townships in the 
city’s environs. At the same time as these projects remain at a planning stage they em-
body an important set of novel urban trends. 
The approach accommodates the modular structure that was set out at the beginning 
as a basis for the comparative dimension within the study. Consequently we proceed 
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along a multiscalar analysis: from the entire structure, to some of the respective nodes, to 
the sector level, and finally to the neighbourhoods and building structures.  
Town dimension ‘string of nodes’ 
Size and density 
Navi Mumbai stretches across an area of 33.400 hectares.216 (Cf. Cidco) This makes it 
the world’s largest New Town and “India‘s largest urban-planning project...” (Shaw 
2004: 7). As the planned area reaches a size of about 80 percent of central Mumbai 
(43.700 hectares) it can also be called a parallel city (cf. Galantay). 
Moreover, the newly developing SEZs are among the largest projects of this type cur-
rently underway in India. The combined Navi Mumbai SEZ and the Mumbai SEZ will 
likely amount to 7.000 hectares and more. This will place them next to the largest pri-
vately run SEZ projects in the world.217 
Significantly lower urban densities and the availability of open space per resident rep-
resent the starkest contrasts between Mumbai and Navi Mumbai.218 Overall net popula-
tion densities are 63 persons per hectare at Navi Mumbai – as opposed to Mumbai’s 
average net densities of 263 persons (and peak densities of several thousand). With a 
final population of 3 million, a density of 100 persons per hectare may be achieved.219 
Indeed, in terms of density, Navi Mumbai is a ‘normal’ city compared to Mumbai. 
Structure 
Navi Mumbai is no single New Town. It is a multi-centric city and a “string of nodes 
with variable densities” (Patel 1997). Back in the planning stage of the 1960’s the scheme 
of 12 to 15 autonomous townships emerged as the favourite strategy among various sce-
narios.220 This strategy of extensive green belts and railway corridors highly resembles 
Ebenezer Howard’s concept of a regional network of Town Magnets. (Cf. above: Con-
text, Predecessors) 
The development agency Cidco adopted this 'nodal settlement pattern' model for the 
overall growth of Navi Mumbai and planned to develop 20 nodes.221 After 35 years, the 
total number of planned nodes has been reduced to 14 (Cf. Kumar, and above). Today 9 
of the nodes are finished. A significant part of the latest evolution takes place as Special 
Economic Zones. 
 Illustration C-8: Scheme of Navi Mumbai’s structure 
 Illustration C-9: Navi Mumbai’s land use plan 
Among the most influential structural features of Navi Mumbai is the combination of 
urban densities with transport arteries (cf. Interview with Charles Correa in August 
2006).222 The nodes are connected by a system of public transport (Mass Rapid Transit 
and bus feeders), enabling the majority of people to live and work within walking dis-
tance of a station. 
                                               
216 This is about the same size as the city of Paris, twice the size of Hanoi’s region, and half the size of Capetown’s or Santi-
ago de Chile’s region. (Cf. Appendix: Comparative Matrix) 
217 The Chinese SEZs are much larger (e.g. the Shenzhen-SEZ with 39.171 hectares). However, they are run by the Chinese 
Government and not by private sector entities. 
218 The Greater Mumbai Metropolitan Region has gross densities of 44 persons per hectare; Mumbai Island has a density of 
close to 500 persons per hectare. (Cf. appendix: comparative matrix, cf. Cidco 2005) 
219 The average number of 50 persons per hectare is comparable to the Metropolitan regions of Shanhgai or London. 
220 Cf. above: Context, Historic Milestones, Navi Mumbai; cf. Shaw 2004: 71; quoting Marg 1965, i-iv. 
221 Later this target was lowered to 13, and now with the two SEZ nodes it is again at 15. (Cf. Cidco 1973) 
222 A concept that is also represented by the US-based approach of Transit Oriented Development (Cf. Calthorpe 1993) 
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Navi Mumbai’s cross-sectional structure is rather flat and without much differentia-
tion. Several of the nodes blend together (for example Vashi and Kopar Khairane). In-
deed, while the planners imagined that the arrangement of rail stations and central facili-
ties would lead to an urban pattern that is higher at the centre and ebbs up towards the 
edge, India’s uniform zoning regulations (cf. Bertaud 2008) have led to a generally flat 
pattern without highlights. (Cf. Interview with Charles Correa in August 2006) 
Accessibility 
Navi Mumbai has been designed as an ‘open city’. All of the neighbourhoods were in-
tended to be open for all segments of society. This fact corresponds to the nature of the 
developer Cidco as a state owned corporation using modern town planning principles.223 
Nevertheless, the planners’ ideals are contrasted by significant trends on the ground. To-
day the city is experiencing an increasing privatisation of space and a corporatisation of 
services and more and more areas are sold as large entities to be developed as all-in-one 
packages. Among the precursors of this course are projects such as the NRI Seawoods 
Estates. The tendency is continued by projects such as Magic Hills or the SEZ projects at 
a new scale. As part of the new initiative the SEZ at Dronagiri will be bounded by a 4,5 
metre wall. Its cost of INR 42 Crore (~ 10 Million US$) is about 20 percent of the cost of 
all roads in the area. (Cf. nmsez.com; 09.Sept.2008) 
Land use 
Before the project was started the land was mainly used for agriculture, fishing activities 
and 86 villages. (Cf. below; Shaw 2005: 190) 5.000 hectares or one sixth of the land was 
urbanised, 16.600 hectares or 53 percent of the land was in private hands, 2.700 hectares 
were saltpans, 10.100 hectares belonged to the government, while flood plains comprised 
4.000 hectares. (Cf. Shaw 2004: 87) 
When the new town was implemented it introduced a modern separation of land uses: 
e.g. a single use zoning pattern with distinct areas for industrial, commercial, residential 
and institutional activities. (Cf. Ananthakrishnan: 10)  
On the ground, the land use pattern represents trends characteristic to peripheral loca-
tions. An ever larger amount of land is residential. The share of land devoted for housing 
doubled from 18 percent in 1973 to 39 percent in 1992, while at the same time the por-
tion of institutional areas decreased from 10 percent in 1973 to 0,3 percent in 1992 – 
apparently an effect of the government’s reluctance to move to the New Town. The por-
tion of regional parks (including parts of the Parsik Hills) remained at a relatively stable 
20 percent while transport and protected zones (mostly preserved marsh lands) comprise 
one tenth of the territory. (Cf. Shaw 2005: 148, quoting a table from Sita 1999)  
Infrastructure 
One of the chief differences between Navi Mumbai and the ordinary Indian city is the 
opulent presence of infrastructure and open space. Navi Mumbai stands out with a tre-
mendous total of open spaces (infrastructure, green and nature), as 58 percent of land in 
various townships of Navi Mumbai is reserved for parks, gardens, green belts, open ar-
eas, non-development zones and reforestation projects (TECS 2001: 100). Moreover the 
quantity of public transport remains superb. Yet, it is not only the network, but also the 
nodes that are remarkable, each featuring at least one own rail station (cf. above: Exter-
                                               
223 This is a significant difference from traditional urban structures in India, which rather featured to specific castes contain-
ing a mix of uses. (Cf. Ananthakrishnan 1998: 10) 
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nal infrastructure). In this context 17 railway stations have been planned and designed as 
extraordinary landmarks.224 
The Juinagar Railway Station complex is an outstanding example of station design. 
The area in Sector 11 is supported by an intricate engineering structure and its interior is 
suffused in coloured light. The facility was designed as an architectural and engineering 
masterpiece by the office of Shirish Patel & Associates.225 
 Illustration C-10: Juinagar Railway Station 
Present trends, though, reflect an increasing orientation towards individual motorised 
traffic. The total length of parkways and expressways in Navi Mumbai is estimated at 
200 km (Cidco website). Indeed, the preliminary development of infrastructure is a cru-
cial component of Cidco’s ‘preemptive’ planning strategy (cf. below: Developer).226 The 
plan of Navi Mumbai employs a hierarchy of expressways, arterial roads and local roads 
that is largely modelled along the principles of modern architecture and planning, mainly 
along the role model of Chandigarh.227 (Cf. above: Predecessors)  
Landmarks are regarded an important ingredient of successful New Towns (cf. Sonne 
2003). In Navi Mumbai’s case the infrastructure projects serve as the ‘cathedrals’ of the 
modern engineering and informational technology age. In this context Cidco is remarka-
bly successful in creating synergies between the railway nodes and commercial projects. 
In the 1990’s the agency has developed a series of new hybrid typologies of enormous 
proportions combining railway stations and IT parks. The International Technology Park 
at Vashi and the International Technology Centre at Belapur are the most prominent 
examples representing this public driven planning incentive. (Cf. Ghorpade) Both of the 
projects feature built up areas close to 1 million square feet of office space. (Cf. 
www.navimumbai.com) 
 Illustration C-11: Vashi’s International Technology Park 
However, with increasing momentum towards privatisation and the information age, this 
first heroic approach faded away. The new economy prefers the monument as a sign and 
calls for global branding strategies. As a consequence Cidco reacted in coming up with 
the new iconic project of the Seawoods Railway Station Integrated Complex. The project 
will cover a built up area of 260.000 square metres, featuring a mix of malls, multiplex 
theatres and hotels (Cidco’s “Nirmiti” Newsletter 2008: 6). The strategy upholds the 
tradition of developing infrastructure as lighthouse projects. New is the tactics of com-
mercialising railway right of ways.228 
 Illustration C-12: Sea Woods Railway Station Integrated Complex (Darave Station) 
As, in this context, an increasing amount of land that surrounds the stations is leased to 
external developers, several commercial technology parks have been cultivated. All the 
projects are focused on IT services and international brands. (Cf. Ghorpade) At Vashi a 
75.000 square metre International InfoTech Park has been developed in collaboration 
with Software Technology Park India. (Cf. Cidco’s website) 
                                               
224 The major railway station projects are listed on the Cidco webpage. 
225 Mr. Patel was also among the three initial authors of Navi Mumbai. (Cf. above: Milestones; below: designers; cf. Correa 
1965) 
226 Significantly, for a long time the agency consisted of 40 percent engineers. (Cf. Cidco’ Chart in Kegler 2007) 
227 Generous green and utility corridors (of 10 meters) have been provided along all major arterial roads. These also provide 
abundant space for pedestrians. 
228 On the 21st of April 2008 Cidco signed an agreement with Larsen and Toubro Ltd., one of the largest construction conglomerates 
of India to develop and implement the project. The bid of INR 1.809 crore (about 450 million US$) happens to be the highest bid 
ever received for a development project in Navi Mumbai. (Ibid: 6; ERIL 2008) 
Navi Mumbai   236 
Other success stories related to commercial infrastructure comprise the successful re-
location of several wholesale markets from Mumbai to the mainland. The most promi-
nent of these are the agriculture produce and the iron and steel markets. (Cf. Ghorpade) 
Located in Vashi, these are big employees of lower skilled labour in the region. (Cf. 
Cidco’s commercial survey in 2007) 
More examples of projects geared to novel knowledge intensive industries (e.g. IT, ITES) 
are represented by: a large Millennium Business Park at Mahape, a prestigious exhibition 
and convention centre of 30 hectares, the Dhirubhai Ambani Knowledge City (DAKC) or 
the SEZ projects in the South. 
Navi Mumbai also features about a dozen large malls. Their number continues to rise. 
Center One was Navi Mumbai's first mall. The complex was conceptualised by RTKL 
USA and constructed by Trafalgar House, UK., houses with long-standing experience in 
designing and executing shopping projects. The Palm Beach Galleria is a newly opened 
25.000 square metre shopping mall in Vashi. Other large malls are the Raghuleela Mall 
(at Vashi station) or the City Centre (adjacent to Palm Beach Galleria).229 
Last, but not least, also the local villages (Gaothans) provide an important but largely 
unaccounted for share of commercial infrastructure, even if this is of a more unspectacu-
lar and simple kind. The villages have emerged as an important bases for micro service 
and small scale manufacturing units. (Cf. Ghorpade) 
Utility services in Navi Mumbai are also well above the Indian average standard. Navi 
Mumbai was projected to achieve an uninterrupted water provision, underground sewers 
and sewage treatment, efficient storm water drainage system and an adequate electric 
supply. Cidco provides all services except electricity. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001: 36) 
The rainwater management system, which includes a concept of holding ponds and re-
tention areas, is regarded as one of the most significant innovations achieved. The plan-
ners are proud of the fact that almost no flooding occurred during the heavy monsoons 
in 1995 and 2005. (Cf. personal Interview with Cidco representatives in August 2006) 
Yet, in contrast to the water supply, the power supply of the New Town is reaching is 
limits. Since 2005 the power supply has been rationed in most of the nodes.230 In this 
context it is planned to raise the installed power generation capacity of 960 MVA to over 
1500 MVA by 2010. (Cf. Cidco website)  
Navi Mumbai has an area wide coverage with state of the art educational and health 
facilities. New developments reflect trends of commercialisation in the high-end segment. 
All sectors are designed to provide a seamless supply with education, playground and 
recreational facilities. The area has 209 schools and 52 colleges for professional educa-
tion (Ananthakrishnan 1998: 13).231 Each sector contains neighbourhood centres, alto-
gether with a total of 175 public gardens and 18 playgrounds. In addition, the develop-
ment plan calls for “100.000 new trees each year”. (Engel 1991, quoted in Anan-
thakrishnan 1998: 11) Current strategies in higher education seek to generate synergies 
among higher education, research institutions and information intensive businesses. 
As part of novel tendencies renowned educational institutions have come to play an 
important role in the projects marketing and branding. The state government is offering 
incentives for knowledge intensive industries and education institutions. Negotiations 
have been underway with the renowned Wharton School of Management and the Har-
                                               
229 Cf. http://mumbaidailysnapshot.blogspot.com 
230 Navi Mumbai’s power supply problems made it even to the pages of popular Wikipedia: “Power supply continues to be a 
daily problem for Kharghar residents much like in other parts of Navi Mumbai and Thane.” (Cf. Cidco) 
231 Cidco (1973) has allocated one primary school per 5.000 residents, one high school for a 12.500 and one college for a 
community of 50.000. In the NMMC area there are 128 primary schools, 80 secondary schools and 25 colleges. (Cf 
NMMConline 17.09.2008) 
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vard Business School. (Cf. India Express 1998) The Indian Institute of Management, 
Ahmedabad, was allocated land in Kharghar. (The Indian Business, 2005) 
Additional social infrastructure for the township has also been developed in the form 
of health services and hospitals (capacity of 2.200 beds).232 
On the other hand, to date the 2 million residents of Navi Mumbai have only a few 
public facilities such as major libraries233, museums, swimming pools, etc. Cidco plans a 
museum, the CidcoSEUM in Kharghar. (http://Cidcoindia.com/Cidco/Futureproject.aspx, 
r02.02.2009) There is only one drama theatre234 and one major interregional sports facil-
ity, the DY Patil Stadium, in Nerul. (Own research) 
Onsite villages 
Navi Mumbai was not planned on a void. The project engulfed the livelihoods of as 
many as 86 Gaothans (traditional villages) and currently comprises 57 onsite village 
communities.235 (Cf. Shaw 2005; 121; Cidco 1993) 
Although the village structures have been categorised as unplanned, these have been 
subject to massive redevelopment interventions. Indeed, villages have been targeted by 
various Cidco development schemes which included either total relocation or integrated 
improvement projects. (Cf. below: Developer, Relocation strategies) After several decades 
of struggle ‘village elites’ emerge as one of the strongest political actors of Navi Mumbai 
(cf. below). 
 Illustration C-13: Map and images of onsite villages 
In addition the rural communities have also experienced fundamental changes in their 
spatial form due to larger socio-economic and political trends. While the traditional 
communities subsist on traditional livelihoods such as farming and fishing, they also 
thrive by running specific urban economies from renting houses to migrant labourers, to 
running supermarkets and catering for global enterprises.236 
Navi Mumbai’s slums 
“Even new cities, built from scratch, have a dualistic outcome with planned 
portions of ordered space in which the middle class live, and unplanned por-
tions of haphazard settlements and shanty towns in which the labourers and 
other low-income people live.” (Shaw 2004: 9) 
After almost 40 years Navi Mumbai more and more reflects the social and spatial 
contradictions of all Indian cities. Like other urban markets on the subcontinent the local 
economy is dependent on low-income labour and services. Indeed, on closer examina-
tion, the city that was proclaimed to be India’s first slum free city evolves as a complex 
conglomeration of the planned and the unplanned, featuring a significant degree of in-
formality. In the meantime about 30 percent of the new city’s population is composed of 
                                               
232 While the Indian health sector is experiencing an extraordinary rapid development (cf. McKinsey 2007) and a parallel 
trend towards privatisation, a new wave of health and wellness related projects could be expected to come up in the area. 
233 In 2003 a public library building for Rs. 1,38 Crore was inaugurated and made open to citizens in sector 3 of CBD Be-
lapur. (nmmconline r17.09.2008) 
234 The VishnuDas Bhave Auditorium is a landmark theatre in Vashi hosting a number of plays. 
235 While the villages take up less than 5 percent of the area, their populations make up for about a sixth of the total popu-
lation. (Numbers for the 1990’s Sita 2005: 239) An additional number of 45 villages are supposed to be affected by the 
development of the new MMSEZ. (Cf. www.nmsez.com, r.12.09.2008) 
236 “The elite and the wealthy from the villages are contractors and landlords.“ (Cf. Shaw: 248) 
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slum residents.237 (Cf. below: Residents) After all it is highly probable that in the future 
informal areas will form an integral part of Navi Mumbai.238 
Certainly, no ‘classical’ (consolidated) slum can be found in the planned nodes. In 
spite of that, major informal settlements have mushroomed in the environs. For this rea-
son the official numbers of informal settlements remained ‘clean’. Yet, as Navi Mumbai 
matures and becomes ‘normalised’, informality increasingly migrates to the nodes.239 As a 
matter of fact, nowadays various types of informal settlements diffuse increasingly all 
over the place. Most in-between locations such as vacant areas and borderlands are ap-
propriated for diverse informal activities. 
Turbhe Stores and Hanuman Nagar are among the largest examples of informal set-
tlements (Siva Raju 1996; see BOX below). These two slums cater to low skilled indus-
trial workers and can be found in between Navi Mumbai and the industrial areas to the 
East. Various other slums of a finer grain have emerged in the village areas, where infor-
mal markets for land and housing developed, on the hill slopes, the creek fronts as well 
as on the railway corridor reservations (Adusumilli 2001: 24). 
Moreover many other ephemeral species of informal dwelling activities are scattered 
all around the place. Informal pockets of tarpaulin villages can be found in proximity to 
large construction sites, squatting on leftover places such as traffic islands, under high-
way overpasses or unsecured lots. Others comprise extended village areas, or temporary 
pavement dwellings, and squatting on apartment stairways240.  
 Illustration C-14: Map and images of slums 
“Unpicked garbage, open drains clogged with garbage, dusty unpaved roads 
with fairly heavy vehicular traffic (trucks loading and unloading goods), and 
several hazardous small-scale industries, oil depots, and timber works along 
main lanes characterise Turbhe Stores.“ (Cf. Shaw: 246) 
Table 16: Turbhe Stores – basic data 
Starting date 1960s? 
Area 18 hectares 
Residents 80.000 
Units 13.000 
Density 4.000 Persons / hectare 
Private construction 100 percent 
LIC Units 100 percent 
Household Income 500 US$ 
 
Turbhe Stores is the largest slum in the area of Navi Mumbai. The area of 18 hectares is 
located to the East of the Turbhe and Sanpada nodes in a diverse urban fabric. The envi-
rons comprises the Mumbai–Pune Highway, the Thane-Belapur Industrial area, the new 
                                               
237 Informal labour and housing are an integral part in the Indian urban landscape. Most Indian households, as well as busi-
nesses, have several ‘servants’ and use informal services. (Cf. accounts in Mehta, Roberts) 
238 According to recent amendments of the Maharashtra Slum Act, 1971, it will no longer be possible to remove slums of a 
certain age without rehabilitation. The populations of the informal areas and the villages (cf. below) are of significant politi-
cal importance. (Cf. Shaw 2005: 248) 
239 NMMC numbers account for 9 villages, and 41 slums (quoted in Shaw: 240). 
240 This practice was described as a common practice in many Indian apartment buildings, e.g. Manil Suri devotes a whole 
Novel named “The Death of Vishnu” to this topic. (Cf. Suri, 2001) 
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Reliance Infocom campus, Vashi’s wholesale market, abandoned industrial sites and 
various quarrying activities (IGIDR: 173, 217). 
With an estimated population of 80.000, most of them Dalits, Turbhe Stores houses 
many casual workers. It is also known for its large red light district. At the same time the 
slum is an important part of the Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation and an influential 
voting bank, mainly for populist parties.241 The area is also acknowledged as having a 
high prevalence of HIV / AIDS cases and Malaria.242 (Cf. Laughton 2005) 
Nodes 
Navi Mumbai is made up of a string of 15 individual townships or nodes. While the 
greater urban fabric of Navi Mumbai’s nodes has been modelled along some of Ebenezer 
Howard‘s Town-Magnet-principles, such as greenbelts or suburban rail arteries, the inte-
rior of the respective townships mirror the principles of modern planning. (Cf. above: 
Predecessors, Chandigarh) 
Each of the satellites is planned in the manner of an independent town of about 
50.000 to 200.000 residents (or 25.000 to 40.000 households). Their respective area 
ranges between 500 to 2.000 hectares.243 All the basic infrastructure and services re-
quired for self-sufficient development are included. Each of the townships is equipped 
with a distinctive urban centre and each has a unique identity.244 This critical mass pro-
vides the city with vitality and identity. (Cf. Raje 2001) 
The node referred to as Belapur was planned to become the administrative and politi-
cal centre of Navi Mumbai and its Central Business District. It is also the homebase of 
Cidco. The township boasts of some of the most futuristic office and commercial build-
ings.245 (Cf. Chauhan 1998) Yet its development stagnated for many years and it was 
Vashi that became the economic centre along an auto-dynamic process. It features the 
best connectivity to Mumbai and the region, and is the target of most trips to the New 
Town. As a consequence the node presented the most dynamic growth rates, the highest 
density of jobs and the highest land prices.246 
Navi Mumbai’s nodes contain a relatively mixed urban fabric. Meanwhile 50 percent 
of all new housing projects are constructed by the private sector, the other half is allotted 
by Cidco for co-operative housing societies, bungalows, row-houses and for other social 
utility purposes. Indeed the compactness of Navi Mumbai’s nodes is clearly more urban 
than suburban. Population densities of 200 to 700 persons per hectare can be found in 
some of the townships and these numbers can be associated with Cidco’s strong master 
planning. While these numbers are significantly lower than the ‘super densities’ of 1.700 
persons and more of some of central Mumbai’s wards (cf. above), these are comparable 
to the centres of New York or Paris.247 While the node of Vashi features population den-
                                               
241 “A local Shiv Sena boss, Suresh Kulkarni, controlled the slum, and its inhabitants were an important vote bank in the 
state and general assembly elections.” (Cf. Shaw: 246, 247) 
242 Various organisations, such as the NGO PRERANA and the Rotary Club carry out social work in the territory. The Tata 
institute of Social Sciences has several field projects in place. (Cf. http://www.tiss.edu/Field_Action_Projects_0607.pdf.) 
243 Kharghar was planned for a exceptional population of 500.000. 
244 Belapur= Central Business District, Vashi = wholesale and services, Airoli= industry, Nhava-Sheva= port (Cf. Anathakrish-
nan: 11) 
245 In the early planning stages a circle of five nodes connected by a ring-shaped promenade and transit line surrounding the 
Mansarovar Lake, was intended to become the representative heart of Navi Mumbai. 
246 30 percent of all non-work trips go to this node. (Cf. Cidco 2005) 
247 Manhattan has a population density of 270 persons per hectare. The centre of Paris has a population density of about 
200, whereas suburban Marne La Vallee features densities of less than 16 persons per hectare. (Cf. Appendix: Comparative 
Matrix) 
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sities of 200 persons per hectare (200.000 on 1.000 hectares), the new township of 
Kharghar houses some 260 persons per hectare (500.000 on 1.700 hectares).248 
 Illustration C-15: Map and images of Magic Hills 
Housing data 
While Navi Mumbai has been conceived as a decongestion scheme for Mumbai, housing 
is among the most important land use categories. Moreover its share in the urban fabric 
is constantly on the rise.249 250 In the year 2005 Navi Mumbai’s housing stock totalled 
210.000 units. In 2005 the highest number of dwelling units was distributed among 
Vashi (16,8 percent), Nerul (16,7 percent) and Kopar Khairane (14,5 percent). (Cf. 
Cidco 2005, ES-3) Cidco has produced 53 percent of this amount; private developers 
provided the other 47 percent.251 About 55.174 houses were under construction.252 (Cf. 
Cidco 2005). 
Indeed Navi Mumbai comprises a significantly higher amount of social housing than a 
‘normal’ Indian city (which was one of the project’s goals). On the other hand the num-
bers are still significantly lower than Indian demographics would require (cf. above). The 
total housing stock in Navi Mumbai consists of 27 percent LIG and EWS units, 59 per-
cent are MIG units, and 14 percent of HIG units.253 (Cidco 2000) 
Vacancy rates in Navi Mumbai vary sharply. They depend on whether a project was 
subsidised or not. Consequently unoccupied apartments are unknown in Cidco’s subsi-
dised housing projects. Cidco curtails any speculative re-sale of the houses.254 (Cf. Cid-
coindia, r13.sept.2008) In contrast, many speculative middle and higher income projects 
feature extreme vacancy numbers. Real estate brokers report that barely 10 percent of 
apartments on Palm Beach Road, the main artery of Nerul, were occupied in 2007 (In-
diaproperty.com, r.12.11.2008). 
Sectors and neighbourhoods (‘self sufficiency’ but monotony) 
 “...again, it is an important part of the project that each ward, or one sixth 
part of the city, should be in some sense a complete town by itself... school 
buildings may be flexibly used...  work, too, would be practically completed 
                                               
248 It is impoprtant to note that even new projects such as the Navi Mumbai SEZ area, as well as some of the upcoming 
Integrated Township projects, feature densities of similar dimensions. Integrated Townships like the Hiranandani Palace 
Gardens or the new SEZ also plan for combined residential and job densities of 200 to 300 people per hectare. Only some 
new and more remote villa townships on the way to Pune (for example Magic Hills) are betting on the detached villa type. 
These plan for suburban densities of 50 persons per hectare and less. Yet even these densities are significantly higher than 
comparable Western schemes. 
249 The area devoted for housing doubled from 18 percent in the 1980’s to 39 percent in the 1990’s. (Cf. above: Land use) 
250 The current incremental demand for housing in Navi Mumbai is 10.300 units, which is likely to increase to 26.500 units 
by 2021. The average shelter supply in Navi Mumbai in the last decade was about 3.700 units. (MMRDA 1999, N-8, 43) 
251 119.460 units have been built by Cidco and 101.990 by private sector stakeholders. 
252 Cidco mainly specialises in developing subsidised projects for the low and medium income segments of the population, 
the so-called Economic Weaker Segments (EWS), Lower Income Groups (LIG) and Middle Income Groups (MIG). Yet, cur-
rently private agents mainly carry out development. More than 88 percent of the houses under construction are developed 
by individual households, housing co-operatives, corporate bodies for their employees and real estate developers. (Cf. Cidco 
2005) 
253 Of the total houses constructed by Cidco, about 50 percent are for EWS and LIG, about 27 percent for MIG and about 
23 percent for HIG (Ibidem). Cidco provides completed housing products, sites and services with partially constructed struc-
tures and only developed sites. The public developer has built projects for the EWS under the BUDP scheme at Kopar 
Kharaine, Kharghar, Nerul, Kalemboli and New Panvel. (Cf. Cidcoindia.com, r17.09.2008) Some exemplary housing schemes 
by Cidco are the Gharkul and Spaghetti schemes for LIG and MIG populations, the Millennium Towers project for MIG 
clients and Seawoods Estate for HIG’s including NRI groups. (Cf. the examples discussed in this section) 
254 While all tenants are required to use the property for personal purpose, in previous years very few had sold their houses. 
Yet, a large share (70 percent) of the houses has been rented out. This may be one of the reasons why very few encroach-
ments/additions and alterations are observed on the ground. Normally the apartments are rented to tenants who come from 
a higher income category than the original allotters. 
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in one ward before commencing on another and the operations in the various 
wards would be taken up in proper sequence ...” (Howard 1947 (1898): 71) 
Navi Mumbai can be conceived as a city of 700 self-sufficient ‘modern’ villages.255 While 
design of its sectors was influenced by modern concepts such as Chandigarh, the underly-
ing ideology of self-sufficiency was associated with Gandhi’s social principles.256 (Cf. An-
anthakrishnan: 18) The system of sectors (or neighbourhoods) is the next hierarchical 
component of the city’s nodes. A node contains 40 to 80 sectors, accommodating be-
tween 2.500 and 10.000 inhabitants. Accordingly, the average sector contains 500 to 
2.500 households on 20 to 50 hectares (own estimates). 
All of these planned neighbourhoods are designed in a self-sufficient manner featuring 
all essential recreational, educational and commercial facilities. Most of the quarters are 
zoned in a monofunctional way (e.g. residential, commercial, industrial et. al.) Yet, they 
are conceived as autonomous subcentres.257 (Cf. Raje 2001) Most of the neighbourhood 
services are accessible by various modes of transport. Often the communal facilities such 
as parks and playgrounds and kindergartens of some communal housing schemes are 
accessible by pedestrians only. 
The neighbourhoods of Navi Mumbai epitomise the city’s exceptional compactness. 
Despite ample space for infrastructure, services and leisure (cf. above: land use) many 
places achieve densities of 200 and 1.000 residents per hectare (own calculations). 
Without a doubt, like in any other city, the populations and urban structures of the 
sectors underlie a high degree of variation. The population (and density) is highly de-
pendent on the income status and the planned character of the respective scheme. While 
low-income areas may comprise 5 to 10 times as many people as middle and upper in-
come sectors, informal settlements and villages feature the highest population densities. 
(Cf. other sections of this chapter) 
Naturally the population densities among neighbourhoods varies more than those of 
the whole township: Site-and-service projects and row house types in Kopar Khairane 
contain densities of 250 persons per hectare; Cidco’s formal housing schemes in walk-up 
apartments for the lower middle and the lower income classes such as Ghansoli, Gharkul 
or the DRS scheme in Sector 26 of Vashi, comprise more than a thousand persons per 
hectare; schemes for the middle income, such as the Spaghetti in Kharghar, achieve densi-
ties of up to 200 residents per hectare. Nevertheless some integrated neighbourhoods for 
the rich, such as Seawoods I and II, accomplish enormous densities as well (by the means 
of luxurious high-rise typologies). 
The divergence in densities among the respective sectors of Navi Mumbai seems to be 
less extreme than the variations within ‘generic’ Indian cities. (In Mumbai, for example, 
70 percent of the population reside on 5 percent of the area. (Cf. above: Mumbai) Yet, 
the stark contrasts reappear when comparing Navi Mumbai’s quarters to the locations in 
the environs. While the ‘unplanned’ areas such as the villages and informal settlements 
(e.g. Turbhe Stores) achieve the highest densities of several thousand people per hectare, 
new villa-type enclaves on the hillsides, represent the lower density end, catering for 
fewer than 50 persons per hectare. 
                                               
255 With 14 nodes the total number of Navi Mumbai’s sectors ranges around 700. 
256 Naturally the approach of autonomy and self-reliance reverberates throughout the history of ‘enlightened’ cities. It can 
be found in Howard’s Town Magnet (cf. quote above), and also at Orange County’s Irvine (cf. www.villagesofirvine.com, 
r22.11.2008). 
257 E.g. each sector has its own cluster of shops called "mini-markets" that sell basic items. Some bigger sectors have bigger 
"mini-markets." (Cf. Shaw 2004) Indeed, Cidco’s mobility data as described above underlines that a high degree of self-
sufficiency was achieved. Cidco’s socio spatial survey describes that the majority of Navi Mumbaikars walk, use public trans-
port and remain within their neighbourhood for every day business. (Cf. above: Regional context: External and internal 
mobility; cf. Cidco 2005.) 
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Land use and structure of neighbourhoods 
All residential formal sector neighbourhoods in Navi Mumbai feature an excessive 
amount of streets, open space, playgrounds and communal facilities. Most of the planned 
sectors have an open space ratio exceeding 35 percent. (This number is in accordance 
with the national building codes.) At least half of the remaining area is used for residen-
tial purposes. 
Table 17: Land use composition in exemplary parts of Navi Mumbai258 
Name Open Space Residential Commercial Social 
DRS Sector 26 35 45 20 10 
Navi Mumbai SEZ 33 17 50 / 
Hiranandani 40 28 28 4 
Turbhe 10 87 2 1 
 
The structure of Navi Mumbai’s 700 neighbourhoods (or sectors) varies considerably 
and reflects different periods and paradigms. A monotonous zoning and single ownership 
often results in a homogeneous fabric. Recently a significant trend towards the formation 
of enclaves can be observed. In the 40 years since groundbreaking, a significant clustering 
along ethnical lines has occurred – which is against the spirit of modernistic planning 
principles.259 Today the ongoing trend towards privatisation is among the most relevant 
trend in relation to the structure of the neighbourhoods.260 At the turn of the century the 
private sector provides 50 percent of all new housing and 80 percent of all structures in 
Navi Mumbai. (Cf. Cidco 2000, MMRDA 1999: N-8: 34) This engenders an increasing 
fragmentation of the urban fabric and shifts boundaries between public and private 
spheres. Early neighbourhoods were highly integrated in a general system of open spaces. 
They featured multiple entrances. In contrast, various new projects are built in the form 
of semi-private enclaves, with semi-private spaces and a restricted access.261 
Numerous residential projects reflect the inclination of Navi Mumbai’s neighbour-
hoods towards homogeneous building structures. The tendency of privatised communal 
spaces is indicated by and the prominence of a controlled access. 
 Illustration C-16: Selected neighbourhood maps 
 
Table 18: Quality of residential projects by various developers 
Name Developer Structure Lots Open-
ing 
Access 
Kopar 
Khairane 
(BUDP) 
Cidco Site and Service on 
minimal lots 
Private > 6 Public 
Sector 26 Cidco Walk-up apart- Com- 2-6 Semi-public 
                                               
258 Own calculations 
259 Ananthakrishnan (1998) demonstrates that despite the efforts of Cidco to equally distribute social classes and ethnicities 
these tend to cluster in specific locations. Her analysis shows that “the urban social pattern appears to be non-uniform at a 
regional scale, and distinctly driven by an ethnic component at the sub-regional scale.” (Ibidem: 64) 
260 Indeed, the material consequences of this trend, as part of an ongoing transformation from a supply oriented fordist 
state to a demand oriented system of the new economy, are the implicit topics of this entire thesis. 
261 E.g. the Kharghar Hills plateau and some other upscale residential areas emerge in this manner. Yet, while the trend is 
clearly present, Navi Mumbai is far from becoming an agglomeration of gated enclaves. 
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(DRS) ments munal 
Gharkul Various  Mix of semi-
detached and 
walk-up buildings 
Com-
munal 
2-6 Semi-public 
Spaghetti Cidco Large meandering 
walk-up buildings 
Com-
munal 
2-6 Semi-public 
Seawoods I 
and II 
Cidco Residential high 
rise towers 
Com-
munal 
1 Access 
strictly re-
stricted 
Navi Mumbai 
SEZ 
PPP (Cidco, 
Skil) 
Residential high 
rise towers 
Private 1 Access 
strictly re-
stricted 
Khargar Hills 
Plateau 
Cidco Detached villa 
types 
Private 1 Access 
strictly re-
stricted 
Hiranandani 
Palace Gar-
dens 
Hirco Mix from town-
houses to high ris-
es 
Private 1 Access 
strictly re-
stricted 
Magic Hills Sternon Detached villa 
types 
Private 1 Access 
strictly re-
stricted 
Bonkode Vil-
lage 
(Kopar 
Khairane) 
‘People’ Mix of village 
houses and infor-
mal rental struc-
tures 
Private > 6 Public 
Turbhe Stores ‘People’ Non-permanent 
(kucha) structures 
Squat-
ted 
> 6 Semi-public 
Urban design 
In contrast to the nodes, Navi Mumbai’s urban variety decreases at the sector level. Most 
of the neighbourhoods are produced by individual developers seeking to rationalise the 
scheme. In addition the projects tend to cater to equal classes with similar demand pro-
files. 
Despite recent trends towards enclaves, the critical mass of Navi Mumbai’s 
neighbourhoods remains the traditional ‘open city’ model. Most of the sectors represent 
openly accessible rectilinear plans.262 Many of the designs have been influenced by mod-
ern superblock layouts. (Chandigarh and Gandhinagar are influential role models.) As 
many of Navi Mumbai’s sectors are constructed in the form of mass housing schemes, 
cluster developments are a common feature.263 
Despite a high typological variation of its 700 sectors in the 45 years of implementa-
tion, Navi Mumbai represents a relatively high varieity of design integrity. The fact that 
Cidco remains the sole leading agency in the development of all major infrastructure fa-
cilities, roadways, landmarks and open spaces, as well as the fact that detailed develop-
ment guidelines are provided for every node, leads to a relatively harmonious cityscape. 
In addition to the New Bombay development plan each of the sectors has a detailed de-
velopment plan. Guidelines of the Kharghar node, for example, require that large build-
                                               
262 Curvilinear subdivisions are less common, as these schemes require more space. 
263 In fact the onsite villages can also be regarded as cluster communities. 
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ings define public spaces and provide street frontages.  (Cf. Personal Interview with 
Adusumilli 2006; Own observations) 
Blocks and buildings 
In order to complete a comprehensive analysis of Navi Mumbai’s structure on the way to 
the portrayal of the residents, we are now approaching an increasingly human scale. Our 
attention shifts towards blocks, lots and buildings. The regional, urban and district scales 
as discussed above, require a certain level of abstraction. It seems that they belong to the 
area of planning professions. The scale of buildings and blocks, in contrast, is most rele-
vant to people’s day-to-day living practices.264 Yet, the scale of blocks and buildings is 
also highly influenced by abstract building codes, zoning codes and development regula-
tions. 
Due to the size of Navi Mumbai the character of its blocks and lots varies greatly. 
Therefore, it does not make sense to identify an archetypical housing type and block ge-
ometry characterising the whole area.265 The analysis of buildings and blocks reveals that 
more than half of the area is built in the form of society plots as part of large schemes 
(this is a significant difference from a generic Indian urban fabric). 
Block size and structure 
Informal settlements such as Turbhe Stores feature the largest blocks with the highest 
number of small and mostly irregular lots. The villages (e.g. Bonkode) as well as other 
planned settlements (e.g. Kopar Khairane), based on low-rise private ownership, feature 
a high number of private lots of a relatively small block size. Central locations such as 
Vashi’s sector 17, the CBD of Belapur or the newly planned SEZ, contain medium sized 
urban blocks comprising a large number of private commercial lots. Moreover, large 
public and private schemes, for example in the form of walk-ups and high-rise towers 
(Spaghetti, Millennium Towers, Hiranandani), consist of uniform blocks of large lots. 
Not least, Villa enclaves such as Magic Hills consist of efficiently arranged private lots. 
Table 19: Block structure of selected schemes 
Vashi Sector 1 Individual lots arranged in groups, clusters 
BUDP Kopar 
Khairane 
Blocks composed of 30 to 50 individual 
rectilinear lots, many irregular subdivi-
sions 
DRS Sector 26 Community land, block equals lot 
Gharkul Community land, semi private spaces 
Spaghetti Semi private community land 
Gharonda-
Ghansoli 
Semi private community land 
Navi Mumbai 
SEZ 
Large individual lots 
Hiranandani Pal-
ace Gardens 
Few lots, semi private facilities 
Magic Hills Small and medium sized private lots, super 
                                               
264 Herbert Gans, for example, in his 1969 portrayal of “The Levittowners” emphasises the fact that for most people the 
question of ‘the neighbours and the block around you’ is more relevant than the question of ‘your neighbourhood’. 
265 One of the overarching trends is conceivably the gradual demise of large patches of community land as was typical for 
publicly developed projects. 
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efficient arrangement 
Bonkode Village Irregular arrangement of individual lots 
Turbhe Stores Extreme amount of illegal subdivisions 
 
Lot size and geometry (private lots) 
The individual lot sizes in Navi Mumbai’s projects are much smaller than those that we 
know from western metropolises. Even in the private sector the average total built area 
per tenement is 63 square metres.266 (Cf. MMRDA A-8, Table A8.8. quoting Cidco 
1992) This size is rather high for Indian standards. Lots in the BUDP site-and-service 
projects have a minimum size of 25 square metres.267 In contrast the middle and higher 
income project Magic Hills offers building plots around 120 square metres intended for 
bungalow type housing.  
While a built up area comprises 45 square metres, dwelling units constructed by Cidco 
are an average of 36 square metres.268 Cidco’s low income, EWS/LIG schemes, feature 
sizes of 18 to 25 square metres (Cidco 2005: ES-3, cf. Adusumilli 2001:24). Moreover 
standard housing sizes range from 25 square metres for LIG units, 25 to 50 square me-
tres for smaller ‘MIG-1’ units, 50 to 75 square metres for ‘MIG-2’ units, and HIG units 
of 75 square metres and above. (Cidco 2005) 
Average private space per resident 
Navi Mumbai provides four times as much space per resident as its mother city: The av-
erage private space per resident is 11,8 square metres (own calculation). The respective 
number for Mumbai island is 3,5 square metres. (Cf. Nissel 1997 quoting data by the 
World Resources Institute) An average household with 3,8 residents can marshal a floor 
plan of 45 square metres. (Cf. Cidco 2005) This translates to an average 6,6 of square 
metres per capita for the EWG LIC sections, 13,2 square metres for the middle-income 
inhabitant and 20 square metres and more for the higher income resident (own calcula-
tion). 
Prescribed Floor Space Index (FSI) 
The general FSI value for Navi Mumbai is 1,0.269 (Cf. Bertaud 2003, MMRDA 1999) 
The regulation predominantly affects lots smaller than 1.000 square metres. For “resi-
dential cum commercial” or commercial plots above 1.000 square metres, FSI permission 
is 1,5. The same is true for compensation packages in some of the villages. 
Housing type 
The majority of Navi Mumbai’s inhabitants live in multi-storey walk up apartments: 
more than 40 percent of the buildings in Navi Mumbai have four floors, 34 percent 2 
and 3 stories, and 7 percent dwell in structures of 8 and more levels. (Cf. Cidco 2005: 
ES-3) 
                                               
266 Areas per tenement range at 82 square metres for bungalow plots; row house plots are 76 square meter in average, 61 
square meters for society plots, 60 square metres for commercial cum residential projects, 47 square metres at health plus 
residential developments, 52 square metres for bulk land. More than half of the area is built in the form of society plots, 
only one seventh as bungalow plots. (Cf. Cidco 2005) 
267 They were allowed to go below Indian building codes. (MMRDA 1999, N-8) 
268 The average size of all tenements constructed by the private sector is 63 square metres ranging from 47 square metre 
tenements on plots to be used for health services plus residential purposes to 82 square metres on Bungalow plots (Table-
A.8.8 in MMRDA 1999, N-8: 43) 
269 FSI (FAR) regulations are an integral part, of Indian urban planning culture. (Cf. above; cf. Bertaud 2003, 2004, 2008; cf. 
Patel 2007) 
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The high number of walk-up apartments is also reflected by the fact that Navi Mum-
bai is a city of cooperative housing societies. A remarkable number of four fifths of the 
population reside in co-op schemes. In contrast, only 11,5 percent live in a commercial 
apartment, 6,4 percent reside in a row house, 0,6 percent stay in a bungalow type build-
ing (Cidco 2005: ES-3). 
Housing fabric 
The 40-year history of Navi Mumbai’s 800 sectors offers a wide range of all conceivable 
architectural styles. Latest trends point to an increasing proliferation of a thematic archi-
tecture working with iconic shapes. (cf. below: Development and Design) 
Navi Mumbai’s architectural housing styles represent a broad choice of options rang-
ing from the romantic vernacular ‘rural’ designs of Charles Correa’s artist village at Be-
lapur, to the ‘non-architectural’ pragmatism of the BUDP site-and-service housing 
schemes, the lean modernist image of Cidco’s large public housing projects from the 
1980’s (DRS, Vashi), the iconic Spaghetti, the postmodern ornamented shapes of 
Gharkul, the technoid forms of the Millennium towers, the traditionally ornamented 
Seawoods Estates, the neo-classical Hiranandani Palace Gardens, and also to celebrity 
resorts offering themed leisure landscapes for high value individuals. 
After all, the context of traditional villages, local towns, creeks, industrial estates and 
modern billboards results in a heterogeneous “landscape of surprise”. (Cf. Gotsch 2007) 
The German urban ethnologist, Christiane Brosius, captures the atmosphere of contem-
porary Indian suburbs, valid also for the environs of Navi Mumbai, in the following 
way: “Countless real estate announcements, Interior Design magazines and billboards 
portray this new homeland: There is a German “Küchenausstatter”, household appli-
ances, as well as a " Sky Lounge" promising an extraordinary cosmic experience; illumi-
nated mansions, geometric spectacles of urban blocks, slogans promoting Italian terra-
cotta tiles and marble floors; “Smart Homes” , which can be remotely controlled from 
the car, but also erected and structures along the traditional Vastu Shastra principles... 
Popular is the citation of a cosmopolitan inventory of „large empires“, the Greek and 
Roman antiques, the Egypt of the Pharaohs or the British Empire.“ (Cf. Brosius 2007: 
68, translated by the author) 
 Illustration C-17: Matrix of housing styles 
Individual adaptations of buildings 
Individual adaptations of the housing structures are on a daily agenda in most of the 
neighbourhoods. They appear to be correlated to the age of a project, the socioeconomic 
status of the residents as well as to the form of ownership and management of the pro-
ject. Slum settlements and villages represent the highest amount of adaptations. Site-and-
service projects have been initiated with adaptations as a concept. Yet, smaller and un-
planned interventions, ranging from converted balconies to the chaotic arrangement of 
air conditioning, mark the whole landscape. Informal appropriation seems only atypical 
in upscale projects such as Seawoods Estates or Hiranandani. 
As generic styles are mixed with locally flavoured features, the result is an Indian or 
Marathi townscape. The condition is best illustrated by a comment of a guest-worker 
from Kolkata: “Fortunately this place was nothing like we imagined it to be. Far from  
being a slice of America, it had India written all over it.” 
 (http://ptblanc.blogspot.com/2004_06_01_archive.html (r17.09.2008) 
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Examples (nodes) 
To illustrate the information presented above the following section presents four exem-
plary nodes – Vashi (1979), Kopar Khairane (1986), Kharghar (1995) and Dronagiri 
(2004). Each of these stands for a specific era of Navi Mumbai’s development. 
1979: Vashi – from experimental ground and economic centre 
 
Table 20: Vashi – basic data (Cf. Cidcoindia r17.09.2008) 
Groundbreaking 1979 
Area 1.000 hectares 
Residents 300.000 
Units 60.000 
Density 300 persons / hectare 
Private construction 37 percent 
LIC Units 39 percent 
Household Income 342 US$ 
 
Vashi was the first township of Navi Mumbai. Located next to the Vashi Bridge and the 
Mumbai-Pune road it features the best connectivity in the area. As a result it became the 
most prosperous node. 30 years after breaking ground Vashi totals 74 percent of all pri-
vate house construction activity. (Cf. MMRDA 1999, N-8: 43) The land became so valu-
able that many low-income neighbourhoods were converted into middle class neighbour-
hoods. 
The node was designed in a modernist manner, as a system of open spaces on a grid 
pattern. Some of the early sections, such as Sector 1, stand for the early principles of self-
sufficiency. Here the communal facilities are placed inside of the sectors. Most of the 
subsequent zones reflect a pragmatic raster organisation. Commercial activities are ori-
ented towards streets which function as public spaces. The arrangement allows for a high 
openness and flexibility. A road and path network modelled along Chandigarh’s hierar-
chic circulation patterns interconnects the sectors. 
Vashi is considered to be the economic and cultural centre of Navi Mumbai. It fea-
tures the highest land prices in the area. The appropriation of the land was relatively 
comfortable. The area consisted of many flood plains and belonged to the government. 
In addition, the Thane-Belapur Industrial Area granted an existing infrastructure net-
work of superior conditions and many employment opportunities. Vasi has served as the 
ground for many pilot projects in Navi Mumbai.270 The architect Charles Correa, one of 
the masterminds of the Navi Mumbai project, has authored some sectors in the area. (Cf. 
below Developers and Planners) 
 Illustration c-18: Vashi map 
Today, after three decades, Vashi is fully developed. It covers about 1.000 hectares 
and has a population of more than 300.000 residents. As the urban structure directly 
                                               
270 An early development plan for Vashi permitted developments to take place while the first Navi Mumbai Development 
Plan was prepared and approved by the government for implementation in 1979. (Adusumilli 2001: 25) 
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joins the Kopar Khairane node further to the North271, the concept of greenbelts has been 
lost. The fact that the node was selected to house the wholesale agricultural market for 
the Mumbai region was a major breakthrough for the economic development of the en-
tire scheme of Navi Mumbai. Today the node thrives on the prevalence of new service 
industries, shopping malls and IT centres, notably the International Technology Park. 
(Cf. above Commercial, infrastructure) 
The commercial heart of Vashi is Sector 17. It hosts a dense concentration of small 
businesses, offices, clinics, banks, retail outlets, restaurants and franchise operations. 
Sectors 9 and 10 are also filled with commercial activity, especially retail. An outstanding 
local feature, popularly known as the "Mini Seashore" or "Seaside Park", is a strip of 
land along the coast of the Thane creek that has been developed as a park. 
 
1986: Kopar Khairane – Site-and-service (BUDP) 
Table 21: Kopar Khairane – basic data (Cf. Cidcoindia r17.09.2008) 
Groundbreaking 1986 
Area 324 hectares 
Residents 227.300 
Units 43.000 
Density 700 persons/hectare 
Private construction 60 percent 
LIC Units 56 percent 
Household Income 180 US$ 
 
Kopar Khairane is a node that was started in 1986. It stands for new decentred and de-
mand driven approaches in the housing sector. The node stands out as one of the major 
sites of The World Bank sponsored Bombay Urban Development Project (BUDP). The 
scheme intended to develop housing solutions even for the poorest populations (in Indian 
terms the Economic Weaker Sections). (Cf. Cidcoindia, r17.09.2008) Site-and-service 
schemes were chosen as the best strategy. Today, 25 years after completion, demand is 
high and land prices have skyrocketed. The node is characterised by extremely high den-
sities as well as high gentrification pressure. 
The node is located to the North of Vashi, between Turbhe and Ghansoli. The hierar-
chical and strictly orthogonal layout structure of the original plan catches the eye. The 
plan resembles traditional Mandala schemes. (Cf. above: Predecessors) Its main part is 
comprised of a group of four large square shaped sectors. Each of the sectors was subdi-
vided into four parts. While the perimeters of the sectors are reserved for wide roads and 
commercial purposes, the central parts have been reserved for parks and recreational 
areas. 
Today a number of important IT parks have settled in the environs the most promi-
nent of which are the Millennium Business Park and the Reliance InfoTech Park (cf. 
above: Infrastructure) – the headquarters of one of India’s leading telecommunication 
powerhouses. In addition several new colleges and universities have been established. As 
a result of these new developments the area has become increasingly gentrified. In this 
context older housing structures are upgraded as numerous new housing complexes for 
                                               
271 The developments in late 80’s and early 90’s were concentrated on the northern end coinciding with the developments 
in Kopar Khairane. (Adusumilli 2001: 25) 
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the white-collar classes of the information economy emerge. A new railway station was 
built as a symbolic landmark. It uses the newest high-tech materials and construction 
technologies and thus aims to exhibit the new informational age. 
 Illustration C-19: Kopar Khairane map 
Kopar Khairane comprises more than 230.000 inhabitants in 43.000 buildings. More 
than 100.000 residents live in the 25.000 units of the BUDP project. While in the first 15 
years after implementation residents were not allowed to sell the subsidised houses on the 
open market,272 today a growing number of houses in “cashed in”. As the new inhabi-
tants comprise mainly white-collar folk such as IT professionals and students, working in 
one of the IT-Parks or studying in one of the local universities, the area tends to have 
become gentrified. (Cf. Cidcoindia.com, r23.10.2008) 
1995: Kharghar – new tendencies 
Table 22: Kharghar – basic data, (Cf. Cidcoindia r17.09.2008) 
Groundbreaking 1995 
Area 1.700 hectares 
Residents 500.000 
Units 120.000 
Density 300 persons / hectare 
Share of housing 25 percent 
 
Started in 1995, Kharghar is one of the most recent (the 14th) of Navi Mumbai’s nodes. 
As such it represents some of the latest planning paradigms and can be regarded as Navi 
Mumbai’s postmodern centre. Planned for a population of 500.000 the node is bigger 
than the others and features a mix of various neighbourhoods for all income groups. 
The node is located to the East of the administrative CBD in Belapur. It is bordered by 
the scenic Kharghar hills to the West and the Panvel creek to the South, featuring prime 
access to the National Highway (NH4) and the Taloje Industrial Estate as Navi Mum-
bai’s second large industrial estate. Cidco started to develop the area in 1995. Currently 
40 percent has been developed. (cf. Kumar). The aim is for the area to become a residen-
tial township and an educational zone. The settlement is spread over 1.700 hectares and 
is divided into 45 sectors.  
Khargar’s plan had to accommodate not less than 12 village settlements with a popu-
lation exceeding 20.000 (cf. Kumar). The former ‘landowners’ participated in the devel-
opment of the project through generous rehabilitation and resettlement schemes. Today 
some of the villages run some of the shopping malls. (Cf. below: Developer, Strategies, 
R&R schemes) 
Kharghar’s land use distribution reflects a bias towards residential spaces and an 
abundance of public area and circulation space: A quarter of the total area contains resi-
dential land use with neighbourhoods for all income groups. (Cf. below: examples of 
Neighbourhoods) One tenth is reserved for social facilities. Public utilities as well as open 
spaces amount to more than 35 percent of the area (a big share is taken by a gigantic 80 
hectare central park and spaces for educational institutions.). In addition 20 percent of 
the spaces are reserved for traffic circulation.  
                                               
272 Which is a general rule for all subsidised housing projects in the state. 
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Balkrishna Doshi drew Kharghar’s master plan back in 1992 (Cf. below: Designers). 
Doshi sought to provide the township a strong identity in carving out a series of public 
spaces and landmarks and defined a strong regulatory framework. The outstanding 
landmark feature of the node is a 80 hectare central park (Sector 23). London’s Hyde 
Park and New York’s Central Park are its obvious models. While the park will serve as a 
recreational centre for the entire region, all major streets have been designed as walkable 
green boulevards. In addition, the zoning regulations require all buildings to develop a 
base with commercial uses facing the street at ground levels. These features of Kharghar 
reflect attempts to counter several anti-urban trends related to segregation and the priva-
tisation of space. 
Even so Kharghar’s spaces reflect a novel tendency heading for a ‘visual’ space of rep-
resentations and symbols. An increasing number of buildings take the form of icons. 
Moreover a new form of nostalgia materialises in a large variety of monumental details. 
The most popular example of this tendency is Kharghar’s main monument, the Utsav 
Chowk. This large circular fountain and arcade in a Greek-Roman style, has become one 
of the most celebrated icons of the township.  
 Illustration C-20: Khargar  map 
As the most recent node, Kharghar is also Cidco’s showcase of its latest housing strate-
gies. 
LIC and EWB schemes have been integrated into the core areas of some main sectors 
of the township.273 A large amount of low-income schemes provide a minimal lot, the 
basic utilities and a basic carrying structure (resembling Corbusier’s famous Domino 
house). (Cf.  C-17) 
Numerous projects by public and private developers reflect the approaches towards 
the average and higher income populations. Projects such as Kendriya Vihar274, and a 
township for Cidco employees at Sector-21 exemplify institutional housing colonies. In 
addition the Indian Armed Forces erected two residential enclaves, JalVayu Vihar and 
Raghunath Vihar. 
Several leading Indian builders have implemented important MID housing projects 
such as: Seawood Heritage, Balaji Angan, Crystal Complex, Shanti Niketan, Rail Vihar, 
Kendriya Vihar and many more. Landmark MID housing complexes developed by Cidco 
include the Gharkul A, B, C & D Condominiums and the Spaghetti Housing scheme. 
In addition some of the most costly state of the art projects for the upper middle and 
upper classes have emerged in the area. Many of these are related to other successful un-
dertakings from other nodes and from further Mumbai locations. Some of these ‘pre-
mium’ residential projects are: Seawood Heritage, Balaji Aangan, Hiranandani Complex 
(Crystal Plaza), Hexblox, Kesar Exotica, Kesar Harmony, Rail Vihar, Regency Hills, 
Shanti Niketan Tower.  
It is also interesting to see that Cidco, the developer of Navi Mumbai, has also em-
barked on some of the strategies normally represented by the private sector. The agency 
has developed an upscale theme park project including a residential area on the slopes of 
the Kharghar hills, in an area which has up until now been part of a regional park. (Cf. 
                                               
273 Cf. Site visit and interview with Cidco representatives in August 2006. The approach is significantly different from 
Correa’s experimental ‘artist’ housing schemes in Belapur, or from Cidco’s site and services projects at Kopar-Khairane. 
274 A large project for government officials developed by CGEWHO (Central Government Employees Welfare & Housing 
Organisation) in Sector-11 
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below: Kharghar Hill Plateau)275 In addition, Cidco will also implement an 18-hole golf 
course, including a 5 star hotel next to Kharghar’s Central Park. (Cf. Cidco website) 
In the non-housing segment several planned large shopping malls and Cineplex thea-
tres represent a consumer-orientated landscape in the making. 
 Illustration C-21: Diagrams of Vashi, Kopar Khairane and Khargar 
 
 
2004: Dronagiri (Navi Mumbai SEZ) 
 
Table 23: Dronagiri – basic data (Cf. Cidcoindia r17.09.2008) 
Groundbreaking 2004 
Area 1.390 hectares 
GFA 20 million square metres 
Amount of private sector construction 100 
Share of industries 40 percent 
Share of Housing 17 percent 
 
The Special Economic Zone (SEZ) at Dronagiri is of central importance for Navi Mum-
bai. The recent project exemplifies the transition from older to newer development para-
digms. 
The SEZ of Dronagiri is planned on 1.390 hectares of land at the southern tip of Navi 
Mumbai. The project is also known as Phase I development of the Navi Mumbai SEZ.276 
The fact that Dronagiri was supposed to become a ‘regular’ node of Navi Mumbai from 
the beginning (Cf. TECS 2001: 81 quoting the original Development Plan by Cidco), 
represents the advantage that the scheme can be integrated into the system of Navi 
Mumbai’s nodes and infrastructure networks. There had been no land acquisition prob-
lem. Due to its proximity to residential areas, the JNPT port, the future airport, and and 
industrial areas277, as well as further planned SEZs, the zone is deemed to emerge as Navi 
Mumbai’s new international hub (TECS 2001: 99). It will cater for service industries 
such as IT, biotech, airport related activities etc. (Cf. TECS 2001: 87) 
 Illustration C-22: Map of the Navi Mumbai-SEZ (and picture of protesting villagers) 
It is important to realise that the project aims to become more than a conventional indus-
trial area. While 40 percent of the land becomes industrial, 17 percent is devoted to 
housing. In this context the SEZ aims to cater for “the best of global living, learning, 
healthcare and recreation standards” and will be an autonomous enclave in terms of in-
frastructure and service facilities. (Cf. Skil website, r. 12.08.2008) 
In spite of that it is also striking to see that in contrast to the distinctive meta-logic 
and design of Navi Mumbai, the interior arrangement of the SEZ project follows no evi-
dent urban plan. The SEZ is composed of rather neutral clusters. Each of these is dedi-
cated to certain types of land uses, which will be determined according to the final de-
                                               
275 According to unconfirmed reports from a reputed business group, the luxury villas on Kharghar Hills will cost from INR 
600.000 to INR 22.500.000 (13.000 to 500.000 US$). Cf. Newbombayplus: “Cidco plays foul?” Posted On Wednesday, 
December 12, 2007) 
276 Phase II of the NMSEZ will be developed at Ulwe on an area covering 400 hectare. (Cf. TECS 2001: 78) 
277 E.g. the Navghar industrial area to the South 
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mand. As a result, the respective sectors linked together by major transport arteries, con-
stitute a fragmented patchwork of isolated activities. (Cf. TECS 2001: 86) 
Examples (projects) 
Whereas the former section has presented some of Navi Mumbai’ paradigmatic nodes, 
this section presents several projects at sector and building level. 
1986: The site-and-service scheme under the BUDP project in Kopar Khairane 
The central area of Kopar Khairane represents a milestone effort of housing strategicyfor 
the low and no-income sector, populations that are usually out of the range of formal 
housing markets. The World Bank supported Bombay Urban Development Project 
(BUDP) sites-and-services project, implemented here, was one of the first of these models 
worldwide.278 The scheme represents a radical break with large public housing projects. 
It was geared to the occupation of individual mini lots and utilised self-help strategies. 
The BUDP project was developed in the second half of the 1980’s. While it included 
13 sites in the Mumbai region, including some slum rehabilitation schemes. Kopar 
Khairane was the most important site.279 It aimed to provide housing poorest population 
segments at alternative locations. The strategy aimed at the construction and financing of 
serviced residential, commercial and small industrial plots. It involved community facili-
ties, core housing and house expansion loans (The World Bank Website, r12.09.2008).280  
In this context the programme had three significant strategic elements: 1) minimal 
standards and self-construction, 2) differential pricing and 3) self governance (cf. 
MMRDA, N-8):   
Firstly, a range of functional standards for the building structures and the spaces was 
developed using a minimal set of rules. The minimum lot size was set at 25 square me-
tres, the lowest size for the core structure at 8 square metres (with another 10 square 
metres to be added in a second phase). These nominal standards281 even undercut the 
locally permissible building codes. Moreover the households were given facilitated access 
to small loans enabling them to complete construction with materials of their choice 
(Adusumilli 2001: 10).282 In this way the developers sought to bring down the price of 
the smallest serviced site to a level that was affordable even to the poorest. 
Secondly, the programme has worked with cross subsidies using methods of differen-
tial pricing. This implies that low-income projects have been cross-financed by the sales 
of other lots at prime locations. These were predominantly street facing lots on the pro-
ject site with exceptional commercial potential. In this way it was possible to ensure full 
cost recovery while serving 60 percent of beneficiaries below the poverty line. And only 
in this way could an important step of reliability be achieved.283 
A third important strategy was the introduction of self-governance through the ar-
rangement of cooperative societies. Developed land with core houses was leased to the 
                                               
278 The other early site-and-service scheme by The World Bank is Dandora in Nairobi. 
279 The whole scheme worked with two components. Firstly, it aimed to rehabilitate housing structures for a population of 
100.000 slum dwellers in central city locations (including granting permanent legal land tenure to the residents). In addition, 
it sought to develop 85.000 new units, mostly in the metropolitan region (MMRDA 1999: 29). 
280 A typical serviced site with a wet core amounted to INR 5.000. A completed one-room house amounted to an additional 
INR 25.000. Each of the subsidised households had to put in their own contribution and to construct a significant amount in 
self-help  (Cf. MMRDA, N-8; referring to examples from Charkop and Gorai Road) 
281 Own Development Control Rules and Building Bye-laws 
282 Cf. the Development Control Regulations for Greater Mumbai for low-cost housing or sites and services under ULC 
schemes and BUDP (GOM, 1991) 
283 It is important to note that Cidco was allowed to apply this strategy only for land but not for finished projects. Hence, 
after The World Bank withdrew from providing subsidies for housing construction at the BUDP projects, the serviced land 
had to be just sold for the highest bidder (cf. Adusumilli 2001). 
Navi Mumbai   253 
cooperative societies of the beneficiaries. These societies had the responsibility of main-
taining the internal services.284 
1987: DRS Scheme (Sector 26 Vashi) – first liberalisation project – differential pricing285 
Sector 26 in Vashi contains an example of Cidco’s housing policies stemming from the 
late 1980’s belonging to the so-called Demand Registration Scheme (DRS). This scheme 
was very important for Navi Mumbai. It contributed to over 10 percent of today’s Navi 
Mumbai population, delivering 25.000 ready-to-move-in dwelling units after an imple-
mentation period of six years in 1993. The plan addressed low-income populations in an 
integrated manner, providing all necessary infrastructure service facilities.286 
The project features a large variety of ‘novel’ solutions (for that time) in construction 
and design. While Cidco has refined and applied its own method of cross-subsidising the 
object between the richer and poorer buyers (differential pricing), design and the imple-
mentation were commissioned to the private sector. Some of the designers and construc-
tion enterprises were selected by means of a national competition. However, it had to 
face a new and unexpected situation as its implementation overlapped with significant 
national reforms in housing finance. The facilities sometimes also served the neighbour-
ing residents (cf. Ibidem: 10). The land use of the ‘integrated’ project area was divided 
into 45 percent residential, 20 percent shopping, 10 percent social facilities, 25 percent 
open space and 10 percent roads. Notably the interior pathways of the project were des-
ignated to have little traffic and to be child friendly. All the amenities and utilities were 
located along the periphery, separately accessible by external roads (cf. Ibidem: 9). 
Cidco intended mixing various income classes utilising three housing typologies: 18, 
25, and 34 square metres. The 18 and 25 square metre classes are for the Lower Income 
Group (LIG), while the larger ones are for the Middle Income Group (MIG).287 The ac-
commodation consisted largely of a multi-purpose room with an asbestos sheet roof, a 
kitchenette, a toilet and a bath. The units for the LIG were arranged in two story twin 
buildings with a shared entry on both sides of the house. This arrangement provided 
semi-private spaces on the ground. In contrast, the units for the lower MIGs were 
stacked onto separate floors of a single building.  
One of the main inovations of this project is organisational, resident associations gov-
ern the scheme. Membership in these is mandatory for the residents. In this context the 
project is divided into 8 condominiums. Each of these has its own office. 
Unfortunately restrictive eligibility criteria (reflecting a surge of populist politics) has 
limited the target group of the project to a small proportion of applicants and thus re-
duced the general benefit of the entire project. All applicants had to provide proof of at 
least one source of stable income and a minimum 15 years residence in the state.288  
Eligible to apply for this scheme in July 1987 were those earning between INR 701 
and INR 1.500 per month (annual income of INR 12.000 or estimated 300 US$ (at 1987 
prices). The estimated cost of the cheapest apartment was about INR 33.000 (~900 US$ 
                                               
284 Typical costs, affordability and cost recovery analysis are shown in Table-8.19 of MMRDA, N-8. A cost analysis of site and 
services schemes revealed that the land acquisition and ground preparation samples only 12-15 percent of the project cost 
whereas on-site and off-site infrastructure costs were as high as 60-80 percent. The non-saleable social infrastructure such 
as community centres, gardens etc. required only 2-3 percent of the project cost. (Adusumilli 2001: 30) 
285 The following paragraph is mainly based on Information from Adusumilli 2001. 
286 Nonetheless, large no-income populations were excluded from entering the application process as the proof of a regular 
income as well as a long-term residence in the state was required. 
287 About 50 percent of the houses were for LIG, 37 percent for MIG and the remaining 13 percent for the HIG ... The 
allotted cost of the houses was about one half of the market rate at that time... in the scheme studied in Sector 26 of Vashi, 
very few houses have actually changed hands, but are rented out by the original owners. (Adusumilli 2001: 36) 
288 A new rule introduced in 1989 by the government of Maharashtra made it mandatory for the applicants to have lived in 
the state of Maharashtra for at least 15 years to be eligible for a house constructed by any public agency in Maharashtra 
(Ibidem: 11). 
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:or INR 1.833 = 45 US$ per square metre).289 1.000 rupees, a monthly income, was re-
quired as a deposit at registration. 
At the time of actual allotment in 1992 the cost escalated to more than 250 percent. 
The cost of the apartments rose to INR 83,660 (or US$ 25.00). (Adusumilli 2001: 12, 
table) This was the case because federal reforms of the housing finance sector had relo-
cated subsidies to the end customers that had been expected by Cidco. Beneficiaries could 
now choose how much loan is to be raised on the house, at what rate of interest and over 
how long a period of repayment (Ibidem). 
 Illustration C-23: DRS scheme in Vashi’s sector 26 
One of the most important innovations Cidco came up with in the DRS scheme was of a 
financial type: here Cidco applied its own method of defining the price of the apartments 
depending on a buyer’s income. This cost was a combination of the value of land and the 
construction cost resulting in a differential price. As a consequence the lower income 
groups received subsidised land, while the higher income groups paid up to double the 
‘reserve price’ (the real value benchmark). The construction cost was added to the total 
(cf. ibid). The buyers who opted for an outright purchase had to pay the amount in 8 
equal segments during the construction period (Ibidem: 79).290 
Furthermore, in the DRS Cidco also experimented for the first time with the outsourc-
ing of design and construction services. The developer explored three different strategies 
for the best solutions and to diversify the risk. One part of the projects was assigned to 
six consulting architectural practices, another part was subcontracted as turn-key pro-
jects to developers and a last part was the object of a national architectural competition 
with five commissions (Ibidem). While the developers tended to experiment with novel 
construction technologies such as reinforced concrete frames (RCC) and new methods of 
prefabrication, most of the architectural offices, such as “Architects Combine” from 
Mumbai, aimed to develop new spatial innovations (Ibidem: 8). 
1996: Low MIC Gharkul in Kharghar – a new consumer oriented approach 
One of the first housing projects of a new consumer oriented era is Kharghar’s Gharkul 
project. 
The four storey walk-up project, in the 15th sector of the node, features 1.152 tene-
ments of 6 types ranging from 27 to 41 square metres. Various apartments are designed 
with terraces allowing for future expansion. Moreover public services such as schools, a 
community centre, public playgrounds and a shopping area were integrated into the 
scheme (Adusumilli 2001: 43). 
The project represents 5 important paradigms reflecting more general trends of liberal 
restructuring and an increasing orientation towards the demand side: 1) outsourcing of 
services, 2) flexibility of layouts, 3) integrated facilities, 4) one step purchasing process, 
and 5) easy payment methods.291 
The project in Gharkul was part of a new approach towards the marketing and sale of 
low-income housing. The project targeted working class populations with direct access to 
credit through new national housing financing agencies. (cf. above: Context, Availability 
of mortgages) 
Cidco’s innovations here comprise a simplified marketing and sales method (“single 
window system”) as well as a plain payment process (“payment made easy”). Beneficiar-
                                               
289 Average prices in Mumbai’s fashionable locations range up to at least US$ 700 per square metre. (Cf. above) 
290 There was also an option to use loans of 11 to 135 percent facilitated by Cidco. 
291 The categorisation was made by the author. 
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ies could come direct to the Cidco office with minimum documentation and book the 
tenements of their choice on a first come first serve basis. Representatives of Housing 
Banks attended on the specified dates. 10 percent of the cost of the tenement had to be 
paid at the time of booking and the remaining amount was recovered in 6 rates over 18 
months. 
2003: LIC – Housing Scheme Ghansoli-Gharonda 
This scheme at sector 9 of Ghansoli is a low cost housing scheme developed by Cidco in 
2003. Here the design symbolises a new postmodern era. The colourful four story walk-
up structures are arranged in the form of perimeter blocks around inner courtyards. De-
signed by the renowned office of Hafeez Contractors the project features 2.792 apart-
ments, with floor plans of 24 to 62 square metres. Prices range from 5.000 to 15.000 
US$ (INR 2,26 lakhs to 5,60 lakhs). Notable is the arrangement of colours and iconic 
shapes, which apparently played a major role in the marketing and sales of the apart-
ments. (Cf. Cidcoindia.com, r13.09.2008) In spite of that the scheme has yet to prove its 
practicality in every day life situations.  (Cf.  Illustration C-17) 
2003: ‘Spaghetti housing’ scheme – New trend for Middle Income Groups (MIG) 
A large 4 to 7 story meandering walk-up ‘spaghetti housing’ scheme by Cidco is among 
the recent hodge podge of projects for lower MIGs. (Cf. below pricing strategy) The pro-
ject represents an example of an application of a new consumer oriented approach to-
wards the lower middle classes. Designed by the same designers as the Seawoods com-
plex (Haafez Contractor) as a large icon292, the project experiments with high-density 
urban schemes of lower middle class housing.293 Apartments are being sold on a first 
come first serve basis. 
1996 (2008): Seawoods I and Seawoods II – High Income 
The Seawoods complex is Navi Mumbai’s pioneering upper class housing project and 
one of the most prestigious housing developments in Navi Mumbai. Its success lies in the 
fact that it eventually succeeded in attracting rich residents from Mumbai and abroad to 
the New Town. 
The scheme is oriented towards the Sea. It comprises the sectors 54 to 58 of the Nerul 
node. It is served by a major road connection, a four-lane boulevard named Palm Beach 
Marg. Today the area is one of the more expensive residential locations of Navi Mum-
bai.  
Cidco completed the first phase of the undertaking in 1996. It consists of 46 towers 
and 1.534 apartments. Initially the project was called the NRI- complex (Non-resident 
Indian). This name points to the first target groups. The project has been a great success 
and is fully occupied. (Cf. cidcoindia.com; r02.08.2008) As a consequence Cidco started 
developing a second phase in 2005. This part will contain 665 apartments. These are 
distributed at subsidised rates of INR 5.000 to 7.000 per square foot (1.200-1.500 US$ 
per square metre).294 (Cf. Sales brochure on Cidco’s website) (Cf.  Illustration C-17) 
                                               
292 Cf. www.hafeezcontractor.com; r09.09.2008 
293 The developer experimented with novel construction techniques (tunnel, Mywan) and developed innovative floor plan 
designs. 
294 A pricing technique developed by Cidco called Book Bidding Process (cf. below) creates much fuss and confusion about 
the distribution of apartments. 
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Designed in 1996 by Hafeez Contractor, Seawood is among the early examples of In-
dia’s current Integrated Township boom.295 The autonomous and gated enclave of land-
mark high-rise towers is well known among the expatriate Indian communities in Dubai, 
Australia and the US. Apartments have been provided with high-class amenities of west-
ern standards. It has its own shopping complex, a clubhouse with swimming pool and a 
park located inside the complex. 
2003: Millennium Towers, Sanpada 
The Millennium Housing Scheme represents Cidco’s recent landmark development for 
the middle class segment in the Sanpada node. This project of 1.200 tenements was de-
veloped in Sector 9 of the township as a series of condominium towers. It is composed of 
684 tenements of type A (80 square metres, 2 BHK296, 336 tenements of type B (56 
square metres, 1 BHK), 24 tenements of type C (2 BHK) and 156 tenements of type D (3 
BHK). On-site services include its own shopping centre, consisting of 12 shops, as well as 
a club with swimming pool. The 15 storey-housing scheme was constructed using mod-
ern tunnel construction technologies.297 (Cf.  Illustration C-17) 
2007: Hiranandani Palace Gardens, Panvel – Integrated Township 
“Hirco creates value by combining ‘location, location, location’ with ‘infrastructure, in-
frastructure, infrastructure”. (Hiranandani 2007: 10) 
Among names such as Mumbai Manhattan, Arrow City, Magic Hills and Bollywood 
City, Hiranandani Palace Gardens at Panvel is one of the most distinguished Integrated 
Townships currently being developed in the vicinity of Navi Mumbai. Announced in 
October 2007, the 233 hectare project will feature fully self-sufficient infrastructure and 
service facilities. The undertaking is an excellent example of a vigorous deployment of 
public incentives and a ‘smart’ utilisation of international investment flows. (Cf.  Illus-
tration C-29) 
Hiranandani Palace Gardens is divided into two parts: Panvel Residential and Panvel 
Commercial. In addition, in 2007, a combined part has also gained the status of a Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ). This setup optimises the deployment of a maximum range of 
available subsidies (e.g. public assistance for township developments, IT parks and 
SEZs). Each of the project parts will feature about 18 million square feet (or 1,7 million 
square metres)298 of floor space. This translates to a Floor Area Index (FSI) of about 1,5. 
While it is located at a peripheral frontier location, Hiranandani Palace Gardens Pan-
vel is not intended to be a suburban dormitory settlement. The preliminary master plan 
for the Panvel Township calls for an urban mix of flats, town houses and villas with high 
densities. The project is intended to become a densely urbanised milestone project featur-
ing exclusive western style services, infrastructure and urban lifestyles: “We are designing 
Panvel to be one of the foremost communities in Mumbai and the country.“ (Cf. Hirco 
2007: 17)  
                                               
295 Cf. above: India, New trends in spatial development) [**Thriving in the real estate and IT boom the architects have 
meanwhile designed dozens of IT parks as well as middle and upper class projects including a projected high rise tower for 
Dubai. (Cf. www.hafeezcontractor.com; and http://www.indiabuildnet.com/arch/ahc_10.htm) 
296 BHK = Bed, Hall, Kitchen 
297 Among the material specifications announced by Cidco are: “a ceramic tile flooring, granite kitchen platforms with 
stainless steel sinks, concealed copper pipe plumbing, concealed copper wiring for electrification, connectivity to Internet, 
telephone, intercom & TV, LPG pipe line with reticulated system, powder coated aluminium sliding windows, intercom 
system, exterior sandtex matt paint and oil bound distemper internally, a separate capsule lift and fire lift for A type build-
ings and fire lift, passenger lift for B type buildings, DG sets and ample parking space for vehicles”. (Cf. Cidcoindia, 
r112.09.2008) 
298 Or 260 soccer fields 
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Up to 40 percent of the township is devoted to open spaces for infrastructure and rec-
reational facilities, reflecting world-class benchmarks. (Cf. Hirco 2007: 22) Of the re-
maining 60 percent built-up area, an equal share of 45 percent is devoted to residential 
and commercial land uses, while 5 percent is assigned to commercial and social facilities 
respectively. 
Hiranandani Palace Gardens combines a variety of external and internal synergies: 
Firstly it thrives on the dynamics of the large real estate and infrastructure projects being 
developed in Navi Mumbai and the Mumbai-Pune development corridor (such as the 
New Airport, the deep sea harbour, other large SEZ projects, the new cross harbour 
bridge; cf. above: External Infrastructure). On the other hand the undertaking employs 
synergies with other incentives of the Hiranandani Group at the Mumbai-Pune corridor 
and beyond. Among these projects are the renowned Hiranandani Palace Gardens in 
Powai, and several projects in Mumbai’s peripheral centre of Thane stemming from the 
1990’s, such as the Hiranandani Estates (1996) and Hiranandani Meadows, and the Hi-
ranandani Biz Park, the construction of a 90 storey Marina tower in Dubai (cf. Hirco 
2007: 10) and the parallel development of Hiranandani Palace Gardens, Chennai. 
Combining the mantra of “location” and “infrastructure”299 the Hiranandani Group 
has designed its strategies of developing large, independent and fully fledged townships in 
urban peripheries based on the most important economic and demographic trends. It was 
among the first developers that came up with the strategy to cater to needs of the newly 
rising affluent middle classes and corporate customers. Reflecting the fact that India’s 
urban context lacks the necessary world-class infrastructure and services, it was conse-
quently decided to build all the necessary infrastructure from scratch300 and to concen-
trate on self-sufficient projects of several dozens or even hundreds of hectares (in order to 
benefit from the economies of scale). Importantly, this also included the approach “to 
place all Hiranandani projects in well-connected suburbs near major cities”.301 (Hirco Plc 
2007: 10) 
The project’s privately developed infrastructure includes roads, fresh water and sew-
age facilities, telecommunication networks and autonomous power generation. Private 
schools and health care facilities, parks, landscaped gardens, retail complexes and leisure 
facilities comprise the services. In addition several domestic and international brand 
name shops, supermarkets, restaurants and cafés are integrated into the project.302  
The Palace Gardens were developed in three steps of 28 months each. Each of the 
phases contains an own mix of infrastructure, residential and commercial land uses. It 
profits from increasing value as well as increasing demand as the project advances. In 
phase 1 a basic housing stock as well as the entire primary infrastructure is developed. 
This includes the roads as well as the water, power and sewage facilities. Primary de-
mand is fuelled by the relevance of Hiranandani’s existing brands, e.g. the Powai pro-
ject.303 While continuing to construct residential and commercial space, phase 2 provides 
for most of the secondary infrastructure such as hospitals, educational and commercial 
                                               
299 “In the developed world, the real estate mantra is ‘location, location, location’. In India, location alone is not enough. 
Increasing urbanization has greatly strained local infrastructure in major Indian cities and towns. Developers cannot simply 
put up a building and adopt a ‘plug and play’ attitude to basic services such as water, power, sanitation, and telecommuni-
cations“. (Ibidem)  
300 We create everything in the self-contained township from the ground up. (Ibidem) 
301 “This approach retains the location advantages a major city offers, such as access to an international airport; rail and 
road networks; talent pool; leisure facilities; commercial services. At the same time, the scale of the undeveloped site en-
ables Hirco to develop local infrastructure and services from scratch with a single unified vision and to the highest world-
class standards.” (Ibidem) 
302 Website of the developer: http://www.hiranandani.com (r11.09.200) 
303 The premium is driven by the strength of the Hiranandani brand and track record of existing townships such as in Powai. 
(Hirco 2007:11) 
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facilities. It is planned to sell many of the service facilities as stand alone businesses. In 
Phase 3 the township matures into a fully functioning location featuring high-quality 
social and residential infrastructure. 
Indeed, The Palace Garden projects serve as an experimental field for the developer to 
create a set of own brands, which can then be replicated at a theoretically unlimited 
amount of locations. The pilot projects in this regard are the Hiranandani Schools, Club-
houses, a Galleria Shopping Mall, the Nirwhana Park, Hiranandani Hospital, Hakone 
Entertainment, the Rodas Ecohotel304 and Lakewood Malls. 
In contrast to most conventional developers concentrating on the house buyers, Hi-
ranandani regards various clients from all over the world as its customers. “Stakeholders 
come from all over the world and from all walks of life and socio-economic back-
grounds. They include: Hirco investors; governments and regulators; customers, employ-
ees and business partners; contractors and their employees; the people who live, work, 
study and play in our vibrant township communities; and our neighbours living near 
townships.” (Hirco Plc 2007: 20) 
Hiranandani Palace Gardens Panvel is being developed by the Hiranandani Group 
Inc. The group is one of the largest real estate developers in the country and renowned 
for its 25-year experience in the development of integrated settlements.305 The project in 
Panvel is aimed to replicate the success of the “Hiranandani Gardens”, a project built in 
1986 at the Powai Lake close to Bollywood. (Cf. Kegler 2005) Importantly, the Hiran-
andani was also among the project consortium developing the Navi Mumbai SEZ pro-
ject. 
A crucial part of the development strategy of the Panvel and Chennai township ven-
tures was the formation of an own ‘investment vehicle’, the Hirco Plc.306 This subsidiary 
was set up in 2006 to harvest international money markets. The company was founded 
with the exclusive objective “to co-invest in large scale mixed-use township developments 
in suburban areas outside city centres in India”. (Cf. http://www.hircoplc.com/) It is 
headquartered on the Isle of Man. 
Founder of Hirco and co-founder of the Hiranandani Group is Mr Niranjan Hiranan-
dani. Trained as an accountant, Mr. Hiranandani is a well-known figure in national as 
well as regional economic and political circles and holds key positions in various Indian 
government bodies, private and social institutions, schools and colleges.307 Other board 
members of Hirco include internationally renowned financial experts, consultants and 
real estate experts. All senior board members have a 30-year plus experience, a strong 
focus on finance and accounting, including personal networks to finance and politics 
(e.g. Isle of Man, British pension schemes).308 
                                               
304 The Rodas, Hiranandani’s boutique business hotel in Powai township, is only the second hotel in India to be accorded the 
prestigious Ecotel® certification. (Hirco Plc 2007: 21) 
305 Being one of India's three large listed developers Hiranandani over the past 25 years has developed 30 million square feet 
(or 2,8 million square metres) of mixed-use townships in India”. (Hirco Pct 2007: 3) 
306 Hirco plc is a closed-ended investment company formed to invest through its wholly owned subsidiary, Hirco Holdings 
Mauritius Limited (Hirco Mauritius) in certain foreign direct investment (FDI)-compliant Indian real estate development pro-
jects to be sourced by Niranjan Hiranandani, Kamal Hiranandani and entities controlled by them (together with Hiranan-
dani). In three of the locations, in Chennai, Hirco has identified the Mumbai Metropolitan Region and Jaipur five pipeline 
projects for investment. The Company acquired Hirco Mauritius on November 21st 2006. The Company operates through its 
subsidiary, Hirco Holdings Ltd., which is its immediate holding company. (www.reuters.com; r15.09.2008) 
307 Current leadership roles include President of the Maharashtra Chambers of Housing Industry (MCHI); Chairman of Mum-
bai City, Development & Environment Committee of the Indian Merchants Chambers (I.M.C.) Mumbai; Member of the Task 
Force of the Government of India for reforms in Housing and Urban Development; and Member of the Study Group on 
Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, Government of Maharashtra. (Hirco Plc 2007: 30) 
308 Cf. http://www.hircoplc.com/board_biographies.htm; r12.09.2008 
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Hirco, as the investment arm of the conglomerate, is listed on the Alternative Invest-
ments Markets (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange.309 The company’s Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) became prominent as the largest IPO of the year and as the largest ever-
real estate investment company IPO.310 The sum raised at the IPO was £362,6 million. 
(Cf. Hirco Plc 2007:4) Hirco has invested 95 percent of this money in the township pro-
jects at Panvel and Chennai. 
Importantly Hiranandani and its subsidiaries are early Indian adopters of the interna-
tionally prominent ISO 9001 (2000) standards.311 This quality Management Systems is 
intended for deployment by any organisation seeking to provide world-class products 
and services in a customer oriented manner.312 Importantly Hiranandani represents one 
of the first Indian real estate companies to adopt these standards.313 314 
In addition to betting on ISO-Norms and international accounting standards, the 
company also borrows from international best practice in pioneering the establishment of 
a Social Corporate Responsibility (CSR) strategy. Accordingly, the company opts to de-
liver more holistic lifestyles than finished products.315 While this strategy puts the needs 
customers first it also takes into account the economic, social and environmental impacts 
of the products.316 
Among the examples of social responsibility is the prioritisation of local workers, the 
provision of appropriate working and living conditions at the construction sites (includ-
ing kindergartens).317 Other achievements comprise more than 300.000 new trees (of 
regional species) that have been planted in Mumbai-area, a biogas plant installed in 
Thane, and rainwater harvesting practiced on a large scale in Powai318.  
Yet, while it is stressed that the projects will minimize environmental impacts on the 
surrounding areas and create social benefits such as employment and jobs319, direct com-
pensation strategies for Project Affected Populations (PAPs) are not mentioned. 
2007: Elora Castle 
Elora Castle, situated in Belapur’s 15th sector, is among several new fashionable projects. 
Currently the project features the most expensive apartments in the Navi Mumbai re-
                                               
309 Hirco PLC was admitted to AIM on 13 December 2006. (Cf Hirco Plt 2007: 43) The AIM is a highly speculative and un-
regulated market. The Company is incorporated in the Isle of Man under the Isle of Man Companies Acts 1931 to 2004 as 
amended (Ibidem: 47). 
310 Cf. also Maharashtra Herald, Oct 27.2007; at: http://propertybytes.indiaproperty.com/?p=1600; r11.09.2008 
311 Cf. Hirco Plc 2007: 26; cf. http://www.hiranandani.com; r11.09.2008 
312 “The most critical community for us is that of our customers. Without customers business has no reason to exist. We will 
always place the customer’s needs first.“ (Hirco Plc 2007: 22) 
313 Indeed, Sinarmas, the developer of Bumi Serpong Damai in Indonesia, did the same. (Cf. previous chapter) 
314 In addition to the ISO norms other global standards are implemented and shape the structural logic of the company. The 
company works with an audit committee, a nomination committee and an investment committee. Among these are Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) applied by the external accounting consultants KPMG Audit LLC (Hirco Plc 2007: 
37) or the valuation standard prescribed by the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors utilised by Jones Lang Lassalle. Hirco 
also aims to adopt the recommendations on corporate governance made by the Quoted Companies Alliance (QCA) – a code 
of best practice for companies listed on the AIM. In addition, the Board is making progress towards ensuring the Company 
with the Combined Code, which is generally adopted by companies admitted to the Official List (companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange’s main market). 
315 “What we offer is more than bricks and mortar. We offer a lifestyle. The quality of that lifestyle is determined as much by 
the social environment we create as by the quality of the physical assets we build. Recognizing and carrying out our social 
responsibilities is an important component of this.“ (Hirco Plc 2007: 20) 
316 Hirco believes that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) requires the Company to look beyond its financial bottom line. 
“We have adopted a broader perspective, one that considers our stakeholders and the economic, environmental and social 
benefits we provide and impacts we have – frequently referred to as the ‘triple bottom line’.” (Hirco Plc 2007: 28) 
317 Most of the unqualified construction workers in India are seasonal workers. 
318 During the four-month monsoon season, approximately 180 million litres of rainwater are collected through the com-
bined central and rooftop collection systems. 
319 “We will minimize the environmental impact of our operations on the local communities. Wherever possible we will seek 
to create employment opportunities for local people.... We will respect the character and traditions of the communities in 
which we work.” (Hirco Plc 2007: 28) 
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gion. (Cf. Mumbaiplus, Dec. 2007) It comprises thirteen private floors with a respective 
area of 641 square metres and a height of 3,4 metres (Chittora 2007). Each of the floors 
includes a private garden and automobile garages on the floor. The floors can be de-
signed along individual preferences. “Welcome to true luxury in Navi Mumbai”. (Cf. 
website of Siddhi Home; r06.09.2008) The project will be completed by July 2008. The 
capital cost is around INR 6.000 per square feet (1.340 US$ per square metre), rent will 
be around 950 US$.320 
2008: Kharghar Hill Plateau – global greening and theming strategies 
Only recently, in September 2008, Cidco opened the tendering process for the project 
“Kharghar Hill Plateau”. The project, praised as the “jewel in the crown of Navi Mum-
bai”, intends to exploit the picturesque scenery of the Kharghar Hill’s area. (Cf. Cidcoin-
dia.com; r12.09.2008) The elevated green site on approximately 200 metres above sea 
level is intended to become a mix of theme park and an “exclusive and premium” resi-
dential area (Ibidem). The theme park will take up 60 percent of the area and the resi-
dential / commercial area will take up the rest. 
The project demonstrates Cidco’s keenness to embark on the newest theming and 
greening strategies: “The vision is to develop the Kharghar Hill Plateau in an eco-friendly 
fashion and metamorphose the site into an exclusive and premium area, which would 
significantly raise the value of the city of Navi Mumbai” (Ibidem). Cidco’s role will be to 
become a project partner by providing part of the land. The project is undertaken with 
the argument of putting Navi Mumbai onto a map of world-class places. Cidco seeks “to 
bring global recognition to the city of Navi Mumbai as well as add value to the city 
through a theme based development.” (Ibidem) 
  
                                               
320 The same company is developing a subsequent project of double size in sector eleven nearby. This project will feature on 
site amenities like a 24-hour coffee shop, a crèche, a cybercafé, a gymnasium, a swimming pool etc. IT parks, celebrity 
resorts, malls and commercial-cum-residential towers are some of the other ambitious and upcoming projects of Siddhi 
Home Makers. Celebrity Resort will be synonymous with leisure entertainment and will reflect cultures from different coun-
tries. (Chittora 2007) 
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Summary 
 
“It should be noted that Navi Mumbai is very different from an average In-
dian City.” (Tecs: 1999) 
Region 
Navi Mumbai emerges as a sub-centre of a dynamically evolving multiplex urban region 
and the starting point of a major interurban development axis, the Mumbai-Thane-Pune 
corridor. The city, about one hour from central Mumbai, accounts for circa one tenth of 
Greater Mumbai’s population.  
The cluster of new modern nodes has a high degree of self-sufficiency. Three fifths of 
all people that live in Navi Mumbai also work there. Walking accounts for the most 
prominent general mode of mobility, the majority of working trips are made by train and 
nearly all students remain at local schools and colleges. 
Indeed, the availability of abundant infrastructure facilities and networks is among 
Navi Mumbai’s biggest assets. Six rail corridors and an independent mainline rail termi-
nal, connect the area directly to other parts of the country. Several national and state 
highways pass through the township. Two bridges provide essential links to the Mumbai 
peninsula across the Thane creek. The Jawaharlal Nehru Port (JNP) South of the Parallel 
City handles almost half of the country’s maritime traffic. Navi Mumbai also stands out 
as a model of uninterrupted power, water supply and state of the art sewage disposal. 
Of superior importance from the beginning have been major industrial zones. Pres-
ently Navi Mumbai’s environs feature nearly 5.400 industrial enterprises with a quarter 
million jobs. Among the most important of these projects was the Thane-Belapur Indus-
trial Area (TTC). 
The project was slow to take off, and development stagnated during long periods in 
the 1980’s and 1990’s. Today the state Government is dedicated to promoting Navi 
Mumbai as the IT hub on similar lines as Chennai, Bangalore and Hyderabad. Accord-
ingly a whole series of major infrastructure projects of regional relevance have been initi-
ated. Among these is the spectacular 23 km Sewri-Nhava Sheva sea link to central Mum-
bai, a new International Airport, as well as a new private harbour, the Revas port, to the 
South. 
It is likely that the new projects will reinforce and strengthen the relevance of the loca-
tion and transform various nodes of the new town cluster into regional centres. Currently 
a new wave of speculation and private investment has created an unprecedented momen-
tum attracting businesses and populations which so far had preferred to remain in the 
city. Several SEZ’s, Integrated Townships, commercial zones and large housing estates 
are being promoted and planned along the Mumbai Pune axis in this way. Most of these 
projects are constructed for the high-end sector in the form of autonomous enclaves fea-
turing world class standards. Of highest significance are the Navi Mumbai SEZ and the 
Mumbai SEZ which will jointly comprise 6.800 hectares. 
Town 
The description of Navi Mumbai’s formal configuration constitutes the pivotal piece of 
this chapter. It is the nexus between the contexts described above, as well as the proc-
esses described below. The city on the other side of the Thane Creek has a history of 60 
years and was elastic enough to accommodate a whole range of planning strategies. Its 
forms range between a centrally planned modernistic approach to new forms of post-
modern privately developed corporate urbanism.  
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Navi Mumbai is enormous. With 34.000 hectares the place is bigger than Paris. It 
covers 80 percent of Greater Mumbai and is arranged along, what Shirish Patel, one of 
the authors of the city, calls a “string of nodes with variable densities”. Hence, it seems 
more appropriate to speak about a parallel multi-centric city. Indeed, among the most 
powerful concepts behind Navi Mumbai is the combination of urban densities with 
transport arteries. The main configuration of this string-city is composed of 15 intercon-
nected nodes in a scheme that highly resembles Howard’s idea of a regional system of 
interconnected Town Magnets. While Navi Mumbai’s population densities are somewhat 
higher that those of British garden cities, it unfortunately lacks the abundant green belts, 
as envisioned by the father of the garden cities concept. Moreover, by far most of Navi 
Mumbai’s building structures have to comply to a uniform Floor Area Ration 1,0. This 
results in a homogeneously flat and widely spread ‘pancake’-city. 
One of the major differences between Navi Mumbai and an ‘ordinary‘ Indian city is 
the opulent presence of infrastructure and open space. The new city is marked by an 
exuberant amount of public transport and employs a hierarchy of expressways, arterial 
roads and local roads that are chiefly modelled along modern architecture and planning 
principles. Navi Mumbai has an area wide coverage with state of the art educational and 
health facilities. Utility services in Navi Mumbai are also well above Indian average stan-
dards (only power is rationed at some locations). Among some of the success stories is 
the successful relocation of a number of traffic intensive wholesale activities from Mum-
bai to Navi Mumbai. 
Combining the requirement of a planned city to have good infrastructure and impor-
tant landmarks, several of the infrastructure projects serve as ‘cathedrals’ of the modern 
engineering and information technology age. 17 major railway stations have been 
planned and designed as unusual landmarks, most notably the combined stations and 
Infotech parks at Vashi and Belapur. The planned Seawoods Railway Station Integrated 
Complex represents an approach of combining railway, shopping, entertainment, and 
office space, along a strategy of privatisation and commercialisation. In addition, the city 
is being equipped with several large shopping malls, an entertainment and Leisure Park 
as well as a world class golf course. 
Each of the 15 nodes caters for an amount of social infrastructure and services that is 
exceptional for Indian standards and provides it with a high degree of self-sufficiency. 
The new scheme introduced principles of modern functional separation. The city’s high 
quality of life standards are essentially based on the fact that three fifths of all urban land 
is composed of open spaces and green areas, while more than 40 percent of the area is 
devoted for to housing, and by the ‘high’ urban densities of the neighbourhoods. Each of 
the townships features a distinct identity, name and economic focus. Each was planned 
as an independent town of about 50.000 to 200.000 residents, representing exceptional 
population densities of 200 to 700 persons per hectare. Almost half of Navi Mumbai’s 
pollution is concentrated in Vashi and the adjacent nodes. 
While Navi Mumbai was proclaimed as India’s first slum free city, the greater area 
evolves as a complex mélange of planned and unplanned zones. Major informal settle-
ments have emerged in the environs of the official project area. In addition a large 
amount of temporal structures can be found within the nodes. Turbhe Stores with a 
population of 50.000 to 80.000 is among the largest slums in the vicinity. In addition to 
informal areas, a significant amount of traditional villages (Gaothans) exist. 
Neighbourhoods 
Navi Mumbai is also a city of 700 ‘modern’ villages. These neighbourhoods, or sectors 
represent the basic fabric of the urban structure. Accordingly each of the nodes contains 
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40 to 80 sectors. The neighbourhoods epitomise the city’s compactness, featuring almost 
exceptional densities between 200 and 1.000 residents per hectare. The urban typology 
of a neighbourhood can vary from a mass-housing scheme to a golf-club–community. 
This leads to a highly heterogeneous urban fabric at the town level that also reflects the 
architectural and urban design paradigms of the last 40 years. 
Yet, towards the interior, most of the neighbourhoods are more homogeneous than 
the ‘generic’ Indian city. Many of Navi Mumbai’s sectors are constructed in the form of 
mass housing schemes by individual developers. A significant number of households re-
side in multiple family dwellings on rather large communal grounds. Private, individual 
land ownership is almost non-existent. Recent tendencies comprise of the growth of eth-
nical clusters, as well as the increasing formation of closed enclavic neighbourhoods. 
Nevertheless, the nodes as well as the sectors portray a relatively high amount of de-
sign integrity and most of them have been developed in the form of openly accessible 
rectilinear plats. (Mainly due to the fact that a semi-public agency remains the master 
planner for the area.) The quantity and quality of open spaces in the planned neighbour-
hoods remains exceptionally high. 
Housing 
The share of housing in Navi Mumbai is constantly on the rise. From the early 1980’s to 
the late 1990s the number of residential areas has more than doubled. Moreover an in-
creasing amount of residential projects is being implemented by the private sector.  
In 2005 the area accommodated 210.000 housing units. Importantly, an impressive 
number of 80 percent of the population is part of co-operative housing societies; most of 
these are in the form of multi-storey walk-up schemes. The new city comprises a signifi-
cantly higher amount of social housing than a ‘normal’ Indian city (though, the numbers 
remain significantly lower than Indian demographics would require.) 11,5 percent live in 
a commercial apartment scheme, 6,4 percent reside in a townhouse, and 0,6 percent stay 
in a bungalow type building. Of the total housing stock almost a third consists of social 
housing for the low and no-income classes, while medium income populations occupy 60 
percent, the rest by high-income groups. In the housing sector as well, an increasing pri-
vatisation is underway. Meanwhile more than 88 percent of the new units are built by 
the private sector, increasingly for the more affluent population segments. 
Block and Buildings 
Mumbai’s satellite township new city represents a vibrant urban fabric. The character of 
its blocks, lots and housing typologies depends on the land use and varies greatly. Yet, 
notably more than half of the area is built in the form of society plots as part of large 
schemes. As a result the majority of people live in multi-storey walk-up apartments. The 
average built up area per tenement of 45 square metres is small by international, but 
rather high by Indian standards. As a result, Navi Mumbai provides four times as much 
space per resident as its mother city. The city’s building structures are based on the latest 
state-of-the-art building technologies and construction materials. 
A great variety of architectural styles can be found in the new city and these indicate 
an increasing proliferation of a consumer oriented ‘spectacular’ and thematic architec-
ture. In spite of this, the context of traditional villages, local towns, industrial estates and 
modern billboards, results in an heterogeneous “landscape of surprise”. This landscape is 
also marked by a widespread culture of individual adaptations, conversions and alterna-
tions by the inhabitants.  
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Exemplary nodes 
To illustrate the data presented in the ‘Structures-subchapter, four exemplary nodes, rep-
resenting four decades of development were described: Vashi (1979), Kopar Khairane 
(1986), Kharghar (1995), and Dronagiri (2004).  
Vashi was the first node realised in Navi Mumbai. It stands for early paradigms in the 
design and construction of social housing. Due to its favourable location the node soon 
developed into Navi Mumbai’s economic and cultural centre. The node Kopar Khairane 
stands for a shift of paradigms from a supply to a demand driven housing construction. 
It comprises one of the largest experiments in social housing for the lowest income popu-
lations along a site-and-services strategy. The World Bank financed the scheme in the 
second half of the 1980’s. 1995 Kharghar represents a recently designed enormous 14th 
township-node. Mainly geared at housing, the scheme is developed by various developers 
for a mix of populations. Not least, 2004 Dronagiri represents a node that is being de-
veloped into a model Special Economic Zone. Major national and international real es-
tate developers are part of this public-private project. Dronagiri aims to become a model 
of its kind for the future. 
Exemplary projects 
Thirteen extra landmark projects have been briefed to present a characteristic range of 
Navi Mumbai’s urban forms and typologies representing different periods:  
1. Vashi’s first (1989) sectors represent an example of an early idealistic pilot project;  
2. The node’s 10th sector portrays the widespread typology of scale public housing 
schemes;  
3. A Demand Registration Scheme in the 26th section of the same node (1987) represents 
a first endeavour by Navi Mumbai’s developers to decentralise and deregulate housing 
construction; 
4. The Land and Infrastructure Services Programme (LISP, or site-and-services) at Kopar 
Khairane (1986) develop bottom-up self-help strategies for housing the lowest income 
sector;  
5. The Gharkul lower middle class project at Kharghar (1996) includes five important 
paradigms of liberal restructuring and an increasing demand side orientation; 
6. The Gharonda Housing at Ghansoli (2003) represents an actual landmark solution for 
low income housing;  
7. Among the recent hodge-podge projects for lower middle income groups is the Spag-
hetti housing project at Kharghar (2003);  
8. With Seawoods I (1996) and Seawoods II (2008), Navi Mumbai’s developers have set 
an early benchmark, and developed an own brand in regard to upper class schemes. 
9. In a similar way the 2003 project of Millennium Towers at Sanpada seeks to cater for 
a mainstream middle classes market; 
10. The 2007 announced Hiranandani Palace Gardens project is one of the first projects 
of the upscale ‘Integrated Township’ typology being developed in Navi Mumbai’s envi-
rons in Panvel. The project perfectly exemplifies a broad range of ‘neo-urbanist’ devel-
opment strategies; 
11. Magic Hills (announced in 2006) is among the examples of luxurious villa type 
neighbourhoods in the greater environs; 
12. Currently featuring the most expensive apartments in the area, 2007 Elora Castle is 
currently hyped as one of the most fashionable recent residential buildings in Navi 
Mumbai; 
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13. The 2008 Kharghar Hills Plateau is among Cidco’s most recent landmark projects. It 
combines a theme park and an upscale residential area. 
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Population –  
Dawn of India’s real estate consumer 
Table 24: Key indicators – Navi Mumbai’s population 
Population (2008) 1,7 million persons 
Capacity 3-4 million persons 
Share of greater Mumbai’s population 11 percent 
Mix of population HIG: MIG: LIG: EWS (42: 34: 22: 2) 
Share of middle and higher income groups (Mum-
bai) 
73 percent (35 percent) 
Share of ‘unplanned population’ 800.000 (47 percent) 
Slum populations 30 percent  
Village populations 17 percent  
Median age 28 (in India 25) 
Average household size 3,8 (5,2 in Mumbai) 
Populations in formal jobs 32 percent (<10 percent in India) 
White collar jobs > 66 percent (23 percent in public of-
fices) 
Largest minority group and its share Muslims, 4 percent 
Population moving each year 10 percent 
Share of population living and working in the place 60 percent 
Share of working population 30 percent 
Ownership of television, car, motorcycle 97, 10, 30 percent 
Median income in NM (Central Mumbai, Country 
side) 
3.600 (6.200, 200) US$ p.a. 
Amount of population using a housing mortgage ~ 50 percent 
Mode of local self-management Widespread cooperative system 
 
Introduction 
The previous two subchapters have described the context and the structural characteris-
tics of Navi Mumbai. The New Town was analysed at various scales and time frames up 
a ‘street view’ perspective. At this stage the portrayal of Navi Mumbai has reached a 
critical threshold. To describe the form and its context is only one side of the coin. The 
other side consists of contents and processes. If we agree with Lefebvre’s hypothesis that 
space is actively created, we must not only ask “what space?” and in “what context?”, 
but also accordingly put the questions of “by whom?” and “by what rules and instru-
ments?” Accordingly having arrived at this nexus of the street, full attention will be 
shifted to the users, the makers, the financial flows as well as the regulatory framework 
of the process. 
Consequently the following subchapter is devoted to the portrayal of the residents of 
Navi Mumbai. The living citizens, workers, students, housewives, families, natives etc., 
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who represent the most direct dialectic counterpoint to the static urban form delineated 
above. 
In the next section Navi Mumbai’s population will be qualified by a series of indica-
tors (demographic, socio-economic and cultural), as well as along a framework of differ-
ences and relations. The important questions in this context are: Who are the various 
groups populating the new city? What is the distribution of these? How is Navi Mum-
bai’s population different from the ‘average’ (e.g. the ‘natives’, the residents of the 
mother city and the residents of the other NeoTowns that are presented in this work). 
The perspective of local and informal populations will be of particular importance, be-
cause it is left out by most of the official accounts. Last but not least it will be important 
to learn how the populations are organised at a neighbourhood level, in other words: 
which forms of local governance exist? Accordingly the subsection portrays these ques-
tions in three parts: The first part presents the population profile, the second unravels the 
main motives of the new residents to move to the new city, and the third part tackles the 
question of self-organisation. 
Population profile 
The profile of Navi Mumbai’s actually existing residents reveals many interesting charac-
teristics and trends, in particular when compared to the target lines of the master plan. 
Navi Mumbai was planned to accommodate a population of 3 to 4 million residents.321 a 
total of 4-5 percent of Greater Mumbai’s residents. While at present the emerging city 
houses about 1,7 million residents322 it has reached more than 50 percent of the planned 
capacity. 
It is very interesting to observe that half of the inhabitants (900.000) are concentrated 
in only two nodes: Half a million live in Nerul, which makes it the largest node. Another 
400.000 are residents of Vashi. The remaining population resides in Belapur, Kharghar, 
Kopar Khairane and the surrounding areas.323 This concentration principally contradicts 
the intention of Navi Mumbai’s structure which aimed to distribute the population in 14 
equal nodes. 
Moreover, despite this large population number, growth in the past has been much 
slower than intended. While the development plan of 1973 targeted a population of 2,1 
million by the beginning of the 1990’s, the project had only achieved a population of half 
a million by that date (cf. Ghorpade). A revised Regional Plan projects this number now 
for 2011 (MMRDA 1999), while New Town has been steadily growing at double-digits 
since the 1980s. 324 This expansion was significantly faster than that of other parts of 
Mumbai.325 In 2005 the growth rates of Navi Mumbai, meanwhile a million city, 
amounted to 7,4 percent.326 (Cidco 2005: ES-5) 
 Illustration C-24: Chart of Navi Mumbai’s population development 
Basic population data 
Mumbai is, by Indian standards, a mature city on its way to a consumer culture. The 
average age of Navi Mumbai’s population is 28, this is three years more than the average 
                                               
321 The assumption of 100 persons per hectare results in a a total number of 3,4 million. 
322 Cidco’c 2005 survey estimated a current population number of 1.43 million. (Cf. Cidco 2005: ES-5) 
323 Cf. www.mumbaipluses.com/newbombayplus/index.aspx; r19.09.2008 
324 Between 1981 and 1991 the area grew by 114 percent. The population has almost tripled in the 1990’s, from a popula-
tion of 210.000 in 1991 to 575.000 in 2000. (Cf. Shaw: 103) 
325 MMR’s annual growth rate from 1990 to 2000 was 2 percent. (Cf. World Resources Institute quoted in Nissel 1997) 
326 The NMMC (2001) affirms a decadal growth of almost 90 percent. 
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in India (cf. CIA, r05.08.2008). Almost a third (28 percent) of the population is younger 
than 15 years327 (TECS 2005: 01), only 3 percent are above 59 years328, while the remain-
ing part ranges in-between. (Cf. Cidco 2005) 
Navi Mumbai features the smallest households in the metropolitan region. The area’s 
average household comprises 3,8 members (cf. Cidco 2005), while households in the 
Mumbai Metropolitan Region have 5,2 family members on average (MMRDA 1999: 
3.3.2). As elsewhere the household sizes are continuously on the decline while the trend 
goes to nuclear families (cf. Cidco 2005). Three quarters of the households are dependent 
on a single earner (Ibidem). Moreover, the number of single households is disproportion-
ately high. All the above data reflects the process of maturation towards a consumer so-
ciety. 
Migration and ethnic composition 
Navi Mumbai is an urban landscape largely formed by migration. This reflects the dy-
namically developing setting (cf. Gotsch 2005). A majority of the residents were born in 
other places. (Indeed, this is representative for a New Town.) Ten percent of the popula-
tion move each year (Cidco 2005). In this context the city features a significantly larger 
gender inequality than similar Indian cities.329  
The 2008 social survey by Cidco reveals that about half of Navi Mumbai’s residents 
stem from the Mumbai Region (30 percent from the Mumbai Peninsula, 18 percent from 
other suburbs), 30 percent shifted among the nodes of the New Town, 10 percent moved 
from the villages in the area330, and that the rest originated in the state of Maharashtra331 
and beyond. Shaw (2003:122) observes that affluent populations tend to originate in 
Mumbai332, while poorer residents are inclined to have a rural background.333 
Most of Navi Mumbai’s residents are Hindu. Out of 100 residents 90 are Hindu, 4 
are Muslim and 6 belong to other religious denominations (Cidco 2005).334 
Education profile and language 
Navi Mumbai’s residents are also more educated than their peers in other locations. The 
literacy rate in Navi Mumbai is at 98 percent (Cidco 2005).335 More than 30 percent 
have a secondary school education (Ibidem). The parallel city features a number of more 
than 250 schools and most children prefer private educational institutions. In the 
NMMC area the number of students attending a private school is five times as high as 
that of those attending a municipal school.336 
While the majority of residents represent a mix of professionals from all over India, 
English is Navi Mumbai’s lingua franca. It is spoken as a common language by 62 per-
cent of the population, while 35 percent of the population (for the main part the poorer 
                                               
327 This number decreased from 33 percent in 1995. (Cf. Cidco 1995, from Ananthakrishnan) 
328 The respective Indian number is 5 percent. 
329 Cidco 2005 reports that males make up 54 percent of the population. 
330 In the allocation of public apartments local villagers have priority rights. 
331 A crucial milestone, with a high impact on the population composition of the area, was a regulation introduced by the 
state government by the end of the 1980‘s. This regulation required from the applicants for publicly subsidised apartments 
to prove citizenship in the state for at least 15 years. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001: 10) 
332 In addition Adusumilli (2001:33) reports that most of the first time owners moved from much smaller accommodation in 
the island city. 
333 “Navi Mumbai in fact, is being peopled by two distinct kind of migration streams. One, an urban stream that represents 
the inflow of middle-class people from Greater Mumbai... Secondly, a rural to urban stream which represents an inflow of 
another class of people, the labouring poor, from surrounding rural regions, to provide labour...and other services.“ (Ibidem) 
334 Ananthakrishnan 1998 has confirmed a tendency of some ethnic minorities to cluster in specific sectors. (Cf. above 
Neighbourhoods,) 
335 As compared to 85 percent in the state of Maharashtra 
336 Although this data is representative for the NMMC area, it is supposedly also representative for a major trend. (Cf. 
http://www.nmmconline.com/english/services/educationShow.php; r17sept2008) 
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segment) commonly talks in Marathi. (Cf. below: education) This can be seen as a 
pointer to a) the mix, b) the educational levels, and c) to the origin of the population. 
Working population 
32 percent of Navi Mumbai’s residents have a regular job. This is a rate that is almost 
300 percent higher than India’s average. (Cf. above: Context: India) The respective male 
to female job-ratio is 89 to 11 percent (Cidco 2005). Reflecting the high educational lev-
els, more than two thirds of the working population works in white collar jobs: of this 
amount 45 percent works in private, a declining 23 percent in public offices.337 While 
blue-collar workers hold one fifth of the formal jobs, unskilled workers comprise another 
tenth. (Cidco 2005)338 
Consumption patterns 
Navi Mumbai is populated by a pioneer population whose daily life patterns are increas-
ingly centred around consumption. Significantly, almost all (official) households (97 per-
cent) own a television339; three quarters a refrigerator, 67 percent a fixed line telephone 
(TECS 2001: 99).340 In 2005 50 percent of people had a mobile phone, 35 percent of the 
households an air conditioner and 13 percent a personal computer (numbers are rising 
steeply). (Cf. Cidco 2005) 
A classical pointer to the emergence of middle classes is the rise of individual motor-
ised transport. While Navi Mumbai’s private ownership rates of motorised vehicles are 
far below western numbers, they are rising at a fast pace and they are greatly above the 
regional average. (Cf. Pucher 2007) These days 40 percent of the population have access 
to an individual mode of motorised transport: 10 percent own a car and 30 percent have 
a two-wheeler.341 
The majority of the residents is highly satisfied with the amount of infrastructure and 
the supply of services in Navi Mumbai’s nodes and claims that the quality of life is better 
in the new city than in the place before (cf. Cidco 2005). 
Mobility of the population 
The travel and mobility patterns of Navi Mumbai’s residents reflect high rates of the 
location’s independence and self-sufficiency. Significantly a majority of the populations 
remains in the area, whether for work, going to school, recreational activities or shop-
ping. A 58 percent majority of the population who live in Navi Mumbai also remain here 
for work.342 The number of children going to local schools is even more impressive. Al-
most all (96 percent) youngsters go to schools in Navi Mumbai. 
Availability of credits 
The consumer orientation of the New Town is also represented by the fact, that a grow-
ing number of residents exploit access to formal credit. In addition accessibility to money 
from public and private financial institutions has continuously increased since the eco-
nomic reforms of the early 1990’s (cf. Adusumilli 01:16, cf. also above: General context, 
                                               
337 The share of jobs in the public sector is shrinking. Only 1.200 of the 70.000 government-office that exist in Mumbai have 
been shifted to Navi. (Cf. Engel 1991: 102 quoted by Shaw 2003: 107) 
338 Since the 80‘s growth of jobs has occurred mainly is three areas: handling and marketing of agricultural products, educa-
tion-related activities, medical services and small businesses (Cidco 2005). 
339 This is 30 percent more than the average of Maharashtra. (Cf. Urban Census 2001) 
340 Against Maharashtra’s 27.3 percent (Urban Census 2001) 
341 In Maharashtra only 5,8 percent of the population own one of these. (Cf. Census 2001 Maharashtra Urban, quoted in 
Cidco 2005: ES-11) 
342 2 percent work in the adjacent industries, 36 percent commute to the island city, and the rest to other suburbs Thane-
Kalyan. (Cidco 2005, cf. Shaw 2004, 102) 
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India, economics), presuming that the households who borrow have a regular income.343 
The fact that 44 percent of the buyers take some kind of loan and an additional 9 percent 
depend on other financial institutions344 (cf. Cidco 2005: ES-4) places Navi Mumbai well 
above the Indian average and underlines the parallel city’s high degree of ‘Westernisa-
tion’. 
Informal population 
Despite the fact that Navi Mumbai has been promoted as a slum free city, the parallel 
city has experienced a steep rise of ‘unplanned’ populations – on a par with the official 
population growth. It can be estimated that today more than 30 percent of the popula-
tion, amounting to more than half a million, belong to the informal sector.345 The num-
bers are rapidly rising and catching up with other, more consolidated Indian cities. 
Preexisting (village) population 
Navi Mumbai was not developed on a tabula rasa. 80 villages existed in the area prior to 
its development. (Cf. above: Structure) While 56 villages and 2 municipalities remain 
integrated as enclaves in the area, their number of residents is assessed at 17 percent of 
the total population or a population of 290.000 residents.346 (Cf. Shaw 2003) In addition 
to this, in the coming years a high number of other villages will be affected by the surge 
of new projects, such as SEZs and Integrated Townships to the South and Southwest of 
Navi Mumbai.347 
In contrast to the planned sectors, the population of these villages in the environs of 
Navi Mumbai contains a higher share of females than males (Ibidem: 36). With a decadal 
growth rate of 7,59 these Gaothans also grow significantly more slowly than average 
settlements in the state, not to mention the nodes of Navi Mumbai. Both of the previous 
facts appear to be as a result of a male-selective out-migration.  
In addition, a study of the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) ascertains that al-
though the average household income per annum in the villages is about INR 10.500 
(US$ 200), most of the people live in poverty. This is explained by a lack of employment 
combined with the poor amount of arable land per capita. Land availability in the vil-
lages is only 0,903 hectares per household (cf. Ibidem). 
On the other hand, since India’s decentralisation course (cf. above: 74th Amendment) 
village populations and their administrations, the Gran Panchayats, are increasingly mo-
mentous stakeholders. In this context more and more people resist new projects. In 2007, 
for example the size of the planned MMSEZ was reduced from 10.000 hectares to 5.000 
hectares after an enormous counter movement of the villagers.348 
                                               
343 Before the reforms public housing was mainly supply side oriented. In this regard from the late 1970‘s to the early 1990‘s 
Cidco has acted mainly as a public housing developer, while it was receiving large amounts of direct public subsidies. 
344 The other half (47 percent) of Navi Mumbaikars finance the purchase of a dwelling in the traditional way, e.g. from their 
financial reserves. 
345 Combined with an “unplanned” 17 percent of village populations the number rises to 800.000. Conservative accounts, 
estimate Navi Mumbai’s slum population at close to 20 percent. (Cf. MMRDA 2003: 8) These statistics, however, do not 
take into account the direct vicinity of the area. In 2001 adjacent suburban district areas such as Thane featured informal 
shares of 30 percent (Ibidem). 
346 As Navi Mumbai’s nodes became consolidated, the villages (and slums) became fully integrated into Navi Mumbai’s 
Municipal Corporation. 
347 The Social Impact Assessment of the Maha Mumbai Special Economic Zone (MMSEZ) by the Tata Institute of Social Sci-
ences (TISS), today Mumbai SEZ, lists a directly affected population of 26.171 persons, or 5.521 households, in 15 villages. 
(Cf. Shaban 2005) A large number of livelihoods in these villages are based on fishing and sand rising from the sea. The 
household size of these villages varied between 4.4 and 5.2. Literacy rates ranged between 57 and 86.8 percent. 
348 Gupta 2006, The Hindu 2006, kvcindia 2007, Gadgil 2008, also compare above: Box about SEZs. 
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Consumer-side finance 
Income 
Navi Mumbai’s residents earn five times more than an average Indian citizen, yet only 
half the amount of a resident of the Mumbai peninsula. In 2005 the median income of 
Navi Mumbai’s residents was INR 12.691 (~ US$ 280) per month. (Cf. Cidco 2005) 
Average earnings have doubled between 2005 and 2007. 
Because of the high income disparity in India349 it is even more revealing to look at the 
distribution of incomes among the main groups. Here it becomes clear that Navi Mum-
bai is more and more positioning itself between the middle and higher income segments. 
Cidco (2005) confirms that 73 percent of the population in the parallel city belongs to 
the middle and higher income groups. The same figure for Mumbai was at 35 percent. 
(Cf. Cidcoindia, r12.09.2008, Shaw 2003: 115) Its proportion between the HIG: MIG: 
LIG, and EWS residents was 42: 34: 22 and 2.350 (Cidco 2000, from Shaw 2003:115) 
As a result we can observe that despite Cidco’s efforts for central planning that ame-
liorates differences, the income distribution among the nodes is not equal. Indeed, the 
growing polarity leaves deep marks in the housing markets and consequently in the spa-
tial arrangement of the nodes. (Cf. Shaw 2003: 185, Nissel 1997) Vashi, as the economic 
centre and the best-connected node, features the highest incomes. These range from 
about INR 15.700 (~350 US$) per month. (Cf.- Cidco 05: ES-8) Income also varies in the 
respective apartment categories. At the turn of the 21st century those in the 18 and 25 
square metre apartments earned INR 5.000 - 10.000 per month, and those in the 40 
square metre apartments between 10.000 and 15.000. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001: 33) 
While Cidco was pushing a planned mix of various income groups in most of its pro-
jects, interviews have revealed that a blend is not much appreciated by the residents.351 
 Illustration C-25: Differences between Navi Mumbai’s nodes exemplified by the ‘reserve 
price’ of land 
Affordability 
While the average housing prices in Navi Mumbai are significantly lower than in the 
central city, the general affordability threshold in Navi Mumbai remains high by Indian 
standards.352 This fact can mainly be attributed to larger structural reasons, the income 
of most Indians is simply too low to afford a house in the formal market.353 (Cf. above 
Context: India: Economy) As a result the statistics reveal a high percentage of middle and 
higher income house owners.354 
                                               
349 Half of Mumbai’s households are living below the poverty line. While the incomes of the top earners have risen by an 
annual rate of 20 percent and more since liberalisation, the real wages have increased by 5 percent (Nissel 1997, quoting 
Geissbauer and Siemsen l996: 72). 
350 Of course with these numbers it can also be stated that a majority of 56 percent belong to the middle and low-income 
classes. 
351 Uma Adusumilli, former head of Cidco’s planning department and long-time resident of Navi Mumbai, observed that 
“The residents of 18 and 25 square metre tenements interact with each other well whereas residents of 40 square metre 
tenements keep themselves independent and celebrate all their events in isolation.” (Adusumilli 2001: 33) 
352 The level is only moderate for Navi Mumbai residents, yet these already represent higher than the average income 
groups. 
353 Formal housing has totally gone out of the affordability limits of India’s Economic Weaker Sections. The affordability gap 
is further increasing because wages in the lowest income sector rise more slowly than housing prices. In addition, large 
populations without regular incomes are unable to qualify for formal loans. Preliminary studies done by Cidco in the 1970 
revealed that more than 30 percent of the population of greater Mumbai could not afford the simplest pucca (durable) 
house (cf. Cidco, 1973). Indeed, according to the numbers presented, buying a house proved very hard to almost 93 percent 
of the population. (Cf. Ananthakrishnan: 8, 12) 
354 Nevertheless it has to be mentioned that western affordability standards may be difficult to apply. Facing these grim 
statistics it has to be noted that in practice more Indians are able to purchase a house than theory would allow. This is due 
to the fact that most of the houses in India are purchased from savings and not by taking a loan, and the relative household 
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As many of Navi Mumbai’s residents move up the ladder of wealth by selling their 
formerly subsidised properties, it can be debated whether subsidised housing in Navi 
Mumbai can be seen as a failure or an economic success. While land prices in some of the 
individual nodes (e.g. Kopar Khairane) have multiplied,355 many original residents have 
cashed in their profits and left.356 Meanwhile, after a 500 percent increase in land values, 
21 percent of all lower income units have been sold in Vashi, 30 percent in Airoli. The 
average reseale was performed after 14 years (Ibidem).357 The result is that many areas 
such as parts of Vashi and Kopar Khairane have become gentrified.  
Adusumilli (2001) confirms: “The selling of the housing stock by lower-income people 
to middle income groups is now widely prevalent in Navi Mumbai and, in many ways, 
defeats the efforts of the state to improve housing consumption for the lowest socio-
economic groups“. 
Revenues from compensation schemes for PAPs 
Meanwhile numerous village residents and former landowners in Navi Mumbai also 
make significant profits. After long years of deprivation with forced disappropriation and 
“relocation” on the agenda, today the political impact of populations in the ‘unplanned’ 
areas has dramatically improved. This resulted in significantly higher levels of compensa-
tion of the villagers. This is the case, in particular, of privately developed schemes.358 (Cf. 
below; Developer, Strategies, R&R) 
The following list demonstrates some examples of contemporary compensation meas-
ures: Cidco compensates about 3,50 INR per square metre land to private owners (gov-
ernment rate of INR 3,50 per square metre (TECS 2001: 80); In 2005 Sea King, leading 
partner in the SEZ projects, offered to compensate 10 INR per square metre (or INR 6-
10 lakh per hectare, or ~ 20 Eurocent) (Shaban 2005: 11); In contrast the villagers inter-
viewed demanded market rates of INR 40 for a square metre (~ INR 40 lakh per hectare, 
Shaban 2005). 
Motives, values and role models of the target groups 
The motives of Navi Mumbai’s target groups range on a scale between basic necessity 
(‘use values’) and the need for representation (‘exchange values’): For the lower and mid-
dle classes residing in one of Cidco’s subsidised projects is a means of securing the basic 
housing needs and improving their quality of life. For the more affluent middle and up-
per income classes dwelling in the new city tends to take on the role of a life style com-
modity. 
From the supply side the decongestion of central Mumbai was a major motive in 
planning the new city. On the demand side people are mainly attracted by the availability 
of space at cheaper prices and by an environment of reduced risks (environmental degra-
dation, traffic safety, air quality). After all, for a wave of new middle and upper class 
                                                                                                                                         
saving rates in India are comparatively high, even for the lowest income classes. (Cf. Reserve Bank of India, 2007: 310, 
Karnad 2007: 23) 
355 In seven years prices have soared from INR 80.000 to INR 221.000 for the 3 categories at the beginning, to market rates 
of the INR 200.000 to 550.000. During the same time rents have increased by 300 percent and more. The rents of the 
smallest units of 18 square metres went from INR 400 per month in 1993 to INR 1.200 per month in the year 2000 
(Adusumilli 2001: 33). 
356 Sale becomes possible after a quarantine period of 12 years. 
357 Current prices can be retrieved from: www.navimumbai.realacres.com; r12.08.2008. 
358 The situation is particularly intricate in the newly developing SEZs and the township projects. Meanwhile private develop-
ers have to purchase the majority of the land directly from the villagers. (Cf. Das Gupta 2006, Bunsha 2006, cf. also BOX on 
SEZs) The SEZ projects had to be repeatedly modified as village collectives blocked the acquisition of land, e.g. demanding 
highly inflated prices. (Cf. Das Gupta 2006, Bunsha 2006) 
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residents, questions of a secure investment, image, lifestyle and representation become 
increasingly important. 
To this date Navi Mumbai has not been the place to fulfil the ‘classical’ dream of the 
villa in a romantic green landscape (at least not according to Western imagination). This 
is mainly due to several supply and demand side reasons: to the income status of the pri-
mary target populations, the planned urban densities, the perceived remoteness of the 
location, as well as the fabric of diverse land uses, including heavy industries, in the envi-
rons. For most of the residents the decision to move to one of the nodes has always im-
plied to move to an everlasting construction site and to wait until the urban fabric even-
tually gets consolidated. The “villa in a garden” was a luxury only affordable by society’s 
celebrities. And the mainstream evidently associated a ‘garden’ more with the backward-
ness of a rural lifestyle than with a luxury asset. Hence, real retreat was only possible to 
the interior of private apartments. This is also why the hitherto markets for the high-
income classes, generally seen as the role models for the other income segments of soci-
ety, mainly comprise Asian style multi-storey towers. (Cf. the examples Seawoods Es-
tates, Millennium Towers) 
Hence, it seems that so far, to the average Indian mind, the notion of a suburban life-
style did not exist – all that was there was either rural or urban.359 Yet, the situation has 
reached a turning point. While high-density apartment towers remain popular (e.g. in the 
Hiranandani project), more and more low-density villa style schemes are being developed 
in Navi Mumbai’s vicinity. These projects are emerging around the highway corridor to 
Pune or on the Parsik Hills. Hollywood City, Magic Hills or the “hill town”-retreat of 
Lavasa (cf. above Predecessors) are the trendsetters of this development producing and 
reproducing a new generation of urban desires and dreams of a consumer orientated 
suburban lifestyle. India’s large and growing middle class is emerging into a class of “real 
estate consumers”. These seek an “unsurpassed living environment”, as well as new in-
vestment opportunities. Real estate entrepreneurs are taking up this trend by “combining 
location with infrastructure” and by providing “world-class business environments”, and 
retailers access to the new consumer classes.360 
Values of target groups 
As new suburban populations face a context of contradicting trends ranging between 
dynamism and stability, New Mumbai and other new suburbs in India have a double 
role to play. On one hand urban peripheries are the forerunners of modernisation and 
change, while on the other hand suburbs represent ‘conservative’ locations of harmony, 
stability and security. In this context the dawn of India’s real estate consumers brings 
about gradually changing core values in parallel to new socio-economic, cultural and 
technological trends.361 In the suburbs the atomisation of society362 is represented by the 
proliferation of the one-generation core family model.363 As a consequence, the suburban 
context becomes orientated around core family values, such as stability, harmony, secu-
rity, the sovereignty to select what to consume and the freedom to be among similar peo-
                                               
359 E.g. Suburbs lacked all major infrastructures, including major transportation arteries. Hence entrepreneurs seeking to 
develop settlements had to provide everything. 
360 Cf. the maxims of the investment company Hirco at www.hircoplc.com (r23.08.2008): Original text: “Hirco creates value 
by combining location with infrastructure, thus providing India’s new real estate consumer – the large and growing middle 
class – an unsurpassed living environment; Indian and international companies a world-class business environment; and 
retailers access to affluent consumers with disposable incomes.” 
361 Among the greater trends are: An increasing focus on exchange values instead of use values, individual fulfilment instead 
of family clan, potential as opposed to achievement, live-style base instead of home, project instead of vocation etc. (Cf. 
Sennett 2006, Sloterdijk 2005) 
362 Another term for the increasing individualisation 
363 While these are emerging in a gradual transformation of a culture that was orientated towards family clans, the detailed 
discussion of this transition goes beyond the scope of this work. 
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ple. These are notably values which may reinforce urban fragmentation by the formation 
of enclaves and segregated lifestyles that also contradict the ethics of existing village 
populations. 
Role models 
The desires of the emerging middle classes are based on various role models. The most 
dominant fashions affecting local dreams and shaping indigenous tastes seem to come 
from the US, Europe and increasingly also from the Gulf region. New desires and life 
styles are conveyed through the media – from Swiss Bollywood movies to US American 
soaps and British news channels –and also transported by a rising number of Indians 
joining the tourist class. Family members who study or work abroad, so called Non-
Resident Indians (INR), personify new ideals (Cf. Appadurai 1990, 1996; Brosius 2007) 
The matter is vibrant as contemporary migration, in particular of the more educated 
classes, is not an irrevocable movement but a matter of frequent location change.364 In 
this context INR’s must be seen more as intercontinental commuters, exporting goods, 
information, money and dreams (cf Nissel 1997). (Cf. above: Culture)365 
Political orientation 
The political orientation of Navi Mumbai’s new and affluent residents is rather liberal. 
However, in the meanwhile it is often the ‘poorer’ population of the villages and infor-
mal settlements holding an important amount of political muscle. 366 In 1995 the Navi 
Mumbai Metropolitan Council was composed of 60 percent by representatives stemming 
from the villages, while only 24 seats represented the other residents of Navi Mumbai. 
(Cf. Sita 2005: 248) In this context many poorer people in Navi Mumbai choose to give 
their votes to populist parties such as the Shiv Sena (“Army of Shiva”) or the BJP367 In-
deed, the Shiva Sainik’s368 strong impact in Navi Mumbai was referred to as a fortress. 
(Cf. Expressindia, 2008)369  
Resident groups and associations – Collective land ownership á la Howard 
Navi Mumbai’s fresh population initially consisted of a population of strangers, a gen-
eral feature of planned cites. Most of the people moved in from different places in the 
vicinity, the city, the region, and beyond. In this situation the time for an evolution of 
‘organic bottom-up governance structures was lacking. In this context resident groups 
and community associations initiated from above play an extraordinary role in the de-
velopment of the new city. The state owned developer Cidco had always pursued the 
policy of surrendering the matters of self-organisation and political administration to 
other, more capable bodies – as a policy and by public regulations. Indeed, those organs 
                                               
364 Qualified experts in IT, Machine Engineering, Accounting and Financial services are courted by many global firms – not 
only in Mumbai and in India – but, as a further effect of globalisation, also in the USA, Australia and in other Asian coun-
tries. (Cf. Nissel 1997, translation by the Author) 
365 For the ethnographer Christiane Brosius the INR’s duplicate the ‘enclavic gaze’ (of the currently prominent “Integrated 
Township” typology) in an interesting way as: “Firstly they look from the enclave of privatopia at India (and the world). In 
addition, they have the perspective of someone who has made the experience of the enclave during migration.” (Brosius 
2007: 67, 68, translation by the author) 
366 Indeed a researcher familiar with the conditions in the area compared the impact of the villagers to the power of the 
developers. (Cf. Personal interview by the Author with a representative of TISS, July 2006) Today no SEZ, airport, or highway 
project can be realised without offering a generous R&R package. (Cf. Shaban 2005) E.g. the large 5.000-hectare Mumbai 
SEZ was repeatedly blocked by demonstrations and protests from below. (Cf. Menon 2006, Das Gupta 2006, cf. Gadgil 
2008) 
367 Bharatiya Janata Party 
368 E.g. members of the Shiv Sena 
369 Currently the National Congress Party (NCP) holds the leadership of the Municipal Corporation. The major is Ms. Anjani 
Prabhakar Bhoir. (Cf. nmmconline; r12.09.2008). Another primary opponent is “The Congress”. 
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such as cooperative societies, condominium associations, etc., are known as important 
hinge-points between larger administrative bodies such as the Sectorial Council or the 
Municipal Council, and the individual household.370 They have proved to be successful 
instruments in the integration of the previously mentioned group ‘strangers’. 
Certainly, one of the most important innovations of subsidised housing construction 
in Navi Mumbai is the organisation of condominium associations and cooperative socie-
ties. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001) More than 80 percent of the population in subsidised apart-
ments is part of a self-governing body (CHS). (Cf. Cidco 2005: ES-3).371 All these resi-
dent-associations, cooperatives and condominiums have a compulsory membership and 
charge additional fees.372 
Moreover “… ensuring participation by the residents in the maintenance of infrastruc-
ture at a decentralised level, condominiums have also proved to be social units where 
innovative ideas can be introduced by the municipality or development authority.“ 
(Adusumilli 2001:11) 
Box 20: Cooperative societies in Sector 26 
Sector 26 (cf. above: Structure: Examples) may serve as an illustrative example of how 
cooperative organisation works: Here, Cidco constructed dwelling units in the form of 
residential condominiums, each one accommodating 100 to 200 tenements (Adusumilli 
2001: 10, 11). Each household that obtained a house had to sign up with a resident as-
sociation. The idea was that of an individual ownership of apartments, but a collectively 
owned and administered land.  
The cooperative societies are officially registered and have an annually elected body. A 
ready built office has been an integral part of the scheme. They are responsible for the 
development and maintenance of the public open and covered spaces and infrastruc-
ture within their boundary. The condominium associations enforce strict discipline on 
maintenance/usage of the common areas on the ground, conversion of building-uses to 
non-residential, use of condominium office space, sale of individual apartments, entry 
of hawkers into the condominiums and levying the maintenance charges for common 
services. 
The two major sources of revenue are: 1) the monthly maintenance charges and 2) the 
transfer charges levied each time an individual apartment is sold. In addition to a gen-
eral transfer charge ranging between INR 16.000 and 25.000; monthly charges in Sector 
26 have amounted to INR 215 per tenement (or US$ 4,72) per month (Adusumilli 2001: 
34). 
Summary 
Population profile 
The residents represent the life of Navi Mumbai. In late 2008 Navi Mumbai housed 1,7 
million people. This means that the city has reached a 50 percent capacity. While the 
city’s growth has been slower than planned, the development has been consistent and 
faster than that of other comparable locations. For a long time Navi Mumbai was stig-
matised and conceived as a secondary, distant and remote location – at least from the 
perspective of Mumbai. Yet currently, the place is overrun by a flood of new middle class 
residents and white-collar employees, as well as seasonal construction workers. 
                                               
370 Beyond the above mentioned publicly installed bodies of self government, a variety of new bottom-up societal actors has 
emerged in the New Town cluster. These range from numerous local clubs such as the Association for Leprosy Education to 
the Stray dog lovers, various laughing clubs, and to the Navi Mumbai Action Committee, the voice of people foundation, or 
various NGO’s, to name just a few. The umbrella organisation karmayog lists about 50 NGO’s in the area. (Cf. 
http://www.karmayog.com/ngoarea/navimumbai.htm; r13.09.2008) 
371 On the larger scale the finished nodes have been transformed into a Municipality (cf. nmmconline.com), which is gov-
erned by a local elected body. (Cf. below: Regulation) 
372 Local fee structures in the privately developed enclaves are not known yet as these are in the planning stage. 
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Sharing the fate of most planned cities, Navi Mumbai is a city of pioneers and mi-
grants. It portrays a blend of a new booming ‘edge city’ location as well as an emerging 
middle class suburb. Yet, it is also polarised between the life styles of new consumer 
classes and traditional villagers. While the profile of the city’s population reflects the 
conditions of a typical New Town (high migration rates, majority of males etc), it also 
reflects the development of a modern consumer society. 
The parallel city represents a dynamic urban landscape that is largely formed by mi-
gration: One tenth of all residents move every year. A majority of the people originated 
at other locations, most (54 percent) are male, their average age is slightly higher, and the 
households are smaller (<4) than the Indian average. The ‘official’ population is highly 
educated and literate; English serves as the lingua franca (and Marathi comes second); a 
large majority of the formal working population belong to the white-collar sector and a 
majority of the children attend private schools.  
The dynamic status of Navi Mumbai as a landscape of economic opportunity is un-
derlined by the economic profile of the inhabitants. The new city more-and-more focuses 
on middle and higher income populations (in 2005 about three quarters of the popula-
tion). The residents earn five times more than an average Indian citizen, yet only half the 
amount of an inhabitant of Greater Mumbai.  
Indeed, the everyday patterns of the formal populations reflect a rapidly developing 
consumer society: communicational, household gadgets, as well as individual motorised 
transport, are all steeply on the rise. (In addition the spread of new mortgage and credit 
mechanisms, geared to the individual consumer, points to the city’s advanced state on the 
way towards a consumer-oriented society.) 
Despite the fact that Navi Mumbai is officially promoted as a India’s first city without 
slums, the area accounts for 47 percent of ‘unplanned’ populations (e.g. residents of vil-
lages and slums). As a result a polarised political landscape is emerging, represented by a 
populist accent of the majority of ‘non-formal’ residents and the rather liberal views of 
the ‘formal’ populations. 
Nevertheless, many of Navi Mumbai’s previously poor were able to improve their 
conditions. Residents of subsidised LIG and EWS schemes benefit from the security of 
tenure and a general rise in the value of their properties. In addition, village populations 
are able to take advantage of generous compensation schemes, at least recently. 
The motives of the residents to move to Navi Mumbai range from improved economic 
efficiency to an increased quality of life, up to lifestyle and representational considera-
tions. The potential inhabitant personifies India’s large and growing middle class of “real 
estate consumers” seeking an “unsurpassed living environment”, as well as new invest-
ment opportunities. The new values and lifestyles also bring about increasing contradic-
tions. 
The parallel city features high rates of self-sufficiency, the majority of the population 
live, work, shop and spend their leisure time in Navi Mumbai. However, within the ur-
ban fabric an increasing amount of spontaneous polarisation and segregation can be ob-
served. A growing polarity leaves deep marks in the housing markets and consequently in 
the spatial arrangement of the nodes. While 14 nodes are at hand, the population is con-
centrated in two (Vashi and Nerul). In addition, certain income groups, working classes 
as well as minorities, tend to concentrate in specific areas. The trend gradually approxi-
mates traditional urban patterns. 
Despite the trend to polarisation and fragmentation Navi Mumbai is notable as a 
heaven of resident associations and co-operative societies. Navi Mumbai represents an 
interesting model where houses are mostly individually owned, but land is generally used 
and administered by the collective. The organisation of residents played an important 
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role since the groundbreaking and was a central instrument of all public housing pro-
grammes. Today more than 80 percent of the population in subsidised apartments are 
part of some self-governing body. 
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Developers and designers –  
State entrepreneurialism 
Introduction 
 
Table 25: Key indicators – Navi Mumbai’s developers and designers 
Name of company Cidco (City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharash-
tra Ltd.) 
Name of developer State of Maharashtra 
Type of firm State owned Non-for Profit Corporation 
Purpose of Cidco Public instrument to explore innovations in urban development and 
housing 
Structure of Cidco 27 major branches, more than 2.200 of employees, traditional focus 
on engineering 
Development of Navi 
Mumbai SEZ 
(NMSEZ) 
Joint venture of Cidco and several other national and international 
private sector conglomerates (e.g. Parsons Brinckerhoff, Jurong, Re-
liance, SKIL, Hiranandani etc.) 
Quality management 
standards 
Integrated SAP and GIS package, CPM and PERT techniques, in 
some departments ISO 9.000, Customer Relationship Management 
(CRM) 
Early goals Balanced regional development (‘Counter Magnet’), social housing 
strategy, modernistic ideals, holistic vision for Mumbai and Maha-
rashtra 
Present visions “City of the 21st century”, “international knowledge city” 
Contemporary opera-
tional framework 
Social, but increasingly demand driven 
Novel trends PPP’s, SEZs and Integrated Township Schemes, Gated enclaves 
Major ‘ingredients of 
success’ 
1) Revolving fund, 2) land bank, 3) phased and incremental devel-
opment, 4) holistic, autonomous plan, 5) focus on public infrastruc-
ture, 6) focus on social housing, 7) back up by the government 
Implementation strat-
egy 
1) Shift of wholesale activities, 2) synergies with industrial area, port, 
airport, 3) new government centre, 4) autonomous development of 
the nodes, 5) integrated transportation corridors 
Social and environ-
mental policies, Reha-
bilitation and Reset-
tlement packages 
Mandatory Social and Environmental Impact Assessments, elabo-
rates R&R packages (12, 5 percent rule, preferential supply with 
apartments, job training programmes) 
Planners, Designers, 
Architects 
MARG (Charles Correa, Pravina Mehta, Shirish Patel); Cidco, Bal-
krishna Doshi, Raj Rewal, and Hafeez Contractor, McClier 
Urban design strategy Contextual, place based design strategy envisioning a ‘twin city on 
the sea’ 
Trends in design ‘Iconic architecture’, ‘super monuments’, outsourcing and specialisa-
tion of disciplines  
Trends in open space Symbolic, monumental space 
Navi Mumbai   279 
Trends in marketing ‘Demand inducing strategies’, ‘proactive image generation’: Navi 
Mumbai as India’s new ‘super city’, increasing focus towards inter-
national investors, novel CSR schemes used in SEZs, web based 
marketing, construction of an own museum (Cidcoseum) 
 
Actuality and Goals 
When describing an urban structure, the understanding of the form and its content, as 
well as the dialectics among these two, is of primary importance. The essence of a 
planned city is based on the interaction of spatial environment and the inhabitant, as 
much as the interaction of text and reader in the case of a novel. Nevertheless, what re-
mains is the question of the author. The dialectic remains obscured without a familiarity 
with the producer. While a planned city in particular represents an ‘act of conscious will’, 
information on their authors (and their ideas) is of primary importance. As a result, the 
following section intends to characterise the creators of the planned city Navi Mumbai. 
After all, in our time of rising specialisation, it must be clarified who precisely the 
driving producer(s) are. Do the forms on the ground represent the motives, ideas, and 
ideologies of designers, planners, the government, the developer, or a mix of all? 
Indeed, within our context of an expanding importance of private urban development, 
it seems particularly attractive to inquire into the specific role of the real estate entrepre-
neurs, as these emerge as the main producers of Neo Towns. Indeed, this is in stark con-
trast to earlier New Town generations. While customarily it was the principal or the gen-
ius inventor (from Peter the Great and St. Petersburg, to Karl Friedrich and Karlsruhe) or 
the master architect and planner working for strong governments (from Leonardo to 
Edward Lutyens and Le Corbusier) or the more abstract public planning office (e.g. New 
Towns in Egypt) – with the rise of New Towns as private ventures, the developers and 
real estate entrepreneurs seem to be (consciously or not) driving the development of the 
newly planned cities, as discussed by this work. 
Navi Mumbai is of particular interest in the context of this entire research, because 
the developer at hand (Cidco) is a state owned corporation, acting along hybrid ration-
ales between public and private. In this role Cidco combines the security of a public or-
ganisation and the efficiency of a private venture. The example reflects a history of rising 
importance of the private sector, while at the same time exhibiting the strengths of a pub-
lic institution. 
Hence, it seems particularly attractive to contrast the hybrid operation of Cidco to the 
entirely private ventures of Bumi Serpong Damai PT and Alphaville Urbanismo and to 
elaborate the advantages of the one or the other. Furthermore, a second and unique as-
pect of special relevance in Navi Mumbai is the qualification of the new project ar-
rangements, stakeholder frameworks and strategies that currently emerge in new SEZ 
schemes. 
Consequently the following section delineates the characteristics of Navi Mumbai’s 
major authors. It portrays developers and their strategies, the conception, design and 
marketing as well as the implementation and operation (administration) of the New 
Town. Naturally the planned city’s developer Cidco draws our major attention. As a 
result, the first sub-chapter is devoted to clarify its background and institutional geogra-
phy, as well as the main goals and strategies. (Importantly, this part will also include 
some of the latest schemes related to SEZs.) A second part delineates the role of planners 
and designers in the contemporary privatising framework. The third part is devoted to 
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the new role of marketing, sales and public relations. Last but not least, the fourth sec-
tion outlines the delivery and the operation of the planned city. 
Developers 
Name and background of developers 
Cidco 
Navi Mumbai’s main developer is the City and Industrial Development Corporation of 
Maharashtra Ltd., or Cidco.373 (Cf. www.cidcoindia.com) Cidco is a hybrid construction 
between the public and private sectors. While it is a fully state owned corporation, it has 
to operate like an enterprise in an economically sustainable way. (Cf. Adusumilli 2006)374 
Cidco was founded with the exclusive aim of developing Navi Mumbai on behalf of the 
state of Maharashtra375. Its duties in this context include: 1) The development of a pro-
ject strategy, together with preliminary drafts, programs, studies and policies, 2) The 
elaboration of planning documents on several scales376 and 3) the implementation of the 
project377. 
Indeed, Cidco can be seen as a pioneer of market driven urbanisation in the hands of 
the state. Its assignment is aimed at a balanced and structured development of the region. 
This includes providing the major urban infrastructure and services, yet also the devel-
opment of affordable housing for the poor. In this context Cidco developed various 
‘Robin Hood’ strategies378 of taking from the rich and giving to the poor. This was 
achieved, for example, by developing novel pricing mechanisms (cf. below: differential 
pricing) and undertaking joint ventures in other profitable projects. The fact that Cidco is 
an actor that performs along the principles of the market has also raised much criticism 
during the last 40 years. And indeed, as a matter of fact it can be observed that in the last 
years Cidco has produced an ever-decreasing amount of low-income housing. 
NMSEZ Navi Mumbai Special Economic Zone – role model and developer’s think tank 
As of its recent endeavours Cidco, as an arm of the state, has also jumped onto the SEZ 
train. The mission to engage in profitable undertakings (in order to redistribute the prof-
its among the poor) has led to the developer’s recent commitment at the newly emerging 
Navi Mumbai Special Economic Zone (NMSEZ). The state government, seeking to de-
velop lighthouse projects for the private sector and keen to benefit from new experiences, 
has appointed the New Town Development Agency as the nodal agency for the planning, 
development and marketing of the NMSEZ.379 
                                               
373 ”The City and Industrial Development Corporation Limited of Maharashtra (Cidco) was entrusted the responsibility of 
developing the metro city.” (Cf. Cidcoindia, r12.08.2008) Meanwhile Cidco became a special planning authority for a num-
ber of other urban areas in Maharashtra. Currently several additional New Towns and infrastructure projects are on the 
developers project list. (Cf. Cidcoindia, r12.09.2008) 
374 Indeed the entire vicinity of Navi Mumbai is an example of an extensive entrepreneurial development strategy driven by 
the state. Both, the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation, as well as the Jawahar Lal Nehru Port Trust, are state 
ventures. The first was commissioned to develop the industrial areas around Navi Mumbai; the latter was aimed to develop 
the Nhava Sheva port. 
375 As early as 1965 the Gadgil Committee (cf. above) had proposed the foundation of a New Town authority. (Anan-
thakrishnan 1999: 14) 
376 E.g.: Land use plans, residential layout plans, infrastructure plans, industrial location plans, environmental assessment 
377 E.g.: Acquisition of land, finance, construction, sales and marketing, relocation strategies, etc. (cf. Ananthakrishnan: 14, 
15) 
378 Name given by the authors 
379 As a result, the NMSEZ represents the only new SEZ in India where the land (except for the Regional Park Zone Area) was 
in possession of the project sponsor, e.g. the government. (Cf. website of nmsez.com; r25.09.2008) 
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Indeed, the development of the NMSEZ is another example of the ‘strong hand’ of 
India’s state governments in regard to urban development. The project is implemented in 
the manner of a public private partnership. A special developer consortium, known as a 
SPV, develops it. While this unit performs as an enterprise with limited liabilities (Ltd.), it 
decentralises economic risks from its holders. 
The group developing the NMSEZ can be seen as a real estate think tank and ‘learn-
ing curve’. It contains some of the most renowned regional and international real estate 
conglomerates. The fact that many public and private partners are on board is a huge 
asset for the project. For example, most of the land was already in Cidco’s hands.380 It 
also brings along a long standing expertise of developing projects in the region. An addi-
tional trade off for its stake in the SPV are increased development rights (Cf. mnsez.com; 
r 12.07.2008)  
In this context the SPV emerges as a structure that is nested in a two fold way. While 
Cidco, itself a semi-public agency, handles a share of 26 percent, several partners from 
the private sector share the remaining 74 percent. (Cf. www.nmsez.com; r23.09.2008) 
The company Sea King Infrastructure Limited (SKIL) has a major stake in the project. 381 
Additional momentum is provided by several renowned national and international 
heavyweights: In 2007 22 percent of the SPV contained representatives of IFC Washing-
ton, IL&FS, the Pune-based Avinash Bhosle group, the Jurong Town group (an enter-
prise owned by the Singapore Government) and the engineering company Parsons 
Brinckerhoff of the USA.382 (Cf. NMSEZ; r12.09.2008) Jurong Consultants as well as 
Parsons Brinckerhoff are participating each with a stake of 10 percent in the project. (Cf. 
SKPC 2005) 
Box 21: Anand Jain  The man behind the scenes 
A central person who is currently steering the development of urban peripheries in Navi 
Mumbai’s environs is the head of the enterprise Sea King Infrastructure Ltd. (SKIL) An-
and Jain. SKIL is a private conglomerate that diversified from industrial products to-
wards venture capital and the real estate business.383 
Mr Jain’s networks and activities illustrate the relevance that individual stakeholders 
can have in the development of the region.384 He chairs the developing consortia of 
both Special Economic Zones on behalf of the Reliance Group. (Cf. Skil, r12.09.2008; The 
Indian Business 2005) Furthermore, Jain is also the Director of Rewas Port Limited, a gi-
gantic US$ 1,3 billion port development project even further to the South of the two 
SEZ projects.  
Indeed, Mr Jain is known as the main strategic advisor of Mukesh Ambani who is chair 
of the Reliance group, one of the “high-value” individuals in the world (cf. Forbes 
Magazine) and one of the most influential businesspersons in India. Yet, with the re-
                                               
380 How complicated land acquisition can get when no public partner is on board is being demonstrated in the Maha Mum-
bai SEZ project. (Cf. above BOX on SEZ) 
381 Importantly SKIL, along with the Reliance Corporation, is also the major developer of the Maha Mumbai SEZ (also called 
Mumbai SEZ, cf. SKIL, r12.09.2008). The MSEZ is located just 300 metres away from the MMSEZ separated by a creek. It is 
the first fully private SEZ in India. (Ibidem) 
382 During the starting phase the composition of the consortium has changed quite often. Nevertheless, it is interesting to 
see developers of several other major projects in the vicinity as part of the group. In 2004 the SPV included, in addition to 
Cidco and SKIL, the Hiranandani Group (cf. above Examples: Hiranandani Palace Gardens), Videocon, the Avinash Bhosle 
Group (cf. The Hindu 2004). 
383 Jai Corp was incorporated in 1985. It has traditionally been in manufacturing businesses like steel, plastic processing and 
spinning yarn. Apart from expansion of its plastic processing business, it is now focusing and investing in emerging oppor-
tunities like developing SEZs, infrastructure, venture capital and real estate. It is listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and 
National Stock Exchange. (http://www.jaicorpindia.com/aboutus/anandjain.html, may 2008) 
384 Mr Jain’s impressive references also list him as the chair of the Reliance Haryana SEZ Limited as promoter and chairman 
of Urban Infrastructure Venture Capital Limited (UIVCL), as ex-trustee of the Mumbai Port Trust and JNPT, a Member of the 
"Empowered Committee for Transformation of Mumbai into a World Class City”. (Cf. Navimumbaisez, r23.09.2008) 
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cent focus on the energy sector, Mr Jain is more and more stepping out from behind Mr 
Ambani’s shadow. 
Cidco’s institutional geography 
Navi Mumbai’s developer Cidco has many roles to play. The institutional structure of 
the firm is immense and conveys a complex character between a bureaucratic public 
agency, a planning bureau, an engineering agency, several town management offices as 
well as a market driven entrepreneur. Not least there is also a strong traditional emphasis 
on technology and engineering. 
The board of directors is the highest body of management. It is appointed by the state 
government. The Vice Chairman and a Managing Director look after day-today man-
agement. The structure is supported by a team of joint managing directors, a chief ad-
ministrator (New Towns), the heads of various departments and the personnel from 
various technical and non-technical disciplines including officers, engineers and subordi-
nate staff. 
A glance at the list of Cidco’s departments385 reveals a list of 27 major branches: 1) 
Marketing386; 2) Information Technology & Special Projects; 3) Town Services & Real 
Estate; 4) Public Relations; 5) Social Facilities/Services; 6) Legal Matters; 7) Finance & 
Accounts; 8) Company Secretariat; 9) Engineering387; 10) Transportation & Communica-
tion; 11) Railway Project Division & New Town Projects; 11) Planning & Architecture; 
12) Special Economic Zones; 13) Lands & Survey388; 14) Unauthorised Constructions; 
15) Economic Planning; 16) Personnel, House Keeping, Security and Library etc.; 17) 
General Administration, Public Health; 18) Computerization; 19) Rehabilitation; 20) 
New Nagpur; 21) Vasai-Virar; 22) Oras; 23) Other areas; 24) New Aurangabad & 
Waluj; 25) New Nanded; 26) New Nashik; 27) Joint Registrar's Office.389  
The departments have evidently developed successively in time. Some cover functional 
and some geographic sectors. As impressive as they are, not all have the same relevance. 
The size of the sections reveals that traditionally a strong emphasis was put on engineer-
ing. Almost every fifth employee of Cidco comes from an engineering field. Out of the 
firm’s 2.200 employees more than 300 are postgraduate engineers while another are 60 
urban planners and architects.390 (Cf. Adusumilli 2001: 30) Indeed, Cidco’s engineering 
department acts almost like its own enterprise: including external consulting services and 
its own material-testing lab. Its significance is also reflected by the large amount of in-
formation on this department on the web page.391 
Goals – from social utopia to international knowledge city 
The original goals, maxims and visions of the respective authors of the New Town clus-
ter are an important prerequisite to understand the foundations of this planned city. For 
the makers involved in the conception of Navi Mumbai the project was much more than 
just a technical task. The comprehensive goals and deliverables also have a visionary 
face. Annapurna Shaw, one of the most comprehensive biographers of Navi Mumbai, 
                                               
385 Cf. http://Cidcoindia.com/Cidco/Deptandfunc.aspx; r02.10.2008 
386 Three sub departments 
387 Including horticulture and two additional sections for the Chief Engineer 
388 Including the ‘12.5 percent’ compensation strategies (cf. below) 
389 The numbers have been added by the author. 
390 As a matter of fact, today many senior planning and development experts have been lured away by the private develop-
ers of the new SEZs and Integrated Townships. Firms such as SKIL, Hiranandani and Reliance recruit much human capital 
from agencies such as Cidco and the Mumbai Metropolitan and Regional Development Corporation (MMRDA). (Cf. Personal 
Interview with a leading representative of MMRDA August 2006) 
391 A diagram of the institutional structure of SEZs can be found in IL&Fs 07: 11 
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confirms that: “The building of this counter magnet can be regarded as one of the most 
ambitious urban-planning projects undertaken in India...” (Shaw 2003: 5)  
The conception and design of the New Town cluster has many idealistic moments and 
high aims. Among others these are represented by Cidco’s declaration to create “Cities of 
the 21st Century”. (Cf. Cidcoindia.com; r23.09.2008) As in many other new city 
schemes, the makers of the new city dream of shaping a social utopia, rather than invent-
ing a dwelling machine. To implement this complex and long-term challenge, the stake-
holders drew on principles from the philosophical reasoning of Mahatma Gandhi392 to 
the functionalistic theories of modernism (Ibidem: 18). 
In summary, five major principles can be identified to be driving the imagination and 
generation of the new city: 1) By proposing Navi Mumbai its makers intended to provide 
a missing puzzle stone to harmonize the existing urban fabric of Mumbai. They aimed to 
achieve this goal by the decentralisation of housing and jobs, as well as by comprehensive 
measures of urban design; 2) One of the most urgent (and also one of the most ambi-
tious) goals has been the solution of the housing problem, both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively; 3) The authors of Navi Mumbai dreamt of creating an equal city and; 4) They 
sought to achieve this by the means of modern planning principles while; 5) Most recent 
fantasies on the new city are inspired by imagining Navi Mumbai as an international 
knowledge city. 
Decentralisation and a nested strategy of urban design and regional planning 
Back in the 1960’s the group around the architects Charles Correa, Shirish Patel and 
Pravina Mehta carved out the idea of a new city as a twofold solution. Navi Mumbai 
was meant to become a) a mechanism to decongest Mumbai, and at the same time, b) a 
manoeuvre to solve the economic problems of Maharashtra.393 
Notably the strategy regarded urban design as an integral part of regional planning. 
Accordingly Correa stated: “The inter-relation of city and region is crucial and it is essen-
tial that regional planning be undertaken simultaneously with that of the individual 
city... the whole is an interconnected and interdependent system.” (1997 (1965): 318). 
Consequently, Navi Mumbai was intended to be a puzzle stone completing the whole 
and leading to a harmonious region. The move was “crucial to the prosperity of Ma-
harashtra.“394 (Correa 1997 (1965): 314)  
The thinking of the three young building experts was obviously focused around the 
generation of urban space. They designed a network of grandesque public spaces, both 
on the mainland and on the peninsula. The empty void of the bay was to become the 
authentic centre of the new urban organism. (Cf. below Urban Design) In spite of that, 
from a more practical point of view, decentralisation was the driving concept. In this 
context Correa assured that: “A major new urban centre on the mainland across the har-
bour would create this kind of pivot from which the energy of this city could spread out 
across the rest of the state.” And also that: “...strong counter magnets are needed if we 
are to draw away the hordes of immigrants...” (1997 (1995): 317). He also concluded 
that  “... This new centre would open up the entire region all the way to Poona.” 
(Ibidem: 322). 
                                               
392 The goal has been to create a city based on Gandhian principles of swavalamban (self-reliance) and swatantrya (self-
motivation and mutual self-help). (Ganguli 1973, discussed by Ananthakrishnan 97: 12) 
393 Although the main objective of the design of Navi Mumbai was to create a self-sufficient urban environment, it also 
hoped to improve the quality of life of Bombay and well beyond. (Cf. Cidco, 1973: 10) 
394 The fact that the Bombay Metropolitan Planning Authority’s as well as Maharashtra’s Industrial Development Corporation 
were founded at the same time along Cidco, underlines these more holistic goals from the perspective of the state govern-
ment. 
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Decentralisation was important in two aspects, for housing as well as for economic 
development. The plan sought to direct the coming tides of new urban migrants, as much 
as it wanted to lure populations away from the island city. In addition the planners in-
tended to initiate a state-wide Industrial Location Policy that was supposed to facilitate a 
balanced development of urban centres in the hinterland.  
Houses, houses, houses 
Creating sufficient dwellings for the growing population was another central issue among 
the major maxims. “Of all of the problems we face, the most crucial concerns popula-
tion.“ (Correa 1965: 317) “... while the population [of Bombay] has tripled since 1964, 
the squatters have gone up more than fifteen-fold! And yet we still do nothing – or pre-
cious little.” (Ibidem: 314) Correa and his peers used projections that 70 percent of the 
state’s population (i.e. 630 million) would seek to live in urban communities. Navi 
Mumbai was supposed to accommodate 2 million in 400.000 houses. (Cidco 1973) 
Yet, Cidco’s ambition was not only to produce a city without slums, but also to plot 
cheaper houses of better quality. The big challenge was that only a small part of the tar-
get populations could afford a house in the formal market. Cidco’s own calculations lo-
cated only 7 percent of the population above the affordability threshold. (Ananthakrish-
nan 1998: 8, cf. above: Population) 
Equality 
Navi Mumbai’s planners wanted to achieve more than to accommodate many poor resi-
dents. A third major target was the ideal of Navi Mumbai as a modern model city based 
in the principle of equality. Consequently, the makers of the New Town neither wanted 
to produce a camp-like dormitory town395 nor to reproduce the fragmented fabric of the 
traditional Indian cities.  
In contrast, a crucial link from equality to modernity was drawn. The new city was to 
be based on a balanced, symmetrical mix of ethnicities, castes, and incomes at a small 
scale. The fabric was supposed to be placed in a system of open public spaces with access 
to abundant infrastructure and services. The draft development plan of 1973 affirms this 
position when it states: “It is expected that this accommodation of residents from various 
social and income groups within the same physical area will not only make for a health-
ier environment, but will also ensure a uniform standard of social and physical infra-
structure and see that not one class of residents is better served than another." (Cidco 
1973: 17-18 from Ananthakrishnan: 13) It was clear that a modern open city was the 
ideal of Cidco’s planners. Indeed, the planners sought to actively produce this equal city 
through measures of physical planning.396 
It is important to recall in this context that there had been significant differences 
among the ideals of the Modern Architecture Research Group (MARG) around Correa 
and the socio-economic goals (and political constraints) of Cidco’s communal planners. 
There is no question that both of these had strong ideological moments, as both sought 
to achieve social equality through physical design. Yet, while the MARG group was 
dreaming of a new urban identity anchored in a system of strong urban spaces, the public 
planners sought to achieve a less dramatic and subtle atmosphere of equality. While the 
first probably thought along the spatial lines of Kevin Lynch’s Image of the City, the sec-
ond referred to the Gandhian values of social equality (cf. Ananthakrishnan: 13).  
                                               
395 "Cidco is anxious that the new city develops its own identity as quickly as possible. It should contain its own jobs, shop-
ping, recreational and other social facilities and should not become a dormitory for Greater Bombay." (Cf. Cidco 1973: 17) 
396 From a more critical perspective it could be debated whether Navi Mumbai’s planners sought to be social engineers. 
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Yet, because Cidco’s quasi-public planners were the ones to implement the New 
Town, most of the monumental ideals, as formulated in the early schemes, have been 
lost.397 Yet, while academic critics deplore this, the ‘average’ residents highly praise the 
town’s safety and high quality of life.398 
Modern planning and the postcolonial quest for identity 
Based on its marriage to the imaginary of an equal society, the ideal of modernity has to 
be named as the fourth omnipresent ideological motive for Navi Mumbai. It seems that 
postcolonial states tend to lean towards enlightened modernity (as much as to strong 
governments). Possible reasons for this tendency are to be found among the general quest 
for identity in a postcolonial tabula rasa setting. 399  In this situation the return to tradi-
tional pre-colonial circumstances is not an option and modernity appears as the sole con-
clusion.400 Not least, and maybe most importantly, modernity can be correlated with a 
strong state that is based on (or, as in India, seeks to be based on) an industrial system of 
production. 
Indeed in this framework it is possible to trace Navi Mumbai along the codes of mod-
ern planning and design (all very different from a traditional urban location): as a nested 
order of nodes, sectors and blocks and hierarchically arranged state-of-the-art infrastruc-
tural systems.401 In this context Navi Mumbai can be better understood from the perspec-
tive of enlightened modernity and rational positivist ideology.402 This perspective regards 
the problem of the city as a set of variables that can be analysed and technically solved. 
At the same time the process of specialised planning is divided up among various experts. 
As a consequence the various urban decisions are the product of economists, engineers, 
architects, health authorities and public administrators. (Cf. TECS: 1999) The downside 
of this approach naturally is a loss of individuality, indigenous culture, small-scale spatial 
coherence, etc. 
Knowledge city in a global business scenario 
In addition to the four major planning ideologies as described above, recently a fifth role 
model has entered the horizon of the emerging place. Navi Mumbai is increasingly imag-
ined as a world-class knowledge city. Indeed, this new objective is strongly related to a 
general transition from an industrial to a service oriented society. While Mumbai increas-
ingly competes with Delhi’s Capital Region, Bangalore, Chennai or Hyderabad, Navi 
Mumbai’s contemporary authors are imagining the place as a base of global production 
and consumption networks, in particular geared to information production and various 
business process outsourcing services (BPO’s). Consequently the city is conceived as the 
starting point of a new ‘knowledge corridor’ towards Pune.403 
                                               
397 Significantly critique and disappointment of what has been achieved is strongest among architects and aesthetically 
oriented engineers. Today Shirish Patel, one of the three members of the initial concept group estimates that the achieve-
ments of the city deserve a maximum of 3 out of 10 possible points. (Cf. personal interview in August 2007) 
398 Cf. Personal interview with former chief planner of Cidco, who still resides in Navi Mumbai in August 2006; Cf. also 
Cidco’s Social Survey of 2005.  
399 A detailed discussion of the factors linking post-colonial conditions and modernity extends the scope of this work (cf. 
King 2004, Kusno 2000). However, the two other cases which are part of this research confirm the observation. 
400 A more pragmatic reason for the prominence of modern ideals can be associated with the increasing western-based 
education of elites (including planners and architects). 
401 Significant for a modern scheme, the infrastructure (and public spaces) was planned first. Driven by the requirements of 
motorised traffic and modern mass transport, different transport arteries were designed for various modes. In addition, the 
new town’s land has been zoned along modern parameters of land use, such as industrial, commercial, recreational, institu-
tional and residential types. Not least a significant amount of space has been reserved for common purposes such as town 
squares, parks, schools, hospitals, restaurants, entertainment places etc. 
402 Indeed, while this is a general critique of modernism, it is also valid for our object of study. 
403 The area is listed as one of the 17 most dynamically growing corridors of India. (Cf. Cushman and Wakefield 2007; Cf. 
above; India; Regional context) 
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The fundamental transformation was prepared by the installation of large IT technol-
ogy incubator parks at Vashi’s and Belapur’s railway stations. Today it is marked by the 
advent of privately developed IT parks, such as the Dhirubhai Ambani Knowledge City 
or the Millennium Technology Park (cf. above: Infrastructure). Clearly the planned SEZ 
projects and integrated township schemes also represent this moment.  
The image of contemporary Navi Mumbai is largely shaped by a “global business sce-
nario”. In this context Cidco’s former chairman Anil Kumar lakhina delineates the desire 
of installing world-class spaces in the Navi Mumbai area as follows: “Our own Shenzhen 
or Jebel Ali will be on Indian soil with international systems.“ (Padmanabhan, In: India 
Times 2002) A further statement on the website of Navimumbai.com, a local informa-
tion and business networking website says: “We can work towards strengthening the role 
of Navi Mumbai as a secure and avant-garde services back office for the world’s process 
and service needs. The BPO industry continues to strengthen the world economies by 
translating their investments in operations into a profitable enterprise.” 
(www.navimumbai.com; r.03.10.2008) 
After all, on the ground, these global business paradigms lead to a significantly differ-
ent spatial language than the representations of the early modernistic times. Now Iconic 
landmark shapes, themed worlds and architecture of symbolic exchange, are on the rise. 
Development strategy, delivery 
Implementation strategy 
The above section demonstrated that Navi Mumbai emerged in an idealistic modern con-
text; this framework is not sufficient to produce a successful project. Consequently, the 
next step is now to delineate the strategies (and the specific innovations behind) by which 
the new city has been implemented. The Navi Mumbai project has been an experimental 
field for new approaches in physical planning, land assembly, public-private partner-
ships, the provision of services, maintenance of properties by resident associations (con-
dominiums, co-operatives) and public-public partnerships. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001: 21) 
The success of the New Town cluster can be mainly related to four crucial elements: 
1) exclusive land rights; 2) an initial land bank; 3) the hybrid structure of the developing 
enterprise; 3a) as a market oriented undertaking with limited liability; 3b) as a state con-
trolled agency and pilot project; and 4) the utilisation of cross-subsidies and revolving 
fund principles. 
Probably the most important element of Navi Mumbai’s development strategy is the 
fact the developer was granted exclusive rights to develop the land. This fact has largely 
facilitated the financial, infrastructural and strategic urban planning of the area. Yet, it is 
important to note that the entire land was not donated to the developer at once. The 
state has only provided a minor area404 on a loan basis to initiate the development proc-
ess.405 In this way Cidco, the developer, was compelled to operate along a revolving fund 
principle. Sufficient profits had to be generated as a prerequisite to develop the next de-
velopment area.406 
The hybrid set-up of the developing agency, as public-private company, was a major 
asset of Navi Mumbai’s success. In contrast to other New Town projects elsewhere in 
India, and other parts of the world, for example some new capital cities, Cidco has not 
                                               
404 Several sectors of the Vashi node 
405 Cidco started in 1972 with a seed capital of 40 million Rupiah plus land as resource. (Cf. below: Finance) 
406 An important detail to note is that all the land in Navi Mumbai is handled on a 60-year lease basis. This is the case with 
land provided by the state government to Cidco, as well as with land developed by Cidco that is transferred to housing 
societies and co-operatives. (www.cidcoindia.com, r21.03.2008) 
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obtained many direct financial resources. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001: 29) The fact that the 
agency was set up as a company with limited liability has helped to eliminate most of the 
drawbacks of public agencies, such as a bureaucratic water head, corruption, inflexibility 
to change, economic inefficiency, etc. As the agency was compelled to market principles 
the cost and time efficiency of the undertaking was largely streamlined.  
A win-sin situation emerged. While the semi-privatisation has also helped to decen-
tralise the political (and economic) risk for the state at a low price, the entrepreneur’s 
legal and economic risks were also reduced as Cidco remained in the hands of the state 
government. The fact that Navi Mumbai had the status of an official pilot project helped 
to streamline legal processes, to obtain permits on a fast track, and to cut through the red 
tape. In addition old boy networks and the cosmos of other public agencies could be di-
rectly accessed. 
Cidco’s Robin Hood strategy – elaborate cross-subsidies  
The necessity to generate revenues from some profitable undertakings in order to sponsor 
less profitable sub-projects has initiated several innovative strategies in Navi Mumbai. 
Seemingly these innovations are linked to the combination of Cidco’s public mission to 
develop housing and infrastructure and the market’s profit constraint. In this distinctive 
context Cidco became a master of developing innovative strategies for the redistribution 
of incomes. 
Cidco’s strategy, which can also be dubbed ‘Robin Hood strategy’, implies that the 
developing agency is selling a certain amount of land at market price and subsidises other 
less profitable elements of a project with that amount. So far the two most interesting 
applications of the strategy have been: A) the development of railway infrastructure with 
cross-subsidies from the development of space above railway stations407, and B) the de-
velopment of low income housing by using the instrument of differential land pricing. 
The initial implementation strategy 
Immediately after Cidco was installed as the central development agency for the New 
Town cluster the developer started drafting his own development plan for Navi Mumbai 
in 1973.408 In seeking to “...reduce the growth rate of population in greater Bombay by 
creating an attractive urban area on the land across the Bombay harbour” (Cidco 1973: 
10) the plan accentuates decentralisation as the foremost objective of the project. 
The implementation strategy worked along 5 important components (cf. Ghorpade re-
ferring to Cidco 1973): 
- The shift of traffic-intensive wholesale activities to Navi Mumbai; 
- The creation of positive synergies with the existing industrial areas, the Nhava 
Sheva Sea Port, the ONGC offshore base at Nhava and the two municipal 
councils of Panvel and Uran; 
- The transfer of the Mantralaya (Secretariat) and public sector offices to the 
New Town cluster; 
- The development of Navi Mumbai’s nodes as autonomous growth centres; 
- The implementation of integrated transportation corridors of both road and 
railway systems. 
                                               
407 Navi Mumbai’s railways were built at 65 percent of the cost, because the airspace of railway stations and often also the 
vicinity (Vashi, Kharghar, Belapur) was commercially developed. In addition, 16 percent of land sale at market price has 
generated 75 percent internal revenues, making the Navi Mumbai project fully self-financed. (Cf. Cidcoindia.com; 
r12.09.2008) 
408 The Government in 1979 approved the plan. 
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These elements assert that Navi Mumbai was never planned to become a dormitory 
town. Even if housing and infrastructure remained central elements, the development 
strategy was mainly aimed at the generation of a sustainable economic base and suffi-
cient employment opportunities. 
The change of traffic intensive wholesale activities from Mumbai to the New Town 
cluster (1) was a central (and successful) part of the decentralisation strategy. In addition, 
the proximity to large industrial areas was seen as an important asset (2). Nevertheless, it 
was clear that a major amount of Navi Mumbai’s jobs would be white-collar jobs.409 
Accordingly it was planned to shift a large share of government jobs (e.g. the Mantra-
laya) from the island city to the New Town (3).410 Yet, unfortunately the goal of found-
ing the New Town on the public sector411 never succeeded, as the state government 
stayed averse to make this crucial move. 
After these initial strategic cornerstones were established, Cidco planned to develop 
the new city for a target population of 2 million in the form of a series of independent 
nodes of 400 – 600 hectares for 50.000 to 200.000 people (4), with ample infrastruc-
ture412 and services (including bicycle paths) and a particular emphasis on housing for the 
poor. In addition the nodes were to be integrated by state of the art transportation arter-
ies (5). (Cf. above: Structure, cf. Shaw 2003: 83) 
Housing strategy – integrated, equal and social 
While economic development was handled as the foundation of Navi Mumbai’s planning 
strategy, housing obviously remained central to the project. After all, decentralisation, 
not only of industries but also of people was one of the major motives of the new city on 
the main land. While Navi Mumbai was intended to become a base for several million 
livelihoods, these livelihoods had to be planned and organised along clear principles. In 
this context the state government and Cidco developed goals.  
In seeking to develop Navi Mumbai as one of India’s lighthouse projects, an ambi-
tious shelter policy, intending to develop the first slum free city of India, was drafted. 
This policy consisted of three major ingredients. It sought to develop housing: 1) in an 
integrated manner, as a complete package of infrastructure and facilities needed; 2) for a 
mix of population groups, independent of ethnicity, class or income and; 3) with a par-
ticular emphasis on dwellings for LIC and EWS populations. 
Uma Adusumilli confirms that: “The strategy adopted by Cidco was to first build 
composite housing schemes for all income groups and also the necessary social facilities 
such as schools, hospitals, fire stations, police stations, gardens, shopping, community 
centres, electrical and telephone facilities, sewage treatment plants, ground and elevated 
water reservoirs and also reserve plots for religious and other cultural amenities.” 
(Adusumilli 2001) 
Yet, Cidco never intended to develop all the necessary housing on its own.413 A great 
emphasis was put on the development of best practices and the replicability of the 
schemes. The projects were intended to serve as lighthouse projects attracting further 
                                               
409 115.000 planned jobs in the industrial sector stand against 825.000 administrative jobs in the white-collar sector. 
410 „...critical to the success of this operation was the tacit agreement on the part of the state government to shift the bulk 
of its offices from the central business district on the southern tip of Mumbai Island to Navi Mumbai.“ (Cf. Shaw 2003: 84) 
411 as it was done in many newly planned capital cities in India and the world (e.g. Brasilia, Islamabad, Chandigarh, Gandhi-
nagar) 
412 Indeed, today this ‘smart’ approach of combining ‘location with infrastructure’ was taken up by the developers of private 
Integrated Townships and the like. (Cf. above: Hiranandani Palace Gardens) 
413 In the watershed project of the Sector 26 DRS Scheme Cidco has essentially experimented with the outsourcing of pro-
ject parts to external project management consultants, architects and developers. According to Adusumilli (2001:10) this 
practice was novel for Indian standards. Young architects and famous offices participated in a design competition for 
10.000 housing units in 1988, which yielded innovative schemes. 
Navi Mumbai   289 
projects of the private sector. Raje 2001 describes: “...rather than constructing high-rise 
tenements Cidco decided to build a certain amount of innovative public housing, as a 
demonstration of what the city fabric should be like and as a model for further growth.” 
Not least, the performance of the composite housing schemes was based by the organisa-
tion of the respective dwellers in resident associations, condominiums and cooperative 
societies.414 (Cf. above: Population; Resident Associations) 
The 1973 Draft Development Plan provided that housing for all groups should be 
equal and every node should be a mix of various populations. (Cf. Adusumilli 1993: 6) 
Accordingly, Cidco experimented with various distribution methods to prevent segrega-
tion among the respective linguistic, religious and economic lines.415 (Cf. Ananthakrish-
nan 1998: 16) A random distribution scheme worked on a first come first serve basis. In 
this context the allottees were chosen on the basis of a draw of lots. The first customers 
generally got to choose the location and floor of the apartment. (Ananthakrishnan 1998: 
11) 
Another general strategy to achieve a high amount of housing for low-income people 
was integrated in the general development plan. In this context one-third of the housing 
in New Bombay was devised as site-and-service plots. This share was equal to the pro-
portion of Mumbai’s slum population at that time. (Cidco 1973:17-18, Ananthakrishnan 
1998: 9,12) 
Likewise, in order to reach the stated targets and benchmarks for low income housing, 
Cidco also developed ground-breaking pricing strategies, cross subsidising low income 
projects with excess charges from medium and higher income projects. In this context a 
maximum surcharge of 15 percent was established for medium and higher income hous-
ing ‘products’. The LIC and EWS projects, such as the above-mentioned BUDP site-and-
service scheme, were subsidised at a maximum amount of 45 percent (Cidco, 1973 
quoted by Ananthakrishnan 1998: 9). This means that only 25 to 50 percent of the Re-
serve Price for land for EWS/LIG houses was charged (Adusumilli 2001: 22). In most 
cases plots for higher income groups were provided at locations with higher market po-
tential, for example at the periphery of the block “thereby making the subsidies on plots 
for EWS economically viable“ (Adusumilli 2001: 22). 
Despite this rich history of experiences, the future of Cidco as a provider of public 
housing looks rather bleak. Since the early 1990’s no further commitment towards the 
provision of targeted housing schemes for the poor was made. While this fact can princi-
pally be related to a greater macro framework of housing finance shifting from the sup-
ply side to the demand side, no real solution for the no-income population segments 
(EWG’s) seems to be in sight. 
Unfortunately, various efforts to engage the private sector in provision of LIC housing 
by offering them large plots to develop did not succeed.416 So today only the plots allot-
ted to the villagers as part of the compensation packages are able to produce housing for 
low-income groups. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001, 27) 
Moreover the problem of informal settlements has always been repressed. Cidco never 
had a policy of enumerating, declaring and addressing the problem of informal settle-
ments within its own vicinity. Since most of the slums are situated in the developed parts 
                                               
414 Adusumilli (2001: 10) describes this as one of the great innovations in the development of Navi Mumbai’s housing 
schemes. 
415 It has to be noted that this approach did not bear the expected results. Ananthakrishnan 1998 demonstrates how Navi 
Mumbai’s sectors are increasingly segregated along ethnic and economic lines. 
416 Cidco attempted to allocate large tracts of land (50 to 200 hectares) for development by the private sector by offering 
liberal payment and development conditions. In return, 25 percent of the land was to be reserved for LIG. But this clause 
discouraged prospective developers. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001: 24) 
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of Navi Mumbai, the problem has been delegated to the Navi Mumbai Municipal Cor-
poration. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001: 25) 
Strategies to prevent land speculation 
A further important lesson the Navi Mumbai experience offers is the hitherto successful 
prevention of large-scale land speculation. In contrast to other new urban schemes in 
many urban peripheries worldwide (cf. to the Jakarta example), Navi Mumbai has very 
successfully prevented land speculation on a large scale, such as the emergence of land 
bank. The developers combined several strategies to preclude an immoderate consump-
tion of space while the sale of subsidised housing on the free market was prohibited. Fur-
thermore the sale of publicly assisted apartments has to be delegated to Cidco, while the 
original owners have to face high transaction costs. 
As far as plots are concerned they are only leased with strict development obligations. 
Developers have to finalise the construction within a specified time frame and with 50 
percent of the permissible construction on the land. Penalties in the form of additional 
levies are imposed for those who haven’t conformed to the rules. Additionally, all plots 
leased by Cidco are not permitted to be re-sold in a vacant form. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001: 
27) The developers of current SEZ are also bound to the rigid implementation rules. 
They have to pass these rules on to all sub-contractors. 
History of strategies and goals (changing borderline between public and private) 
An interesting and distinctive feature of contemporary Navi Mumbai is the fact that the 
city exists in the condition of being between a permanent construction site and a historic 
city. While today less than half of the project has been completed, the existing urban 
landscape brings to the fore 45 years history of concepts, ideas and paradigms, as well as 
failures and also first ruins. According to Charles Correa, one of the conceptual fathers 
of the New Town, the scheme started slowly, took off, collapsed and is now reviving. 
(Cf. Personal interview with Charles Correa, August 2006.)  
Navi Mumbai’s respective development policies, the plans, and its architectural forms 
reflect macro trends and micro events of almost 5 decades. A main moment that emerges 
in the chronologic perspective is advancing privatisation. Various examples demonstrate 
the scope of changing paradigms and stakeholder constellations. While Vashi’s CRS 
housing schemes, or its International Technology Park, portray a publicly driven plan-
ning approach, Kharghar’s Spaghetti Housing Scheme, the 18 hole golf course, or most 
recently the Kharghar Hill Plateau Theme Park cum residential project, point to an in-
creasing leaning towards private urbanisation. In this context the following section seeks 
to draw an overview of the transition from the publicly driven and centrally oriented 
development policies of the 1960’s to the increasingly privately driven policies of recent 
times up to the recent era of speculation and volatility. 
The 60’s – the golden age of state planning 
Combine with NM milestones above? 
Navi Mumbai’s planning and implementation phase is marked by a strong alliance of 
visionary urban design, planning disciplines and centrally oriented development policies. 
The 1950’s and 1960’s represent an area when planners felt invincible. It seems that 
architects and planners had a ‘godlike’ status.417 This was the epoch when Navi Mumbai 
was born on the sketch board of two young architects and one engineer. Charles Correa, 
Pravina Mehta, and Shirish Patel published the project in the 18th volume of the architec-
                                               
417 Le Corbusier had designed Chandigarh (1953), Oscar Niemeyer Brasilia (1960), Constantinos Doxiadis employed more 
than 700 hundred associates to design Islamabad and many other New Cities worldwide. In his urbanistic concept of the 
Dynapolis (1968) planning was basically regarded as means of pacifying the globe. 
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tural and art journal MARG in 1965. The early concept regards the New Town as a civic 
endeavour.  For the architects and planners Navi Mumbai was mainly a structural 
idea.418 The architects have pursued a strategy of place-based design, based on the char-
acteristics of the local culture and the respective environment.  
It is important to note that private stakeholders and businesses were also integrated, 
however in a different way than today. In the first planned nodes Ulwe (and Vashi) 
Correa drew the line between private and public at the boundaries of the lot. His plan for 
Ulwe sought to allow small investors to develop individual sites within a set of controls. 
Emphasis was put on affordability, replicability, and optimal density. 
 Illustration C-26: Design of Ulwe node 
In parallel, the 1950’s and 1960’s were also characterised by a strong ‘public hand’ and 
an omnipotent planning discipline. Planning and development were essentially extended 
arms of the government and in this context in 1967 the Mumbai Economic Development 
Council (MEDC) called for a strong New Town Development Authority to erect Navi 
Mumbai’s entire stock of social housing.419 Still, the issue of privatisation has always 
been highly debated. Therefore it seems only a logical step that Cidco was installed as a 
state owned planner and developer to implement these goals. And significantly in the 
1970’s the organisation included an army of 400 engineers, 25 planners and 10 archi-
tects. (Cf. Interview with Dinkar P. Samand; former chief planner of Cidco; Navi Mum-
bai; August 2006) 
Therefore, between the lines the early concepts have also prepared the ground for 
market driven mechanisms: it was ascertained that the New Town should also be eco-
nomically self-sufficient, while the mechanism of a revolving fund became a significant 
part of this strategy. 
"There is no reason why our New Towns should not become an equally paying 
proposition, if sufficient money is raised for the initial investment. The return therefore 
could be used as a revolving fund for undertaking further development.” (MEDC 1967, 
63, 76; from Shaw 2003: 76) 
This pivotal role of the government has already been affirmed by the first conceptual 
ideas. While industrial relocation played a leading role, more so did the relocation of 
public sector facilities. (Cf. above implementation strategies 1. and 2.) Correa, Patel and 
Mehta reaffirmed, in the famous 1965 issue in the MARG Magazine on the concept of 
Navi Mumbai, that the success of the New Town depends on the government’s decision 
to move eastwards: "It is obvious that to Bombay the importance of the second centre 
can be assured if government undertakes to participate actively by moving its offices 
there and creating a new capital for the State.”420 (Cf. Correa 1997 (65): 326; cf. below: 
Planners and Architects) 
The 1970’s – era of physical planning 
V.N. Phatak, former chief planner of MMRDA, calls the 70’s “the era of physical plan-
ning” (Personal Interview in August 2006). At that time Navi Mumbai was built as a 
                                               
418 Charles Correa states: “Planning it about size & structure ... All I could do was to devise a structure plan.” (Cf. Personal 
Interview in August 2006) 
419 ”... social housing can be brought about if the entire housing is put up by the New Town Development Authority.” (Cf. 
MEDC 1967: 21, quoted in Shaw 75) 
420 When after five years it became clear that the Government would move to Nariman Point in South Mumbai, Shirish Patel, 
one of the authors of the Navi Mumbai, demonstratively left the consulting team, because he was desperate about the lack 
of public commitment. (Cf. Personal Interview with S. Patel in August 2006: „...then it wasn‘t followed, there was no politi-
cal commitment“ – at the same time government started selling plots in South Mumbai...”) Ultimately only 1.200 of the 
70.000 government-office jobs have been shifted to Navi Mumbai (Engel 1991, 102; quoted in Shaw: 107). 
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modern and civilised city for the poor.421 This period of execution was predominantly 
marked by the implementation of the goals as formulated in the 1973 development strat-
egy.422 The strategy was “facilities and infrastructure first”. Almost no physical restric-
tions to growth existed and the agency started to fill the gigantic area with projects. In 
this context Cidco succeeded in attracting significant capital e.g. from the national rail-
ways, large industries and institutions, to build housing estates. Caps on the maximum 
size of developable lots restricted large-scale development. Yet, while the initial plan 
foresaw the withdrawal of Cidco as early as the 1980’s, Navi Mumbai’s growth picked 
up at a much slower pace than expected. Among the major reasons was the decision of 
the government to stay in the centre city and to relocate to Nariman Point (cf. above). In 
addition, the construction of essential links to the mother city was delayed. 
80’s to late 90’s: gradual privatisation, property boom and crisis 
This unstable period was characterised by volatile land markets and massive financial 
sector reforms. The late 1980’s to the late 1990’s marked Cidco’s gradual transformation 
from a public housing agency to a quasi developer. During this period a growing share of 
projects was subcontracted to external designers and developers and more and more land 
was leased to private sector stakeholders and institutional developers. 
While the period between mid 80’s and early 90’s saw the biggest quantity of low-
income housing construction, the reverberations of the early 1990’s New Economic Pro-
gramme marked a watershed for Navi Mumbai’s progress (cf. above: Context, India). 
Public housing production was shifted from the supply side to the demand side. Conse-
quently Cidco’s sources of direct public funding, e.g. by HUDCO and the like, were dry-
ing up. This was reflected by a sharp decline of directly constructed public apartments. 
Since 1994 no new schemes for low-income (EWS) populations were taken up. (Cf. 
Adusumilli 2001: 30) 
Importantly, during this time the structure of Cidco was also drastically reformed 
along neo-liberal lines. A policy of maximising performance and efficiency introduced 
novel practices of risk minimisation such as subcontracting and improved (international) 
standards on management, monitoring and accountability. In this context Cidco’s part 
was generally boiled down to management and monitoring.423 (Cf. Adusumilli 2001: 25) 
A changing macro framework and the shifting policies were not without a major im-
pact on the physical features of the sites and the typologies of the buildings of that time. 
Significantly the main trend went towards an increasing size of developable areas and 
towards extended private boundaries. In addition a high volatility of land prices has sup-
ported a process of privatisation and the sale of large plots: When in the mid 1990’s 
Mumbai’s real estate market was boiling with the highest real estate prices in the 
                                               
421 It was realised along principles of enlightenment (modern architecture and planning) and Gandhi’s principles. (Cf. Anan-
thakrishnan: 13, cf. above: Goals) 
422 Self financed, catalytic land bank and revolving fund principle, social housing programmes, site and service schemes, and 
co-operative projects. 
423 Uma Adusumilli, a former chief planner of Cidco, gives an illustrative and detailed account of the changing strategies and 
paradigms by the case of the DRS project in Vashi’s Sector 26 (cf. above, DRS-project): “In 1987, the Board of Directors of 
Cidco, a fully owned company of the state government of Maharashtra, took a review of the houses constructed by Cidco 
over the previous 17 years and concluded that the organisation can be made much more effective.... It was then decided to 
adopt a different approach for delivering housing. Towards this end a) pre-qualified developers were invited to quote on 
turnkey basis with their own designs and layouts and b) eminent architects/planners invited to design other schemes... it was 
felt that the in-house professionals could concentrate on infrastructure development projects.... While the developer was to 
complete the construction and hand over the houses to Cidco for allotment to the registered eligible applicants, the archi-
tectural consultants were to bring the project up to the stage of tendered after which a contractor take up the construction 
under the supervision of the architect as well as the PMC. ...  It was expected that use of modern methods of monitoring 
such as CPM and PERT networks by PMCs would deliver better results. They were also to report financial and physical pro-
gress of work with reference to pre-fixed targets, review progress in view of time and cost parameters, and suggest im-
provements from time to time.” 
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world424, Cidco sought to jump on the band wagon by placing an increasing amount of 
land on the private market. In addition, when in 1996 land prices collapsed by up to 500 
percent425, large clusters of undeveloped lots of land were sold to bulk buyers.426 As a 
consequence the average size of developable lots increased steadily and grew to 50 hec-
tares and more (or 500.000 square metres, or 80 soccer fields). However, private and 
institutional developers mainly catered for the middle and upper classes. (Cf. Shaw 2004: 
45) 
Vashi, once more, serves as a good example of rising privatisation. The node experi-
enced a crucial turnaround in the mid 1990’s. When in 1992 the public commuter rail 
arrived at the node, land prices soared. The node that so far had been a showcase for 
public projects (cf. above) became a major target for private commercial and housing 
investments (Shaw 2004: 154). Moreover the prices in Vashi have increased so much that 
developers are trying to acquire the former Phase-1 social housing areas. (Cf. Shaban 
2006) 
Late 1990’s and 2000’s: Ongoing privatisation and internationalisation, Megapro-
jects, SEZ-era 
Navi Mumbai in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s reflects an ongoing drive towards large 
projects, flexibilisation and privatisation. Large autarkic enclaves, such as SEZs and Inte-
grated Townships, and new colossal infrastructure ventures, such as a new international 
airport and the Sewri-Nhava Sheva Sea Link mark this era of expanded international 
investments (cf. above: Context, economy). On the demand side the new projects are 
mainly geared towards affluent classes, on the supply side the schemes are developed by 
enormous consortiums. (Cf. above: Developers: NMSEZ) 
Significantly Cidco makes use of the momentum in leading the development of the 
Navi Mumbai SEZ, aligning its efforts with national and international developers. While 
the state of Maharashtra plays an important role as a facilitator in land acquisition, 
Cidco acts as an implementing agency (cf. above). While additional “SEZ-Township 
schemes”, notably the Maha Mumbai SEZ, emerge on gigantic amounts of land to the 
South and East of Navi Mumbai, the size of the recently planned nodes also increases: 
Kharghar, a new Ulwe and a new Dronagiri-SEZ are being developed on areas of 1.600 
to 2.500 ha for large populations of 350.000 to 450.000 respectively. These nodes are 
being developed almost entirely by the private sector.  
2005 – 2008 Speculation and volatility 
The period since 2005 is characterised by continuing speculation, up and downs of the 
markets and rising local resistance movements. Corporate strategies, including Cidco’s 
become more refined. No new project can be developed without environmental and so-
cial impact studies, compensation as well as resettlement schemes. 
At the same time a noteworthy counter-trend can be observed. While the size of new 
projects is growing steadily, the public impact appears to continue diminishing. Many of 
the large private developers (such as SKIL or Hiranandani) have head hunted key plan-
ning personnel (e.g. from Cidco) and now run their own large urban planning depart-
ments. Moreover the big private projects tend to be governed autonomously, while the 
urban management and administration in the new enclaves is privatised. (Cf. below: 
Maintenance, Operation) As a result developers enjoy an increasing political, economic, 
physical and creative freedom on their land. 
                                               
424 In 1996, office space in Mumbai became the most expensive in the world. (Nijman 2000, IPR 2002; from Weinstein 
2005: 18) 
425 Land prices in the node of Belapur fell from INR 50.000 per square metre to INR 10.000. (Cf. Shaw 2003) 
426 The German architectural journal Stadtbauwelt of 1997 on Navi Mumbai spreads an infernal scenario: it reports on 
peripheral ‘tristesse’, mediocre architecture, speculation ruins and devastated public spaces at the edge of Belapur. 
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However, after the real estate markets experienced tremendous new peaks in 2006 
and 2007427, prices collapsed in early 2008. The descent continued with the global finan-
cial crisis of September 2008. Experts are now calling for a reorientation of India’s real 
estate sector towards lower middle and lower income classes (LIG’s and MIC’s) along 
more successful models such as Mexico (The Economist 2008). 
Current times (Spring of 2009) are more volatile than ever. Native populations, or-
ganised by populist parties, continue to resist the commercialisation of the region on the 
mainland. They have reached the withdrawal of the state government from the second 
Maha Mumbai SEZ,428 while the initial site of this SEZ had to be halved.429 (Yet, the 
zone is still cited as the largest private SEZ in India.) 
In its own cosmos Cidco experiments with new demand based selling mechanisms. 
e.g. at the NRI-Phase II project at Kharghar a fresh Book-Building process of open bid-
ding.430 Flats in the Spaghetti Housing scheme are sold on a first-come-first-serve basis. 
(Cf. Cidcoindia.com; r23.09.2009) The developing authority’s private market behaviour 
is further accentuated by its own development of a Golf Course Project including a 5 star 
hotel next to the central Park in Kharghar, as well as by the new theme park-project of 
the Kharghar Hill Plateau. (Cf. above: Examples)  
In spite of this, crisis times regularly underline the essential role of the ‘public hand’, 
as the project of the Sewri-Nhava Sheva sea link demonstrates. (Cf. above: Infrastruc-
ture) Here the government had to pitch in and take over the development after the pro-
ject was caught in the power struggles of elite industrialists (e.g. the Ambani Brothers, cf. 
The Economist 2008). 
R&R (Rehabilitation and resettlement strategy) 
Cidco’s Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) schemes are among the outstanding ex-
periences Navi Mumbai has to offer to its national and international peers. During the 
project’s 45-year history Navi Mumbai’s developers have come up with increasingly re-
fined rehabilitation and resettlement strategies (R&Rs), addressing the needs of project-
affected populations (PAP’s). National decentralisation programmes leading to a rising 
impact of local politics as well a generally sensitised public have increasingly empowered 
Navi Mumbai’s rural residents.431 In this context questions of R&R have currently be-
come central to the success of the upcoming SEZ projects in the area. On the other hand 
the strategies resonate in the corporate responsibility portfolios of the private sector. 
Acquiring the necessary development land seemed a straightforward matter in the 
1970’s. At that time 47 percent of Navi Mumbai’s project area was already in the hands 
of the public. The remaining territory was predominantly composed of agricultural and 
village land belonging to 80 affected villages. In the course of the development process of 
                                               
427 Cf. above: Mumbai: real estate boom, for actual real estate quoting cf. also 
http://property.magicbricks.com/newproperty/locality/propertyrates-mum.html; r30.09.2008) 
428 How hot and prominent the issue of the Navi Mumbai SEZ currently is can be seen on Google: A search on “Navi Mum-
bai SEZ” performed on Oct.01.2008 revealed 177 articles only for the same month. 
429 ”Between 8 am and 5 pm on September 21, the Pen Tehsil was a theatre hosting a multidimensional drama. Villages 
bristled with activity and anticipation, anti and pro SEZ lobbies tried their best to outperform each other, modestly built 
government schools served as poll centres, and lush-green paddy fields mocked a claim made by the government that the 
land could not produce even fodder for the cattle. ... The Pen Tehsil in Konkan region kept its date with history on Sunday 
as it held India's first ever 'referendum' on whether villagers wanted to give up their land for a special economic zone. ... 
This was the first time such a public hearing and opinion poll was held over any large-scale land acquisition in India.” (Cf. 
The Economic Times 21 Sep, 2008: ”Low turnout spoils Mumbai SEZ; r.30.09.2008; cf. also to: Bunsha 2006, Gupta 2006) 
430 Article: “Cidco plays foul”, Mumbaipluses, 12.12.2007 
431 It can be observed that, in the course of the 4-decade project history, a specific bureaucratic terminology developed: local 
populations whose livelihoods are influenced by new projects are called project affected populations, or PAPs, and accord-
ingly compensation measures are usually referred to as rehabilitation and resettlement programmes, or R&Rs. Indeed, the 
emergence of that kind of jargon represents a growing specialisation and refinement of the matter, which is increasingly 
handled by external project consultants such as sociologists, risk mitigation experts, etc. 
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the New Town several strategies handling the PAP’s were applied.  While the residents of 
27 villages (or Gaothans) were completely removed to an outer area, the remaining 53 
villages were rehabilitated at the same place. 
Since Navi Mumbai was deemed a project of higher public interest, the state govern-
ment basically appropriated the agricultural land. The compensation at those initial 
stages was minimal. In the manoeuvres that were subject to the Land Acquisition Act of 
1894 only the current value of (agricultural) land was offset.432 
In contrast the Amendment of the Land Acquisition Act in 1984 dramatically changed 
the status of the local population. This Act made compensation and rehabilitation pro-
grammes mandatory. Cidco reacted by introducing the innovation of the ‘12,5 percent 
rule’. This regulation, foresaw that 12,5 of the land developed after 1986 would be re-
turned to the farmers. Yet, significantly the new policy was delayed and only imple-
mented in 1994.433 
Since then the R&R packages have constantly improved. As a result the schemes ac-
count for the few successful low income housing policies in place today (cf. Adusumilli 
2001: 24): A recent regulation retrospectively allocates a share of 8,75 percent of the 
land to the individual owners as serviced land and the villages are encouraged to resell 
the plots to developers for the purpose of developing low income housing. (Cf. personal 
interview with Cidco Planning staff in August 2006) In addition to the land, PAP’s also 
get priority job contracts (for example for landscaping and security services), educational 
and vocational training as well as increased FAR development rights.434 
Indeed, today the political context is so sensitised that no new major project is practi-
cable without extensive R&R incentives. Accordingly all SEZ and township developers 
regularly seek the advice of external experts. In this context, for example, a large Social 
Impact Assessment on the Maha Mumbai SEZ was done by the Tata Institute of Social 
Sciences for Sea King Infrastructure Limited in 2005. (Cf. Shaban 2005) The study rec-
ommends the upgrading of the village infrastructures, extensive job training as well as 
long-term employment programmes for the Project Affected Population. (Cf. Shaban 
2005: 9) 
R&R Strategy offered by the MMSEZ 
Facing fundamental resistance from the local populations, on February 19th 2007, the 
developers of the Maha Mumbai SEZ published their own comprehensive R&R proposi-
tion. Basically modelled along Cidco’s 12,5 percent scheme, the offer of the private con-
sortium tops the package offered by the state developer. Each affected household is of-
fered a job, plus 12,5 percent of the developed land and compensation for land at market 
rates. The first options can alternatively be supplemented by monetary payments. In ad-
dition, the MSEZ management offers special programmes to landless families and 
women, as well as INR 90 crores (900.000.000) on village rehabilitation programmes. 
(Cf. http://www.msez.in/rehabilitaion.html; r.03.10.2008) 
It is therefore not surprising that the large private developers seek to innovate and 
transform the burden of R&R into an advantage. As a result, the R&R tend to be inte-
grated into marketing programmes and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) packages. 
(Cf. below: Marketing, and http://www.msez.in/csr.html; r12.09.2008) 
                                               
432 While Cidco used to compensate INR 3.75 per square metre land to private owners, the populations today often demand 
market rates of INR 40 per square metre. (Cf. above: Population, Finance, Revenues; cf. also Shaban 2005) The immediate 
village territories had always been excluded from acquisition. (Cf. Shaw 2003) 
433 Importantly, as a result, a wealthy and powerful elite emerged in the villages and started to challenge the interests of the 
developers and the middle class residents, e.g. village representatives dominated Navi Mumbai’s municipal council in 2000. 
(Cf. Shaw 2003: 190, cf. above: Population: Preexisting) 
434 At Kharghar, for example, former villagers were granted an increased FAR of 1,5 to develop commercial areas under the 
12,5 percent scheme. (Cf. above: Examples) 
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Design – from contextualism to the Supermonument 
 
„Globalisation homogenises standards and management models. But it needs 
specialised economic capabilities.“ (Sassen 2007) 
“... the chase for a singular perspective of architecture (read style) is in con-
flict with the present era where belief is often inundated by exponential 
change. My designs are usually a direct response to the needs of the client. In 
this way believe I have developed an architectural approach that is respon-
sive to today's values and allow for a expressions in concert with contempo-
rary society.”  
Introduction planners, architects and designers 
Observing the factors as discussed above, namely Mumbai’s congestion, macro economic 
and political trends and successful predecessors, one could be tempted to regard Navi 
Mumbai as an inevitable development. Yet, it is also impressive to observe that the de-
velopment of this New Town is inevitably linked to the enthusiasm and the determina-
tion of certain individuals and groups. Consequently the next paragraph is devoted to the 
role of Navi Mumbai’s planners and designers. Indeed, these are the authors with the 
strongest ideals and with the most powerful impact on physical form and spatial organi-
sation. 
Architects, urban planners, engineers and landscape architects are among the stake-
holders acting on behalf of the developers, politicians and implementation agencies. 
Their job is to transform the combined goals, ideals and strategies into projects in space. 
Yet, while the designers are performing agents who give ideas a hand, the hand holding 
the pen also has its own determination and its own will. And these, consciously or not, 
find their way onto the physical schemes. 
Early strategies 
MARG 
Even if the idea of the New Town is deeply rooted in Mumbai’s planning history (cf. 
above: Milestones) the contribution of a group of three young individuals has been 
among the most important milestones for the new city. Charles Correa, Shirish Patel and 
Pravina Mehta have assembled and transformed the previously (more or less) dispersed 
ideas for the new magnet on the mainland into a set of visionary proposals.435  The archi-
tect (Correa), the urban planner (Mehta) and the engineer (Patel) have teamed up to form 
a think tank (cf. Correa 1997 (1965): 312). The condensed publication of the group’s 
visionary plans for Navi Mumbai in the June 1965 issue of the Arts Journal MARG436 
has led to a fundamental redirection of the regional development strategies of that time. 
The title of the issue was: “Bombay – Planning and Dreaming”, hence pointing to the 
importance of visions instead of technical codes. The publication presented a combined 
                                               
435 “We didn‘t invent it, a lot was already there” (Charles Correa in a personal interview in August 2006); “Charles and I 
looked at this.. and it was obvious...that Bombay should go eastwards... a bridge was under construction... port was being 
planned at Nhava Sheva... industries were already there... so we prepared a plan for a new city across the harbour”... “with 
Pravina Mehta we developed a plan for a second city on the main land, which would take the pressures of growth from 
Bombay...” (Shirish Patel in a personal interview in August 2006) 
436 MARG was established in 1946. It is the only magazine of its kind in India. While the name is an acronym of Modern 
Architecture Research Group, it also stands for the Sanskrit word of “path”. (Cf. http://www.marg-art.org; r3.09.2008) 
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set of views of politicians, planners and architects and culminated in the proposals for 
the visionary development of a parallel city.437 
When it decided in favour of the New Town in 1970 the Government of Maharashtra 
decided to hire all three authors. For 5 years (1970-1974) they became the principal 
planners for the new city and co-ordinated the work of a multi-disciplinary team of 
economists, sociologists, transportation, and city planners, architects and engineers. 
The team sought to solve the concepts of a holistic metropolitan development, decen-
tralisation, housing schemes and an urban design for the modern society (cf. above: 
Goals and paradigms) by means of urban design. The existing structure of Bombay, a 30-
degree wedge, was questioned, culminating in the visionary suggestion of a parallel 
city.438 In Correa’s eyes only a strong new focal point, a new centrality, would be able to 
establish a certain level of independence from the mother city: “This area would then 
develop into a new self-sufficient city whose continental contact and exchange with the 
older city would be primarily for social, cultural and commercial contact.“ (Correa 1997 
(1965): 322) 
Twin city on the sea 
The early visionary concepts of the new city were dominated by urban design. The disci-
pline served as the main generator of the city’s identity. Congruity was supposed to be 
generated from the features of the local place, such as topography, climate, existing land 
use patterns, flows, history etc. Accordingly, the MARG group’s most central idea was to 
develop a city on the water and to transform Bombay into a “twin-city on the sea”. (Cf. 
Correa 1997 (1965): 315) Correa imagined that the bay would become a new virtual 
centre, that much of the traffic would flow across the harbour, establishing a new East-
West axis in the metropolis. The plan proposed to create a series of magnificent public 
spaces at the seashores of both sides, enabling people to experience the situation.439 A 
historic place “Elephanta, and with it a sense of the past, would stand in the centre...” 
(Ibidem: 443). On a smaller scale the newly planned city was to get its own public void 
as well. This was represented by the circular transport line as well as the grandiose public 
promenade at the new public centre around Belapur. 
 Illustration C-27: MARGs conceptual drawings 
While the new city of Navi Mumbai was intended as a series of interconnected nodes (cf. 
above structure), it was of foremost importance to create an individual identity for each 
of the nodes. A strategy to attain this goal was to outsource the master plan design of the 
nodes to different consultants. This tactic however, has been only partially successful. Of 
the more prominent architects’ schemes, only that of Doshi’s Kharghar was implemented. 
Correa’s Ulwe became a victim of the coastal protection laws and had to be cancelled in 
1998. Only some model sectors in Vashi and a housing scheme in Belapur have been 
implemented by this architect. (Cf. above) 
                                               
437 The editorial states: “One of the problems facing civilisation today is the question of the growth of cities, such as Bom-
bay. This special issue of MARG presents the moot points of the Bombay Plan in the form of a tentative blueprint by a group 
of officials, architects, and town planners.” (Cf. http://www.marg-art.org/mVOL-18_3.html; r04.10.2008) 
438 Interestingly the team was opposed to the idea of a dispersed set of New Towns. Instead the image of a second, a paral-
lel city, was favoured. Correa noted accordingly: “If however [instead of several satellites] a single major centre is created on 
the mainland directly opposite Bombay, of equal prestige and importance, it could develop into an area as large as the city 
(Correa 1997 (1965): 322, Fig. 12). 
The early proposals proved visionary in demanding the development of a second cross thane bridge: Today the Sewri Nhava-
Sheva bridge is constructed at almost the same position that was proposed by Correa and his peers 40 years ago. (Cf. 
above: Infrastructure) Correa stated accordingly “... as development proceeds, the need will eventually be felt for more than 
one link between the mainland and the penninsula. The feasibility of a second bridge accross the harbor exists from Trom-
bay to Elephanta island and the mainland near the new doc area (Correa 1997 (1965): 331). 
439 Possibly the image of the twin city of Istanbul can be brought in here. 
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Indeed, after Cidco took over, the implementation of the new city urban design as a 
driving tool of urbanism lost momentum. The responsible planners justified the loss 
(rhetorically) by claiming to be developing a city for the common man. The urban design 
concept was accused of monumentality. This was declared incompatible with the social 
goal and even related to a Gandhian social ideology. (Cf. Ananthakrishnan: 12) 
In spite of that, from a more rational perspective, it can be assumed that MARG’s 
early design visions rather became the victim of the operational logic of a state run enter-
prise, constrained by bureaucratic rules, marked by the necessity of short term opera-
tional profits and dominated by a large base of pragmatic engineers. More generally 
Cidco’s framework was characterised by an increasing dominance of process over form. 
The development authority has impressively concentrated (and impressively innovated) 
on the neighbourhood scale and implemented a remarkable amount of large monumental 
infrastructure projects. At the same the (urban design) vision of a city based on a net-
work of public spaces on a metropolitan scale was lost and Cidco’s monumental infra-
structure projects evolved as rather isolated landmarks. 
Disciplines 
Architecture 
Navi Mumbai is the ground for many architectural landmark designs and innovations. 
To date the project has neither been produced exclusively by international design experts, 
nor at 100 percent by locals. In contrast, it has been (and it is) produced by hybrid teams 
or personalities, who combine both global as well as local expertise. 
Most of these better-known Indian architects have an international educational back-
ground. Charles Correa was educated in the US (University of Michigan; MIT). Shirish 
Patel is an affiliate of Cambridge University. Balkrishna Doshi was educated at the North 
London Polytechnic and at Corbusier’s office in Paris.440 
The wider range of architects and engineers at Cidco were educated at local schools 
and at Cidco.441 Indeed, when the developer started operations, it had been hard to find 
qualified staff with the knowledge of constructing modern buildings and applying mod-
ern technologies.442 
While some of the master planning schemes were carried out by foreign firms (e.g. 
McClier’s plan on the NMSEZ), most of the developers preferred to rely on the expertise 
of locals when it came to implementation (and more and more often also design). As a 
result, most of the architects, urban planners and designers working in Navi Mumbai are 
Indians. This is based on the sheer scope of the work, but also because Indian business 
ethics are fairly different.443 
In some of the more prestigious projects teams among foreign and local architects are 
formed in order to utilise both the name and technical ability of the foreign office. This is 
                                               
440 All of the renowned Indian architects involved in Navi Mumbai’s major projects – Correa, Patel, Hafeez – have done (or 
are doing) significant work abroad. ”We are now doing work all over the world. We are working in Dubai, we are doing 
work in Shanghai and there is more in the pipeline.” (Cf. Hafeez at Moneylife 2008) 
441 Cf. Personal interview with Cidco staff in August 2008 
442 Hafeez Contractor confirms “in 1988 there was a time in India when there was nothing like an office building and no-
body had designed an office building”. (Cf. Moneylife 2008) 
443 Cf. Hafeez Contractor in an Interview with Moneylife; 02.09.2008: “If you are working abroad the first thing the guy 
does is an agreement letter, sends it for confirmation and takes an advance before starting work. Here, when a guy comes 
and gives you a job you cannot talk about money, otherwise he thinks you are only interested in the fees and not the work. 
I just talk about work and after I have done the design one of my staff discusses the fees. So the work culture and ethics are 
different.” 
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in particular the case when innovative building typologies such as office towers, hotels or 
convention centres are explored.444 
In addition to the big names that were part of the early urban design schemes, several 
local architects have realised important projects in Navi Mumbai: Pheroze Kudianwalla 
has designed the Vashi and Belapur stations; the Dhirubhai Ambani Knowledge City and 
the Kharghar railway station stem from Ratan J. Batliboi. 
In 1997 the award winning and Delhi based office of Raj Rewal designed one of the 
most interesting housing projects, The Belapur Housing scheme totalling 40.000 square 
metres. It is made of a modular block masonry construction. The cluster housing project 
resembles the approach to European Structuralism of the 1960’s and 1970’s445 as well as 
Raj Rewal’s renowned Asia Games village housing from Delhi. The project consists of 
1.048 flats of 18 basic types. These have been arranged into 17 clustered buildings (cf. to 
the pictures). 
 Illustration C-28: Belapur Housing Project (Raj Rewal) 
Doshi’s post-Chandigarh approach 
While none of the three initial architects of Navi Mumbai were able to implement a node 
of their own, in 1992 Cidco hired Balkrishna Doshi446, another renowned Indian archi-
tect and designer, to draft the master plan for the Kharghar node. Doshi designed this 
along a strategy which he termed the post-Chandigarh approach. Today the township is 
an important showcase which experiments with a blend of the traditional public space 
approach of planning with various forms of privately driven urbanism. (Cf. above: ex-
amples) 
Example: Hafeez Contractor 
The most prominent contemporary architecture consultancy doing a magnitude of work 
in Navi Mumbai and the environs is the office of Hafeez Contractor. This office has de-
signed multiple housing schemes and the new Seawoods railway station complex for 
Cidco. It also participates in several of the privately developed schemes, such as the Hi-
ranandani Palace Gardens project (cf. above: Examples). Hafeez is a design factory with 
hundreds of associates, seamlessly producing spectacular architectural schemes that 
achieve the current ‘Zeitgeist’.447 
 Illustration C-29: Examples of Hafeez Contractor’s oevre in Navi Mumbai 
Engineering 
Navi Mumbai is too large to credit all the engineers involved in the project. However it 
must again be stressed that engineering is one of the most important disciplines in the 
                                               
444 Hafeez Contractor describes along the example of DFL, one of Inda’s largest developers, how Indian firms started to 
construct office buildings of international standards with the ‘help’ of international expertise: “DLF decided to take a trip 
abroad and took me along to see all office buildings - we went to London, Dubai, Canary Warf, we went everywhere. ... It is 
never a one-way street, especially when we are doing work of the kind that has never been done in India. For instance, if we 
are doing a Convention Centre, we had to take the help of a foreigner because they have done it before. I think we should 
not be afraid of doing that, but the next time we will do it ourselves.” 
445 For example by Aldo van Eyck or Herman Herzberger 
446 Doshi is known for his collaboration at Chandigarh and became one of the leading figures in Indian building and settle-
ments design. His Ahmedabad based Vastu Shilpa Foundation had designed an all India mass housing scheme for Cidco in 
1988. The office was working at the formulation of urban planning principles geared to the Indian context, negotiating 
between Chandigarh’s modernism on one side and ancient Indian planning traditions, such as the Shilpashashtra and Vas-
tupurusha, on the other. The master plan for Vidyadhar Nagar, an urban extension of Jaipur, served as a fundemental model 
case for Kharghar. (Cf. above: Predecessors) 
447 Hafeez Contractor, a self made man and one of the most successful contemporary Indian architects, has Columbia Uni-
versity degrees in architecture and urban design. His office has done more than 1.000 projects (Hafeez at Monelife 2008). 
The architect claims to realise 85 to 90 percent of all Hiranandani projects. Cf. 
http://www.indiabuildnet.com/arch/ahc_10.htm; r22.09.2008 
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whole scheme. This is so as Navi Mumbai is based on the extensive planning and imple-
mentation of infrastructure. Cidco’s in-house staff implemented most of the schools, 
railways, roads, bridges and water reservoirs. Indeed the share of engineers in the agency 
is enormous. Of the firm’s 2.200 employees more than 300 are postgraduate engineers 
and another 60 are urban planners and architects. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001: 30) 
Shirish Patel has designed two of the most impressive railways stations in Juinagar 
and Nerul, as well as an award-winning footbridge at Juinagar. His office SPA448 has also 
implemented the Belapur Housing cluster scheme for Raj Rewal at Belapur (see above: 
Form, Infrastructure). 
Landscaping 
Landscaping seems to be playing a ‘normal’ role among Navi Mumbai’s design disci-
plines . While it does not appear to be the secret ‘super discipline’ as in Bumi Serpong 
Damai, a closer look reveals a rising significance. A total of almost 60 percent of land in 
various townships of Navi Mumbai, reserved for parks, gardens, green belts, open areas, 
non development zones and reforestation measures (cf. TECS 2001: 100), requires care-
ful design and maintenance operations. 
Cidco is responsible for most parts of the area. More than 2 million trees have been 
planted. Examples can be found on many scales: the calm interior zones of many of the 
superblocks and sectors developed by Cidco (cf. above DRS) are largely maintained by 
the cooperatives and resident associations; the luxury landscaping at Seawoods Estates 
stands out as a design feature; the recent redesign of Palmbeach Marg recreated as an 
important landmark boulevard; the newly planned central park at Kharghar aims at rec-
reating the success of London’s Hyde Park or Manhattan’s Central Park. Moreover, the 
18-hole golf course at the same node seeks to be an important ‘green enterprise’ and im-
age generating upscale project. (Cf. Cidcoindia; r12.09.2008) Not least, the new Khar-
ghar Hill Plateau project is going to take advantage of the picturesque natural location of 
the Kharghar hills for a luxury themepark cum residential development. Significantly the 
project uses eco theming and branding strategies while at the same time it carves into a 
natural forest reserve area. (Cf. also the Genesis and Burle Marx projects at Alphaville) 
Contemporary trends in design 
From self-construction to subcontracting 
Initially Cidco was designing and implementing almost all projects with its own design 
team. Little by little this approach has shifted towards subcontracting and outsourcing to 
architectural consultancies, as well as to turnkey developers. An important watershed 
project in this regard was the CRS housing scheme in Vashi (cf. above. Examples). 
From competitions to direct commissions 
Today it can be observed that the role of designers and planners is increasingly chang-
ing. Back in the 1980’s and 1990’s Cidco supported the idea of architectural competi-
tions as a mechanism to foster innovation and augment the diversity of options. (Cf. 
above: CRS scheme at Vashi) Today, in contrast, more and more design consultants are 
directly appointed. The most important broad trend is that master plans are dominated 
by business plans and that business consultancies are take the organisational lead. 
                                               
448 Since 1970 Shirish Patel runs a cooperative office with several partners named SPA Shirish Patel Associates. 
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From holistic design to a diversified group of consultants 
Indeed, today, urban planning and design are not at the head of the planning process (as 
was the case in the planning era of the 1960’s and 1970’s). They have become one of the 
subordinated, executing disciplines. Today financial experts and economic consultancies 
set strategies and development scenarios and lead the urban development process. Feasi-
bility and implementation studies prepare the ground for the internationalisation of the 
project’s design standards. In this context: “The master plan or development plan for the 
proposed Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is a planning tool, which is based on the broad 
objective of developing first world infrastructure facilities in a third world environment“ 
(TECS 2001: 82). 
The design (and implementation) for large real estate schemes, such as the SEZs, has 
long since become a part of comprehensive development packages. These are outsourced 
to consortia of international financial experts, urban planners and developers, etc., who 
feature extensive experience with international financing, business operations and 
‘world-class’ standards. In this context the business consultants of Tata Economic Con-
sultancy Services prepared the feasibility studies, business strategies and financial mecha-
nisms of the NMSEZ (cf. TECS 2001). The business plan was drafted by the consultancy 
of Ernst & Young (formerly Arthur Andersen).449 
Moreover, international consultancies have played a significant role in drafting the 
planning documents for the Navi Mumbai SEZ. A consortium of the US American design 
consultancy of McClier prepared the master plan.450 In addition, Jurong Township Cor-
poration (JTC), a state owned consultancy from Singapore, and the US American infra-
structure specialists of Parsons & Brinckerhoff were appointed as project management 
consultants and have financial stakes in the project (cf. The Hindu March 28, 2004). 
 Illustration C-30: Ad “If you want to plan a new city for ...” 
From monument to ‘supermonument’ 
Interestingly, at the same moment when the schemes are more and more detached from 
the ideals of ‘placemaking’, there is also a déjà-vu experience with the urban monument. 
The recent emphasis on the process goes along with a recurring focus on the value of 
representative architectural forms.  
Navi Mumbai’s public spaces experience a remarkable boom of monuments as urban 
image generators. The nostalgia for historic identities is nurtured by new historicist 
landmarks such as the Utsav Chowk in Kharghar or the Shivaji Chowk in Vashi. While 
these structures are designed with marketing in mind, one of their most important func-
tions is photogeneity. 
The recent boom of landmarks is quite different from the role that landmarks played 
in the past. Formerly monuments chiefly represented (and reconfirmed) the power of the 
state.451 Obviously industrial modernity (the modernity associated with the democratic 
welfare state), including the early visions of Navi Mumbai, secularised this approach. 
Here, monumental public space acted as a signifier representing the enlightened modern 
and democratic society. 
Cidco’s planners rejected this ‘bourgeois’ monumentality arguing that Navi Mumbai 
needed to become a city for the small man (cf. above). At the same time the agency 
                                               
449 The business plan components comprise demand analyses and competitive positioning, key regulatory and political 
issues, a project development strategy, a capital structuring plan of the special purpose vehicle, organisation of manpower 
structure, asset and equity valuation and a financial model and plan for the SEZ. (Cf. Netscribes; r12.09.2008) 
450 McClier, an arm of the Aecom conglomerate, is a multinational company with significant experience in master planning, 
design and planning of infrastructure projects in various parts of the world (www.aecom.com, r12.09.2009). 
451 Before that it was the divine. (Cf. Lefebvre 1973, 2003) 
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erected a series of enormous infrastructure landmarks (e.g. the IT-park-railway-stations 
in Vashi and Belapur), which glorify the state’s exclusive and positivist powers. Indeed 
the IT-terminals resemble enormous cathedrals, or gigantic cruise ships, that apparently 
rebel against the increasing powers of post-industrial dematerialisation. (Cf.  Illustra-
tion C-11) 
Nonetheless, in times of privatisation and liberalisation the role of the monument is 
again changing. A new brand of urban landmarks not only addresses a longing for nos-
talgia and lost identity, it moreover becomes a significant component of urban branding 
strategies. Monuments such as Kharghar’s Utsav Chowk or Vashi’s Shivaji Chowk452 
seamlessly represent this trend. Moreover these new supermonuments are a significant 
component of unique tactics of identity generation453 and valorisation within otherwise 
increasingly homogeneous urban landscapes. 
Importantly, these new monuments represent a new typology of super monuments or 
‘monuments of monuments’. While earlier monuments used to represent a content, con-
temporary monuments tend to become simulacra – monuments that represent other 
monuments. Accordingly, the narratives of these contemporary landmarks are placeless, 
their typologies and facades reflect a global mediascape of omnipresent images.454 
 Illustration C-31: NM’s new style monuments 
From form to content (visualisation and marketing= Imagineering) 
Architectural renderings and visualisations have always been an important communica-
tional tool of architects. Yet, with the merging of urbanism and marketing (cf. below) the 
relevance of visual representations has entered a new dimension. As Navi Mumbai and 
other dynamically emerging urban peripheries tend to be portrayed as life style-scenarios, 
urban imaginations are generated by a flowing sphere of renderings and images. 
For not long now the developers’ web pages have been among the main entry points 
to Navi Mumbai. Brochures of Integrated Townships in Poway (Hiranandani Palace 
Gardens) seek to transport the bourgeois atmosphere of European metropolises.455 Archi-
tectural objects are increasingly designed along their imaginative potentials (cf. above), 
nurturing the longing for distant histories or futures beneath the horizon. (Cf. the project 
of Hafeez Contractor above)  
German Ethnographer Christiane Brosius gives an exemplary account of the relevance 
of nostalgic image worlds and media landscapes of Indian suburbs: “Wherever one looks 
– real estate ads enact a 5-star life with a complete 24/7 power and water supply – some-
thing that in India, even in the metropolises, can by no means be taken for granted. In 
addition, the best surveying and security systems, a clubhouse, swimming pool, fitness-
studio, a golf course or a park, perhaps also equipped with rare flora and fauna, are also 
available.  Geographical characteristics are blurred by the worship of luxury and of a 
global-Indian lifestyle. Are we in Bangkok? In Singapore? In a made-up collage? Count-
less real estate ads, interior design magazines and billboards illustrate this new home. 
Also popular are references to the ‘great empires’, such as the Roman Empire, Greek 
Antiquity,  Egypt of the pharaohs or the former British colonial power.” (Brosius 2007: 
68; translated by the author).    
                                               
452 A relatively new monument for the founder of the Maratha Empire 
453 A practice that appears to be relevant in all of the case studies and which we propose to call ‘Imagineering’. (The fact 
that the term usually refers to the Walt Disney Imagineering corporation (WDI) only supports the case). 
454 The relevance of the longing for the greater world, is represented by the fact that for a long time online discussion fo-
rums fantasised about the possibility of the Eiffel Tower being reconstructed in Navi Mumbai. (Cf. “An evening in Paris... 
right here in Navi Mumbai”; at http://www.vashi2panvel.com/Navi-Mumbai-News/index.php?arr=item/51 (r12.09.2008); 
and at http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=210234&page=2; r12.09.2008) 
455 Others pretend to be direct offshoots of Dubai (e.g. The Lanco Hills Township in Hyderabad). 
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From western models to ‘indigenous modernities’ 
Western architectural and urban models play a significant role in the genesis of Navi 
Mumbai456, although these models are generally adapted to the requirements of local 
conditions. Yet the trend does not stop here, and a new quest for nostalgia enhances the 
resulting image. The results are hybrid urban landscapes and ‘indigenous modernities’.457 
We propose to call these landscapes “Landscapes of Surprise”. (Cf. Gotsch and Kohte 
2007) 
The original authors of Navi Mumbai dreamed that they could be creating a modern, 
equal and enlightened city (cf. above) and yet from the beginning the result turned out to 
be a hybrid and indigenous modernity. Many of the city’s architects are blending West-
ern with Indian experiences. Moreover, locally, outlandish concepts and typologies have 
always been the subject of socio-cultural adaptation and transformations from below.458 
Indeed, the following quote demonstrates that residents seem to be happier with this blend:  
“Fortunately this place was nothing like we imagined it to be. Far from being 
a slice of America, it had India written all over it.”459  
Indeed, current times are characterised by new forms of hybridisation. The danger posed 
by the high culture of modernity has lost its edge. Instead, in postmodern times, nostalgia 
for a lost history haunts the synchronised world: The perceived and experienced, jeop-
ardy of global universalisation gives rise to a countertrend of esotericism and historical 
pastiche. No new integrated New Town is being built without a mix of Vastu Shilpasha-
shastra principles, and modern amenities are wrapped in neo-historicist facades. 
Marketing sales and PR 
Introduction 
During the 45 years of planning and implementation Navi Mumbai has experienced an 
increasing shift from a supply side oriented construction of housing towards a demand 
side oriented view (cf. above). Significantly the changing composition of the market has 
also had a major impact on the question of marketing and sales. While in the first 20 
years Navi Mumbai’s developing agency, Cidco, had to lobby among institutional stake-
holders, such as large housing banks and state institutions, recently the market attention 
has shifted towards potential buyers as well as an increasing group of private developers 
(national and international). 
The following section seeks to describe the relevance of marketing for Navi Mumbai 
in both the past and the present. Accordingly, it delineates essential marketing strategies, 
the creation of products and images, the organisational structure of marketing and sales 
departments and the respective marketing instruments. We are, after all, seeking to ex-
                                               
456 India has a 4.000-year-old urban tradition (see above: Predecessors). Yet, western urban models have played a major role 
in India’s modern planning practice. Patrick Geddes made an impressive impact with his famous Cities and Town Planning 
Exhibition and his extensive surveys of about 50 Indian cities (Tyrwhitt, 1947). He has also consulted extensively. Moreover 
external figures, such as Sir Edward Lutyens (New Delhi), Le Corbusier (Chandigarh), Otto Koenigsberger (Bhubaneswar) 
made a fundamental impact. These brought Western building typologies, the maxims of hygiene, and eventually the mod-
ernist principles of functional separation, superblocks, neighbourhood design and modern infrastructure. In addition, promi-
nent concepts whose main protagonists have never appeared in India, such as the Brutish New Town concept, have had a 
deep impact on the formation of Navi Mumbai. 
457 Jyoti Hosagrahar (2005) discusses the processes of hybridisation and the emergence of indigenous modernities during 
late colonial times citing the example of Delhi. In addition Ulf Hannerz (1997) has elaborated on the concept of hybridisation 
versus homogenisation. 
458 Malathi Ananthakrishnan (1997) reports how the urban social pattern of Navi Mumbai increasingly resembles traditional 
Indian cities as it is divided into quarters along caste and ethnicity. 
459  
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tract and portray those strategies and dimensions which are characteristic for the context 
of neo-urbanism and the new economy. 
Subsequent findings reflect a more fundamental ‘revolution’ in progress: In the age of 
mobile image- and information-scapes (cf. Appadurai 1996) marketing matures from an 
important, but more or less pragmatic exercise, into one of the core practices in regard to 
the production of contemporary urban spaces. 
Marketing and ‘proactive image generation’ 
Putting in general conclusion? 
The role of marketing in the production of contemporary urban space, emerges as 
more essential than was perhaps thought. This fundamental role needs to be related to a 
broader framework of advancing rationalisation, a new international division of labour, 
new modes of the generation of identities and the roles the generation of images plays 
within. (Cf. Appadurai 1996) Indeed, a new blend of marketing and design plays a cru-
cial role in a process that can be referred to as ‘proactive image generation’. 
This strategy of pro-active urban image construction and new ‘urban rhetoric’ is best 
represented by Cidco’s omnipresent motto of “We make Cities”. Nowadays Navi Mum-
bai is constructed along a model image of an information and outsourcing hub. Notably, 
in this context, Navi Mumbai is “no longer the mega city’s poor country cousin”, instead 
Cidco promotes the parallel city as India‘s new ‘Super City’... – a label the project ac-
quired after it was featured on National Geopgraphic’s Television Channel.460 Accord-
ingly, a new scheme, such as the upcoming SEZs, is “developed and marketed as a joint 
mega world-class project adjacent to the business hub of India”. (Cf. Skil; r12.09.2008) 
Marketing strategies 
The bottom-up perspective examining the practical operational aspects of marketing in 
Navi Mumbai reflects that Cidco, as a semi-public corporation with a quasi monopoly of 
subsidised housing, was able to maintain a special role for a long time. Nevertheless a 
gradual change from traditional to modern marketing techniques reflects the new rele-
vance of the discipline in the production of contemporary urban space. Indeed, while the 
relevance of marketing is changing from the pragmatic business of distribution of subsi-
dised goods to the masses towards a service for a diverse group of sophisticated custom-
ers, the strategies in this context are more and more similar to the techniques of  the lar-
ger commercial sector. 
Until the 1980’s Cidco acted as a central supplier of subsidised housing. During that 
time marketing played a subordinate role. Lobbying had to be done towards big institu-
tional political stakeholders, such as the national housing banks and the state govern-
ments. Yet, sooner or later (e.g. mainly as an effect of fundamental reforms of the na-
tional mortgage system) the individual consumer became the ‘king’. Here, the launch of 
Demand Registration Schemes in the late 1980’s marked a watershed towards the rising 
relevance of demand oriented housing construction (cf. above: Example: DRS scheme). 
Mainly projects for the middle-income populations served as the basis for the develop-
ment of consumer friendly marketing and sales methods. The Gharkul scheme in the 
Khargar node (Cf: Examples) introduced several new marketing strategies: prospective 
customers were able to obtain their apartment in an easy single window system with easy 
payment methods. In addition, the practice of a first come first serve basis was estab-
lished. (Cf. Adusumilli 201: 43) 
                                               
460 Cf. Mr Rao, Vice chairman and managing director of Cidco, in the in-house Journal Namaskar (2007) 
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Recently Navi Mumbai’s authors are focussing their marketing efforts on interna-
tional investors. In respect of Navi Mumbai SEZ Cidco was looking for investors, part-
ners and master planners on an international scale. In 2002 a global tender was pub-
lished in journals such as ‘The Economist’461 and, in addition, the developing agencies 
toured several international real estate fairs.462 
Novel tactics towards added value 
As real estate developers become public figures whose movements are constantly moni-
tored by public media, the field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) becomes essen-
tial. In addition to the theming and eco-branding methods, as described above, today 
strategies of green and social awareness as well as of Rehabilitation and Redevelopment 
(R&R) are packaged and marketed under the umbrella of holistic CSR schemes (Cf. 
http://www.msez.in/csr.html; r06.10.2008) 
The Kharghar Hill Plateau project, announced in September 2008, represents some of 
the strategies of marketing and urban image generation which are in vogue.. It combines 
asset maximisation along global theming and branding strategies. In addition, ecological 
branding is a fundamental part of the theming approach: “The vision is to develop the 
Kharghar Hill Plateau in an eco-friendly fashion and transform the site into an exclusive 
and premium area, which would significantly raise the value of the city of Navi Mum-
bai” (ibidem). The sociologist, Amita Baviskar, describes these tactics as bourgeois envi-
ronmental activism – portraying only another strategy of social segregation and envi-
ronmental degradation.463 
Despite the highly fledged goals, the major purpose of CSR is augmentation of share-
holder satisfaction. Profitability and shareholder value remain its bottom line. An origi-
nal source, the disclaimer of the Mumbai SEZ states: “CSR consists of integrating the 
interests of stakeholders - all those affected by a company's conduct - into the company's 
business policies and actions. CSR focuses on the social, environmental and financial 
success of a company - the so-called triple bottom line - with the goal being to positively 
impact society while achieving business success.” (Cf. http://www.msez.in/csr.html; 
r06.10.2008) 
Marketing media 
Detailed customer surveys and professional demand analyses are among the chief instru-
ments of modern marketing. Classified ads are largely used as a means of evaluating the 
market. 
Cidco has established its own PR department as part of the marketing department. 
Here marketing is done through all conceivable media. Nowadays Internet presentations 
are among the most important information channels. The extensive information and 
marketing tool resembles the Internet presence of a large corporate enterprise, as op-
posed to state run agencies.464 Significantly Cidco’s Internet presence at 
“www.cidcoindia.com” provides comprehensive information on Navi Mumbai, its plan-
ning history, as well as on Cidco as the developing agency, the major projects, policies 
                                               
461 The Economist Vol. 364, No 8291, 13.07.2002: 21 
462 India Times of November 2002 reported on a global sales trip of Anil Kumar Lakhina, vice chairman and managing direc-
tor of Cidco: “Lakhina was here [New York] last week for a series of road shows to hard-sell the [$ 2-billion] project. He also 
visited San Francisco and Boston, besides holding similar investment meetings in London, Dubai, Singapore and Maylaysia. 
(Padmanabhan “Cidco seeks U.S. investment for Shenzen”, New India Times, Nov. 2002, brackets by the author) 
463 Quoted in Brosius 2007: 69; Cf. also the discussion on the antagonism on green and brown ecology, for example in 
Environment & Urbanisation; Vol. 18.1; 2006 
464 The differences can be studied among the World Wide Web representations of the Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation 
and Cidco at: “www.Cidcoindia.com” and “www.nmmconline.com” (r04.11.2008). 
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and the newest tenders. Important sub projects, such as the NMSEZ are represented at 
own domains (www.nmsez.com, r12.09.2008).465 
The website is supplemented by advertisements and requests for tenders, in national 
and international newspapers. The PR department is also organising community events 
and on-site property exhibitions.466 Not least, the marketing is supported by plans to 
develop its own museum, the  “Cidcoseum”. (Cf. www.Cidcoindia.com; r12.12.2008) 
Summary developers and designers 
While the portrayal of Navi Mumbai’s authors and their ideologies illustrates the rising 
importance of the private sector, it also confirms the ongoing relevance of the public 
hand. 
Navi Mumbai’s main developer is the City and Industrial Development Corporation 
of Maharashtra Ltd., or Cidco. As a model project of privatisation, Cidco is a hybrid 
construction between the public and private spheres. Its primary aim is to develop and 
carry out the plan for Navi Mumbai.  
The public developer had been set up to contribute in a structured regional develop-
ment in implementing the major infrastructure and services, along with affordable hous-
ing for the poor in the Navi Mumbai area. Since Cidco was bound to the generation of 
profits, it embarked on various redistribution strategies, such as a land development 
along a revolving fund principle, or innovative strategies of ‘taking from the rich and 
giving to the poor’. 
As part of a strategy to utilize the dynamics of the private market, the developer has 
recently embarked on various PPP ventures such as the Navi Mumbai SEZ scheme. 
Among the project partners are a range of local and international private developers. 
Accordingly the NMSEZ serves a pioneering and experimental project for all parties in-
volved. The fact that one developer had owned almost all of the SEZ land prior to the 
development, is unique in India and is a major competitive advantage. Some of the part-
ners (e.g. SKIL, Reliance, or the Hirananadani Group) now develop their own projects in 
the vicinity and are transforming Mumbai’s periphery into one of India’s gateways of a 
transnational urbanism. Importantly, the activities and networks of certain individuals, 
such as Anand Jain, or Niranjan Hiranandani, demonstrate the pivotal role of distinct 
energetic personalities in the development of the region. 
Cidco 
The institutional structure of Cidco is immense and conveys a complex character, be-
tween a bureaucratic public agency, a planning bureau, an engineering agency, several 
town management offices as well a market driven entrepreneur. The list of Cidco’s de-
partments reveals 27 major branches. A strong emphasis has been put on ‘traditional’ 
engineering capacities. (Cidco is experiencing a brain drain as many senior planning and 
development experts are being lured away by the private developers of the new SEZ’s 
and Integrated Townships.) 
                                               
465 Sometimes in a confusing way, as older versions of the same project are retained online: cf. navimumbaisez.com, 
12.09.2008. 
466 “The four day mega property exhibition – Haute - which drew to a close on Monday, November 19 (2007), witnessed a 
tremendous response from all quarters of the society from the lower and middle classes to the upper class. In the cool 
ambience of the colossal tent measuring around 4000 sq ft which was built on the Cidco exhibition ground opposite the 
Vashi Railway Station, the customers were keen on inquiring about the residential and commercial properties. There were 
some who seemed to be interested in investing their money in property considering the rapid growth and escalating prop-
erty prices in the city.” (www.mumbaipluses.com; r12.09.2008) 
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An important prerequisite to understand Navi Mumbai are the initial goals, maxims 
and visions of the authors of the new town cluster. Rather than seeking to invent a dwell-
ing machine, the makers of the New City dreamed of shaping a social utopia. To imple-
ment this novel, complex and difficult challenge, the stakeholders drew on principles 
from the philosophical reasoning of Mahatma Gandhi to the functionalistic ideals of 
Modernism. 
Navi Mumbai was conceived with five superior objectives in mind: 1) to be a puzzle 
stone completing the whole and leading to a harmonious region; 2) as a mechanism to 
solve the housing problem; 3) as a strategy to construct an equal society; 4) as a modern, 
postcolonial utopia, and 5) (most recently) as a information hub of global dimensions.  
The two pivotal groups pursuing these goals were a group of young Planners around 
Charles Correa, Pravina Mehta, as well as Shirish Patel (MARG) and also Cidco’s own 
planning department. While MARG imagined Navi Mumbai materialising as a spectacu-
lar public sculpture, the public planners pursued the subtler ideal of a Gandhian city of 
villages, however, the idea of rational modernism was always omnipresent. In contrast, 
today, the image of contemporary Navi Mumbai is more and more shaped by a “global 
business scenario”, while private developers envision a Town Magnet on a global scale.  
Notably the global business paradigms are leading to a significantly different result on 
the ground than the representations of the early modernistic times. (Nowadays, iconic 
landmarks, themed worlds and generally an architecture of symbolic exchange is becom-
ing prominent.) 
Beneath its idealistic background, Navi Mumbai stands on four pragmatic ‘ingredients 
of success’: 1) The developers have always enjoyed the exclusive land rights for the whole 
area; 2) An initial land bank provided start-up leverage; 3) The structure of the developer 
combined the advantages of the private sector (efficiency and flexibility) and the public 
hand (security and control); 4) Not least, various financial innovations, such as cross-
subsidies and revolving fund principles, were successfully deployed. 
Cidco’s following implementation strategy was based on the strategy of decentralisa-
tion and had 5 components: A) The relocation of some wholesale activities from Mumbai 
to Navi Mumbai; B) The creation of productive links to the existing industrial facilities 
and municipalities; C) The transfer of some government  offices to the new city; 4) The 
development of Navi Mumbai’s nodes in a self-sufficient way; 5) The development of 
integrated transport corridors.  
Importantly, this development strategy was mainly geared towards the generation of 
an economic base and sufficient employment opportunities and not primarily on housing. 
One of the critical elements of the early strategy was the relocation of various govern-
ment offices to Navi Mumbai. (The fact that Navi Mumbai’s development stagnated in 
the initial stages can be strongly linked to the failure of this plan.) 
Still, despite the fact that housing was not among the central strategic elements, Navi 
Mumbai was also aimed at becoming one of India’s lighthouse projects in regard to resi-
dential schemes. It was intended to become India’s first slum free city. Accordingly it had 
its own housing strategy. The plan contained three main ingredients a) self-sufficient 
neighbourhoods, b) an equal mix of populations, and c) a particular emphasis on low-
income households. As part of this approach Cidco, above all, sought to build composite 
self-sufficient housing schemes for a mix of all income groups. These were intended to 
serve as lighthouse projects triggering further development by external developers. The 
special effort to provide solutions for the poor led to a target quota of 30 percent houses 
for the lowest income sector.  
This dominant housing policy changed drastically during the course of the govern-
ment’s liberal reforms of the early 1990s – and with it also Cidco’s role. When the na-
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tional housing strategy of a supply driven system was substituted by a demand driven 
approach, the targeted provision of housing schemes for the poor in Navi Mumbai came 
to a halt. 
History of privatisation 
A specific characteristic about contemporary Navi Mumbai is the fact that the city exists 
in a state between a never-ending construction site and a historic place. Above all, the 
location embodies a narrative of privatisation: e.g. steady transition from centrally 
steered planning towards a gradually liberalised planning approach based on private sec-
tor stakeholders. 
The plan for the city was born in the 1960s when architects and planners felt almost 
invincible and when planning was regarded as one of the core methods of pacifying the 
globe. Planning and urban development essentially were extended arms of the govern-
ment. A strong ‘public hand’ marked Navi Mumbai’s initial planning and implementa-
tion stages. (Yet the early concepts also prepared the ground for market driven mecha-
nisms. Cidco was accordingly set up as a semi-private corporation that needed to operate 
profitably.) The 1970s were referred to as the era of physical planning. Significantly al-
most all major infrastructures were built during that period. The scheme was executed as 
a modern city for the poor. In the 1980’s a period of transition followed. This was char-
acterised by volatile land markets and massive financial sector reforms. The bulk of low-
income housing was implemented. However, at the same time, a rising number of pro-
jects as well as land were subcontracted and leased to the private sector. During that 
time, Cidco’s structure was also drastically reformed along neo-liberal lines. Its focus 
shifted from implementation to management and monitoring.  
The shifting macro setting also had a direct impact on the physical features of the site 
and the typologies of the buildings. The main trend leaned to ever-larger developable 
areas and extended private boundaries. (When land prices dropped by nearly 500 percent 
in 1996, large clusters of undeveloped lots of land were sold to bulk buyers.) At the same 
time the public impact on the areas started to diminish with developers enjoying a more 
and more political, economic, physical, and creative freedom within the boundaries of 
their sites. 
In the late 1990’s and early 2000’s Navi Mumbai reflected an ongoing drive to big-
ness, flexibility and privatisation. Large autarkic enclaves, such as SEZ’s, and Integrated 
Townships and new gigantic infrastructure ventures, such as a new international airport 
as well as the Sewri-Nhava Sheva sea link, surfaced on the basis of immerse inflows of 
international money. At present, Navi Mumbai’s developer Cidco is seeking to exploit 
this momentum, in heading the development of the Navi Mumbai SEZ. Nevertheless, 
Navi Mumbai’s latest era (since 2005) is characterised by growing contradictions. 
Among these are: progressing speculation, volatile markets as well as rising local resis-
tance. 
Rehabilitation and resettlement  
One of the most significant innovations of Navi Mumbai is its refined rehabilitation and 
resettlement strategy (R&Rs). In the last 45 years developers have taken a great leap 
forward in addressing the needs of project-affected populations (PAP’s). In particular the 
Land Acquisition Act of 1984 has brought crucial reforms. Today no new major project 
is practicable without extensive R&R programmes. Under the 12,5 percent scheme, one-
eighth of all land developed after 1986 has to be returned to the villagers. In addition to 
the land, PAPs also get priority job contracts (for example for landscaping and security 
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services), educational and vocational training, as well as special development rights. At 
the same time the R&R programmes account for a significant amount of new lowest 
income housing stock in Navi Mumbai. Moreover, a wealthy and powerful elite is 
emerging in the villages. The developers, in turn, seek to internalise the burdens of com-
pensation in marketing their incentives as part of their comprehensive Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) packages.  
Design 
Designers and engineers are among the authors with the strongest ideals. They have a 
powerful impact on Navi Mumbai’s physical form and its spatial organisation. The de-
velopment of Navi Mumbai is inevitably linked to a group of three young individuals. 
The architects Charles Correa and Pravina Mehta, as well as Shirish Patel, a civil engi-
neer, have transformed the previously, more or less, dispersed ideas for a new magnet on 
the mainland into a set of visionary proposals. The group’s intuitive plans for the futurist 
development of a parallel city were published in the June 1965 issue of the Art Journal 
MARG.  
The discipline of urban design dominated the early concepts of the new city and 
served as the main generator of the city’s identity. The initial designers followed a con-
textual and place-based approach, seeking to develop congruity from topography, cli-
mate, existing land use patterns, traffic flows, history, etc. MARG’s most central idea 
was to transform Bombay into a “twin-city on the sea”. The bay was supposed become a 
new virtual centre, to be framed by a chain of magnificent public spaces on the seashore 
of both sides.  
After Cidco took over the realisation of the project, urban design as a driving tool of 
development lost its momentum. For the next 20 years (1970-90) the framework was 
characterised by the idea of a conglomeration of “urban villages“ based on Gandhian 
principles. The project however was marked by monumental infrastructure projects (e.g. 
the IT parks at the railway stations in Vashi and Belapur). These evolved as solitary 
landmarks celebrating the planning powers of the state and the potency of Cidco’s engi-
neers.  
None of the three initial architects of Navi Mumbai, Correa, Patel or Mehta were able 
to implement their own node. While Correa has designed several of the early residential 
sectors, Shirish Patel produced some phenomenal railway stations. In 1992 Balkrishna 
Doshi, another renowned Indian architect and designer, was invited to draft the master 
plan for the Kharghar. Doshi’s remarkable plan seeks to reconcile traditional and mod-
ern principles. The tactic was dubbed the post-Chandigarh approach. Renowned Indian 
architects such as Pheroze Kudianwalla, Ratan J. Batliboi, or Raj Rewal, completed addi-
tional landmark schemes on a smaller scale. Among the current designers dominating the 
scene is the architectural consultancy Hafeez Contractor. This is an extremely successful, 
but somewhat populist, Indian architectural practice. 
Even so it can be observed that the role and strategies of architects are in a state of 
change. While business consultancies are taking the organisational lead, master plans are 
increasingly dominated by business plans. Significantly the NMSEZ was designed along a 
business plan prepared by Ernst & Young (former Arthur Andersen). A consortium of 
international and Indian business, finance, and planning consultancies prepared the plan. 
(Yet, because local knowledge remains essential, most of the architects, urban planners 
and designers that work in Navi Mumbai are Indians.) 
While the new era is characterised by an ever-increasing emphasis on abstract proc-
esses (profits, codes, business cycles), there is also a ‘déjà vu’ experience with the urban 
monument on the urban level. Urban designers have to engage in the (pro)active genera-
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tion of identity. While the cultural context becomes too complex, to be based on local 
congruity alone, cities are increasingly based on imaginaries. In this context theming and 
branding, adapted from the media and advertising industries, become state-of-the-art 
design strategies. The ‘nostalgia’ for the lost historic and spatial coherence leads to a 
boom of new Monuments. These experience a comeback as ‘supermonuments’, or 
‘monuments of monuments’. Kharghar’s Utsav Chowk andVashi’s Shivaji Chowk, serve 
as the most prominent examples valorising the homogeneous urban landscapes.  
The visual representations, both of nostalgicand also futuristic worlds, have gained a 
new significance in generating urban imagination and as demand inducing instruments. 
While western (modern, as well as postmodern) architectural and urban models play a 
significant role in the making of Navi Mumbai, these are commonly adapted to the re-
quirements of local conditions. In combination with an omnipresent historical nostalgia, 
what emerges on the ground are hybrid urban landscapes and ‘indigenous modernities’.  
Marketing 
In the age of increasingly mobile images and ‘information-scapes’ marketing evolves as 
one of the core practices of urban development and planning. 
Until the 1980’s promotion played a rather pragmatic and secondary role within the 
project. The business of distributing the products dominated Navi Mumbai’s first two 
decades. The situation changed with the general shift of the national policy from a sup-
ply, towards a demand oriented system in the late 1980’s. From that time on the devel-
opers of Navi Mumbai themselves were forced to actively (and creatively) engage in the 
sales and marketing of their ‘goods’. Hence, the relevance of marketing changed from the 
pragmatic business of distributing subsidised goods to the masses (as much as in a soup 
kitchen), towards a service towards a diverse group of clients. Nowadays, the ‘products’ 
are ever more geared towards the wants and tastes of affluent middle class customers as 
well as international investors.  
The particular strategies have been borrowed from the larger corporate sector. In this 
context an increasing blend of marketing and design operates with strategies of ‘life-style 
theming’, and ‘green-‘ as well as ‘brown-washing’. The latter are combined under the 
umbrella of corporate social responsibility. Cidco’s recent Kharghar Hills Plateau project, 
a combined theme park and villa community, located in a green-preservation zone, illus-
trates this approach. 
At the same time as customer surveys and professional demand analyses gain impor-
tance, marketing of the projects is done through all conceivable media avenues. In this 
context new technologies as well as Internet based distribution and marketing enjoy a 
rising prominence. 
Implementation 
 
Navi Mumbai’s developer Cidco has always sought to implement their products along 
the best standards available. Accordingly various state-of-the-art quality management 
strategies have been used. Among these are ISO 9000 and 14000 as well as progress 
monitoring and co-ordination tools such as CPM and PERT techniques. Moreover exter-
nal consultants are hired on a regular basis. An example is Cidco’s recent project called 
Intelligencity: here the developer seeks to innovate in exploring synergies of several elec-
tronic management tools, business process applications and geographical systems soft-
ware. (E.g. System Applications Product (SAP), Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), 
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Customer Relationship Management (CRM), and Geographical Information Systems 
(GIS)). 
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Finance –  
Liberalisation for social purposes 
Table 26: Key indicators – Navi Mumbai’s financial indicators 
Supply side  
Start capital in 1972 40 million INR plus ‘land as resource’ 
Strategy, Approach Social redistribution of land (‘Robin Hood 
Strategy’) 
General system Land = 60 years lease, renewable; structures = 
private property 
Amount of reinvestments 100 percent (Cidco is a non-for-profit corpora-
tion) 
Innovative Instruments ‘Reserve prices of land’ (developed land with-
out the usual profit margin) 
Expenditures in 1989 INR 56 billion (~US$ 110 million) 
Share of infrastructure expenditures 80 percent 
Share of housing cost 16 percent 
Project pipeline in 2.000 US$ 1.500 million 
Capital investments in Navi Mumbai SEZ US$ 520 million  
Capital investments in the Hiranandani 
Township Scheme at Panvel 
US$ 170 million 
Impact of FDI Infrastructure loans from ADB, the IFC and 
The World Bank, State Industrial and Invest-
ment Corporation of Maharashtra (SICOM), 
WB site-and-service scheme, today: interna-
tional PPPs 
Subsidies More than half of the SEZ investments are 
public loans: 75 million invested by ADB and 
the IFC, US$ 170 million by the Indian IDBI, 
and US$ 40 by IFCI 
Profits Rising relevance of PPPs (Cidco has the land 
and the expertise, conglomerates bring the 
money), focus on the middle income and lux-
ury segment 
Planned annual return rates of NMSEZ 30 percent 
Products Whole spectrum from housing, to land devel-
opment, to modern financial products (order 
along increasing relevance) 
Financial products GDRs/ADRs/and FCCBs/ Shares/ partly ex-
treme speculative products on international 
exchanges such as the AIM (e.g. HIRCO’s Ur-
ban Infrastructure Opportunities Fund) 
Demand side  
Price of undeveloped land 500 –1.000 INR/ sqm (US$ 10 – 20) 
Price of serviced land (Cidco) 2.500 – 7.000 INR/ sqm (US$ 50 – 140) 
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Price of serviced land (Mumbai) 20.000 – 60.000 INR/ sqm (US$ 400 – 1200) 
Price of upscale apartment in central Mum-
bai 
> 200.000 US$ 
Price of a middle class apartment (Cidco) 25.000 US$ (1,2m INR) 
Affordability levels for Mumbai Residents 
(The average Mumbaikar earns 2,5 times as 
much as an average Indian) 
NM = 2, Central Mumbai = 15 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“The property market in Navi Mumbai has well and truly arrived. Not only 
are flats and offices selling like hot cakes, but the demand for the premium 
flats too is rising by the day. There is no dearth of customers in the city who 
are willing to shell out Crore for exclusivity of the premium flats. The Palm 
Beach road commands the highest price and the costliest flats in the city fall 
in this area.”  
(Cf. www.mumbaipluses.com/newbombayplus/index.aspx; 12.11.2008) 
 
 
Money is the fundamental medium and a basic infrastructure of modern market ex-
change.467 At the same time the modern context of production of space is more and more 
driven by the private sector and the new economy. As a consequence the inquiry into the 
financial mechanisms of Neo Towns becomes a central issue.468 In this context the next 
section seeks to shed light on the question in how far the abstract and fluid logic of capi-
tal resounds in the spaces of contemporary Neo Towns. Moreover it will be particularly 
interesting to find out how the financial context of Navi Mumbai is different from that 
of other cases and which novel form of innovations will emerge. 
The next sub-chapter aims to delineate various aspects of the financial landscape of 
Navi Mumbai. Above all the section concentrates on the portrayal of the most recent 
dimensions and strategies , which are characteristic for the framework of the new econ-
omy (cf. to the first chapter of this thesis). The topic is delineated from a synoptic per-
spective, along a quantitative description of budgets, prices and investment sums, as well 
as along a qualitative discussion of investment and product strategies (e.g. important 
characteristics and innovations). Not least it investigates the role of new financial in-
struments (stocks, bonds, futures) and the internationalisation of financial flows to un-
cover some of the relationships between invisible networks and concrete spaces. 
                                               
467Matthew Edel writes in this context: ”Capitalists must 'realize' their profits by selling their goods in order to keep on 
hiring workers and producing. Thus capitalism requires a 'sphere of commodity exchange', in which goods are bought and 
sold. ... Capitalist exchange has one other important feature: the use of money." (Edel 1981) 
468 New financial instruments change the equilibrium between real and virtual space, and between network and fragments: 
“Money tends to develop its own logic in creating networks, circuits, and channels for its exchange between markets. The 
reorganization of the global financial system brings about a dematerialised production with new means and financial in-
struments in invisible markets. Vast amounts of money flow through invisible circuits. Deregulation and financial innovation 
along with developments in telecommunications create a global stock market and a single world market of money.” (Gotsch 
1995) 
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Overview 
Cidco, the developing agency of Navi Mumbai, acts as a land developer and also as a 
housing agency. The private developers of the Township Schemes and the SEZs profit 
from the lease of properties and from fees as service providers, as well as from a steadily 
diversifying range of financial service products.  
For, in particular, land was the only (real) resource to finance the development of the 
new city (cf. Adusumilli 2001: 21). In this context Navi Mumbai thrives along a revolv-
ing fund principle, based on the consecutive development of particular areas.  
Consequently Cidco’s primary products are the preparation of habitable land and the 
construction of housing units. Since groundbreaking in 1974 a large majority of the 
34.400-hectare project has been transformed. In addition more than 100.000 houses 
have been delivered (Cidcoindia; r12.09.2008). While the rates of housing produced by 
Cidco have declined steadily the relevance of land development has constantly increased 
(cf. Shaw: 151). 
Today, the fact that Cidco directly (and indirectly) controls huge amounts of devel-
oped land but a falling share of public funds, has resulted in an increasing number of 
partnerships with private developers (PPPs). In this context Cidco participates in the 
NMSEZ, the Navi Mumbai International Airport, the Central Park, the new city’s mass 
rapid transit system, the Mumbai Trans Harbour Link Project (MTHL, also known as 
the Sewri Nava-Shewa Sea Link), the Integrated Complex at Seawoods Railway Station, 
the Golf Course in Kharghar, and several others. Notably the PPPs of the new projects 
are represented by Special Project Vehicles (SPVs). Of rising importance is also an in-
creasing array of financial products. In addition to the SPVs, some private firms, such as 
Hiranandani, operate on a completely private basis. 
 
Demand side finance 
Land cost 
Fundamental in the analysis of Navi Mumbai’s financial framework is the review of land 
and housing costs. Of course, the prices reflect a larger socioeconomic, historic and spa-
tial context (e.g.: questions of affordability, trends in time, as well as in a local and 
global framework).469 
Land in Navi Mumbai costs only one eighth of that of prime locations in the mother 
city. Cidco’s ‘reserve prices of land’470, e.g. the prices of developed land without a profit 
margin, range between INR 2.700 (~US$ 55) per square metre in the recently developing 
nodes Ulwe, Kalamboli or Jui Kamothe, to INR 7.000 (~ US$ 140) in Vashi.471 
Currently (in 2008), buildable land at Arrow City, one of the planned private projects 
on the way to Pune, costs INR 3.000 per square metre (~ 70 US$ per square metre). At 
‘Regent Park’, or Arrow City’s luxury section, land costs INR 5.000 per square metre 
(~US$ 105 per square metre). 
                                               
469 Navi Mumbai was part of a property bubble in the mid 1990’s. (Cf. above: General context, India, Economy) In the 
course of this bubble some housing prices escalated from INR 916 in 1991 to INR 15.474 per square foot in 1995 – a 16 
fold increase. (Cf. Nissel 1997) 
470 Cidco’s reserve prices ranged between INR 1.250 and 2.500 per square metre in 2001. Free market prices in 1996 could 
be as high as INR 8.000. That means that Cidco subsidised about 25 to 50 percent of the free market price. (Cf. Adusumilli 
2001: 21) 
471 In contrast, land at central locations in Mumbai is fetching between INR 20.000 to 60.000 per square metre (cf. also 
above: Mumbai: Real Estate). Agricultural land fetches INR 40 per square metre. 
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Housing cost 
The prices of subsidised apartments in Navi Mumbai reflect a good affordability level for 
the respective populations. On the other hand, they are well above the Indian average. In 
2008 apartment prices in the Spaghetti housing scheme at Kharghar472 ranged from INR 
600.000 to INR 2.250.000 (US$ 13.000 to 48.000). (Cf. www.mumbaipluses.com; 
r12.09.2008) While this is well below Mumbai’s standards of US$ 50.000 to 200.000, it 
is above the general Indian affordability range. (Cf. above: Context, India…  Housing 
affordability)473 
Yet, as the popularity of the parallel city is on the increase, some premium properties 
begin to rival Mumbai’s prime locations. In early 2008, prime residential property at 
Palm Beach Road and the Belapur node skyrocketed to INR 10.000 per square foot (US$ 
1.900/ sqm). (Cf. Mumbaiplus.com; r12.09.2008) Superior flats in projects such as El-
lora Castle peaked at rates of INR 6.000 per square foot (~ US$ 1.000 per sqm). A com-
plete flat here fetched up to INR 50 million (~US$1m).474 
 
 
Supply side finance 
Seed capital, Revenues 
Indeed, it seems that Navi Mumbai’s developer Cidco has done a good job of multiplying 
money and resources. The developer started in 1972 with a seed capital of 40 million 
Rupiah plus land as resource.475 Less than 20 years later, by the end of the 1980’s, the 
total development expenditure in Navi Mumbai had grown to INR 56 billion (cf. Cidco 
1989).476  
The distribution of project costs reflects that Cidco’s most fundamental duty in the 
development of Navi Mumbai is the development of infrastructure. Infrastructure has 
comprised by far the biggest share of the total outlays amounting to 80 percent of all 
expenditures.477 The remaining 20 percent of the project expenditures were comprised by 
the repayment of state loans, the construction of railway projects, construction of bus 
terminals and depots, police stations etc. (Cf. Shaw 2003: 133) Of that sum housing has 
consumed INR 9 Billion or 16 percent (Adusumilli 2001: 21). 
Infrastructure also accounts for the highest position in Navi Mumbai’s new projects. 
At the NMSEZ, for example, the capital cost has been estimated at US$ 520 million: 
Infrastructure is supposed to account for 72 percent of this share.478 While Hiranandani’s 
                                               
472 Assuming average household income levels at US$ 6.000 per year, the Spaghetti prices reflect affordability levels of 3 to 
8. (Cf. above: Population: Consumer side finance) 
473 In 2008 commercial space in Navi Mumbai amounted to INR 12.000 to 16.000 per square metre (~US$ 300) (cf. Cush-
man & Wakefield 2007). 
474 Cf. ”The Finest Flats in Navi Mumbai”; at: www.mumbaipluses.com/newbombayplus/index.aspx; posted on Sunday, 
March 16, 2008; r12.09.2008 
475 Cf. Interview with D. Samand Chief Architect, Planner at Cidco in August 2006; also Cf. above: Strategies 
476 These are more than US$ 110 million, or 550 million in today’s money. (Cf. http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency; 
r12.04.2008) 
477 Back in 1989 Cidco had installed infrastructure surpassing US$ 930 million. (Cf. Shaw 2003: 115; quoting Cidco 1989) 
At the beginning of the 21st century an additional US$ 1.500 million remained in the project pipeline (TECS, 2001). While 
earthworks, levelling and drainage amounted to 32 percent of the project cost, land reclamation alone comprised 19 per-
cent. (Cf. Shaw 2003: 115 quoting Cidco 1989) 
478 Tata Economic Consultancy Services (TECS) prepared the “Techno Economic Feasibility Report” for the Navi Mumbai 
Special Economic Zone in 2001. TECS estimates that the cost of land will amount to 20 percent of the total expenditures, 
and other infrastructure to 52 percent. 
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Panvel Township is supposed to amount to US$ 170 million of investments, the focus on 
infrastructure will be equally strong.479 
Major lending bodies, investors, banks 
Navi Mumbai is not a ‘normal’ project. The new city has the status of a greater ‘Nation 
Building Project’. In this context it was backed by various national and international 
banks. This is also true for the new Special Economic Zones in the area. Even large de-
velopment funds and international lending institutions have committed themselves to the 
scheme. 
Support in earlier times was received from HUDCO, the ADB or The World Bank. 
(Cf. the discussion of the BUDP project in this chapter) Cidco as well as the private con-
glomerate Reliance, was able to draw money from the State Industrial and Investment 
Corporation of Maharashtra (SICOM) 480 in the past. At the moment, according to a 
report by India’s SKP Crossborder Consulting (2005), the Asian Development Bank and 
the International Finance Corporation have agreed to invest roughly US$ 75 Million in 
the Mumbai Integrated Special Economic Zone. Moreover, the Industrial Development 
Bank of India (IDBI) backs the project with US$ 110 million and the Industrial Finance 
Corporation of India (IFCI) contributes an estimated US$ 44 million (Ibidem 2005). Not 
least, further private funding comes from the partners in the developing consortium 
(SPV), e.g. Jurong Consultants, as well as Parsons Brinckerhoff have devoted individual 
stakes amounting to 10 percent of the total investments of the SEZ. (Cf. SKPC 2005) 
 
 
Financial strategies 
Valorising land 
The major profits in Navi Mumbai and its environs are made on the basis of expected 
land appreciation. As in many comparable cases of peripheral land development around 
the world, most of the profits in Navi Mumbai are made on the basic principle of devel-
oping cheaper agricultural land in dynamically growing urban peripheries into urban 
land. While the price of agricultural land in Navi Mumbai is as low as INR 500 on the 
private market, urban land sells for up to INR 7.000. (Cf. table above) 
Reinvestment and cross subsidies 
Cidco has managed to develop Navi Mumbai as a financially self-sustained city at costs 
that are significantly lower (sometimes less than a fifth) than market prices. Several re-
markable characteristics for Navi Mumbai relate to the fact that Cidco was set up as a 
not-for-profit organisation. 481  
This implies that the authority has to operate towards the recovery of full costs and 
that all profits have to be reinvested in the same location and for the benefit of the local 
residents. 482 Hence the development agency was never allowed to realise gains on the 
                                               
479 Cf. INRnews; October 25, 2007: 
www.inrnews.com/realestateproperty/india/fdiinvestment/hirco_invests_966_million_to_d.html; r24.09.2008 
480 SICOM is the nodal agency for foreign direct investment in "Maharashtra State". It was founded in 1966 and works as a 
Limited Corporation Ltd.. It operates with its own venture capital fund. (Cf. sicomindia.com; r12.10.2008) 
481 The not-for-profit strategy of communal land ownership administered by a land trust was also an integral part of Ebene-
zer Howard’s proposals for the Town-country magnet. (Cf. Howard 1946 (1898): pp58) 
482 Howard elaborates in this context: “Such increment of the value [e.g. the difference between the value of agricultural 
and the value of urban land] may, with some foresight and pre-arrangement, become the property of the migrating peo-
ple.” (Howard 1946 (1898): 59; text in brackets by the author) 
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sole basis of speculative land appreciation. The ‘system’ thrives on a system of land lease. 
While the ground is leased for 60 years, only the built structures can be sold, and resold 
on a market. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001) Notably all profits have to be reinvested: A major 
part of revenues was reinvested producing what is today one of the best infrastructure 
and public space systems in India with a share of open spaces of up to 40 percent. Cer-
tain quotas were also used for low-income housing and for the integration of local agri-
cultural populations (cf. above R&R schemes). 
Distinct innovations 
Indeed, only in this specific framework could innovations such as the differential land 
pricing and distribution schemes emerge, which made decent housing affordable to a 
larger amount of lower income populations. In regard to its ‘mission’ of full cost recov-
ery, Cidco has developed intricate land value evaluation mechanisms (e.g. the reserve 
price mechanism) that make sure that “at any time the project will, in the worst scenario, 
break-even”. According to Cidco, an amount of 16 percent of land sold in the private 
market was sufficient to finance 75 percent of the City (Cidcoindia.com; r21.09.2008).  
Box 22: Differential land-pricing mechanism 
Taking into consideration the goal that Navi Mumbai was supposed to become an 
equal city, Cidco has managed to develop innovative methods of pricing and distribu-
tion. In this context the authority developed the instrument of ‘differential pricing’, 
which discriminates between rich and poor buyers.483 This approach can truly account 
for the main innovations of Navi Mumbai’s development authority. While this instru-
ment allows recovery of the full development cost (e.g. the Reserve Price, see below), 
prices are applied relatively, e.g. the value mainly depends upon the type of land use and 
the income groups. Thus, while the commercial, residential and industrial users pay 
higher rates, low income populations, social facilities and public utilities receive subsi-
dies. 
The strategy subsidises low-income projects by 50 to 75 percent of the average devel-
opment cost without profits. Accordingly, lower income households are charged be-
tween 25 to 50 percent of the Reserve Price and social facilities and educational institu-
tions 10 to 50 percent. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001: 21) In contrast, commercial areas, as well as 
projects for higher income groups, are sold at rates above the Reserve Price (Ibidem: 21) 
and this land is often offered by way of an auction with the highest bidder getting the 
land (Ibidem: 12). 
An important prerequisite of applying the differential pricing mechanism is Cidco’s con-
cept of a Reserve Price of Land. This instrument reflects the value of the developed land 
without taking profits into account. Importantly the elaborate calculation method 
makes sure the project breaks even at any time and for each location.484 
The price of land depends on the use, the affordability of the end user, its desirability in 
Navi Mumbai, and a comparative market value. The Reserve Price of land is calculated 
for each of the nodes respectively.485 
Diversification, financial tools 
Compared to the semi-public character of Cidco, private developers basically work with 
a similar motivation of developing land and profiting from the appreciated values, yet 
with fewer obligations. This enables them to invest elsewhere and to work with financial 
                                               
483 Cf. http://Cidcoindia.com/Cidco/Crosssubsidy.aspx; r12.09.2008. 
484 Until 1993/94 the Reserve Price was deduced from the total aggregated land-development costs (absolute method). Later 
on the Reserve Price was calculated along a ‘present worth concept’, taking into account the change of land values over 
time. (Cf. Cidcoindia.com/Cidco/Pricingpolicy.aspx; r13.09.2008) 
485 In this context the reserve prices of land in the 2008 – 2009 period ranged between INR 2.700 for the cheaper, newly 
developing, nodes (Ulwe, Kalamboli, Jui Kamothe) to INR 7.000 for land at Vashi. 
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instruments and speculative mechanisms, e.g. raising money in the forms of bonds and 
stocks, as well as betting on the development of these. As a consequence recent strategies 
towards an optimal revenue generation increasingly bet on diversification and the effec-
tiveness of the fiscal markets. 
While Cidco is generally not allowed to directly generate profits, the developer has 
developed strategies to participate in certain private sector mechanisms. A common way 
to cream off some of the advantages of private markets is the means of Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs). With the Navi Mumbai SEZ project, for example, the organisation 
has contributed its share of assets to the Navi Mumbai SEZ in the form of land. All its 
existing assets and land development rights are supposed to be transferred to the Special 
Project Vehicle, e.g. the private holding corporation of the SEZ. (Cf. TECS 2001) The 
Special Project Vehicle that operates the Navi Mumbai SEZ is supposed to earn revenues 
through sale of land, the lease of commercial and industrial space, as well as provision of 
utility services like power and water and various maintenance management fees. (Cf. 
nmsez.com/finance; r23.09.2008)  
Importantly, the above set up allows for NMSEZ to become a target of various finan-
cial investments, such as external debt and equity funds (nmsez.com/finance; 
r23.09.2008). 
Financial products (receipts, bonds, shares) 
There is clear evidence that the private sector stakeholders in Navi Mumbai diversify the 
range of their products to the financial services sector, exploring monetary products and 
financial instruments new to the real estate sector. As most of the large privately devel-
oped projects in and around Navi Mumbai tap international money markets and utilise 
international subsidiaries, they also tend to become part of an increasingly complex jun-
gle of global monetary flows. 
Most of the large companies involved in the new real estate projects at Navi Mumbai 
are listed on the stock markets. The corporations can raise unrestricted amounts of inter-
national money by issuing GDRs, ADRs and FCCBs.486  
Mukesch Ambani’s Reliance, the major shareholder at both local SEZs is an interna-
tionally operating conglomerate that is listed on various stock exchanges world wide; 
Anand Jain’s SKIL Corporation, the main partner at both SEZs, developed two urban 
infrastructure funds487; Niranjan Hiranandani has established its own financial invest-
ment arm HIRCO488 that was listed on London’s Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM)489. Up to the fall of 2008 most of the stakeholders profited from buoyant emerg-
                                               
486 GDR Global Depository Receipts, ADR American Deposit Receipts, FCCB Currency Convertible Bonds (GoI, Department of 
Industrial Policy & Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2002: 11) 
487 The company is managing two funds, the Urban Infrastructure Opportunities Fund (UIOF) and Urban Infrastructure Real 
Estate Fund (UIREF), with a total fund corpus of over US$ 1.3 billion, While the UIOF is a domestic Indian Venture Capital 
Fund, and the UIREF is geared at an international market. Significantly it is based at the offshore centre of Mauritius 
(www.urbaninfra.com; http://www.jaicorpindia.com/ r.09.10.2008). Money invested in those funds includes many institu-
tional investors, among these for example the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC), State Bank of India, ICICI and Axis Bank. This 
made it “one of the largest domestic venture capital fund scheme in Real Estate sector in India” (www.urbaninfra.com; 
r.09.10.2008). Stakes in this fund have also been offered as part of a closed investments fonds Bayernfonds Asien – Asia 
Growth. (Cf. http://www.fondsdiscount.de/download/pdf/xml/fonds/geschlossene-
fonds/23940/realis_bayernfondsasien1_flyer] by the State Bank of Bavaria (Bayerische Landesbank) 
488 Hirco was founded in 2006 and is based on the Isle of Man, Douglas, United Kingdom, Mumbai, India and Wayne, 
Pennsylvania. The name of the stock is: “AIM:HRCO.L”. Hirco was able to raise more than 600 million US$ making its initial 
public offering (IPO) “the largest ever real estate investment company IPO on AIM and the largest AIM IPO in 2006”. (Cf. 
INRNews; Oct 2007; cf. http://www.hirco.com/hirco3.html; r23.10.2008) 
489 ”The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is a sub-market of the London Stock Exchange, allowing smaller companies to 
float shares with a more flexible regulatory system than is applicable to the Main Market. The AIM was launched in 1995 
and has raised almost £24 billion for more than 2.200 companies. ... The companies predicted to make the biggest noise 
this year are from India. In 2006, 11 Indian companies listed on the LSE, raised more than £1 billion. (Essen, Yvette "Aim 
market: Offshore attractions for the 'sophisticated' investor"; In The Telegraph; 12.03.2007) 
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ing country markets and a wide-ranging real estate boom. (Cf. above: General Context) 
The Jai Corporation’s stock (JAICORPLTD), for example, rose by a factor of 2.800 
times in the last two years – “ostensibly on the back of the upside that lies in the com-
pany’s new focus on infrastructure”– before it then fell by the same amount 
(www.jaicorpindia.com; r. 09.10.2008). 
International investment and role of NRI 
The boom of international investments Navi Mumbai thrived on between 2002 and 2008 
occurred in the context of a global oversupply of money. In this context excess liquidity 
had attracted investors in search of higher returns into riskier emerging markets and as-
sets. Low bond-market returns in the traditional markets combined with booming shares 
in emerging economies, encouraged bigger inflows into higher yielding emerging market 
bonds, equities and property, especially in Asia. (Cf. The Economist 2007) During this 
boom, the Indian market has certainly been one of the most attractive investment mar-
kets worldwide. (Cf. Goldman & Sachs 2001, 2003, and 2007; cf. also above: India, 
Economic context)  
This condition was also shored up by a rising group of Non-Resident Indians seeking 
to invest in their home country. These Persons of Indian Origin (POI) and Non Resident 
Indians (NRI) or their enterprises (OCBs), are allowed to directly invest in a wide range 
of undertakings along an ‘automatic scheme’ of the Reserve Bank of India.490 These 
groups also have permission to invest in projects such as housing and real estate (as well 
as aviation), which are restricted for other international investors. 
Strategies to reduce financial risk 
Navi Mumbai’s financial security mechanisms and risk scenarios are characterised by 
strategies of spread and diversification and a parallel backup of the scheme by the public 
hand. The state, the developer, as well as the private sector stakeholders, have all culti-
vated particular risk optimisation mechanisms. 
Navi Mumbai has always enjoyed exceptional protection from financial failure. De-
spite the fact that the state has created Cidco as an independent, quasi-private develop-
ment authority, the developer entirely remains in the hands of the Government. While 
Cidco was equipped with a special status of guaranteed access to land and comfortable 
credits, in this setting the risks for the state were minimised and the opportunities were 
maximised. 
The financial risk for Cidco was primarily reduced by the instrument of incremental 
development along the revolving fund principle and by the general public relevance of the 
project. Being part of a Nation Building Enterprise, the general impression always was 
that in case of failure the project would be rescued by the state. Cidco, in turn, has in-
creasingly sought to diversify risks (and maximise revenues) by cultivating the practice of 
outsourcing and subcontracting and by establishing joint ventures with other large com-
panies from the public and private sector. (Cf. above: Railways, SEZs, Kharghar Hill 
Plateau... etc) 
Moreover, private developers have sought to minimise their risks by entering win-win 
partnerships with the state (e.g. Cidco) and in diversifying their products into the global 
financial service sector. The risk has been spread by diversification from a single devel-
oper to many investors and from a few products to a multitude of outputs. 
Yet, at the same time, the general horizon of danger was widened as the projects are 
now more and more dependent on hard to predict money markets. While new financial 
                                               
490 Cf. GoI, Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2002: 11 
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instruments boost the ‘normal’ gains of land appreciation and while they spread the po-
tentials among a larger group of shareholders, these also maximise respective risks. In the 
last 8 years many privately developed projects have benefitted from over optimistic (bear-
ish) markets. International financial institutions (Morgan Stanley, Wachovia and the like) 
have joined the leagues of investors as projects such as the Navi Mumbai SEZ lured in-
vestors with planned return rates of up to 30 percent per year (TECS 2001).491 
Summary finance 
At the same time as planned cities become economic ventures, financial strategies come 
out as central tools of contemporary private urban modernisation. The fiscal landscape 
of Navi Mumbai is characterised by the effects of a growing diversification of products, 
the internationalisation of investments, as well as the deregulation of markets (as is the 
case in many other places). As urban space is increasingly moulded by a synchronising 
logic of international codes and regulations (cf. above), its dependence on worldwide 
economic cycles is also on the rise. 
Despite being a model project and social experiment, Navi Mumbai was bound to 
achieve financial sustainability from the very beginning. In this context Cidco, the semi-
private/semi-public developer, needed to develop innovative strategies. These were prin-
cipally based on a social re-distribution of profits realised by developing agricultural land 
(a strategy that was also one of the foundations of Ebenezer Howard’s Garden Cities).  
Cidco primary mission was the preparation of habitable land as well as the construc-
tion of housing units. Since groundbreaking in 1974, a large majority of the 34.400-
hectare project has been implemented; in addition more than 100.000 houses have been 
delivered. The authority has managed to develop Navi Mumbai as a financially self-
sustained city, at costs that are significantly lower than market prices. Serviced land in 
Navi Mumbai costs about one eighth of the amount of prime locations in the mother city 
and less than a half of the amount at private land markets. Housing is also significantly 
cheaper than in the central city. Whilst today the availability and affordability of low-
income housing remains a major problem, an increasing number of prime properties re-
flect the rising regional and international importance of the location. 
As far as the project budget is concerned, Navi Mumbai was supported with seed 
capital and an initial land bank in 1972. The city was started along the financial strategy 
of a revolving fund. Infrastructure comprised a gross of 80 percent of all project costs. 
Indeed one of the most interesting financial innovations is Cidco’s system of differen-
tial land pricing based on a reserve price mechanism. Given the goal of maximising op-
portunities for all and constructing an equal city for all classes and castes, the developer 
transferred surplus revenues from the sales of commercial, as well as higher income pro-
jects, to the benefit of lower income customers. Revenues are also maximised by using 
the instrument of auctions. These innovations have unquestionably made decent housing 
affordable to a larger number of lower income populations, as it is usually the case. 
Land served as a genuine resource for financing the development of Navi Mumbai. 
Importantly, Cidco had a semi-monopolistic position. As a state company it has always 
enjoyed an exceptional protection from financial failure and was equipped with a guar-
anteed access to land and comfortable credits. In addition the planned city had the status 
of a Nation Building Project. This facilitated generous partnerships with national and 
international financial institutions, ranging from the Industrial Development Bank of 
                                               
491 At the time of writing this chapter the situation after the 2008 global financial crisis remains vague. However many 
aspects point to the fact that India as well as China have been less affected by the catastrophe than most western countries. 
(Cf. The Economist: “BRICs and the world economy”; Jun 18th 2009. 
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India, India’s Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO), to the Asian 
Development Bank, and also The World Bank. (The newly emerging SEZ project is part 
of some of these partnerships as well). In addition, Cidco started to diversify risks in cul-
tivating a practice of outsourcing and subcontracting. The financial risk was mainly re-
duced by diversification from a single developer to many investors and from a few prod-
ucts to a multitude of outputs. 
Today the organisation is progressively acting as a land developer and less as a hous-
ing agency. In order to profit from private real estate projects, the authority is entering 
into an increasing number of partnerships with private developers 
In particular in the last decade the spectrum of financial service products has been 
steadily increasing. New generation private developers issue depository receipts, bonds or 
shares, and raise a significant amount of seed capital through international markets. 
Non-resident Indians also play important roles. They enjoy distinct investment quotas in 
many restricted sectors, including real estate. Moreover the organisational geography of 
various international partners (organisations and individuals) and their subsidiaries be-
comes increasingly complex. 
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Control and regulations –  
The ramified anatomy of power 
Table 27: Key indicators – Navi Mumbai’s regulatory framework 
Stakeholders  
Underlying power relations State of Maharashtra controls the general regional de-
velopment through the MMRDA, Cidco controls de-
veloping nodes, NMMC administrates the finished 
nodes, cooperatives at micro-scale, ‘non planned popu-
lations’ have enormous political power, populist parties 
have an enormous influence 
Relevance of international lending 
institutions’ guidelines 
YES (WB, ADB for some projects, see also the finance 
section) 
Novel forms of organisation and 
control 
SPV and Development Commissioners (DCs) control 
the SEZ areas 
PPPs, Joint ventures YES (Railways, Infrastructure, SEZs, Luxury Town-
ship, also with international corporations) 
Regulations  
Government approach during start 
of the project 
Socially oriented central planning (5 year plans) 
Important regulations at federal 
level 
Amendment of the Land Acquisition Act (1984), Envi-
ronmental Protection Act (1986), 73/74th constitution-
al amendments (1992), SEZ Regulations (2001, 2005) 
Major change of economic para-
digms 
1990s and 2000s (NEP; Foreign Investment Laws, SEZ 
laws) 
Social goals YES (balanced development strategy, however largely 
skewed by a bias towards Maharashtra citizens) 
Own town status YES 
Significant regulations at regional 
level 
General Development Control Regulations, (uniform) 
FAR-Regulations  
Master plan at start YES (1971, NM was a crucial part of the MMRDA 
Master Plan) 
Allowable heights and densities 
(FAR) 
Uniform FAR of 1,0 (with few exceptions) 
Local master plan YES (Cidco’s Draft Development Plan of 1973) 
Novel trends TDR’s, Flexible market based development guidelines, 
(U-2 Zones) 
Introduction 
The final part of this chapter on Navi Mumbai is devoted to a portrait of the stakeholder 
and the regulatory framework underlying the parallel city. This is important to complete 
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the analytical framework that was outlined at the start of this work. Every game consists 
of an environment, a playing field (or a board), the players, someone who has conceived 
the game, a medium, as well as someone who implements the rules and regulations. Con-
sequently this subchapter on Navi Mumbai devotes attention to stakeholders as well as 
the rules underlying the urban planning system of the new city. In contrast to the third 
subchapter, which focused on the private sector, the description will mainly concentrate 
on the role of the public sector. The latter generally provides the most important rules. 
Accordingly, the section is structured along two parts. The first focuses on the major 
public sector stakeholders of Navi Mumbai; the second part concentrates on some im-
portant aspects of the legal and regulatory framework of the new city. 
Stakeholders 
Whose city is it? 
Political power in Navi Mumbai is mainly represented by government institutions, pri-
vate developers and recently also by the village populations. The new residents suppos-
edly have the least amount of political power.492 Yet, despite the national efforts to de-
centralise power towards local authorities (cf. Context… Section on the 73rd and 74th 
Amendments), planning capacity in India remains largely concentrated at the state level. 
(Cf. Bertaud 2002) Accordingly, it is the government of Maharashtra that controls most 
of the essential organisations and authorities steering the development of Navi Mum-
bai.493 
Public institutions, the private sector, civil society, as well as hybrid formations among 
these groups represent Navi Mumbai’s major stakeholders. The power of the Indian 
Government is represented by federal regulations such as the Environmental Protection 
Act or by federal organisations such as the Indian Railways. 
State level organisations are represented by institutions such as Cidco (the City and 
Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.), the MIDC (Maharashtra Industrial Develop-
ment Corporation), the MMRDA (the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development 
Corporation), MSRDC (the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation), (MJP) 
(Maharashtra Jeevan Pradhikaran as the State Water Corporation), SICOM (The State 
Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra) or MHADA (Maharashtra’s 
Housing Area Development Authority. 
Among the local administrative and planning bodies are the Navi Mumbai Municipal 
Corporation (NMMC) and the municipal and village councils (Gram Sabhas).494 The 
private sector is represented by a large array of stakeholders: from the informal street 
vendor to the international industrialist (cf. above Developers). The civil sector is com-
posed of residents and civil organisations, as well as political parties. With an advancing 
implementation of decentralisation programmes, today the numerous village populations 
and slum residents enjoy a constantly rising amount of political power (cf. above: popu-
lation). In addition, a mix of stakeholder groups composes some hybrid stakeholder con-
figurations. Prominent examples are: the partnership between Cidco and the Indian Na-
tional Railways and the Special Project Vehicle developing the Navi Mumbai SEZs. 
                                               
492 Cf. Personal interview with a researcher at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) in August 2006 
493 Indeed, this is currently the case in most of the dynamically growing Metropolitan regions of India. Gotsch and Kohte 
2007, for example, describe the influence of the state of Andhra Pradesh in the regional development of Hydarabad. 
494 Most of these organisations were installed in the course of Navi Mumbai’s implementation. (Cf. Ananthakrishnan: 14) 
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Major Stakeholders 
Among the major public sector stakeholders in the framework of the new city are: the 
Mumbai Metropolitan Development Authority (MMRDA), The City and Industrial De-
velopment Corporation of Maharashtra (Cidco), the Navi Mumbai Municipal Corpora-
tion (NMMC) and several populist parties. Furthermore, the private administrations of 
the SEZ projects have a growing political impact. 
MMRDA 
The Mumbai Metropolitan Development Authority (BMRDA, later MMRDA) is the 
organisation that oversees the regional development of Mumbai’s Greater Metropolitan 
region. The state had set up the BMRDA in parallel to Cidco in 1973, as it became clear 
that plans were needed to organise the growth of Mumbai beyond the municipal 
boundaries. The BMRDA took over such functions as coordination of metropolitan 
planning, funding, execution of programs, development control and maintenance of the 
entire Greater Bombay region including Navi Mumbai (MMRDA; UNCHS, 1993). 
However,  MMRDA is not an implementing agency; its major job is the development of 
land use strategies for the region, represented by the Regional Plan for Mumbai Metro-
politan Region. The last version of this plan was drafted for the time span from 1996 to 
2011. (Cf. above, cf. MMRDA 1999) It was Cidco’s role to implement the new city of 
Navi Mumbai, an integral part of the first regional plan. In this context MMRDA and 
Cidco are two state agencies with close ties. 
NMMC 
Technically Cidco acquired the entire land of Navi Mumbai on behalf of the state of 
Maharashtra and its people. The land was principally leased out for 60 years. Today, the 
political, administrative and managerial control of the new city is generally divided into 
two parts, the Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation (NMMC) which administers one 
part and Cidco which administers the other. The NMMC is a Municipality, headed by a 
major; Cidco is a state run enterprise. In Addition the municipal councils of Panvel and 
Uran) are governed by their own municipal bodies (cf. Ghorpane). 
The Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation represents the local administrative level of 
Navi Mumbai. It administrates the completed parts of Navi Mumbai. Constituted in 
December 1991 the NMMC controls 8 of Navi Mumbai’s 15 nodes. Its administrative 
area spans 162 square kilometres, mainly in the northern part of the new city. It com-
prises about half of Navi Mumbai’s total area. (Cf. www.nmmconline.com; r 
08.10.2008) The jurisdiction of NMMC starts at Digha in the North and ends at Belapur 
in the South and has been divided into nine zones. These are Belapur, Nerul, Turbhe, 
Vashi, Kopar Khairane, Ghansoli, Airoli, Digha and Dahisar. It is important to note that 
the industrial areas to the East of Navi Mumbai (MIDC) are an integral part of the 
NMMC. Cf. Shaw 2004: 99 495  
 Illustration C-32: Political boundaries of the NMMC  
The MMNC represents the local implementation of the 74th Amendment in Navi Mum-
bai. It comprises an elected mayor and an elected council. Its instalment in 1991 was a 
major political watershed. It implied that the state (and Cidco) had to surrender signifi-
cant political, planning and administrative powers of large areas of the new city. (Cf. 
Ananthakrishnan: 15) The shift of power was not only between the state and municipal 
levels. Crucially the NMMC also spurred a rising importance of local populations, as it 
incorporated the entire population of adults with voting rights. Since then the representa-
                                               
495 Cf. also the Website of NMMC at http://www.nmmconline.com/english/aboutUs/zoningShow.php; r13.09.2008 
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tives elected by the villagers and informal populations make up a major share in the Mu-
nicipal Council. (Cf. above: Population) Accordingly Annapurna Shaw (2003: 248) re-
ports that the representatives of the non-planned areas had won 40 of the 66 seats of the 
Navi Mumbai Municipal Council. On the other hand the impact of the Municipal Cor-
poration on the overall planning framework of the area remains limited. Applications for 
respective SEZ projects, for example, have to be made to the Industries department of the 
state of Maharashtra. 
Among the consequeces of the 74th amendment is also the increasing popularisation of 
India’s landscape of local political parties. The Shev Sena party is one of the most influ-
ential of these.496 
A significant amount of governance is also in the hands of smaller groups of stake-
holders. In this context it is important to recall that on a minor scale cooperative socie-
ties and condominium associations run many of the sectors developed by Cidco. These 
play the important economic role of decentralised asset managers and the cultural role 
handling the integration of diverse populations. (Cf. above: Population; cf. Adusumilli 
2001: 38) 
Joint ventures (PPP’s) between developers and government 
Besides the above-mentioned ‘classical’ stakeholders, various forms of joint ventures and 
hybrid institutions have been important for the development of the new city. These start 
with Cidco and its mixed structure between state agency and enterprise oriented (cf. 
above: Developers). It continues with the partnership of Cidco and federal institutions 
(such as the National Railways, or the nested structure of the Navi Mumbai SEZ Special 
Project Vehicle, that includes Cidco and a range of private developers), to joint ventures 
among various private stakeholders, for example the partnership of Reliance and SKIL, 
and the stakes of several international enterprises (such as Jurong and Parsons-
Brinckerhoff at the Maha Mumbai SEZ project). 
The state and private stakeholders 
The state, however, remains among the most influential stakeholders. Private developers, 
active as they are, are bound to perform in the public operative and regulative frame-
work. In the context of Navi Mumbai, the seemingly unlimited freedom of private devel-
opers has been repeatedly constrained by the power of the people and the state govern-
ment. This was the case, for example, when the state of Maharashtra refused to support 
the developers of the Maha Mumbai SEZ with land acquisitions and when, as a result, 
the size of the MMSEZ had to be cut in half. (Cf. Press Trust Of India, 2007) Or when 
the government had to take the development of the new trans harbour link from Sewri to 
Nhava to Sheva, back into its own hands. The project was in danger of falling victim to a 
feud betweem the two Ambani brothers. (Cf. The Economist, July 24th 2008) 
New forms of private governance 
Most recently, mainly in the SEZ and mega township projects, ever-larger tracts of land 
will be serviced and maintained by private town managements and headed by private 
‘mayors’ or Development Commissioners (DCs). (Cf. Ahya 2006; cf. above SEZ) 
Significantly, the NMSEZ is expected to become a municipality in its own right. The 
Mumbai SEZ will be a totally “delineated deemed foreign territory” for the purposes of 
duties and tariffs” (GoM, Minsity of Commerce). While the SPV will act as the imple-
mentation agency, a special Development Commissioner will be appointed as the sole 
                                               
496 The Shev Sena largely promoted the change of Bombay’s name to Mumbai. It has also introduced preferential quota for 
people from Maharashtra for subsidised housing in Navi Mumbai. 
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planning and management authority. (Cf. TECS 2001: 153; cf. The Hindu 2004) Indeed, 
the SEZ project is supposed to become more than an industrial area, but a mega town-
ship featuring housing, schools, and commerce. In addition its organisation will come 
close to resembling a privatised municipal organisation. (Cf. nmsez.com; r03.10.2008) 
Wrap-up: Decreasing public intervention 
In conclusion in can be stated that the large amount of public intervention in Navi 
Mumbai is slowly decreasing. 
Navi Mumbai’s public sphere is being increasingly diluted, as it is sandwiched be-
tween the combined process of decentralisation and globalisation. Generally, India is a 
highly bureaucratised country and the amount of public power in the Indian context is 
relatively high. Not long ago, central planning and five year plans drove the spatial de-
velopment of the country (cf. above Context: Planning Framework). Then, in the first 
stage of decentralisation, the planning authorities were shifted to the state level, and it 
must be stressed here that the project of Navi Mumbai can be seen as a landmark of state 
power in this context. This chapter has demonstrated that the project clearly reflects a 
high impact of public intervention. Navi Mumbai’s urban qualities, the planned structure 
and the high amount of infrastructure and services differ greatly from a ‘normal’ Indian 
city and could not have been achieved with a lesser amount of public control.  
This amount of central control began to crumble from the early 1990s causing a slow, 
but ongoing empowerment of local administrations and populations (cf. 74th Amend-
ment). Navi Mumbai reflects this change. Moreover ongoing trends of privatisation, lib-
eralisation and economic globalisation have consistently weakened the impact of the 
public hand. More and more large private developers are entering the scene. Ever larger 
areas are being planned by private planning teams and controlled by private service pro-
viders, acting as quasi municipal authorities. While international players are part of most 
of the Special Planning Vehicles, developing consortia, through international money, 
predominantly nurture the newly planned real estate ventures. 
As its urban structure matures and consolidates, Navi Mumbai finds itself in an in-
creasingly tangled web of various government institutions, private developers and resi-
dents. Moreover its context is more characterised by corruption497 and spontaneous, in-
formal development. In fact, the differences between Navi Mumbai and the ‘normal’ 
Indian city are on the decline. 
Regulations 
The regulatory framework of the new city is comprised of federal programmes, incen-
tives and laws, as well as local land use regulations. The most critical for our context are: 
the MMRDA Master Plan, Guidelines for Development Control Regulations, Floor Area 
Ration prescriptions, Transferable Development Rights and local development plans. 
Federal regulations 
General subsidies and programmes 
Navi Mumbai was developed along extensive public subsidies and development pro-
grammes. (Cf. above: Finance) Such programmes continue to play a major role today. In 
the early planning stages Cidco was backed by the government by massive physical, legal 
and financial subsidies : Land and seed money was given to the agency for free, the long-
term acquisition of land was guaranteed and access to public credit was assured. The 
government also intended to support the new city by shifting its offices to the new loca-
                                               
497 On the problematic of the term see above at: Context, India, culture. 
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tion. Many current projects in Navi Mumbai thrive on public programmes and economic 
development incentives such as federal infrastructure funds (e.g. JNNURM), SEZ pro-
grammes; subsidies for IT related business parks etc. (Cf. above: Context) 
73rd and 74th Amendment 
Among the most significant regulatory milestones for Navi Mumbai was the 74th 
Amendment of the Indian Constitution498, also known as the 1992 Amendment Act on 
Municipalities. The 74th Constitutional Amendment in India enabled the Industrial De-
velopment Corporation to perform as a planning authority. Later on it was the basis for 
establishing the NMMC. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001:30; Cf. above) 
Land Acquisition Act of 1894 
The public hand fundamentally facilitated the purchase of land for Navi Mumbai. The 
state government guaranteed exclusive availability of all land necessary for the project. 
Prior to 1984 Most of the land was confiscated under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. 
Later, the Amendment of the Land Acquisition Act in 1984 dramatically changed the 
status of the local land owning populations, leading to improved practices and better 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement programmes. (Cf. above: Developers… R&R) 
SEZ regulations 
Among the most recent and important federal level incentives are the SEZ and Township 
regulations of the new millennium. (Cf. above General Context…SEZ and Township 
Acts) 
Land use planning at regional and local levels 
The Mumbai Metropolitan Development Authority (MMRDA) Master Plan accounts for 
the most influential planning and regulatory instrument at the regional level. 
Rise and fall of the 1973 Master Plan 
Navi Mumbai’s legal framework document is Mumbai’s Regional Development Plan. 
The Mumbai Metropolitan Development Authority (MMRDA) formulates this plan 
every fifteen to twenty years. The first draft plan was published in 1973, the second plan 
in 1996, major revisions were made in 1996, and a third plan will presumably be formu-
lated in 2012.499 Navi Mumbai was a substantial part of the strategies of the first master 
plan.500 
1973 plan recognised the relevance of the extended urban region for Mumbai’s devel-
opment. Its underlying rationale was a belief in the immense power of planning to de-
terministically change the course of urban development. In this context population tar-
gets for different urban centres in the region were set. These were based on predeter-
mined norms of population and job densities. Navi Mumbai played an important part in 
the industrial location policy501 and was designated as one of four important regional 
                                               
498 The 74th Amendment of the Constitution of India (the 1992 Amendment Act on Municipalities) is one of India’s impor-
tant milestones towards political decentralisation. It seeks to institutionalise a shift of planning powers from the central 
governments towards the local level. The Act foresees that Municipal Corporations are responsible for the economic devel-
opment and also the spatial planning of their respective areas. Importantly two thirds of the municipal councils are supposed 
to be elected. The implementation of the 74th Amendment in India is a slow and cumbersome process. (Cf. Bertaud 2002) 
Generally the respective state governments are reluctant to give up their planning authorities and fearful that an organised 
spatial development may be hindered by small fragmented municipalities. (Cf. Gotsch 2007) 
499 The current plan-document is published online at: www.mmrdamumbai.org; r12.10.2008. 
500 “The main focus of the new organisational arrangement was on the new metro-centre across Thane Creek (i.e. Navi 
Mumbai) for which the State Government created Cidco and appointed it as the New Town Development Authority for Navi 
Mumbai“. (MMRDA: 1999, 14.3.3.) 
501 Following the recommendations of the Regional Plan, on the 23rd March 1973, the Government introduced the Indus-
trial Location Policy for MMR. It divided the region into 4 zones, namely, Zone I (island city of Mumbai), Zone II (suburbs of 
Mumbai, Thane and Mira-Bhayander area), Zone III (Navi Mumbai) and Zone IV (Rest of the MMR). (MMRDA: 1999, 14.2.4.) 
The Industrial Location Policy (ILP) sought to foster decentralisation processes by prohibiting new medium and large-scale 
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zones (MMRDA: 1999, 13.4.1.). To achieve its goals the 1973 plan divided the region 
into 5 principal land use zones: 1. The urbanisable zone (U-Zone); 2. The industrial zone 
(I-Zone); 3. The recreational zone (R Zone); 4. The forest zone (F-Zone) and; 5. The 
green zone (G-Zone).502 (Cf. MMDRA 1999: 13.7.1) 
 
 
The failure of the New Town strategy as the leading model for regional development 
 
“Despite the statutory land use plan and the host of laws, rules, regulations 
and policies, the development control system in the region has remained 
weak. It has not been able to prevent undesirable development. The unau-
thorised construction activity in the region in the past two decades has been 
alarming“. (MMRDA: 1999, 14.3.1.). 
The generally fruitful 1973 Master Plan has also brought about a series of problems and 
contradictions.503504 Principally it was lagging behind a boundless progress on the 
ground.505 Whereas the plans thrived on an eternal and absolute spirit, Mumbai’s pat-
terns of socio-economic, as well as spatial development, increasingly varied from what 
was anticipated: Navi Mumbai proved incapable of absorbing most of the suburban 
growth. The urban periphery was growing much faster and in an more unregulated man-
ner than was anticipated.506 The authors of the 1999 revision of the Master Plan verify 
that Navi Mumbai, which was expected to absorb “two-thirds of the incremental growth 
of  the urban population between 1971-91“ and “to achieve a target population of 2,2 
million by 1991”, has not developed as planned – as at that point the city had reached 
only 600.000 residents.507 508(Cf. MMRDA 1999: 13.8.1.) 
While Mumbai’s periphery was ultimately overrun by the spreading wave of urbanisation, 
the 1999 Master Plan illustrates a general change of paradigm. The planners acknowledge 
that the region grows in many and sometimes surprising directions, and that develop-
ment is largely driven by a bottom-up dynamic of myriad of (private market) stake-
holders. As a consequence the centrally steered (top-down) urban development approach gives 
                                                                                                                                         
industries or their expansion in Zones I, II, and the Kalyan Complex area of Zone IV. It also placed severe restrictions on the 
growth of small-scale industries in Zones I & II. (MMRDA: 1999, 14.2.4.) 
502 The U-Zone covered existing towns and areas marked for their planned expansion, proposed new towns and other new 
township areas. Large industrial areas outside the existing towns were designated as ‚I‘-Zone, and rest of the areas ‚F‘ or ‚G‘-
Zone. In ‚G‘-Zone no development except existing structures and certain special activities is envisaged (MMDRA 1999: 
13.7.1). 
503 These difficulties can be grouped into two major areas: Firstly, the unanticipated contradictions that emerged through 
the dynamic growth of the city, and secondly problems inherent to the plans structure and its methodologies (e.g. the 
classification of the zones). The overarching question is to what extent planning, represented by a master plan, can have a 
significant impact in steering certain trends and growth processes shaping the region, and to what extent it may also pro-
duce unintended and counterproductive effects. 
504 An additional problem was also that the Master Plans were largely based on outdated data. The current plan, published 
in 1999, was based on data from 1994. (Cf. MMRDA 1999; cf. Personal interview with former chief planner of MMRDA in 
August 2008) 
505 In regard to Navi Mumbai alone it can be stated that almost none of the recent large projects in its vicinity has been a 
part of the original 1973 Regional Plan document. The new international Airport, the Mumbai trans harbour link, the Revas 
Sea Port, the two SEZ projects of combined 7.500 hectares, the Integrated Townships (Hiranandani, Mumbai’s Manhattan, 
Magic Hills) – all have been incorporated only retrospectively into the official planning documents. 
506 E.g. Mostly in opposition to the officially designated locations, many areas designated as park and preservation areas 
were urbanised; Slum development was spreading at a much faster pace than anticipated; Moreover agricultural land was 
informally urbanised at highway corridors and around existing villages. (Cf. MMRDA’s list of unauthorised developments, 
also discussed above at: Context, Mumbai, Structure of the Periphery) 
507 This stagnating development was rightly related to a tardy implementation of the Nhava Sheva Port, the failure of the 
government to move to the new city, inadequate transport linkages with Greater Mumbai and problems of land acquisition. 
(Cf. MMRDA: 1999, 13.2.1.: Outcome of the Regional Plan-1973)  
508 In addition, the MMRDA planners related a large part of the problems to ‘internal reasons’ such as inadequate land use 
categories and a system lacking local monitoring and implementation (MMRDA: 1999, 14.3.1.) 
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ways to tactics that are flexible stakeholder oriented and demand driven. The plan introduces 
significant modifications to the system of land use and zoning. Most significantly it in-
troduces a new U-2 land use category in addition to the existing U-1 category. (Cf. 
MMRDA: 1999, 13.4.3.) 
In this light Navi Mumbai emerges as a modernistic and Keynesian experiment of the past. 
The vision that urban development could be steered by large and centrally planned 
counter magnets such as Navi Mumbai looses momentum, and strikingly, at the same time, 
the city’s incompleteness provides an arena for the private sector. 
Cidco’s new role as a special planning authority in the environs of Navi Mumbai 
Interestingly in this post-new-town-era, Cidco also evolves into a Special Planning Au-
thority, supposed to control the rapidly urbanising parts of the environs: The Regional 
Land Use Plan had defined a two-mile belt around Navi Mumbai in 1973. This buffer 
was intended to act as a green belt and also preclude land-speculation. Yet, due to a lack 
of any agency supervising the development of the region, the area is rapidly urbanising. 
The same is true for the corridor along the Mumbai-Pune highway. Given the proximity 
of Navi Mumbai, Cidco is supposed to serve as a Special Planning Authority to these 
zones (MMRDA: 1999, 14.3.6.).509 
 
Box 23: Mumbai’s U-2 Zones: New experiments in market driven urbanisation 
The U-2 land use class seeks to address rapidly developing “zones in transition” in the 
whole region. These are locations that have embraced most of the unauthorised 
growth in the previous decades, i.e. mainly sections close to transport corridors and 
commercial hubs.510 
The novel U-2 category is intended to serve as an experimental ground at the bounda-
ries between control and self-organisation. No formal development plan will be in 
place. Instead novel development control regulations will be implemented. These lib-
eral and flexible rules will be entirely demand driven taking into consideration the dy-
namics of the private sector. A vital ingredient of this regulation is that all developers 
will be required to provide their own infrastructure. In addition, the practice of land 
pooling and organised development of large plots will be encouraged. This will be 
mainly achieved by the instrument of tradable development rights such as increased 
building permits.511 
The new land use instruments will be employed in the whole region. Hence they will surely 
have a significant impact on the future of Navi Mumbai and its environs, hopefully do-
mesticating masses of unofficial construction activities. (Cf. MMRDA 1999: 13.8.2) 
Moreover they will surely lead to ‘refined’ balance sheets and certainly also to im-
proved living standards. On the other hand the question of how ecologically sensitive 
areas can be safeguarded from urbanisation remains open. 
                                               
509 Excerpts from MMRDA 1999 (14.5.6.) underline that: “Today Cidco is helplessly witnessing building activity in the ‚G‘ 
Zone just outside Navi Mumbai‘s boundary, especially near Taloja, New Panvel, Panvel etc. The decision to dispense with the 
extra control in the two-mile belt has indeed proved to be a short-sighted one“ ... “This was a buffer zone and was in-
tended to ensure that, taking advantage of the developments in Navi Mumbai, private development does not take place just 
outside its boundary.” ... ”The area along Mumbai-Pune highway and Mumbai-Goa road near Panvel has been zoned as U-
2 and is under considerable pressure of development. Planning of this area needs to be undertaken immediately. Given the 
proximity to Navi Mumbai, Cidco may be appointed as the Special Planning Authority for this area.“ ... 
510 So the U-2 zone “In particular, includes lands within 1 km on either side of important roads and within 1.5 km radius 
from railway stations subject to other physical and statutory constraints.” (MMRDA 1999: 13.8.2) 
511 New Development Control Regulations propose a graded scale of FSI (FAR) as well as a weighing system (MMRDA 1999: 
13.8.2). Accordingly the permissible FSI will increase with the size of the plot: For plots up to 0,5 ha the FSI will be 0.2; it 
then progressively increases to reach a value of 0,34 for a plot of 10 hectare or more. In addition, the weighting system 
proposed will allow for additional built-up area ranging between 20 and 40 percent if the land owner or developer allocates 
additional land for public facilities over and above the rates proposed by the Development Control Regulations“. (MMRDA 
1999: 13.8.2) 
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Role of General Development Control Regulations (GDCR) 
General Development Control Regulations play a two-fold role for the Parallel City: 
Firstly, the development of building structures in the parallel city is governed by the Gen-
eral Development Control Regulations for Navi Mumbai (GDCRs). These GDCRs spec-
ify the codes for the urbanisation of an area.512 Secondly, General Development Control 
Regulations apply for all areas in the Mumbai region, which are not part of a local de-
velopment plan. (MMRDA 1999: 15.1.2) Therefore these are of highest significance for 
newly urbanising areas in the periphery including Navi Mumbai’s environs. 
While the revised Master Plan of 1999 designated some generally novel land use cate-
gories, such as the U-2 zone as discussed above, the Development Control Regulations 
specified particular rules for these areas. The following box summarises some significant 
parts of the codes for U-2 zones as reworked by the MMRDA in 1999. Importantly 
these: 1. Delegate the provision of basic infrastructure to the private sector stakeholders; 
2. Encourage the grouping of developers in larger formal entities; 3. Regulate the supply 
of public services for areas exceeding certain proportions and finally; 4. Set the permissi-
ble FAR for the U-2 zone to 0,2. 
Box 24: Excerpt from the Development Control Regulations for U-2 Zones 
 [I]: “No development of any land in zones other than U-1 or I-zone shall be permitted 
unless the owner undertakes to provide at his own cost physical and social infrastruc-
tural facilities, such as roads, water supply, sewage disposal system, solid waste collec-
tion and disposal system, electricity, recreational open space, playground, school, etc. 
as, in the opinion of the Planning Authority, may be reasonably required for the devel-
opment proposed, and provided that the owner also undertakes to maintain these fa-
cilities for a reasonable period specified by the Planning Authority.“ (15.3.5) 
[II]: ”The Organised Development may be undertaken by a co-operative society of land 
owners, a land owner, developer or builder on behalf of a land owner, local authority 
or any public agency who shall submit to the planning authority or where there is no 
Planning Authority the Collector of the District, an Outline Development Proposal 
(ODP) for approval in principle.“ (15.5.2) 
[III]: “In the case of sub-division or layout area exceeding 10 ha., the Planning Authority 
will be entitled to take over 50% of the open space free of cost for providing higher 
recreational facilities.“ (15.5.3) 
[IV]: In the case of Organised Development, land for residential purposes, certain pro-
portion as specified in Table-15.6 of the gross plot area shall be provided for public fa-
cilities. ...  The land so reserved shall be handed over to the Planning Authority or any 
agency specified by it free of cost. (15.5.3) 
[V]: “The permissible FSI in U-2 Zone shall be 0,2.“ (15.5.4) 
The legacy of FAR 
Among the most important regulations at the building scale in the Indian context is the 
Floor Area Ratio (FAR). 513 514 A universally applied FAR of 1,0 in Navi Mumbai is a 
leading reason why Navi Mumbai emerges as a relatively dense, but uniformly flat ‘pan-
cake’ city. (Cf. above: Structure...) 
                                               
512 In addition special development regulations were applied at several model projects, such as the BUDP site-and-service 
schemes at Kopar Kharaine, or certain rehabilitation projects. The specific codes for this project allowed for significantly 
reduced maximum standards (e.g. for lots or open spaces) and increased densities. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001: 22; cf. above: 
Examples BUDP) In the case of the rehabilitation projects the special regulations allowed for increased densities. 
513 Also known as Floor Space Index or FSI 
514 The floor space of a large majority of the building structures in Navi Mumbai is restricted to the size of the lot they are 
standing on. In other words the bulk of buildings in Navi Mumbai conforms to a general Floor Area Ratio (FAR) of 1,0. This 
value concerns plots that are smaller than 1.000 square metres. (Cf. Betraud 2003, MMRDA 1999)  
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Yet, despite the homogeneous application of FAR regulations a series of exceptions 
exist at some locations. Increased FAR development rights are used at selected insular 
locations, mainly as compensation measures for local villages and as instruments to 
stimulate economic development. Accordingly, here the figures for plots larger than 
2.000 square metres have been raised to a FAR of 2,0; for ‘residential cum commercial’ 
or for commercial plots the FAR permission is 1,5; the same is true for some village reset-
tlement and rehabilitation projects.515 Some locations also feature FAR-ratios lower than 
the standard 1,0: A FAR of 0,5 is common in certain row house residential projects; 
while 0,2 is used for some suburban bungalow type schemes and the U-2 zones as dis-
cussed above. 
Exceptions however tend to be on the rise. Cidco plans to increase development rights 
at locations of critical importance and augmented demand, such as the railway nodes, 
and some locations in proximity to the new sea link, but also as part of selected resettle-
ment schemes and private megaprojects.516  
Apparently these trends reflect a twofold dynamic between integrating as well as dis-
integrating forces. Hence, it is left open if the resulting urban fabric will be more accen-
tuated or fragmented and polarised. 
Box 25: Floor Space Index (FSI/ FAR) 
Floor Area Ratio (FAR) regulations are a very crucial key to understanding the spatial 
form of contemporary Indian cities. As a significant planning instrument affecting the 
form of the built-up structures in relationship to the underlying plots, the FAR largely 
affects the form of the greater urban fabric. (Cf. above: Structure, and cf. below: Regu-
latory framework) 
Indian FAR regulations are an integral and widely used part of the urban planning cul-
ture on the subcontinent. (Cf. Bertaud 2003, 2004, cf. Patel 2007) The reason why in 
most of the cities FSI values have been kept relatively uniform and low, was a top-down 
orientated planning policy aiming at the creation of equal and socially inclusive cities.517 
(Cf. Jain 1993, Bertaud 2002, cf. above: Context: Planning regulations) 
Greater Mumbai’s FSI values have been uniformly set to a level of 1,3 and do not ac-
count for specific features such as urban nodes and land value differentiations. (Cf. 
MMRDA 1999; and Bertaud 2008). The numbers for suburban locations range at the 
level of 1,0.518 
 Illustration C-33: Mumbai FAR Map 
 
Experiments with Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) 
In the privatising context delineated above market oriented planning instruments enjoy a 
rising popularity. In particular the tool of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) is 
                                               
515 Warehouse plots are not subject to FAR regulations at all. (Cf. Cidcoindia/faq’s; r16.09.2008) 
516 Indeed some of the private stakeholders have developed ‘tricks’ to virtually increase the FAR of a project, e.g. the Sea-
woods Integrated Commercial Complex at Nerul is operating with augmented development rights of 1,5. Yet, while the 
scheme itself is significantly denser, a 16 hectare ‘land bank’ area was integrated into the terrain (cf. 
http://www.projectsmonitor.com/detailnews.asp?newsid=15453; r19.09.2008) 
517 Betraud (2004: 10) argues that the conservative policy on FAR regulations is one of the most destructive regulations of 
Indian cities: “The constraint imposed by the low FSI is by far the most damaging compared to the 3 others constraints 
constituted by topography, muddled property rights and poor infrastructure. This is because the low FSI compounds the 
effect of the three other constraints. ... This commentator opposes the “vision” of the common man to the vision of the 
developer; he does not seem to realize that eventually if people in Mumbai want to consume more than the current 2.9 
square meter of floor space some developers would have to build this floor space somewhere or several million people 
would have to leave Mumbai to make room for those who can afford floor space at the current high prices.” 
518 New York, Singapore and Seoul feature FSI values of up to 20. (Cf. Betraud 2008) 
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frequently used as a non-plus-ultra strategy in combination with the FAR regulations.519 
Contemporary Navi Mumbai contains a great deal of experimentation with these in-
struments. As building controls become liberalised, the practice of Transferable Devel-
opment Rights finds its way into the planning practices of the area. Nowadays develop-
ers who decide to provide an extra amount of social or ecological amenities are allowed 
to increase the load of their project. Elsewhere the MMRDA plans to make extra reve-
nues in selling supplementary development rights at the two bridgeheads of the new Se-
wri-Nava Sheva trans harbour link. (Cf. Phadnis 2008)  
 
Cidco’s Draft Development Plan of 1973 
 Illustration C-34: Picture of draft development plan 
To date, the development of Navi Mumbai is guided by the 1973 Draft Development 
Plan. 
The general MMRDA Master Plan, as discussed above, was supposed to guide re-
gional development in general. Local authorities and the other government agencies were 
responsible to implement the plans in their respective jurisdictions. Because Navi Mum-
bai had the status of a special project, Cidco authored an own master plan, the Navi 
Mumbai’s Draft Development Plan in 1973.520 The state government in 1979 approved 
the plan. The document is a strategic plan that is largely text-based.521 Importantly it is 
still valid until today. (Cf. Shaw 2004: 83) Updates were made in the form of regular 
revisions.522 
The fact that the new city’s 35 year old development plan is still valid underlines the 
timeless relevance of the initial goals and objectives of the undertaking. On the other 
hand, a widening gap between plan and reality can be observed. New projects, such as 
the two SEZs, create increasing contradictions in regard to the city’s primary objec-
tives.523 This is why various experts note that this plan is also outdated and reactive, and 
that a radically new version is needed.524 
In addition to the text based ‘strategic’ Draft Development Plan, each of the respective 
nodes features its own spatial development plan. Cidco is obliged to draft the legally 
binding documents. In some instances external consultants prepare the guidelines for the 
spatial development framework.525 
Local design ordinances 
In addition to the land use planning and ordinances at regional and local level, guidelines 
and ordinances at the scale of neighbourhoods play a major role in Navi Mumbai. These 
underline an increasing trend of decentralisation. Vital rules governing the place can be 
found at the scales of neighbourhoods and blocks of the new city. In the ‘traditional’ 
                                               
519 TDR’s imply that a specific amount of the permissible FAR of a location can be traded on a market. While relatively new 
to the Indian planning context, they are becoming increasingly popular. The city of Mumbai has introduced these strategies 
to cross-subsidise the development of infrastructure and services in some of the city’s poor areas, notably Dharavi. (Cf. 
MMRDA 1999; Bertaud 2004: 5; The Economist 2007) TDR’s are also increasingly used in other booming Indian cities. A 
prominent example is the special development zone around the new Hyderabad Airport HADA. (Cf. Gotsch 2007) 
520 Cidco developed this plan in fact in parallel to the MMRDA Master plan 1973. (Cf. above: General Context: Milestones, 
Navi Mumbai) 
521 The plans’ concrete goals and visions are listed in the Developers section above. 
522 This leads to a continuously expanded document of hundreds of pages that non-experts can hardly comprehend. 
523 Interestingly in 2003 Cidco proposed to include the SEZ in the list of land use categories as listed in the Development 
Plan. (Cf. Cidco 2003) 
524  Cf. Personal interview with a former chief planner of Cidco in August 2008 
525 E.g. The node Kharghar was conceived by Balkrishna Doshi. (Cf. above: Examples…) 
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Cidco neighbourhoods local resident associations and cooperative societies mainly han-
dle the implementation of design guidelines. (Cf. Adusumilli 2001; Cf. above: Residents) 
Summary regulatory framework 
Navi Mumbai remains a landmark of state power – notwithstanding the major trends of 
privatisation and deregulation, as discussed in this chapter. Urban Development in India 
is a state subject. The government of Maharashtra controls all fundamental organisations 
and authorities steering the development of Navi Mumbai, such as Cidco, SICOM, 
MHADA, MISD, and the MMMDRA. Accordingly private developers, active as they are, 
are bound to perform within the operative framework of public regulations (The state 
demonstrated its power, inter alia, by the forced reduction of the Navi Mumbai Special 
Economic Zone (NMSEZ), as well as the recent takeover of the new cross harbour link). 
Nevertheless, as Navi Mumbai is increasingly sandwiched between the combined 
processes of decentralisation and globalisation, the high amount of state intervention in 
Navi Mumbai seems to decline. The power of local administrative and planning bodies 
such as the Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation (NMMC) and village councils is on 
the rise. Local populations are gaining political power (mostly represented by local popu-
list parties) as a result of ongoing decentralisation programmes. Micro institutions such 
as cooperative societies and condominium associations represent local power. In addi-
tion, some privately developed areas, such as the SEZs, are serviced and maintained by 
private town management bodies and headed by private mayors (Development Commis-
sioners).  
In regard to the framework of regulations, extensive public subsidies and development 
programmes supported the development of the new city. Moreover the scheme was part 
of a Nation Building initiative. Among the most crucial federal rules with a direct affect 
on the progress of the project are the 73 and 74th Amendment, the Land Acquisition Act 
of 1894 and its revisions of 1984, as well as the SEZ and Township Acts in relation to 
the series FDI reforms of the new millennium. 
The MMRDA Master plan accounts for the most relevant documents on a regional 
scale. Moreover the General Development Control Regulations, including the generally 
Prescribed Floor Area Ratio (FAR) and the new practice of Transferable Development 
Rights are highly relevant building codes. The most important local planning regulation 
is Navi Mumbai’s Draft Development Plan, of 1973. While this strategic document is still 
valid today, more and more contradictions come forward between its initial aims and 
trends on the ground. 
Navi Mumbai was a significant strategic part of the first MMRDA master plan of 
1973. It was supposed to become Mumbai’s primary counter magnet and alternative 
pole. Nevertheless, the new city developed at a slower rate than expected. Moreover, the 
area was overrun by the rapidly sprawling region. As a consequence Navi Mumbai can 
serve as an example to demonstrate the limitations of central planning. The public plan-
ners have recently acknowledged that the region continues to grow in many, and some-
times surprising, directions and likewise that regional development is driven by bottom-
up dynamics.  
 Illustration C-35: Urbanised in the MMR 
Notably, Mumbai’s urban planners seek to tackle the problems of uncontrolled devel-
opment by the definition of new urban land use categories. The 1999 master plan pro-
poses a new U-2 land use class. These areas are experimenting with novel liberalised and 
flexible regulations encouraging the pooling of landowners and the  personal construc-
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tion of basic infrastructure. (In addition, Cidco recently also proposed introducing a new 
land use category explicitly for SEZ’s.) Indeed, the results of this remarkable experiment 
will have great relevance for many cities worldwide. 
A significant class of regulations in India at a building scale with a high relevance for 
the greater urban form are the FAR parameters. Significantly Navi Mumbai’s FAR fea-
tures a flat FAR ratio of 1,0 for all of the nodes. This notably results in a uniform and 
flat ‘plancake’ urban form without any highlights. Because the green-belt regulations are 
not working, the nodes also blend into each other. On the other hand an increasing 
number of projects, such as relocation schemes and new railways nodes, enjoy excep-
tions. In addition a new generation of building controls is experimenting with market 
oriented planning tools such as tradable development rights.  
It, however, remains highly unclear if this will lead to an urban fabric that is more ac-
centuated, or to a form which is even more fragmented and polarised. Will Cidco be able 
to counterbalance these trends, as it becomes a Special Planning Authority for significant 
parts beyond the Navi Mumbai? 
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Abstract 
 
“Esta é a terra mais valorizada do entorno da maior metrópole brasileira.”  
(Arthur Castilho de Ulhôa Rodrigues,1  
 
“AlphaVille (or first city) is one of the world's earliest and best known gated 
communities and its origins lie in a number of co-determinants, namely rising 
crime in São Paulo, improvements in infrastructure under a massive public 
works programme and new modes of urban planning around the city, such 
as the ABC Region.”  
(Stevens 2007) 
 
 “Mention AlphaVille to someone from Britain’s chattering classes – and cer-
tainly France’s – and the association will be with the 1965 film by French di-
rector Jean-Luc Goddard, in which AlphaVille is a futuristic city where the 
wicked scientist in charge, Von Braun, has banned love and self-expression. 
But say AlphaVille in Brazil and the connotation is quite different: firstly it 
does not concern the stuff of films, but reality; and secondly, it is generally a 
place aspired to by the middle classes.” (Davidson 2004) 
 
AlphaVille-Tamboré emerges in Brazil’s postcolonial context. The nation has a legacy of 
political and economic elites aiming to lead the modernisation process. Major economic 
and political shifts and the reverberations of the Cold War mark the moment. At the time 
of the project’s ground breaking the country is governed by a military regime. It under-
goes a major industrial transformation. The local context of São Paulo epitomised many 
of the dynamics and portrays a status of dynamic change, this is in particular true for the 
urban periphery. While the city offers immense opportunities and serves as a fertile 
ground for the emergence of new middle classes, it also represents a context of inequality 
and increased risks. In this context significant processes of process of clustering and con-
centration of prime businesses and affluent populations in particular sectors of wealth 
can be observed.  
The project comes out as modern regional node on the basis of a state-of-the-art re-
gional infrastructure (E.g. regional highways). The city of 90.000 residents and 130.000 
jobs represents a new residential as well as commercial hub in the form of an ‘edge city’. 
Its structure is highly hierarchic and modular. It is based on the combination of highly 
homogenous neighbourhood enclaves (‘residencial’) and a system of highly controlled 
semi-public space. 
Affluent Bourgeois are among the major target populations. Their major motives are: 
1) security, 2) life-style, 3) investment, and 4) decongestion (quality of life). The urban 
venture is fundamentally based on tertiary economies and the experience of consumer-
ism. Important part of the success is the principle of contractual ‘automanagement’ of the 
neighbourhoods on the basis of Resident Associations. 
The private scheme developed as a start-up venture of two engineering graduates and 
rapidly developed into one of Brazil’s largest and most successful real estate undertakings 
with more than 40 projects in Brazil, Portugal and Angola. It was taken over by Gafisa, a 
Brazilian real estate conglomerate in 2007. The project is one of the forerunners in the 
                                               
1 Mastermind behind Tamborè SA, at Tambore’s website 
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development and application of ‘market-driven-strategic-planning’ tactics. It thrives on a 
strategy of secured access to land, the objective of a balanced land use, a strategy of 
phased development (in time and in space), and the application of modern corporate 
management mechanisms. Moreover the developers innovate by introducing novel mar-
keting strategies to the real estate sector: mainly in the form of new Social Corporate 
Responsibility (CSR) methods. 
Aiming to create landmark neighbourhoods of a hitherto unknown quality in Brazil, 
they excel in examining the market demand, exploring the productivity of standardisa-
tion, seamless product improvement, and the capability of the market to structure ter-
rain. On this basis a project emerges which is extremely resilient, adaptive, and adjust-
able to volatile urban environments. 
The designers of the project engage in a (pro) active generation of identity. They are 
mainly occupied with the creation of highly synthetic controlled environments. In this 
context staging, eco-theming and branding emerge as crucial design methods. Planning is 
increasingly equalled with the management of business processes. 
As it is geared to higher-income classes AlphaVille-Tamboré emerges as a highly prof-
itable venture. The project features price levels which double the amount of projects in 
the vicinity. The ‘only’ price of the privatisation and profit orientation seems to be exclu-
siveness and segregation. The NeoTown evolved into important investment targets of 
large corporations, which started to diversify into the real estate sector. As a consequence 
urban space is more and more affected by the homogenising rationale of international 
norms and standards, mainly in relation to credit and accountability regulations. 
AlphaVille emerges as an example par excellence of a model of an elite driven mod-
ernisation at the end of the Keynesian era, which experiments with the dynamism of 
market based instruments. Thriving in a political context of a strong federal level and a 
weak local government, the project employs various informal tactics. On one hand Al-
phaVille developers were nurtured by the benefits of Federal Finance Programmes geared 
to housing and infrastructure development, on the other side the scheme lacks an own 
city administration, despite the physiognomy and morphology of a fully-fledged town. 
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Introduction –  
Non-plus-ultra private city? 
AlphaVille-Tamboré is the third example of a NeoTown examined by this thesis. After 
describing an example from Indonesia (BSD) as well as India (Navi Mumbai) this case 
provides a perspective from Latin America. 
While Bumi Serpong Damai (BSD) appeared as the largest planned town in the hands 
of an individual private developer and Navi Mumbai emerged as one of the largest sys-
tems of planned New Towns worldwide, AlphaVille-Tamboré appears as one of the big-
gest clusters of autonomous, gated communities, which together result in a vast private 
edge city.  
AlphaVille-Tamboré is an agglomeration of several real estate ventures, spreading 
over São Paulo’s peripheral districts of Barueri and Santana de Parnaíba. The two most 
important projects dominating the system are AlphaVille and Tamboré. While AlphaVille 
is the largest private city in Brazil and the core of the system, the environs comprise a 
large agglomeration of similar models: Aldeia da Serra or Granja Viana are neighbour-
hoods created under the concept of ‘bounded communities’.2 The whole represents a new 
breed of urban forms, challenging the ‘classical’ notions of a ‘city’. Since AlphaVille and 
Tamboré form a joint urban system, the following chapter will refer to the AlphaVille-
Tamboré NeoTown. Both are the most visible projects in the area, sharing a significant 
amount of facilities. 
AlphaVille challenges many traditional notions of planning on one hand, and of self-
organisation on the other. Of the three cases discussed in this thesis, AlphaVille is the 
project that evolved along the least amount of ‘traditional’ planning. Whereas the area 
does not have a general master plan, the structure represents a case of bottom-up incre-
mental growth and the result of a persistent learning-by-doing process. Yet its fabric is 
very different from the irregularity of slums and favelas. A series of questions emerge that 
will be driving our examination:  
Does AlphaVille represent the non-plus-ultra private city? Has it emerged a sole result 
of the efficiency of the market? Can we think of this model at other locations other than 
the periphery of São Paulo? How is the project responding to public laws and regula-
tions? Was the public hand implicitly driving the process? Can it be classified as a New 
Town? What kind of ideology does a purely privately driven New Town follow? 
In correspondence to the structural approach inherent to this work (cf. Introduction) 
the chapter was ordered along six perspectives on the topic: The planned city’s general 
context will be described first (general context), its formal features are subject of the sec-
ond section (physical structure), the third part profiles the residents of AlphaVille, the 
fourth section delineates the developers and designers, the fifth component attends to the 
financial framework of the project, and finally the sixth part closes with an examination 
of the project’s formal regulatory framework. 
 
Table 28: General overview AlphaVille-Tamboré 
                                               
2 Cf. www.vogaimoveis.com.br/teste/english/exploring_region.htm, 12.01.2009 
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Name of NeoTown AlphaVille-Tamboré, São Paulo 
Country and region Brazil, São Paulo Region (RMSP), 
Barueri and Santana de Parnaíba 
Start date 1973 
Status Incremental development 
Size 3.600 hectares3 
Population 90.000 persons 
Daytime population 150.000 persons 
On-site population None 
Structures 22,000 residential buildings 
Developers AlphaVille Urbanismo SA, Tamboré 
SA4 
Major motive ['1' = decongest; '2' = economic devel-
opment; '3' = security; '4' = lifestyle and representa-
tion, own ranking] 
3, 4, 2, 1 
Type ['A' parallel city; 'B' satellite town; 'C' regional 
node; 'D' independent new centre; 'E' others] 
C 
 
 
 Illustration D-1: Map of Brazil 
                                               
3 Own calculation for the entire group of schemes using Google Earth and area measuring software (http://www.geo-
news.net/index_geof.html) 
4 The firm Gafisa SA appropriated AlphaVille in late 2007. Brascan SA acquired Tamboré in the same year. 
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Context –  
The city as a venture  
An almost chaotic mass of buildings, fragmented by vacant lots, spreads with 
a diameter of approximately 45 kilometres above the hilly terrain of medium 
sized 800 metre mountains. A smog dome spans this structure above. When 
the aeroplane breaks through this dome, groups of high-rises become visible, 
but no public squares. At the edge of the building-mass, and also partially 
towards the interior, industrial estates can be discerned. Everything is im-
mersed in a greyish-white and reddish colour with some dark-green strains 
[...]. The question emerges if a settlement of this type deserves to be labelled 
a “city”.  (V. Flusser 1994) 5 
Introduction 
AlphaVille-Tamboré develops in a specific ground. The project is marked by distinct na-
tional, economic, cultural and historic parameters. Therefore the following section inves-
tigates this fundamental basis. Various spatial and temporal narratives are established 
which facilitate our understanding of the NeoTown venture. 
According to the objectives as presented in the introduction to this thesis, the follow-
ing section examines four major aspects: The first section presents a general socio eco-
nomic and cultural profile of Brazil with a particular emphasis on the condition of ine-
quality. Thereafter São Paulo is scrutinised at various dimensions from the basic num-
bers, to the economic performance, specific spatial forms and typologies. A third part 
devotes attention to the temporal sequence of events from a dual perspective: a) from a 
countrywide, as well as b) from a project based standpoint. Finally the fourth part exam-
ines the environment of AlphaVille-Tamboré’s predecessors, peers, and its ‘offspring’. 
Brazil is the largest nation in Latin America and the fourth largest democracy in the 
world. Since the country became independent in 1822 it was in a constant struggle be-
tween top-down and bottom-up modernisation. The country’s profile portrays advanced 
levels of socio-economic development: urbanisation levels are at 83 percent, services 
amount to three fifths of added value and the human development index is above the 
levels of a developing country. On the other hand, enormous levels of inequality remain a 
constant structural feature of space and society - more than 30 percent of the population 
subsist on less than 2 US$ per day and unofficially this percentage is constantly rising.  
AlphaVille-Tamboré is located in the periphery of the greater region of São Paulo 
(RMSP). This is South America’s most important global city region and one of the largest 
urban agglomerations worldwide. While the city is a forerunner of national modernisa-
tion, it also condenses major extremes and problems such as segregation, crime and pol-
lution. 
The historic framework of AlphaVille is marked by two major periods: The ground 
breaking phase of the project occurs in the context of a major industrial boom of the 
                                               
5 English translation by the author: "Eine beinahe chaotische, von Lücken durchbrochene Häusermenge erstreckt sich mit 
einem Durchmesser von zirka 45 Kilometern über ein bis 800 Meter hohes Mittelgebirge. Darüber hinaus wölbt sich eine 
Smog-Glocke. Durchstößt man mit dem Flugzeug diese Glocke, dann werden verstreute Gruppen von Hochhäusern und 
Hütten sichtbar, jedoch keine Plätze. Am Rande der Häusermenge, stellenweise auch in ihr, erkennt man Industrieanlagen. 
Alles ist ins Grauweiße und Rötliche getaucht, mit einigen dunkelgrünen Flecken. [...] Es stellt sich die Frage, ob eine derarti-
ge Siedlung "Stadt" genannt werden kann." 
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early 1970s, marked by national liberalisation strategies of the military regime. More-
over, the consolidation and maturation of the scheme is embedded in a framework of 
‘denationalisation’ and international liberalisation and democratisation of the 1990s. 
What emerges from AlphaVille-Tamboré is a rich context of predecessors and peers, 
serving as an important model for many other schemes, albeit none of which reach the 
size and complexity of our NeoTown. 
Brazil – ‘O Brasil, é o pais de futuro’6 
“At the core of the crisis was the continued unwillingness of the elite to share 
the benefits of Brazil's wealth with the majority of the people.”7 
 
Table 29: AlphaVille-Tamboré, Selected country level indicators  
Name Federative Republic of Brazil 
Population 174 Million 
Independence 1822 
Shift from industrial to services sector 1970s 
Economic growth rates (1998-2008) ~ 2 percent 
GDP p.a. 1.600 billion US$ 
HDI 80 (South > 90, North < 70) 
GINI Index (Income Inequality) 0,6 
Urbanisation rate 83 percent 
Added value of services 57 percent 
Population < US$ 2 per day 27 percent 
Cars per 1.000 people 120 
 
General profile 
Country 
AlphaVille is located in the Federative Republic of Brazil. Brazil is the fifth largest coun-
try in the world by geographical area. It occupies nearly half of South America’s terrain 
and is only slightly smaller than the USA.8 Brazil is the fourth largest democracy in the 
world and is fifth overall in terms of population.9  
Political system 
Brazil is a young parliamentary democracy. 10 The country was governed by a military 
regime up until the mid 1980s. The foundation of AlphaVille falls in the era of Brazil’s 
third ‘open’ dictatorial regime (1964 - 1985). The era is marked by neo-liberal economic 
                                               
6 A popular Brazilian slogan portrayed by Theresa Caldeira (2000)  
7 James Hudson’s (1997) statement on the 1964 coup d’état 
8 Cf. www.CIA.gov, r12.09.2008 
9 India is the largest democracy. Indonesia is ranking fourth. 
10 After three colonial centuries, Brazil became independent from Portugal in 1822. Slavery was abolished in 1888. Since 
1889 the country was nominally a democratic republic, except for three periods of open autocratic systems (1930–1934; 
1937–1945 and 1964–1985). 
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policies on the one hand, and movements of resistance and extreme levels political vio-
lence and insecurity on the other (in particular in the years from 1968 to 1973). 
Brazil’s present constitution was passed only in 1988. While urbanisation rates are 
among the world’s top, stark problems of poverty, social and economic inequality11, spa-
tial fragmentation and political corruption persist.12 Since colonial times the country has 
been marked by a history of elite-driven and authoritarian politics (this combination is 
also referred to as ‘Caudillismo’).13 
The end of Brazil’s autocratic regime was not as radical as in South Africa, for exam-
ple. It represented an evolution rather than a revolution. Only one year after AlphaVille’s 
inauguration in 1974, the government started a gradual “abertura” (opening). The year 
of 1986 marks the end of the dictatorial regime. In this year a new constitutional com-
mission was elected. A new constitution was finally passed in 1988. 1989 saw the first 
election (Cf. Landman 2002: 7). Of course it can be stated that evolutions have many 
advantages over revolutions. The moderate speed also reflects a reluctance of certain 
population segments to change.14 (Cf. also below: Milestones) 
Market attitude 
The Brazilian market attitude is rather liberal. The authoritarian regimes introduced lib-
eral reforms as early as 1965. The democratic Governments of Collor de Mello, Franco 
and Cardoso promoted a second wave of economic liberalisation between 1991 and 
2001 (Cf. below, Milestones). During this ‘Desestatização’ almost all state owned enter-
prises were denationalised or privatised.15 While the present government under Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva maintains a high degree of continuity, it is also credited for inquiry 
into new solutions ‘beyond the consensus’ (Cf. Fendt 2004: 3).16 
Nevertheless, the country’s governmental system remains characterised by a ‘corpu-
lent’ bureaucratic apparatus. The complex system consumes large amounts of money and 
is highly embedded in the country’s authoritarian and clientelist traditions. In 2006 the 
                                               
11 Stevens (2007) writes that even “By Latin American standards, the disparities in Brazil are particularly unnerving, with a 
political system that in the two decades since the negotiated end of its military dictatorship has been saddled with instability 
through corruption and inertia. Brazil's elites, in place since colonial times, have remained above reproach throughout its 
modern history”. (Stevens 2007) 
12 Indeed, as we will see in the course of this chapter, the discussion of equality (and inequality), as well as socio-spatial 
segregation, is one of the most widespread topics of intellectual discussion among Brazilian academicians. From the per-
spective of the author, there exist in general three large groups of argumentation: one representing a traditional social 
critique, a second representing a perspective of global-city research, and a third preferring a ‘neutral’ and descriptive ap-
proach. Of the papers accessible to the author during the short period this research, Erminia Mericato, Flávio Villaça, or 
Theresa Caldeira represent the first ‘home-grown’ group, scholars such as Regina Kato, Eunice Abascal, or Paulo Pereira 
represent the second global approach, while individuals such as the historian Nestor Reis, or the landscape architect Silvio 
Macedo represent the ‘neutral’ phenomenalistic make-up. 
13 The contrariness of Brazil’s ‘unlimited’ freedom is illustrated when Holston and Caldeira (2008: f19) describe how ruling 
elites managed to erode the privileges: “ Upon independence, Brazil’s birthright citizenship was only restricted by freedom –
 that is, unlike American citizenship, Brazil’s was inclusive and unrestricted for all free people regardless of race. ... In 1881 
they made suffrage direct and voluntary but restricted it to the literate. Moreover, in the Republic’s founding constitution 
(1891), they eliminated the right of citizens to a primary education...” 
14 James Holston and Teresa Caldeira see the massive informal suburbanisation of large cities as a central trigger of the 
democratisation movement: “... these social movements [of poor peripheral dwellers protesting for their „rights to the city“] 
were central actors in the political processes that brought the miliary dictatorship to an end. Their influence was especially 
important during the national Constitutional Assembly (1986-1988) and the numerous state and municipal assemblies that 
followed. ... Most of these articles confer rights unprecendented in Brazil precisely because they concern the new urban 
experiences in the peripheries” (Holston, Caldeira 2008: 21; Cf. also below: São Paulo, Urban Structure). 
15 With yields of about US$ 67.9 billion for the state and US$ 18.1 billion debts transferred to the private sector this pro-
gramme was among the largest privatisation incentives worldwide. (Cf. Anuatti-Neto et al 2005: 152, Cf. also below: Eco-
nomic Indicators) 
16 Indeed, commentators have dubbed Lula’s approach of combining social programmes with liberal politics as the “Brasila 
Consensus” (Cf. Fendt 2004: 1). After the world financial crisis in the fall of 2008, Lula has been actively lobbying for a 
revision of the consensus (Cf. http://anba.achanoticias.com.br/noticia_diplomacia.kmf?cod=7870341, r.15.12.2008). 
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country’s average tax rate amounted to 38 percent of the GDP.17 This is a sum higher 
than in the US and close behind France and Italy (Goldman Sachs 2007: 79). 
Urbanisation 
Brazil is a country with very advanced levels of urbanisation. 83 percent of Brazilians live 
in cities.18 19 In the Seventies, the time when AlphaVille was implemented, about half of 
the country’s population was urbanised. It was the era with the starkest urban growth. In 
2006 Brazil had 14 municipalities with over 1 million inhabitants and 36 municipalities 
with 500 thousand inhabitants (Cf. IBGE 2006). 
As much as other emerging economies, the country developed from a predominantly 
rural into an urban society in only a few decades. While urbanisation was at 30 percent 
in the 1940s the proportions swapped in the 1980s. (Cf. Caldeira 2008) The urban popu-
lation was growing from 30 million in 1950 to 85 million in 2005 and is supposed to 
reach 91 million by 2030. (Cf. Demographia, r12.12.2008) In 1991 nine metropolitan 
Regions, had a combined population of 42.7 million people, almost one-third of Brazil's 
total population.20 (Cf. Hudson 1997) Most of the cities have colonial roots. Manaus, 
Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, or São Paulo, among others, emerged as centers of power and 
trade (Rojas 2004: 7). 
Brazil’s largest urban regions are São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Porto Alegre. All are 
located in the Southeast. They have an aggregated population of 28.6 million, nearly 67 
percent of the total metropolitan population and almost 20 percent of Brazil's total 
population.21 (Cf. Hudson 1997) 
Migratory movements, internal and external 
Brazil’s urban transformation from the 1950s to the 1970 was predominantly triggered 
by an enormous internal migration.22 Within this period the country’s rapidly industrial-
ising urban centres attracted more than 20 million people (Hudson 1997). The urban 
population grew from 56 percent in the 1970s to 75 percent in the 90s (Ibidem). By far 
the greatest number of internal migrants came from the poor Northeast of the country 
(Bogus 2004).2324 In the 1990s the process of regional migration lost momentum, and 
people started to move from the central cities to the suburbs (Hudson 1997). 
Decentralisation programmes 
Brazil is a federative republic of 26 autonomous and equal states (plus the federal dis-
trict).25 Populous states such as São Paulo, and deserted ones tend to have the same po-
                                               
17 India’s tax rate was at 10 and China’s at 18 percent (Goldman Sachs 2007: 79). 
18 75 percent of all Latin Americans are urbanised (Cf. UN 2001) 
19 This also represents a higher amount than France (76%), or the US (77%). Cf. The World Bank 2006) 
20 Belém, Fortaleza, Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo, Curitiba and Porto Alegre (Ibidem) 
21 Looking at the whole Latin American continent, there was no single city in the region with one million inhabitants at the 
turn of the 20th century. 100 years later, about 50 cities of 1 million and more were documented. (This amount had doubled 
since 1975). Four of them were among the 10 largest cities in the world with more than 10 million inhabitants. These 
megacities are Mexico City (with 16.6 million inhabitants), São Paulo (16.5 million), Buenos Aires (11.6 million) and Rio de 
Janeiro (10.2 million) (Cf. Rojas 2004: 4) 
22 The national migration of the 1950s and 1960s is known as the third major migrational movement of Brasil. The previous 
two waves are represented by the slave trade (16th to 18th centuries) as well the movements from Europe (19th century). 
23 In the 1970 the per capita income of the Southeast exceeded the national average by 53.2 percent, while that of the 
Northeast was 44.4 percent lower (Cf. Hudson 1997). 
24 About 20 percent of São Paulo’s residents are supposed to be Baianos (e.g. stemming from the state Bahia in the North 
East, Cf. Rolnik 2008). 
25 The 18th article of the 1998 constitution states: "A organização política administrativa da República Federativa do Brasil 
compreende a União, os Estados, o Distrito Federal e os Municípios, todos autônomos, nos termos desta Constituição" (cf, 
Marini 2000). 
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litical significance.26 While a large share of taxes and revenues goes towards the state and 
central governments, more than half of the municipalities rely on redistributions from the 
federal and state governments.27 This flat distribution of votes and competencies is be-
lieved to be problematic.28 (Cf. Fendt) 
Economic indicators 
“One of the main reasons why Brazil's growth has been slower than China's 
and India's is that Brazil is richer and more urbanised.” (The Economist 
2007) 
 
In 2002 the GDP of Brazil, a country of 170 million, amounted to US$ 452 billion (The 
World Bank 2004). Latest figures of October 2008 indicate a current GDP of US$ 1,6 
trillion and an average per capita product of US$ 8.600.29  This roughly equals India (1 
billion residents), a quarter of Germany (80 million residents), or slightly less than the 
gross product of the city of London.30 31 
In 2002 Brazil’s per capita yearly gross domestic product (GDP) averaged US $2700, a 
figure five times higher than India’s and three times that of Indonesia.32 Indeed Brazil is 
one of the most dynamic emerging economies worldwide.33 The country’s GDP grew at 
moderate rates of 2,3 percent between 2001 and 200634, reflecting the advanced rates of 
urbanisation and development (Goldman Sachs, 2007). During the same period, the 
country’s stock markets have grown by 369 percent (Ibidem) – mainly based on a boom-
ing demand in resources.  
The time of the late 1960s and early 1970s saw the most rapid economic expansion 
and major social and economic transformation. The growth rates of that time amounted 
to ‘Asian dimensions’.35 
                                               
26 “The biggest enemy of Brazil's promise is an overbearing state: Brazil's federal system makes no distinction between 
forested provinces and the metropolis of São Paulo with its population of 10,8m… ‘Every municipality has competence to 
do everything, which is absurd’, says Raquel Rolnik, the national urban secretary… Most don't have capacity.” (The Econo-
mist 2007) 
27 Basically municipalities get about 10 percent of tax revenues, while the central government’s share is as high as 40 per-
cent (Cf. The Economist 2007, quoting the Inter American Development Bank). 
28 In November 2008 Brazil received a us$ 500 Million credit to overhaul its tax management system (Cf. Rojas, at 
www.iadb.org/NEWS/detail.cfm?id=4855, r 12.12.2008). 
29 Cf. IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, 2008, r12.12.2008 
30 Cf. Appendix: Comparative Indicators table 
31 Brazil will be the world’s 8th largest economy in 2025. By then it is supposed to become the fourth largest economy, after 
China, the US and India. Its GDP in PPP is projected to reach US$ 12.000 billion (Goldman Sachs 2007: 140). 
32 Mostly due to high inflation and fiscal reforms, this medium GDP per capita has more than tripled to US$ 8600 in 2008, 
(Cf. The World Bank 2004, CIA 2009, and IMF 2008). 
33 In 2001 the investment bank Goldman Sachs grouped the country, along with Russia, India and China, as one of the four 
“BRICs that would share the dominance of the world economy by 2050. Cf. Goldman Sachs, 2001: Building Better Global 
Economic BRICs’; New York. 
34 This figure is quite moderate compared to the rates of the other three BRICs; it reflects the relatively advanced state of the 
Brazilian economy.  
35 Brazil’s average growth in whole 20th century averaged at 4.9 percent. The 1970s period (also the start-up era of Al-
phaVille) marked an extraordinary “taking-off” period (Cf. Goldman Sachs 2007: 78). In the 1970s, GDP grew 8.7 percent 
annually; industry, 9.5 percent; and agriculture, 4.4 percent. In the same period, the employed population increased 3.9 
percent annually, from 29.6 million to 43.9 million persons (Cf. Hudson 1997), and per capita income experienced a marked 
increase in the 1970s, from US$ 1253 to US$ 2266. Though, the economic growth largely stagnated in the 1980s (“lost 
decade”). This was mainly a result of the 1978 oil shock as well as a severe debt crisis in 1982. Following Geisel’s Real stabi-
lisation plan in 1994, finances were reorganised and hyperinflation eradicated. The country started to grow again. While 
population growth rates have declined since the 1980s, economic growth has become increasingly dependent on capital 
accumulation and total factor productivity. (Cf. Goldman Sachs 2007: 78) 
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Distribution and transformation of economic sectors 
The fact that Brazil’s economy is comparatively advanced is reflected by the distribution 
between the three major economic sectors: agriculture, industry, and services. In 2002 
the agricultural sector produced 24 percent of added value, the industrial sector ac-
counted for 19 percent, and services made up 57 percent (Cf. The World Bank 2004, 
Goldman Sachs 2007).36 The tertiary segment, in 2002 was 2,6 times as large as in India’s 
and 1,5 times as large as Indonesia’s (Cf. Appendix: Comparative matrix).37 Nonetheless, 
it is important to note that the ever-increasing informal domain accounts for a significant 
part of the trend (Cf. below, Cf. Hudson 1997).38  
In the ‘Macrometrópole’ São Paulo the primary sector amounted to insignificant with 
0.1 percent of the total employment, industries engage a rough third of all workers, 
commerce takes up a sixth of all labourers, services 41 percent and public administration 
15 percent (Cf. Villaça 2002). Also, in reference to the well-developed public sector de-
scribed above, public administration posts make up one of the largest parts of the econ-
omy for many cities.39 
Household size and income 
Demographically decreasing household sizes40 and population growth rates41 reflect the 
trends of socio-economic maturation. For Eduardo Rojas of the Interamerican Develop-
ment Bank this is a reason to hope that the situation of the poor may also significantly 
improve: “... people will have an opportunity to increase their income-earning capacity 
and improve their human capital and expand their physical assets, both conditions to 
overcome poverty.” (Rojas 2004: 47) 
Rise of middle classes 
Economic growth has repeatedly lifted the country’s average incomes towards the mid-
dle-income sector (Cf. Hudson 1997). (This was the case during the 1970s, when Al-
phaVille was underway, and again at the turn of the 20th century.42 Many households 
crossed a threshold allowing for increased disposable incomes (Cf. The Economist 2009). 
                                               
36 While the period from 1950 to 1970 witnessed slow growth in agricultural employment and a rapid increase in typically 
urban occupations, the 1970s and 1980 were marked by rapid growth in industrial employment, and the 1980’s and 1990’s 
were characterised by a rise of the services industries (including a rise of urban based informal employment). Correspond-
ingly, the portion of agriculture in total employment fell from about 60 percent in 1950 to 44.3 percent in 1970, that of the 
industrial section expanded from 14,2 percent to 17,9 percent, and that of the services sector increased from 25,9 percent 
to 37,.8 percent. The share of Agriculture fell from 30,1 percent in1980 the share of agricultural employment had fallen to 
9.4 percent in 1992 (Cf. Hudson 1997) 
37 In the industrialised economies service sectors range above the 70 percent mark and agricultural sectors amount to less 
than 5 percent (Ibidem). 
38 Interestingly the numbers for the secondary sector are almost equal with the Indian and Indonesian numbers. They range 
from 17 to 19 percent (Ibidem). While the industrial segment of Indonesia and India increased by 3-4 percentage points in 
the 1990s, in Brazil it declined by six percentage points (Ibidem).  
39 IBGE reported in 2005 that 31.3 percent of all Brazil’s municipalities had more than one third of its economy dependent 
on public administration, and the weight of value added of public administration in Brazil, in 2005, was 13 percent. (Cf. 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/presidencia/noticias/noticia_visualiza.php?id_noticia=1061&id_pagina=1, r05.02.2009) 
40 Brazil went through a very fast transition between the 1980s and 2004, when fertility reached the replacement level 
(Naves 2007:2). Today one person households are on the increase (with a majority of women headed households), and large 
households on the decrease. (Ibidem: 3)  
41 In the 1950 population growth rates were around 3 percent per annum, at the turn of the millennium at 1,5 percent, and 
they are projected to fall below 0,2 percent in 2050. (Cf. Globalis 2008, r 1.12.2008) The average household size in 2008 
was 2,4 people (Cf. http://www.idcide.com/realestate/in/brazil.htm, r12.12.2008)  
42 Only between 2002 and 2005 the number of households with annual disposable incomes over US$10,000 rose by 31,6 
percent (Cf. http://www.euromonitor.com/Brazils_new_middle_class_has_a_growing_appetite_for_consumption, 
r27.03.2009). 
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The resulting population segment chiefly works in the services sector and embarks on 
consumer-oriented lifestyles (de Santos: 2, reciting Caldeira 2000).43  
The growth has engendered a steep rise in demand for consumer goods and services: 
Nowadays 120 out of 1.000 people own a car44, a 75 per thousand have their own per-
sonal computer, the country’s energy consumption ranges at 1074 kg of oil eq.45  
Poverty  
Despite the advanced levels of development a large proportion of Brazil’s population 
remains poor. In 2003, 21 percent of the population lived off of less than US$ 2 and 8 
percent on less than one US$ 1 per day.46 47  Poverty is also reflected by high mortality 
rates, in particular among children: death rates of children under 5 are at 37 per mille.48  
The informal sector 
A growing informal sector is an integral part of Brazil’s economy (as much as in many 
other parts of the developing world). While in the last 15 years extra-legal activities have 
decreased on a national scale, they have sharply increased in the cities (Cf. The Econo-
mist 2007). Increasing deindustrialisation49 and a drastic rise of unemployment are seen 
as the main triggers of this informal boom. This has been particularly drastic in some of 
the traditional industrial centres. Between 1989 and 1997, Porto Alegre lost 31 percent 
of its industrial jobs, Campinas lost 28 percent, Curitiba 7,5 percent, Belo Horizonte 5,5 
percent. But nothing matches the loss in Rio de Janeiro – here 45 percent of industrial 
jobs were cut over that period.50 51 52 53 Today informal employment accounts for almost 
two fifths of all wageworkers.54 55 
Marcio Pochman, a specialist in working relations at UNICAMP56, draws an ever 
bleaker picture and marks out the trend as a process of dismantling of formal working 
                                               
43 Ribeiro (2001:63) states more generally: „The total insertion of Brazil into the global economy solidifies its compliance 
with an international model of urban consumption and its consequences for urban organization.” 
44 This is 10 times more than in Indonesia, and 20 times more than India, yet 4 times less than in the USA. (Cf. The World 
Bank 2004; Cf. also Appendix: Comparative Indicators). 
45 Only slightly more than the Indian and Indonesian numbers, it amounts to 25 percent of US American and 50 percent of 
European levels (Ibidem). 
46 Cf. http://earthtrends.wri.org/povlinks/country/brazil.php, r14.12.2008. 
47 This number was falling from 26,5 percent in 2001 (UN-Habitat 2001; Cf. Comparative chart in the Appendix) 
48 In the in the same range as Egypt or Turkey (Cf. The World Bank 2004) 
49 The value of industrial output decreased nationwide from 23.8 percent in 1994 to 19.1 percent in 1998 (Data from 
SEADE) 
50 FSP: Sep 19, 1999: 2-4 
51 This fact is supported by the observation that average labour productivity has declined since the 1980s. (Cf. Goldman 
Sachs 2007:79) 
52 Precise data on informal-sector employment is rare, but there are indications of its expansion since 1980 (Cf. Hudson 
1997). Unemployment rates have soared from 7,9 percent by the end of the 1980’s (Cf. Hudson 1997) to 18,2 percent in 
1998 (Cf. SEADE figure, quoted in Villaça 2002). Between 1980 and 1990 the share of employees in the total employed 
urban labour force fell from 78,7 percent to 74.6 percent, and the share of the self-employed (many in the informal sector) 
rose from 17,2 percent to 19,1 percent (Cf. Hudson 1997). 
53 One important factor for the rising levels of informality is the rising global demand for flexible supply chains (Cf. the 
mainstream account on informality and globalisation such as Portes 1989). The other interlocking component is Brazil’s 
extraordinarily bureaucratised regulatory context that encourages firms to work undercover (Cf. Goldman Sachs 2007:80).  
54 Soares 2004 accounts the impact of the increase of non-registered workers, as well as a constantly decreasing (!) wage 
gap between registered and non-registered workers as the two decisive factors behind the rise of the Brazilian informal 
sector. He estimates that almost 14 out of 36 million private sector wageworkers work informally. In this context the rise of 
informality is also related to market-oriented reforms, of the early nineties (Ibidem). The data used by Soares stems from the 
Annual Household Survey (PNAD – Pesquisa Nacional de Amostragem Domiciliar) carried out by the Brazilian Statistics Office 
(IBGE – Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatisticas). 
55 „One of the distinguishing features of the Brazilian labour market is the existence of a large number of workers whose 
job contract is not regulated by the legal labour code, i.e., they do not have a “signed work-card”. These contracts are 
informal and illegal but make up something around 40 percent of the “wage workers” and seem to have increased since 
the early 1990’s.“ (Soares 2004: 4) 
56 University of Campinas, State of São Paulo. 
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relations: “Between 1940 and 1990, for each 10 working positions created in the coun-
try, 8 were formally paid jobs. Two were non-paid jobs [autonomous or other]. In the 
90’s, from each 10 working positions created, 8 are non-formally paid [autonomous 
work or other] and 2 are paid, but without formal bonds to the employer.” (Cf. FSP: Jun 
14, 1999: 3-1). 
Informality is also a common feature of Brazil’s urban landscapes. According to data 
provided by Urban Age (2008) in the year 2000 37 per cent of the population in Brazil 
lived in favelas.57  
Inequality and segregation 
“The knowledge of the enormous inequalities which prevail in Brazil, is of 
vital importance, in the understanding not only of the country and its society 
but also of the urban space of its cities as well.” (Villaça 2002) 
Income inequality is one of the most characteristic features of Brazilian society. Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso proclaimed in 1994 "Brazil is no longer an underdeveloped country. 
It is an unjust country."58 Despite of multiple indicators pointing to a relatively matured 
economy, socio-economic unevenness remains a persistent enigma, in varying dimen-
sions: from the North and the South, from rural to urban, and between Caucasian and 
coloured populations. Indeed, as Villaça says above, this sort of ‘structural unevenness’ is 
an important precondition to understand the country.59 
Critical voices such as Oscar Ribeiro speak not only of inequality but of a deliberate 
social exclusion and urban usurpation: “Today, in the context of these ongoing changes, 
the Brazilian urban question is no longer qualified by just inequities, but even more so by 
social exclusion“(Cf. Ribeiro 2001: 64). 
Trends in income and income distribution – rising incomes but growing disparities 
The overall picture presents a parallel development of rising per capita incomes yet at the 
same time falling minimum wages.60 Moreover, the disparity between the top 10 percent 
of earners and the bottom has steadily increased.61 Spatially, the divide surfaces from 
North to South, between city and hinterland, as well as among local neighbourhoods. 
                                               
57 Respective numbers for other countries amounted to 33 percent in Argentina, 22 percent in Colombia and 68 per cent in 
Peru. The average number across South America is 36 percent (Cf. http://www.urban-age.net/10_cities/_data/data_SP.html, 
r07.01.2009). 
58 Quoted in http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Brazil.html, r03.01.2008. 
59 A county survey of The Economist’s (2007) confirms inequality as one permanent feature of Brazilian culture and politics: 
“Brazil's bloodiest conflicts, with the exception of the ruinous Paraguayan war of 1865-1870, have been internal affairs, 
pitting classes, regions and races against each other. The country's thinkers have dwelt on the paradox of a nation where 
power is a rich man's luxury and vitality flows from below. Its politics are a quest to narrow the awkward gap between the 
Brazil of closed condominiums and the other Brazil of untreated sewage. ... In metropolitan areas informality rose sharply 
between 1992 and 2005 even as it fell nationally”. (Cf. The Economist 2007: “Rich man, poor man”) 
60 While Brazil's average per capita income was raised from the low-income range in the late 1950s to the upper middle-
income range in 1980, the average minimum wage shows a downward course. In 1961 the monthly minimum wage aver-
aged US$ 113,30 (in 1986 dollars), while in 1991 it amounted to less than one-third this sum (Cf. Hudson 1997). 
61 In 1960 the poorest 10 percent of the employed labour force with earnings received 1.9 percent of the total earnings, but 
in 1990 their share was only 0,8 percent. At the other extreme, the richest 10 percent increased their share of total earnings 
from 39,6 percent in 1960 to 44.1 percent in 1990 (Cf. Hudson 1997). 
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Growth Environment Score (GES) 62 
Brazil’s ambivalent standing between the first world and the developing world is reflected 
the country’s Growth Environment Score (GES).  In 2007 Brazil’s GES amounted to 4,2. 
The country was ranked 88th rank among 170 nations. Notably, the individual compo-
nents of the GES reveal the county’s fragmented and ambiguous condition. While life 
expectancy and technological standing correlate to Western standards, education, macro-
economic conditions, as well as high debt and inflation are stated as the major problems 
(Cf. Goldman Sachs 2007: 92). 
HDI versus QoL 
These contradictions are also revealed when juxtaposing the Human Development Index 
(HDI) with the quality of life index. While the HDI ranges at 80, along the same levels as 
China, Russia, or Turkey (Cf. UN 2008), if features a quality of life index of 6,47 that is 
not far from Great Britain’s 6,91.63  
Household incomes and polarisation 
Another good indicator of economic polarisation is the distribution of household in-
comes: In 2002 11,2 percent of all households had no income, 32,2 percent earned up to 
3 minimum salaries64, 52,4 percent earned up to 30 minimum salaries, and a residual 
part of 4,2 percent earned more than 30 salaries.65 (Cf. Villaça 2002)66 
Gini-Index 
Brazil’s Gini-Index, a prominent measure for income inequality, amounts to 0,61. It af-
firms the country as one of the most unequal places on the globe and underlines critical 
trends of rising polarisation.67 The Gini coefficient for the country has been constantly 
increasing: from 0.50 in 1960 to 0.56 in 1970, 0.59 in 1980, and 0.60 in 1990 (Hudson 
1997). On a worldwide scale the country is ranked just below Sierra Leone, Botswana, 
and Bolivia.68  
Detailed data for the environs of our study case reveals that AlphaVille-Tamborè is 
located in one of the country’s most unequal regions: Santana de Parnaíba with a Gini of 
0,73 is leading the list of the most uneven municipalities in Brazil. Barueri is not far be-
hind with an index of 0,69.69 70 
 Illustration D-2: Income gaps in São Paulo and Santana de Parnaiba 
                                               
62 GES is an index to measure the openness of a country’s environment to support potential economic growth. It was devel-
oped by Goldman Sachs in 2005. The index measures 13 components across five broad areas macroeconomic stability, 
macroeconomic conditions, human capital, political conditions and technology to assess the growth environment (Cf. 
Goldman Sachs 2007: 143). 
63 The quality of life index is measured on a scale from 1 to 10. 
64 One minimum salary in 2006 amounted to about 170 US$ 
65 If a threshold is drawn at the mark of one minimum salary, the 1990 household survey revealed that 30.8 percent (some 
19.9 million people) of the employed population earned this amount or less. Accordingly 14 percent earned more than 20 
minimum salaries (Cf. IBGE 2001, Censos Demográficos). 
66 “In Brazil the wealthiest 20 percent have an income 33 times bigger than the poorest 20 percent. In Mexico it is 13 times 
bigger... the wealthiest 10 percent capture 46 percent of total income, whereas the poorest 10 percent capture only 1 
percent...” (Cf. Villaça 2002, quoting the UN Human Development Index, 2000). 
67 Cf. UN 2007, Cf. cia.gov, r12.03.2009. 
68 Indonesias’s and India’s Gini values range below 0,4, Germany’s at 0,3 (Cf. Appendix: Comparative Indicators). 
69 Barueri heads the list of municipalities of 200.000 residents and more. Cf. http://www.fomezero.gov.br/noticias/barueri-
usa-pesquisas-para-melhorar-odm/?searchterm=urbaniza%C3%A7%C3%A3o, r28.03.2009 
70 In contrast the State of São Paulo, with a Gini of 0,59 was slightly less unequal than the whole country,  
 (Cf. IBGE 2002: Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil, quoted in: Prefeitura do Município de Santana de Parnaíba, 
Plano Diretor 2005/2006, ANEXO A.08) 
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North-South divide 
Brazil continues to be marked by an immense North-South divide. In 1990 53,1 percent 
of the country’s 39,1 million poor, stemmed from the deprived Northeast - less than half 
that amount (25,4 percent) came from the well-off Southeast. Notably, in the Northeast, 
the majority of the poor lived in rural areas, while in the Southeast the largest portion of 
the poor lived in cities (Hudson). While huge national disparities existed from the begin-
ning (initially the North was dominating the country), the period of 1968-73 (the plan-
ning period of AlphaVille) marks an important watershed, characterised by a concen-
trated industrialisation of the South leading to an increasing concentration of incomes 
and an increasing articulation in regional disparities (Hudson 1997). 
The polarisation and concentration in wealth is even more clearly displayed at the 
level of metropolitan regions. In 2006, only five municipalities bundled 25 percent of the 
country’s wealth. The contributions of São Paulo (11,9%), Rio de Janeiro (5,4%), 
Brasília (3,8%), Belo Horizonte (1,4%) and Curitiba (1,4%), together accounted for 
about one quarter of the Brazilian GDP.71  
Literacy rates – disparity among class, ethnicity and place 
As with other socio-economic data the combination of advanced development and high 
polarisation is displayed by literacy rates. Almost 88 percent of Brazilian’s above the age 
fifteen can read.72 The rates for the genders are almost equal. On the other hand, a re-
gional resolution reveals that in rural areas of the Northeast and North literacy rates are 
at African levels, while in the urban areas of the Southeast and South the figures correlate 
to developed nations (Cf. Hudson 1997). Moreover, the literacy levels also correlate with 
the income levels. 73  Illiteracy is ten times greater in the poorest 20 percent of population. 
Notably it is not only the quantity but also the quality of Brazilian education that has 
a poor reputation – at least as the public sector is concerned. While, for example, Brazil 
spends almost twice as much (4,1 percent of GDP a year) on education as China; it ranks 
poorly in terms of the average number of years spent in school (Goldman Sachs 2008). 
Urban-rural-gap 
As much as elsewhere, Brazilian income levels also correlate with urbanisation rates. 
In the period 1975 to 2000, with few exceptions, urbanisation led higher per capita in-
comes (Cf. Rojas 2004: 8).74  
In general the proportion of poverty in cities is smaller than in rural areas. While, in 
absolute terms about half of Brazil’s poor lived in rural areas and the other half in urban 
areas, in relative terms, the proportion of the urban poor (22,5 percent) was substantially 
lower than that of the rural poor (50,1 percent, Cf. Hudson 1997).75 In 1990 the total 
number of poor in the nine largest metropolitan regions amounted to almost 12,3 million 
people, or 28,9 percent of the total population. São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro had the 
                                               
71 Cf. IBGE 2006: “Gross Domestic Product of Municipalities 2003-2006” at 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/estatistica/economia/pibmunicipios/2006/default.shtm, r05.02.2009 
72 This is about the same rate as Indonesia, and twice as much as India (UNESCO data, at Globalis 2008). 
73 According to the 1991 census data, illiteracy rates can be as low as 0,4 percent among those youngsters (16-19) whose 
families earn more than two minimum salaries in Rio Grande do Sul and as high as 84,3 percent among those in ages 79 
living in the Northeast and in families with incomes equivalent to one quarter of the minimum wage (Cf. http://www.brazil-
brasil.com/blajul98.htm, 28.03.2009). 
74 On the entire Latin American subcontinent Economies of more urbanised regions grew faster than those of less urbanized 
regions, as urban areas offered better employment opportunities, higher incomes and easier access to public services. 
75 Significantly the Greater São Paulo region featured a lower share of households that earned more than the 20-fold mini-
mum wage. In 2000 the respective number for the region ranged at 7 percent, while it amounted to 20 percent for the 
whole country (Cf. IBGE 2001, Censos Demográficos). 
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largest absolute numbers of poor (over 3 million, or nearly 24 percent of the total metro 
region), but the highest levels of urban poverty were in the urban regions of the North 
and Northeast (Cf. Hudson 1997, Cf. above). 
Disparities within urban regions 
The income gap has also constantly increased within urban areas. It widened in all met-
ropolitan regions, except Curitiba, between 1970 and 1988 (Cf. Hudson 1997). In the 
Greater São Paulo region of the early 1990s, 60 percent of the employed work force 
earned less than two minimum wages.76 At the other end, 11 percent of the employed 
workers secured more than 10 times the minimum wage.77  
Lucia Maria Machado Bogus and Suzanna Pasternak (2004) describe how the trend 
towards spatial polarisation and segregation leads to gated communities and informal 
settlements as two extremes. They also describe the problematic impact of these urban 
typologies towards basic rights and democratic values: “One similarity between the two 
extremes, the slums and condos, is the denial of democratic values in the city, regarding 
the law, freedom of movement, the existence of a public space and equality."78  
Spatial fragmentation 
„Social class segregation is a necessary process for the upper classes to con-
trol the process production of urban space“ (Villaça 2002) 
Since inequality and exclusion have significant implications for space and the urban 
structure, urban fragmentation and polarisation are major characteristics of the contem-
porary Brazilian city. In this context the urban tissue is increasingly fragmented and vari-
ous land uses exist in close proximity without a direct interrelation: we find luxury en-
claves next to favelas, schools next to light industries, or agriculture. The Argentinean 
scholar Eduardo Garay compares this phenomenon to the process of coagulating mayon-
naise or milk.79  
Box 26: Theory of social class segregation 
We have seen above, that the comprehension of phenomena such as segregation, 
fragmentation and exclusion is of utmost relevance to understand the condition of Bra-
zilian cities.80 Unfortunately the interrelationships of urban structure and social struc-
ture are rarely understood. While many researchers keep measuring and describing so-
cial gaps and spatial fragmentation quantitatively, few theories on the phenomena 
have been developed. The São Paulo urban planner and professor Flavio Villaça repre-
sents one significant school of thought. He seeks to tackle this knowledge gap by de-
                                               
76 10,8 percent, or 6,5 million persons, earned only one-half of a minimum wage (a monthly average of US$ 299), and 49,2 
percent of the employed work force, or 29,8 million persons, received two minimum wages or less (Cf. Hudson 1997 quot-
ing IBGE’s the 1991 household survey) 
77 7,8 percent received more than ten minimum wages, a monthly average of US$ 1941, and 3,2 percent, or 1,9 million 
persons, earned more than twenty minimum wages, or a monthly average of US$ 4000. At that time, more than 60 percent 
of formal employees earned less than the average monthly earnings of US$ 211 (Ibidem). 
78 “Uma semelhança entre os dois extremos, as favelas e os condomínios, está na negação dos valores democráticos da 
cidade, o respeito`a lei, o direito de livre circulação, a existência de um espaço público e igualitário.” (Bogus and Pasternak 
2004, Translation by the author) 
79 Cf. Prof Garay during a lecture given in 2003 at the FADU/UBA in Buenos Aires. 
80  “One of the most outstanding features of urban space in Brazilian large and middle size cities is that all of them exhibit 
to a considerable degree a significant pattern of socio-spatial segregation. It is a subtle type of segregation, different from 
traditional patterns. ... This pattern has to be understood if one has to understand the structure of metropolitan space in 
Brazil.” (Villaça 2002) 
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veloping a theory of Social Class Segregation.81 The perspective is based on Villaça’s 
professional expertise as a public planner and a scholar with a profound familiarity with 
the work of Manuel Castells.82  
The most important ‘principles’ of the theory of class segregation and the characteris-
tics of the elite sectors that Villaça has in mind can be summarised as follows: 
Social class segregation is: 
1) Defined as a process that enables upper-class populations to control urban territories 
and the production of urban space. “In societies with a wide gap between the rich and 
poor the control of urban space production process would be impossible without seg-
regation in one single region of the metropolitan area.”(Ibidem) 
2) Dominating other kinds of segregation, for example segregation along lines of eth-
nicity or religion. Villaça writes accordingly that “Class segregation is the main force de-
termining urban spatial structure and differences in urban space, in societies with a 
deep gap between social classes.” ... “In São Paulo rich gays and poor gays meet in dif-
ferent sectors on the city”. (Villaça 2002) 
3) Mainly driven by the upper classes, who cultivated certain patterns in Brazil. Villaça 
writes accordingly “In Brazil upper-class neighbourhoods have shown a pattern of 
movement, always in the same direction.” (Ibidem) 
4) Dependent on the size of the social gap that exists in a society: “We believe that the 
wider the gap between social classes’ economic and political power (as in Latin Amer-
ica) the stronger will be upper-class segregation and the stronger the role their segre-
gated area will play in shaping the whole of urban spatial structure.” (Ibidem) 
5) Fostering a trend towards a disproportionally high concentration of upper income 
households in certain areas: “In most cities – São Paulo included – such areas concen-
trate about 10 percent of total population but more then 50% of upper class families. 
(Ibidem)  and “Only segregation in one single broad urban region – the one we are call-
ing here area of high concentration of upper income classes – makes possible for upper 
classes the control of the urban economy... “ (Ibidem) 
6) Nonexclusive as: “The remaining 50 percent are spread out all over the remaining 
urban area.” ... “The majority of upper class families live in such areas, but the reverse is 
not true.” (Ibidem) 
An “Area of high concentration of upper income classes” is characterised as follows: 
a) It is heterogeneous and thus may contain several neighbourhoods of different social 
classes, sometimes-even favelas (Cf. Paraisópolis is Morumbi) 
b) The elite group does not need to make up the majority in numbers. “Most often a 
majority is comprised of non-middle class households.” (Ibidem) 
c) Centrality and access to jobs, services and infrastructures are of primary importance. 
d) The structure grows in a certain direction. In the case of São Paulo the wedge formed 
‘vetor sudoeste’. (Cf. below) 
 Illustration D-3: Photograph of São Paulo’s ‘operative landscape’ 
Liberalisation programmes and their effects 
„Trade liberalisation has exerted a strong positive influence on TFP 83, and 
thus has been a key driver of growth“ (Goldman Sachs 2007: 78). 
                                               
81 Indeed Villaça (2002) charges the research world of not having developed any significant insight on urban segregation 
since the renowned works of Chicago School of Sociology in the 1920s. 
82 Castells’ theories are fundamental to Villaça. The Spanish-Californian researcher established a theory of spatial segrega-
tion as an instrument of power and control and stressed the relevance plays in this process when he states: “Urban space is 
a set of resources produced by human labour and social classes struggle for its unequal appropriation... location is the main 
and non-reproducible or these resources. ... Through segregation, the production (and consumption) process of locations 
(and their counterpart which is transportation) is controlled. The control we are talking about is exercised through the con-
trol of space production in itself.” (Castells 1978 quoted by Villaça 2002) 
83 Total factor productivity 
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A high level of internationalization is among the basic characteristics of the Brazilian 
economy. For many years now foreign corporations have played a leading role in many 
economic segments (Cf. Hiratuka 2008). Private entrepreneurs have played a crucial role 
in the development of urban infrastructure.84  
After the World WarII the county experienced two significant waves of economic lib-
eralisation: a first linked to the model of a techno-authoritarian development of the 1960 
and 1970s, and a second in relation to the democratisation process of the early 1990s. 
The intermediate era of the 1980s was marked by a recession and a debt crisis. This has 
largely contributed to the end of the authoritarian era leading to democratisation, de-
regulation and privatisation reforms (Cf. below: Milestones). 
I- Wave – Economic policies during AlphaVille’s founding 
AlphaVille’s story is deeply embedded in the economic strategies of the military regime 
and the resulting economic boom. “When the revolutionaries took over in April 1964, 
Brazil was approaching bankruptcy, with foreign-exchange reserves of less than US $150 
million, and a cost of living that was soaring at the fantastic rate of 144 percent a year.” 
(Hudson 1997).  
The situation changes when the military regime of 1964-1986 embarks on a develop-
ment policy marrying central planning and liberal development models that results in a 
technocratic planning approach.85 At the time, foreign corporations are matched with 
domestic enterprises (public as well as private) to develop a diversified industrial (in-
fra)structure of western standards. This is seen as an important precondition for the suc-
cess of import substitution policies aimed at helping the country to rebound86 (Cf. 
Ribeiro 2001; Veiga 2004; Hiratuka 2008; Cf. below: Milestones). The strategies, along 
a context of a favourable world economy, result in a very rapid growth.87 
Amount of World Bank aid money, funds in the 1970s 
An important factor that supported Brazil’s economic turnaround in the 1970s was a 
gush of international aid money. Some say that Brazil’s decision to join the anticommun-
ist club was rewarded by a flood of investments and loans. The Time magazine of De-
cember 31 1965 heralded that: “President Humberto Castello Branco's tough-minded 
revolutionary government is giving Brazil a breath of political and economic stability.” 
(Cf. TIME Magazine, December 31, 1965)88 
                                               
84 In the 19th century São Paulo‘s streets, tramway and electricity systems are developed by the São Paulo Tramway Light & 
Power (also termed ‘Light‘), a British-Canadian enterprise (Cf. Anelli, 2008:17). 
85 Cf. the postcolonial Suharto regime in the Indonesian Chapter of this thesis. 
86 In the mid-1970s, the regime began implementing a development plan aimed at increasing self-sufficiency in many sec-
tors and creating new comparative advantages. Its main components were to promote import substitution of basic industrial 
inputs (steel, aluminium, fertilizers, petrochemicals), to make large investments in the expansion of the economic infrastruc-
ture, and to promote exports. (Cf. Hudson 1997) 
87 The policy was only possible at the expense of enormous sums borrowed on international markets, while: “… the interna-
tional financial system was awash in petrodollars and was eagerly offering low-interest loans.” (Hudson 1997). 
88 The TIME article reported in more detail that: “Alcoa is planning a $50 million aluminium project, Volkswagen is spending 
$100 million to double its 60,000-car annual production, and Ford is building a $30 million plant that will turn out all-
Brazilian Galaxies in 1966” (Ibidem). Moreover, The World Bank – absent from Brazil since 1959 – agreed to lend US$ 80 
million for power projects. The International Monetary Fund, another long-absent investor, chipped in $125 million, plans to 
offer $120 million to $180 million more in new standby credit next year. And the U.S., which cut Alianza aid to Brazil to a 
trickle under Goulart [the last president before the overthrow], has granted more than US$500 million in technical and 
economic assistance. (Time Magazine 1965: “Brazil: Toward Stability”; Friday, Dec. 31, New York; at: 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,842333,00.html, r27.12.2008) 
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II Wave– ‘democratic liberalisation’ 
As a reaction to the structural and debt crisis of the 1980s the democratic governments 
embark on further liberalisation reforms. In this context the Collor, Itamar and Cardoso 
governments become known for their Plano Collor and “Plano Real” programs. 
During this time the state starts to privatise an increasing number of strategic national 
entreprises under the National Privatization Program (Programa Nacional de Desestati-
zação, or PND).89 In addition the country opens up for direct foreign investments and 
international trade. 
Notably, the liberalisation and decentralisation policies aggravate two important spa-
tial trends: a) an ongoing dispersal of the industrial productive system throughout the 
country; and b) the concentration of points of power, decision making, innovation and 
advanced tertiary services. This context was affirmative for São Paulo’s role as an eco-
nomic centre of Brazil and beyond (Mercosur). 
Internationalisation 
Since the return of the democracy as well as the opening up of trade borders, economic 
internationalisation is on the rise. (Cf. below: Milestones) The expanding presence of 
internationals, as well as massive inflows of international money and technology, has had 
far-reaching effects on the local economic system, up to the organisation of enterprises.90 
Significantly in the mid 1990s most of the legal differences between Brazilian compa-
nies and foreign owned companies are abandoned, and state monopolies on oil and gas 
end (Cf. Veiga 2004: 4). The major reforms affect not only the FDI regulations but also 
the investment rules. Likewise many public monopolies (e.g. health and infrastructure 
sector) are opened up for private entrepreneurship (Ibidem: 4).91 As a result international 
corporations begin to expand their presence in the Brazilian economy again.92  
FDI inflows; Aid money, remittances etc 
A notable result of the democratic liberalisation is a huge inflow of foreign money. Brazil 
becomes the largest addressee of foreign direct investments (FDI) in Latin America and 
one of the largest worldwide.93 It also becomes one of the largest clients of The World 
Bank.94 At the turn of the Millennium FDI amounts to US$ 30 billion. Only China re-
ceives more money at that time (Cf. Rothmuller 2003)  
After reaching 5,4 percent of GDP in the year 2000 and declining to less than 1,7 per-
cent in 2003, international investments rise to US$ 3, 5 billion in 2007 (Cf. The World 
Bank 2008). The largest share of the international money, 28 percent, originates in the 
USA. 15 percent comes from Germany (UNCTAD 2002). While before 1995 the largest 
share (64 percent) of the money went to the manufacturing sector, the ratio flips in 2000 
towards the services sector (UNCTAD 2002, Hiratuka 2008). 95 
                                               
89 The Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico–BNDE coordinated the plan. (Cf. Hudson 1997) 
90 The recent merger of AlphaVille Urbanismo with Gafisa, and of Tamboré SA with Brascan, can be seen as a reverberation 
of this trend of economic consolidation under conditions of increased international competition 
91 Hudson 1997 also reports that: “During the Collor government between 1990 and 1992, fifteen state-owned enterprises 
were privatized, yielding about US$ 3.5 billion in total proceeds. The most important sale was that of the Minas Gerais Iron 
and Steel Mills, Inc. (Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais SA-Usiminas) steel company in October 1991, which alone ac-
counted for nearly twice the revenue of all previous privatizations and sold for US$ 2.3 billion.” 
92 Hiratuka 2008:4 notes that: from the 1980s to the mid nineties FDI inflows increased from approximately US$ 1.5 billion 
to an average annual level of US$ 24 billion. 
93 Cf. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2002, FDI in brief: Brazil, at 
www.unctad.org/sections/dite_fdistat/docs/wid_ib_br_en.pdf, r12.12.2008. 
94 Cf. Catoinstitute.org 1988, https://www.cato.org/dailys/5-04-98.html r.04.01.2008. 
95 By 2000, the service sector’s share in the FDI stock increases to 64percent and that of the manufacturing sector had 
dropped to 33.7 percent. (Cf. Hiratuka 2008: 5) 
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Crucially, the monetary inflows augment the share of the Brazilian economy in foreign 
hands (Cf. Hiratuka 2008: 5). The implications of this trend are highly controversial and 
are debated among liberal and protectionist sides. Some critics suggest that mainly the 
donor countries benefit from their FDI investments (Cf. Rothmuller 2003).96 Others see 
more positive effects: Hiratuka (2008: 9), for example states that multinationals in Brazil 
are generally more productive, have a higher qualified labour force, pay higher wages, 
are more innovative and have a higher degree of trade integration.  
While Hiratuka is sceptical that the impact of internationals would have a dynamising 
effect on productivity for the industrial structure as a whole, the contrary can be ob-
served in the case of AlphaVille Urbanismo and Tamboré SA. As will be seen in the 
course of this chapter, AlphaVille’s major developers appropriate international standards 
and technologies early on and become part of larger conglomerates and overseas mar-
kets,97  
Liberalisation of the housing sector 
In the context of deregulation and liberalisation as described above, Brazil’s housing sec-
tor has also seen a fundamental overhaul (Cf. Rojas 2004).98 The national housing 
strategies increasingly shifted from supply towards demand-driven tactics along the prin-
ciples of the Washington Consensus (Cf. the Introduction chapter).99 This ‘enabling ap-
proach’ to housing markets implied that the government started to play the role of a 
regulator and facilitator instead of a direct provider.  
The new policy rested on two main pillars: 1) A direct, demand-driven system of di-
rect household subsidies, as well as 2) the provision of houses by private sector enter-
prises. Long-term mortgage-backed loans for households as well as for developers have 
been an essential instrument in this context.100  
Another important aspect of the reforms was political decentralisation. In the 1990s, 
the state and municipalities took over expanded responsibilities for the provision of key 
services (such as health and education) to low-income populations and the regulation and 
overseeing of privatised services. International donors largely supported these initia-
tives.101  
Effects of liberalisation on the real estate and construction sectors 
By the end of 1980s Brazil became The World Bank’s largest urban development bor-
rower and many Brazilian cities started to invest in urban infrastructure. As a conse-
quence the property and construction sectors were experiencing a major boom. In the 
first decade of the 21st Century the country’s economy experienced extraordinary growth 
                                               
96 Hiratuka 2008 states that: “According to data from the census of foreign capital carried out in 1995 and 2000 by the 
Brazilian Central Bank, total sales of foreign majority-owned companies reached 14.4% of Brazil’s total output in 1995. In 
2000, this ratio increased to 19.7%. Foreign corporations also increased their share of the country’s foreign trade, reaching 
41.3% of exports and 49.3% of imports” (Ibidem: 5). The role of the foreign capital is even stronger when we consider only 
large companies. Among the largest 500 private Brazilian companies, those under foreign control accounted for 41.2% of 
sales in 1989. This share increased to 49.9% in 1997 and, by 2003, reached 51.7% (Ibidem: 5). 
97 Cf. the Developers and Finance sections below 
98 It appears that many aspects of the liberal reforms in India and Indonesia worked along parallel lines. 
99 The 1980s in particular witnessed the gradual consolidation of a novel approach to low-cost housing and housing sector 
financing and management” (Rojas 2004). The approach was originally advocated by the United Nations (HABITAT, 1988) 
and then adopted by The World Bank in the early 1990s (The World Bank, 1993) and by the IDB shortly thereafter (IDB, 
1995a). (From Rojas 2004: 23) 
100 Rojas (2004: 23) lists among the major priorities for reforms: The development primary and secondary mortgage markets, 
the facilitation of land subdivision and servicing for residential uses, and improvements in the construction industry. 
101 International donors accordingly introduced new programmes and policies to strengthen the capacities of the sub-
national governments. In addition, they developed ‘Private Sector Lending Windows.’ The Bank provided syndicated loans 
and guarantees for private companies investing in municipal infrastructure, most frequently in sanitation, transportation and 
energy distribution (Rojas/IADB: 35). 
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along a global boom of basic resources (Cf. Goldman Sachs 2007), as well as a tempered 
inflation (Cf. The Economist 2007). Now international investors seek to diversify their 
stakes in infrastructure as well as real estate projects and property and construction 
companies are increasingly prominent among those heading for the Novo Mercado (The 
Economist 2007).102 The real estate consultancy Colliers reports a recent boom in the 
construction of large Grade A and A+ office buildings, which is based on the increasing 
valorisation of spaces in central cities.103 Consequently, São Paulo now features the third 
highest office prices, after New York and Washinghton D.C.104 105 
Culture – A colourful balance between integration and segregation 
In addition to demographic, historic and economic factors, culture is a significant com-
ponent of society. Consequently it becomes important to understand the same as a pre-
condition of conceptualising the production of contemporary space. Behavioural codes, 
morals, and traditions the everyday have a tremendous impact on the construction (and 
structure) of space and politics. Yet, in contrast to profits, population numbers or his-
torical dates, the object is elusive and much more difficult to qualify. A subject aiming to 
conceptualise his own culture faces the puzzle of transcending it at the same time. More-
over, culture, as much as space, is a process that is subject to constant development, re-
definition and change. 
Even so, the next paragraph makes an attempt to elucidate the cultural context of 
Brazil and to explore the possible impacts of culture on the production and formation of 
contemporary space. It will thus provide a brief outline of the political, religious and 
ethnic dimensions of Brazilian culture. Some of these dimensions, such as ‘Caudillismo’, 
have been briefly encountered above. 
Multiethnic society 
 
The Brazilian culture is known for its relative freedom regarding the human 
body: From carnival to soccer, Bodies are constantly being moved, vitalised, 
and presented. This attitude parallels a way of life for that the exterior space 
was always more important as a space of representation than interior spaces, 
consequently the street is more important than the four walls of the own 
apartment.106 
                                               
102 The Economist 2007 comments in its special report titled “The blessings of stability”: that “investors are crowding 
around Brazilian infrastructure projects like thirsty sheep”. It also reports that: “Now builders lick their lips at the prospect of 
“Mexicanisation”, thanks to stability and better loan guarantees. Property and construction companies are prominent 
among those heading for the Novo Mercado. (The Economist 2007: The blessings of stability. Lower inflation has done 
wonders for finance and industry.) 
103 „O Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo (IPCA) prevê uma leve redução da inflação para os próximos 12 
meses, e um pequeno aumento no crescimento da economia de 3,90% para 4%. ... A estabilidade da economia que vem 
aquecendo o mercado imobiliário desde 2006 tem permitido uma rápida absorção das novas áreas que estão sendo 
entregues, motivando assim, o investimento de construtoras que tiram do papel grandes projetos e aceleram a construção 
de empreendimentos já em andamento. ... Os edifícios considerados A e A+ são grande parte do novo estoque, que entrará 
no mercado nos próximos anos, representando 90% dos edifícios em construção em São Paulo. (Cf. Colliers International: 
Knowledge Report Primeiro Trimestre, 2007) 
104 Cushman & Wakefield 2005 at 
http://www.cushwake.com/cwglobal/jsp/newsDetail.jsp?repId=ca3400256&LanId=EN&LocId=GLOBAL, r03.01.2009. 
105 The average monthly rental price for a square metre of A+ office space in the city was ranging around BRL 110,00. Price 
peaks of BRL 130,00 per square metre per month have been reported for the new centre of Faria Lima (Colliers 2008b). 
106 “Die brasilianische Kultur ist bekannt für relative Freiheit in Bezug auf den menschlichen Körper. Vom Karneval bis zum 
Fußball werden Körper bewegt belebt und zur Schau gestellt. Diese Einstellung ist parallel zu einer Lebensweise, für die der 
Außenraum als Ausdrucksmöglichkeit immer wichtiger war als der Innenraum, und daher auch die Stadt und die Straße 
wichtiger als die eigenen vier Wände.” (Cf. Silke Knapp at Wolkenkuckucksheim; http://www-1.tu-
cottbus.de/BTU/Fak2/TheoArch/Wolke/deu/Themen/021/Kapp/Kapp.htm, r04.01.2008) 
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Brazil represents one of the most colourful, multicultural and multiethnic societies on the 
planet. The Brazilian model of society is based on cultural and ethnic heterogeneity, so-
cial integration and tolerance, while for example, the Anglo-Saxon model has much 
longer thrived on the institutionalisation of difference, anti-miscegenation policies are 
unknown in Latin America.107 
The roots for the country’s hybrid culture date back to colonial times, marked by a 
legacy of Portuguese colonial rule, African slave populations108, as well as large inflows 
of migrants from Europe and Asia. A significant amount of ethnic and cultural mixing 
occurred between Native Americans, Portuguese and Africans. In the late 19th and early 
20th centuries Italian, German, Spanish, Arab and Japanese added to the cultural diver-
sity. 
While the strong tradition of racial integration made Brazil, at least officially, a ‘col-
oured democracy’ without prejudice towards diverse people,109 the country’s fragmented 
urban landscapes portray the fact that various cultural dimensions have never mixed and 
that a culture of differentiation and segregation exists. 
Religion 
The language, religion and law of the Portuguese colonisers can be seen as an instru-
ment of synchronisation and control. Portuguese is the major language spoken by almost 
every citizen. Likewise the country is predominantly Christian, featuring the world’s 
largest Catholic community in the world.110  
Ethnicity 
Still, Brazil is among the most racially heterogeneous countries on earth. A blending of 
African, Indian, and European elements makes Brazilian culture unique. Slightly more 
than half of Brazilians, 53.7 percent, are classified as white, about two fifths, or 38.5 
percent are mulatto (mixed white and black), 6.2 percent are black, Japanese, Arab, and 
Amerindian minorities comprise about one percent, and 0.7 percent are unspecified 
(2000 census quoted in www.cia.gov, r 04.01.2008).  
Yet, these distinct categories may be misleading as most Brazilians are supposedly of 
mixed ancestry. In the past the country never had two discrete racial categories—black 
and white—and Brazilians recognize a wide variety of ethnic categories.111 As a conse-
quence a national identity of a Brazilian “race” is prevalent, and this in turn serves as a 
common reason for most of Brazilians to distinguish themselves from other Latin Ameri-
cans. 112 
                                               
107 „Quando analisamos o modelo norte-americano (ou mesmo anglo-saxão) observamos que a segregação étnica e racial é 
uma prática histórica. Nossa tradição latina defende que a convivência entre diferentes permite uma maior tolerância social. 
O local por excelência de convivência de grupos sociais distintos seria o espaço público.“ (Loffredo 2006: 2) 
108 The practice of slavery began earlier, lasted longer, and involved the importation of two to three times more slaves than 
in the United States. When by the 17th century the deportation of slave into North America was just beginning, slave trade 
had already been operating for more than a century in Brazil. While the greatest amount of settlers who came to the North 
American colonies were families, the Portuguese colonists were frequently single males (Cf. 
http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Brazil.html, r04.01.2008). 
109 Cf. http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Brazil.html, r04.01.2008. 
110 Nearly three quarters of all residents are Roman Catholic; another 15,4 percent are Protestant. (Cf. www.cia.gov, r 
04.01.2008) 
111 Historically Brazil was a nation of coloured people until the 1870s. In the first national census in 1872 over 60 percent of 
the population was classified as black or of mixed ancestry. Portuguese colonists amounted only to a small proportion of 
slave and indigenous populations. The resulting tendency of single white men to take African or indigenous women as 
concubines or wives eventually lead to the great racial mix that characterizes Brazilian society today (Cf. 
http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Brazil.html, r04.01.2008). 
112 Ibidem 
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Despite the formally open and multiethnic society the real population is extremely po-
larised and fragmented (Cf. Above: Section on segregation). Undoubtedly dark-skinned 
populations are more likely to be deprived and poor.113 Ethnic compositions also vary in 
the various parts of the country. The Northeast has a high proportion of people of Afri-
can descent; the South and Southeast are home to the bulk of Brazilians of European and 
Japanese ancestry. Indigenous people live largely in the North and Central-West. (Cf. 
Ibidem) 
Elite cultures 
Despite being one of the most equal and tolerant countries on the globe, by constitution 
as well as by culture, the country remains dominated by feudalistic traditions and elitist 
cultures.114 Powerful minorities generally resist political change, explore legal loopholes 
and slow down the redistribution of political and economic power. This was the case, for 
example, when it took ten years to approve a new constitution.115 Moreover the power of 
the privileged groups appears to be reinforced by government support (Cf. Villaça 2001, 
2002).116  
The country’s elite culture is rooted in a legacy of large monopolist land holdings. 
Brazil's agrarian structure is dominated by large land possessions. Significantly, less than 
one percent of the farms comprise more than 44 percent of the area. While more than 
three million farmers work on 20 million hectares, the twenty largest landowners own 
the same amount. 117 
Today, this tradition of the privileged is increasingly drawn along the lines of class 
and income. It materialises in affluent urban sectors attracting large sums of public 
money, or in the increasing prominence of high-rise condominiums or guarded land divi-
sions (loteamentos fechados), modules that also form the basic structure of AlphaVille-
Tamboré. 
Jeitos and Clientilism 
In many developing countries, including Brazil, it is not the existence of laws and regula-
tions that is a problem, but their acceptance and enforcement (Cf. the Jakarta Chapter). 
While the regulatory frameworks tend to be extremely formalised and occasionally cor-
rupt, down to earth pragmatism in achieving the desired ends is what counts.  
Two important survival strategies in this context are ‘jeitos’ and clientelism: ‘Jeitos’ 
demarcates a strategy of cutting through bureaucratic obstacles, such as rules and red 
tape, to achieve a desired end.118 Clientelism refers to a practice of produced and main-
                                               
113 Whites’ incomes are 250 percent greater than non-whites. Non-whites have fewer years of schooling than whites, with 
illiteracy rates of 30 percent and 12 percent respectively (Ibidem). 
114 “20 years of military dictatorship did not abolish the culture of cordialidade” and even former presidents condemn a lack 
of citizenship and respect for the law. (Former president Fernando Cardoso quoted in The Economist 2007) 
115 Theresa Caldeira 2000 (372) confirms that: "the justice system is ineffective, justice is exercised as a privilege of the elite, 
individual and civil rights are delegitimized, and human rights violations (especially by the state) are routine.” 
116 In studying São Paulo’s elite neighbourhood of Morumbi Gonçalvez (1998: 12), a renowned local architect, confirms that 
the state reinforces the powerful elites by providing them with the entire major infrastructure necessary to sustain the pre-
sent system. James Holston and Teresa Caldeira (2008:18) speak of an “exclusionary regime of political citizenship”. 
117 Historically a small white elite of Portuguese ancestry dominated the colonial country. It owned sugar plantations worked 
by Indian, and later African slaves. A small European elite continued to dominate the country’s political and economic life, 
when gold had replaced sugar as the principle source of wealth (later coffee would replace gold). (Cf. 
http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Brazil.html, r04.01.2008) 
118 “Jeitos are partly a response to Brazil's notorious bureaucratic thicket which makes getting a government document—be 
it a driving license, passport, or marriage license—a cumbersome process. Those who can afford to hire despachantes (dis-
patchers), professional facilitators who know how to do “jeitos", to get things done. Others do “jeitos” on their own; 
perhaps a small "gratuity" to a low-paid government clerk will produce the desired document.” 
(http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Brazil.html, r05.01.2008) 
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tained influential connections and personal networks of patrons, politicians and high-
ranking bureaucrats. (Ibidem) 
Corruption Index 
The concept of corruption attempts to qualify an incorrect handling of entrusted power. 
According to the organization Transparency International: “Corruption is the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain. It hurts everyone whose life, livelihood or happiness 
depends on the integrity of people in a position of authority.”119 Transparency Interna-
tional attempted to quantify corruption by developing an index that describes the percep-
tion of corruption by a country’s population.120 According to this index, Brazil scores a 
value of 3.5 on a scale of 1 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt).121  
                                               
119 http://www.transparency.org/about_us, r03.01.2008 
120 “The Transparency International CPI measures the perceived levels of public-sector corruption in a given country. It is a 
composite index drawing on different expert and business surveys. The 2008 CPI scores 180 countries (the same number as 
the 2007 CPI) on a scale from zero (highly corrupt) to ten (highly clean).” 
(http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008, r05.01.2008) 
121 While this is the same range as India’s 3,4, corruption seems to be worse than in Peru (3,6), Romania (3,8), Cuba (4,3), or 
Chile (6,9), but somewhat better than Argentina’s score of 2.9 (Cf. Transparency International 2007). 
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São Paulo – ‘Macrometrópole’ 
“Discutir a paisagem implica em discutir os processos sociais” (Campos 
2005: 3) 
 
After the basic parameters of AlphaVille-Tamboré's national-scale framework were ex-
amined above, the following section seeks to provide a synopsis of the local-regional set-
ting. Consequently selected parameters on São Paulo and the region will be presented. 
 
Table 30: Selected indicators of São Paulo and the SP Region122 
Name São Paulo 
Size of SP region 850.000 hectares 
Population of SP region 19,7 million123 
Population of SP municipality 11 million124 
Total regional density 21 persons per hectare 
Annual population growth rates 0,8 percent 
Densities at the centre 71 persons per hectare 
Gross urban domestic product 224 billion US$ 
Quality of Life 131 in the world° 
GINI Index 0.59 
Share of country’s GDP 13 percent 
Number of high rises > 6.100 
Populations in slums 20 percent 
The Macrometrópole’s basics 
São Paulo is the largest and most affluent region of the Brazil, South America’s number 
one global city region and one of the largest metropolises worldwide. The city is the pre-
dominant economic and demographic growth pole of Brazil – as much as Jakarta and 
Mumbai are in their respective countries.125 It represents a Brazilian milieu as described 
above with all its opportunities, ambiguities and problems in a concentrated form. 
The city is situated in the south-western part of Brazil. The locality, only 50 kilome-
tres from the sea on a plateau at 800 metres above sea level, results in a moderate cli-
mate. In 2006 every 10th Brazilian lived in São Paulo’s metropolitan region. According to 
the Urban Planning department of the Municipality of São Paulo EMPLASA today São 
Paulo’s Metropolitan Region (RMSP) features almost 20 million residents126. A further 4 
million residents exist within a 90km radius. (Cf. Villaça 2002)  
                                               
122 If not indicated otherwise the numbers stem from the comparative matrix (Cf. Appendix) 
123 Emplasa 2008: at http://www.emplasa.sp.gov.br/portalemplasa/infometropolitana/rmsp/rmsp_dados.asp, r.06.01.2009 
124 IBGE 2007: at http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/contagem2007/defaulttab.shtm, r.06.01.2009 
125 The city is the 2nd most expensive city in the Americas (after New York City) and ranks 25th worldwide. 
(http://www.mercer.com/costofliving, r05.01.2008) 
126 When Campinas with around 2,5 million residents as well as the port city of Santos with another 1,5 million are included: 
http://www.emplasa.sp.gov.br/portalemplasa/index.asp, r06.01.2008 
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A significant detail (which São Paulo shares with many Megacities) is a huge disparity 
between the political boundaries of the city and the footprint of the urbanised area.127 
The locals, or Paulistanos, came up with the new term Macrometrópole to describe this 
overwhelming regional agglomeration (Cf. Meyer 2008, Cf. Emplasa-website, 
r07012009). Some even portray the entire urban corridor between São Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro as a large megalopolis. (Cf. Goulhard 2006) 
 Illustration D-4: Region of São Paulo (RMSP) 
São Paulo experienced a phenomenal growth during the past century and a half. It grew 
from 31.000 residents in 1872 (the first year with census records), to 1,3 million in 1940, 
to 10,5 million by the year 2000. The growth was highest at the peak times of industri-
alisation. In the 1960s and 1970s the city was growing at decanal rates of 5,3 percent, 
more rapidly than the state (3,2 percent), or the nation (2,7 percent).128 
The city represents an extreme economic, demographic and cultural concentrate. 
Among the predominant contemporary trends are ongoing increasing suburbanisation 
(or ‘peripherisation’) and a dynamically growing informal sector (‘favelisation’). The 
1990s represent an important watershed marked by first time negative migration rates. 
This was the decade, when people started to leave the centre towards the region at an 
average rate of 69 thousand per year while growth rates had slowed down to an annual 
1,13 percent in the 1980’s. Only informal areas kept growing at rates of 4 to 7,5 percent 
per year. (Bogus, Pasternak 2004: 2)  
AlphaVille is located in one rapidly urbanising peripheral areas of the metropolitan 
region. While the area marked an urban frontier during the 1291970s, today it has became 
fully integrated into the dynamic and widespread urban corpus. 
Economy – superb concentration 
São Paulo represents an enormous concentration of wealth. The state of São Paulo is by 
far Brazil‘s richest, most developed and populous, accounting for over 50 percent of in-
dustrial production (Cf. Rojas 2004: 13). Here 22 percent of the national population 
generate 34 percent of the county’s gross national product. Moreover, São Paulo’s 
greater metropolitan region (RMSP) is the most important economic pole of state and 
country. In 1996 the region was responsible for 90,3 percent of the industrial added 
value in the state (Cf. Villaça 2002). 
Its size coupled with a relatively advanced state of development made São Paulo the 
19th richest city of the world in 2008; a rise to the 13th rank is forecasted for 2020. Ac-
cording to data of IBGE, Brazil’s major statistics institute, the city’s Gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2005 amounted to BRL 240 billion (US$ 160 billion). This was an 
equivalent of 13 percent of the national GDP.130 São Paulo’s role reverberates in its urban 
landscape. 6.100 highrise structures131 spread as far as the horizon.132  
                                               
127 In 2000 about 10 million people, lived in what is the City of São Paulo, representing while 60 percent of the regional, 
and 30 percent of the state’s population. (Cf. Bogus, Pasternak 2004: 2) 
128 Cf. Brant 98 quoted by Bogus and Pasternak: 11 
129 The periphery accounted for 55 percent São Paulo City‘s population increase in the 1970s and for almost 97 percent in 
the 1980, and for 127 percent in the 1990s. São Paulo’s central neighbourhoods between the Tiête and Pinheiros rivers lost 
130 thousand residents in the 1980s, and more than 168 million during the 1990s. On the other hand the periphery has 
added 1,3 million new residents in the 1980s and more than 1 million in the 1990s (Bogus, Pasternak 2004: 4, Cf. also to 
the chart there) 
130 This is more than the output of Egypt, and twice as much as the GDP of Mumbai or BSD 
131 Emporis.com, r30.03.2009 lists 5,649 as ‘existing’, 435 as ‘under’ construction, and 261 planned high-rise structures. 
132 This number is only topped by New York and Hong Kong 
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Global impacts 
Brazil’s cities have been the focal points of the country’s economic development and in-
dustrialisation early on.133 Today a specific set, lead by São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, 
plays a central role in linking the country to global networks of production, consumption 
and exchange. These cities at the nexus of global and local are marked by the rise of ad-
vanced business services in particular (Cf. Cato 2006: 5, 6). By the end of the 1990s, São 
Paulo concentrated 70 percent of all large national and 94 percent of all international 
banking headquarters. In addition the city houses the headquarters of the many large 
Brazilian conglomerates. (Ibidem: 6) 
São Paulo’s political geography 
In order to understand the situation of AlphaVille-Tamboré it is important to have an 
idea of São Paulo’s political geography. São Paulo is the name of a state, a metropolitan 
area and a municipality. The respective Metropolitan Region (RMSP) was established in 
1973 and comprises 39 municipalities. Notably in the same year AlphaVille-Tamboré 
emerged. Municipalities are the smallest autonomous political units in Brazil. Each mu-
nicipality has a mayor and a city council, which is elected for 4 years.  
São Paulo’s municipality has a shape close to a trapezoid, spanning 110 kilometres 
from North to South and 70 kilometres from West to East. Notably AlphaVille-Tamboré 
lies just outside this shape. It is part of two municipalities, Santana do Parnaíba, as well 
as Barueri. 
Significant master plan documents 
Significant milestones of São Paulo’s master planning are the ‘Plano de Avenidas’ by 
Prestes Maria and Ulhôa Cintra (1924), the Public Improvement Programme (‘Pro-
gramma de Melhoramentos Públicos’) of 1949 (Consultant Robert Moses), the 1969 
‘Plano Urbanisto Básico’ (PUB) by the consultancy Asplan/Daily/Montreal, as well as the 
Plano Metropolitano de Desenvolvimento Integrado from 1971.134 These plans supported 
the development of major transport arteries based on mortised traffic that largely rein-
forced and structured São Paulo’s urban regional growth. The foundation of AlphaVille 
was strongly influenced by the construction of the Castello Branco highway, the devel-
opment of the two expressways along the Pinheiros and Tietê rivers, as well as the turn-
pike (Çebolao) between at the nexus of the two. These large infrastructure projects trans-
formed AlphaVille’s terrain overnight into a highly desirable prime location, to be ac-
cessed in 20 minutes travel time from São Paulo’s southwestern centres of Morumbi and 
Faria Lima. 
Box 27: Master plans 
Important master plans and government publications (Cf. Csaba 2001): 
1940: Maia, Prestes, Plano de Avenidas, São Paulo, 
                                               
133 Historically São Paulo’s economic success is based on its role as a market for agricultural products (i.e. coffee) as well as 
raw materials in the 19th century. The city played a crucial role as an interface between major ports as well as the hinter-
land, a market, as well as a centre of power and control. (Cf. Abascal 2006: 8). An exceptional network of rail and road 
connections provided the essential connectivity and linked the city to the hinterland, as well as to Minas Gerais.  
In the 1950s São Paulo became the cradle of the country’s industry (mainly automobiles) under president Kubitschek (Cf. 
below: Milestones). Notably the industrial sector was at the forefront of the economic boom of the 1970s. At this time São 
Paulo’s region comprised 42 percent of the national industrial product with São Paulo State accounting for 75 percent of 
the same. (Cf. Abascal 2006: 8) 
 
134 Cf. Anelli 2008; and also the Milestones section of this sub chapter. 
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1968: Plano Urbanístico Básico- PUB, GEGRAN, São Paulo, 
1971: Plano Diretor de Desenvolvimento Integrado- PDDI* 
1993: Plano Metropolitano de Desenvolvimento Integrado- PMDI 
1999: Plano Integrado de Transportes Urbano – PITU 2020, State Secretariat for Metro-
politan Transport SP 
2001: Plano Diretor Estratégico do Município de São Paulo* 
* The only two documents with legal status, approved by the Muncipal Council 
Risks and disasters. 
A brief look at the risk and vulnerability profile of the country contributes to a deeper 
understanding of the motivations of people moving to specific locations. The following 
marks out an epigrammatic, but holistic, overview of risks in the context of São Paulo – 
ranging from the effects of global change to urban pollution and crime. 
General risk framework 
São Paulo’s mega city region comprises dangers such as flooding, landslides, but also 
locally made problems such as water scarcity and urban air pollution. Significantly, the 
poor were always facing the highest threat, having their own weighting and perception of 
danger. Most of São Paulo’s informal settlements are constructed on steep slopes or near 
the water reservoirs. Paraisópolis, one of the larger favelas, located in Morumbi (Cf. be-
low) is constructed with an average inclination of 43 percent (Cf. Vigliecca 2008). 
Water 
While almost all urban residents in Brazil have access to fresh water135, considerable 
variations in the water’s quality exist. Less than 50 percent of the sampled river water 
was classified as “good quality water” in 1998.136   
The supply with wastewater services is poorer than the drinking water supply. Less 
than half (48 percent) of urban and only 3 percent of rural households in Brazil are con-
nected to public sewers (Cf. UN 2004, Cf. Csillag). In addition, 80 percent of collected 
wastewater in Brazil does not receive any kind of treatment before it reaches waterways 
(SEDU and SEPURB quoted by Csillag 2000). This has a significant impact on health. A 
large number of hospital admissions as well as infant deaths are attributed to water-
borne diseases. Again the poor are in a weak position.137  
The most prominent environmental problems in the São Paulo Region are related to 
rising conflicts among human habitats and fresh water reservoirs. As ever-larger amounts 
of water are needed, the available sources, such as São Paulo’s Guarapiranga reservoir 
(Cf. Porto 2001), become gradually more depleted. Informal urbanisation and uncon-
trolled waste seriously threatens the fresh water assets.138 139 
                                               
135 Cf. http://www.wssinfo.org/pdf/country/BRA_wat.pdf, r05.01.2008 
136 35 percent of samples were classified as acceptable, bad or very bad, and only 15 percent were rated as excellent (Cf. 
Csillag 2000; Cf. The State Secretariat of Environment São Paulo, 1998). 
137 Csillag 2000 states that „According to a 1995 report from the Ministry of Planning and Budget titled Assessment of the 
Sanitation Sector: Economic and Financial Study, 32% of all hospital admissions in 1990 were due to diseases related to 
inadequate sanitation. ... The same report cites research showing that infant mortality in households with adequate sanita-
tion is 21,9 per thousand - less than half that found in homes with inadequate sanitation (59,0 per thousand). 
138 Informal settlement along water reservoir is a common feature in Brazilian cities. For example, by 1997, 662.000 mostly 
low-income people were living within the watershed and occupying 15 percent of the total watershed area of the Guarapi-
ranga reservoir. These slum dwellers, living on public land and irregular plots, tend to concentrate in precarious, flood-prone 
areas in the basin and have no appropriate infrastructure for water supply, sewage, drainage and solid waste management. 
(Cf. Porto 2001, Cf. The World Bank “Water Quality and Pollution Control Project” at 
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Traffic and Air pollution 
Air pollution accounts for the most tangible environmental and health risks. The popula-
tion reference bureau estimated in 2007 that São Paulo is among the metropolises with 
the world's worst outdoor air pollution.140 A large share of this pollution is caused by 
motorised traffic. The number of vehicles registered in the city has been growing at a 
much higher rate (4 percent per year) than the population and road network. Nearly 5,5 
million vehicles roam the streets of the region.141 Almost all parameters of particulate 
matter and vehicle emissions reach levels above accepted standards, with the exception of 
sulphur dioxide.142  
While the average concentrations in air of SO2 and lead have been decreasing drasti-
cally during the period of 1982-88, an effect attributed to the introduction of ethanol-
based fuels, non-methane hydrocarbon, NO2 and O3 levels have been constantly on the 
rise (Cf. Kabuto 1990). 
The Paulista capital is well known for its notorious traffic jams, while it has one of the 
highest car densities in South America.143 The city features 200 kilometres of clogged 
streets on each working day. Commutes of 3,5 hours and longer are on the daily agenda 
for many residents. (Cf. Anelli 2008:17) 
Crime 
The experience of violence and crime (real and mediated) is probably among the chief 
triggers causing households to relocate to new and more secure locations such as Al-
phaVille, as well as to invest in private security services (cf. Calderia 2000).144 Crime 
rates in Brazilian cities, in particular São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, are among the highest 
worldwide. Among the most significant crime problems are homicide and murder.145 
Sadly the country also has the highest rates of youth crime worldwide.146  
The murder rate in greater São Paulo, for example, is more than seven times that of 
the New York metropolitan area. The city figures 60 murders per 100,000 citizens com-
pared to New York's 7.8 (Cf. Stevens 2007) or Newark’s 35 (The Economist Aug 17th 
2006). The rates of violence have been rising in particular after the democratisation 
process in the late 1980s. While in 1990 a total of 8.287 murder cases have been re-
corded in the region, the number almost doubled in less than ten years to 14,132 in 
1999.147  
                                                                                                                                         
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Pr
ojectid=P006541, r.05.01.2008 ). 
139 Another serious problem is the pollution of urban rivers. Enormous sums have been invested to clean up the Tietê River in 
São Paulo and the surrounding municipalities. (I.e. The river also flows through a part of AlphaVille; Cf. Csillag 2000) 
140 Cf. www.prb.org/Articles/2007/FightingAirPollution.aspx, r05.01.2008 
141 Cf. H. Ribeiro 2005, at http://library.witpress.com, r05.01.2008 
142 Cf. Csillag 2000, quoting the “Report of the Quality of Air in the State of São Paulo 1999”; by the Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality at CETESB 
143 354 of 1.000 residents own a car; the car density comprises 2.500 cars per urban square kilometre – only Buenos Aires 
features more cars. (Cf. urban-age.net, r06.01.2009) 
144 Mercer Consulting’s quality of life index (2007) places São Paulo at the last position of large Brazilian cities and at a 131 
position worldwide. The rating was heavily skewed due to the increased crime rates in the city. (Cf. 
http://www.mercer.com/summary.htm?siteLanguage=101&idContent=1262695, r05.01.2009). 
145 The South African urban security specialist and researcher Karina Landman compares crime rates in Brazil with those of 
her country and states that: ”In South Africa it was especially common robbery, assault with the intent to commit serious 
bodily harm, rape and car hijacking that increased the most from 1994 to 1999” (Schonteich and Louw 2001). In Brazil it 
was especially homicides that increased significantly. (de Mesquito Neto 2000 in Landman 2002: 7) 
146 World Health Organization: World report on violence and health, 2002, from 
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/cri_mur_com_by_you-crime-murders-committed-by-youths, r05.01.2008. 
147 Data from SEADE, and EMPLASA, quoted in Villaça 2002 
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As much as the residents crime has also a history of migrating to the suburbs.148 In-
deed for AlphaVille-Tamboré and its peers this is tragic and ironic at the same time. 
While the worst of São Paulo’s central city districts featured homicide rates of 60 per 
100.000 residents per year, several suburban locations featured murder rates of more 
than 110. 
One of the consequences of Brazil’s extreme crime levels is that the prisons are filled 
beyond capacity. 169 per 100.000 people are jailed.149 Two years São Paulo ago was 
terrorised by gangs operating from inside the prison system (Cf. The Economist 2007). 
On the other hand the police has a reputation of being corrupt, and police violence is a 
daily occurrence.150  
The spectre of violence 
The experienced and perceived levels of crime are among the major factors limiting the 
quality of life of major population segments. Large parts of the city, e.g. São Paulo’s cen-
tral district, become no-go areas at night. Excessive media coverage of spectacular mur-
ders and kidnappings contributes to an atmosphere of uncertainty. A report by The 
Economist 2007 titled “No end of violence” affirmed that issue of violence displaced 
unemployment as the Brazilians' top worry for the first time in years (Despite the fact 
that crime rates had been on a steep decline since the turn of the century again). About a 
half (49 percent) of the respondents of a large national study claimed that they do not 
feel safe when walking the streets of their neighbourhood. The respective rate for São 
Paulo was 57 percent. Significantly, all segments of the population perceived the danger 
of crime in the same way.151 
As a result the security business is booming and has had a large impact on the layout 
of urban spaces. Whoever can afford it lives behind high walls and employs private secu-
rity services. Rich Paulistanos drive armoured cars and send their children to school in 
the company of bodyguards. (Cf. The Economist 2007). The Washington Post reports 
that at night on TV Alphaville the residents can view all exiting employees being patted 
down and searched in front of a live video feed.’152  
Urban Structure 
Uma característica marcante da moradia paulistana neste início de século é o 
crescimento das favelas e dos condomínios horizontais fechados. 
(Bogus andPasternak 2004: „A cidade dos extremos“). 
From central city to ‘operative landscape’ 
It is noticeable that many Brazilian urban researchers conceptualise São Paulo’s urban 
structure not by the classical dichotomy of city and nature but as a contemporary land-
scape.153 This notion does not intend to romanticise the matter. In contrast, it points to a 
postmodern operative landscape. This is scenery which is actively and dynamically 
                                               
148 “Crime follows the path of wealth, not poverty” (Sérgio Adorno, head of the Nucleus for the Study of Violence at the 
University of São Paulo. Quoted by The Economist 2007) 
149 (Cf.: http://www.nationmaster.com/country/br-brazil/cri-crime, 05.01.2008) 
150 Killings by police are common in poorer urban areas. (Cf. http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Brazil.html, r05.01.2008) 
151 (Cf. Opinion poll conducted by IBOPE, the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics, in a Target Group Study, 
from http://www.zonalatina.com/Zldata194.htm, r05.01.2008) 
152 Cf. Chris Darke, a film theoretician and lecturer, in his 2006 article “AlphaVille exists”; at 
http://www.vertigomagazine.co.uk/showarticle.php?sel=bac&siz=0&id=203, r09.02.2009 
153 The new (postindustrialist) urban landscape is regarded as landscape that is in a constant flux and that is actively pro-
duced. In this context various studies are devoted to producing an inventory of new urban spaces in a phenomenological 
manner (Macedo 3003, Lemos and Soares 2004, Gonçalves and Soares 1998). 
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shaped, produced and reproduced, developed and redeveloped, and which can mutate in 
the course of few years beyond recognition and faster than any planning.154  
As much as many other large urban agglomerations worldwide155, São Paulo has un-
dergone an enormous process of transformation in the 20th century. It changed from a 
centrally oriented metropolis to a multiplex urban region. It seems that social, economic, 
and cultural processes have always played the driving role for the organisation of the 
urban structure, resulting in the contemporary ‘fragmented corporate metropolis’. (Cf. 
Santos: 1990)  
Ana Cecilia Campos (2005: 5) equates São Paulo’s Region with a “diversified indus-
trial park” that evolved mainly along the needs and structural dynamics of capital accu-
mulation.156 She states that the city evolved as a bottom-up process driven by affluent 
elite populations, whereas legislations and master plans were added only in retrospect. 
Gilda Collet Bruna, planning professor at São Paulo’s renowned McKenzie University, 
describes how a mega-metropolis network is developing, distributing production and 
jobs outside the region, and engendering a different equilibrium of economic activities.157 
Box 28: Brazilian discussion on the driving forces of urbanisation 
The Brazilian researchers cited by this research reflect a rich debate on the driving 
forces of urban transformation. Four major perspectives can be identified: global, his-
toric, socio-economic, and ‘planned’.  
Some experts claim that global forces mainly produce new urban structures and typolo-
gies.158 Others stress the relevance of local socio-economic dynamics (Cf. Villaça 2001159) 
or infrastructure (Cf. Anelli 2008). A third group attempts to draw a differentiated pic-
ture of spatial-societal realities as an outcome of a multiplicity of trends and multiple 
stakeholders. (Cf. Abascal 2006, or Caldeira 2008)160 
 
The ‘periferia’ 
„The development of Brazil’s urban peripheries occurred overwhelmingly 
through private market operations that were almost completely unregu-
lated.“ (Holston, Caldeira 2008: 21) 
The concept of the ‘periferia’ has made a stunning career in the Brazilian context, which 
goes well beyond the classical nation of the ‘suburb’. São Paulo’s urban periphery is of 
particular relevance in our effort to contextualise AlphaVille-Tamboré, as it is a frontier 
                                               
154 This new terminology is importantly pointing to a quest for new conceptualisations and terminologies within a changing 
macro framework shaping contemporary spatial and temporal realities (Cf. Macedo 2003, Lemos 2004, Reis 2006). Work 
such as that of Lemos 2004 is titled: Condomínios Residencial Horizontais Fechados Na Região Metropolitana De São Paulo: 
Um Aspecto Da Produção Paisagísta Contemporânea (Lemos 2004). 
155 Cf. the other examples within this thesis 
156 The same author describes Rio de Janeiro as a city planned around the idea of public spaces. 
157 Cf. Collet Bruna, in Simmonds 2000: p.117. 
158 „A emergência desses artefatos arquitetônicos e urbanos globalizados começou revelar eorganizou uma nova maneira de 
segregar e discriminar a localização de grupos sociais no espaço metropolitano, ...intensificar a privatização e difundir os 
condomínios fechados; ...Esta transformação da urbanidade pode dar origem a um modelo de cidade tanto mais 
excludente, quanto menos civilizada. ... Desde o final do século, não só em São Paulo, mas em várias metrópoles, 
emergiram as empresas corporativas multinacionais associando-se às novas centralidades, o que fazia crescer os subúrbios 
reforçando o papel policêntrico da metrópole“. (Pereira 2004) 
159 Also the Chilenean Sabatini 2000 
160“Em sociedades historicamente desiguais como a brasileira, estabelecer vínculos específicos entre segregação socio-
espacial e processos recentes da mundialização da economia é uma tarefa muito difícil, sobretudo porque antigas 
desigualdades sociais se reproduzem e se agregam às novas condições.” (Cf. Abascal 2006: 6) 
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in many aspects: it has developed from the sphere of the strange and uncivilised ‘other’ to 
a cradle of modern democracy. Mediating the clash of city and nature, and among vari-
ous social classes, this vast territory between city and hinterland the ‘periferia’ is the most 
dynamic and rapidly changing part of the city and often also landscape of surprise (Cf. 
Gotsch 2008). It challenges traditional concepts and ideologies and brings to the fore 
new lifestyles, typologies, and sometimes even new societies. 
Peripheries are perceived as places of disorder, wilderness and destruction (an unregu-
lated predatory capitalism), but also as localities that allow for spontaneous appropria-
tion and where (sometimes radical) alternatives can develop. 
Box 29: Pigs killed on the boulevard 
The ‘periferia’ is a blend of the urban and rural, the formal and the improvised, leaving 
space for the possibility to slaughter a hog in the streets. Silke Knapp describes161 the 
uncertainties and freedoms of the periphery as follows: “It allows people to build with-
out a predefined pattern, to raise pigs, and to sit on the street.” The storyline is con-
firmed when the Folha de São Paulo describes a visit of São Paulo’s former Major: 
"Then I found out on the outskirts of Sao Paulo pigs killed on the road and the meat 
divided among the people. This was my first lesson of the reality of the periphery.”162   
After all, the reality of the periphery is more complex than its image. Suburbs are more 
than an antithesis to the city. On the contrary, in many cases they embody potentials of 
new urban realities.163 In this regard over the last 40 year the Brazilian version of the 
‘periferia’ was a central space for the consolidation of idea of an urban civil society. (Cf. 
Holston, Caldeira 2008: 21) “Traditionally a disadvantaged place for the poor, in the 
past 40 years the suburbs received masses of working class migrants and other displaced 
central-city -poor.164 During this phase the periphery became the home, but also a politi-
cal and symbolic space, of the poor in Brazilian society (Ibidem: 21).165 The ‘periferia’ 
become the cradle of Brazil’s democracy, while its residents gradually discovered that 
they have a right to claim their right to the city: [Slum residents] ... discovered that being 
taxpayers legitimated their ‘right to have rights‘ and their ‘rights to the city”... (Ibi-
dem)166 
                                               
161 Along the highly illustrative case of Belo Horizonte at: http://www-1.tu-
cottbus.de/BTU/Fak2/TheoArch/Wolke/deu/Themen/021/Kapp/Kapp.htm, r31.03.2009). 
162 "Desse primeiro dia, uma coisa que lembro muito é que eu estava andando com o Otávio [Pereira de Almeida, secretário 
de Obras Públicas] e fomos em direção a onde é o jornal 'O Estado de S. Paulo'. De repente, nós entramos num lugar e foi 
uma lição para o prefeito urbano, que era eu. Eu vi uma correria e perguntei: 'O que é isso?' e me responderam: 'Ah, é 
porque estão matando um porco e eles pensam que é a prefeitura que vem apreender'. Então, eu fiquei sabendo que na 
periferia de São Paulo se matava porco na rua e se dividia a carne entre as pessoas. Foi a minha primeira lição da realidade 
da periferia", sobre sua passagem como prefeito de São Paulo (1975 a 1979). 
(Folha Online; 27/08/2008; Veja frases de Olavo Setubal sobre política, economia e São Paulo; at: 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u438385.shtml; r05.04.2009) 
163 Cf. the thought of Fishman and King in the Introduction Chapter 
164 „… state planning in the centres resulted in evictions, demolitions, and high rents that ejected most low-income resi-
dents from the central districts of cities...  thus public policy consolidated the centres for the upper classes, while neglect 
made the peripheries feasible as a repository for the poor” (Holston, Caldeira 2008: 21). 
165 The same authors describe how in this context the meaning of the term povo (people) shifted from representing the 
disadvantaged lower class to labelling a politically active and economically mobile urban proletariat. (Hudson 1997) 
166 Possibly 2009 marks an end to the ‘chaotic’ condition: Nowadays a major milestone for the normalisation and consolida-
tion of the Periferia has been achieved. As part of the programme ‚Cidade Legal’ more than 830.000 hitherto illegal proper-
ties in the Greater Region of São Paulo will be legalised. (Cf. below: Milestones) 
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Fragmentation, segregation and the practice of ‘walling’ 
In the 1990s São Paulo has matured into a complex metropolitan region that “cannot be 
mapped out by the simple opposition of center-rich versus periphery-poor.” (Caldeira 
2000: 231). At the same time the city’s urban fabric is characterised by a “city of 
walls.”167 (Ibidem)  
According to Caldeira the development of São Paulo’s urban structure was dominated 
by three subsequent patterns: 1) A ‘concentrated city’ was preeminent throughout the 
early industrialisation in the 19th century up to the 1940s: 2) A dual centre-periphery 
system with a predominantly affluent centre and a dynamically growing ‘periferia’ char-
acterised the industrialising metropolis between the 1940s and the 1980s168; 3) The pre-
sent ‘city of fortified enclaves’ is marked by heterogeneity and fragmentation. It emerged 
since the 1980s and is characteristic for a new post-industrial economy (Caldeira, 2000: 
213).169 In this context São Paulo displays a different segregation pattern, than the one 
represented by the famous Chicago School. While rich and poor now live closer to one 
another than ever, this happens by the means of walls, which are higher than before.170 
171 
Interestingly Caldeira also describes how the spatial structure of Santana de Parnaíba, 
one of the Municipalities of which AlphaVille-Tamboré is a part, is transforming along a 
new post-industrial pattern of suburbanisation based on the proximity of housing and 
tertiary services:  
“Santana de Parnaíba exemplifies what one might call a new suburbaniza-
tion of Sao Paulo. Its growth has been neither the traditional expansion of 
poor and industrial areas nor the American outgrowth of the 1950s and 
1960s, but a new type of suburbanization of the 1980s and 1990s that brings 
together residences and tertiary activities. Santana de Parnaíba has not had 
the same economic performance as its adjacent municipalities Barueri and 
Cajamar, but it shows more clearly how the area is becoming a new middle 
and upper class enclave.” (Caldeira 2000: 253) 
 
Distribution of wealth – the ‘vetor sudoeste’ 
“...a metrópole paulista vive um processo de mundialização incompleto, 
seletivo e desigual” (Kato 2006: 12) 
In the section above an idealised image was established that portrays São Paulo as a 
highly homogenised but profoundly fragmented ‘city of walls’. Yet this representation 
requires an important modification: While in the recent 30 years São Paulo’s urban struc-
ture has undergone a significant spread and rich and poor neighbourhoods have been 
                                               
167 Indeed, “City of Walls” is also the main title of Caldeira’s influential book on São Paulo. The work is based on her doc-
toral dissertation on the city from the early 1990s. 
168 During the urban expansion of the 60s and 70s the city merged with some of the surrounding municipalities: At first with 
Osasco and Taboão da Serra to the West, then Guarulhos in the East and thereafter with the so-called ABC-area towards 
the Southeast (Cf. Rolnik 2008). Most of the growth occurred in the form of informal ‘autoconstruction’ (Ibidem). 
169 Rachel Rolnik states that also a scattered landscape of new commercial services, such as regional supermarkets and 
shopping malls (also entering the central districts) largely adds to the status of fragmentation and diffusion. (2008: 14,15) 
170 Cf. Koll–Schretzenmayr 2001, discussing Caldeira’s work. 
171 Interestingly the Chilean Francisco Sabatini observes similar phenomena, of a diffusion of poor and wealthy neighbour-
hoods in Santiago de Chile (Cf. Sabatini’s chapter on Santiago in Simmonds 2000).  
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more and more dispersed throughout the region, specific areas of modernization remain 
essential.172 
Of particular importance in this context is the ‘vetor suoeste’. This enormous and af-
fluent wedge stretches from the centre towards the Southwest. Its history dates back as 
far as to the late 19th century (Cf. below: Predecessors). Crucially the area contains some 
80 percent of São Paulo’s urban wealth, the best infrastructure. It is also home to impor-
tant national and international enterprises. (Cf. Abascal 2006) 
 Illustration D-5: São Paulo’s ‘setor oeste’ indicated by AAA rated office locations 
 Illustration D-6: … and by educational levels* 
[A recently published gis-map of educational levels in São Paulo perfectly portrays the 
geography of the ‘Vetor Sudoeste’. In this context AlphaVille-Tamboré appears as the 
only enclave of high educational levels in the region.173 ] 
 
It is important to note that this ‘slice of gateau’ is not defined by the absence of poor 
neighbourhoods, but by the presence of wealth and the quality of urban infrastructure. It 
is also important that it continues to grow. Villaça explains the existence and persistence 
of the sector with the ability of the residents to channel a disproportional amount of the 
limited urban development resources into their own area (Ibidem). The strategies of gat-
ing and fortification can be seen as important tools that help to increase levels of ‘toler-
ance’ in this increasingly complex and fragmented framework. 
The modern facilities of the ‘vetor’, its major boulevards, shopping centres, offices and 
lifestyle centres, have acted as triggers of the urbanisation of a whole catchment area, 
and also served as an important reference point for AlphaVille-Tamboré’s. Since the 
1970s the Avenue Faria Lima has emerged as a major spine, triggering a massive real 
estate boom in the whole zone. (Costa 2006: 7, Abascal 2006: 8) Today the development 
continues along the axis of Luiz Carlos Berrini and extension of the Av. Brigadeiro faria 
Lima e towards the Avenida Marginal do Rio Pinheiros - areas notable for their concen-
tration of tertiary services and corporate headquarters of national and global relevance. 
(Cf. Abascal 2006b: 2) 
Notably, the development of the ‘sector’ was nurtured by massive government inter-
ventions. Transport arteries along the Pinheiros River and to São Paulo’s city airport of 
Congonhas were installed. As a consequence the area became an alternative modern cen-
tre, rivalling São Paulo’s traditional core (Abascal 2006: 13).174 The location emerged as 
one of the most important new tertiary centres of Latin America (Ibidem).175  
Featuring levels of wealth previously common only for more central elite districts (Cf. 
Caldeira, 2000: 231-234), AlphaVille became a part of the extended wedge. In addition, 
it also emerged as an own magnet driving further growth. This underlines the fact that 
São Paulo’s regional development occurred along new points of centrality and conver-
gence, and not only by an even spread.176 
                                               
172 Abascal (2006: 14) describes how in the context that is governed by the laws of the market and real estate speculation 
concentrations of modern islands emerge, playing a major role in the valorisation of urban land. 
173 Cf. Urban-Age 2008, at http://www.urban-age.net/10_cities/_data/data_SP.html, r06.01.2008. 
174 In the 1990s alone the inner city neighbourhoods of Sé and República have lost 22 percent of their populations (Cf. 
Sampaio et al 2008, Cf. Brito 2008). 
175 The dominance of the new centre is also symbolic: Significantly the German portal of Wikipedia features the Ponte estai-
ada Octavio Frias, a large spectacular crossing of the Pinheros river, as the landmark image of São Paulo (Cf. 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%A3o_Paulo). Moreover, the English Wiki features the new skyline at the Pinheros which 
portrays the image of a ‘global’ city.  
176 Mônaco dos Santos (2002: 2) notes accordingly: “A partir dele afirmouse a tendência em se implantar esses 
empreendimentos nos municípios vizinhos a São Paulo, ao longo das rodovias Castelo Branco e Raposo Tavares, nas regiões 
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 ‘Fortified enclaves’ and gated communities 
The principal components of the practise of walling are gated communities and fortified 
enclaves. (Cf. Caldeira, 2000: 211). In the early 1980s middle classes started an unparal-
leled mass migration to the suburbs. “For the first time in the history of modern Sao 
Paulo, rich residents were leaving the central and well equipped areas of the capital to 
inhabit distant territories.” (Caldeira, 2000: 234) Among the target designations were 
some municipalities to the Northwest and the South of São Paulo with good accessibility 
to the new centres. 
Yet, when arriving at their new destinations, the new middle class residents discovered 
that they were surrounded or poverty (another wilderness). Facing the problem of pre-
serving security and also status, guarded enclaves became the typology of choice. What is 
interesting is that several critics trace the practice of building walls was not to economic 
insecurity and criminality, but to the extreme contrast of rich and poor.177 Moreover, 
walling is seen as a continuation and evolution of the widespread practices of self-
organisation already in place in central city neighbourhoods178, “where private security 
arrangements are the norm”, “given a notoriously unresponsive police force”. (Cf. Ste-
vens 2007) 
Indeed, currently Brazil is experiencing a boom in gated communities. The total num-
ber of horizontal enclaves in São Paulo’s region increased from 168 in 1992179 to 2.533 
in 2002. The settlement typology experienced a particular boom at the beginning of the 
21st century, while numbers of new projects were up by 243 percent in the first quarter 
of 2001.180  
Types of residential enclaves in São Paulo 
While walling and fortification are urban practices that are as old as urban settlements 
themselves, three specific types of ‘fortification’ are of specific importance in the post-
industrial landscape of São Paulo: 1) The vertical estate (condominio verticais), 2) The 
horizontal land subdivision (loteamento horizontais), and 3) The horizontal estate (con-
dominio horizontais). The fortification of existing areas constitutes an additional prac-
tice. The following section will expand upon these practices. (Also cf. below: Control, 
Regulation)  
‘Condomínios verticais’ 
‘Condomínios verticais’ are jointly owned, secured and serviced types of residential tow-
ers or groups thereof. The history of the model in São Paulo dates back to the early 20th 
century (Cf. below: Predecessors). A specific boom occurred during the growth phase of 
the 1970s and 80s. During this period, mutations and variations of the typology 
                                                                                                                                         
oeste e sudoeste da Grande São Paulo. Ao longo da rodovia Castelo Branco encontram-se, além de AlphaVille, outros 
grandes loteamentos fechados, como Tamboré e Aldeia da Serra, e, ao longo da Raposo Tavares, o Granja Vianna, entre 
outros.” 
177 “A obsessão de construir muros e cercas fechando os bairros dos mais ricos ocorre, não só num momento de incerteza 
econômica e de medo da criminalidade, mas também quando os mais ricos começam a ficar mais próximos dos pobres e 
miseráveis excluídos, ou seja, quando os ricos começam a ir para a periferia”.  (VILLAÇA, 2001: 152, quoted in Abascal 
2006: 7)  
„...também em áreas da periferia, onde ao lado das áreas de habitação popular erguem-se condomínios residências de alta 
renda, cujos muros escondem o luxo e sofisticação das moradias. Além de constituírem um símbolo da separação entre os 
ricos e o pobres que coabitam uma área marcada pela desigualdade, esses condomínios constituem verdadeiras “ilhas de 
riqueza” em meio à periferia pobre.“ (Bogus 2004: 11)  
178 Cf. Andrew Stevens and Elisangela Fracaroli in 2007 
179 When Embraesp (Empresa Brasileira de Estudos de Patrimônio) started to collect data. 
180 Cf. Santos, 2002; Bogus: 15; Loffredo: 7 
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emerged. Jointly owned and fully serviced ensembles of residential towers are particularly 
representative of this phenomonen. 
Caldeira tracks the main history of fortified enclaves in São Paulo to the 1970s.181 At 
a period when industrialisation peaked, essential regional infrastructure systems were 
installed, tremendous masses of immigrants arrived, a new middle class emerged, and the 
city was rapidly suburbanising. Notably an exemplary case and forerunner was the 1973 
Ilha do Sul project in the central-western neighbourhood of Alto de Pinheiros. Signifi-
cantly, this fully serviced complex for upper income classes182 was conceived and built by 
Yoshiro Takaoka, one of the developers of AlphaVille.183 Combining several high-rise 
complexes into one compound, Ilha do Sul portrays a new typology that become ex-
tremely successful during the following decades. Most closed condominiums constructed 
in the 1980s Sao Paulo were vertical and were built in Morumbi. (Cf. Caldeira 2000) 
A matured typology of vertical condominiums is represented by the landmark project 
of Portal de Morumbi, in the neighbourhood of Morumbi. (Gonçalves 1998: 17) The 
neighbourhood is a part of the ‘vetor oeste’. Located to the East of the Pinheiros River, it 
contains exceptional concentrations of affluent neighbourhoods and belongs to the most 
significant elite neighbourhoods of São Paulo. Accordingly, its Mansions and ‘con-
domínios fechados’, the clubs, higher schools, and the apartment high-rises get the high-
est real estate ranking in the city (Gonçvales 1998: 17). Yet, on the other hand the 
neighbourhood also houses one of the largest favelas of the city, Paraisópolis (Vigliecca 
2008). 
‘Loteamentos fechados’ 
‘Loteamentos fechados’ are walled land subdivisions comprised of privately owned lots 
and public streets. This typology emerged in the early 1970s and boomed in the 1980s 
when more and more of the middle class opted for a suburban life-style with yet greater 
levels of security. The closed subdivisions usually contain several dozen to several hun-
dred private properties. Significantly, AlphaVille was one of the pioneers of this model. 
Only recently the typology becomes increasingly prominent among lower income classes, 
not for prestige, but more for security reasons184 (Cf. Loffredo 2006: 5). The greatest 
dilemma of the typology is its legal standing. Such an urban form was not foreseen by 
any public laws (Cf. below: Regulation).  
‘Condomínios horizontais fechados’  – (R3-03) 
Condomínios horizontais are walled enclaves. They are comprised of a large jointly 
owned lot which and a low-rise housing typology such as row housing, walk-up apart-
ments, or villas. Condomínios horizontais are much smaller than ‘loteamentos fechados’. 
The type has boomed in the second half of the 1990s, after the City of São Paulo enacted 
the ‘Lei de Vilas’ in 1994.185 It serves as a means to redensify São Paulo’s inner city 
                                               
181 Some other researchers trace the history of segregation back to the colonial courtyard typologies of the 17th, or the 
bourgeois neighbourhoods of the 19th century. (Cf. below: Predecessors) 
182 Comparable to contemporary Indian ‘Integrated Townships (Cf. the Navi Mumbai chapter) 
183 Cf. dos Santos 2002 discussing Caldeira’s work 
184 Antes destinados à moradia da classe alta e localizados em grandes áreas das zonas periféricas da RMSP, os condomínios 
fechados atualmente atendem outras classes sociais e possuem características bastante distintas (tamanho da gleba, 
tamanho e padrão da unidade habitacional, serviços coletivos oferecidos, etc.). A preocupação com conforto foi suplantada 
pela necessidade de segurança e pelo status. (Cf. Loffredo 2006: 5) 
185 The Law 11.605 of 12 July 1992, or of Vilas made possible the construction (and indiscriminate installation) of small 
horizontal condominiums in almost all residential areas of Sao Paulo. Most of these belonged to a specific typology, the R3-
03. The maximum size allowed for such as condominium was 15.000 square metres. The building coverage was limited to 
50 percent. 
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neighbourhoods (Cf. below: Milestones).186 As a result 82 percent of all ‘condomínios 
fechados’ of the whole region (RMSP) were launched in the Municipality of São Paulo 
(Loffredo 2006: 7).187  
Fortification of existing areas 
Recently fragmentation is produced not only by the construction of new gated communi-
ties of various scales, but also by retrofitting existing neighbourhoods and blocks with 
gates, fences, modern security technology, as well as security services. While certain elite 
neighbourhoods such as Morumbi, Pinheiros and Itambi stand out in producing the 
starkest contrast, the tendency towards fortification is omnipresent. Among the most 
prominent means are the ‘private’ closure of cul-de-sac streets or dead-end roads and the 
conversion of high-rise buildings188 (Cf. Landman 2002: 10). As the city evolves into a 
fragmented patchwork of various types of neighbourhoods, the trend occurs at an in-
creasing amount of locations.189  
Favelas and more 
“O crescimento de São Paulo pode até mesmo ser caracterizado pela 
expansão de zonas urbanas ditas ilegais, nas quais vive uma parte cada vez 
maior de sua população” (Rolnik 2000) 
The economic momentum produced by São Paulo’s rising bourgeois population was able 
to induce a large and profitable real estate sector. This sector is servicing the affluent 
populations with various dwelling typologies. While most of these typologies have devel-
oped in the West (gated community, villa, apartment tower, condominium), they were 
adapted to the local living conditions. 
Nevertheless, while the elite populations concentrate much of the financial power, 
they don’t make up the majority of the population. More than 87 percent of the popula-
tion earn less than 3 minimum wages. A formal housing market does hardly serve the 
segment of the “other” poor populations. In this situation São Paulo experienced a gap 
of almost 200.000 dwelling units in 2005.190 
Because the demand was/is colossal the city has predominantly grown in a self-
organised way. In this context, several kinds of semi-legal and illegal settlements 
emerged. Official estimates indicate that between 30 and 40 percent of all dwellings in 
                                               
186 „A Lei de Vilas possibilitou a instalação indiscriminada de condomínios horizontais em todas as zonas Residencial da 
cidade de São Paulo. Porém, o grande incremento nos lançamentos de condomínios horizontais só acontece a partir de 
1999-2000.“ (Cf. Loffredo 2006) 
187 The boom of horizontal condominiums in the inner-city areas significantly demonstrates another far-reaching trend: this 
is the spread of this building typology towards lower income groups. Embraesp’s statistics reveals that 30 percent of the 
units were smaller than 75 square metres, 35 percent of the projects had only one bathroom (both typical indicators of 
lower middle class standards in Brazil). Many of the apartments had a footprint of 35 square metres or less, which is even 
below the Brazilian public housing standards (Cf. Loffredo 2006: 8). 
188 In this context many older apartment blocks in São Paulo’s central city were converted to closed condominiums. (Land-
man quotes Correado Lago 2001: 11) 
189 Several researchers depict manifold examples to describe the intensifying fragmentation of even rich neighbourhoods. 
Maria Loffredo sketches an illustrative image of the juxtaposition of Paraisópolis, with 82.000 residents one of São Paulo’s 
largest favelas, and its upper class surroundings located in Morumbi: “Quando imaginamos exemplos de exclusão social e 
segregação espacial, imediatamente pensamos em imagens paradigmáticas como a favela Paraisópolis. Lá, podemos 
observar os “barracos” (que, aliás, deixaram de ser barracos há bastante tempo) praticamente colados aos enormes muros 
dos grandes e luxuosos edifícios do Morumbi, na cidade de São Paulo”. (Loffredo 2006: 2)  
Costa (2006:8) reports about two favelas which are directly located in prime areas of the ‘vetor’: The favela ‚da Peinha‘ with 
2.500 persons on the Jardim Santo Antônio hill between the Marginal de Pinheiros and the Avenida João Dias, as well as the 
Favela Real Parque, between the neighbourhoods of Brooklin and Morumbi with 7500 residents. 
190...while on the other hand more than 400,000 houses stood vacant. (Cf. Rolnik 2008: 15). 
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Brazil are located in such areas.191 This amounts to a stock of 8 to 11 million dwellings 
with 30 to 40 million people (Rojas 2004: 28). In the São Paulo region currently about 
13 percent of the population exists in favelas. 
Nevertheless, a concerning trend is the increasing level of informalisation. At the time 
of AlphaVille’s emergence, slums were an exotic urban type, amounting to a mere 1,09 
percent of the population. Just five years later their respective share had increased to 4.01 
percent, and it went on to rise to 7,7 percent in the next 10 years. In 1995 the level of 9,1 
percent was reached, with the 10 percent mark being broken shortly after the turn of the 
millennium. Significantly, since the 1980s the informal populations have grown at higher 
rates than the general population.192  The rise of slum populations has persisted despite 
the liberalisation and democratisation reforms of the early 1990s.  
The number of slum dwellers in the Paulista capital has increased from 891.673 in 
1991 to 1.160.590 in 2000.193 A large majority (70 percent) of the population are col-
oured and originate at Brazil’s North (Bogus 2004: 21). A look at the spatial distribution 
of slums reveals that a large number of favelas concentrate in the southern sector of the 
region close to the large water reservoirs (Cf. Bogus: 19). Examining the ethnic composi-
tion, we find that more that more than half of the population is black and coloured - a 
rate exceeding the medium of the Paulista capital by 25 percent. 
While this number is significantly lower than in India, Indonesia or many other devel-
oping countries, slum populations do not account for the only type of informal living 
models in Brazil. Most of the peripheral dwellers, rich and poor, dwell on semi-legal land 
divisions. These illegal land subdivisions became a feature dominating São Paulo’s urban 
expansion in the last 30 years. (Cf. Holston and Caldeira 2008: 22)194 Bogus and Paster-
nak (2004: 10) locate the origins of the practice of illegal land subdivisions in the early 
1970s, when the Metropolitan region of São Paulo was established (Cf. below). Today 
the Urban Planning Department estimates that 65 percent of Paulistanos violate property 
laws in one-way or another.195 
Historic Perspective 
National milestones 
The information presented in the above sections makes clear that Brazil is a relatively 
matured economy. It can be located midway between developing countries and the West. 
Yet it remains open whether this status represents backwardness or an inopportune (even 
tragic) progress.196  
Certainly the country has undergone important economic, spatial and societal trans-
formations at a much earlier stage than many other developing countries (e.g. those in 
                                               
191 In Latin America the numbers range between 20 and 50 percent (Ibidem) 
192 Between the 1980 and 2000, São Paulo’s slums grew at an average annual rate of 5.12, during the same period the 
municipal population increased at an annual rate of 1.07 percent (Cf. Bogus 2004: 19). 
193 Cf. Bogus 2004:18; quoting numbers by the Centro Estudo da Metrópole, CEM. 
194 The various settlements are called ‚loteamentos‘, ‚clandestinos‘, ‚subúrbios‘, ‚cidades satélites‘, ‚ocupações‘, or ‚favelas‘, 
and that they are generally subsumed as ‚periferia‘. (Ibidem: 21) 
195 A expansão da periferia pela chamada Região Metropolitana, constituída oficialmente, como área administrativa, em 
1973, ocorreu principalmente a partir da década de 1970 com a abertura de inúmeros loteamentos, muitos deles 
“clandestinos”, ou seja, projetados e vendidos sem a aprovação da municipalidade e desrespeitando a legislação de 
parcelamento e uso do solo. (Bogus 2004: 10) 
196 Brazil features urbanisation rates of western levels and a great degree of freedom. Yet, it is also extremely polarised: 
wealth and quality of life are extremely fragmented. It remains unclear whether and how this entrenched situation can ever 
be overcome, whether we find here in Brazilian a model of an advanced post-industrial society that may become a proto-
type for many developing countries. 
Case 3: AlphaVille-Tamboré   375 
Africa or Asia). A major boom of industrialisation, urbanisation, migration and infra-
structure construction has been taking place since the late 1960s. Processes of suburbani-
sation and the growth of the middle classes gained momentum in the 1980s. On the 
other hand, democratisation (along with new forms of liberalisation) occurred only since 
the late 1980s. The question arises: why has a country that industrialised so early and 
developed already far not been able to achieve a fully developed status? 
A historical perspective emerges as a significant element that may open up new per-
spectives on the matter. AlphaVille represents a history of more than 35 years, which is 
asking to be contextualised. Consequently, in the next section we seek to develop a time 
axis for the project, presenting some important political, economic and urban milestones 
of the last century. A particular attention will be given to the early 1970s as the historical 
and political point in time which saw the emergence of AlphaVille,  
Indeed, it turns out that AlphaVille-Tamboré has developed in an ambivalent context: 
the peak of the country’s economic boom and the darkest days of the military regime. 
 Illustration D-7: Milestone chart Brazil, São Paulo, AlphaVille 
1930 to 1964: ‘prehistory’ – wishy-washy populism, modernisation as a project and the 
concentric city 
Politics 
Brazil’s 1930s to 1960s, also known as the ‘populist era’, is characterised by a rising con-
flict among the elites and the common man. The rulers of this epoch seek to buy off the 
disorder and achieve a tolerable degree of stability in initiating large-scale industrializa-
tion. Getúlio Dornelles Vargas is the most famous of them. The epoch is characterised by 
nationalism and state-guided industrialisation (modernisation). It is demarcated by the 
contrasts of rural elites and the urban proletariat, struggles between pro-Communist and 
pro-fascist movements, and by volatile shifts between self-proclaimed authoritarian re-
gimes and elected governments. The post-depression and pre-World WarII era (1937-
1945) is subject to Varga’s authoritarian administration, also known as the Brazilian 
‘Estado Novo’. His overthrow and re-election and several democratic presidents follow, 
thereafter the period (1945 to 1964), known as the second republic, is marked by Jus-
celino Kubitschek’s modernisation programmes and ends with the left-populist presi-
dency of João Goulart.197  
Economics 
“In less than one generation Brazil's leapfrogged from the bull cart and mule 
train era into that of the internal combustion engine”. (Cf. Hudson 1997) 
The great depression of 1929 ends the dominance of commodities such as coffee and 
triggers the country’s industrialisation. This populist era is characterised by a strong, but 
liberal state that promotes economic nationalism, state-guided modernisation and import 
substitution trade policies (Cf. Box below). The modernist-paternalist spirit is based on 
holistic planning, characteristic of many postcolonial regimes worldwide (Cf. the Indone-
sian Example).198  
                                               
197 Cf. McCann 2005 at: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/brtoc.html., r12.04.2009. 
198 Significantly, the Estado Novo (1937-1945) sees the foundation several large state owned industrial companies, such as: 
the Fábrica Nacional de Motores (FNM); the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional" (CSN) (National Iron Smelting Enterprise); or 
the Conselho Nacional do Petróleo" (CNP) (Cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Brazil_(1930%E2%80%931945), 
r12.04.2009) 
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50s industrialisation – “São Paulo não pode parar“ 
The 1950s is an era of major industrialisation. For the first time the industrial share of 
GDP (25.2 percent) surpasses that of the agricultural sector (22.5 percent). In only ten 
years, the number of industrial workers more than doubles from 1,6 million in 1940 to 
2,9 million in 1950.  São Paulo becomes the industrial powerhouse of the country. The 
majority of the country’s industries is installed in its periphery. “São Paulo não pode 
parar” – São Paulo cannot stop – is the motto that spurred the city. (Cf. Koll-
Schretzenmayr 2001) 
To some accounts President’s Juscelino Kubitschek’s national modernisation pro-
gramme (1956-1961) is particularly important. Kubitschek, a trained doctor of medicine, 
commissions the new capital Brasilia, and pushes the automotive industry and grand 
infrastructure projects.199  
Yet the state guided modernisation is a costly measure. By the end of the populist era, 
Brazil falls into a hefty economic (and political) crisis. In the 1950s and 1960s inflation 
reaches 75 percent. Frequent working class protests and strikes point to a rising self-
confidence of this non-elite. 
Urbanism 
The period of the Estado Novo is also the cradle of modern Urban Planning. One of the 
paradigmatic figures is the French planner Donat-Alfred Agache. His master plans for 
Rio, Recife, Porto Alegre and Curitiba serve as a model for the later planning efforts of 
the 1960s.200  
A new urban landscape of São Paulo materialises as a mix of a tradition of French 
boulevards and US American skyscraper typologies. Whereas the 1920’s configure the 
shape of the central area of the city, one decade later Greater São Paulo undertakes initial 
efforts towards orchestrated public planning (Cf. Nery 2002). Notably, consolidation 
and legalisation policies are fostering the emigration of working classes (and later also of 
middle classes) from the inner city to the suburbs. 
1929: Working Code Arthur Sabóia 
The 1929 law 3.427/29, also known as the ‘Código de Obras “Arthur Sabóia’ arranges 
the city in four concentric zones: 1) Central commercial, 2) Urban, 3) Suburban and 4) 
Agricultural. It maintains a general urban pattern of a dense city centre201, permitting 
exceptions at important locations.202  
1930: Plano de Avenidas 
Between 1924 and 1930 the Plano de Avenidas, São Paulo’s first important comprehen-
sive planning document is drawn up. This scheme by Francisco Prestes Maia and João de 
Ulhôa Cintra’ is famous for its idealist radio-concentric structure.203 (Cf. Anelli 2008: 18) 
Maia and Cintra lay out the basic transportation structure for a São Paulo entering the 
motor age. They propose to connect the city and ‘periferia’ by a number of new avenues 
                                               
199 His legacy comprises a modern highway network and the world's eighth-largest automobile production. (Cf. Hudson 
1997) 
200 Cf. Moreira 2004, at http://repository.upenn.edu/dissertations/AAI3138056/, r12.04.2009 
201 Based on the municipal standards (law 2.33/20) 
202 The law allows buildings up to 80 metres in the ‘centro novo’, and restricted buildings in some placed of the ‘centro 
velho’ up to 50 metres (Cf. Nery 2002: at http://jmarinho.sites.uol.com.br/1periodo.html; 
http://www.usp.br/fau/docentes/depprojeto/e_nobre/AUP274/cidade_industrial.htm, r13.04.2009). 
203 Francisco Prestes Maia was an architect and engineer. Like many of São Paulo’s renowned planners and bureaucrats, he 
was based at the Polytechnic School of the University of São Paulo, (Cf. below). Maia became prefect of the city during the 
Second World War, and again on the eve before the milirary regime. His second important planning document, published in 
1945 was “The Improvement Plan for São Paulo” (“Os Melhoramentos de São Paulo”) (A short biography is available at: 
http://www.vivabrazil.com/vivabrazil/francisco_prestes_maia.htm, a short film documentary on Maia can be retrieved at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-WNY5aBFZos r12.04.2009). 
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radiating from the centre. The progress triggered the re-organisation of large parts of the 
inner city and initiated a real estate boom.204  
1948: Robert Moses 
In the year 1947 São Paulo sees the foundation of a planning department and the start of 
a coordinated master and land use plan.205 As industrial development takes off, the plan-
ning office commissions a new development study. Notably the project team is lead by 
the US American Robert Moses.206 Moses focuses on an efficient road infrastructure and 
proposes to replace many of the Maia’s avenues with highways (Cf. Anelli 2008:17). A 
negative consequence is the fragmentation of the urban fabric (as much as in New York 
City). 
1955: Industrial Zoning: 4.805/55 
The law 4.805/55 regulates the location of hazardous industries in the city’s areas. The 
law is guided by the spirit of a separated and uncluttered city and operates by the means 
of noise regulations. As a consequence São Paulo is divided in 4 types of zones: residen-
tial, predominantly residential, mixed, and manufacturing industrial.207  
1957: Law Anhaia (5.261/57) 
When in 1957 the socialist Adhemar de Barros becomes mayor of São Paulo, for the first 
time in the city’s history a zoning law (5.261/57) is drafted for the whole municipal 
area.208 The law, also known as the law of high-rises, aims to regulate the increasing con-
gestion of the city centre. While it drives the modernisation (and the gentrification) of the 
downtown area, it also leads to a boom of high-rise constructions beyond the traditional 
core.209 
1956 to 1958: SAGMACS (Estrutura Urbana da Aglomeração Paulistana) 
In the second half of the 1990s São Paulo’s mayor Toledo Pisa commissions the French 
Dominican Louis Joseph Lebret with an urban study. Lebret’s group the SAGMACS 
(Sociedade Para Análise Gráfica e Mecanográfica Aplicadas Aos Complexos Sociais), 
known for an approach of a ‘humanistic economy’, prepares a holistic planning docu-
ment on a regional scale.210 It identifies the rising disparities of a developed centre and 
the underdeveloped peripheries as the major problems of the city’s development, propos-
ing the development of sub-centres. Lebret’s propoals are widely discussed. They influ-
ence later documents such as the The Plano Urbanisatico Básico (PUB) of 1968 (Cf. be-
low).211 
                                               
204 Caldeira, who is providing a critical comment, writes: “The Plano de Avenidas also chose to enhance roads instead of 
expanding public trolley transportation in the city. Consequently, the working classes, who could not afford the increased 
rents, were driven out. The launching of a bus system, associated with the progressive opening of new avenues, made 
possible the expansion of the city toward the periphery.” (Caldeira, 2000: 215-20) 
205 Cf. Feldmann 2005, Cf. http://www.usp.br/fau/docentes/depprojeto/e_nobre/AUP274/metropole_industrial.htm, 
r12.04.2009) 
206 Moses is a famous urban planner from North America and author of New York City’s master plan of that time. His pro-
jects were the main object of Jane Jacob’s critique. (Cf. Flint, Anthony 2009: Wrestling with Moses: How Jane Jacobs Took 
On New York's Master Builder and Transformed the American City; New York) 
207 Cf. Nery 2002 at http://jmarinho.sites.uol.com.br/4periodo.html, r13.04.2009 
208 The law prescribed maximum floor area ratios of 6 for commercial and 4 for residential buildings; the maximum density 
was set at to 600 persons per hectare; the minimum size of an apartment at 35 square metres (Cf. Nery 2002 at: 
http://jmarinho.sites.uol.com.br/4periodo.html, r13.04.2009).  
209 Caldeira (2000: 255) sees the law as another trigger pushing poor populations from the inner city towards the peripher-
ies (Cf. Calderia 2000: pp225) 
210 The document, known as the “Estrutura Urbana da Aglomeração Paulistana” is regarded as a pioneering document. It 
represents an integrated planning approach based on methodical research, scientifically determined indicators, historical 
analyses, the inclusion of the public, and a global vision of development 
(http://www.urbanismobr.org/entrevistas/topicos.htm, r12.04.2009). 
211 SAGMACS prepares more studies for the city of Belo Horizonte and for the state of São Paulo in the 1960s (O Plano de 
Ação do governo Carvalho Pinto). 
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1964 to 1985: immediate context – military autocracy, developmentalism2 and metropo-
lisation 
Politics 
The rising economic crisis, intensifying protests, as well as indirect impacts of the Cold 
War, lead to a Coup d’Etat in 1964. Once again, Brazil becomes an autocratic regime. 
The coup reflects a rising interest of the expanding state to control the economy. Differ-
ent from a true dictatorship, where power resides with one person (Cf. Indonesia), the 
power of the junta is founded on the whole military apparatus. While the leadership is 
regularly passed to a series of appointed general-presidents, the military era comprises 
several stages. After a modest start but then a fierce first period (1964-1974), from 1974 
a gradual re-opening begins. The regime lasts until the new constitution of 1988.212 
1964 - 1967Castello Branco 
Brazil’s military Coup d’Etat of April 1964 dethrones the republican president João Gou-
lart, in an overthrow, which is known as the ‘quiet intervention’ (Cf. Parker 1979). Fif-
teen days after the plot, the Army Chief of Staff, Marshal Humberto de Alencar Castello 
Branco becomes appointed president. (Cf. Parker 1979) 
In a context of the hot atmosphere of the ‘Cold War’ – the Cuban revolution is only 
three years prior – the new government is directly recognised by the US government and 
its allies (Cf. Hudson 1997). The new years issue of Time magazine,1965, heralds the 
transition with the headline “BRAZIL Toward Stability”.213 214 The country is run along 
a fictitious two party system. The parties are popularly known as the "Yes" party 
(Arena) and the "Yes, sir" (MDB) party. Anyone who opposes the government is re-
moved from office. Moreover the military government controls the posts of all Gover-
nors and Mayors of large cities. 
1967 – 1969 Artur Costa e Silva 
In 1967 Castelo Branko’s moderate leadership style gives way to the most rigid stage of 
the military regime. Artur da Costa e Silva, former war minister became president be-
tween 1967-1974. At this time the military elite seeks to consolidate and fortify its stand-
ing. E Silva proclaims the 5th Institutional Act (AI-5). It gives the president the power to 
dismiss the National Congress, strip politicians of their offices of power, to censor public 
media, and to institutionalize repressive methods of rule (Cf. Hudson 1994). The gov-
ernment’s infringements of human rights  trigger a wave of student protests. 
1969 –1974 The Médici Administration 
The third military government engenders a general tightening of the situation and a par-
allel rise of counter movements. The state becomes increasingly oppressive under the 
general Emilio Garrastazu Médici, former chief of Intelligence Services. The period is one 
of the most repressive stages of Brazil's autocratic era. It includes torture and strict cen-
sorship.215 
                                               
212 It seems that the autocratic era is a white blanket in Brazilian history. As of August 2006, nobody in Brazil has been 
convicted of human rights violations during the 21 years of military dictatorship 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Condor#Brazil, r07.04.2009) 
213 Cf. http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,842333,00.html, r04.04.2009. 
214 The coup was also described as an action of military elites to prevent a further erosion of power to the left and to main-
tain present power relations (Cf. the article by Celso Castro of the of the Getúlio Vargas foundation: “O Golpe de 1964 e a 
instauração do regime milita”; at: http://www.cpdoc.fgv.br/nav_fatos_imagens/htm/fatos/Golpe64.htm, r04.04.2009). 
215 The resistance movement sought to gain publicity by kidnapping several important foreign diplomats. Charles Burke 
Elbrick the U.S. ambassador was kidnapped on 8th October of 1969, Nobuo Okuchi Japanese consul general in São Paulo in 
several months later. Other victims were the US consul in Porto Alegre as well as the German ambassador. (Cf. 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,902646,00.html, r12.12.2008) 
The truth and reconciliation commission stated in 2007 339 documented cases of government-sponsored political assassina-
tions or disappearances. (http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u323017.shtml, r12.11.2008) 
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1974 – 1979 Ernesto Geisel – start of the ‘abertura’ 
By the end of the first half of the 1970s the effects of the oil crisis in combination with 
rising inflation becomes visible. Ernesto Geisel, a military General and Industrialist of 
German-Brazilan ancestry, is the first of the military generals to embark on a path of 
opening and a gradual democratic reform (‘abertura’) during his 5-year rule (from March 
15th 1974 to March 15th 1979).216  
Table 31: São Paulo’s prefects form 1965 to 1979 (AlphaVille’s start-up phase) 
While the military junta seeks to run the large cities like gigantic machines, it handpicks a 
series of successful industrialists, managers and engineers as to serve as prefects of the 
country’s economic powerhouse São Paulo.217 The following list provides an overview of 
these personalities. It reveals that all of them were relatively young (in their 30s to 50s) 
and the majority of them were trained as Engineers. Importantly the Polytechnic School 
of the University of São Paulo emerges as a seed institution. Notably the examination 
reveals that most of the technocratic prefects are of the same generation and of the same 
back ground as AlphaVille’s developers Yoshiro Takaoka, and Renato Albuquerque. 
 
Term Name Year of Birth 
(Age when 
taking office)  
Training Profession 
1965 - 
1969 
José Vicente 
Faria Lima 
*1909 (56) Military College Military Engineer, Pi-
lot, Politician 
1969 
to 
1971 
Paulo Salim 
Maluf 
*1931 (39) Civil Engineer, 
Polytechnic 
School at USP 
Industrialist, Politi-
cian 
1971 
to 
1973 
José Carlos de 
Figueiredo 
Ferraz†218 
*1918 (53) Civil Engineer, 
Polytechnic 
School at USP 
Engineer, Professor, 
Consultant, Politician 
1973 
to 
1975 
Miguel Co-
lasuonno 
*1939 (34) Economist, USP Economist, Politician 
1975 
to 
1979 
Olavo 
Setúbal219 
*1923 (52) Trained Engi-
neer, Polytechnic 
School at USP 
Industrialist, Banker, 
Head of Itaú (one of 
the largest Brazilian 
Banks) 
 
Economics: developmentalist-technocratic model 
The military regime is devoted to reviving the country’s economy. Its economic reforms 
are centred on a right wing liberal model.220 Development is carried out along a liberal, 
                                               
216 Geisel’s government permitted elections for the legislative organs and increased the freedom for the opposition party. 
Moreover, the practise of Censorship was abandoned by the end of his mandate. 
217 Jamie Lerner, the author of the Curitiba’s prominent master plan, was picked as the prefect of the capital of Parána in 
1971. 
218 Ferraz was closely associated with Pires do Rio and Prestes Maia. His office did the engineering of Lina Bobardi’s Museum 
of Modern Art in the 1950s 
219 "It was one of the rare periods I had insomnia and had to take medicines to sleep..." , "Administrating the city is a 
fantastic thing, I feel honoured, but you have to work much harder than you do while running a bank and the salary is 
much lower." (Mr Setúbal about his time in office as mayor of São Paulo: at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olavo_Set%C3%Babal, r06.04.2009) 
220 In contrast to India and parallel to Indonesia (Cf. the two other cases studies of this investigation) 
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technocratic, and positivist model (Cf. Ribeiro 2001).221 Strategic partnerships with the 
corporate sector play a pivotal role and the policy results in a remarkable and quick eco-
nomic upturn. 
The strategy of the military regime seeks to put forward a policy of economic inde-
pendence. To achieve this goal the state seeks to substitute imports of as many capital 
goods as possible. Moreover it undertakes huge investments in the country’s infrastruc-
ture.222 The situation is characterised by a strong alliance of corporate and public sector 
elites. As international corporations are invited to invest and implement model projects, 
these play a crucial role for the transfer of know-how. Moreover they are hassle free 
partners for the government.  
Thus, the darkest days of the military regime are paralleled by the launch of Volks-
wagen, Ford, GM and Mercedes production plants. The Trans-Amazonian Highway is 
constructed through the northern rain forests, and the world's largest hydroelectric dam 
emerges at Itaipu (Cf. Hudson 1997). Metropolitain areas, with São Paulo and Rio at the 
forefront, see major planning efforts and an enormous boom of construction and invest-
ment (Cf. below). 
Notably the autocratic governments also revamp the housing market and credit sys-
tems by installing demand driven systems with a privatised supply side and reforms in 
housing finance. As part of this effort a new ‘Housing Finance System’ (SFH) and a new 
National Housing Bank are installed.223  
Fuelled by huge amounts of government subsidies and international finance, the eco-
nomic policies lead to impressive results: Brazil becomes one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world, growing at rates beyond the 10 percent mark from 1968 to 1973 
(Cf. Hudson 1997). The military regime sees itself as validated. The state of euphoria 
peaks when the World Cup is won in 1970. (Cf. Hudson 1997)224 
Nonetheless, the situation is bound to change. The continual injection of capital 
proves unsustainable. By the mid of the 1970s, in the aftermath of the oil crisis225, an 
increasing number of contradictions of the right-wing central planning model become 
apparent. This leads to a gradual transformation of the system.  
1980 ‘a lost decade’ with hope in the end 
The 1980s are widely conceived as a ‘lost decade’ (Cf. Hudson 1997). Yet it is also an 
era of immense progress towards democracy. It becomes evident that the developmental-
ist technocratic model is an unsustainable ‘money-eating machine’. The realisation of 
infrastructure and industries requires immense financial resources and triggers a fatal 
vicious circle. (Cf. Hiratuka 2008: 4) While constantly growing sums of money have to 
                                               
221 Presupposing that the ‘Volk’ is not mature enough to decide what is best for its own development (Cf. Holston 2004). 
222 Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) is a strategy of state induced industrialisation. The policy was highly popular in 
Latin America at that time. The policy is influenced by the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes. It was largely pro-
moted by international organisations such as the UN subsidiary CEPAL (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean) (Cf. Baer, Werner (1972), “Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experi-
ences and Interpretations,” Latin American Research Review vol. 7 (Spring): 95-122.). 
For an indebt discussion of ISI see for example: Hira, Anil 2007: Did ISI fail and is neoliberalism the answer for Latin Amer-
ica? Re-assessing common wisdom regarding economic policies in the region. Rev. Econ. Polit. [online], vol.27, n.3, pp. 345-
356 ; (Available from: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572007000300002, r04.04.2009) 
223 Cf. Rodrigues 2000: 11; Cf. below: BOX SFH 
224 Ana Cecilia Campos (2005, 2007) describes the political and economic moment as one of easy financial resources, highly 
indebted states, an ambiguous position of the federal subsidies towards middle class and low-income populations, and the 
preference of large companies. She illustrates the situation by the example of the New Town of Barra da Tijuca in Rio de 
Janeiro: „A implantação do plano para a Barra espelha o momento político e econômico brasileiro na década de 70: a 
facilidade de recursos, o endividamento do Estado, a posição ambígua do BNH financiando maciçamente habitação para 
camadas mais altas ao mesmo tempo em que tentava prover as camadas mais baixas da população, o favorecimento às 
grandes empresas e o que se altera quando os recursos financeiros se tornam escassos.“ (Campos 2005: 5) 
225 The oil crisis halved the amount of growth in 1994. 
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be borrowed on international markets, the augmented supply in the homeland causes 
spiralling rates of inflation (Cf. Ribeiro 2001). Eventually the elite regime, seeking to 
preserve its power, becomes incapable of inducing a sustainable economy from the top. 
By the 1980s an external debt crisis ends the economic growth cycle and activates politi-
cal reforms.226 The economic decline triggers unemployment, pushing large populations 
towards informality and spurring a growing dissatisfaction from the working classes. 
When huge strikes are called off in 1978 and 1980, in São Paulo’s peripheries the ma-
chines come to a halt.227  
Urban planning in the autocratic era – the modernist-developmentalist model 
The economic boom of the late 1960 and early 1970s is paralleled by the great wave of 
migration from Brazil’s Northeast, South and Southwest, boosting the growth of the in-
dustrial urban centres (Cf. Bogus, Pasternak: 10). São Paulo matures into a regional me-
tropolis. Its urban mass is growing beyond the municipal area of São Paulo merging with 
Osasco und Taboão da Serra in the West, Guarulhos to the East and the so-called ABC-
Area in the Southeast (Cf. Rolnik 2008). The city administration draws up integrated 
development plans and its technocratic mayors steer the implementation of large infra-
structure projects (most visibly in the transport sector). 
1964 – SFH/BNH, Housing Finance System 
A critical federal regulation of the time is the federal housing finance programme. The 
scheme provides loans for up to 400 thousand houses and apartments a year from the 
mid-1970s to the early 1980s (Rodrigues 200: 12). Notably municipalities are obliged to 
draft development plans in order to be eligible for credits, moreover they have to take on 
private entrepreneurs to carry out the projects (Botega 2007: 68), so the programme 
promotes the private real estate sector, construction industries and private consultants.228 
1965 - 1968 PUB – towards a polynuclear metropolis 
The second half of the sixties sees the urban footprint of growth beyond the administra-
tive limits of the city. This causes mounting efforts to bring the development under public 
control. Most notably, the Gegran (Executive Group for Greater São Paulo)229 is founded 
as a regional planning body and a new master planning document, the Plano Urbani-
satico Básico (PUB) is prepared. José Vicente de Faria Lima, the new prefect of São 
Paulo230 awards the preparation of the plan to the international consortium of Asplan-
Daily-Montreal-Wilbur and Smith (Cf. Anelli 2008). 
The PUB is among the first documents that seek to organise São Paulo’s disparate 
growth. It develops several scenarios of a ‘polynuclear metropolis’. The preferred option 
entails the creation of a strong core and five regional centres. 650 kilometres of new 
metro lines and 4.000 kilometres of new expressways are supposed to become the veins 
and arteries of this system. Nevertheless the plan reflects the technocratic spirit of the 
1969 – 1974 economic ‘miracle’ in its belief that the metropolis of 42 million could be 
                                               
226 During this time not only Brazil, but many Latin American Countries face a severe debt crisis. Brazil’s deficits rise from 
US$ 6.4 billion in 1963 to nearly US$54 billion in 1980. At the same time inflation augments from 16.2 percent per year in 
1973 to 110.2 by 1980. (Cf. Hudson 1997) On the northern part of the continent, The World Bank develops principles to 
respond to this Latin American debt crisis. These become known as the Washington Consensus. (Cf. Chapter 1: Introduc-
tion: Neoliberalism). 
227 “Protesters asserted that wage increases indexed to the inflation rate were far below a liveable level. Union leaders, 
including the future 1990 presidential candidate Luis "Lula" Inácio da Silva, were arrested for violation of national security 
laws.” (Hudson 1997 at: www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-1700.html, r05.04.2009) 
228 Among the programmes developed by the BNH was also the program of accelerated urban community revitalisation the 
(Comunidades Urbanas de Recuperação Acelerada – CURA). (Cf. Anelli 2007)  
229 The Gegran is the direct precedent of the Emplasa (Cf. below Regulation) 
230 Faria Lima also immediately abandoned the law 5.261/57, replacing it with law 6.877/66, which abandoned the density 
limitations and applied a maximum far of 6 to the whole municipal area. (At: 
http://jmarinho.sites.uol.com.br/4periodo.html, r13.09.2009) 
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fully developed by the year 2000 (Deák 1999) and providing no means for the participa-
tion of society at large. (Cf. Holston and Caldeira 2004, p. 407).231 While the PUB is 
actually never legally enforced, it has an important impact on subsequent planning 
documents and sectored plans.232  
1969 triumph of pragmatism and large scale infrastructure projects 
When in 1969 a new mayor, 39-year-old Paulo Salim Maluf233 takes over the municipal 
power, São Paulo’s population has 6 million residents (Cf. 4 million in 1960). Pragma-
tism triumphes over idealism, the PUB is abandoned, and Maluf government embarks on 
a ‘Haussmannian’ transformation of the city based on transport infrastructure. The 
measures comprise the completion of the expressways along the Tietê and the Pinheiros. 
78 important bridges and several major tunnels link the East and West and the North 
and South. Dozens of Avenues are remodelled. Among the famous projects of Maluf’s 
time is the Elevado Presidente Costa e Silva in the centre of São Paulo.234 The radical pro-
ject, also known as the ‘Minhocão’ (Earthworm) (Cf. Anelli 2008:20), is aimed at linking 
the centre to the southwestern vector, penetrating some residential areas.235  
1971 PDDI 
In December 1971 the Empresa Municipal de Urbanização – EMURB, is founded (Cf. 
Anelli 2007) and another master plan the ‘Plano Diretor de Desenvolvimendo Integrado’ 
(PDDI) is developed. The PDDI is distinctive, as it is one of the few master plans that win 
the approval of São Paulo’s city council, becoming the law 7688/71236. This was neces-
sary as authorised planning documents are a mandatory requirement of receiving federal 
urban development grants (e.g. SFH, or CURA). Nevertheless, in contrast to the high 
ambitions, the power of the plan remained limited. Like many of its peers, it was not 
capable of resolving the complex set of problems of the growing urban region (Anelli 
2008: 20).  
1972 São Paulo Zoning Code (Lei 7.805/72) 
The fact that the funding requirements of the federal government also demand land use 
and zoning regulations to be drawn up has critical effects. A new zoning code enforced in 
1972 in the form of the Law 7.805/72, under the prefect Figueiredo Ferraz, is bound to 
remain one of the most central planning regulations for more than 30 years to come (Cf. 
Nery 2002). While it represents modernist principles of a functionally separated and dis-
persed city, it is highly beneficial to the emerging real estate sector237 Accordingly São 
Paulo’s fabric is divided up into eight zones (Z-1 to Z-8) and categorised along a set of 
                                               
231 Faria Lima's administration is notable for the completion of important projects. Among the most important of these are: 
the Marginais Tietê and Pinheiros, the Avenida Sumaré, the Radial Leste, 23 de Maio, or the Rubem Berta. In addition the 
trolley was discontinued and the Metro was initiated. In addition the city government embarked on health, education, social 
service projects. 
232 So, for example the 1971-72 highway plan (Plano de Vias Expressas), or the 1971 Plano Diretor de Desenvolvimento 
Integrado. 
233 Maluf was a trained engineer and made his career out of a ‘right-wing neoliberal populist’ practice. Before becoming 
mayor, he chaired the São Paulo Chamber of Commerce as well as Brazil’s Federal Savings Bank - the Caixa Economic Fed-
eral. Maluf later became a notable figure in Brazilian politics, both for his achievements as well as being part of several 
corruption cases. He was serving as the governor of São Paulo and led the Progressive Party of Brazil. Even a political style 
was named after him. His political of right-wing liberal populism became known as Maulufismo. Maluf was to become 
Mayor of São Paulo again in 1992. By then he initiated another remodelling of the city (pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paulo_Maluf; 
r23.03.2009). 
234 Conceived by Faria Lima in the previous legislature period. 
235 When after his term of only two years Maluf becamomes transport minister of the state from 1971- 1975 he commis-
sions important train and metro projects in the region. 
236 Cf. Holston 2004: 409; Cf. below: Regulation 
237 “Um dos objetivos mais importantes desta lei foi auxiliar a produção habitacional por grandes empresas imobiliárias, ao 
estimular a construção de conjuntos Residencial - R3 - na cidade”. (Cf. Nery 2002 at 
http://jmarinho.sites.uol.com.br/conclusao.html, r12.04.2009) 
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land uses and densities (residential, commercial, industrial, nature etc). The Floor Space 
Index is fixed at a factor of 4 and confined to 10 percent of the city’s area. 
Caldeira (2000: 222) and Nery 2002 discuss, how the zoning laws at the same time 
contributes to the consolidation of inner city elite districts, while at the same time driving 
the exodus of the ‘others’ (e.g. the poor, industries etc). The new zoning codes protect 
most of the traditional elite neighbourhoods through zones classified as exclusively resi-
dential, which strictly safeguard land use and density (Z-1). As the scarcity of space in 
the inner city along with the formalisation of land use results in an increase of land 
prices, poorer populations are driven out. Moreover, particular strict restrictions towards 
for industries result in an exodus of this land use from central locations (Cf. Nery 
2002).238 
The zoning code reinforces the trends of segregation and polarization: It reinforces the 
trend to locate apartment buildings away from the central areas, but not evenly. Middle 
class residents tend to move along the southwestern axis to Morumbi, or even further to 
Granja Viana and AlphaVille. The national housing bank sponsors the owners of (expen-
sive) formalised land and bypasses the proprietors of illegal subdivisions. As a result, the 
tendency to regulate e.g. restrict the development of the central areas, contributes to an 
increased demand in the peripheries, particularly those areas featuring connections to the 
central locations.239 
1973: Establishment of the RMSP 
The last important milestone in the early seventies, and a consequence of the 1969 PUB 
plan, is Gegran’s establishment of the São Paulo Metropolitain Region (RMSP). The 
RMSP comprises of the city of São Paulo and 42 additional municipalities.  
1986s and onward: democratisation, liberalisation and regional consolidation 
Politics 
The late 1980s mark a period of democratisation and economic reforms. The top-down 
developmentalist method gives way to a bottom-up approach in regard to economic 
growth, state intervention and urbanization (Cf. Ribeiro 2001). In December 1989 Fer-
nando Alfonso Collor de Mello seizes the moment and becomes the first elected head of 
state for 29 years240. While inflation amounts to 25 percent per month, Collor and his 
successor Franco Itamar initate major economic and political changes.241 These are 
marked by a massive wave of privatisation, in the local context known as ‘denationalisa-
tion’ (Desestatização), deregulation as well as a severe fiscal policy. 242  (Anuatti-Neto et 
al 2005) Under the name Plano Collor I and II: a moratorium on Brazil’s foreign debt is 
negotiated; the policy of import substitution is revised and import restrictions for more 
than 800 products are abolished; more than 70 state companies (almost all) are priva-
tised; public salaries are frozen, and (quite controversially) private savings confiscated243. 
                                               
238 In addition, the Lei 7.805/72 and its modifications in 8.001/73 lead to some alternative typologies for higher income 
classes in the central areas. Notably, the R-3 form of land use in Z-2 zones triggers the boom of vertical condominiums such 
as Ilha’s do Sul, or Portal Morumbi. The famous “Fórmula of Adiron" allowes the increase of Floor Space Index by a propor-
tional reduction of the occupation index, and a parallel provision of common green areas and facilities for collective use. (Cf. 
Caldeira, 2000: 225-28, Cf. Nery 2002 at: http://jmarinho.sites.uol.com.br/producao.html, and.... conclusao.html, 
r12.04.2009). 
239 The zoning codes were further revised, refined and ‘softened’ by the laws 53 laws, most notably the 8.001/73, 8.006/74, 
8.211/75, 8.848/78, 8.843/78, 8.844/78, 9.049/80, 9.411/81, 10.041/86, 10.071/86, which resulting in a greater mix of 
land uses. (Cf. Nery 2002 athttp://jmarinho.sites.uol.com.br/consideracoes2.html) 
240 The conservative Collor defeates Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva by 35 million votes. 
241 In São Paulo Salim Maluf becomes São Paulo’s mayor again in 1992 and starts remodelling the city. 
242 The telecom sector was one of the first of the privatised sectors. As early as November 1990 private mobile phase com-
panies were competing for the market (Cf. Fendt 2004). 
243 Cf. From a self description of Collor’s achievements at: collor.com/collorplan_001.asp., r06.04.2009 
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In addition an increased amount of goods was purchased at foreign markets resulting in 
a rise of imports from 4.8 percent in 1989 to 20.3 percent in 1998. 
Itamar’s successor the sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) maintains 
free trade and privatisation programs along his Plano Real. The stabilisation of the Real 
and its reintegration in the world economy is among the most significant achievements of 
his term (Cf. Hudson 1997). 
The year 2002 sees the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. ‘Lula’, as he is commonly 
known, is a popular public figure of the working-class movement244. His presidency is 
particularly known for its widespread social (and environmental) reforms. Yet he also 
maintains liberal policies including public sector reforms. (Cf. Fendt 2004) Lula’s success 
is widely approved and he is re-elected in 2006. 
The government develops a series of social programmes geared at a social redistribu-
tion of wealth and the eradication of poverty. A significant initiative is the Fome Zero 
(Zero Hunger) program. This program intends to give each Brazilian three meals a day. 
Other measures comprise a drastic increase of minimum wages from R$200 to R$350 in 
four years (Cf. Fendt 2004). The government’s social reform approach also translates 
into various infrastructural and service programmes. Among these are plans to supply 
3.7 million people in Brazil’s poorest Northeast region with potable water, to construct 
1.2 million housing units for the poor, and to provide essential public health services for 
those in need (Ibidem).  
Economy 
The notable aspect of Brazil’s democratic and economic restructuring is the fact that an 
intense liberal restructuring of the economy parallels the deep socio-political reforms 
(indeed a pair full of contradictions and innovations). Color’s, Itamar’s and Cardosos’s 
reform programmes of denationalisation (privatisation), deregulation and decentralisa-
tion245 bring the inflation down and restart the country’s economy. While the country’s 
credibility ratings are rehabilitated Brazil becomes the largest borrowers of urban devel-
opment money from The World Bank by the end of the 1980s. 246 This makes possible 
new massive infrastructure investments. On the problematic side are for example the 
polarising effects of an unrestrained global capital. (Cf. above: …Inequality) 
Space/ legislation 
The progression of economic and political reforms has tremendous impacts on the urban 
surface. Most notably the ‘periferia’ matures into a multiplex urban region along a new 
logic of connectedness, access and fragmentation, despite the fact that master plans are 
absent or redundant. The relations of centre and periphery are reshuffled. While some of 
the advanced services, such as command, control and innovation cluster in distinct cen-
tres, other less knowledge intensive secondary functions decentralise. Rising disposable 
income leads to the rise of ever more middle classes, which then strive to realise a con-
sumer oriented lifestyle. On the other hand, growing unemployment and disparities bring 
along a boom of informality and greed. As a consequence Brazil’s urban centres experi-
ence a major crime and security crisis. While crime level peak in particular in the 1980s 
and 1990’s, thereafter the peripheries are increasingly affected. 
The economic and spatial restructuring is generally based on the decline of the indus-
trial and the rise of the services sector. New modes of production and control become 
                                               
244 He played an important role as a working class in the 1978 and 1980 strikes around São Paulo. 
245 Cf. Antônio Barros de Castro, FSP: Sep, 22, 1999: 2 
246 The 1990s reforms have to be regarded in a wider framework of political and socio-economic trends. It was the time 
when the iron curtain fell, the Cold War ended and the triumph of the market economy was heralded.  
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possible. As a consequence industries tend to spread throughout the country, reversing a 
40-year-old trend of agglomeration and concentration. São Paulo’s relevance as an indus-
trial centre is reduced, while at the same time its status as a focal point of command, 
control and as a producer of advanced tertiary services increases. (Cf. above: São Paulo) 
Political and spatial decentralisation 
The country’s debt crisis and the dwindling government resources are not only triggering 
the economic reforms described above, they also reinforce a process of political decen-
tralisation. As the relevance of the local level grows, municipalities enter into a stage of 
competition. While all seek to attract resources and economic facilities within the own 
jurisdiction, the trend of industrial deconcentration is reinforced.  
While on one hand social movements struggling for equity, participation, ‘the right to 
the city’ and the preservation of the environment are stronger than ever before, the cities 
become increasingly dependent on corporate initiatives and private assets.247 In this con-
text, city governments try out neo-liberal planning and development strategies. Two sig-
nificant programmes in this regard are São Paulo’s ‘paid authorisation for the right to 
construct’ (‘outorga onerosa do direto de contruir’) and ‘urban operations’.248 Both initia-
tives thrive on the idea of public-private partnerships. While developers can buy in-
creased development rights in certain areas that are promoted, the public side obliges 
itself to spend the revenues for public ends. Two important (and controversial249) projects 
that develop in the manner of ‘urban interventions’ are the Avenida Faria Lima and Bern-
ini, Aquas Espraiadas. Both schemes emerge as global business hubs in the ‘vetor sudeo-
ste’.  
1986 to 1988: National Constitutional Assembly 
The national constitutional congress is critical for Brazil’s democratisation. Between 
1986 and 1988 this assembly elaborates the general basis of the country’s democratic 
constitution. Importantly this includes a new conception of citizenship and a ‘right to the 
city’. (Cf. Holston, Caldeira 2008: 21)  
The constitution contains several elements of the highest relevance for the configura-
tion of human settlements. The constitutional article 182, for example, defines a new 
framework for a ‘socially oriented and inclusive master planning’. Hence it stresses the 
idea of the city as well as its elements as common goods that have to be developed with 
the participation of all inhabitants.250 Another important part of the constitution is the 
Article 193. This section allows squatters of small properties to legalise their land after a 
period of five years. Indeed, this regulation promises far-reaching consequences, as the 
land titles of the majority of the inhabitants of urban peripheries are unclear. The 2009 
program ‘Cidade Legal’ represents a first step towards its implementation. 
1993: Lei de Vilas (11605/94) 
This law enables the construction of small closed condominiums in inner city areas pro-
viding alternatives for the increasing outmigration of middle class residents.251 The result 
                                               
247 It is representative for the situation that São Paulo’s mayors continuously oscillate between right and left in the decade 
(Cf. Holston: 408; Wikipedia gives a first outline at: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%A3o_Paulo#Law_and_government, Cf. 
05.03.2009). 
248 Holston (2004) discusses the issue in more depth 
249 It is highly debated whether public subsidies were a necessary prerequisite for the development the projects (Cf. Abascal 
2006: 10). 
250 The principles represented by this article played an important role in the conception of the new law of land divisions and 
the current discussion on the legality or illegality of guarded condominiums (Cf. below: Regulation, Lei da Responsabilidade 
Territorial Urbana (PL 3057/2000)). 
251 The type is also referred as R3-03. 
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is a sharper competition with the suburban enclaves (loteamentos fechados) in the pe-
ripheries.252  
2001: Estatuto da Cidade (City Statues) 
The landmark legislation of Etstatudo da Cidade (Lei 10.257), enacted on July 10th 2001, 
stresses the social function of the city (including private properties) and the importance 
of environmental preservation. Importantly the law institutionalises participation at the 
basis of master plans, as all cities with more than 20.000 inhabitants (40 percent of all 
Brazilian municipalities) are asked to rewrite their planning documents. 
São Paulo’s 2002 Plano Diretor Estrategico PDE (Municipal law 13.430) 
São Paulo’s 2002 Plano Diretor Estrategico PDE is the direct application of the Estatudo 
Da Cidade. Notably, it is the city’s second plan to be approved by the City Council re-
placing the 1971 PDDI master plan and zoning regulations. Importantly, this milestone 
document takes into consideration the in rising significance of non-state-actors, the civil 
society and also the private sector. It institutionalises socio-ecological principles, as well 
as market-oriented development mechanisms.253 The question of how market mecha-
nisms can best augment social and ecologic assets remains to be resolved.254  
2009 Cidade Legal 
The current programme Cidade Legal promises to emerge as one of the most significant 
milestones of the new urban constitution. This agenda rationalised by the state of São 
Paulo in March 2009, aims to legalise more than 830.000 illegal properties in 47 mu-
nicipalities of the Greater Region of São Paulo. 
Project milestones 
The last section sought to contextualise our case within a general (political, economic, 
spatial) chain of events. It was operating from a macro (top-down) perspective. What is 
still missing is a time axis from the perspective of our particular project as well its devel-
opers. The next section therefore summarises the major milestones of AlphaVille-
Tamboré. In this context five important development stages emerge: 1) prehistory, 2) 
initial experiences, 3) unfolding, 4) maturation, and 5) refinement and diffusion. The 
ongoing exploration revisits some of the important events of the greater context. 
Before 1950s: ‘Prehistory’ 
Some parts of AlphaVille’s history can be traced back to the early colonial times of the 
16th century. By then the land belongs to several native villages. The villages are de-
stroyed and the land becomes part of the Union territory by the end of the 16th cen-
tury.255 On the 31st May 1739 Bernardo José Leite Penteado gains unrestricted leasehold 
                                               
252 Cf. Loffredo 2006, Cf. above: São Paulo; and below: Regulation 
253 Cf. Chapter III: §15, Cf. http://www.usp.br/fau/docentes/depprojeto/e_nobre/AUP274/novos_instrumentos.htm, 
r12.04.2009 
254 Entretanto, ainda é difícil avaliar o papel de políticas públicas que visam à regulamentação e à gestão dos resultados 
espaciais, arquitetônicos e urbanísticos destes aportes de capitais, e possam gerir a aplicação de mecanismos capazes de 
gerar ações redistributivas em outras áreas da cidade e da região (venda de potencial construtivo e a prática da outorga 
onerosa do direito de construir.  ... Estes instrumentos estão regulamentados pela Lei Federal 10.257 de 10 de julho de 
2001 – Estatuto da Cidade, conforme consta do Plano Diretor Estratégico do Município de São Paulo Capítulo III, “Dos 
instrumentos de Gestão Urbana e Ambiental”). Da mesma forma, o Plano Diretor Estratégico (15) dirimiu sobre as 
Operações Urbanas Consorciadas, estabelecendo áreas estratégicas em que podem ser realizadas. (Abascal 06:10) 
255 The history of AlphaVille’s lands is relatively well documented, as land disputes of the area are on a daily agenda (Cf. 
below: Regulation): Duran 2006, a lawyer working on the present land disputes quotes Jerônimo Leitão, a captain of the 
Portuguese army in 1580. Another account on the site’s history is portrayed at: Revista Isto É, SP, 27/7/05. Seção Economia 
& Negócios, p.76 a 77; online at; online at http://geodesia.ufsc.br/wiki-ctm/index.php/Posseiros_de_Luxo; r16.01.2008. 
Case 3: AlphaVille-Tamboré   387 
on the land that since then was called Fazenda Tamboré. The farm remains in the hands 
of the family until the 20th century (Duran 2006).256  
The terrain is not subdivided until 1935 (Cf. Duran 2006).257 By then it is partitioned 
into six pieces.258 It is also reported that Japanese immigrants settled on a significant 
amount of the land and cultivated coffee and other crops (Cf. Revista Isto É, SP, 2005).  
In 1966, with the military regime in place, the Penteado family regains control of the 
entire Fazenda Tamboré. As a consequence settlers who have gained ground have to 
leave the area (Cf. Revista Isto É, SP, 2005). The way for the commercialisation of the 
land is paved. 
1950s to 1970s: Pioneering – first experiences 
In 1951, in the same year as Getúlio Vargas comes to power again and the Government 
of São Paulo undertakes great efforts to invest in large urban infrastructure259, Renato 
Albuquerque and Yoshiro Takaoka260, two college mates from the Polytechnic School of 
São Paulo’s University, establish the firm ‘Construtora Albuquerque, Takaoka ltda.’. The 
firm operates in a 20 square metre office in São Paulo’s centre. (Cf. Cruz 2003)  
Takaoka’s and Albuquerque’s were: “Dedicated, from the first moment, to participa-
tion in public works projects”.261 The firm rises to the ten biggest engineering consultan-
cies in the country in second half of the 1960s262. It carries out 250 projects in several 
States of Brazil and makes important experiences (and profits) in the residential sector in 
implementing publicly funded social housing and infrastructure sector. Many of the pro-
grammes are based on federal loans (Cf. Box: SFH/BNH programme).263  
Box 30: 1960s – SFH program 
Most of Takaoka’s and Albuquerkque’s early projects thrive on federal housing subsi-
dies. The government seeks to enable mass segments of the population to afford their 
own house. As part of this effort, a new ‘Housing Finance System’ (SFH) is created and a 
new National Housing Bank installed. (Cf. Rodrigues 2000: 11) An important part of the 
SFH programme is the requirement for municipalities to draft development plans in or-
der to be eligible for credits.264 What is very crucial, however, is that the federal gov-
ernment only grants a loan if private developers do the implementation. (Cf Botega 
2007: 68) As a result, from the mid 1970s to the early 1980s the scheme provides loans 
for up to 400 thousand houses and apartments a year, (Rodrigues 2000: 12). Signifi-
                                               
256 This former farmland comprises the whole southern part of AlphaVille comprising the first 5 residencial areas (0 to 4), the 
whole industrial and commercial centre as well as some two other condominiums of the Tamborè enterprise, Nova Aldeinha 
and Mel Ville (Ibidem). The fact that such as large chunk of land was open can be seen as a crucial factor in the unique 
development of the area. 
257 At that time the first military regime ends and Getúlio Vargas initiates a ‘paternalistic’ autocracy. Varga’s policy favours 
an entrepreneurial state and nationalises several industries. (Cf. Prutsch 2003; http://www.lateinamerika-
studien.at/content/geschichtepolitik/brasilien/brasilien-63.html, r07.01.2009) 
258 It remains unclear whether Renato Albuquerque and Yoshiro Takaoka, the developers of AlphaVille, obtain parts of the 
area by that time (Cf. Duran 2006). 
259 Robert Moses just prepares the Programma Melhoramentos Públicos geared towards mortised traffic (Cf. ‘National and 
urban Milestones’). Niemeyer builds the famous Copan Building, as well as the Ibirapuera-Park, The Paulista area becomes a 
new business centre (Cf. Timetable in Arch+ 190) 
260 Yoshiro Takaoka’s father Sentaro Takaoka was a doctor who was sent by the Japanese government to take care of the 
immigrants who arrived in Brazil at the beginning of the century (Cf. Takaoka.org.br, r23.08.2008). 
261 Cf. History of the firm at: www.takaoka.eng.br, r.12.08.2008. 
262 While the new military regime under General Castello Branco makes a ‘frontal attack’ on housing (Cf. Rodrigues 2000: 
11) 
263 Albuquerque Takaoka S.A: completed 12.200 metres of bridges and viaducts; they regulated 8 million metres of rivers 
and sanitary canals; constructed 250 thousand square metres of public buildings, as well as 3.036 housing units (of these 
1729 within their housing system). (Cf. http://www.sitedaaldeia.com.br/DrYoshiroTakaoka.htm, r17.01.2008) 
264 As a consequence in São Paulo the Plano Metropolitano de Desenvolvimento Integrado (PMDI) was drafted. (Cf. above) 
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cantly the SFH programme mainly supports the richer parts of society. Botega confirms 
that middle and higher income populations ‘cannibalised’ 80 percent of the loans of 
the National Housing Bank (2007: 69 quoting Maricato 1987 and Kowarick 1979). De-
velopers such as Takaoka and Albuquerque benefit, because, developers are granted 
exclusive rights to acquire large tracts of land in São Paulo’s periphery below market 
rates and to develop these along reduced standards (Cf. Sampaio 2008). In exchange 
they had to retain certain quota for the lower income sector (Ibidem).265 
Indeed, working on behalf of the government in public works and housing, by the end of 
the 1960s Albuquerque and Takaoka assemble the necessary knowledge and an enor-
mous set of skills, only waiting for the right moment and the right combination of cir-
cumstances to realise its full potential.  
An essential constituent of AlphaVille’s success in this context is the construction of 
major traffic arteries providing access from the city towards the region. The main direc-
tion of ‘where to move’ is demonstrated when in 1968 the first section of the Rodovia 
Presidente Castelo Branco inaugurated. This artery is Brazil’s first expressway. It unlocks 
up São Paulo’s hinterland to the West.  
It is also significant is that development plans recommend the development of the 
area: The ‘Plano Urbanistico Basico’ 1969, for example, outlines a future growth of São 
Paulo along the axis of the Tietê-river. (Cf. Above) ‘The Plano de Desenvolvimento Inte-
grado – PDDI’ as well as the zoning regulations of 1972 further consolidated the process. 
These divide the central city into eight zones with different uses and utilisation rates (Cf. 
Caldeira, 2000: 225-28). While the historic centre is being pedestrianised, the Avenida 
Paulista and the Jardins area emerge as new centres of economic and political power. (Cf. 
Rolnik 2008, Cf. above) As the central spaces become valorised, many people, affluent 
and poor, leave the city. The well-to-do populations predominantly move along the 
Southwest axis, the ‘vetor sudoeste’ (Cf. above). Morumbi becomes the first privately 
planned developed neighbourhood.266 Another constituent of AlphaVille’s success is the 
fact that the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo is established in 1973 (Cf. Bogus: 10). 
This fact contributes to a real estate boom and leads to a rapid apportionment of the 
urban periphery, both by the formal, as well as by the informal sector. (Ibidem) In this 
way, the puzzle of AlphaVille-Tamboré is pieced together. 
In course of these early 1970s turnovers as well as the real estate boom, Albuquerqe 
and Takaoka demonstrate a right mix of experience and intuition and try their fortune in 
parallel, in the inner city as well as in the periphery. 
1970 to 1980: Unfolding – From nucleus to fully fledged city 
In 1972 Albuquerqe and Takaoka launch the ‘Ilha do Sul’-Project (Cf. below: Predeces-
sors). This gated and fully serviced luxury ensemble of six buildings á 80 apartments 
soon develops as the new reference point for luxury housing in Brazil.267 On the other 
                                               
265 Poor residents were pushed out of the city at that time not only because the critical condition of the traditional low 
income housing, the ‘Cortiços’, but also because they were driven out by a process of gentrification.  Costa (2006: 7) de-
scribes the effects of this real estate boom, with constantly increasing prices mainly for the Vetor Sudoeste: “Nos anos de 
1960, impulsionada por boom imobiliário, a Avenida Faria Lima, eixo de ligação de imensa área entre os bairros do Itaim e 
Santo Amaro, foi o vetor desta nova centralidade. ... “Centenas de terrenos, muitos ainda vazios, ou ocupados por galpões 
industriais e residências de classe média, foram adquiridos por grandes agentes imobiliários e estocados, numa estratégia de 
valorização a longo prazo”. 
266 In particular a stringent preservation of affluent residential neighbourhoods, so called Z1 zones, limits the dwelling op-
tions for the middle classes in the city and spurs the desire to relocate towards the periphery. (Cf. Gonçalvez 1998: 9) 
267 Cf. Aragão 2007: 54; Caldeira 2000 quoted by Landman 2002: 2. 
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hand, the two seize the favourable moment and develop the 500 hectares in Barueri.268  
Interestingly, at this initial moment in 1973, the developers seek to develop the site as an 
area for non-polluting industries.269 The US American firm Hewlett Packard, one of the 
initiators of Silicon Valley, demonstrates a strong interest and becomes one of the major 
tenants.270271  
The important innovation of transferring the vertical Ilha-do-Sul-strategy from the 
compact centre into the horizontal plane of the spacious periphery is realised only three 
years later. Notably, this specialty emerges not as an ingeniously planned coup, but is 
induced by a growing demand - mainly from the employees of commercial facilities in the 
vicinity who seek to settle close to their working place. (Cf. AV-Webpage: “História”; 
and Davidson 2004) When in 1975 the first residential cluster, named ‘Residencial-1’ is 
developed, the result is “the first concept of a jointly owned horizontal property ” 
(Davidson 2004).272 This is the nucleus of AlphaVille that will later develop into a 
brand.273 ‘Residencial-1’ comprises single-family houses on 900 lots, (each of circa 700 
square metres), and a central clubhouse with tennis courts. Crucially a large perimeter 
wall of 4 metres encloses the neighbourhood with only one access. (Cf. below: Structure). 
While Albuquerque buy the land and plan for the infrastructure, Takaoka takes care of 
the construction and the marketing of the houses (Cf. AV-História). The designers Re-
inaldo Pestana and José Almeida Pinto elaborate upon the urban design and name of the 
project.274 275 
While both the commercial as well as the residential areas boom276, “the neighbour-
hood-venture becomes such a great success that it soon becomes clear that it would be-
come more important than the commercial” (Cf. AV Historia, translation by the Au-
thor). By the end of the 1970s Takaoka and Albuquerque launched two external pro-
jects. While one of these is the holiday beach resort named Toque Toque in 1979, the 
other is the significant project Aldeia da Serra in the vicinity of AlphaVille.277  
Despite the fact that these projects become important precedents of the lifestyle, and 
eco-schemes of the late 1990s (such as Gênesis, or Burle Marx), Albuquerkeque’s and 
                                               
268 It has to be noted that the data on the acquisition of the land is somewhat clouded. It is not clear if and how much extra 
land was bought at this moment in addition to the amount that Takaoka and Albuquerqe had acquired in the 1935 (Cf. 
Duran 2006 above). The chronology on the website of AlphaVille Urbanismo says that the land was mainly bought in 1973, 
and that the land transfer demanded a long negotiation as most of the offered land of 500 hectares, was occupied by 110 
legal owners (Cf. AlphaVille História at: http://www.AlphaVille.com.br/modules/content.php?recid=762). 
269 Albuquerque recalls the initial discussions with Takaoka in 1972 regarding the possibility of a business development. The 
idea was for a new business environment for non-polluting companies, in reaction to the massive unplanned and haphazard 
industrial boom that was occurring at the time. (Cf. AlphaVille História 
http://www.AlphaVille.com.br/modules/content.php?recid=762, r.12.12.2008, Cf. Davidson 2004) 
270 HP is considered to be one of the symbolic founders of Silicon Valley. The firm became known for mass-produced scien-
tific calculators and personal computers in the 1970s. Today it is one of the largest computer companies worldwide (cf. 
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/facts.htm, r11.04.2009 
271 In addition, companies such as C&A, DuPont, Sadia and Confab move the area. 
272 As a matter of fact the project was a ‘loteamanto fechado’, a legally unprecedented and highly disputed construction 
(Cf. below: Regulatory framework). 
273 Indeed, developing the concept of an ‘ordered occupation’ (ocupação ordenada) Takaoka and Albuquerque (more or less 
consciously) explore the incapacity of the public hand to provide for a regulated urban development. Its standards (quality, 
security, governance) remain the national benchmark until today” (Cf. Davidson 2004).  
274 Pinto is also credited for having conceived the name (Cf. AV História, r12.06.2008). 
275 Indeed there are many comments and speculations about this name by intellectual critics. The Brazilian filmmaker Paulo 
Caruso has produced one of the most recent notes (Cf. Stevens 2007, Cf. 
http://www.paulinhocaruso.com/AlphaVille/AlphaVille%20info, r1.07.2008). Yet, rather than being a reference to the 
dystopic film-noir of Jean Luc Goddard (1965), the name has be to regarded as a direct tribute to the quest of creating a 
‘first’ and ‘optimal’ Alpha-city (Cf. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/alpha, r14.01.2009).  
276 The light-industry area was fully developed five years after its inauguration. In addition a new commercial centre 
emerged. Today AlphaVille-Tamboré’s daytime population amounts to 150,000 people. 
277 Implemented in 1980, 20 kilometres to the west of AlphaVille on an elevation of 1000 metres above sea level, the pro-
ject became the basis of the Takaoka family.  (Cf. also http://www.sitedaaldeia.com.br/DrYoshiroTakaoka.htm, r17.01.2008) 
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Takaoka’s activities focus on the Barueri and Santana de Parnaíba site.278 The demand at 
the Barueri site is so huge, that by the early 1980’s AlphaVille had turned into a fully-
fledged city. The commercial centre (centro commercial) develops into a true edge city, 
featuring a significant amount of jobs (and some of São Paulo’s highest office and resi-
dential towers). Moreover, the place attracts all essential services such as schools, banks, 
and supermarkets (Cf. Bogus 2004: 13).279 
1980s to 00s: Maturity and consolidation – AlphaVille-Tamboré and more 
By the time of the late 1980s, when democracy was fully restored after 20 years of mili-
tary dictatorship, the environs sees more than a dozen residential clusters. AlphaVille 
matures and evolves into a serious role model of urban development (Bogus 2004: 13).  
At this time, also more and more projects by other developers appear in the area. 
Most of the new ventures copy AlphaVille’s strategy of residential clusters. Each featur-
ing its own variations, they increase the range of products on the market, and hence the 
attractiveness of the whole.280 Indeed, the situation of several private stakeholders devel-
oping a city as a bottom-up process between symbiosis and competition is quite new and 
unique.281 
It is during the late 1980s that the firm Tamboré SA is launched to develop the lands 
of the Penteado family. Arthur Castilho de Ulhôa Rodrigues, and Elbio Fernández Mera 
launch the project in 1988.282 283 It is the same year when Brazil’s new democratic consti-
tution is declared.284 Notably, the 600-hectare project is more than a copycat and subor-
dinate to AlphaVille. It develops into an essential component of the New Town venture, 
and contributes a notable share of the infrastructural and service facilities. As a conse-
quence, the fundamental set-up and the basic structure of the area and accordingly the 
underlying rationale of the New Town typology at hand is altered. This magnitude and 
impact suggest the use of the terminology ‘AlphaVille-Tamboré’.  
In the course of 80s the AlphaVille-Tamboré complex almost doubles in population 
size to almost 40 thousand residents (Cf. Campos 2005: 7). New facilities, such as the 
Sopping Tamboré (1992), the first open-air mall of Brazil are opened.  
The middle of the decade brings major generational changes, both for AlphaVille as 
well as Tamboré: Yoshiro Takaoka’s dies in October of 1994. The firm Albuquerqe and 
Takaoka Empredimentos is inherited by Yoshiro Takaoka’s son Marcelo. Albuquerque 
starts a new venture under the AlphaVille brand incorporating the venture as a ‘so-
ciedade anónima’, SA, (Cf. Cruz 2003). The other main shareholder of the firm is his 
son-in-law Nuno Luís de Carvalho Lopes Alves. Notably from that moment on, the firm 
concentrates more on the refinement and commercialisation of the product than on the 
                                               
278 We have to keep in mind that this is still a time of the military regime. Only in the 1980s the regime began to soften 
and gradually turned into a democracy. (Cf. the National milestones section) 
279 In 1981 Takaoka’s son Marcelo, who stepped into his father’s shoes as an engineer, founded his own company, the MVT 
Ltda. Engineering. The company is important, because in the period that followed Marcelo pioneered several innovations 
and developed a series of own projects in AlphaVille’s vicinity (Cf. below). MVT has also implemented the building, which 
houses the AlplaVille headquarters at the Barueri site (Cf. Takaoka, Timeline at www.takaoka.eng.br, r12.01.2009). 
280 Some of the ‘new’ projects bring new innovations: Tamboré SA, for example, is the first to deliver turnkey buildings. (Cf. 
below) 
281 The constellation is quite different from all the other examples within this thesis, and also different from other prominent 
predecessors such as Irvine. On a worldwide scale the author knows no other case like this. 
282 Arthur Castilha de Ulhôa Rodrigues is a lawyer and the son in law of Sílvio Álvares Penteado, head of the clan presiding 
over of the farm. Fernández Mera is one of the most important real estate tycoons of São Paulo (Cf. 
http://geodesia.ufsc.br/wiki-ctm/index.php/Posseiros_de_Luxo, r12.01.2009). 
283 There is a third major landholder in the area. The engineering company Jubran, is holding another area of 600 hectares 
in the vicinity. Yet apparently the firm remains in the background and did not act as a developer of residential properties in 
the area. (Cf. www.jubran.com.br, r12.01.2008) 
284 Cf. Ramiro 2006 at: http://www.terra.com.br/istoedinheiro/471/negocios/o_dono_de_tambore.htm, 14.01.2008 
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land.285  In parallel, the control of Tamborè is transferred in 1996 from Arthur Castilho 
de Ulhôa Rodrigues to his son Fábio Penteado de Ulhôa. Furthermore, Takaoka’s son 
Marcelo starts his own company, the Marcelo Takaoka Empreendimentos SA (MTA), 
aiming at the development of new lifestyle products and sustainable residential en-
claves.286 
By the end of the decade the AlphaVille-Tamboré São Paulo experiences increasing 
saturation. At this moment the concept of the ‘loteamento horizontais’, as cultivated by 
Albuquerque and Takaoka, matures into a product brand and export starts to other met-
ropolitan regions of the country. The main targets are the large metropolises of one mil-
lion and more, promising a large base of potential middle class buyers. (Cf. Davidson 
2006) AlphaVille Caminas opens in 1997, a branch in Belo Horizonte the year after, and 
another in Curitiba in 2000 (Cf. Teixera 2002, Cf. www.AlplaVille.com.br).  
The 1990s see a snowballing demand for guarded condominiums (condomínios 
fechados, loteamentos fechados) in São Paulo and beyond. A great number of new pro-
jects hit the market, not only in the peripheries, but also in the central areas (Loffredo 
2006: 1). When, for example, in 1994 a new legislation, the “Lei de Vilas”287 allows for 
the installation of new small housing enclaves in residential inner-city neighbourhoods 
(the so called Z-1 zones288), new options for middle class families emerge (Bogus 2004: 
14). From this point, the typology of the ‘condominio fechado’ not only quickly spreads 
from São Paulo to other regions, becoming adapted to inner city conditions (in a smaller 
format), but also spreads out to the lower income segments.289 
On the other hand, the original site of AlphaVille SP does not come to a standstill. In 
particular AlphaVille SP faces increasingly saturated and competitive markets, as well as 
a decreasing availability of land. New solutions emerge in the environs: When by the mid 
of the 1990s the project reaches an age of 25 years, large patches of central public spaces 
are modernised and redesigned with an emphasis on pedestrian walks and pocket 
parks.290 Moreover, the late 1990 are marked by the advent of new marketing strategies 
and lifestyle approaches. In this context Marcelo Takaoka emerges as the primary, and 
one of the most ambitious, entrepreneurial innovators exploring a new ‘eco-sustainable’ 
approach. In 1998 Marcello cultivates his father’s Aldeia da Serra concept, and intro-
duces this ‘novel’ issue to the market segment of closed neighbourhoods. Gênesis, as the 
project is branded, combines the AlphaVille set of strategies with a strong eco-flavour.291 
292 
Marcello Takaoka also demonstrates his professionalism and intuition for novel 
trends, when he initiates another life-style scheme geared towards a new health and well-
ness market for the middle classes at the same time. The project is coined “São Paulo 
                                               
285 Stemming from Portugal Mr Alves apparently is Albuquerque’s son-in-law. He became AlphaVille’s CEO in 1997 (Cf. 
http://www.geneall.net/P/per_page.php?id=373734, r17.01.2009; and goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-5946034/Gafisa-
Acquires-AlphaVille-Urbanismo.html, r17.01.2009). 
286 Cf. www.takaoka.eng.br/website/default.asp: Nossa Historia, r12.06.2008. 
287 This means as much as ‘law of villages’. The official name of the law is ‘Lei municipal de loteamento de vilas em São 
Paulo’ 
288 Cf. below 
289 Cf. discussion of the Vilas Alpha project at: “Predecessors and peers” 
290 In the year 1996 the total green area along the main Avenida Rio Negro is redesigned. More than 30000 m2 of pedes-
trian walks and pocket parks are installed. (Cf. Gonçalvez 1998) 
291 Indeed, the name stresses the earnestness and ambition of the developer. (Cf. www.projetogenesis.com.br, r12.06.2009, 
Cf. below Structure: Examples) 
292 The Gênesis project emerges on remote areas in the vicinity of the AlphaVille-Tamboré cluster on a site previously cov-
ered by Atlantic Rain forest. It features lots of 2000 square metres and more (Genesis II). The project received the “Top of 
Marketing” as well as the “Top de Ecologia” awards of the Brazilian Marketing and sales association (ADVB, Associação dos 
Dirigentes de Vendas e Marketing do Brasil).  
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Wellness”. It is a superblock of four 100m residential towers placed on top of a base 
centred on health and medical services.293  
In the same year, 1998, the private Viaoeste consortium adds a four-lane tollway to 
the Castello Branco highway. The project that opens in 2001 features exclusive lanes, as 
well as an exclusive access point for AlphaVille. Yet, the fact that at the same time the 
toll-free access point is demolished initiates protest from the inhabitants of the area (Cf. 
Fiedler, 2001). 
21. Century: Refinement and diversification of the model 
The first decade of the 21st century is marked by high profits, rapid growth and apprecia-
tion. Standardised state-of-the-art management methods, as well as marketing and sales 
techniques become omnipresent. 
MVT Ltda., Marcello Takaoka’s venture, is the first real estate undertaking in the 
country to receive significant quality certifications; such as the ISO 14.001 certificate by 
the BRTUV, as well the green certificate of the FSC (Forest Stewardship Council).294  
The Gênesis project goes into the second stage (Gênesis 2) and triggers a boom of 
other eco-projects:295 in 2006 AlphaVille Urbanismo develops the project ‘Burle Marx’, 
as its own eco-lifestyle brand. In the same year Rodrigues launches Tamboré 11, a life-
style neighbourhood along the theme of the French region of the Provence (Cf. tam-
boré11.com.br, r16.01.2009).296 Both Takaoka, as well as de Ulhôa seek to step into 
AlphaVille’s shoes and establish the Gênesis and Tamboré brands at other locations in 
the country. On the other hand AlphaVille plans to launch a “Green AlphaVille” in 2011 
in Goiás.297 Moreover, numerous other schemes such as Ecoville or Bethaville emerge in 
the area. 
In 2007, less than 15 years after the milestone-changes of the mid 1990s the Al-
phaVille-Tamborè cluster comes forth as a central location between São Paulo, Campinas 
and Sorocaba (a gross area that accumulates 40 percent of the region’s economic product 
(PIB)). The new-town cluster of offices and residential enclaves has grown to 30 residen-
tial enclaves, it features 90.000 residents (including projects by other entrepreneurs), and 
the daytime population of the commercial downtown is estimated to amount to 150,000 
people. The AlphaVille brand successfully spreads to other locations. The firm has a 
landbank of about 1000 hectares in the country and 48 new projects are in the pipeline. 
298 
As the brand is well received all over the country, as prices increase by 60 percent 
from 2003 to 2006, and while interest rates are at historically low levels, major real es-
tate groups demonstrate an increasing interest in successful local start-ups. 
Box 31: List of AlphaVilles in Brazil 
                                               
293 Images can be retrieved at: http://www.ufrgs.br/lac/consultorias/sp_wellness.htm; Cf. also below Structure: CDB. 
294 In 2006 the firm also receives one eco prize handed out by Al Gore. (Cf. www.takaoka.com.br, r24.06.2008; and below: 
Developers) 
295 80 percent of the lots sell in two months after the announcement of sales. (Cf. www.takaoka.com.br, r31.12.08) 
296 Reinaldo Pestana, remains the consulting architect and planner of most of the projects. (Cf. below: Developers: Design) 
297  Cf. www.alphavilleurbanismo.com.br, r23.05.2009 
298 Between 1994 and 2007 AlphaVille Urbanismo launched 35 new projects in 16 Brazilian states, two of them in Portugal 
(Abrarec 2006) Among the other locations are Campinas, São José dos Campos, Ribeirão Preto, Goiania, Curitiba, Londrina, 
Maringá, Salvador, Fortaleza, Belo Horizonte, Natal, Gramado, Manaus, and others, as well as to Portugal (Lisbon and Sin-
tra). Many of these developments, such as that of Campinas, are also large (1200 residences, in this case) and have an 
adjoining business district, with a shopping mall, a hotel, schools, etc (Abrarec 2006). The projects amount to more than 25 
million square metres of urbanized space. (AV Historia; Gafisa SA; Cf. below Developer.). 
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Alphaville Gramado, Alphaville Gravataí, Alphaville Caxias do Sul, Alphaville Porto Ale-
gre, Alphaville Pinheiros (Curitiba), Alphaville Graciosa (Curitiba), Alphaville Maringá, 
Alphaville Londrina, Alphaville Barueri e Santana de Parnaíba, Alphaville Burle Marx, 
Alphaville São José dos Campos, Alphaville Ribeirão Preto, Alphaville Sorocaba, Al-
phaville Campinas, Alphaville Conde, Alphaville Lagoa dos Ingleses, Alphaville Juiz de 
Fora, Alphaville Rio das Ostras, Alphaville Barra da Tijuca, Alphaville Serra, Alphaville 
Natal, Alphaville Genipabú, Alphaville Salvador, Alphaville Litoral Norte, Alphaville 
Eusébio, Alphaville Fortaleza, Alphaville Recife, Alphaville São Luis, Alphaville João Pes-
soa, Alphaville Campina Grande, Alphaville Patos, Alphaville Sousa, Alphaville Flamboy-
ant, Alphaville Green Alphaville, Alphaville Cuiabá, Alphaville Campo Grande, Al-
phaville Manaus 
Consequently it comes as no surprise when in late 2007 Gafisa SA, one of the country’s 
largest real estate conglomerates absorbs AlphaVille SA, securing the success of the brand 
as well access to one of the largest land banks in the country (Cf. below: Developers). In 
the same year, Tamborè SA is acquired by Brascan Residential Properties, a subsidiary of 
the Brookfied Properties Corporation, one of the largest American real estate companies. 
Tamboré’s landed properties and landbanks at this time amount to 500 hectares.299  
Moreover, the availability of large sums of venture capital prior to September 2008 
leads to a second stage of consolidation and densification, featuring immense superblock 
projects unimaginable only few years before. (Cf. below: Structure) 
                                               
299 The project Brascan Century Plaza, a 200.000 square metre project is supposed to become a first Brascan landmark 
project on Tamboré land, another project will be Green Valey. 
(http://www.brascanresidential.com.br/ri/pdf/eng_Edita_AGE_BRP.pdf, r12.01.2009) 
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Predecessors and peers 
„Alphaville is unique in Brazil“300 
 
Box 32: Predecessors and milestone projects 
Hygíenopolis (Buchard & Nothmann*, 1890), Jardim America (Cia. City, 1913), Granja 
Viana (Viana, 1960s), Barra de Tijuca (Costa, 1969), Ilha do Sul (Albuquerque & Takaoka, 
1972), Vila Velha (N.N., 1975), Rivera de São Lorenço (Sobloco, 1979), Aldeia da Serra 
(Albuquerque & Takaoka, 1980), Tamboré 1 (Tamboré, 1988), Piedra Roja (Manquehue, 
1998), Vilas Alpha (Alphaville Urbanismo, 2004), Portal do Morumbi (Mathias, 1973); 
AlphaVille Graciosa (AlphaVille Urbanismo, 1996), Gênesis 1 (Takaoka, 1998), BethaVille 
(Conspar, Bethacenter and PSV, 2003), Tamboré II (2006), Burle Marx (Alphaville Urban-
ismo, 2007), Green Alphaville (AlphaVille Urbanismo, fc 2011) 
*The names represent the most important author of the project - either developer or architect 
Introduction 
AlphaVille-Tamborè emerges as a unique phenomenon in São Paulo and beyond. No 
comparable settlement typology, e.g. no privately developed (and owned) mixed-use 
township with these dimensions and this history exists in the Brazilian context.301 Never-
theless the project is deeply embedded in a local and international tradition of New 
Towns and planned cities. Various components of the scheme can be traced along several 
streams of predecessors. Likewise the concept has had and continues to have a tremen-
dous impact on a large number of offspring projects all over the country.302  
For this reason this last section of the context subchapter aims to inspect and describe 
various predecessors of the project. In addition it also seeks to explore some of the Al-
phaVille’s impacts and reverberations. It will be demonstrated that AlphaVille-Tamboré 
is deeply embedded in a local context, as it continues a tradition of privately developed 
elite neighbourhoods and country-side vacation towns that is more than 100 years old. 
The project’s linkages to the North American tradition of privately developed New 
Towns and Edge Cities portray the relevance of the international context. As a next step 
a series of parallel projects in the local, as well as a South American context will be dis-
cussed and some exemplary schemes that have been influenced by the NeoTown will be 
presented. 
I. Predecessors 
Despite the fact that AlphaVille-Tamboré emerges as a historically unique phenomenon, 
the project is deeply rooted in a local as well as global milieu of planned settlements and 
New Towns. 
                                               
300 Flavio Vilaça is emeritus Professor and one of the key public planning figures in São Paulo in a personal interview in 
March 2007 
301 Indeed, the situation is different from India’s national boom of Integrated Township’s or the cluster of New Towns in the 
Jakarta Region. 
302 We will see below (discussing the developer’s strategies), that the uniqueness of Alphaville SP cluster can partially be 
explained by the fact that the project developed as an incremental bottom-up process without a master plan behind, on the 
base of an impressive business strategy, the more or less legal availability of land, and pure market demand. In this context 
AlphaVille-Tamboré was developed along an entrepreneurial logic, but without a spatial vision. 
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Local Predecessors 
AlphaVille-Tamboré is an integral part of a legacy of privately developed elite 
neighbourhoods in São Paulo. This tradition is more than 100 years old. A historical 
migration of the city’s elite-quarters along the affluent ‘vetor sudoeste’ can be traced. 
AlphaVille-Tamboré constitutes one of the contemporary frontiers of this voyage. 
19th century: Elite neighbourhoods in the São Paulo region 
Privately driven urbanisation and foreign investments are familiar throughout the history 
of the multicultural melting pot of Brazil (Cf. above: Culture). São Paulo becomes an 
important international gateway at the beginning of the 20th century. The city is a highly 
interconnected place, mediating between the hinterlands and the international world. It 
comprises enormous movements of people, trade and finance and is loaded with the lat-
est trends.303 The incentive of private elites along with international technology and fi-
nance accomplishes the most significant milestones of São Paulo’s urban expansion. 
The legacy of São Paulo elite neighbourhoods dates back to the rise of the city as na-
tional economic powerhouse in the second half of the 19th century, when the coffee trade 
boomed and a new class of affluent citizens (of former immigrants) was emerging. The 
new bourgeoisie embraces an enormous demand for new-fashioned urban spaces of rep-
resentation and appropriation along Western models of lifestyle and hygiene. ‘Campos 
Elísios’ (Paradise Fields) and ‘Higienópolis’ (City of Hygiene) become the first modern 
elite neighbourhoods.304  
Campos Elísios 
Campos Elísios (‘Paradise Gardens’), in the central Santa Cecília district, is regarded as 
the first of São Paulo’s elite districts. Swiss entrepreneurs develop the prime location, 
close to the main train terminals, as well as to a major hospital305 by the end of the 19th 
century. The area is known as the town base of the state’s affluent coffee trade and for 
housing the headquarters of State Government of São Paulo (as well as the president’s 
villa). The international names of the streets and avenues, such as Alameda Glette, Ala-
meda Cleveland or Rua Helvétia, point to the background of the entrepreneurs and resi-
dents (Cf. Homem 1996). In contrast to many other elite neighbourhoods of the Vetor 
Sudoeste, the area deteriorated with the end of the coffee boom (Cf. Homem 1996). 
Higienópolis 
The land of Higienópolis is acquired by Martinho Buchard and Victor Nothmann in 
1890 while São Paulo is shocked by an outbreak of bubonic plague.306 Located on a hilly 
and green terrain, isolated from the centre, the neighbourhood is the urban frontier and 
safe heaven of that time. The scheme is developed almost exclusively with materials im-
ported from France.307  It is the place where, from the 1940s onward the first vertical 
condominiums appeared: The ‘Bretagne‘(1959, Arch. João Artacho Jurado) and the 
                                               
303 It was the place where Le Corbusier and Josephine Baker meet in 1929 on a cruise ship. (Campbell, Matthew 2008: Le 
Corbusier; In: The Sunday Times; July 6th 2008) 
304 Higienópolis remains the point of reference of elite-neighbourhoods for some time to come (Cf. Gonçalves 1998: 15: see 
graphic p.15) 
305 The Sorocabana, as well as to the ‘Estação da Luz’ train stations, and the Santa Casa de Misericórdia de São Paulo 
306 The neighbourhood maintains its status until today and is known as a predominantly Jewish neighbourhood. 
307 Maria Homen, architectural historian tracing the emergence of São Paulo’s urban forms between “coffee, industry, and 
the private kitchen”, describes how large estates and giant mansions dominated the area. Among the examples are the 
mansion of Veridiana Valéria Da Silva the Prado, or the Vila Penteado. While the first was a prominent meeting point of 
intellectuals and the Paulista elite, the second, the Vila Penteado, is an Art Noveau palace of Antonio Álvares de Almeida 
Penteado. The palace was constructed by a European architect, the Swedish Carlos Ekman in 1902 and decorated with 
European statues, carpets and marbles. Today the building serves as the postgraduate centre of the São Paulo University. 
(Cf. Homem 1980) 
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‚Louveira‘ (1946: Arch. Vilanova Artigas308) are among the most exclusive of these pro-
jects. Operating almost like hotels309, they feature a wide range of services - from a 
swimming pool, private bar and large gardens to a sports and community club (Bogus 
and Pasternak 2005: 12, 13)310  
20-40s: Private urban development 
At the dawn of the 20th century both the infrastructure and the housing sectors are 
mainly driven by private internationals. At that time São Paulo Tramway Light & Power 
(‚Light‘), a firm based in Canada and Brazil, develops the city’s essential infrastructure 
(Cf. Anelli 2008: 17). In parallel the City of São Paulo Freehold Land Company Ltd., a 
conglomerate with headquarters in Paris, London and São Paulo, produces a major 
quantity of state-of-the-art housing. 
With the advent of the tram, the automobile, the modern road and tunnel building 
technologies, the early 20th century is marked by garden-city-type neighbourhoods (Cf. 
Anelli 2008) At this time also models from the Anglo-Saxon world start to dominate 
(Bogus 2004: 7). Moreover, the axis of the ‘vetor oeste’, a spatio-temporal sequence of 
affluent neighbourhoods starts to develop (Cf. above: São Paulo). 
The Companhia City – São Paulo’s early urban venture 
The relevance of private urban development in the housing sector is best represented by 
case of the City of São Paulo Improvements and Freehold Land Company Ltd, or Com-
panhia, Cia. City, or ‘City’. 311 While ‘City’ develops a series of the city’s elite neighbour-
hoods from the second and to the third decade of the 20th century, it consolidates essen-
tial strategies that remain valid for AlphaVille and its peers. The company works as a 
joint venture of Brazilian landowners and international, mainly European investors.312  
The Companhia City taps into a huge demand and experiences an extraordinary 
growth. Only briefly after its foundation in 1911 the venture is able to accumulate 1200 
hectares of urban land, an impressive 37 percent of São Paulo’s area of the time (Bogus, 
Pasternak 2004 : 7).313 The main Bairros (neighbourhoods) developed are: Jardim 
América, Anhangabaú, Butantá, Alta da Lapa, Bela Aliança, Vila Romana, Pacembú, and 
Alto de Pinheiros. This is a major share of São Paulo’s affluent vetor.314 ‘City’ is active 
until today. In its 94 year history it has developed 3.150 hectares of urban land. After 
having established a base in São Palo the brand ‘City’ spreads to other locations: “The 
                                               
308 The same architect who designed the building of São Paulo’s Architecture and design faculty (FAU/USP) 
309 Services comparable to hotels offered in apartment buildings can be traced back to New York’s impressive Belnord, 
Apthorp, or the Astor Court apartments erected in the first decade of the 20th century (Arch. Clinton & Russell, 1908). 
310 The 2008 Wallpaper guide to São Paulo describes the Bretange as ‘an exuberant festival’ and one of the best addresses 
in the world (Cf. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/turismo/noticias/ult338u465046.shtml, 21.01.2008). 
311 Cia. is the Portuguese abbreviation for companhia 
312 Bogus and Pasternak (2004 :7) describe the founding phase of the firm: “Edouard  Lavelaye, a Belgian entrepreneur, 
specialised on the handling of basic materials from the tropics, visualised the future potential of real estate in São Paulo. In 
1911 Lavelaye presented his ideas to the city hall with his colleague Bouvard, who was the former director of the public 
works department of Paris and consultant of various urban and rural development projects (Bouvard had projected and 
implemented the Avenida Paulista! (Cf. http://www.ciacity.com.br/, r19.01.2008). Victor Freire, at that time director of the 
public worls department, put them in contact with the owners of big land holdings, such as Cincinato Braga e Horácio 
Sabino. This contact resulted in the formation of a real estate corporation (sociedade imobiliária). While the Brazilian part-
ners sold the land to the company, the Belgian partner became the finance expert. Lavayale went on a marketing trip to 
Europe to find investors and founded CIA City of São Paulo, with branches in London, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (Cf. 
Rolnik, 1997). The administrative board of ‘The City’ was Lord Balfour, the president of São Paulo Railways, Bouvard, Cinci-
nato Braga, a land owner and later federal representative of São Paulo; with more relations to ‘Light and Power’ and, later 
also Vitor Freire himself. (Translation by the Author) 
313 On March 19th 1913 a German periodical that circulates in the São Paulo capital, the “Deutsche Zeitung”, advertises 
sales of land in Jardim América, Lapa and Pacaembú (Cf. www.ciacity.com.br, 419.01.2009). 
314 While Jardim América, Pacembú and Anhangabaú are located more centrally, the other neighbourhoods are aligned 
along the former southwestern frontier of city. 
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concept of the garden-city was implemented in regions where green has been scarce and 
the heat intense.”315  
 Illustration D-8: Cia. City’s projects 
 Illustration D-9: Utility lines operated by private companies in the 1920s 
 
Two of ‘City’s’ Bairros 
Jardim America as well as Pacaembu are among the earliest and most interesting cases in 
our context. As these two early neighbourhoods portray the most significant of Cia.’s 
strategies, these will be discussed briefly in the following. 
Jardim America 
Jardim America is one of the initial and most important projects of the Companhia 
City. Construction on this large neighbourhood of 109 hectares started in 1913. The 
project embodies the first example of a garden city style suburb in South America. 
(Ibidem) Moreover it represents a shift from European models and a rising American 
conscience. The ‘American Garden’ is a bourgeois neighbourhood, based on individual 
land ownership, individualised transport, the detached villa typology, state of the art 
infrastructure and abundant greenery. Despite the fact that the project has been designed 
by nobody less than Barry Parker316, the landscape of bending streets in a park resembles 
Olmstead’s Riverside, or Sunny Side Gardens projects more than the social imaginary of 
Howard’s garden city.317 Parker devises large areas for public gardens and community 
use. After a while a large part of the areas is consumed by club facilities (E.g. the Club 
Athlético Paulistano), something that became a brand of the developer. While housing 
construction starts in 1925, the developers promote the project by initiating stone pave-
ments (1928), installing a public illumination (1931), and providing bus services (1934). 
Sales are advertised in several languages (from Russian, to Hungarian, Italian, Polish, or 
German)318, pointing to the foreign background of most of the prospective buyers.  
As the first holistically master planned neighbourhood on the subcontinent319, Jardim 
America was among the earliest that introduced comprehensive ‘private design codes and 
guidelines’ (as much as its British predecessors). Present until today these ‘private’ rules 
are more elaborate than any the public codes of the time.320 Implemented by the devel-
oper, they ensure the integrity of the scheme and as a consequence the presentation of all 
assets and investments.321   
Pacemboú 
In parallel to Jardim America the neighbourhood of Pacemboú is promoted from 1912 
onwards. It becomes the most elegant and ‘aristocratic’ bairros of City.322 The 
neighbourhood is equipped with modern infrastructure such as electricity networks and 
sewage systems. The place distinguishes itself by the curved layout of the streets323, as 
well as by an abundance of greenery. As much as in Jardim America, Pacemboú’s subur-
ban and residential character is ensured by strict land use regulations, allowing for 
                                               
315 Cf. www.ciacity.com.br, r17.01.2008. The same website also features a complete list of all projects. 
316 Parker had co-designed Howard’s Letchworth scheme, as well as London’s new Hampstead Garden Suburb in 1907 with 
his partner Raymond Unwin. 
317 Nowadays the Neighbourhood has also experienced some Latin influence as almost all owners have erected high walls. 
318 Later projects also target Japanese populations 
319 Cf. www.ciacity.com.br, r17.01.2008 
320 Companhia’s codes have been legalised by an urban law only in 1941 (Ibidem). 
321 Cf. www.ciacity.com.br: Controle de Matricula, r17.01.2008; and Bogus 2004: 7. 
322 Cf. Journal “A Capital”, March 25th 1913, quoted at www.ciacity.com.br, r17.01.2008. 
323 Supposedly inspired by donkey paths based on the rough topography 
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maximum coverage ratios of 33 percent and a maximum building height of 10 metres). 
The implementation starts only the 1925 and gains momentum only later. When in the 
1930s a massive construction of mansions begins the Companhia’s engineers supervise 
every move. When half of the land is developed, the company decides to donate a major 
piece of land for the construction of a new sports stadium of regional relevance, São 
Paulo’s Pacembú stadium. The generous gesture underlines the developer’s philosophy of 
stressing lifestyle aspects by enriching its projects with sports facilities. The fact that the 
stadium becomes a well-known São Paulo landmark is a smart marketing mechanism. 
Whenever the Companhia goes to develop another site, it is expected that a small 
Pacaembuzinho will emerge at the centre.324 
50s Granja Viana – Vacation Refugee New Towns 
AlphaVille’s list of predecessors is not only comprised of elite neighbourhoods drifting 
from the city’s centre to the peripheries, but also of former weekend retreats in the coun-
tryside. The schemes belong to what Alexander Garvin calls ‘vacation refugee New 
Towns’ – former leisure communities that have been overrun by the urban frontier.325 
Granja Viana, in the Western periphery of São Paulo is the largest and most important of 
the models. Dating back to the early 60s, the site features no less than 38 residential 
communities today.326 This makes is as large as AlphaVille.  
 Illustration D-10: Map of Granja Viana 
The history of project dates back to the mid-1940s. A significant part of the area is part 
of the former Fazenda Carapocuyba, which has a history as milk farm run by Niso Vivi-
ana and his family. First land divisions start in 1945 when the area is divided among a 
dozen families.327 In 1951 the land is further subdivided, while its use became increas-
ingly intense.328  
The first community of Vila Santo Antonio de Carapicuiba is developed at kilometre 
24 of the Raposo Tavaras highway. The area becomes increasingly popular with middle 
class families, which start to erect weekend cottages on the terrain. Among the most im-
portant pioneer populations are members of São Paulo’s Rotary club. While the connect-
edness of the locality increases, more and more families decide to remain in the area. The 
first gated condomínios appear by the beginning of the 1970s.329  
Granja Viana (Old Farm) is located about 25 kilometres to the East of São Paulo’s 
centre in an area that used to feature nice county side scenery with patches of the Atlan-
tic rain forest. The main part of the 5000-hectare site belongs to the Carapicuíba district. 
The SP270, or the Raposo Tavaras highway provides access to the area of about 50 
thousand residents in almost 40 residential enclaves. The area thrives on its proximity to 
São Paulo’s affluent southeastern wedge. The landmark of the São Paulo Jockey Club in 
Morumbí is only 15 kilometres away. 
                                               
324 http://www.ciacity.com.br/, r17.01.2009 
325 While Garvin lists places such as Mariemont (Ohio), Columbia, (Maryland); Lakewood or Irvive (California), he states that 
each of the projects “was established on open land, that initially was far outside city limits and then was engulfed in a 
rapidly suburbanizing landscape (Cf. Garvin 1997: pp 320.) 
326 Cf. www.granjaviana.co,br, r01.01.2009. 
327 A detailed account of the history of the site is presented at: www.granjaviana.com.br/second/familia_vianna.asp?cn=18, 
r02.02.2009. 
328 Interestingly many Japanese settled here and the area became well known for Japanese pottery and horticulture (Cf. 
www.granjaviana.com, r02.02.2009) 
329 Granja Velha 2 Jardim Colonial, or Jardim Primavera (Cf. www.granjaviana.com.br/second/familia_vianna.asp?cn=18, 
r02.02.2009) 
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Granja Viana is an example of a cluster of gated communities that was autonomously 
developed for (and by) the upper and upper-middle income classes. Featuring a wide 
range of state of the art services and infrastructure, including schools, restaurants, private 
schools, sport clubs, shopping centres, offices and beauty salons, the area presents a vi-
brant and postmodern suburban fabric330. Most of the neighbourhoods follow the pat-
tern of a ‘condominio horizontasis fechado’, featuring names such as Novo Hygienópo-
lis, São Paulo 2, Beverly- and Forest Hills, Residential Los Angeles, Paisagem Medít-
terâneo, or Paisagem Renoir III. As much as the new projects in AlphaVille’s vicinity, 
most recent projects, such as the Vila Verde, Reserva Val Verde, or Green Village, are 
designed and branded along various eco-strategies such as ‘responsible parcelling’.331 No-
tably some of these are grouped in respective clusters: for example, the Bolsão da Fazend-
inha (Carapicuíba), which is renowned for its landscaping. The area is popular among 
artists and freelancers and is also known for its excellent restaurants. 
Predecessors from North America 
1990s: Edge City Model 
“The hallmarks of edge cities are not the sidewalks of New York, for usually 
there are few sidewalks. Look, rather, for jogging trails. Nor are these new 
cities tied together by locomotives and subways. Instead, they are united by 
jet ways, freeways, and satellite dishes 10 meters across. ... you will find 
high, atrium-shielding trees perpetually in leaf at the cores of corporate 
headquarters, fitness centers, and shopping plazas... the landmark dwelling is 
the celebrated single-family detached home - the three-bedroom, two-bath 
unit with grass all around - that made America the best-housed civilization 
the world has ever known.” (Joel Garreau, 2003) 
North America’s legacy of New Towns and ‘gated communities’ as well as ‘edge cities’ 
provides the most significant contemporary models for AlphaVille and its local siblings. 
Renato Albuquerque and Yojiro Takaoka were clearly inspired by the North-American 
suburbs of California, as much as by Garreau’s Edge City model.332  
Both, AlphaVilles’s commercial ‘Edge-City’-features, as well as its residential typolo-
gies demonstrate significant parallels to North American typologies. Indeed, in housing 
one of the largest office and retail concentrations in São Paulo’s Metro region, the com-
mercial centre of AlphaVille resembles US American edge-city peers such as Southfield 
(Detroit), Tysons Corner, Reston (Baltimore-Washington), or Irvine (Los Angeles re-
gion).333 334 
AlphaVille’s residential neighbourhoods, on the other hand, are close to their North 
American gated community models335  
 Illustration D-11: Juxtaposition of residential 12’ and Irvine’s Sierra Broadmoor 
                                               
330 Cf. http://www.granjaviana.com.br/, r03.02.2009 
331 Cf. http://www.proinvest.com.br/, r03.02.2009 
332 Cf. Santos 2002, at: http://www.nomads.usp.br/site/condominio1.htm, r23.01.2009 
333 AlphaVille qualifies for all of Garreau’s (1991) edge-city criteria (Cf. http://www.garreau.com/, r06.01.2009). It comprises 
more than 2.000 offices with several national and international headquarters (e.g. Hewlett Packard Brazil), two major re-
gional shopping malls, plus as an enormous number of vertical, as well as horizontal residential schemes. While the total 
area comprises about 80.000 residents, it features more than 120.000 jobs. (Cf. below: Urban Structure) 
334 On the other hand AlphaVille will never compete with São Paulo’s central office concentrations of the voguish ‘vetor 
sudoeste’ (Faria Lima, Berrini) or the Paulista Avenue district (Cf. 
http://www.brazilcham.com/default.asp?id=248&c002_ui=sa&c002_id=196, r06.01.2008). 
335 Cf. Introduction Chapter: Urban Debates 
Case 3: AlphaVille-Tamboré   400 
1960s: Omnipresent Irvine 
The North American master planned community that shares a remarkably high amount 
of common characteristics with Alphaville SP is Orange County’s Irvine. Amounting to 
more than 21.000 hectares, Irvine emerged in the 1960s as the largest privately planned 
city in the US (probably the largest worldwide).336 While concentrating an enormous 
amount of suburban office space (90.000 jobs), Irvine also features huge numbers of sin-
gle-family homes (180.000 residents). As much as AlphaVille the master planned town 
materialises on the grounds of a former farm. It is fundamentally driven by the excep-
tional impetus of the private entrepreneur James Irvine, and like AlphaVille, the city is 
structured as a cluster of neighbourhood enclaves or ‘urban villages’.337  
II. Peers 
In addition to a rich framework of predecessors that was roughly delineated in the above 
section, AlphaVille Tamboré emerges in an opulent environment of analogous projects 
(categorised as ‘peers’ in our context). While the category of predecessors presupposes 
the impact of earlier projects upon our case-study, the category of ‘peers’ assumes the 
prevalence of mutual interrelationships and processes of exchange, influence and effects. 
(The ‘offspring’-section below will concentrate on some exemplary (and evident) effects 
of the AlphaVille scheme on some other projects).  
The cases examined in this subsection aim to sharpen our picture of what is distinct 
about AlphaVille-Tamboré and what relates to more general trends. While only few of 
the projects qualify as fully-fledged New Towns, nonetheless they share many important 
aspects with it. The section will explore significant examples of privately driven urbanism 
in the context of São Paulo, Brazil, and South America. (A global context is provided by 
this thesis itself). At the end, it confirms that the selection of the scheme as well as of the 
main cases in this study was justified. 
Local Peers 
1972: Ilha do Sul 
In the year 1972 Takaoka and Albuquerque develop an important reference project of 
the typology of the ‘condominio vertical’ (Cf. above: Project Milestones). The project 
‘Ilha do Sul’ (Island of the South) is a residential retreat in the bairro of Alto de Pin-
heiros. In general it thrived on the expansive boom of the adjacent Avenida Paulista area 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Specifically the new zoning law of 1972 (7805/72) 
allowed redensifying many central residential areas (Cf. above: National Milestones). 
The innovation lies in the fact that the developers take the concept of the serviced apart-
ment house, as existing in Higíenopolis (Cf. above Bretagne, Loveria), and expand it into 
a whole block of three hectares. Six immense apartment towers are arranged around an 
elevated garden with a club with exclusive access to the residents. Reinaldo Pestana pre-
pared the design. Hence a team evolves that becomes a permanent partner in the Al-
phaVille project to come. (Cf. Aragão 2007: 53)  
An important part of the strategy is that ‘Ilha do Sul’ seeks to represent “more a than 
a simple condominium, but a concept of live”.338 The project features a wide range of 
                                               
336 In addition, at least according to Alexander Garvin (1996), Irvine represents the only case of a privately developed New 
Town that is a financial success. 
337 While the similarities between Irvine and AlphaVille are remarkable, it remains open if the coincidence emerges by the 
nature of the logic of both projects as bottom-up self-generating processes, or by a conscious copying. Lemos (2004: 7) and 
Gonçalvez (1998), discuss the similarities of AlphaVille’s residential forms and some US models. 
338 Cf. „Mais que un condomínio, que un conceito de morar“: Cf. http://www.ilhadosul.com.br, 20.01.2008. 
Case 3: AlphaVille-Tamboré   401 
services, several clubs and offers a multitude of leisure activities. Hence, with the ‘Island 
of the South’ Albuquerque and Takaoka introduce a typology than enables affluent 
populations to maintain a decent life in the increasingly unsafe inner city, and as much as 
AlphaVille, it becomes a benchmark project for the entire Brazilian real estate industry. 
(Cf. Bogus 2004: 13; Aragão 2007: 54) 
The idea is even expanded when only one year later the Portal do Morumbi material-
ises on a 16-hectare lot in Morumbi. The project, developed by a group around the engi-
neer Alfredo Mathias, portrays an entire autonomous district, featuring a large private 
park on 10 hectares.339  
1990s: ‘Generic’ benchmarks – Av. Luiz Carlos Bernini and Morumbi 
São Paulo’s sections of the Avenida Carlos Bernini as well as the residential section of 
Morumbi represent the contemporary benchmarks for living and working in São Paulo. 
This makes them important points of reference for AlphaVille-Tamboré. 
The spine along the Avenida Luiz Carlos Berrini stands out as a concentration of ul-
tra-modern office and service centres at the frontier of the vetor oeste. A large amount of 
the region’s advanced tertiary services are bundled into the area. Various subsections, 
marked by private real estate schemes, such as Brooklyn, Novo Bernini or Vila Olímpia 
emerge as miniature global-hubs. The areas attract many international clients and feature 
the best real estate ratings of the city (Cf. Cushman & Wakefield 2007, Cf. Abascal 
2006). 
When it comes to residential neighbourhoods Morumbi emerges as the largest concen-
trations of wealth and benchmark neighbourhood in the city today. Competing schemes 
such as AlphaVille have to be measured against this area to the East of the Pinheiros 
River. Significantly, in contrast to AlphaVille, Morumbi has a different urban grain. As a 
result of a piecemeal development by multiple stakeholders it is less homogeneous. In this 
context it features a large amount of the mansions, a mix of vertical and horizontal con-
dominiums, clubs, schools, hospitals and also some significant favelas such as Paraísopo-
lis. (Cf. Gonçalves 1998: 14; Cf. also above ‘vetor oeste’)  Is this the picture of a future 
AlphaVille? 
2004: Vila Butantã  (Condomínio horizontal fechado) 
The latest of the local peers that is deemed relevant and interesting in the context of Al-
phaVille and its peers is the typology of the condomínio horizontal fechado.340 This low-
rise condominio typology has experienced a major boom in São Paulo since the second 
half of the 1990s. 22 years after the Zoning law of 1972 (lei 7805/72) which had trig-
gered the emergence of the vertical condominium complexes such as the Ilha do Sul and 
Portal do Morumbí projects, the city administration comes up with the Lei de Vilas 
(11605/94) allowing the construction of inner city residential neighbourhoods by the 
means of horizontal condominiums of a limited size and density.341 The model emerges a 
serious alternative for many potential customers of AlphaVille and the like. (Cf. Loffredo 
2006) 
One award-winning example of such a re-emigration of the walled housing enclaves 
types back to São Paulo’s central area is the 2004 project of Vila Butantã by Marcos 
Acayaba Arquitetos. The project is located in the Butantã neighbourhood, a former Cia. 
City’s garden city project, and comprises 16 houses built on a terrain of 4.400 square 
                                               
339 Cf. Aragão 2007: 64; and Nagy 1989. 
340 Since the residents do not jointly own the neighbourhoods of AlphaVille, these don’t qualify as condominiums, but as 
closed subdivisions (Cf. below: Regulation). 
341 The small type, with a limited size of 1,5 hectares becomes known as the R3-03. 
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metres. The residences are arranged in duplex houses of about 150 square metres, resem-
bling North American cluster communities.342  
Brazilian peers 
It was mentioned in the introduction of this chapter that the urban typology of Al-
phaVille-Tamboré represents a unique typology. Nonetheless, two other Brazilian private 
schemes must be mentioned: Barra da Tijuca and Rivera do São Lorenço. As both are 
dominated by the corporate sector, master planned, as well as of an enormous size and 
complexity, they make interesting references of private cities in Brazil.343 Nonetheless the 
projects are very different from Alphaville SP: Barra da Tijuca is an enormous new edge 
city and elite-neighbourhood of Rio de Janeiro. Rivera da São Lorenço is an independent 
leisure city located at one of São Paulo state’s beaches. The projects do not qualify as 
fully-fledged NeoTowns because: ‘Barra’ is a carioca district344, master planned by the 
public hand, but now submerged by various private developers, and because the ‘Rivera’ 
is dominated by one private enterprise, it features a rather limited mix of uses and does 
not belong to a greater metro region. 
1969: Barra da Tijuca – between city and nature, utopian modernity and private 
pragmatism 
Barra de Tijuca is a new a large district and alternate centre in the South of Rio de Ja-
neiro. Dating back to the early 1970s the project developed in parallel to the AlphaVille-
Tamborè cluster. While the scheme is based on an ultramodern plan of Lucio Costa, 
nowadays the landscape became a postmodern ‘real estate park’. 
The project emerges in scenery of spectacular beauty, featuring lagoons, large dune 
formations, a beach of 18 kilometres, as well a hilly environment (that can reach up to 
1050 metres) which is covered by the Atlantic rain forest. Barra, as the place is also 
called, follows the trajectory of Rio’s elite quarters along the Atlantic to the South (Bote-
fango, Copacabana, Ipanema).345 
In contrast to AlphaVille-Tamboré, Barra is a result of official planning efforts. No 
one less than Lucio Costa, the renowned Brazilian architect who also the authored Brasi-
lia, prepared the master plan. Costa346 seeks nothing less than to reconcile and harmonise 
the two dimensions of nature and city. As he intendeds to preserve the landscape of 
dunes, creeks and lagoons, the landscape becomes his major theme (Cf. Costa 1969: 8, 
quoted in Silva 2004). The large-scale plan represents an organisational strategy. It fo-
cuses on the organisation of urban densities and traffic flows. Large preservation areas 
are contrasted by a dense urban centre in the form of a ‘Stadtkrone’347, linking the south-
ern and northern parts of the city (Cf. Costa 1969 in Silva 2004). Moreover, a series of 
autonomous sub-centres are placed on a grid of 1000 metres. As a result, in contrast to 
Copacabana, or Ipanema (and also to AlphaVille), Barra is based in a visionary ‘modern-
istic’ spirit.348  
Nonetheless, Costa’s utopian approach also embodies some tragic contradictions: 
Composed by gigantic superblocks and wide multilane boulevards, the scheme has been 
based on the automobile from the beginning. After the beginning of the implementation 
                                               
342 Pictures and Maps are presented at: www.arcoweb.com.br/arquitetura/arquitetura667.asp, r21.01.2009 
343 Brasilia, is contrast, is not suitable as a reference, because it is largely under public control. 
344 District of Rio de Janeiro 
345 Significantly New Ipanema was the name of one of the first condominium towers.  
346 Official name of the plan is: Plano Piloto para Urbanização da Barra da Tijuca, Pontal de Sernambetiba e de Jacarepaguá 
(Cf. Silva 2004) 
347 E.g. A dominant and dense centre 
348 Some critics call Barra an antithesis of the Copacabana (Cf. Campos 2005) 
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of the district in 1970, the role of the commercial real estate sector increased continually. 
Whereas the modern layout was largely preserved at a macro scale, private developers 
seized most of the superblocks, cultivating a culture of clubs and autonomous enclaves. 
The first phase in the early 1970s saw the implementation of the gated condominiums 
such as Nova Ipanema and New Leblon.349 350 As a result of a real estate boom, in the 
1980s the area is transformed into an edge city with an increasing mix of uses. It featured 
large numbers of gated condominiums351, office centres, hypermarkets, hotels, amuse-
ment parks, private schools and hospitals.352 
The result is that Barra’s landscape is increasingly abstracted and corporatised, and 
superseded by another market-driven logic. While its ambivalent spirit is marked by a 
juxtaposition of condominium towers and single-family houses (as the two dominating 
housing options), at the same time a major redefinition of the public-private nexus oc-
curs.353 While closed enclaves are cultivated in the superblocks and parks, and jogging 
trails are landscaped ‘for residents only’, to the outside the pedestrian scale is largely ne-
glected.354 Buildings are mainly placed in the remote areas of the lots. For that reason the 
visitor on foot finds it impossible to stroll around the place. The only major public asset 
that remains is Barra’s 18-kilometre beach.355  
Ordinary Brazilians refer to the above phenomena as the ‘American way of life’356. 
And indeed this view is validated by the fact that the urban landscape is dotted by an 
iconography of signs and symbols representing an US-style consumer landscape. The 
picture culminates at a miniature copy of New York’s Statue of Liberty at the entrance of 
the Barra Shopping centre.357  
AlphaVille Barra da Tijuca 
Given this context it also comes as no surprise that AlphaVille Urbanismo decided to 
buy a large chunk of the land and develop a ‘carioca’ version of its brand in Barra.  
The product ‘AlphaVille Barra da Tijuca’ is among the superior luxury schemes of the 
AlpaVille Urbanismo.358 The scheme lies to the North of Barra’s central Avenida das 
Américas on a peninsula facing a lagoon (Lagoa de Jacarépaguá). The sensitive location 
actually violates Costa’s master plan.359  
Fernando Chacel, a famous Brazilian landscape architect designed the project360, in-
cluding a large eco-park developed along his Eco-Gênesis concept.361 The area comprises 
                                               
349 The names represent the desire to attract Carioca elites to the area 
350 Notably these emerge in parallel to the Albuquerque and Takaoka’s ‘Ilha do Sul’, and the first AlphaVille residential 
clusters. Moreover it is memorable that Nova Ipanema is constructed by GAFISA, the firm that in 2007 acquired AlphaVille 
Urbanismo SA (www.novaipanema.com.br, r22.01.2009) 
351 One of the private condominiums even carries the name ‘Parque Lucio Costa’. (Cf. Silva 2004) 
352 Large shopping centres arrived in the 1990s and resulted in the largest concentration of shopping malls in South America 
(Cf. Silva 2004). In addition the grandest convention centre of the country arrived. Several multinationals, e.g. Shell, relo-
cated from the centre. 
353 As in many other places, the system of individual buildings immersed in a sea of an idealistic public space is replaced by a 
structural logic of controlled semi-private enclaves connected by a network of major traffic arteries. 
354 The boulevards have been widened and cut into the urban fabric. They are flanked by parking lots, fences and a myriad 
of billboards. 
355 Own transect of the area in March 2007 
356 João Carlos Lopes dos Santos, a resident and lawyer describes his memories of the place ‘as he knew it’ (Cf. 
http://www.pitoresco.com.br/consultoria/variedades/12.htm, 22.01.2008) 
357 A good documentation of Barras visual imaginary was prepared by an art class of the Pontifical University of Rio de 
Janeiro: http://wwwusers.rdc.puc-rio.br/ednacunhalima/2005_2_1/fotos%20barra%20web/barrasite.html, r23.01.2009). 
358 Interestingly the project is developed and marketed in close collaboration with AlphaVille’s parent company Gafisa, the 
firm that also developed the very first condominium, the Nueva Ipanema, in the early 1970 at Barra. 
359 Apparently the location is less romantic than is pledged in the adverting brochures: Barra’s formula one racetrack and the 
local airport are situated on the opposite side of the lagoon.  
360 Cf. http://www.alphaville.com.br/modules/index.php?id=barradatijuca, r22.01.2008 
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260,000 square metres, including 150,000 square metres of the park. Chacel planned a 
modest rectangular layout with 350 individual houses. These are arranged in 16 groups 
along small community parks. A small area of luxury apartment buildings is planned on 
the southern edge of the side. Entrances for residents and services and delivery have been 
entirely separated.362 Sales started in late 2008. One square metre of serviced land costs 
about US $650. 
1979: Riviera de São Lorenço 
Riviera de São Lorenço is the second project worth mentioning when discussing the issue 
of private cities in Brazil.363 The project demonstrates that Alphaville-Tamboreé cluster is 
not the only place featuring private sector innovations. The Riviera is known in particu-
lar for its environmental initiatives and has received an ISO 14001 environmental certifi-
cation as one of the first real estate ventures worldwide. 
The project on São Paulo’s Atlantic coast is part of the municipality of Bertioga. Its 
area comprises 900 hectares. Only 20 hectares (82 percent) are urbanised, while the rest 
will be preserved as Atlantic rain forest (Mata Atlântica). The terrain is structured into 
three zones: touristic, residential, and mixed. It expects a capacity of circa 60 thousand 
residents. While sales started already in 1983, currently only about 50 percent has been 
implemented. A characteristic feature, chiefly recognisable from the air, is the curved, 
meandering structure of the streets. The project features infrastructure of highest stan-
dards: from basic services to shopping, health, entertainment and recreation. It is known 
in particular for its environmental infrastructure: from state of the art eco-sewage plants 
and exceptional waste collection system. 
Riviera is a holiday resort for the middle-income classes. Accordingly the population 
fluctuates strongly. 4000 people live permanently in the area, it can triple during the 
weekends and rise to more than 40 thousand during holiday times. 364  
The firm Sobloco Construtora SA developed the project in 1979.365 Uncommonly at 
the time, Sobloco undertook several environmental impact studies and developed a holis-
tic concept aiming at covering a wide range of sustainability aspects: from finance to a 
sophisticated waste collection, environmental education to ecologically optimised land 
use patterns and building envelopes. 
In addition, Sobloco runs an environmental control laboratory with an attached edu-
cational programme to monitor the efforts. The firm has an elaborated a strong Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility profile. Its ‘Associação dos Amigos de Rivera’ employs more 
than 500 people and undertakes various social and environmental programmes. More-
over the non-for profit organisation ‘Fundaçao de 30 Agosto’ offers various social pro-
jects for local residents. 
                                                                                                                                         
361 Chacel is also the landscape architect of Barra’s Cidade da Musica that is designed by Christian de Portzamparc. Impor-
tantly Chacel developed a concept that was dubbed Ecogênesis, a strategy that was applied in several of Takaoka’s and 
AlphaVille’s projects, i.e. Gênesis and Burle Marx.  (Cf. also below: Developers: Design) 
362 The delivery entrance is located at the northern side of the area, the residential entrance towards the East. 
363 http://www.rivieradesaolourenco.com/, r21.01.2009 
364 Cf. http://www.rivieradesaolourenco.com, r21.01.2009 
365 Sobloco is Brazilian real estate entrepreneur that, as much as the developers of AlphaVille, was developed upon the base 
of public assignments of Brazil’s early dictatorial regime. It has constructed one of the first SFH financed housing schemes in 
the city of São Paulo, the ‘da Penha’ neighbourhood in São Paulo’s district Vila Císper. The firm celebrated its 50th anniver-
sary in 2008. 
Sobloco has implemented more than 100 projects, from villas to urban revitalisation schemes. Among the most important 
urban projects are Caminhos de San Conrado in Souzas in Campinas (5,8 million sqm, SP), the project Nova Petrópolis in 
São Bernardo do Campo (210 thousand sqm, SP), Rivera de São Lorenço in Bertioga (9 million sqm, SP), the Parque Faber-
Castell in São Carlos (2,1 million sqm, SP), the Guarujá Central Park in Guarujá (500 thousand sqm, SP), and the most recent 
urban redevelopment of Espaço Cerâmica in São Caetano do Sul (310 thousand sqm, SP). (Cf. www.sobloco.com.br; 
www.parquefabercastell.com.br; www.guarujacentralpark.com.br; all r22.01.2009). 
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The results of the ecological efforts of the developers have been widely recognised and 
achieved various awards. Riviera de São Lourenço has been commended by international 
developer organisations (e.g. the International Real Estate Federation, FIABCI) as a 
model of sustainable development. The project is particularly notable for obtaining an 
ISO 14001 certification.366 According to the developers, the project was even the first real 
estate venture to receive this diploma. (Cf. www.sobloco.com.br) 
Box 33: ‘Eternal privatisation’ 
“Our commitment to quality is eternal.” are the sanguine words that appear on the 
web site of the Memorial Necrópole Ecumênica, a private cemetery that was established 
in Santos in Brazil in 1983. 
In addition to the two examples of privately driven urbanisation discussed above some 
more examples exist. Among the most spectacular of these is a private cemetery ven-
ture – the Memorial Necrópole Ecumênica in the port city of Santos. The project por-
trays the fact that private fortified enclaves are not only prominent for the living popu-
lations, but are also gaining ground at the market for everlasting peace, transferring 
the dual living standards from the living world towards eternity. 
Necrópole Ecumênica features the typology of a high-rise or condominium. It presently 
houses 14.000 burial spaces spread over 14 floors, accepting ‘tenants’ of all religions. A 
recent extension currently under construction will accommodate an additional 25.000 
niches in a 108 metre-high tower.367 Indeed, managed by a private company and 
equipped with a restaurant, a chapel, a lagoon with turtles and a peacock garden, the 
facility has become one of the most popular tourist attractions in Santos. Recently the 
company promotes the ‘brand’ by sponsoring sport events and individual athletes.368 
The project is not unique. Nowadays its Guiness-Book-status is under threat, as more 
similar schemes are emerging on the subcontinent. Bogotá’s Panteón Memorial Towers 
complex will consists of 13 towers. The locally celebrated architects Héctor Mejía Felipe 
Uribe de Bedout and Mauricio Gaviria have designed these in vaguely deconstructive 
style. While a direct access from the highway is self-evident, the developers naturally 
offer a project with exceptional yield, valuation and trustworthiness.369 370 
The architectural critic Fabricio Gallantani in article by the Italian architecture and de-
sign journal Domus writes: “Architecture appears swift to take the opportunity to ad-
dress a new area where death creates a market, on the borderline between consumer-
ism and entertainment.”371  
 
Latin American peers 
In contrast to India and South-east Asia, the context of privately dominated New Towns 
in Latin American is relatively meagre. Not many projects qualify as NeoTowns. Appar-
ently until the 1990s watershed the sub-continent’s governments prevented large-scale 
construction of private infrastructure or new settlements. 
                                               
366 The ISO 14001 specifies environmental quality standards. Similar to the ISO 9000 norms it focuses on the whole process 
of production, not just the final product. (Cf. www.din.de, r12.05.2009) 
367 For this fact the project made it also into the Guiness Book of records as the highest necropolis on earth. (Cf. 
http://www.grupomemorial.com.br, r06.03.2007) 
368 Here it appears on the side of other lifestyle or medical brands such as “Apoio da VO2Max, Oakley, Clínica Ortocenter, 
CST Pneus, Exustar, Poli Sport, Fitnesshop, Pro-File e Med-Mar Emergências”; http://www.grupomemorial.com.br, 
r06.01.2008. 
369 Cf. http://www.panteonmemorialtowers.com, r12.05.2008 
370 Another scheme in preparation is the ‘Necrópole Ecumênica Vertical’ in Curitiba. (Cf. Domusweb 2007) 
371 Cf. domusweb 21.02.2007; Or http://nsystemlab.com/05_pub/05_pub_img_2007/07pub_05a.gif ; r12.05.2008 
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Indeed, private urbanism372 has been thriving in Latin America for less than a decade 
now. Notably, most of the projects appear in emerging economies where a significant 
share of the population has reached middle class standards, such as in Chile, Argentina 
or Mexico (Cf. The Economist 2009).373 Important examples for our context are Nor-
delta in Buenoas Aires, Santago de Chile’s cluster of ‘Ciudadas Walladas’, and the 
planned Valle de Las Palmas project in the Tijuana region (Mexico). While several of 
these projects feature a significant size (1000 hectares or more), almost all are only in the 
stage of being implemented. Hence most of the schemes examined do not match the 
complexity of a city. 
The Argentinean case of Nordelta features the same size as AlphaVille SP.374 The pro-
ject represents a peak in the landscape of gated communities in its environs, e.g. the Bue-
nos Aires’ suburban municipality of Pillar. It was developed by private sector initiatives 
after the financial breakdown of the country in the late 1990s, and emerges as an enor-
mous sleeping town.375  
On the other hand several gated towns, or ‘Ciudades Walladas’, of an enormous size 
are currently emerging in Chile’s Santiago-Valparaiso region. Piedra Roja, Valle Norte, 
or La Reserva, as three examples, are planned and implemented by the private sector. 376 
Nevertheless the realisation of these private cities in Chile is fundamentally linked to ma-
jor public planning efforts and a central master plan.377  
Not least the case of Valle de Las Palmas (2007) is among Mexico’s most ambitions 
real estate ventures of the time. It represents of a joint venture scheme between the public 
sector and large corporate players.378 The project is a collaboration of Urbi Desarrollos 
Urbanos and several public agencies.379 It will emerge as an enormous parallel city of 
Tijuana, larger than the city of Paris and twice the size of Bumi Serpong Damai (e.g. 
13.400 hectares). Significantly the scheme is aiming to become the first privately built 
ecological model city worldwide that at the same time addresses lower income classes.380 
Conceived by renowned consultants such as the Californians William Siembieda and 
Michael Boswell and supported by the Canadian Government, it is intended to become 
‘Mexico’s Dongtan’381. 
Indeed, while their implementation has barely started, the Chilean and the Mexican 
towns in particular  emerge as highly interesting examples of a fresh generation of New 
Towns. While their size and complexity, as well as the dominance of the private sector 
justifies categorising them as NeoTowns in our context, it will be highly interesting to 
monitor their further development.  
The lack of full-grown ‘peers’ in the Latin American context confirms AlphaVille’s 
unique standing as an early example NeoTowns on the continent and may solidify the 
presumption that the project was predominantly based on a historically and locally 
                                               
372 Marked by a gush of gated communities, edge cities, globalised nodes, and other mainly suburban typologies 
373 This thesis can only focus on some exemplary cases. A systematic investigation of the entire context of contemporary 
NeoTown projects in Latin America is still an open project. 
374 Cf. Appendix: Comparative matrix; Cf. www.nordelta.com, r20.01.2009 
375 Cf. div. publications of Michael Janoschka 
376 Remarkably some of Santiago’s schemes are connected by private expressways, which are only open for the exclusive use 
of the residents and their guests. The expressways are enormous infrastructure projects by their own standards. (Ibidem) 
377 Such as the ZODUC, or the AUDP (Cf. Borsdorf and Hidalgo 2004, Prajoux 2007).  
378 Cf. www.oem.com.mx/elsoldetijuana/notas/n227966.htm; www.triplepundit.com/pages/sustainable-cit.php, r 
15.04.2009. 
379 E.g.: The Municipality of Tijuana, The Government of Baja California, Conavi (Comisión Nacional de Vivienda), as well as 
the Sociedad Hypotecaria Federal. 
380 The developer is one of the forerunners in Mexico, and probably also globally, in exploring the vast market of lower 
middle classes (Cf. Urbi 2007, Information material for investors; at www.urbi.com, r12.04.2009) 
381 In reference to Ove Arup’s renowned, but unrealised, eco-model city close to Shanghai.  
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unique set of circumstances. Yet, the contexts of the recent examples (and the global set 
of peers) demonstrate that the project in Barueri is more than a flash in the pan. In fact 
AlphaVille-Tamboré emerges as a paradigmatic forerunner of an increasingly popular 
typology. 
III. AlphaVille’s ‘offspring’  
The postulation that AlphaVille is an individual historic incident is also repudiated by the 
scope of the project’s impacts. Since the late 1980s AlphaVille’s concept, based on the 
three elements of security, lifestyle and self-government, has spread to the entire Brazil 
and beyond.382 AlphaVille is currently present in 17 Brazilian states, 35 municipalities 
and two additional countries383  
 
2003: Vilas Alpha – The first gated community for the poor 
The planned gated community for lower income populations makes it obvious that de-
veloping countries such as Brazil are capable of producing novel urban forms unknown 
to Western urbanism. 
While the poor face comparable risk scenarios as the rich, the question emerges 
whether the model could also serve the low-income sector. As a consequence of this hori-
zon,384 AlphaVille’s developers came up with a concept of secured neighbourhoods for 
lower income classes in 2004.385 The resulting brand was christened Vilas Alpha. Indeed 
it is the country’s first gated community for the lower income sector (Cf. Davidson 
2004). Renato Albuquerque, who devotes a large amount of his personal time to the pro-
ject, stresses the social obligation to resolve the problems of the less affluent popula-
tions.386  
In contrast to AlphaVille Urbanismo’s other projects, Vilas Alpha is supposed to be 
implemented in city centres rather than in the peripheries (Oliveira 2004). Moreover, 
access to decent public transport is was a prerequisite (Davidson 2004). A first model 
project has been launched in the Municipality of Gravataí, in the metro region of Porto 
Alegre in 2004. While as much as in AlphaVille young starter families are among the 
main target groups, the US$ 7,5 million scheme is geared to households with an income 
of less than 15 minimum salaries, or around BRL 2400 per month (~ 800 US$). As a 
matter of fact these are lower middle-class households. A house will cost about BRL 
40.000 (around US$ 13.800) (Cf. Fitzpatrick 2003). The families get access to federal 
housing credits with a runtime of 60 months. Additional schemes are planned for São 
José dos Campos (in the São Paulo region), as well as Goiânia in the central part of the 
country as well as Salvador, and the capital of Bahia at the North Eastern coast (Cf. 
Oliveira 2004). 
The concept of Vilas Alpha, also dubbed ‘threes and security’ by AlphaVille’s plan-
ning staff, is a stripped down version of its big brother AlphaVille. It works with the 
same strategic mix of security, self-governance and individual ownership. Monthly main-
tenance fees amount to 12 US$ a month (a tenth of the average fees in AlphaVille’s 
                                               
382 Cf. below: Developer, Strategies. 
383 In addition to the two Portuguese sites in Sintra and Lisbon, AlphaVille Urbanismo started to collaborate with the Portu-
guese real estate group Espírito Santo on an 80-hectare township in Angola’s capital city of Luanda. The Luanda scheme is 
supposed to contain villas, hotels, a marina, as well as a convention centre. The site called Futungo de Belas used to house 
the presidential palace (Oliveira 2004, Cf. also above: “Project History: 1980s to 2000s”). 
384 Moreover triggered by government assistance 
385 In the meanwhile more projects of this sort are underway, most notably under Gafisa’s Bairro Novo brand (Cf. below). 
386 “Eu acho que nós temos a obrigação de resolver o problema desse pessoal” (Cf. Cruz 2003) 
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neighbourhoods). The amount covers the basic security services, but no lifestyle ameni-
ties, such as a club.  
Notably the first project at Gravataí is an enclave based on the detached villa typol-
ogy. It comprises 1500 lots with a maximum of 250 square metres (The big brother Ap-
phaVille’s features 400 to 1000 square metre lots). Up to 35 per cent of the area is re-
served for public services. The developers contribute these as well as a community centre 
to the public (Cf. Oliveira 2004). Crèches, schools, health services and sport facilities will 
be developed with the local municipality.387 Moreover, various vocational training and 
capacity building programmes will be part of the scheme. Here the residents will be 
trained, for example, as phone engineers. While the scheme will be based on residents 
associations and employ privately contracted security guards, an actual wall around the 
area is not planned.388 (Cf. Davidson 2004) 
AlphaVille-Tamboré’s environs 
As Barueri remains one of the most dynamically developing places in the region, the suc-
cess of AlphaVille has led to a boom of similar undertakings in the area. While the mu-
nicipality featured the fastest growth rates in the country, gated communities have been 
booming since the early 1990s. A major part of this change occurred in and around the 
AlphaVille-Tamborè cluster. The cluster of 18 AlphaVille’s, 7 Tamboré’s, and two Gêne-
sis’ was joined by one Melville, two Bethavilles, as well as 2 Valvilles (Cf. below Physical 
structure). In addition Conde, Green Valley, and Ecoville have been set up in the greater 
environs (Cf. below: Structure).389  
Box 34: Bethaville 
As a neighbour of AlphaVille and a national benchmark scheme, why not name your 
project Bethaville? No sooner said than done –  a group of four developers launched a 
project with this name. Conspar, Bethacenter, PSV and Coelho da Fonseca plan a new 
integrated office and residential park on the Southern site of the Castello Branco.390 391 
The project features 100,000 square metres and will be implemented in two phases.392 
While it is supposed to become a new downtown area with all kinds of urban amenities 
and services, it will actually serve as the commercial counterpart of Barueri’s new ad-
ministrative centre. Soon Bethaville is supposed to feature large hotels, a furniture mall, 
and offices – including the highest building in SP as well a residential community called 
Art Ville 
The developers have made an investment of 8 million BRL or 2,6 million Euro.393 Engi-
neering and landscaping services are provided by the consultancy of Kunio Sato.394  
                                               
387 This practice corresponds to Companhia City’s strategy in São Paulo (Cf. above: Butantá) or the strategies of the Levitt’s 
in the post-war-II US of the 1940s and 50s (Cf. Gans 1967). 
388 Mara Paludo prepared VilaAlpha’s urban design. The architect employs a concept of defensible design that is supposed 
to promote the control of open spaces by the residents of the area. E.g. the houses are placed on a square facing each 
other. (Cf. Davidson 2004) 
389 Cf. Most of these projects have been formalised as ‘official’ neighbourhoods only in 2006. For a list published by the 
municipality see: http://www.baruerinet.com.br/noticia76.htm, 12.01.2009. 
390 Conspar Emredimentos e Paticipaçoes, Bethacenter Empreendimentos e Participações, PSV as well as Fonseca are real 
estate developer and investors (Cf. www.conspar.com; http://www.coelhodafonseca.com.br/empresa.aspx; Cf. 
www.bethaville.com.br, r10.03.2009). 
391 In addition, the firm Imovel CIA Lançamentos Imobiliários is coordinating the marketing and sales of the real estate 
products (Cf. www.imovel.cia.com.br).  
392 Bethaville-I will feature 83 lots with an area of 68.172.83 square metres and Bethaville-II, 50 lots with an area of 
35.931.16 square metres. The lots vary between 250 and 3000 square metres and the developers will provide the complete 
infrastructure. 
393 Cf. http://www.eira.com.br/wow/3,1,37,2984.htm, r12.03.2009. 
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Box 35: Ecovile 
Ecoville is one of the projects capitalising on the boom of new Eco-Projects by Marcello 
Takaoka and his peers. The project is located at the 46th kilometre of Castello Branco 
Highway to the East of Takaoka’s Aldeia de Serra, in the municipal area of Araçari-
quama (SP). It is a mountainous, yet rapidly urbanising area. The scheme features 70 
houses, with individual lots starting at 2400 square metres. It is developed by Patricia 
Faux and the Faux Group. Designed by a consortium of Brazilian and US American Ur-
ban Designers, the undertaking compares itself to US American projects such as Oxon 
Creek (Washington DC), Oxford Mews (Annapolis, Maryland) and Evergreen Mills 
(Loundoun County, Virgínia). The villa neighbourhood in the green also promotes itself 
an Edge City, completely disregarding Gareau’s classification (Cf. www.ecoville.com.br, 
r20.01.2008; Cf. above: International Peers). 
                                                                                                                                         
394 Cf. www.takaoka.org.br/website/text.asp?txtCode=%7B8E1E357E-8975-4F52-BD66-A39D625E7A71%7D, 
r12.03.2009. 
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Summary 
This section presented the greater socioeconomic and historic context of AlphaVille-
Tamboré. In this context firstly the demographic, social, economic and cultural profiles 
and trends of Brazil and the São Paulo region were examined. Thereafter, a historical 
background was elaborated upon, delineating chronological milestones from a national 
as well as a project perspective. Last but not least, the project was contextualised in a 
substantial tradition of predecessors, peers and ‘offspring’. 
Brazil 
AlphaVille-Tamboré is located in Brazil, the fourth largest democracy worldwide. None-
theless, the project was initiated during one autocratic period. In the early 1970s Brazil 
reaches a first important threshold towards industrialisation. At the same time the era is 
marked by a paternalistic military regime and also by violent resistance movements. 
Globally the Cold War is underway. 
Formally Brazil’s democracy dates back to 1889. It is characterised by tolerance, as 
well as its scope for freedom and self-fulfilment, but also by a tradition of elite regimes 
and the persistence of gross social and economic inequalities. A large and costly bureau-
cratic apparatus dominates the country’s governmental system. Central planning plays a 
significant role with more than half of the municipalities relying on redistribution trans-
fers from the federal and state governments. 
AlphaVille emerges in a country of immigrants and entrepreneurs. Brazil has always 
been a market-oriented place, with all of the country’s regimes, populist, autocratic, or 
democratic, representing different shades of market-based systems. In this context the 
nation has undergone some crises and waves of liberalisation and reforms (most notably 
by the end of the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1990s). Yet the high status of mar-
ket-based entrepreneurialism does not mean that free markets always meet an optimal 
milieu. Stark contrasts are the norm in Brazil. A relatively high life expectancy and a 
good technological standing are contrasted by problematic education, knotty political 
conditions and an immense economic polarisation. 
Urbanisation 
Brazil is among the most urbanised countries in the planet. While the country’s economy 
is progressively diversified and specialised, 83 percent of the population are living in ur-
ban areas. Indeed, the beginning of the 1970s, which was the time of AlphaVille’s devel-
opment, represented a watershed of urbanisation and mass migration. By then more than 
half of the country’s population had become urban citizens, and migration to the large 
industrialising areas was reaching a peak. 
The growth of Brazilian cities since the 1950 was mainly based on a mass migration 
of the poor from the Northeast to the industrial centres of the South. From the 1990 
onwards the migration from North to South has ebbed up. The metropolises were in-
creasingly marked by an ongoing sprawl and diversification, leading to vast multiplex 
urban regions.   
Economy 
In 2002 Brazil’s GDP was in the same range as India’s – this amounting to 25 percent of 
Germany’s national product. The country is among the most important emerging 
economies globally. In 2001 the investment bank Goldman Sachs grouped the country, 
along with Russia, India and China, as one of the four ”BRICs” that would share the 
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dominance of the world economy by 2050. It has a huge amount of resources of global 
interest. 
Maturation, Consolidation 
Brazil shows many signs of a post-industrial economy, yet in combination with major 
characteristics of a developing country. Indeed, the growth rates today (demographic and 
economic) are relatively moderate, at least when compared to the start-up phase of the 
1960s and 70s. This maturation is reflected by the dominance of the service sector and 
the country’s advanced levels urbanisation. Likewise, population growth rates and 
household sizes are on the decrease. Further decline is projected. Hence, in many aspects 
Brazil looks more advanced than contemporary India or Indonesia. (Urbanisation rates 
are two to three times as high, average income per person is 4 to 6 times bigger, child 
mortality rates are significantly lower, and the amount of persons earning less than 2 
dollars per day is smaller by factors of 2-3). The early 1970s were marked by the most 
rapid economic transformation and mass industrialisation (cf. below Milestones). This 
‘taking-off’ period featured two digit growth rates. It was comparable to some contem-
poraneous numbers in South East Asia. 
Yet, among the characteristics of a developing country are a huge and inefficient pub-
lic as well as an informal sector that is constantly on the rise. Whole regions, mainly in 
the country’s periphery, continue to rely on the value added by the public sector. In the 
metropolitan areas, shadow economies and informal cities are thriving. 
Informal ‘scapes’ 
An integral part of Brazil’s austerity is also the country’s ‘shadow economy’. It remains a 
major characteristic of the country’s urban landscapes. By the turn of the 21st Century 
two-fifths of the country’s population lived in favelas, the Brazilian version of the slum. 
The same amount worked in the informal sector. The nationwide number of urban slums 
continues to grow, while it is today deeply embedded in increasingly diversified and 
globalised processes of production and exchange. 
Middle classes, consumer lifestyles 
Despite the large informal sector significant middle class populations exist. The 1970s 
economic boom that was underlying the foundations of AlphaVille, has spurred a signifi-
cant rise in the mainstream middle class population. Since then the country’s average 
incomes have increased to middle income levels. The share of households with disposable 
income has consistently increased, and lifestyles have become increasingly based upon 
consumption. Accordingly the country’s rates of car ownership, computers, cell phones 
and energy consumption all come close to western standards. (About 12 percent of all 
Brazilians, 20 times more than in India, own a car). 
Inequality, disparity 
One of the most significant features of Brazil is its extreme social, economic, and spatial 
inequality. While the South and Southeast feature Western development levels, all of the 
country’s economic centres are located in the Southeast, the conditions in the northern 
regions are comparable to Africa. The statistical figures on a national level are often 
skewed by these stark contrasts. 
Among the most persistent of Brazil’s problems is income inequality. This is one of the 
preconditions of understanding the country. Critics speak not only of inequality, but also 
of deliberate social exclusion. Brazil is among the top five most unequal countries in the 
world. The wealthiest 10 percent capture 46 percent of total income, whereas the poorest 
10 percent get only 1 percent. 
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The phenomenon of inequality reverberates at different sectors and along many spa-
tial scales: class and ethnicity, North and South, rural and urban, and also locally. More-
over, Brazil’s economic wealth is highly concentrated in only a few metropolitan regions, 
most of which are in the South. In 2006, five municipalities accounted for 25 percent of 
the national wealth. Furthermore, for 40 years now all major indicies of inequality have 
been on the rise, notwithstanding constantly growing average incomes. 
AlphaVille’s emergence in the early 1970s marks an important watershed character-
ised by an increasing concentration of incomes and a growing articulation in regional 
disparities. These days the Municipalities, Santana do Parnaíba and Barueri, home to 
AlphaVille-Tamboré, are topping the lists of the richest, and at the same time the most 
unequal places in the country. 
Economy & foreign capital 
Foreign capital and transnational corporations are regarded as the key features of the 
Brazilian industrialisation process from its initial stages. They have a long history in the 
development of the country’s urban infrastructure (São Paulo’s streets and electricity 
systems were developed by a British-Canadian undertaking). The country is characterised 
by two large waves of liberalisation and large foreign capital inflows: the first is linked to 
the model of a techno-authoritarian development of the 1960 and 1970s, and the second 
as part of the 1990s democratic turnaround. 
The military regime of 1964 to 1986 represented a marriage of central planning with 
liberal development models and worked together with international finance and expertise 
to develop significant urban infrastructure. AlphaVille thrived on the resulting economic 
boom (Hewlett Packard, for example was among the firm’s first major clients). It was the 
epoch of enormous infrastructure investments, such as the power dam of Itaipú, the larg-
est hydroelectric facility in the world. 
The democratic governments since the late 1980s implemented a second important 
wave of economic liberalisation. The governments of Itamar Franco and Collor imple-
mented the ‘Plano Real’ in 1994. In the context of the National Privatisation Programme 
(PND) a significant number of state enterprises were privatised and many public mo-
nopolies (e.g. the health and infrastructure sector) were opened up for private entrepre-
neurship. 
The 1990s have also seen a rise in international trade and massive inflows of foreign 
money. Brazil became the largest recipient of FDI in Latin America and one of the largest 
developing FDI recipients worldwide. The largest share of the international money (28 
percent) originated in the USA. While sceptics complain that during the recent waves of 
foreign investment significant parts of the national economy passed into international 
hands, optimists underline that international firms play a major role in connecting the 
country globally. 
The expanding presence of internationals, as well as the massive influx of interna-
tional money and technology had deep effects on the structure of national enterprises. 
For example, the recent merger of AlphaVille Urbanismo (the developer of AlphaVille) 
with Gafisa, and of Tamboré S.A. with Brascan, demonstrates a trend of economic con-
solidation under conditions of increased international competition. 
Liberalisation of housing and real estate 
Brazil’s housing sector as well has undergone a fundamental shift towards deregulation 
and privatisation since the late 1980s (Rojas 2004). The national housing strategy shifted 
from supply-driven towards a demand-driven paradigm. The government embarked on 
an ‘enabling approach’ towards housing markets along the principles of the Washington 
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Consensus. This strategy sought to unleash the potential of individuals, communities, 
developers, investors and entrepreneurs. It rested on two main pillars: 1) A direct, de-
mand-driven system of household subsidies, as well as 2) the supply of the houses by 
private sector enterprises. 
With major housing and infrastructure programmes underway and the availability of 
cheap credit, the property and construction sectors were among the biggest benefiters of 
the liberalisation and privatisation programmes. International firms and investors were 
also attracted. The metropolises saw the development of significant markets for prime 
real estate and it became one of the most important segments on the Novo Mercado. 
AlphaVille-Tamboré became part of this prime real estate. When the area matured and 
consolidated, it developed into a ‘true’ peripheral centre and edge city, attracting an ever 
larger and more international selection of investors and clients. 
Culture – A colourful balance between integration and segregation 
Brazil represents one of the most colourful, multicultural and multiethnic societies on the 
planet. Its hybrid culture must be seen in the light of a multitude of individual impacts: 
Indian traditions, Portuguese rules, African mores, Oriental trade, Italian food, Asian 
entrepreneurialism, etc. Portuguese language, religion (Brazil features the largest catholic 
community worldwide) and law have served as important means to integrate a multitude 
of populations and accordingly most Brazilians see themselves more as Brazilian in ‘race’, 
leading to a distinct status of the country in South America. 
This multiethnic context transformed Brazil into one of most equal and tolerant coun-
tries on the globe, by constitution as well as by culture. Still, at the same a strong culture 
of segregation exists: Ethnicities vary within the various parts of the country; Dark-
skinned populations are much more likely to be undereducated and poor; Most societal 
groups prefer to reside in homogeneous enclaves. These trends are revealed by the frag-
mented spaces that mark Brazil’s urban landscapes. 
Other dark sides of Brazil’s legal and cultural idealism are the ‘messier’ version of 
daily survival politics, which are dominated by the elites. While Brazil’s culture contains 
a relatively high amount of personal freedom, feudalistic traditions continue to play a 
significant role. Powerful minorities in particular know how to lobby politicians. They 
tend to resist political change, explore legal loopholes, and slow down the redistribution 
of political and economic power. Elites tend to cluster in certain sectors of the city, at-
tracting a disproportionally high amount of public investments. Many prefer an exclusive 
life style in closed condominiums and guarded enclaves. 
Two significant cultural factors that play an important role in daily politics and sur-
vival strategies of groups are ‘jeitos’ and clientilism. While ‘jeitos’ comprises the know-
how of cutting through the red tape of bureaucracy and whom to hire to achieve the de-
sired end, clientelism circumscribes the fact that politicians are produced and maintained 
by personal networks and patrons. The clientelist cultures, feudalism, the ‘messy’ strug-
gles of Brazilian power groups, and the abuse of authority are well perceived by Brazilian 
society and result in a high corruption score. 
Risks and disasters 
Risks, real and perceived, have a deep impact on the specific arrangement and patterning 
of human environments. In a country like Brazil the explicit context of risks and needs, 
such as struggles over land access, resources, clean air, water, a safe environment and 
mobility, leads to the formation of particular urban geographies. The powerful usually 
select the most central and secure locations, while the poor are often left with compro-
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mises. In many cases the poor must compromise security for access to jobs (Paraisópolis, 
one of the larger favelas of São Paulo, is constructed with an average inclination of 43 
percent.)  
The character of Brazil’s risk framework helps to explain why an increasing amount 
of the population seek to maximise security and exclude risks by choosing to reside in 
controlled enclaves. In this context AlphaVille-Tamboré is a place that represents the 
dream of combining all the amenities of urban and rural life in a harmonious and risk 
free environment. 
Brazil represents an environmental problem scenario that is a common characteristics 
of many developing countries: Only a minority have direct and free access to fresh drink-
ing water; almost all of the urban rivers are polluted; waste is rarely treated; exploding 
rates of motorised transport combined with ancient modes of production cause extreme 
levels of urban air pollution.  
Vicious circles develop as sprawling settlements pose an increasing threat to essential 
natural resources, such as the fresh water reservoirs. While recent global and local cli-
mate change scenarios have many uncertain outcomes, it is highly evident that they are 
very likely to aggregate existing problems and epitomise present struggles for resources. 
Therefore they pose not only a physical but also a political threat to the country. 
A problem that deserves a specific consideration in the Brazilian context is crime and 
the ‘spectre of violence’. Indeed the experience of physical insecurity has a tremendous 
impact of the quality of life in the larger metropolitan areas. The murder rate in greater 
São Paulo, for example, is more than seven times that of New York. Certain neighbour-
hoods are beyond public control and become no-go areas, prisons are filled beyond ca-
pacity and additionally police corruption is commonplace.  
The media add to the trouble by creating an atmosphere of mass concern, angst and 
paranoia. In 2007 the issue of violence was ranked as the top concerns of all Brazilians, 
higher than unemployment. And many observations speak for the fact this ‘fear of crime’ 
has a major impact of the way spaces are produced and how people construct their 
houses. Crime and angst thus can be seen as one of the most important factors leading to 
a rising prominence of walling, private security services, high rise ’condomínios’ and 
guarded enclaves.  
It is an irony of fate that efficiency of ‘exit’ strategies is limited. Because crime follows 
the path of people and money, violence levels in the suburbs are on the rise, and many of 
the ‘pacified’ neighbourhoods see rising levels of ‘internal’ youth and household violence. 
São Paulo 
AlphaVille-Tamboré is located in the context of the greater region of São Paulo, the larg-
est and most affluent region of the country. The city is South America’s number one 
global city region and one of the largest metropolises worldwide. In 2006 more than 10 
percent of all Brazilians lived in this Macrometrópole. São Paulo was always a precursor 
of the most recent social, political and spatial trends.  
AlphaVille evolves as part of the largest Brazilian metropolis as a child of the auto-
mobile era and as part of the most dynamic economic and societal change. In the 1950s 
under president Kubitschek, São Paulo becomes the cradle of the country’s automobile 
industry. The city is bursting at its seams. The state of São Paulo attracts 75 percent of 
Brazils domestic industrial product. The early 1990s mark an important watershed with 
negative rates of population growth of the central city. AlphaVille’s development on an 
urbanisation corridor to the West of the centre is among the most rapidly urbanising 
areas in the metropolitan region. 
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São Paulo is Brazil’s global city. It is the most important nexus linking the national to 
the global economy. In the late 1990s the city was home to 70 percent of all large na-
tional and 90 percent of all international banking headquarters. The city concentrates an 
enormous amount of advanced business services, financial institutions and all significant 
infrastructures from international airports to South America’s most important stock ex-
change.  
Among the most important spatial trends is regionalisation (or peripherisation) as well 
as a dynamically growing informal sector (‘favelisation’) (which can be seen as the results 
of major shifts from an industrial society towards a consumer society).  
São Paulo’s urban structure 
The vast urban structure of São Paulo’s urban region is progressively conceptualised 
along the terminology of a landscape. The notion does not seek to romanticise the mat-
ter; in contrast it points to operative postmodern scenery. In the 20th century the city has 
undergone a process of transformation, from a centrally oriented metropolis towards a 
multiplex urban region. Many observations and anecdotes confirm that the development 
of the city was predominantly driven by economic dynamics. In this context São Paulo 
was associated with a ‘diversified’ industrial park, which evolved mainly along the needs 
and structural dynamics of the market. 
Practice of ‘walling’ 
While São Paulo’s metropolitan region spreads out it also becomes increasingly diverse 
and fragmented. Pictures of a rich centre and a poor periphery, for example, become 
difficult to maintain.  
This homogenised context, in which every part of the city becomes an object of ex-
change, engenders a renaissance of a ‘culture of walls’. The trend is largely aggregated by 
an environment dominated by violence and a movement of middle class households to 
poor suburbs. This leads to an urban structure that is fragmented at an ever smaller 
scale. In some districts rich and poor live side by side, but are more distanced socially 
than ever before. 
Three types of walled enclaves are of specific importance in this post-industrial land-
scape: 1) the vertical estate (‘condomínios verticais’), 2) the horizontal estate (‘con-
domínios horizontais’) and 3) the horizontal land subdivision (‘loteamentos horizon-
tais’).395  
Gated enclaves 
Beginning with the industrialisation of the 1970s, a rise of the middle classes and their 
increasing migration to the suburbs caused various forms of closed enclaves to become 
prominent in the peripheral regions of São Paulo. The emergence of this dwelling typol-
ogy was related to an immense contrast between the existing (poor) residents and the 
new middle class settlers, who had a need to mark out their own secure and discrete 
space. Most of these early gated enclaves emerged in Western municipalities of Barueri, 
Santana do Parnaíba and Cotia. Later on, an increasing spread towards the whole region 
of São Paulo, the RMSP, was observed. In São Paulo City gated horizontal enclaves were 
not prominent, either legally or economically, until 1994. Only by then a new regulation 
                                               
395 Scholars, such as Teresa Caldeira, date the emergence of these forms back to the 
1970’s – a time of mass industrialisation, new middle classes, and of an enormous urban 
expansion towards the suburbs. 
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– the ‘Lei de Vilas’ – facilitated the installation of horizontal ‘condomínios’. As a conse-
quence of this, the compact type of horizontal enclaves became a very prominent dwell-
ing form in all inner city residential zones of the city. 
Periferia  
The ‘periferia’ represents an interesting and widely used model in the context of Brazilian 
development. The term has acquired a spatial as well as a political meaning. It marks an 
important frontier in many aspects: mediating between city and nature, rich and poor, 
order and chaos. It thus challenges traditional concepts and ideologies and brings to the 
fore new lifestyles, urban models and sometimes even new societies.  
While most of Brazilian cities have doubled or even tripled in size in the last 30 years, 
the suburbs developed from places of chaos and disorder into cradles of modern democ-
racy and civilisation. All urban districts have undergone a radical reconfiguration as the 
duality of centre and periphery has given way to the complexity of a heterogeneous ur-
ban region. The ‘periferia’ became an integral part of the fragmented city of walls – not 
defined by its distance from the geometrical city centre but by a new set of parameters of 
access and centrality.  
This fringe portrays new spatial order and can have a high physical presence, for ex-
ample in the form of walls, gates, fortress buildings, and large infrastructures, or in a 
form hidden from most senses – an order represented by electronics, electromagnetic 
waves and also socio-cultural codes. 
‘Setor sudoeste’ 
While many common models portray São Paulo as a highly homogenised but profoundly 
fragmented ‘city of walls’ the reality on the ground needs a significant correction. While 
in the recent 20 years São Paulo’s urban structure has been increasingly fragmented, and 
rich and poor neighbourhoods have been more and more dispersed throughout the re-
gion, an affluent wedge has continued to develop from the centre towards the Southwest. 
Despite the fact that it is penetrated by favelas, this ‘setor sudoeste’ contains some 80 
percent of São Paulo’s urban wealth, the best infrastructure and the most of the signifi-
cant enterprises. The location is regarded as one of the most important new tertiary cen-
tres of Latin America. The development was supported by massive government interven-
tions.  
AlphaVille-Tamboré can be seen as an extended part of that sector. In the 1980s 
Santana do Parnaíba and Barueri were among the municipalities with the highest migra-
tion rates in the whole metropolitan region. The region developed levels of wealth previ-
ously common only to some of the central districts of Sao Paulo 396. And AlphaVille 
served as a major magnet driving the growth of the area. ”Together with the neighbour-
ing developments of Aldeia da Serra, Tamboré, and in the municipalities of Barueri and 
Santana do Parnaíba, the whole region has been aggressively marketed in Brazil as true 
‘edge city’.”397 
Slums 
Illegal land subdivisions have to be regarded as a central characteristic of São Paulo’s 
urban growth in the last 30 years. The city represents an ambivalent approach towards 
its low-income populations. In the 1970s the city’s economic development attracted huge 
masses of migrants from the North. Yet the city has never been able to cope with the 
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housing problem. The public hand was always overburdened by the increasing demand, 
and the private real estate sector was not able to provide housing for the masses at prof-
itable margins. As a consequence, large informal land markets developed, with entrepre-
neurs subdividing and selling land without the proper titles. In this context a large major-
ity (about 70 percent) of the São Paulo’s poor ended up in illegal subdivisions (‘clandes-
tinos’) while another 13 percent found themselves in ‘real’ slums.  
That's why the share of real slums (squatted areas without any prior subdivision or 
development) is rather low, at least if compared with say African or Indian conditions. 
Yet, it is of concern that the number of slum dwellers has been constantly on the rise (it 
seems independent of political regimes). Forty years ago the typology was practically 
unknown in the city. Another element of concern is the fact, that favelas are increasingly 
transformed to their own type of enclave, holding significant amounts of the non-white 
population, and becoming excluded no-go areas. 
National milestones  
Chain of events 
Brazil stands between developing countries and the West. The country has undergone 
important social, economic and spatial transformations and shifts at a much earlier stage 
than other developing countries. In particular the decade between the 1960s to the mid 
1970s, which is also the cradle of AlphaVille, can be regarded as an important threshold 
of development.  
The decade was marked by one of the most repressive military regimes. The right 
wing developmentalist government undertook major efforts to boost the economy. Im-
mense sums of money were pumped towards the industrial sector as well as the develop-
ment of the infrastructure it needed. As a result the country experienced a major boost of 
large-scale industrialisation resulting in (world-) record levels of economic growth. This 
process of industrialisation has triggered a mass migration to the cities of unprecedented 
proportions. The movement occurred mainly from the underdeveloped rural areas of the 
North to the cities in the industrial South. The consequence was that by the end of the 
1960s half of the country’s population become citizens – a threshold that was reached at 
the global level only in 2007.  
Yet the new populations did not concentrate in the urban centres. A large mass of in-
ternal migrants was redirected to the urban hinterlands, resulting in an enormous wave 
of suburbanisation. As the public, in particular the outer municipalities, were not pre-
pared to handle such a scale of change, a major part of the urbanisation process was self-
organised.  
Notwithstanding the incapacity of the public hand to solve the urbanisation problem 
in a positivist way, the time has seen the implementation of a multitude of projects with 
an emphasis on transport infrastructure. The urban structure was drastically remodelled 
along the requirements of the motor age. The government appointed several renowned 
and highly competent figures, mainly engineers and economists, to serve the city in a 
techno- bureaucratic manner.  
The decade between 1965 and 1975 portrayed the largest economic and urban growth 
and expansion of the century. Notably the growth also induced a momentous rise of 
middle class populations, triggering a new consumer orientated market, ranging from 
household appliances to lifestyle homes.  
Yet what the immense growth of the late 60s and early 70s was not able to resolve 
was the county’s huge polarisation and inequality. In contrast many observations speak 
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for the fact that existing boundaries and divisions have been reinforced or even widened, 
and that a large amount of the benefits (profits and subsidies) ended up in the pockets of 
rather a few elites. Indeed the fact that the government required development money to 
be spent in formalised neighbourhoods has benefited many elite districts in particular. 
São Paulo’s affluent ‘vetor sudoeste’, for example has seen enormous upgrading and ex-
tension. 
AlphaVille’s scenario / How does AlphaVille fit into this framework?  
AlphaVille’s emergence is clearly connected to the reforms of the military regime and the 
economic boom of the time. Its developers Yorshiro Takaoka and Renato Albuquerque 
share the same set of values as São Paulo’s leading technocrats of the time – Takaoka and 
Albuquerque are civil engineers raised at the Polytechnic Scholl of the University of São 
Paulo. They are of the same generation and share the same educational background. The 
conservative-liberal government is seeking such partners and nurtures the firm (cf. below: 
Project milestones).  
The success of AlphaVille as a place is closely interrelated with the construction of a 
new important highway. Notably this ‘autobahn’ is carrying the name of the first presi-
dent of the autocratic regime: Rodovia Castello Branco. The new express road reduces 
travel times to important central destinations to less than half an hour. It also establishes 
a direct connection with the ‘vetor’, the most modern part of the city. In the context of 
the exorbitant growth rates of the industrial sector, by the end of the 1960s it seems 
quite self-evident that the developers would seek to jump on this train. However, what 
was visionary and innovative was that they aimed to develop a new kind of light indus-
trial and commerce park at this strategic location between city and periphery. Signifi-
cantly, one of the triggers of the process is the American computer firm Hewlett Packard, 
a firm that is concentrating on the novel and highly promising sector of information 
technologies and data processing (cf. below Milestones). 
However the plans for the commercial park prove to be short-lived. When the after-
math of the oil crisis hits the country’s economy in 1974, economic growth rates are 
halved. The developers react by shifting AlphaVille’s emphasis to a residential and office 
zone. In doing this they choose to address the increasing market of middle class popula-
tions, which at the peak of the military regime, long for safe and protected heavens in 
which to rear their children, and to realise the old dream of living in a garden city close 
to nature. 
Summary national milestones 
1930 to 1964 ‘Prehistory’ 
The period prior to AlphaVille’s implementation is demarcated by the advent of the in-
dustrial society and enormous parallel socio-political shifts. This epoch from the 1930s 
to the 1960s is characterised by increasing antagonism between rural and urban, agricul-
tural and industrial, communist and fascist, or bourgeois and proletarian. The state (e.g. 
politicians) seeks to reconcile the aforementioned confrontations by fostering national-
ism, a policy of strength and a centrally guided modernisation.398 Politically the period is 
referred to as the populist epoch, as policies are geared to the opinion of the masses, 
rather than being driven by idealist principles. This orientation towards mass attitudes 
remains a constant variable, while volatile shifts between self-proclaimed authoritarian 
regimes and elected governments occur. 
                                               
398 Reflecting the situation in Europe in-between the first and second world wars 
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The populist era is characterised by a liberal but strong state that promotes economic 
nationalism, state-guided modernisation and import substitution trade policies. The state 
establishes monopolies in raw materials, basic industries and infrastructure. In this con-
text, São Paulo emerges a national economic powerhouse with a majority of industries 
installed in its periphery. The motto ‘São Paulo não pode parar’ (São Paulo cannot stop) 
characterises the spirit of the time. (Cf. Koll-Schretzenmayr 2001) 
The Paulista capital, as well as the other large metropolises, emerge as dual cities. 
These are composed of a modern centre versus an underdeveloped periphery. Notably 
the time sees initial efforts towards an orchestrated spatial development. In the 1930s, 
the period of the Estado Novo, personalities such as Donat-Alfred Agache or Francisco 
Prestes Maia prepare guiding plans for the country’s large metropolises. Among the mile-
stone plans and regulations in São Paulo are the Working code of Arthur Sabóia (1929), 
Francisco Prestes Maia’s Plano de Avenidas (1930), the 1957 Law of highrises and 
SAGMAC’s integrated study ‘Estrutura Urbana da Aglomeração Paulistana’ (1958). 399  
1964 to 1986 immediate context  
The era from 1964 to 1986, AlphaVille’s immediate development context, is marked by 
the country’s third military dictatorship. In late 1964 a serious economic crisis, in com-
bination with the spectre of communism, results in a coup d’etat. The military scraps the 
opposition with the support of traditional elite and puts the centrally driven development 
model to its extremes. In contrast to dictatorships the power of leadership is passed to a 
series of appointed general-presidents. In this context the autocratic period is marked by 
various stages: a relatively moderate beginning (1964-1967), followed by an ultra sup-
pressive period (1967 – 1974) and thereafter the advent of a slow democratisation proc-
ess (1974 – 1989).  
The strong-hand military regime devotes itself to reviving the economy. It seeks to 
achieve this goal by running the country (and its cities) along a developmentalist and 
technobureaucratic approach (like a gigantic machine). In this context strategies of im-
port substitution are maintained, while partnerships with the industry, local and interna-
tional, gain a pivotal role. The government borrows immense sums at international 
money markets and invests these in the country’s industrial and urban infrastructure. As 
a result a remarkable and quick economic fix is achieved, and Brazil is transformed to 
one of the fastest growing economies in the world. 
New dimensions of migration from Brazil’s Northeast the South and Southwest paral-
lel the economic boom of the late 1960 and early 1970s. The country’s industrial centres 
grow at unprecedented rates and more than half of Brazilians become urban citizens. 
Despite the fact that the complex problems of this unprecedented urban growth can-
not be resolved by planning, São Paulo sees immense infrastructure investments. These 
fundamentally transform the urban landscape of the city. In this situation, several tech-
nocratic mayors, appointed by the military regime, steer the implementation of large in-
frastructure projects (most visibly in the transport sector).400  
The major landmark plans and legislations of the autocratic era are: The federal 
Housing Finance System (SFH/BNH, 1964), obliging all large municipalities to draw up 
spatial development plans; The Plano Urbanístico Básico (PUB, 1968), developing scenar-
ios of a polynuclear metropolis; The resulting ‘Plano Diretor de Desenvolvimento Inte-
                                               
399 The SAGMACS study (1958) is particularly notable for its holistic and integrated planning approach addressing the whole 
region. 
400 Among the most notable of these projects are: The peripheral expressways of the Marginais Tietê and Pinheiros, the 
Metro, some major elevated highways, bridges, and tunnels (e.g. the Minhocão and the Çebolão) international airport 
terminals and regional highways as well as important regional train connections. 
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grado’ (PDDI, 1971), São Paulo’s first legally binding master plan; The Zoning Code (Lei 
7.805/72), consolidating existing patterns of spatial concentration and segregation. 
Once the gush of money runs dry with the oil crisis of the early 1970s, the develop-
mentalist technocratic course of action proves unsustainable. While a major debt crisis 
hits the country, rising unemployment spurs a growing dissatisfaction of the working 
classes, and large populations are pushed towards informality. It becomes apparent that 
the regime is not capable of inducing a long-term modernisation process from below and 
that another system is needed. 
1986 and onward 
The late 1980s mark an era of a gradually increasing democratic culture, but also a 
changing modus operandi of economic development. In this situation deep socio-political 
reforms are paralleled by an intense neo-liberal restructuring of the economy.  The first 
democratic presidents Collor (1990-1992), Itamar Franco 1992-1995 and Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) 1995-2003 are preoccupied with economic reforms 
(Plano Collor, Plano Real). The new economic programme is marked by a massive de-
nationalisation, privatisation and internationalisation along neo-liberal lines. The year 
2002 sees the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who adds a social (and environ-
mental) dimension to the reforms. 
The new democratic period is characterised by a decline of the industrial and the rise 
of the service sector, as well as ongoing division of labour. Brazil loses almost one quar-
ter of its industrial jobs between 1989 and 1997. The geometry of centre and periphery is 
changed again. The country experiences an increasing trend towards political and eco-
nomic decentralisation, but at the same time particular service centres, such as São Paulo 
are strengthened as nodes of as innovation, command and control.  
The general processes of economic and political restructuring and decentralisation 
have major impacts on the ground. Trends of industrial deconcentration and political 
decentralisation are reinforced as Brazil’s municipalities compete against each other. At 
the same time Brazil’s major urban centres mature into multiplex urban regions.  
In this situation the former dominance of the state gives way to an increasing rele-
vance of the civil, but also to the corporate sectors, reconfiguring the stage of political, 
economic, social, cultural and spatial struggles, and leads to both innovations and con-
tradictions. While, for example, the Brazilian constitution takes account of a social ‘right 
to the city’, individual municipalities are experimenting with market based planning and 
developing strategies based on public-private partnerships (e.g. ‘paid authorisation’ or 
‘urban operations’).  
Recently, some of the most important regulatory milestones of the new democratic 
epoch in the context of São Paulo are: the 1993 ‘Lei de Vilas’, enabling the construction 
of closed horizontal condomínio of a limited size in São Paulo’s inner city areas; the ‘Es-
tatuto da Cidade’ (2001), stressing social as well as environmental functions of cities and 
requiring municipalities to draw up spatial development plans; São Paulo’s 2002 Plano 
Diretor Estratégico (Municipal law 13.430), institutionalising socio-ecologic principles, 
as well as market oriented development mechanisms; and the programme ‘Cidade Legal’, 
aiming to legalise most of the informal properties in the Metropolitan Region of São 
Paulo. 
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Project milestones 
Prehistory, land 
AlphaVille-Tamboré develops on the lands of a former farm, the Fazenda Tamboré. The 
land originally belonged to native Indians. It becomes a part of Union territories in the 
16th century and is then leased to an important landholding clan, the Penteado family by 
the first half of the 18th century. With industrialisation underway, in 1935 the terrain is 
divided among the successors into six pieces and thus fragmented (it is highly probable, 
that the developers of AlphaVille were able to acquire land at that time). Large parts of 
the land are then cultivated by settlers from Japan, yet with the arrival of the military 
regime the Penteado family regains control of the land and starts to commercialise the 
area. 
Pioneering phase 
By the beginning of the 1950s – while São Paulo is experiencing a major modernisation 
and investment boom – two civil engineers Renato Albuquerque and Yoshiro Takaoka 
establish the firm Construtora Albuquerque Takaoka Ltda. The firm thrives on a mass of 
civil works projects, from road construction to housing, and soon rises to the top ten 
engineering consultancies in the country. The venture thrives in particular during the 
military regime, as the government chooses to entrust the corporate sector with the im-
plementation of the development and modernisation programmes.  
As a consequence, by the end of the 1960s, Renato Albuquerque and Yoshiro Taka-
oka have assembled an enormous set of skills and the necessary financial basis, seemingly 
only waiting for the right combination of circumstances to realise their full potential. 
This right moment for AlphaVille’s developers comes at the beginning of the 1970s and 
is a jigsaw of five pieces401: 1) The reappropriation of the large tract of land by the 
Penteado family in 1966; 2) The completion of the Castello Branco Highway in 1968; 3) 
Strategic recommendations of the 1969 development plan (PUB) to develop areas along 
the Tietê River; 4) The consequences of the 1971 planning and zoning regulation (PDDI), 
pushing out industries and middle class populations from central areas and verifying the 
progress of elite neighbourhoods towards the Southwest; 5) The establishment of the 
Metropolitan Region of São Paulo (RMSP) in 1973, which among other things strength-
ened the long term confidence of investors. 
1970s unfolding 
By the beginning of the 1970s the venture of Albuquerque and Takaoka finds itself in a 
position to cater for the city’s growing middle classes (this time based on the services 
sector). While opportunities emerge both in the inner city, as well as in the periphery, it 
seems only consequent that the developers come up with two parallel projects (which are 
also bound to become landmark typologies). In this context an ensemble of serviced 
high-rise ‘condomínio’ named ‘Ilha do Sul’ is launched in 1972 in a residential inner city 
neighbourhood of São Paulo. Notably, only one year later Albuquerque and Takaoka 
decide to develop the 500-hectare site in the suburban municipality of Barueri, which 
would become AlphaVille.  
While, at the beginning, it seems more profitable to develop a commercial and light 
industrial park, only three years later, with the oil crisis underway, the potential of a 
novel ‘garden city for the automobile elites’ is realised. In this context the vertical strat-
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egy of ‘Ilha do Sul’ is (more or less consciously) transferred from São Paulo’s dense urban 
centre to the horizontal plane of the spacious periphery to emerge as a new type of gated 
community. In a quest to conceive the ‘first’ and ‘optimal’ Alpha-city, the architects José 
Almeida Pinto, a partner of Reinaldo Pestana elaborate of the urban design of the scheme 
and coin the name AlphaVille. 
As a result, in 1975, the first ‘prototype’ of a residential cluster (Residencial) is devel-
oped. The neighbourhood consists of nearly 900 lots for single-family houses, and a 
common club and sports facility. Notably, the scheme is developed along the motto 
‘quality, security, governance’ -  a concept that has been foreign to the peripheries before. 
At the same time its name Residencial402 points to the fact that the developers aimed to 
replicate the success.  
1980s maturation and consolidation 
The 1980s mark a watershed of AlphaVille becoming a truly urban place. The era sees a 
process of maturation and consolidation at various levels: By the early 1980s a dozen 
new ‘residencials’ are added and the commercial centre takes off. As a consequence Al-
phaVille doubles in size, attracting many secondary service facilities (such as private 
schools and shopping malls). A hybrid mix of edge and garden city emerges, featuring the 
(functional) qualities of a fully-fledged town. 
The success starts to attract an increasing number of similar ventures to the environs. 
The most important of the new enterprises is Tamboré S.A. The firm is launched to de-
velop several hundred hectares that have remained with the largest land-owning family of 
the area, the Penteado family. Indeed, the quality and magnitude of the Tamboré project 
change the underlying rationale of the New Town typology. It therefore seemed more 
fitting for our context to establish the name AlphaVille-Tamboré for the entire NeoTown 
scheme. 
The mid 1990s brings major generational changes resulting in a fundamental restruc-
turing of the chief corporate stakeholders: When Yoshiro Takaoka dies in 1994, Albu-
querque and his son in law Nuno Lopes incorporate AlphaVille as a new ‘Sociedade 
Anônima’. The former Albuquerque and Takaoka Empreendimentos is inherited by Yo-
shiro Takaoka’s son Marcelo and becomes Marcelo Takaoka Empreendimentos S.A. 
(MTA). In addition, Arthur de Ulhôa transfers the control of Tamboré S.A. to his son 
Fábio.  
Significantly, the demand for enclosed neighbourhoods reaches unprecedented levels. 
In this context the typology of the gated neighbourhood not only rapidly spreads from 
São Paulo to other regions, it is also adapted to inner-city conditions (in a smaller for-
mat), and in addition becomes increasingly prominent among lower income segments.  
AlphaVille Graciosa (Curitiba) becomes known as an important landmark project and 
a precedent for a new generation of ecological AlphaVille’s. At ‘home’, the image of Al-
phaVille’s downtown area is polished when large patches of its ‘central public space’ are 
modernised and redesigned with an emphasis on pedestrian walks and pocket parks. 
When by the late 1990s a private four-lane expressway connects to the area, Al-
phaVille-Tamboré reaches the first point of saturation. In this situation the developers 
concentrate more on the refinement and commercialisation of the distinctive product-
brand than on the development of new land. In consequence AlphaVille emerges as an 
experimental playground for novel strategies and typologies, such as new marketing 
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country resort of Aldeia da Serra. However, most of the construction activities occur at the Barueri site.  
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strategies and lifestyle approaches. In addition the developers start to focus on introduc-
ing the brand into other regions. 
Marcelo Takaoka in particular emerges as a significant entrepreneurial innovator. His 
two Gênesis projects valorise AlphaVille’s ‘residencial’ typology, by introducing a new 
combination of an ‘eco-sustainabile’ approach and life-style marketing. Furthermore 
Marcelo Takaoka explores the promising wellness and health market along the introduc-
tion of the Asian-style superblock scheme (São Paulo Wellness). 
21st century 
In the first decade of the 21st century, brings exceptionally high profits, rapid growth 
and appreciation for all developers. While older trends are continuing, state-of-the-art 
management methods, as well as marketing and sales techniques become ever more im-
portant. 
Being accountable not only to the buyers of the end products, but also increasingly 
towards the group of shareholders, almost all of the developers implement quality man-
agement,and environmental standards (e.g. ISO 9001, and 14.001). In addition, new 
marketing tools and media strategies, partly based on Corporate Social Responsibility 
concepts (CSR) are being explored.  
Tamboré S.A.’s lifestyle neighbourhoods with turnkey houses along Mediterranean 
themes and AlphaVille’s first Eco-quarter (e.g. Burle Marx) represent new levels of prod-
uct refinement and diversification. Moreover, AlphaVille’s success attracts numerous 
additional schemes such as Ecoville or Bethaville. 
By 2007, less than 15 years after the milestone-changes of the mid 1990s, AlphaVille-
Tamboré emerges as sub-centre of a gross area between São Paulo, Campinas and Soro-
caba, that accumulates two-fifths of the region’s economic product. The new-town clus-
ter of offices and residential enclaves has grown to 39 residential enclaves. It features 
90.000 residents (including projects by other entrepreneurs) and the daytime population 
of the commercial downtown is estimated at 150.000 people. In addition, AlphaVille has 
successfully spread to other locations. The firm has a land bank of more than 1000 hec-
tares in the country and 48 new projects are in the pipeline. 
As the brand is well received all over the country and revenues are booming, major 
real estate groups demonstrate an increasing interest in the successful businesses. It there-
fore comes as no surprise when in late 2007 Gafisa S.A., one of the country’s largest real 
estate conglomerates, absorbs AlphaVille S.A., and notably in the same year Tamboré 
S.A. is secured by the real estate heavyweight Brascan Residential Properties. 
Shortly before the financial crisis of September 2008, AlphaVille-Tamboré experiences 
a second stage of major consolidation and densification. Uninterrupted demand, as well 
as the availability of large sums of venture capital, engenders several immense superblock 
projects that seemed unimaginable only few years ago.  
Predecessors and peers 
Despite the fact that AlphaVille-Tamboré emerges as a unique phenomenon in the local 
context, the venture is deeply rooted in a local as well as global milieu of predecessors 
and peers. The scheme is an integral part of a legacy of privately developed elite 
neighbourhoods and county club resorts in São Paulo. Moreover, significant parallels to 
North American Edge City, New Town, and gated community typologies become evi-
dent. Likewise, various contemporary privately developed settlements in São Paulo, Bra-
zil and Latin America emerge in parallel. Today many important facets of the AlphaVille 
brand reverberate as role models across the whole country. 
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Historical predecessors 
AlphaVille-Tamboré is an integral part of a legacy of privately developed elite 
neighbourhoods in São Paulo. Indeed, at the time of its conception, the project was the 
most recent result of the migration of São Paulo’s affluent neighbourhoods along a 
southwestern wedge of wealth. The tradition emerged, more than 100 years ago, when 
São Paulo became an important international gateway and cosmopolitan centre (on the 
base of the coffee trade) at the time when a new middle class of self-made entrepreneurs 
was emerging. When this new bourgeoisie triggered an enormous demand for new-
fashioned urban spaces of representation, a new brand of international businessman re-
sponded by importing Western technologies and models of lifestyle and hygiene. Impor-
tantly international corporations largely drove both the development of the city’s infra-
structure and that of the housing sectors. In this context ‘Campos Elísios’ (Paradise 
Fields) and ‘Higienópolis’ (City of Hygiene) emerged as first examples of modern elite 
neighbourhoods.403 
Jardins 
Garden city type neighbourhoods (bairros jardim) emerged in the second decade of 20th 
century – in parallel to the arrival of the tram, the automobile and modern road systems. 
In this situation, the firm ‘City of São Paulo Improvements and Freehold Land Company 
Ltda.’ (commonly known as ‘Cia. City’ or Companhia City) became the leading private 
entrepreneur in this sector, and in a little while this joint venture of Brazilian landowners 
and international investors controlled nearly 40 percent of all territories in the city. 
Mainly catering to successful migrants from Europe, the Middle East and Asia, Compan-
hia City developed a series of renowned neighbourhoods. Among the most important of 
these ‘Bairros City’ were the Jardim América, Pacaembú, or Alto de Pinheiros. Quite a 
few important typologies and strategies deployed in these elite-quarters remain valid for 
AlphaVille and its peers to date. 
In particular Jardim América (the American Garden), started in 1913, exemplifies 
many of these tactics. The scheme is regarded as the first Garden City type neighbour-
hood in Latin America. Companhia City commissioned the British star architect Barry 
Parker, co-designer of Ebenezer Howard’s Letchworth garden city, to design the plan. 
Parker conceived a landscape of bending streets in a park. This resembled Law 
Olmstead’s bourgeois North American schemes more than the socialist Garden City 
models from Britain.  
Importantly Jardim América represents one of the first holistically master planned 
neighbourhoods on the continent that was planned along its own set of ‘private’ design 
codes and standards. The result was a bourgeois neighbourhood, based on individual 
land ownership, mortised transport, the detached villa typology and state of the art tech-
nology (such as stone pavements and street lighting). The remarkable system of greenery 
and the common club and sports facilities became a distinctive characteristic of all of 
Companhia City’s Bairros. 
Granja Viana 
AlphaVille’s list of Predecessors is not only comprised of elite neighbourhoods drifting 
from the city’s centre to the peripheries but also former weekend retreats in the country-
side that have undergone a successive transformation into fully-fledged middle class 
neighbourhoods (Alexander Garvin dubs this typology ‘Vacation Refugee New Towns’).  
Granja Viana, in the Western periphery of São Paulo is the largest and most important 
of these models. Granja Viana can be seen as AlphaVille’s predecessor and peer (e.g. ‘di-
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rect contestant’) at the same time. Their histories overlap. The area dates back to the 
early 1960s and emerged when a highway connecting São Paulo with the suburban mu-
nicipality of Cotia provided direct access to São Paulo’s South Western centres. Today 
the ‘organically’ grown structure results in a landscape of 40 middle class neighbour-
hoods, dotted with infrastructure and services. Indeed, this pattern can be seen as a 
benchmark of what could have happened to AlphaVille without a ‘big’ developer behind 
it.  
North American predecessors 
While the concept of the Garden City reaches AlphaVille indirectly through the legacy of 
Companhia City’s Bairro’s, its most significant international models are represented by 
the North American typologies of privately built New Towns, ‘gated communities’ and 
‘edge cities’. AlphaVille’s developers were clearly inspired by some North-American New 
Town schemes, as well as by the Edge City concept of the US American planner Joel Gar-
reau. 404 The neighbourhood typologies of the area also closely resemble US American 
gated community typologies. Orange County’s New Town of Irvine must be regarded as 
the most significant international predecessor. Indeed, AlphaVille shares a remarkably 
high amount of common characteristics this scheme of clustered neighbourhood enclaves 
(urban villages) and commercial centres developed by James Irvine. 
Local Peers 
In addition to a rich framework of predecessors that was touched upon in the above sec-
tion, AlphaVille-Tamboré emerges in an opulent context of parallel projects.  
The ‘Ilha do Sul’ scheme is an important ‘peer’ project. It was a brainchild of Al-
phaVille’s developers Renato Albuquerque and Yoshiro Takaoka. Developed in 1972 in 
the central residential neighbourhood of Alto de Pinheiros, it was the first superblock 
ensemble of vertical condomínio in São Paulo. The concept was the model and bench-
mark for a new boom of condomínio to come (e.g. Portal do Morumbi). The method 
resulted in an alternative option for middle and upper class residents to remain in the in 
the city. While the project looks very different from the horizontally spreading settle-
ments of AlphaVille, and while it is far from being a New Town, it shares many analo-
gous features and strategies with its suburban peer. The scheme is highly secured, pro-
vides a wide range of services for the residents, and is autonomously governed by a resi-
dent association. Moreover, as much as AlphaVille, it claims to represent a whole con-
cept of life rather than just a physical stage for it. 
São Paulo’s new commercial centre of the Avenida Luiz Carlos Berrini and the resi-
dential area of Morumbi constitute a different set of AlphaVille’s contemporary peers. 
These places, which are part of the Vetor Sudoeste, embody São Paulo’s benchmark lo-
calities of middle and upper class life and work. They are the locations against which 
AlphaVille-Tamboré has to compete. While they comprise more heterogeneous land uses 
(including informal settlements), the dual landscape of commercial superblocks versus 
low-rise residential areas parallels that of AlphaVille. 
A last small but continually growing local typology of peers and contestants of Al-
phaVille is represented by the closed horizontal condominium (condomínio horizontal 
fechado, or R3-03). The typology is a low-rise, miniature version of a closed residential 
enclave featuring 15 to 50 housing units. While it is a result of the 1994 Lei de Vilas, the 
R3-03 demonstrates the increasing spread and success of gated enclaves in São Paulo’s 
inner city neighbourhoods. It represents an alternative option to the suburban enclaves. 
                                               
404 Indeed, today AlphaVille Tamboré qualifies for all of Garreau’s criteria of an Edge City. 
Case 3: AlphaVille-Tamboré   426 
The project Vila Butantã by Marcos Acayaba Arquitetos serves as one prominent exam-
ple of this horizontal condominium typology. 
Brazilian peers 
The context of AlphaVille-Tamboré’s project peers on a national scale reveals two sig-
nificant reference settlements that are dominated by the private sector. These projects are 
Barra da Tijuca and Riviera do São Lorenço. 
Barra da Tijuca is an enormous new edge city and elite district of Rio de Janeiro. In 
contrast to AlphaVille it was initiated by the state and drawn up as a modernistic 
neighbourhood by the important architect Lucio Costa. While nowadays the place has 
been taken over by the private sector, it has undergone a transformation from a visionary 
scheme of the 1960s into a postmodern ‘real estate park’. In this situation, modernistic 
superblock schemes were transformed into closed condomínios complexes and large 
boulevards became highways. The range of urban typologies was reduced to two: the 
high rise condominium and the detached villa as part of a gated community, and Public 
places, other than the 18 kilometre beach, have been largely eliminated. In contrast, the 
contemporary urban landscape is dotted with an iconography of generic signs and sym-
bols representing a consumer landscape. Significantly, AlphaVille is also planning a Barra 
da Tijuca appearance. Its premium eco-neighbourhood, laid out by the star landscape 
designer Fernando Chacel, emerges on the site of land from reclaimed from a lagoon, 
between airport, shopping mall and subtropical rainforest. 
When discussing the issue of private cities in Brazil, Riviera do São Lorenço is the sec-
ond project worth mentioning. The project in the São Paulo state municipality of Ber-
tioga is considered to be the largest and most successful private real estate venture on 
Brazil’s coast. The independent beach resort city was developed by the firm Sobloco 
Construtora and is located 130 kilometres to the North West of São Paulo. Developed by 
the end of the 1970s, the 900-hectare plan is supposed to house up to 60 thousand resi-
dents (depending on the season). Riviera do São Lorenço is known in particular for its 
ecologically sensitive planning approach. The project’s eco-friendly infrastructure ranges 
from state of the art eco-sewage plants to an innovative waste collection system. Even an 
own environmental control laboratory exists. According to the developer, the project is 
supposed to be the first real estate venture in the world to receive an ISO 14001 certifica-
tion (This is an environmental management guideline modelled along the ISO 9000 qual-
ity management principles). 
It remains open whether any of the two examples Barra da Tijuca, or Riviera do São 
Lorenço represent a future scenario for AlphaVille, or whether the São Paulo NeoTown 
will emerge as its own typology. 
South American peers 
AlphaVille does not to have any historical peers on the subcontinent that would qualify 
as fully-fledged New Towns developed by the private sector. It appears that until the 
1990s most South American governments have pursued ‘European’ style urbanisation 
policies dominated by the public hand. Only very recently could a renaissance of pri-
vately driven New Towns be observed. This is mainly concentrated in the metropolises of 
the richer economies: Mainly in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, where middle class popu-
lations have reached a significant size. The trend is represented by cases such as Nordelta 
in Buenos Aires, several ‘Ciudades Walladas’ in Santiago de Chile, or the plan for Valle 
de Las Palmas in the metropolitan region of Tijuana (Mexico). 
Nordelta is a privately driven project in the North of the Argentinean metropolis Bue-
nos Aires. The project has the same dimension as AlphaVille. However, while the project 
represents an impressive peak in the landscape of gated communities characterising the 
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environs it does not reach the complexity of a town. The cases of Santiago de Chile’s 
‘Ciudades Walladas’ such as Piedra Roja, Valle Norte, or La Reserva are examples of 
currently emerging enormous satellite cities for the middle classes. These are driven by a 
public master plan towards concentrated dispersal, which relies on the enforcement by 
large corporate players. Not least the Mexican case of Valle de Las Palmas represents an 
example of a joint venture of the public and a large private real estate undertaking. The 
scheme was geared towards lower income populations and ecological design. With a size 
significantly larger than the city of Paris, it will emerge as an enormous ‘parallel city’ of 
Tijuana.  
Indeed, while building has barely started, the Chilean as well as the Mexican models 
in particular have to be kept in mind as the latest interesting examples of this ‘species’ of 
Latin American NeoTowns. 
Offspring 
The argument that AlphaVille-Tamboré was not a single historical event is underlined 
by the scope of its impact. Since the late 1980s the model, based on security, autonomous 
management and lifestyle, not only succeeded to spread and diversify to most of the large 
metropolitan areas in the country and beyond, it also managed to (re)colonise some inner 
city areas and become the preferred option among lower income classes.405  
AlphaVille’s original brand is currently present in 17 Brazilian states, 35 municipali-
ties and two additional countries. It became a quasi-standard in the real estate industry, 
spurred the desires of customers and served as a role model for a whole generation of 
new projects.  
The most visible impacts occurred in the direct environs of the Barueri and Santana do 
Parnaíba site. The area remains among the most dynamically developing places in the 
country since the late 1980s.  It has seen the emergence of many similar ‘AlphaVille’ style 
neighbourhoods. In addition to 18 AlphaVilles, 7 Tamborés, and two Gênesises, the area 
also features a Melville, two Bethavilles, as well as two Valvilles. In addition, neighbour-
hoods carrying names such as Conde, Green Valley, and Ecoville have been set up in the 
greater environs. 
Crucially AlphaVille’s triumph was not just limited to its geography - its diffusion had 
also socio-cultural dimensions. In 2004 the brand’s developers came up with a concept of 
secured neighbourhoods for lower income populations in a joint venture with the gov-
ernment. They invented a stripped down version of AlphaVille, which was christened 
Vilas Alpha – the country’s first gated community for the poor. Four model projects have 
been implemented so far. 
                                               
405 Cf. The discussion of the closed horizontal condominium, or R3-03 in other parts of this chapter 
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Structure –  
A bunch of grapes 
Introduction 
The following subchapter intends to provide a basis for the understanding of AlphaVille 
as a form. Urban form is one fundamental element in the relational and dialectic (‘Le-
febvrian’) model of space that inspired this thesis. Therefore the following section por-
trays the AlphaVille-Tamboré NeoTown cluster and its subsidiary spaces. 
AlphaVille-Tamboré will be described along the multiscalar approach, which is part 
of the methodological framework of this work (Cf. Chapter: Introduction). The initial 
part investigates the relationship of the project to the greater region. The subsequent sec-
tion delineates the project’s ‘interior’ morphology, aiming to uncover its structural logic. 
This second part will unfold the spatial logic of AlphaVille-Tamboré as an entire city, of 
its respective neighbourhoods, as well as of its blocks and building structures. Not least, 
a series of paradigmatic elements will be marked out. 
Regional context 
“Along this highway, just a few kilometres away from the tangential road, 
something developed in 1973 that a few years later would be called ‘Edge 
City’ Cf. Garreau 1991, a car friendly, suburban and commercial agglomera-
tion. After the completion of the initial phase of the Castello Branco Toll-
road, a series of initial enterprises had been erected on the grounds of the 
former farm.” (From Fiedler 2001, translation by the author) 
Table 32: Key indicators of AlphaVille-Tamboré’s regional context 
Share of metro population  0,04 percent 
Share of metro area 0,2 percent 
Number of Regional Malls (existing, planned) 2 (2) 
Major interregional road arteries 1 
Percentage of project area owned by the developer 95 percent 
Distance to centre 25 km 
Commute to centre 30-90 minutes 
People living and working in the area 30 percent 
Major mode of internal mobility Car 
Chief mode of external mobility Car 
 
Basic data 
Location: topography, climate, elevation, fauna 
AlphaVille emerges on a terrain of rolling hills originally covered by plantations and the 
Atlantic rain forest (Mata Atlántica), the bulk of which was originally part of a farm, the 
Fazenda Tamboré (Cf. above: Project Milestones). The terrain stretches between the Ti-
etê River at the Western side and hills at the Northeastern side. A highway, the Castello 
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Branco, marks the Southern boundary, and the municipality of Santana de Parnaíba the 
Northern frontier. The existing landscape has been heavily remodelled (Cf. Gonçalvez 
1998: 165). 
Physical character of the close environs: nature; agriculture, villages, towns 
AlphaVille’s contemporary surrounding is a ‘messy’, fragmented, diversified, and sprawl-
ing ‘post-industrial’ landscape. The scene is marked by a mix of power lines, favelas (un-
organised informal settlements), loteamentos and clandestinos (organised informal set-
tlements), the colonial town centre of Santata de Parnaíba, Barueri’s downtown, shop-
ping centres, suburban highways, immense power lines (transecting AlphaVille’s area), 
acres, garages, public parks, commercial areas and forest patches. (Cf. the São Paulo sec-
tion above) 
 Illustration D-12: Site and surroundings 
 Illustration D-13: Images from the vicinity 
Political boundaries 
AlphaVille-Tamboré positions itself on the terrain of two suburban municipalities. It 
spans from Barueri, where it began in the South, to Santana de Parnaíba in the North. 
Yet the centres of both of the municipalities, the city of Barueri and the town of Parnaíba 
have no physical relation to the NeoTown (Cf. Fiedler 2001). 
Size in relation to the centre 
On a regional scale AlphaVille comprises a rather insignificant share of people and land. 
The picture changes when looking the economic weight of this edge city. AlphaVille’s 
population of 90.000 amounts to less than 0,1 percent of the regional populace; its 3600 
hectares represent a mere 0,4 percent of the regional terrain.406 407 In spite of that, Al-
phaVille-Tamboré’s economy is among the most dynamic of the entire country. The area 
contains an extraordinary concentration of upper-class residences as well as office and 
commerce complexes. Santana de Parnaíba is the municipality with the highest average 
income of the whole metropolitan region. It features levels of wealth previously common 
to Sao Paulo’s central districts.408 The whole region has been aggressively marketed in 
Brazil as a true ‘Edge City’.409  
 
Presence of other Neotowns 
The AlphaVille-Tamboré cluster is a unique phenomenon in the São Paulo metro region 
and in Brazil. No other metropolitan region contains a privately planned city of this size 
and mixture.410  
Since the 1980s, the neo town thrives on a symbiotic relationship of two enormous 
schemes: AlphaVille and Tamborè. In addition, several additional, but smaller real estate 
ventures cross with the project area. As a matter of fact the AlphaVille project alone 
could be (and was) solely addressed as a private Neo Town (Cf. for example Fiedler 
2001). It consists of 18 neighbourhoods, multiple service facilities, industrial and com-
mercial areas (Cf. below). On the other hand Tamborè cannot be neglected as it contrib-
                                               
406 BSD share of land is 4,5 times higher, Navi Mumbai’s is 4 times larger. 
407 At the same time the private New Town amounts to a fifth of the combined Barueri and Santana de Parnaíba popula-
tions and to 0.64 percent of São Paulo’s urban population. According the 2006 census, Barueri has about 252.000 resi-
dents, and São Paulo has 10.800.000. (Cf. Embraesp 2006) 
408 Cf. Caldeira, 2000: 231-234, quoting Embraesp data. 
409 Cf. Caldeira, 2000: 253; and above: North American predecessors and peers. 
410 So, the Neo Town’s role in the regional context is notably different from Jakarta, where numerous New Towns take up a 
significant proportion of the urban region, and from Mumbai, where one parallel city is dominating a large part of the 
Eastern suburbs. (Cf. Predecessors, Peers) 
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utes a significant amount of residents (8 neighbourhoods), infrastructure and services 
(e.g. the largest shopping mall). 
Presence of gated communities 
While the AlphaVille-Tamboré cluster constitutes a matchless urban typology in São 
Paulo (and Brazil), smaller residential enclaves become a prominent dwelling type in the 
region as well as in the country.411 412 Indeed, it can be observed that more and more 
gated residential enclaves are attracted to the services available in AlphaVille.413 A rising 
number of these undertakings in the environs are geared to lower middle-income 
classes,414 featuring tiny lots starting at 125 square metres.415  
Percentage of land owned by the developers 
AlphaVille-Tamboré was in the hands of a few private developers from the beginning of 
the project. Among the major landholders are the Penteado family, Albuquerque and 
Takaoka, and Jubran. (Cf. above: Prehistory of the site). Despite the fact that Japanese 
migrant farmers subside on some parts of the area, the land has been cleared and re-
consolidated in 1966 (Cf. above Project Milestones). Consequently no onsite villages, 
and hence no relocation problems existed, at least officially.416 
Accessibility 
Distance to the centre, other centralities 
The AlphaVille-Tamboré cluster is well connected to all major regional centres.  
The distance to São Paulo’s point zero at Sé is 23 kilometres. All-important centres in the 
region, the city centre and the elite quarters along the Marginal Pinheiros can be reached 
by travelling 18 to 30 kilometres. The national Airport of Congonhas is 35 kilometres 
away, the international Airport at Garulhos 55 kilometres by highway. The travel times 
to all central locations are between 20 and 90 minutes, depending on the traffic condi-
tions.417  
The excellent accessibility of the project is based on the direct access to a major radial 
traffic artery, the Castello Branco Highway (Cf. above: Milestones). The highway leads 
in 11 kilometres to the major traffic junction of the Complexo Viário Heróis de 1932 (or 
Cebolão), which provides access to the two major peripheral highways of the city – Mar-
ginal Pinheiros and the Marginal Tietê.418  
                                               
411 More and more people in the region, including the lower middle classes, choose to locate to secured compounds that 
offer an exclusive range of services. (Cf. above: São Paulo: Type of newly planned neighbourhoods) 
412 Theresa Caldeira (2000) points to the fact that the main type for newly suburbanising middle classes is the fortified 
enclave. (Caldeira, 2000: 231-234; and above) The total number of units in conominios horizontais (gated communities) in 
the Greater São Paulo Region (RMSP) rose from 168 in 1992, to 2535 in 2001, in the same time the number of projects rose 
from 4 to 70. (Embraesp data presented at http://www.nomads.usp.br/site/condominio3.htm, r6.02.2009) 
413 Cf. above: Offspring 
414 An exemplary search at a prominent real estate web site of Barueri brings to the fore ventures such as Graziela, Pq Es-
meralda, São Fernando, Nova Paulista, or New Ville, Jd Reginalice, Aldeia de Barueri, Parque Esmeralda, Cond Tarumã, or 
the Jd São Paulo-SP, City Viana, or Ribeiro de Lima. (Cf. http://www.barueriimoveis.blogspot.com/; r.03.02.3009). A com-
prehensive list of new projects is also provided in the article “Panorama do mercado imobiliário da nossa região” at 
http://www.takaoka.org.br/website/text.asp?txtCode=%7B8E1E357E-8975-4F52-BD66-A39D625E7A71%7D, r10.03.2009 
415 Cf. for example to: www.conspar.com, r08.03.2009 
416 In contrast to Navi Mumbai, and Bumi Serpong Damai 
417 AlphaVille has an own television channel which reports on the traffic conditions. 
418 The Cebolão (Onion) is a combined flyover and cloverleaf highway connection elevated above the point of intersection of 
the Pinheiros and Tietê rivers. Significantly the place serves as the point zero for the kilometre numbering of the peripheral 
highways that start here. (Cf. Souza, Bárbara 2003: Complexo Viário Heróis de 32. Para os íntimos, Cebolão; In: Jornal da 
Tarde; Newsclipping at: 
http://www.sptrans.com.br/clipping_anteriores/2003/julho2003/clipping09e100703/pagina1.htm#Igeral; r23.01.2009) 
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AlphaVille can also be accessed by public transport. Bus lines depart from Santana de 
Parnaíba and via Baruerì, and a rail connection exists to the South of the Castelo Branco 
Highway (with the Carapicuiba and Santa Terezinha stations). Nevertheless, making the 
connection is quite cumbersome and involved. A commute includes several transfers and 
may take more than one and a half hours to complete. As a consequence the residents of 
the area use practically no public transport. (Cf. Fiedler 2001) 
External infrastructure 
AlphaVille-Tamboré is well connected to a wide range of urban infrastructure and ser-
vices, private as well as public. Basic services such as water and electricity are part of 
public networks (Cf. Davidson 2004).419 Despite the presence of public facilities, private 
infrastructure systems such as toll roads and private schools are playing an increasing 
role. When the Castello Branco became ever more congested in the 1990s, an alternative 
toll road section opened in 2001. The private consortium Viaoeste implemented the pro-
ject. AlphaVille received an exclusive access point at kilometre 11. Interestingly, private 
security forces of the new town patrol parts of the highway as a service for the residents. 
When, as a consequence of the toll-road, AlphaVille’s access to the public section of 
the road was removed, AlphaVille’s residents started a remarkable and ongoing wave of 
protest.420 Since then many people opt for a complicated 3-kilometre detour to reach the 
next public access point in Barueri (Cf. Fitzpatrick 2003).421  
 Illustration D-14: AlphaVille’s access by public road 
                                               
419 Public recreational facilities exist as well, for example in the public Parque Ecologico Tiete Tamborè. Yet these are accessi-
ble only by a small dirt road and surrounded by the high perimeter walls of the gated communities. The park is used exclu-
sively by external populations and neglected by AlphaVille’s residents. (Cf. Gonçalvez 1998) 
420 The tolled route costs at least BRL 4.30 (U$1,50) 
421 The umbrella organisation of AlphaVille’s homeowner associations SIA provides a map of the detour as a service. (Cf. 
www.sia.org.br, r23.01.2008) 
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Local context 
Introduction 
The description of the form of the AlphaVille-Tamboré private cluster city lies at the 
heart of this case study. While the last section provided an overview of the relationship of 
the project and the region, the next part seeks to delineate the interior structure and dy-
namics of the project. This will be done along a multi-scalar perspective, exploring the 
entire scheme, the respective neighbourhoods, as well as the blocks and building typolo-
gies. 
Table 33: Key indicators of AlphaVille-Tamboré’s local context 
Size 3600* 
Permanent population (residen-
tial) 
90.000* 
Floating Population (employees) 160.000* 
Start date 1973 
Houses ~ 20.000 
Neighbourhoods ~ 40 
Average population per enclave 2000 
Average size of a residential en-
clave 
50 hectares 
Average density per enclave 50 people per hectare 
Typical lot size 400-600 square metres 
Cost per square metre of built-
up space 
~ US$ 750 – $ 1500  
Milestone examples of guarded 
enclaves 
Residencial 1 (1974); Residencial 11 (1984); Cidade 
Tamboré (1988); Projeto Gênesis (1998); Burle Marx 
(2007); São Paulo Wellness (superblock scheme, 
planned) 
* The numbers were estimated by the author on the base of satellite maps of the area. The number of residents results from 
a multiplication of 40 neighbourhoods by 2250 residents. The number of employees takes into account official numbers of 
office jobs plus estimated numbers of low-key services. 
Town level 
 Illustration D-15: Map of AlphaVille-Tamboré 
Basics 
Our spatial exploration of AlphaVille-Tamboré starts by describing the entire scheme’s 
structural features, its land use composition, and the infrastructure and services it pro-
vides.  
The entire complex reaches a size of roughly 3600 hectares. The place accommodates 
some 90.000 residents and supplying some 150.000 jobs. While the section of AlphaVille 
comprises about 1400 hectares, Tamboré accounts for 1200 hectares, and additional 
third party projects are estimated to embrace another 1000 hectares.422 The territory, 
roughly 12 kilometers by 3 kilometers in size, makes up 60 percent of the 6000 (planned) 
                                               
422 The longitudinal urban structure of AlphaVille makes up the dominant part of the area. 
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hectares of Bumi Serpong Damai and less than 20 percent of Navi Mumbai. When it 
comes to the areas, which have already been developed, however, AlphaVille-Tamboré 
presents the double amount of BSD and more than 40 percent of Navi Mumbai. In a 
wider context, the size of the project surpasses the size of peers such as Levittown (Long 
Island), Nordelta (Buenos Aires), Piedra Roja (Santiago de Chile), or DLF City (Delhi).423 
After all it would accommodate nine of Howard’s Town Magnets. 
Planned Gross Floor Area (GFA) 
AlphaVille Urbanismo estimates that it has realised a gross floor area of 20 million 
square metres.424 This amounts to half of the total area that the firm develops at other 
locations in the country. (Ibidem) 
Status  
Although the project has reached a relatively mature state, its character defies any defini-
tion of completion. The scheme does not have any specific predefined end, as it was de-
veloped without a master plan or any other set vision of the outcome. As it is driven by 
entrepreneurial spirit that is open to various scenarios, the condition of the place is a 
snapshot of a specific time. Along this rationale AlphaVille starts off as light industrial 
park in 1973, maturing into a New Town and Edge City in the late 1980s. Nowadays 
the limits of available land and developable areas become visible on the ground. The in-
creasing land cost, the density of new schemes, the maturity of the products, as well as 
the sophistication of marketing and PR concepts reflect this. (Cf. below: Developers, 
Strategies) 
Structure 
The AlphaVille-Tamboré cluster is in essence a heterogeneous conglomerate of controlled 
neighbourhoods, which altogether result in a structure of a higher urban complexity. The 
aggregation of residential, commercial, service and light-industrial enclaves is mainly 
accessible by modes of personal transport. 
The area develops in a pocket that is formed by the Tietê River to the West, the Cas-
tello Branco Highway to the South and the SP-021 highway to the East. A major interre-
gional power line bisects the territory on the Northern part of the site. (Cf. also to the 
regional context) 
AlphaVille, the largest part of the agglomeration, is also the most homogeneous of the 
ventures. Located in the East of the terrain, it stretches over an area of about 1 by 4 
kilometres, edging the Northeastern shore of the Tietê. The Tamboré cluster borders SP-
021 highway in the Western part of the land. The light industrial and commercial area of 
Jubran comprised a central part of 600 hectares.425 Nevertheless, while the urban fabric 
is composed of urban modules, the respective undertakings blend and intersect with each 
other along ‘soft borders’. 
Parasite enclaves 
While the AlphaVille residential landscape currently comprises 18 neighbourhoods, it is 
interesting to observe that more than a dozen additional enterprises were able to gain a 
foothold in the area. In addition to Tamboré, which developed in the 1990s and became 
a crucial part of the scheme, Gênesis, Melville and Valville have all gained ground at 
various locations, and make up a significant 33 percent of the residential fabric. 
                                               
423 Cf. Comparative Matrix in the appendix. 
424 Personal interview with AlphaVille staff in March 2007. 
425 Cf. http://www.jubran.com.br/int/imoveis.asp, r20.03.2009 
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While these competing schemes have explored different variations of the AlphaVille 
concept, the presence of this bunch of ‘parasite’ undertakings has resulted in a reinforce-
ment of the attractivity of the location by increasing the availability of options on this 
market. Tamboré SA, for example focuses on upper income classes, offering large lots in 
Tamborè 1 and 2, as well as on turn-key villas as an entirely new product on the Brazil-
ian market in Tamboré 3.  At the same time Gênesis explores eco-lifestyle themes (Cf. 
below: Examples; and Strategies). 
A bunch of grapes 
A central traffic artery running from the Southeast to the Northwest of the terrain and 
connecting the majority of the neighbourhoods is among the major linear features of the 
locality’s interior structure.426 While the quarters are all formed as enclaves, the sche-
matic result of this arrangement resembles a bunch of grapes that is serviced by a central 
trunk. 
Indeed, the structure is radically different from the open systems as represented by 
modernist urban fabrics. The first seem to represent an evolutionary and organic process, 
the second portrays a fixed geometric approach.427  
 Illustration D-16: Bunch of grapes vs. the Manhattan grid 
Growth pattern and phases of development 
Indeed AlphaVille-Tamboré represents an interesting combination of bottom-up sponta-
neous development and top-down planning. While the present form of the city has 
evolved incrementally, without a master plan, on the other hand the particular 
neighbourhoods, whether commercial or residential, are extremely structured and con-
trolled. The various phases of the 35-year-old scheme remain discernible and can be 
traced back to various historical milestones. In this context four principal stages can be 
identified: a first era dating back to Alburuquerke’s and Takaoka’s initial days, a second 
phase representing the emergence of the first group of residential communities; a third 
period characterised by the rise of AlphaVille Urbanismo SA, and finally a recent phase, 
represented by new marketing concepts and the consolidation of the firm by the big mar-
ket player GAFISA (Cf. above: Project milestones). 
A trajectory of the project’s history 
AlphaVille’s chief artery developed through time and in several phases. The form of this 
axis reflects the fact that the entire project it is based on principles rather than a formal 
order. Hence its trajectory represents a historical timeline of the project. The axis is not 
straight but meandering, much like the main trunk of a tree. Built along the needs of a 
specific time and location, it changes its character multiple times.428  
Starting at the highway exit, the spine runs through AlphaVille’s central business dis-
trict. At this point it is named Alameda Rio Negro and has the form of a grand represen-
tative urban boulevard. The boulevard ends at the entrance plaza of AlphaVille’s first 
residential neighbourhood. However the spine does not terminate here, it rather leaves 
the central business district after two additional turns emerging into a suburban scenery 
                                               
426 This central artery is at the same time the main road to the town of Santana de Parnaíba. 
427 The radically different spatio-structural logic can be exemplified by the urban space systems of Paris, Berlin, or Manhat-
tan. 
428 This fact is affirmed by the frequent changes of the names of the segments: Accordingly the street changes its name 
from Alameda Rio Negro (business district), to Alameda Mamoré (left turn, business dstrict), to Avenida AlphaVille (first 
phase of the project), to Avenido Yoshiro Takaoka (second phase of the project, after Takaokas death), to Avenida Alfa-
norte (recent phase of the project). 
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of gated single-family homes. Fortunately the hilly landscape facilitates a visual experi-
ence of the interiors, otherwise the street view would move through a channelled laby-
rinth of walls and gates. Having reached this new landscape, the street transforms from 
an urban boulevard into a suburban traffic corridor. Flanked by 4 metre walls of the 
enclaves, the passageway barely allows for pedestrian circulation. Only cross-sections 
and the intensively landscaped entrance points of the enclaves mark widening. Occas-
sional local service centres are dotted along the central spine. These feature small offices, 
health clinics, hair salons and drug stores. In addition various schools and office build-
ings spread around the place.429  
After winding through the neighbourhoods that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
artery joins the wide corridor of an immense power line where it is temporally flanked by 
the green lawns of irreclaimable zones. Shortly before the power line descends to a hy-
droelectric plant at the river, the street reaches the latest projects and construction sites. 
The view from the sales offices of the 2007 project of Burle Marx reveals a retrospective 
of the whole panorama. Thereafter the road winds and descends towards the historic 
town of Santana de Parnaíba. 
 Illustration D-17: Dual landscape of villas and high-rises 
Land Use 
General land use pattern 
AlphaVille has no mixed-use neighbourhoods that could be comparable to inner-city 
locations. While the entire locale features a distinct variety of neighbourhoods, these re-
spective modules are highly homogeneous. (Cf. below)  
A commercial and a residential section dominates the land use pattern and creates a 
dual urban landscape. The commercial and light industrial uses comprise less than a third 
of the terrain and are concentrated in the southern part of the area. The part is topog-
raphically flat and features the best access. In contrast, the residential neighbourhoods 
gradually disperse into a green and hilly landscape, covered by forests to the North. 
The residential areas make up the largest part of the terrain (2100 hectares), commer-
cial areas amount to 600 hectares, and offices encompass an estimated 300 hectares. Al-
phaVille Urbanismo developed land comprising 1000 hectares of residential areas, 80 
hectares of offices and 250 hectares of commerce areas. 430 
Public space 
The town is highly controlled and secured. This fact is also true for open space. Most of 
the land is private. A smaller amount is semi-private431, and only a tiny amount of open 
space is public. While the use of open space requires no direct fees, the access to the resi-
dential neighbourhoods is restricted. The maintenance of the places lies in the hands of 
the resident associations, who charge a monthly fee for this service. Our own estimates 
are that about 70 percent of the areas are private, while about 25 percent are circulation 
spaces, and only a remaining amount of less than 5 percent are communal432. Traditional 
pedestrian spaces are reduced to major boulevards as well as few pocket parks in the 
downtown area.433  
                                               
429 E.g. the Colégio Objetivo e Universidade Integrada Paulista, or UNIP, or the campus of São Paulo’s renowned McKenzie 
University. 
430 Own calculations 
431 E.g. the enclosed open spaces in the enclaves or the circulation areas of the malls 
432 Cf. also the land use composition of the residential areas below. 
433 Interestingly some of AlphaVille’s hilly streets have been discovered by youth of the area for their skate boarding quali-
ties. YouTube features various videos of this local sport. (Cf. below: Polpulation) 
Case 3: AlphaVille-Tamboré   436 
Downtown area 
In contrast to the vast scenery of the ‘residencial’ (Gated Communities) AlphaVille’s 
southern area is primarily comprised of commerce and services. The floating population 
of this area amounts to 150.000 people per day, hence exceeding the residential popula-
tion by almost 200 percent. The downtown contains an 80-hectare CBD, as well a vast 
commercial and light industrial district, six times as large. The terrain involves two large 
regional malls, more than 360 companies, as well as 600 commercial and service facili-
ties. 11 schools and universities and some of the services are also dispersed across the 
residential part. (Cf. Lemos 2004: 6) 
CBD 
With more than 120.000 office jobs in 2500 businesses, AlphaVille’s central business 
district, or ‘centro empresarial’, represents one of the oldest and most significant office 
agglomerations in the region. It is known as one of the first and most significant Brazil-
ian Edge Cities. (Cf. above: predecessors) The area continues to consolidate rapidly. The 
147-metre West Side tower, one of the highest buildings of the entire region, was finished 
four years ago (2005).434 The 80 hectares of the downtown area imply that it is only 30 
percent of an average residential enclave. Yet, the footprint is more than offset by the 
amount of vertical space, containing more than 2000 offices with headquarters of vari-
ous international corporations, such as Hewlett Packard, Nike or Dupont, and various 
local TV stations.435 Emporis.com, one of the largest Internet-based building databases, 
currently lists 95 high-rise buildings of twelve or more stories in the area.436 More than 
44 vertical apartment towers (with 5500 apartments and 15.000 inhabitants) and 8 ho-
tels add to the vibrant mix.437 
Centro de Apoio – an urbanistic experiment 
AlphaVille downtown is not only marked by the typical edge city typologies of office 
high-rises, restaurants, fuel stations and malls. It also features an early urbanist experi-
ment: the Centro de Apoio.438 More than 30 years ago in the southern part of the CBD a 
dense low-rise neighbourhood was erected. This remarkable and unique quarter was en-
tirely built at pedestrian scale. It features a low-rise urban fabric, marked by a network 
of small alleys and a structure of pocket parks and plazas. Three story walk-up buildings 
arranged in perimeter blocks feature various styles from Ibapuelo to Meditteranean to 
Modernist. Small entrepreneurs providing a wide range of services dominate the place. 
One can find a small café, as well as a dentist or a travel agent.  
While the Centro de Apoio439 impersonates the entrepreneurial spirit of AlphaVille’s 
early residents, many of whom had been freelancers and small entrepreneurs, it unfortu-
nately remains an isolated experiment that is struggling to survive. While the area re-
quires the daytime user to walk, and while it features no housing, the monofunctional 
use transforms it into a ghost town at night. 
New boom of megaprojects 
As AlphaVille-Tamboré’s downtown area continues to mature, several new megaprojects 
are planned or underway. Named iTower, the AlphaSquare, Brascan Plaza, Castello 
                                               
434 Cf. http://www.emporis.com/en/wm/ci/bu/?id=103922, r23.02.2009 
435 The Brazilian Bank Banespa is running a data processing centre, the Journal Folha de São Paulo its printing plant. In 
addition two television stations are headquartered in the area (Cf. Fiedler 2001). 
436 A thread at skyscrapercity.com illustrates most of the new important projects in the area. 
www.emporis.com/en/wm/zo/?id=100284; www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=769430, 12.02.2009 
437 Cf. Website of ‘Area’, the association of residents and enterprises in the cbd at http://www.area-
alphaville.org.br/conteudo.asp?id=30&conteudo=513, r04.02.2009. 
438 This means as much as service centre. 
439 Meanwhile also known as the Centro Commercial 
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Branco Office Park, São Paulo Wellness or Tiner-Videolar projects, the superblock 
schemes reach ‘Asian’ dimensions that even surpass the magnitude typical for the inner 
city.  
The 32 million square metre iTower projects will include a 26-storey office tower as 
well as a large new shopping mall, the Shopping Iguatemi. Located at the highway en-
trance of AlphaVille to the Castello Branco artery, it is a joint venture of Odebrecht Em-
preendimentos and Iquatemi.440 It will be inaugurated by 2010. The Odebrecht also 
launched the AlphaSquare project in 2008. This will comprise six high-rise towers (two 
commercial towers, four residential), a boutique mall of 5300 square metres, a large spa, 
as well as a park of 15 million square metres.441 
The Brascan Century Plaza-Green Valley complex will be a distinct integrated multi-
use project with completion scheduled for 2011. Significantly this project will leave Al-
phaVille’s CBD and surface in the predominantly low-rise landscape of AlphaVille hin-
terlands. It will be part of the Green Valley office park at Avenida Andrômeda, close to 
the AlphaVille Conde I and II neighbourhoods in the proximity of the Tiête River. Nota-
bly the BRL 460 million mixed-use projects are offspring of a landmark Century Plaza 
São Paulo project with the same name in São Paulo’s inner-city district of Itaim Bibi. 442 
 Illustration D-18: AlphaVille’s latest superblock schemes 
The Century Plaza-Green Valley contains two large residential as well as commercial 
high-rise complexes, and shopping malls with almost 600 shops. The linear buildings in 
the form of circular segments are arranged around a lake and a park. The project was 
developed by Brascan residential Properties, the firm that acquired Tamborè SA in 2007. 
The inner city precedent inspired the design of the renowned architect Josè Lucena. 
A fourth new spectacular mixed-use undertaking is Castello Branco Office Park. The 
complex was developed by Tishman & Speyer and a range of Brazilian peers and was 
designed by KOM arquitectura. The project totalling more than half a million square 
metres comprises six towers with offices and a hotel space. These are grouped around a 
semi-private plaza/park and connected to a gigantic mall/ parking structure. (Cf. 
www.komarquitetura.com.br, r23.02.2009) 
Marcello Takaoka’s São Paulo Wellness is a fourth example of the ambitious mixed-
use super block generation. This project is geared to the wants and needs of newly 
emerging middle classes and an increasingly aging population. SP Wellness features a 
constructed area of 200 thousand square metres and has a value of BRL 300 million. The 
project’s four residential towers nearly reach the 100-metre mark. They are placed on an 
8-storey base with a health and wellness theme (e.g. with an integrated medical centre), 
while the obligatory shopping mall, a 372-room hotel/ conference centre (Marriott 
Group) and a parking garage for 3300 vehicles add to the mix. The Unitas group acted 
                                               
440 Odebrecht is one of the largest Brazilian real estate developers, Iquatemi one of the most sucessful shopping mall ven-
tures in the country. 
441 Cf. www.oei.com.br/site/portal_oei/pt/imprensa/releases/releases_detalhes_9290.aspx; 
www.iguatemialphaville.com.br/page/ficha_tecnica.asp; r12.02.2009 
442 The Century Plaza SP was drafted by the renowned office of Königsberger Vanucci Architects. Implemented at the turn 
of the millennium it became one of the new landmarks of a new generation of mixed-use projects in Brazil. The scheme has 
received the FIABCI Prix d'Excellence award for multi-use projects in 2005. It is an integrated superblock of two large towers 
as well as semi-public plaza/ park in-between. It features offices, multiplex cinemas, a hotel and shops. (Cf. 
http://www.vitruvius.com.br/institucional/inst91/inst91.asp; 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2005_August_3/ai_n14843994; 
http://www.arcoweb.com.br/arquitetura/arquitetura438.asp; r12.02.2009). 
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as a financial consultant as well as an investment vehicle to the project, providing a sum 
of BRL 401 million.443  
The most spectacular (and speculative) planned project in the area is the Tiner-
Videolar scheme. The BRL 1 billion proposal of gigantic dimensions was drafted by the 
Miami based architectural consultancy Arquitectonica.444 It consists of six residential 
towers, three commercial high-rises, one hotel, a shopping mall, a large supermarket, as 
well as one hospital. The tower structures amount to 50 floors, and a total of 250 million 
square metres of usable space. The similarity with Indian Integrated Township types as 
described in the Navi Mumbai chapter of this thesis is striking.445  
Infrastructure and services  
In addition to the variety of its residential and commercial ‘products’, AlphaVille-
Tamboré distinguishes itself from other contestants by its exceptional infrastructure and 
services. Among the facilities are five hospitals, several 24-hour clinics, 16 banks, eight 
hotels, a cinema centre, three major shopping centres and eight large supermarkets.446  
AlphaVille’s infrastructure and services, such as schools, local shops or small services, 
as well as most of the sport clubs, are typically located outside the residential communi-
ties and hence openly accessible. On the other hand, most of the facilities demand a 
membership. Furthermore, in many instances access is only possible by the means of a 
private car. 
The area has principally no central cultural or recreational facilities for the general 
public. While one communal park, the public Parque Ecologico do Tietê, exists on the 
banks of the Tietê river, it is neglected by the project’s residents (Cf. above: regional in-
frastructure). 
 Illustration D-19: Isolation of the Parque Ecologico do Tietê 
The utilities in the area are basically connected to the public grid. The availability of elec-
tricity and fresh water is principally much better than in India or Indonesia, and in con-
trast to the general state of affairs, AlphaVille-Tamboré even has potable water. More-
over, the major utilities (such as gas, water and sewage) are generally laid underground. 
The area also features several private sewage plants. Recent projects, such as the Burle 
Marx enclave, operate with decentralised sewage facilities. Rubbish collection is well-
organised and modern separation concepts and waste facilities are becoming more and 
more the norm (Cf. alphaville.com.br, r12.11.2008). 
Transport 
AlphaVille and its environs represent an urban system based on individual transport. The 
quality of the area’s streets and circulation systems is exceptional and represents Western 
standards.447 The private developers have built most of the roads in the area. Public roads 
have been upgraded. The streets and pocket parks are extremely well maintained and 
landscaped (a Brazilian tradition). The interior roads in the enclaves are a part of these 
and thus maintained by the respective resident or business associations. Bus transport is 
available on the main artery route to Santana de Parnaíba. Yet, on the whole only service 
                                               
443 Cf. http://www.icone.jor.br/bodytaka.htm; http://www.unitas.com.br/go/homesite/site_en.asp?pag=56, r12.02.2009 
444 Cf. http://www.skyscrapercity.com/archive/index.php/t-655062.html, r12.02.2009 
445 Cf for example to the project www.lancohills.com 
446 Shopping Tamboré is the first mall with an open concept in São Paulo. It features natural lighting, 10 anchor stores and 
200 chain stores. (Cf. SIA 2007; Stevens 2007, Davidson 2004) 
447 The streets for example are constructed in various layers using the best pavement on the market (Cf. AlphaVille.com.br, 
r12.12.2008) 
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personnel use it. The next railway station lies outside the area, 1 kilometre to the South 
(Cf. above: Regional infrastructure). 
Security infrastructure 
Given the context of violence and fear of crime in the region, AlphaVille’s security con-
cept is eminently important. Indeed security infrastructure and self-management (‘auto-
management’) are among the major strategic pillars of the undertaking. While every 
community is managing and maintaining its own security systems, the larger operations 
are organised and controlled by an umbrella group. (Cf. below: Residents, Governance) 
Here the majority of residents associations, independent of the developer, collaborate on 
an integrated security strategy. This includes physical barriers, technical surveillance sys-
tems, private security forces and the public police. Private, as well as public security 
forces operate a joint security base close to AlphaVille’s 10th and 11th enclaves, between 
the two municipalities.448 The fact that security makes up for the by far highest post of 
the operational budget of the residents associations underlines the relevance of the is-
sue.449  
Schools, Hospitals 
Of exceptional quantity and quality is also the range of schools and hospitals. AlphaVille 
features more than 14 schools as well as multiple training centres and language insti-
tutes.450 It is important to note that the presence of this rich framework of services was 
not programmed by conscious planning in advance. In contrast, the area lacked many 
essential facilities for a long time (Cf. Nagy 1989).451 A post office opened only in the 
second half of the 1990s, the public police even more recently (Cf. Davidson). Third 
party entrepreneurs provided most of the demand – from schools to clinics. 
Shopping 
Nowadays the area features a wide range of options for shopping and services. Local 
facilities can be found in several service centres (Cento de Apoio) along the main road in-
between the residential enclaves. The CDB area then features several large Shopping and 
Commercial facilities of regional relevance. Shopping Tamboré was the first mall typol-
ogy with an open concept in the São Paulo region, featuring natural lightning, 10 anchor 
stores and 200 chain stores. Currently a new 120.000 square metre Iguatemi AlphaVille 
shopping mall emerges as part of the iTower project by MVT, JAG, and other renowned 
Brazilian real estate ventures. This will be the first Brazilian LEED certified mall.452 
                                               
448 The umbrella organisation of the residents and business associations Sociedade Alphaville Tamboré (SIA) has invited the 
municipal administration of Santana de Parnaíba to open up a base for communal police on the front of AlphaVille’s Resi-
dencial 11 and 12. The base is a central part of the integrated security concept of the area. It operates as service point for 
the public (local as well as the military) police (Cf. www.sia.org.br; r12.07.2007) 
449 According to the local statistics an average security vehicle travels 200 to 400 km each day (SIA 2003; www.sia.org.br 
r12.07.2007). An exemplary camera surveilance system for one neighbourhood can amount to BRL 170.000 (Ibidem). 
450 Among these are the Colégio Pueri Domus, Colégio Universitário, Colégio Pentágono, Escola Morumbi, Escola Fernão 
Gaivota, Escola Internacional de AlphaVille, FIEB, Mackenzie, UNIP, ESPM, Cursinhos Anglo, Objetivo (Universitário e Meta). 
Among the listed language institutes are for example: Yazigi, Cel-Lep, Berlitz, CNA, Skill, Wall Street, Wizard, Redbaloon, 
Futurekids, Anglo American. (Cf. www.tambore10.com.br, 02.07.2008) 
451 Research at the Univerisity of São Paulo found that back in the 1980s AlphaVille’s residents missed parks and cultural 
facilities, as much as they complained about the quality of the public services in the area, e.g. telephone lines, sewage 
systems and retail facilities. In contrast the schools, security services and business services were highly approved. (Nagy 2989, 
Vol.2, pp88). 
 
452 Cf. Gazeta Mercantil: Iguatemi e Brascan entram na onda verde; from 16 Sept 2008; 
http://indexet.gazetamercantil.com.br/arquivo/2008/09/16/19/Iguatemi-e-Brascan-entram-na-onda-verde.html, 
r12.02.2009). (LEED = Leadership in Energy Efficient Design is a prominent US American environmental standard in the real 
estate sector.) 
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Neighbourhoods/ Clusters 
As a modular system of highly controlled enclaves is a fundamental attribute of the pro-
ject, the subsequent section aims to delineate the structural features of these building 
stones. 
The AlphaVille-Tamboré cluster city is currently composed of 39 residential clusters 
(or ‘residencials’). Each of the neighbourhoods represents an individual project. Al-
phaVille Urbanismo developed 18453, Tamboé SA 8454 and other companies the 13 
projects other schemes455. 456 
In addition to this basic set-up, today the AlphaVille-Tamboré area is becoming ever 
more consolidated and diverse. This occurs in a three-fold sense: a) more and more 
products are developed by third party developers (diversification of ownership), b) an 
increasing amount of schools, shops, medical clinics, etc. is added to the area (functional 
diversification), and c) the urban fabric undergoes a densification and verticalisation, for 
example through an increasing share of high-rises.457  
 
Profile of Neighbourhoods 
AlphaVille-Tamboré’s average ‘residencial’ amounts to 50 hectares in size.458 While 
smaller neighbourhoods such as Melville amount to 20 hectares, larger enclaves such as 
AlphaVille’s Residencial 13 can grow up to a size of 80 hectares (Cf. SIA 2003, SAR13). 
The average enclave leaves place for two to three thousand residents, while upper income 
enclaves (e.g. Melville) feature an exclusive crowd of 800 to 1000 inhabitants. The re-
spective lot numbers per community range from 70 in Uptown to 250 in Melville and 
912 in AlpaVille 11 (cf. SIA 03). These numbers lead to average population densities of 
up to 50 persons per hectare – twice as much as many suburbs in the West.  
Structure of Neighbourhoods  
The typical AlphaVille ‘residencial’ is a gated enclave. Its morphology and physiognomy 
are based on the logic of the automobile. Indeed, local statistics count as many car 
movements per cluster as residents (Cf. SAI 2004). When walking occurs, it is usually 
only practised within the cluster. Enormous perimeter walls of 4 to 5 metres in height 
bound the neighbourhoods459 and the access to the neighbourhoods is restricted to one 
point. These gates, however, are of the highest functional and symbolic importance. In-
deed its features rather resemble the door of a private house that an urban entrance.460  
                                               
453 The clusters of Alphaville Urbanismo SA comprise: Alphaville 1, Alphaville 2, Alphaville 3, Alphaville 4, Alphaville 5, Al-
phaville 6, Alphaville 8, Alphaville 9, Alphaville 10, Alphaville 11, Alphaville 12, Alphaville ZERO, AlphaVille Condé 1, Al-
phaVille Condé 2, Alpha Plus (Towers), Alphaville 18 do Forte, AlphaVille Burle Marx 
454 Tamboré SA has constructed and/or plans the following 8 neighbourhoods: Tamboré 1, Tamboré 2, Tamboré 3, Tamboré 
4 (Villagio), Tamboré 5, Tamboré 6, Tamboré 10 – Terras Altas, Tamboré 11 – Terra de Provence 
455 Among the condomínios of other enterprises are: Melville 1, Melville 2, Bethaville 1, Bethaville 2, Valville 1, Valville 2, 
Gênesis 1, Gênesis 2, Vila Solaia, AlphaSítio, Vila Velha, Tarumã, Uptown House  
456 Cf. The list was generated along an own evaluation of real estate websites, i.q. Vivenda Imóveis at: vivendaalpha.com.r; 
http://www.hbcnconsultoria.com/pesquisa.asp; www.alphaimoveis.com/; www.alphahouse.com.br; 
www.alphavilleimoveis.com/; http://brasil.trovit.com/imoveis/; http://imoveis.imovelweb.com.br/; www.vilavelha.com.br/; 
www.valville.com.br/; r.15.05.2007) 
457 Several vertical projects have entered pre-implementation stage in 2009: Maxhaus, Ekilibrio, and Notting Hill (Cf. Trino, 
Simone: “Três empreendimentos são lançados na região”; In. Folhe de AlphaVille online; 16.01.2009, 
http://folhadealphaville.uol.com.br/artigo/?id=5654, r04.02.2009). AlphaVille Conde and 18 do Forte also comprise vertical 
apartment towers. 
458 The numbers correspond to estimates by EMBRAESP, 2003 
459 Only very recently transparent fences have been introduced at some less sensitive locations (e.g. at the Burle Marx pro-
ject). 
460 The walls, in contrast, present themselves in homogeneous and repulsive prison-wall-aesthetics. 
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 Illustration D-20: Example of a ‘portaria criteriosa’ 
The gate accounts for the place where the respective neighbourhoods most distinguish 
themselves from each other publicly. More than a mere barrier, the entrances comprise 
ensembles with a gate, large plazas (to the exterior, as well as to the interior), as well as a 
display of the community’s emblem. The design is geared to a driver’s perspective. Most 
of AlphaVille’s gates feature an unpretentious modern architectural language461. None-
theless a particular local characteristic is the presence of separate entrances for residents, 
guests, as well as service personnel. The addition of three entry and three exit points re-
sults in impressive dimensions. Yet we have to remember that at most of the points sev-
eral thousand cars have to be funnelled through each day and that the crush during the 
rush hours can be enormous.462  
While the entry plaza, including the place behind the gate, for the most part remains 
the principal open space of the enclave, the interior is characterised by a dense mass of 
private lots and buildings.463 A characteristic feature of AlphaVille’s brand is that internal 
land use is exclusively reserved for housing and all communal facilities such as clubs, 
shops and other services are placed to the outside of the wall. (Cf. above).  
The green space on the interior of the neighbourhoods is limited, with the exemption 
of small playgrounds for infants and individual vacant lots. It is primarily represented by 
private front gardens of the individual buildings as well as by trees along the streets. The 
neighbourhood AlphaVille 12, for example, features 27 percent open spaces. Of these 3 
percent are used by recreational facilities while the remaining 24 percent belong to 
streets. Sidewalks exist here and there, but not as a continuous network. (Cf. Lemos 
2004: 13).464  
By and large the share of vacant lots is very low. Of course places under construction 
are the exception. The developers take great care to market every piece of the land for 
the best price possible, thus avoiding wasteland that may limit the representational value 
of the whole. As a consequence the neighbourhood schemes are usually developed piece 
by piece. A new neighbourhood is only started after the previous one has been fully de-
veloped.465   
Parcelling 
The ‘residencials’ with their packed interior structures, are usually ordered along a mix 
of rectangular and bent street patterns allowing for an easy circulation of vehicles. While 
the bended patterns are prominent at affluent neighbourhoods, the grid characterises 
enclaves with smaller allotments. Cul-de-sac arrangements are rather avoided. In contrast 
to the ever-increasing variety of the entire area, the interior structure and land use of the 
residential enclaves remains highly ‘pacified’ and homogeneous. The lot sizes within the 
‘residencials’ are extremely consistent (cf. SIA 04). Most of the undertakings cater to only 
one specific customer group, be it rich academics, newly rich entrepreneurs, freelancers 
or lower middle class families. 
                                               
461 These appear modest when compared to their thematic peers from Bumi Serpong Damai. 
462 Along a system that is referred to as a ‘portaria criteriosa’ the residents are allowed to drive in and out after a brief visual 
check, while the visitors are asked to identify themselves, to declare their destinations and have to wait for a confirming call 
(cf. Fiedler 2001). 
463 This is indeed a stark contrast to gated communities, as we know them from the US American context. 
464 Many walkways have been appropriated by the respective owners or never realised (own observations). 
465 Indeed this is a contrasting picture to the situation in BSD. (Cf. the first case sudy) 
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In any case both land development models have been implemented in a tabula rasa 
manner without taking care of the existing topographical and natural features and thus 
have extensively remodelled the existing landscape (including the flora).466 467 
Variation of housing type and size per cluster  
The same homogeneous pattern is true for the building structures. All neighbourhoods 
are based on only two typologies, either the individual single-family villa in the ‘lotea-
mento horizontais’, or the apartment tower: the ‘condomínio verticais’. Cluster type 
communities as well as walk-up residential apartments are on the rise only recently. This 
can be seen as part of a new trend towards diversification. 
Design codes 
A central feature of all enclaves is the existence of private urban design codes. While few 
public regulations exist this leads to the development of highly controlled spaces of ex-
ceptional standards. The agreement on the codes and standards is a central part of the 
quality control strategy and an integral part of the purchase agreement. The code im-
poses the pattern of single family villas and provides the respective projects with an spe-
cific building envelope, including detailed guidelines for materials, maximum floor 
spaces, setbacks, maximum heights, roof forms, facade openings, planting standards, 
parking spaces and many other features. (Cf. below: Buildings) 
In this manner the private design codes conserve the physical form of the neighbour-
hoods, making sure their final appearance remains stable for many years to come. This 
leads also to a stabilisation and securitisation of investments – a factor that is often over-
looked. Yet while the elaborate local design codes lead to a highly harmonious and inte-
gral residential landscape of the ‘residencials’, a certain freedom is left to the individual 
lot owners. 468 
 Illustration D-21: Examples from AlphaVille guideline brochure 
Blocks and buildings 
A third important physical dimension is the scale of blocks and buildings. This level is 
highly significant in particular from the perspective of the everyday life of the house-
holds. These focus their attention on the appearance of their front garden, the status of 
their neighbours and the quality of nearby schooling. 469 
Basic data 
AlphaVille-Tamboré’s residential landscape is characterised by the module of vast man-
sions featuring garages for two to three cars. The 90,000 residents inhabit more than 
20,000 single-family structures. Typical block sizes normally range from 15 to 25, and 
sometimes up to 50 lots. The intricate circulation system of Burle Marx leads to linear 
blocks of 50 lots and more. 
 Illustration D-22: Examples of block structures 
 Illustration D-23: Characteristic urban fabric 
                                               
466 This tabula rasa approach was mainly prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s when most of the neighbourhoods had been 
implemented. (Cf. Lemos 2004: 3, Cf. below. Developer, strategy) 
467 While Brazilian scholars such as Lemos (2004: 5) tend to draw parallels of the landscaping and monofunctional parcelling 
to North American models of the 1950s, European observers such as Fiedler (2001) emphasise indigenous Roman character-
istics, or example a more dense and ‘privatised’ urban fabric with smaller lots and individual perimeter walls. 
468 Cf. Gonçalvez 1998: 167; Cf. below: Designers 
469 As Herbert Gans affirmed in 1969 
Case 3: AlphaVille-Tamboré   443 
The main block pattern facilitates the formation of rectangular plots. These typically 
feature sizes from 350 to 1000 square metres with longitudinal proportions of 1:3 to 1:4 
– hence maximising the effectiveness of access and services. Almost all of the enclaves are 
densely packed and contain plots of a smaller size.470 The general AlphaVille model com-
prises lots of 500 square metres with an estimated land coverage of 0,5 and a floor area 
ratio (FAR) of 1,0. (Cf. Gonçalvez 1998: 167)  
The 11th ‘residencial’, for example, features compact lot sizes of 400 square metres 
and less. While small perimeter walls bound the lots on three sides, all buildings have an 
open garden-front that is 6 metres deep. This often contains the sidewalk, which has to 
be maintained by the residents. The fact that the lateral distances of the buildings on the 
lots are minimal leads the street frontage to appear almost closed. Only the free forms of 
the roofs, as well the individual designs of the front gardens muddle the picture. This 
leads to a the street view which is very different from São Paulo’s inner city residential 
locations, such as Jardim Americas, or Alto de Pinheiros, where the individual lots are 
bounded by walls and fences. (Cf. Lemos 2004: 12)  
The arrangement leaves only a private space of about 4 metres in the rear, an area 
that is typically reserved for the traditional barbecues (churrasquerias) that are perma-
nently installed. Moreover, when the size allows, swimming pools are very prominent. 
Indeed the aerial views of Alphaville’s neighbourhoods are dominated by the red colour 
of the roofs, the green of the gardens and the blue water of the pools. 
 Illustration D-24: Housing typologies 
Housing style – cinematographic landscape roman style 
While AlphaVille’s residential enclaves are highly controlled, scope for local adaptation 
and appropriation remains a vital element of the scheme. The basic building envelope is 
fixed, but the individual owners are free to achieve the highest possible degree of person-
alisation. As a consequence AlphaVille’s residential landscape features a remarkable vari-
ety of housing styles and fashions, whether modern, historicist, postmodern, colonial or 
vernacular.471 The result is quite different from gated community standards in other loca-
tions and only pacified by the abundance of greenery. Combining two important obser-
vations of a Brazilian journalist and an Austrian urbanist, the result can be dubbed 
‘cinematographic mansions roman style’.472 
Floor plans 
AlphaVille’s main housing typologies, the single-family villa and the high rise condomin-
ium, are renowned in Brazil for their particularly large floor plans. Consequently most of 
the houses feature an abundant amount of space. While the constructed areas amount to 
50 to 100 percent of the lot, floor areas may reach 300 or even 800 square metres. 
Moreover Condominiums between 200 and 300 square metres are not unusual. Typical 
floor plans provide 3, 4 or even 5 dormitories, study rooms, a couple of kitchens, an ex-
tra TV room, a bath rooms for every dormitory, extra rooms for servants, and above all 
                                               
470 Only Tamboré 1 and 2 feature lots of 1200 square metres catering to upper income classes. Of AlphaVille’s neighbour-
hoods the 3rd residential stands out with lots above 1000 square metres, while the 8th enclave (and also Melville) have 
medium sized lots of 800-900 square metres. (Cf. SIA 2004) 
471 For a list of several ambitious architectural project cf. to the designer’s section of this chapter 
472 Christian Carvalho Cruz dubbed the result cinematographic mansions (‘mansões cinematográficas’)472 In addition the 
Austrian scholar Johannes Fielder (2001) stresses local the Roman character of the housing landscape: “The exceptional 
aggregation of singly family villas, the atrium-character of the back gardens, the paved surfaces, the solid construction, the 
neo-feudal floor plans are of a thoroughly of Roman origin. ... The house behind the wall is something natural in roman 
culture. (Cf. Fiedler 2001, translation by the author) 
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a swimming pool area. Apartment units usually have 90 and 180 square meters of pri-
vate area, three or four bedrooms and two to three underground parking spaces. 
Examples of neighbourhoods 
In the following the Tamborè as well as the Genêsis projects will be discussed to illustrate 
the characteristics of AlphaVille Tamboré’s residential neighbourhood ventures. Both of 
these projects are dwelling on the basic components of success provided by the model of 
AlphaVille. Yet while they are realised by other developers, they portray an array of dis-
tinct innovations. 
1988: Tamboré – Cidade do Terceiro Milênio 
In addition to AlphaVille, Tamboré is the second largest town-enterprise in the area. Lo-
cated at the Western edge of the site, the undertaking was started in 1988. (Cf. above: 
Milestones) With eight neighbourhoods and various infrastructure and service amenities 
the project quickly developed into one essential component of the entire conglomerate. 
The venture was founded under the directorship of Arthur Castilho de Ulhôa Rodrigues, 
a member of the Penteado family. Rodrigues sought to explore new markets geared to 
the luxury as well as lower income segments. He was pioneering, for example the devel-
opment of turnkey houses – a new concept for the Brazilian market. (Cf. Nagy 1989: 
148) 
Tamborè’s visionary concept 
Tamboré’s first master plan comprised 1400 hectares and targeted a final population of 
60,000 people. In contrast to AlphaVille, the entire scheme was carefully master planned. 
As the developers aimed to create an alternative to suburban sprawl, the Cidade Tam-
borè was labelled „Cidade do Terceiro Milênio“, or “Cidade de Futuro”. (Cf. Nagy 
1989) Urban design has played a significant role in valorising the scheme. The basic con-
cept was developed by the consultancy Placedesign473 and no one less than Jamie Lerner, 
the famous mayor of the eco-city Curitiba, acted as a consultant.474  
The numerous solutions to reconstruct the spatial coherence and orientation in the 
otherwise fragmented suburban context included a central boulevard as a main business 
axis, residential zones mixed with convenience and service areas, and a large park with 
preserved woodlands. The central axis was conceived not only as a trunk road, but also 
as a new longitudinal centre, aimed at bundling together a greater network of public 
spaces. In view of that, it was designed as representative grand boulevard along a Medi-
terranean theme and marked by a sequence of dense urban spaces (‘praça’), dotted by 
public facilities, and lined by a large linear parks and walking zones – a place designed 
for a better orientation and sensual experience.475 Accordingly, more than US$ 40m were 
invested towards state of the art infrastructure at the start of the project (Cf. Nagy 1989: 
148ff). Additional measures integrated the scheme into the greater urban fabric via pub-
lic transport. This was to be realised not only by conventional bus transport, but also via 
a futuristic hovercraft route on the Tietê River. (Cf. Nagy 1989)  
 Illustration D-25: Maps and illustrations of Tamboré 
                                               
473 Placedesign is headed by José Moralez who graduated from Berkeley 
474 Cf. http://www.placedesign.com.br/condomínios/tambore.swf., r28.01.2009; (Cf. also below: Developers: Strategies) 
475 The conceptual thinking largely corresponds to Kevin Lynch’s proposals to restore spatial coherence in the sprawling city. 
(Cf. Lynch 1969) 
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Unfortunately Tamboré’s contemporary reality on the ground displays a stark contrast to 
the visionary ideas of the first hour. The plan has lost much of its visionary momentum. 
The artery lacks a vital integration with other major interregional infrastructural systems 
as the project can be accessed from a secondary place along AlphaVille’s Avenida Yojiro 
Takaoka via a futuristic gate. On the interior only fragments of the central axis have 
been realised. Public transport has not even been part of the demand, let alone the vi-
sionary hovercraft concept.  
Box 36: Tamboré 11 – Terras de Provence 
The Tamboré 11 – Terras de Provence is a neighbourhood scheme that is capitalising on 
a combination of eco and thematic strategies. The enterprise at the Avenida Honório 
Álvares Penteado, possesses an area of about 55 hectares. 40 percent of the spaces have 
been reserved for nature and leisure. The 411 lots vary between 420 and 850 and 
square metres in size. Tamboré SA has invested BRL 30 million in the landscaping of a 
modern road network, state of the art underground sewage and electrical systems, as 
well as 4 metre high walls – along the well-established AlphaVille methodology. Renato 
Bianconi and the landscaping consultancy DW/Santana acted as the primary design-
ers.476 (Cf. also to  D-20) 
1998: ‘Projeto Gênesis’ – An eco-sustainable gated community 
The unique context of AlphaVille-Tamboré has produced a series of startling innova-
tions477 of local and global relevance. One of the most remarkable of these innovations is 
the Projeto Gênesis as one of the first ‘green’ gated communities worldwide. 
Projeto Gênesis was developed by the Marcello Takaoka Empreendimentos (MVT) at 
the end of the 1990s. The time was marked by rising global environmental awareness 
and by a rising saturation of the environs with residential enclaves (Cf. above: Project 
milestones). The two-stage project has an aggregate size of about 350 hectares.478 
Though this makes it one of the smaller undertakings in the environs, the project is sig-
nificant for having merged AlphaVille’s concept of the ‘residencial’ with an eco-
sustainable approach.  
Gênesis I and II are located in a remote hilly section of the AlphaVille Tamboré cluster 
at an elevation of 800 metres above sea level, looking down upon the city. Notably the 
project reverses the common land use pattern of 75 percent built-up and 25 percent open 
space. As a result, only 16 percent of the total land will be urbanised and 75 percent re-
main green, and in addition the existing forest areas will be increased by 25 percent. 
1064 residential lots479 averaging a respective size of 500 square meters have been ar-
ranged on a site that was previously used as farmland480. The rest of the area will become 
a green preservation zone. (Cf. Amato 2004) The project will lavish a green area of 
around 600 square metres per resident (Ibidem).481  
The undertaking does not intend (nor pretend) to provide a general solution for the 
problems of the greater region, but to optimise the urban typology of ‘condomínios hori-
zontais fechados’ (e.g. gated communities). This prerequisite implies that to be sustain-
                                               
476 Cf. Press release of Tamboré S/A, at www.tambore.com.br. 
477 Mainly in combining the typology of enclave neighbourhoods with self-governance and state-of-the-art security tactics. 
478 150 hectares for Gênesis I and 200 hectares for Gênesis II 
479 Gênesis I: 466; Gênesis II: 598 
480 Originally Atlantic rain forest dominated the landscape 
481 The developers highlight the fact that The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends a minimum of 12 m2 green 
areas per inhabitant and that the 250-hectare forest area will maintain an inventory of approximately 100,000 tons of CO2. 
(Cf. Takaoka 2004, 2006) 
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able it has to be geared to the better-educated and affluent populations. Hence, it lies in 
the nature of the matter that Gênesis is a costly endeavour. Conceivably, one of the most 
important achievements of the developer was to discover that the time for sustainability 
was ripe and that a critical mass of potential customers for this ‘product’ existed in São 
Paulo. In this context an extensive market analysis played an essential role. 482  Before 
starting the design, the developer surveyed 333 households in the region in order to iden-
tify their needs and desires.483 The survey led to the development of a green-life-style 
scheme featuring a comprehensive leisure structure: from wood trekking, a sports and 
health club (with a 25-meter long heated pool), as well as a convenience store and busi-
ness offices for the residents – many of whom are freelancers able to work from home. 
(Cf. Takaoka 2004) Whereas Takaoka also applies the successful practice of residents 
associations – one of AlphaVille’s main pillars of success – the codes include duties for 
the sustainable preservation of the environment. (Ibidem) The broad strategy was con-
firmed when, after the project launch in 2004 the majority of the lots were sold in only 
three weeks. 
Gênesis is based on a highly professional and experienced team that was assembled by 
the developer. Among the main business partners is the firm JAG Participação e Desen-
volvimento Ltda.484 The marketing can be traced back to the part of Victor Rebouças, 
head of Zen Communications Ltd., a large local marketing and media company.485 Fur-
thermore no one less than Reinaldo Pestana provided the planning and urban design ser-
vices.486 An interesting observation is that Gafisa, the very firm that in late 2006 bought 
the majority of AlphaVille Urbanismo’s shares and that is today developing several new 
projects in the area, is part of the team of Gênesis II. (Cf. below: Developers) 
While other real estate projects in the same area serve as a benchmark, Gênesis is 
guided by the quest to increase the quality of life for the residents, to become a profitable 
undertaking and at the same time to provide an added value for the environment. Conse-
quently the strategy is divided into three main dimensions, an environmental, a social, as 
well as an economic one. The developers are convinced that increased investments lead to 
augmented returns.487 At the same time their self-image is one of an enlightened entrepre-
neur.488  
The environmental objective of Gênesis is to produce a result that features an im-
proved not worsened environmental quality in comparison to the initial conditions. The 
scheme seeks to prevent the negative environmental impacts represented by a ‘tabula rasa 
urbanism’, which is a common standard in Brazil.489 As a consequence various zones be-
                                               
482 Seeking to promote the project in the scientific community Takaoka and his colleagues write: “The quest for sustainabil-
ity can only materialize through the realization that there exists a consumer market concerned about the future of the 
planet, able (and willing) to pay for the additional costs resulting from the attributes of quality incorporated into the devel-
opment, to preserve and restore the environment. ...” (Amato, Takaoka, et al 2004) 
483 The survey conducted in 1998 by Datafolha, a renown-polling institute, “indicated that 84% of the inhabitants of the 
region consider it important to have forest reserves, and about 70% of them considered the existence of leisure and sport 
facilities important.” (Takaoka 2004) 
484 JAG, is a joint venture of different companies under the directorship of John George De Carle Gottheiner. It appears that 
this firm provided the venture capital to the Gênesis project. Other joint ventures of JAG and Takaoka are the São Paolo 
Wellness Ltd. and the recent iTower projects. 
485 Zen is also the in-house agency of Takaoka’s firm and of Tamboré Shopping. 
486 Pestana’s office worked for all major developers in the AlphaVille-Tamboré area. (Cf. below: Developers: Design) 
487 “Green solutions cost money to implement, but this is not stopping many of the enlightened developers who believe the 
benefits of green far outweigh the costs.” (Kellenberg, 2004 quoted in Amato 2004) 
488 This spirit is also underlined by the fact that Marcello Takaoka runs a 400 square kilometre ecological farm 280 kilome-
tres from São Paulo, where he aims to develop concepts of ecological farming 
(http://www.takaoka.agr.br/website/nossaFazenda/, r12.01.2009). 
489 Takaoka (2004) lists the removal of vegetation, soil permeability, heat islands, contamination of surface and underground 
water, removal of natural water, air pollution caused by air and land transportation systems, visual pollution from urbaniza-
tion and noise pollution as the negative aspects of this approach. 
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tween nature and culture, from a preserve to a park are created and only a fraction less 
than a fifth of the area is urbanised. The plan also seeks to increase the local biodiver-
sity490, to optimise the use of local resources491 and to enhance C02 storage capacities492. 
The undertaking’s social dimension comprises the creation of new jobs programs493, 
the inclusion of various stakeholder groups494, as well as the dissemination and discus-
sion of the results in a wider public through the dissemination of results and good prac-
tices (Cf. Takaoka 2004).495 Importantly, the residents and owners associations will be 
responsible for maintaining the project and implementing the codes. 496 
When it comes to the economic level, the Gênesis venture aims to produce profits 
comparable to the benchmark projects in the environs. Return rates are expected to reach 
25 percent and primary investments are supposed to pay off in less than 3.5 years.497 As a 
matter of fact the scheme outperformed all expectations resulting in such as a high de-
mand. Most of the lots were sold before implementation started. Prices exceeded compa-
rable benchmarks at 10 percent and the value of the land experienced an appreciation of 
another 50 percent. (Cf. Amato 2004) 
Indeed, Gênesis accomplishes the goal of becoming an important national benchmark 
of eco-sustainable residential enclaves, while still increasing overall profits (Cf. Campos 
2007). This success was achieved by sensing the right moment, the formation of the right 
team, and the application of the right set of strategies. The interdisciplinary team that 
developed the project pioneers “...the development of an innovative paradigm-setting 
product in the Brazilian realtors’ market” (Amato 2004) and promotes eco-friendly and 
sustainable life styles among Brazilian elites. Transfer of knowledge is also important, as 
many state-of-the-art solutions and best practices are imported from other countries (e.g. 
US and Europe). The achievement is confirmed as other developers start to duplicate the 
scheme, most notably AlphaVille Urbanismo in its Burle Marx project. Not least the ex-
ceptional quality of the project is approved by various recognitions and awards – from 
the Latin American Development Bank, the Bavarian TÜV and the Forest Stewardship 
Council.498 (Cf.  D-33) 
                                               
490 The “project of enrichment planting of tree species was developed with an expected number of at least 120 tree species 
per hectare... Special crossings were built for animals to move through the forests, and along these “corridors of biodiver-
sity...” (Takaoka 2004) 
491 “The project’s water resources are managed in order to meet the estimated water demand of 1328 cubic metres per day. 
Of this total, 426 cubic metres per day come from underground aquifers, and 902 cubic metres per day from a reservoir that 
is recharged by the spring runoff.” (Takaoka 2004) 
492 “In the forested areas (Atlantic rainforest), CO2 fixing is around 26-37 tons per hectare per year during the period of 
plant growth. Considering the entire area to be reforested and preserved of around 250 hectare, an inventory of approxi-
mately 100.000 tons of CO2 will be maintained in the long term...” (Takaoka 2004) 
493 The developers write in a scientific article: The works to implement the Gênesis I Project generated nearly 200 direct jobs 
in average, for a 24-month period. Considering that each direct job generated four other indirect ones, there were more 
than 1000 new jobs per month over the 24-month work period for each residential condominium. That is higher than a 
normal urban land development by 10%... the environmental processes that began at an early stage of the project will be 
generating jobs for many years more... (Takaoka 2004) 
494 From Universities, to NGO’s, to future residents, to employees 
495 The developers also stress the fact that the project would bring increased wealth to the region. (Ibidem) 
496 “The development takes special care of the security and preservation of the environment through: (i) planned occupation 
of the region: (ii) steady watch of the project areas to avoid squatters (including hunters), and uncontrolled vegetal extractiv-
ism, and (iii) environmental education programs” (Amato 2004). 
497 In this context the developers list the following quality indicators for Gênesis I: “1) 25,2 percent domestic return rate; 2) 
25,8 percent result on the sales volume; 3) 41-month primary payback; 4) 12 million investment in “Reais”, or 13,8 percent 
VGV, which is considered low because the land was bought by the developer.” (Amato 2004) 
498 Among the most important of these are: Tear: the programme “Tecendo Redes Sustentáveis” (weaving sustainable nets) 
by the Latin American Development Bank rewards small and medium sized businesses for their social and environmental 
efforts; the NBR ISO 14001/ BRTÜVA certificate confirming the neutralisation of 10.390 tons of C02 and was issued by the 
German TÜV (Technical Controlling Agency). ETHOS, a reward for the achievements in International Social Responsibility 
(ISO 26000); as well as the renowned FSC Certificate SW-COC-1805 for smart wood certified forestry by the Forest Stew-
ardship Council. In addition, both Gênesis I and II are certified by the Selo AELO the Association of São Paulo’s realtors 
(Associação das Empresas de Loteamento e Desenvolvimento Urbano do Estado de São Paulo). 
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Critical remarks 
While the achievements of Gênesis as an innovative product in the real estate field are 
unquestionable, this section cannot be concluded without pointing out some contradic-
tions which cast a shadow on their otherwise unstained and triumphant picture.499  
In the final analysis from a regional perspective it is questionable whether a project in 
an ecologically sensitive area of this quality should have been approved in the first in-
stance, no matter how careful and sensitive it proceeds. It is also questionable whether 
homogeneous low-density schemes of eco-friendly villas, which are by nature highly de-
pendent on the use of individual transport, can ever really be eco-friendly and sustain-
able. Yet probably the regulatory void of the local governance framework has to take 
more of the blame than the ‘ignorant’ developers acting along their own motives and 
operational logic. 
                                               
499 Indeed, the fact that some of these contradictions and dilemmas have been omitted in the publications of the devel-
oper’s team, points to a rhetorical approach. It thus reduces the scientific value of the work. What has been also ‘over-
looked’ is the relationship to the ecogênesis approach of the Brazilian landscape designer Fernando Chacel (2001). 
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Summary 
Regional context 
AlphaVille-Tamboré emerges on an urban frontier on a landscape of rolling hills that 
used to be covered by farmland, as well as by the Atlantic forest (Mata Atlântica). The 
project spans the area between a large highway (Castello Branco), a major River (Tietê), 
and the natural Hills and negotiates the environment of a shambolic ‘post-industrial’ 
urban landscape. 
The AlphaVille-Tamboré cluster is a unique phenomenon in the São Paulo metro re-
gion and beyond. No other metropolitan region of the country contains a privately 
planned city of this size and variety. The project’s site is situated on the terrain of two of 
São Paulo’s suburban municipalities: Barueri, as well as Santana do Parnaíba. While Al-
phaVille-Tamboré’s size is rather small on a regional scale – the projects amounts to less 
than 1/200 of the regional population – the location is among the most important eco-
nomic centres of the country. It is aggressively marketed as a Brazilian Edge City. The 
levels of wealth represented by the scheme were previously common only in some of the 
São Paulo’s central districts. One of the results of AlphaVille’s success is that today a 
growing number of similar typologies cluster at the site and its environs. Moreover a 
significant amount of these undertakings are geared to the lower income sector.  
AlphaVille-Tamboré is well connected to all major regional centres. The distance to 
São Paulo’s geographical point zero at the Praça da Sé totals 23 kilometres. Other impor-
tant centres of the region can be reached by a trip of 18 to 30 kilometres. The main 
means of access to the location, as well as the initial trigger of its development is the Cas-
tello Branco expressway. The area is well connected to public transport networks (bus 
and train). However, ‘only’ the supporting populations are using these (e.g. maids, work-
ers). Despite the fact that the vicinity offers an abundant array of natural amenities (e.g. 
the river, the forest, as well as an ecological park) the project generally turns its back on 
these. 
Basic services such as water and electricity come from public networks, while in the 
domains of transport, security, communications, health care and education, parallel pri-
vate as well as public alternatives are available. The trend points to a boom of private 
systems. Nevertheless, AlphaVille’s residents are also very sensitive about the elimination 
of public networks. When access from the public expressway was blocked in favour of a 
new toll road, the population reacted with resistance and protest. 
Local context 
AlphaVille-Tamboré engrosses an area of roughly 12 by 3 kilometres (or 3600 hectares). 
The project of AlphaVille comprises the majority of this (1400 hectares), while Tamboré 
amounts to 1000 hectares. Several additional third-party developments make up the re-
maining area. Despite the fact that these days the project has reached a fairly mature and 
advanced stage, any distinct end is excluded by the very concept of the scheme. Only the 
neighbourhood modules are permanently fixed once completed, other parts of the 
scheme are subject to a process of permanent modification, upgrade and change. 
Indeed, the structure of the scheme is best understood as the result of a basic set of 
rules, rather than of a geometric master plan. From this perspective the scheme is in es-
sence a heterogeneous conglomerate of standardised modules (e.g. residential and com-
mercial enclaves), resulting in a structure of a higher urban complexity. Whereas com-
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mercial land uses dominate the well-connected areas to the South, residential zones are 
prevailing in the North.  
AlphaVille-Tamboré’s structure is fundamentally based on the underlying logic of in-
dividual transport. The abstract structural form of the project resembles of a bunch of 
grapes that is serviced by central trunks. This system is most visible in the AlphaVille 
scheme, where a central traffic spine runs through the whole terrain and taps the 
neighbourhood enclaves. The artery is not a result of a central plan; its bending and 
twisting form rather developed through time, representing some general rules, rather 
than a geometric order. As the road changes from an urban boulevard to a passageway 
moving through a labyrinth of walls and gates to an open country road, its trajectory 
delineates a historical timeline of the project. A passage through the residential areas is 
not only marked by the defence-elements of the neighbourhoods, it is also characterised 
by an increasing amount of service facilities. 
The typological alphabet of AlphaVille-Tamboré is essentially based on three typlo-
gies: high-rise structures, detached villas and low-rise commercial structures. The fact 
that these typologies are never mixed, leads to a pattern of homogeneous patches. As a 
result AlphaVille-Tamboré’s downtown area with its high-rise buildings stands in a stark 
contrast to the low-rise residential zones, while both of these differ significantly from the 
commercial and industrial area. This third typology includes two large regional malls as 
well as several hundred other commercial facilities, which cluster mainly to the East of 
the downtown area. 
AlphaVille’s central business district is known as one of the first and most significant 
Brazilian Edge Cities. It represents one of the oldest and most significant office agglom-
erations in São Paulo’s region. The area is organised by an open rectangular circulation 
system. It encompasses about 100 skyscrapers, 120.000 office jobs, half a thousand busi-
nesses and several hundred apartments. Among the illustrious tenants are various inter-
national corporations, such as Hewlett Packard, Nike, or Dupont and a number of local 
TV stations. Remarkably, one part of the central area was fashioned as a low-rise fabric 
comprising a pedestrianised service centre for small businesses (Centro de Apoio). How-
ever, the tiny returns of this early experiment are less prominent among the developers 
today. In contrast, the valorisation process of the district keeps going and is reaching a 
new momentum. Several mega superblock schemes of Asian dimensions, with names 
such as iTower, Brascan Plaza, AlphaSquare, or Tiner-Videolar, are presently in the pipe-
line. 
AlphaVille-Tamboré distinguishes itself from its surroundings by the exceptional in-
frastructure and the wide range of services it offers. Indeed, the locale features all essen-
tial infrastructure and services that characterise a fully-fledged city. Its roads, utilities, as 
well the numerous service facilities (hospitals, schools, shopping centres, hotels etc) fea-
ture state-of-the-art standards equal to most Western countries. AlphaVille’s streets, for 
example are composed of several layers, the utilities are laid underground, some 
neighbourhoods feature decentralised sewage facilities, renowned schools have branches 
in the area, and new shopping malls are certified along western energy and design stan-
dards (LEED). Of particular importance is also the integrated security concept (com-
posed of physical barriers, technical surveillance systems and private security forces). On 
the other hand the developers did not anticipate many of the facilities, with a large num-
ber of extra schools, shops, clinics and offices gradually migrating to the area.  
It is also worth mentioning that public facilities such as libraries, museums, theatres or 
communal swimming pools are absent. Some representative public spaces and small 
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lunchtime parks exist in the downtown area. An ecological preserve provided by the pub-
lic has been systematically insulated and neglected. 
Neighbourhoods 
As AlphaVille is based on a system of urban modules, neighbourhoods are the fundamen-
tal elements of the scheme. Currently 39 residential clusters exist; AlphaVille Urbanismo 
completed half of these, Tamboré S.A. realised 8, and other enterprises 13 projects.500  
An average horizontal residential enclave (Residencial - singular) comprises about 50 
hectares (The range is between 20 and 80 hectares). In this context, the lot numbers per 
neighbourhood may fluctuate from 80 to 1000, in relation to the proportions of the 
neighbourhood and the size of the respective lots. As a result resident numbers per en-
clave amount to an average of 1500 people (while the crowd of service staff may add up 
to another 500 individuals). Notably this leads to relatively high average densities of 50 
people per hectare – a total that equals some Western inner city locations and is three to 
four times as much as suburban neighbourhoods in the West. 
Gates 
A standard AlphaVille style Residencial is a gated enclave geared to automobiles. The 
movement of cars per day leaving and entering the neighbourhoods roughly equals the 
total amount of the residents. A Residencial is surrounded by the significant structure of 
a 4-5 metre high perimeter wall. Its access is generally restricted to only one point. In 
contrast to the appearance of the wall, this entry point is of highest functional and sym-
bolic importance. The opening marks a stark transition between the public and private 
spheres, as much as the classical door of a traditional city house. As a result the access 
points are formed as ensembles, composed of the gate itself, representative entry plazas 
with lush landscaping (both to the interior and to the exterior of the gate), as well an 
array of signs and images geared to the perception of the motorist. 
The gates are mostly designed in a modern architectural style. The majority are formal 
and rather unpretentious, at least the ones built from the 1970s to the 1990s. In spite of 
this, their very distinct feature is functional, as they comprise various entrances for resi-
dents, visitors, as well as service staff (‘portaria criteriosa’), a characteristic that is leading 
to remarkable dimensions at particular locations.  
Neighbourhoods 
While the entry plaza principally remains the largest open space of the neighbourhood, 
the interior of the ‘usual’ quarter is characterised by an unexpectedly dense mass of pri-
vate lots and buildings. These generally make up for two thirds of the land use. Street 
spaces comprise another quarter. The entry plaza as well as some scattered playgrounds 
makes up a tiny remainder of 9 percent. The high amount of green is secured by the 
mandatory private front gardens. In addition collective facilities are a must for each of 
the neighbourhood ventures. Yet, importantly, these are always placed to the outside of 
the walls, making up an important principle of the AlphaVille brand. In addition, small 
centres along the main road provide local services. 
The neighbourhoods of AlphaVille-Tamboré are highly monofunctional and uniform. 
Despite an increasing variety of urban typologies in the greater area, homogeneity is a 
distinct and persistent feature at the neighbourhood level. As most of the enclaves cater 
for specific customer groups, almost no variation exists among the land uses, lot sizes, 
                                               
500 Indeed, these days a memorable trend towards a diversification of stakeholders, functions, and typologies can be ob-
served – albeit the fact that the tendency remains confined to a limited ‘toolbox’ of typologies (e.g. villas or high-rises) and 
only if looking at a scale of several associated modules. 
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housing typologies, or their cost. While the neighbourhood’s street patterns and the par-
celling types range from a curved layout to a raster design, depending on the socio-
economic status of the target population, by no means are they ever mixed within one 
and the same cluster. A greater blend of lot sizes, building styles (but not land uses) exists 
only in some of the luxury neighbourhoods. 
In spite of this, the scale of the individual buildings once more provides a high degree 
of diversity. As most of the individual buildings are individually designed, a great varia-
tion of the forms and appearances of the particular villas can be observed. This situation 
is changing at the moment, as an increasing quantity of homes are being constructed as 
turn key projects ‘cut from the same cloth’. 
Indeed, the existence and implementation of local ‘private’ design regulations is 
among the major pillars of AlphaVille’s exceptional success and a central feature behind 
the superior formal integrity of the neighbourhoods. Whereas design codes are a central 
part of the purchase contract, they secure homogeneity and high standards by providing 
a specific building envelope, including detailed guidelines for materials, maximum floor 
spaces, setbacks, maximum heights, roof forms, facade openings, planting standards, 
parking spaces and many other features.  
Examples 
The Tamboré as well as the Genêsis projects illustrate some major characteristics of Al-
phaVille-Tamboré’s residential neighbourhood ventures. While both of these projects 
dwell on the basic components of success provided by the model of AlphaVille, they also 
portray an interesting array of additional innovations. 
Tamboré 
Tamboré is the second largest real estate undertaking in the area. Started in 1988, it 
presently features eight residential enclaves, as well as several important infrastructure 
and service facilities. The scheme is notable for having developed new products geared to 
the luxury as well as lower income segments. In this context several luxury neighbour-
hoods with gigantic lots and extensive landscaping, as well as some clusters with small 
lots and turnkey houses have been developed.  
Members of the Penteado family, the clan that was controlling the entire environs in 
the past, developed the project. Tamboré was planned along a master plan right from the 
beginning – a huge contrast to AlphaVille, which developed without a holistic plan. This 
plan comprised 1400 hectares, and targeted a final population of 60,000 people.  
Indeed, far from being a technical manual, Tamboré’s plan was a visionary document. 
It was co-developed by no less than Curitiba’s former mayor and architect Jaime Lerner. 
The strategy intended to address some of the major contradictions, which are usually 
produced by private urban development. Accordingly Lerner’s tactics sought to devise 
various ways of injecting a strong urban spirit to this ‘Cidade do Futuro’, or ‘Cidade do 
Terceiro Milênio’. Among the core elements of the idea was a new linear centre. This 
consisted of a main urban boulevard, flanked by office blocks and structured by a 
rhythm of open squares, monuments and public buildings. Lerner also sought to recon-
nect the new district to São Paulo’s public transportation networks. The gesture material-
ised as a large public bus terminal at the eastern end of the boulevard. Furthermore, he 
proposed a new futuristic hovercraft service to São Paulo’s centre along the Tietê River, 
epitomising the opposite of the ordinary rational pragmatism of real estate developers. 
Sadly, but not unexpectedly, few of Lerner’s visionary ideas have been implemented. 
At present the usual fabric of residential enclaves dominates the place, and only frag-
ments of the central boulevard exist. A noteworthy example of a recent neighbourhood 
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representing a ‘genuine’ demand is Tamboré 11. The gated luxury enclave dubbed ‘Ter-
ras de Provence’ is capitalising on the eco-movement as well on a French lifestyle theme. 
Projeto Gênesis 
At present Marcello Takaoka’s ‘Projeto Gênesis’ is among the far-reaching projects in the 
area. The two-stage project of about 350 hectares was initiated by the end of the 1990s. 
It combines AlphaVille’s concept of the Residencial with an eco-sustainable strategy and 
operates along a holistic development concept, state-of-the-art eco technologies, and so-
phisticated life style marketing. The result is one of the first green, gated communities 
worldwide.  
The project basically inverts AlphaVille’s regular land use pattern by featuring 75 per-
cent open spaces and only 25 percent urbanised land. Notably the strategy seeks to save 
and reforest significant amounts of the former forest, to provide an abundant amount of 
outdoor infrastructure inside the walls, and even to train the new residents to protect the 
area. The success of the scheme was not only confirmed by high media attention and a 
number of awards, it was also verified by the fact that the first phase (with 466 lots) was 
sold out within three weeks.  
Undeniably, the Gênesis project can be seen as a benchmark model for new peripheral 
settlements in the environs and beyond. It became an important precursor of paradigm 
change for the entire real estate sector, as it was reflected by AlphaVille’s neighbourhood 
of ‘Burle Marx’ and others. In spite of this, some critical contradictions remain. These 
demonstrate the limitations of the private sector: The project consumes an ecologically 
unique area, by a density that is rather rural than urban; Its residents belong to an highly 
educated ecologically minded minority; In addition it is hard to reach and depends on 
cars. Consequently it can be questioned whether this scheme can contribute to resolve 
problems of society at a larger scale. Hence to the observer of a larger context, Gênesis 
reveals, that in contrast to the exaggerated claims of the developer, the ideals of ecology, 
economy, and social justice may remain irreconcilable. Indeed, from this perspective the 
whole venture surfaces as an exceptionally successful marketing operation. Yet, it also 
becomes evident that most probably the deficient framework of public regulations and 
their missing enforcement has to be blamed most for the dilemma. 
Blocks and buildings 
The ultimate motive for people coming to AphaVille-Tamboré is a life in a private sub-
urban home. As a result 85 percent of the nearly 100,000 residents reside in single-family 
villas (and only a relative minority in the high rise condominiums). That is also why de-
tached mansions dominate a large part of the landscape, the green of their private gar-
dens, as well as the garages and parking spaces. At the same time as open circulation 
systems (rectangular or bended) are the preferred mode of circulation in the residential 
schemes, the properties are mostly grouped in blocks between 12 and 50 entities. Follow-
ing principles of efficiency, the lots are typically longitudinal in shape with the shorter 
side facing the street, and their size may vary between 350 to 1400 square metres. In 
spite of that, lots of less than 600 square metres with a maximum land coverage of 50 
percent and a floor area ratio of 1,0 account for the norm. 
For this reason, most of AlphaVille’s blocks are densely packed. This results in a fairly 
coherent street frontage, and a stark division of the properties in a representative front 
and a private rear garden. While the frontage is dominated by representative landscaping 
and abundant parking lots, the rear contains a ‘churrasqueira’ and whenever possible 
also the obligatory swimming pool. Nonetheless, the absence of walls in the front leads 
to a picture that is drastically different from other residential neighbourhoods. 
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AlphaVille’s urban landscape features a remarkable amount of all imaginable housing 
styles and fashions. The respective design codes leave a relatively high degree of freedom 
in regard to the final appearance of the house. However, while the basic typology (e.g. 
the suburban one family mansion) remains homogeneous, the resulting category can be 
circumscribed as the ‘vila cinematográfica’, albeit with a Roman (as opposed to an An-
glo-Saxon) inclination. At the same time as representational aspects constitute the major 
motives of design, many local details, such as plants, walls or the churrasqueira remain. 
Typical are also the exceptionally large floor plans of the mansions (as well as high rise 
condominiums), which may reach 300 square metres and more (a common norm for 
Brazilian upper middle classes). 
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Population –  
Middle class ‘parentela’ 
After having gained a good understanding of AlpaVille-Tamboré’s spatial and temporal 
context, the national and regional setting, the sequence of historic milestones, its prede-
cessors, and the major aspects of the town’s morphology, the next chapter turns to the 
reality of the resident and user. 
Introducing the German edition of Hernert Gans’ famous investigation of the Levit-
towners (1967) Lucius Burghardt, a Swiss-German urban sociologist, writes that it is not 
primarily the house, or the garden, or the neighbours house of a prospective buyer that 
drives the buyer’s view. He claims that it is rather the imagination of the socio-economic 
potentials of the side, such as the neighbour’s family, the main denomination of the sur-
rounding, his daily route to work, the school system etc. that drives the process of set-
tling in one area or another. (Cf. Gans 1969) 
What remains valid in any case is that a good understanding of the resident, who is at 
the same time the consumer and also the producer of his place, is among the most central 
elements of a holistic analysis, as it is represented by this endeavour. Consequently the 
subsequent section firstly aims to present a profile of AlphaVille’s residents, secondly, to 
discuss their motives and aspirations, and thirdly to illuminate some important strategies 
of social organisation. In this context it is of particular importance to bring to the fore 
the qualities and practices of AlphaVille’s residents that make them different from other 
comparable populations. 
Population profile 
Table 34: Key indicators of AlphaVille-Tamboré’s population 
Population (resident, 2008) 90.000 persons 
Day time population 150.000 persons (mainly in the downtown area) 
Capacity No final target was set 
Share of greater São Paulo’s popula-
tion 
0,5 percent 
Domestic staff ~ 25.000 
Main target groups Upper Middle and Upper Income Groups, Starter 
Families 
Share of middle and higher income 
groups  
100 (with the exemption of service personnel) 
Share of ‘unplanned population’ Zero 
Share of formal jobs 100 percent (60 percent in Brazil) 
HDI of local Municipality 0.83 (compared to 0,6 in North Brazil) 
Predominant occupation Entrepreneurship, white collar jobs, (‘colarinho e 
gravata’) 
Estimated household income > 20 minimum salaries/ month (~ 3600 US$), 14 
percent of Brazilians * 
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Ethnicity Predominantly white 
Share of population living and work-
ing in the place 
~ 30 percent 
Homeownership rates ~ 95 percent 
Main motivation 1) Security, 2) comfort, 3) financial safety 
Gini Index of Santana de Parnaíba 
(São Paulo) 
0,73 (0,59) 
Mode of local self-management Neighbourhood Associations as non-for profit or-
gans with mandatory membership 
Voting rights in the associations Depending on quantity of properties owned 
 *1 MS ~ 160 US$ p.m. 
 
Planned population  
AlphaVille-Tamboré has emerged without a final master plan in mind, neither by the 
developer, nor by the relevant authority. The final population of the project is limited 
only to the maximum carrying capacity of the site. Assuming that 3600 hectares can be 
urbanised with an average density of 50 persons per hectare501 the capacity of the area 
amount to 180.000 residents. 
Preexisting population 
In contrast to Bumi Serpong Damai or Navi Mumbai the site had no significant preexist-
ing population that would play an important role. Starting with the colonial era, existing 
populations have always been ‘efficiently’ removed. As a consequence no rehabilitation 
or resettlement schemes have been necessary. Prior to the development of the site, the 
area was used mainly as a farm, the Fazenda Tamborè. While it is reported that a popu-
lation of Japanese migrants lived on the land, these had to leave the site when the 
Penteado family re-appropriated the land several years before development began in 
1966. (Cf. above: Milestones; Cf. Revista Isto É, SP, 2005) 
Average income 
The residents of AlphaVille-Tamboré belong to an elite-segment of the upper-middle 
class as well as the upper class. They earn in excess of 20 times the minimal salary, be-
longing to the upper income quintile of the Brazilians.502 Interviewed by the Brazilian 
Association of Corporate Client Relations (Associacao Brasileira Das Relacoes Empresa 
Cliente) Marcelo Puntel, AlphaVille’s marketing directors, as well as Fábio Kuchkarian 
public relations officer of the firm, reassure that the brand of AlphaVille is geared at São 
Paulo’s higher income populations, and is now one of the most successful providers of 
exclusive housing projects in Brazil. (Cf. Abrarec 2006) 
Education profile  
AlphaVille-Tamboré is not only among the richest but also the most developed places in 
Brazil. Barueri’s and Santana de Parnaíba range among the top 5 percent Brazilian Mu-
nicipalities with a Human Development Index well above 0,83, with exceptionally high 
marks for educational levels.503  
                                               
501 Barueri has 36, New Delhi has 75, Shenzhen 58, and Irvine 12 persons per hectare 
502 It was estimated above that pricing of the properties require average income well above 20 times an average Brazilian 
salary. Davidson (2004), or Stevens (2007) who estimate an average monthly income of 3.000 to 5000 US Dollars confirmed 
this amount. 
503 Cf. http://www.pnud.org.br/atlas/, r.02.02.2009). In contrast, some municipalities in the Northern part of the country 
feature HDI’s of less than 0,6. (Cf. above: Context, Brazil, inequality) 
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Variation per neighbourhood  
The variation of incomes of the residents within the residential enclaves is rather low. 
The homogeneous ‘product’ of the ‘residencial’ implies that each community represents 
people of analogous income. This trend is further strengthened by the fact that the en-
claves are developed as distinct projects at a certain time. 
Occupation 
AlphaVille-Tamboré’s population belongs to an elite of highly educated knowledge 
workers504, freelancers, artists  and entrepreneurs. Some stars and celebrities (actors, 
singers, TV personalities) are also among the residents. (Cf. Davidson 2004)505506 
Ratio of residential population, working population 
The large daytime population of 140.000 people, mostly office workers, exceeds 80.000 
permanent residents by 175 percent.507 This combined intelligentsia contributes a share 
of more than 65 percent of the municipal revenues508 and triggered a boom in the mu-
nicipalities of Barueri as well as Santana de Parnaíba. These became the fastest growing 
and most lucrative boroughs in the country. Barueri features steep economic growth rates 
with a specific emphasis on the informational economy, trade and financial mediation.509 
Significantly in 2005 Barueri’s annual GDP per person was 16 times that of the 
neighbouring municipality of Carapicuíba.510  
Main age segment of buyers  
As in many other examples worldwide, AlphaVille-Tamboré’s residential ventures are 
mainly targeting young starter families with kids, who long for a harmonious environ-
ment, secure outdoor space and stable investments. (Davidson 2004, Nagy 1989) 
Homeownership 
Brazilians are a society of homeowners. AlphaVilleTamboré is no exception and is also 
based on this premise. Whether favela or gated community, home ownership rates exceed 
the 80 percent mark in most urban areas. In the previous framework of slavery, migra-
tion and feudalism only few were privileged enough to possess own land. Yet, as a result 
of rising urbanisation, the home ownership rates in the 20th century have seen a steep 
increase. In São Paulo, for example, the amount of residents in possession of their own 
house rose from 19 percent in 1920 to 69 percent in 2000. And indeed, some researchers 
describe this as an important element in the emancipation and social development of the 
country.511  
                                               
504 According to Kato (2006: 10) 90 to 95 percent of the affluent residents of São Paulo’s southwestern sector, of which 
AlphaVille-Tamboré is an extended part, have a higher education, speak at least on foreign language and are employed in 
knowledge intensive industries. 
505 Among the star residents with a residence in AlphaVille are: Eliana, Chitãozinho & Chororó, Milton Neves, Cafú, Celso 
Portiolli, Luciana Gimenez (Cf. http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alphaville_(condom%C3%Adnio, r06.04.2009) 
506 The journalist Colin Brayton (2007) claims in his blog that the Colombian drug lord Abadia was living (and hiding) in one 
of the gated communities. 
507 The enormous numbers of ‘invisible’ services personnel, such as maids, security guards, gardeners do not appear in the 
official statistics. 
508 Cf. Cruz 2003 quoting Renato Albuqerke 
509 The city is the 9th richest place on Brazil in 2005, surpassing many other state capitals and large metropolises and con-
tributing to a national share in GDP of 1 percent. Other cities with several million residents such as Porto Allegre, or Salvador 
contributed a roughly equal amount to the national GDP. The 50 times more populous Metropolitain Region of São Paulo 
contributed 12,5 percent of the national GDP (Cf. 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/presidencia/noticias/noticia_visualiza.php?id_noticia=1061&id_pagina=, r04.02.2009) 
510 While Barueri’s share amounted to BRL 87.338, the share of a resident of Santana de Parnaíba amounted to BRL 22.107. 
In contrast the neighbouring working class suburb ob Carapicuíba contributed with an average sum of BRL 5.004 (Cf. IBGEI 
2005, at http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/economia/pibmunicipios/2005/tab01.pdf, r02.02.2009) 
511 Holston and Caldeira 2008 stress the fact that the process of ‘autoconstruction’ transformed the Brazilian working poor 
into homeowners in only one generation. (Cf. above: Context) 
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Ethnic composition 
While no official data on the ethnic composition area was found, it can be safely pre-
sumed that AlphaVille represents a high share of white residents, as it is an enclave of 
rich residents.512 This picture presumably changes when the low-key service workers; 
invisible legions of maids, guards and gardeners are taken into regard. 
Consumption patterns 
AlphaVille’s Bourgeois residents seek to fulfil their potentials for reproduction, represen-
tation and above all also for consumption. Accordingly the Jortnal Istoé Dinheiro esti-
mated that the area carried an annual consumption potential of BRL 1,4 billion per year. 
(Cf. Cruz 2003) The area’s typical resident belongs to the upper and middle classes, one 
with ‘colarinho e gravata’, i.e. he is wearing a tie while he has a while collar job. His 
daily life is based on a car and the commute between work, home, the club, the children’s 
school, etc. Moreover being middle class in Brazil also means that most of the house-
holds put a great emphasis on large amounts of living space with multiple dormitories. 
They are also far more likely than their European and American counterparts to employ 
domestic servants.513  
Indeed, AlphaVille’s residents live a suburban life based on the car. Despite the fact 
that the area features twice as many jobs as residents, the day-by-day traffic jams illus-
trate that many people commute to other places, while others come into AlphaVille’s 
Centro Empreserial – a pattern characteristic for many regions worldwide. Children, on 
the other hand find enough educational options and remain in the area. 
Motives, values and political orientation of the target groups 
Upper-middle class populations are the main clients buying a residence in AlphaVille-
Tamboré. Among the motives to relocate to a guarded condominium, three main ones 
stand out: physical security, comfort, and financial security.514  
Violence and Angst 
Many observers agree that in the Brazilian context angst, insecurity and crime have to be 
regarded as the major drivers of a renaissance of gated enclaves. Unsurprisingly security 
services may amount to 80 percent of the maintenance cost of a neighbourhood (Cf. SIA 
2006). Some trace this phenomenon to medieval feudalistic traditions (Cf. Fiedler 2001), 
others relate it to a state paralyzed by the dynamics of neoliberal-globalisation.515 In any 
case AlphaVille can be regarded as an early bottom-up model that addresses middle-class 
insecurity (Cf. Caldeira 2000, Fitzpatrick 2003, Stephens 2007, et al).  
The fear of crime forms a significant aspect of daily life of São Paulo’s residents. 516 
AlphaVille-Tamboré employs one security guard for every 30 to 50 residents, resulting to 
a permanent number of 400 and 500 security guards in the area (occasionally amounting 
                                               
512 This claim is substantiated by personal observations and interviews, as well as backed up by the general data on the 
ethnic composition of various income classes. (Cf. above: Context: Culture: Ethnicity: the average whites’ incomes are 250 
percent greater than nonwhites). 
513 According to ‘Countries and their Cultures’, in Brazil people who work with their hands are, by definition, not middle 
class. It is inappropriate for a middle-class housewife to get down on her knees to scrub the floor (Cf. 
http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Brazil.html, r.04.01.2008.) 
514 The order of the relevance of these motives was confirmed by secondary literature and by the author’s interviews and 
observations. 
515 Cf. www.ignacioparis.org/?tag=violencia, r6.02.2009 
516 Davidson (2004) reminds us that “The violence is real, and it is not just bourgeois classes who want these things.” 
(Davidson 2004 quoting Pasternak; Cf. also above: Context, São Paulo, Risk framework) 
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to a staff of more than 50 persons per neighbourhood)517. 4.5 metre walls, sophisticated 
surveillance systems, a large fleet of vehicles and close collaborations with the public 
police result in greatly lowered crime rates (at least in regard to the non-domestic 
sphere). Yet the presence of the extensive security apparatus and the extremely high pres-
ence of the crime reports in the everyday media518 point to the fact that the levels of angst 
are a serious organising force of daily life. 
Yet, while the area seems to be well protected against crimes committed by foreign in-
truders, the myriads of security forces remain helpless when it comes to violence and 
crime generated from within. AlphaVille-Tamboré’s neighbourhoods are riddle by high 
rates of household violence as well as drug-criminality, and petty crimes persist in accor-
dance with the habits of newly rich and bourgeois middle class populations.  
The urban fabric turns out to be a hostile environment to youngsters in particular. 
Gonçalves (1997) remarks “the same walls that protect the residents from the urban vio-
lence don’t protect them from their own children.”519 Informal meeting points are fre-
quently dissolved as soon as they emerge and the social homogeneity, total control, and 
the lack of spaces for appropriation lead to the fact that an increasing amount of teenag-
ers break out to the inner city. (Cf. Fieldler 2001 quoting Caldeira 2000) 
Moreover, a false sense of security triggers high levels of traffic accidents, as it leads to 
inattention and carelessness. Theresa Caldeira (1992) reports about 91.646 registered car 
accidents with 925 injured and 6 dead only between 1989 and 1991, 80 percent of which 
occurred within the boundaries of the ‘residencial’. 
High levels of interior crime are certainly related to a ‘regulated’ atmosphere of the in-
terior dominated by ‘contractual solitarity’520 and very different from the ideals of (social 
or religious) community building. Caldeira (2000), for example points out that there is 
no positive reference to the idea of community in Brazilian closed condominiums, an 
aspect that she regards as very popular in American gated communities (Although also 
here a stark contrast exist in the communitarian tradition of condominiums and the con-
tractual culture of gated communities). She observes that Brazilian condominiums are 
never advertised as ‘communities’ or as a type of development that could enhance the 
sense of doing things together, and that the inhabitants are often struggling with internal 
conflicts. (Ibidem in Landman 2002: 28)521 
 Illustration D-26: Skating youth 
 
Box 37: AlphaVille’s skating culture 
An exemption and successful example of appropriation of space by AlphaVille’s youth is 
the vibrant skating culture in the area. The suitability of the area’s asphalted hills has 
become known in the whole country and beyond and even started to attract many 
                                               
517 Some sources report that the environs are controlled by armed guards, carrying 12 calibre taurus guns with the theoreti-
cal permission to shoot intruders. (Cf. http://www.ignacioparis.org/?tag=violencia, r5.02.2009) 
518 Not least also the advertising brochures of AlphaVille and its peers 
519 „Os muros que „protegem“ os moradores da violência da cidade acbam não protegado os moradores deles ou seus 
filhos.“ (Gonçalvez 1997: 167) 
520 Cf. the discussion of this concept by Marc Augé, in the first chapter. 
521 A satiric wiki-site portrays the characteristics, complexes, neuroses and obsessions of AlphaVille’s residents: 
(http://desciclo.pedia.ws/wiki/Alphaville, r12.02.2009. 
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middle class youth from outside. Since then several significant competitions have been 
held. The topic is prominent on the YouTube website.522  
 
Lifestyle 
The search for a higher quality of life and a distinct lifestyle are certainly other important 
drivers of AlphaVille-Tamboré and other Brazilian condomínios fechados.523 The longing 
for the freedom to open a window at night, as well as to have a safe place to play for the 
kids is regularly confirmed and became one of the major PR motives of the advertising 
media.524  
As a matter of fact the lifestyle aspect is composed of a combination of several factors 
such as the quest for environments that ease the transfer of (cultural, family) values from 
one generation to another, the longing for peaceful and green surroundings, and also the 
search for a milieu that facilitates the appropriation and representation of a certain social 
identity.525 All of these factors are well represented in the freely available PR materials 
and brochures, as well as on project websites. They also include the built-in option to 
calm down a remorseful conscience by sponsoring some Corporate Social Responsibility 
initiatives, or by becoming a member of the social clubs or environmental projects. (Cf. 
below: Developer, Strategies)  Accordingly, in addition to the 4,5 metre high walls, we 
find an abundance of private and green-space, various club facilities, representative gates, 
multiform options for leisure and consumption, as well as the option for each buyer to 
present their individual style through the individual design of their house. 
Financial security 
The regime of control characteristic for residential enclaves does not remain just physical 
– it also extends to the world of finances. In addition to physical security and a comfort-
able lifestyle, the people’s quest to safeguard their investments represents a third and 
widely understated motive. Even for upper middle class households, the purchase of a 
property in AlphaVille is still a very significant amount of money. The (conservative) 
question of preserving, stabilising, maximising and inheriting this capital becomes a ma-
jor concern; this is the case in particular in high-risk mega city environments such as São 
Paulo.526 (Cf. also to the Finance chapter below) 
Values of target groups 
AlphaVille’s population is on a quest for nothing less than a ‘third alternative’, combin-
ing all the advantages of vibrant urban life with the beauty and enjoyment of the country 
(Cf. Howard 1946 (1898): 46) 527 The fact that most of the families move to the area to 
raise children leads to the popularity of certain ethics. Guarded enclaves represent paci-
                                               
522 An article on the role of Skating is also available at: http://www.alphanews.com.br/materias.asp?id=802 
523 The 1990s political and economical stabilisation enabled many people to join the middle class and to spend more and 
more money on leisure and consumption. 
524 Fitzpatrick 2003 states “The people who live there are usually middle-class Brazilians and expatriate businessmen. These 
places are generally spacious and families can live in houses instead of apartments and their children can walk and play in 
the streets with relative security from traffic and thieves”. 
525 AlphaVille-Tamboré features a wide choice of private schools. This guarantees that children can grow up among a rela-
tively homogeneous group of peers. 
526 According to data presented by residents associations in Morumbi, the biggest concern of the inhabitants is the fear that 
the quarter may undergo a process of disinvestment, decline and deterioration (Cf. Santos, 2003 at 
http://www.nomads.usp.br/site/condominio3.htm, r06.02.2009). 
527 Naturally this is the case for many suburban communities worldwide. 
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fied spheres of safety, stability and harmony in this context, providing an environment 
that facilitates the realisation as well as the tradition (in a global sense) of bourgeois cul-
tures. The general composition of the population, with upper incomes, families or retir-
ees, as well as many entrepreneurs leads to the presumption of a political landscape 
halfway between conservatism and liberalism.528 
Resident groups and associations 
Indeed, the achievement of AlphaVille-Tamboré seems to be based on the fact that the 
place represents a good balance between top-down planning and bottom-up self-
organisation. The fact that all neighbourhoods (‘residencial’) are run by residents associa-
tions once they are completed, emerges as one of the major pillars of the success of this 
urban typology.529  While for example the developers of Bumi Serpong Damai are stug-
gling with the rising cost of upkeep in their neighbourhoods (Cf. Chapter on BSD), Al-
phaVille-Tamboré’s neighbourhoods, whether residential or commercial, are self-
organised and run by bottom-up resident committees.  
AlphaVille’s resident organisations are non-for profit corporations that are adminis-
tered by elected representatives and run by professional employees. The maintenance of 
the respective communal territories is among the major tasks of the consortia. More spe-
cific duties include the landscaping of the common areas, cleaning the streets, the organi-
sation of waste collection services, communal events, social programmes, public relations 
and of course the important issue of security.530 531 The extra services are funded by addi-
tional fees. These usually amount to BRL 300 per month (140 US$). The amount is 
largely spent on security services as well as the joint club (Cf. Personal Interview with 
staff of AlphaVille Urbanismo in March 2006). 
In addition public relations play an important role. The programmes modelled along 
Corporate Social Responsibility strategies range from environmental initiatives to train-
ing programmes for the residents in nearby slums (Cf. below: Developer: Strategy). Yet, 
from a down-to-earth perspective these programmes seek to increase the quality of life by 
protecting the invasion of low-income intruders and industrial entrepreneurs while at the 
same time comforting a guilty conscience. 
SIA 
Interestingly, the presence of about two-dozen resident associations has led to the emer-
gence of the Sociedade AlphaVille Tamboré, or SIA. This is an umbrella organisation 
which embraces most of the resident and business associations as well as many individual 
corporate members532 It was founded in 1993 with the major aim of closing a security 
gap in regard to the whole area and to represent the interests of the individual member 
                                               
528 The fact that no official data on the political orientation AlphaVile-Tamboré’s residents is available points to a need for 
more empirical studies. 
529 Notably the ‘father’ of the Garden City movement, Ebenezer Howard, aimed his Town-City Magnet to be governed by 
resident associations (Howard 1946 (1898): 92). 
530 Cf. SIA at www.sia.org.br, r09.02.2009 
531 The question whether the organisational strategy of resident associations meets a fruitful setting in the local cultural 
context is debated. While for example Fielder (2001) describes the organisation of residents in Brazil as a compulsory exer-
cise (mainly in contrast to the US American buzz of the ‘community’ as a concept and catchword), the author regards the 
Brazilian cultural practices of ‘clubbing’, as well as the political culture of ‘lobbying’ (Cf. above) as important basic elements 
for the communal organisation at hand. 
532 Such as the village of dogs, TV Alphaville, the Collegio Perntagono, or the Dolce Vita Buffet (www.sia.org.br, 
r09.02.2009) 
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associations vis-à-vis public institutions (such as the Barueri Municipal Administra-
tion).533 
A large fraction of the security services which SIA provides is concealed in the vague 
area of traffic-security. This domain ranges from special traffic signals, the patrolling of 
major public streets (including the Castello Branco Highway) 534 to the coordination of an 
integrated security programme with the public police and the security forces of the re-
spective member organisations.535 Other mostly PR-friendly activities in environment, 
health, social life and communication add to the portfolio of the organisation. These 
include recycling, tree planting, anti-mosquito programmes and the organisation of fes-
tivities and social events.536  
Box 38: Selected by-laws of AlphaVille No2537 
- A characteristic resident association is a civic body with non-for profit status  
- It is based on the article 53 of the federal law 10.406/02 
- The [major] objectives of the residents association comprise: a) The implementation of 
internal codes and regulations; b) the provision of common services (landscaping etc); c) 
the approval of construction plans; d) the organisation of social and cultural activities; 
e) the collection of fees and taxes; f) the organisation of the reception and security ser-
vices (also by subcontracting) 
- All property owners are automatically members of the association 
- The share of votes is calculated on the basis of the quantity of land as well as the 
building mass that belongs to the respective member. (Land is calculated in fraction of 
500 square metres, the constructed area counts by shares of 150 square metres) 
- A general assembly, an advisory council, the executive director and the fiscal council 
comprise the governance structure of the society. 
- All the positions within the advisory council, of the executive board, as well as the 
statutory audit committee and the working commission work on an honorary basis. 
- The advisory council meets two times a year. 
- The general assembly elects the representatives (of the advisory council and the execu-
tive board), and approves the budget.  
- The advisory council takes more detailed tasks (e.g. finances and jobs) and organises a 
bi-annual election. 
- The executive board consist of five elected members: President, Administrative Direc-
tor, Financial Manager, Technical Director and the Director of Security. 
- The managing president has the task of representing the association. 
Summary 
A good understanding of the resident, who is at the same time the consumer and also the 
producer of his place, is among the most central elements of a holistic analysis.  
Profile 
AlphaVille-Tamboré is currently home to a population of about 90.000 residents. Most 
of the residents belong to an educated, white collar, affluent, white and family-oriented 
                                               
533 The organisation, for example has successfully lobbied against the installation of eight industrial areas (zonas de uso 
predominantemente industrial, or ZUPI) by the state in AlphaVille’s vicinity in 1995. The project thought to attract new low-
income people to the area (Cf. www.sia.org, r09.02.2009). 
534 Among the patrolled areas are the Avenidas Dr. Yojiro Takaoka, Alpha Norte, Altos de AlphaVille e Pacífico Sul, from 
Melville to Alpha 12 
535 SIA has also persuaded the Municipality of Santana de Parnaíba to run a joint communal police base from a location 
close to the 11th and 12th ‘residencial’. (Ibidem) 
536 Cf. www.sia.org.br/paghistorico1.html, 11.06.08 
537 Cf. Excerpts from the by-laws of the AlphaVille No2 resident association (2004): Approved Draft 25/10/2004, 
r12.06.2008) 
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bourgeoisie. While, prior to the development of the site, the land was under control of 
affluent land barons, e.g. the Penteado family, the project is a tabula rasa scheme with no 
prior settlers remaining on the ground. As a result all residents moved to the site since the 
1970s.  
The bulk of the new residents belong to São Paulo’s upper middle class elites. These 
command incomes of 20 minimum salaries and more and belong to the top 20 percent of 
earners in the population. In contrast to the aristocratic elites of the 16th century, Al-
phaVille-Tamboré’s residents are part of an educated elite of academics and entrepre-
neurs with a significant emphasis on the white-collar service sector (colarinho e gravata) 
and with a high proportion of self-employed. In combination with the enormous daytime 
population of 140.000 predominantly office workers, AlphaVille-Tamboré’s intelligent-
sia accounts for the lion’s share of a recent economic boom in the area. These propel the 
two municipalities that embrace the scheme to the top group of the fastest growing mu-
nicipalities in the whole country. Moreover, the high incomes and good educational lev-
els of the population result in a Human Development Index of Western levels (0,83), 
marking AlphaVille-Tamboré’s hosting municipalities as the most developed places in 
Brazil. (Brazil’s HDI is at 0,8, the figure for the Northern part ranges at 0,76)  
AlphaVille-Tamboré’s residential undertakings are mainly targeting the young starter 
families with kids, who long for a harmonious environment, secure outdoor space and 
stable investments. Consequently, home ownership is among the central motives of the 
target groups, who seek a life centred on their own house and a family. Whereas for 35 
years now the scheme has served as the cradle of more than two new generations, at pre-
sent an all-inclusive range of households, from starters to seniors make up the resident 
demographic. The distribution of distinct age groups in the clusters, however, appears 
fairly homogeneous, reflecting the fact that the neighbourhoods were completed as dis-
tinct projects at particular periods. 
The households portray a typical stratum of consumer society, represented by exuber-
ant amount of dwelling space, multiple cars per household, a wide range of modern 
household gadgets, and domestic servants as a standard. Whilst the area is well served by 
schools, most of the work places remain elsewhere. In consequence the daily life of the 
residents is based on regular commutes between the office, the mall, the club and the 
school. 
Motives 
Among the major reasons of the decision of the buyers to relocate to a guarded condo-
minium three major motives stand out. These are: 1) security, 2) comfort, and 3) finan-
cial security. 
Concerns of security and perceived angst are among the most important motives of re-
locating to AlphaVille-Tamboré. The fact that São Paulo is among the most violent cities 
in the world is the primary reason for affluent families to embrace the project as an al-
ternative secure haven. Indeed, AlphaVille can be regarded as an early bottom-up model 
addressing middle-class insecurity in Brazil. The developers focused on this drive, devel-
oping an integrated security concept which combined high tech surveillance systems, 
walls and fences and armies of private security guards. The buyers in turn seem to be 
willing to spend drastically higher maintenance costs for this protection without batting 
an eyelid.  
Nevertheless, in spite of the armament, the pacified environment also appears to 
stimulate certain crimes. At least fact the remarkable rates of household violence and 
Case 3: AlphaVille-Tamboré   464 
youth delinquency (drug-criminality and petty crimes), as well as the extraordinary high 
rates of traffic accidents (particularly within the enclaves) point to this assumption. 
Quality-of-life and lifestyle issues certainly share the list of the most important drivers 
behind the prominence of Brazilian gated enclaves in the green. The households undenia-
bly long for peaceful and green surroundings – a milieu that facilitates the appropriation 
and representation of their social identity – and for environments that facilitate the tradi-
tion of cultural values from one generation to another. 
The factor of financial substantiality accounts for the third often underestimated mo-
tive of the individuals who decide to buy properties in the area. Of course, middle class 
households are seeking an efficient means to secure and pass on their riches to the next 
generation – in addition to the transfer of ideal values. AlphaVille-Tamboré’s controlled 
neighbourhoods appear as an almost ideal answer to this need. 
In conclusion it can be said that, the above context of motives, most notably the func-
tion of the new home as a base for reproduction (social, cultural, financial), produces a 
predominance of conservative values such as stability, harmony, solidity and safety. Es-
sentially the resulting political landscape, halfway between conservatism and liberalism, 
sheds a new light on the popularity of gated enclaves as a ‘third alternative’ between the 
dangerous city and the backward countryside. 
Management, Organisation 
In addition to the security and lifestyle concepts, the practice of self-government (or 
‘automanagement’) of AlphaVille’s neighbourhoods by the owners is surely among the 
three major pillars of the brand’s success. The fact that resident associations represent the 
residents provides a balance between top-down planning and bottom-up control. The 
owner associations function as non- profit-making bodies which are administered by 
elected representatives and run by professional employees. Significantly, all property 
owners are obliged to become part of the association. The membership is an integral part 
of the purchase contract. What is remarkable is that the amount of votes depends on the 
quantity of properties owned by a member. Whereas additional fees supply the necessary 
financial support, most of the budget is spent on security services as well as the mainte-
nance of the joint facilities. Likewise, social and environmental programmes play a vital 
role. Another remarkable fact is that the joint efforts of the member groups are coordi-
nated by an umbrella organisation – the Sociedade AlphaVille Tamboré or SIA. 
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Developers and Designers–  
From garage venture to industrial conglomerate 
“In the last days of the 20th century, there was a profession of people who, 
ironically enough, called themselves "planners." Even at that time, their 
numbers were dwindling.” (Joel Gareau, 2003) 
While the examination of urban forms and their users is essential to the understanding of 
any spatial environment, when looking at New Towns the question of authorship be-
comes particularly important. Moreover in the case of privately developed projects the 
corporate sector emerges as the chief motor of development. Accordingly the following 
section aims to generate a comprehensive understanding of AlphaVille-Tamboré’s au-
thors, including their ideologies, strategies and motives. While the examination of the 
profile of the developers will be of particular importance, we will also devote a serious 
amount of attention to architecture, planning and design and their integration into a new 
privately driven stakeholder context, as the classical disciplines conceiving space. 
Table 35: AlphaVille-Tambore’s developers & designers 
Development  
Name of developer AlphaVille Urbanismo SA, Tamboré SA, MVT Ltda. Engi-
neering 
Name of company Gafisa SA, Brascan SA (among the largest real estate firms in 
Brazil) 
Origins ‘Garage’ start-up venture, Albuquerke and Takaoka Em-
preendimentos SA 
Type of firm Sociedade Anónima (corporation) 
Purpose  For-profit 
Major product AlphaVille guarded condominiums (a robust and high-quality 
product with brand-status) 
Slogan “Um Mundo Melhor para você” (A better world for you) 
Mantra of the firm; Major 
‘ingredients of success’ 
‘Business-oriented evolution model’, professionalism, institu-
tional credibility and value orientation, perfectionism, quality-
control, active and flexible managing style 
Implementation strategy Security, quality, careful phasing, automanagement 
Strategies of the new mother 
company 
Professional management and corporate governance, world-
wide integration, growth and diversification 
Structure  4 major branches, (planning, technology, marketing, man-
agement) 
Staff at Barueri location ~ 40 
Structure of mother company Range of 5 brands towards a broad market spectrum 
Quality management stan-
dards 
Quality-Control Manual, ISO 9.000, Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM), SAP-Tools, SOX certificate 
Social and environmental pol-
icies, Rehabilitation and Re-
Large CSR package, AlphaVille & Tamboré foundations, (no 
R&R) 
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settlement packages 
Product trends Mixed superblocks, turn-key projects, low income schemes 
(BairroNovo, VillasAlpha), financial market products, ecolog-
ical gated communities 
Design  
Planners, Designers, Archi-
tects 
Focus on in-house product innovation, limited range of 
trusted partners 
Planning and urban design 
strategy 
Technological perfection dominates over artistic expression; 
principles are more momentous than forms; codes and quality 
standards are preferred to spatial planning, tabula rasa is 
more important than context 
Important designers and con-
sultants 
Reinaldo Pestana, Alfred Willer, Fernando Chacel, Jamie 
Lerner, Arquitectonica 
Trends in design  ‘Abstract localisation’ techniques, eco-branding, lifestyle 
theming 
Trends in open space (Re)-introduction of new spatial hierarchies by the closure of 
the neighbourhoods 
Marketing  
Marketing instruments Newsletters, showrooms, websites, soap operas, parties & 
events 
Tactics in marketing ‘Dual transparency’ and focus on customer relations; em-
ployment of multiple brands; combined lifestyle branding and 
eco-strategies; active construction of product-images (Imagi-
neering) 
Trends in marketing Images are more important than realities, role of CSR strate-
gies institutionalised by non-profit foundations, ‘redundant 
marketing’ and outsourcing 
 
Profile 
Name and background of developers 
The firms AlphaVille Urbanismo SA, Tamboré SA, as well as the MVT Ltda. Engineering 
are among the three major developers of the AlphaVille-Tamboré cluster city. AlphaVille 
Urbanismo has developed about 18 residential enclaves, the central business district, sev-
eral commercial centres and a large industrial area. On Tamboré’s project list are five 
gated communities, one major shopping centre, a light industrial park, two enterprise 
centres and seven residential towers (cf. www.tambore.com.br). In contrast, MVT’s im-
pact is rather qualitative. It has developed the first green gated community named Gêne-
sis and plans the first mixed lifestyle superblock scheme named São Paulo Wellness. 
All three companies are based on creative individual entrepreneurs. They represent the 
dynamics of a middle-sized business sector with an ‘achievers’ spirit, as is characteristic 
in Brazil’s post-migratory context538: AlphaVille was founded by the engineers Renato 
Albuquerque and Yoshiro Takaoka and later controlled by Albuquerque and his son in 
law Nuno Luis de Carvalho Alves. Tamboré is directed by the lawyer Fábio Penteado de 
                                               
538 The website of Takaoka names “Entrepreneurial sensitivity, boldness and pionerism, the foundations of our history.” (Cf. 
www.takaoka.com.br, r12.01.2009) 
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Ulhôa Rodrigues who married into the Penteado family (the long-established owners of 
the land). MVT Inc is controlled by the son of Yoshiro Takaoka Marcello Vesponti Ta-
kaoka. (Cf. above: Milestones) 
The largest section of AlphaVille-Tamboré – more than half of the area – was devel-
oped by the firm AlphaVille Urbanismo SA. The history of the firm can be traced back to 
a partnership of two young engineering graduates Yorshiro Takaoka and Renato Albu-
querque in the early 1950s. By mid 1990s the firm became the largest developer of 
guarded horizontal condominiums in Brazil (Cf. Business Net, 2007). Indeed the family 
enterprises of AlphaVille Urbanismo as well as Tamboré SA were dominating the area 
for more than four decades.  
The major authors of the AlphaVille-Tamboré cluster started as associates and limited 
companies. Today as part of a consolidation process in the Brazilian market the trend 
goes to large incorporated, publicly listed and highly diversified consortia. AlphaVille-
Tamboré’s history demonstrates that the area is attracting more and more large corpo-
rate stakeholders. 539 Hence it was no surprise when in 2006 both of the enterprises were 
taken over by two of Brazil’s largest corporate real estate developers – Gafisa SA540 has 
absorbed AlphaVille, while Brascan Residential properties has bought Tamboré SA. 
Gafisa estimates the potential value of the land bank it owns with AlphaVille at BRL 
4.1 billion in potential sales (Cf. Business Net, 2007). The merger is supposed to lead to 
important synergies combining AlphaVille’s main expertise in developing lots and Gaf-
isa’s experience of developing turnkey apartments (www.gafisa.com.br, r12.07.2008). 
Despite the recent boom in takeovers, the pioneering businesses such as AlphaVille 
Urbanismo, Tamboré SA or MVT remain major partners in several new schemes cur-
rently underway in the area. As a matter of fact, for the time being AlphaVille will oper-
ate as a subsidiary of Gafisa, as it were an independent Company and will keep its offices 
and team in Barueri.541  
 
Among these projects is, for example, a new iTower project developed by Brascan or 
MVT’s São Paulo Wellness superblock scheme. (Cf. above: Structure: CBD) 
Box 39: Gafisa 
Gafisa SA, is the new owner of AlphaVille Urbanismo since 2006. Along with Cyrela and 
Rossi Residential SA it is one of Brazil’s largest developers. The firm operates as a 
homebuilder, engaging in the development of residential buildings, land subdivisions 
including electric, water and sewage systems, paved streets and common recreational 
areas, guarded horizontal condominiums, shopping centres, schools, and entry-level 
housing. The company also provides construction services to third parties (for example 
at the Genêsis project cf. above).  
Gafisa’s history demonstrates a trend of increasing growth, standardisation and inter-
nationalisation. The firm emerged from the enterprises Gomes de Almeida Fernandes 
Ltda., or “GAF,” which was established in 1954 in Rio de Janeiro. Only in late 1997, GP 
Investimentos SA and its affiliates, or “GP,” entered into a partnership with the share-
holders of GAF to create Gafisa SA. In 2004 GP became dominant, and in 2005 an affili-
ate of Equity International Management  LLC or “Equity International” bought ap-
                                               
539 Some other real estate magnates that recently became active in the area are: CIA Lançamentos Imobiliários; SPQ; Ode-
brecht Enpreedimentos Immobiliários (oei.com.br); or Iguatemi etc. 
540 Cf. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=axj8kMQdhk8A&refer=latin_america, r03.05.2009. 
541 Mr. Nuno Luis de Carvalho Alves and Mr. Renato Albuquerque will keep 40 percent of AlphaVille throughout the next 
five years. Mr Nuno Luis de Carvalho Alves will remain the Chief Executive Officer of AlphaVille. On the other hand Gafisa 
will man three out of the five members of AlphaVille’s consultative administration board (Cf. Press note by Gafisa, 2006: 7; 
at www.gafisa.com.br, r12.07.2008). 
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proximately 32 percent of Gafisa. In February 2006, the firm concluded its initial public 
offering in Brazil, floating 47 percent of its shares.542  
As of December 31, 2007 more than 954 developments and constructed over 40 million 
square meters of housing under various brands had been completed. The corporation 
operated in local 49 markets, including Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Fortaleza, 
Natal, Curitiba, Belo Horizonte, Manaus, Porto Alegre and Belem, across 17 states.543 
Box 40: Brascan 
Brascan SA (Brascan), the holder of Tamboré SA, is a Canadian firm that has been oper-
ating in Brazil for over a century in the sectors of finance, real estate, energy, mining, 
agriculture, and business services. Brascan Residential Properties SA (Brascan) is a Brazil-
based company engaged in real estate sector. The company was ranked as the best of 
12 top Brazilian construction and real estate firms by business magazine Carta Capital. 
Jacky Delmar is the 54-year-old CEO of the company.  
Brascan operations include land acquisition, planning, construction, sales, financing, 
customer service, design, development and management of real estate. Its holdings in-
clude several of Brazil's largest shopping malls and a growing number of hotels and 
residential projects. Half of its revenues in 2008 came from residential projects, the 
other half from the hotel and mall branch. The projects range from the 189-room Hotel 
Inter-Continental São Paulo to the 400-store Riosul shopping mall, or the US$ 80 million 
Waterways residential complex in Rio's glitzy Barra de Tijuca. The firm operates with 
strategic joint ventures with the Inter-Continental brand and related products, such as 
Holiday Inn, or Crowne Plaza or Staybridge. 
The projects are mainly targeted at luxury homebuyers, but also more and more at the 
rising middle class markets. Most recently national and international joint ventures 
have been playing an increasing role. The mother company Brascan Brazil Holding LLC, 
headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, is the subsidiary of the Canadian conglomerate Brook-
field Asset Management.544  
Institutional geography of developers  
AlphaVille Urbanismo’s structure 
The corporate structure of AlphaVille Urbanismo SA reflects an equal focus on planning 
and implementation as on marketing and managerial aspects. Its national operations are 
headquartered in the central business district of AlphaVille-Tamboré. The firm operates 
here with a staff of about 30 to 40 in a building constructed by MVT (Marcelo Vesponti 
Takaoka SA). The undertaking is divided into four major departments: the projects office 
(diretoria de projetos), the technical department (diretoria técnica), a marketing division 
(diretoria de marketing), and managerial and financial division (diretoria administrativo-
financeira).545 The project department is responsible for the conception of the projects, 
the technical office coordinates their implementation, the marketing section organises the 
advertising campaigns and supervises the sales, and the finance-management office deals 
with human resources, accounting and administrates the treasury.546  
AlphaVille-Tamboré’s companies are thriving along a ‘business oriented evolution 
model’. The distinct entrepreneurs flourish in networks of other successful partners, 
                                               
542 Cf. http://sec.edgar-online.com/gafisa-sa/20-f-annual-and-transition-report-foreign-private-
issuer/2008/06/18/Section6.aspx, r12.03.2009. 
543 Cf. http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=GFA.N&rpc=66 ,r13.01.2009 
544 Cf. http://finance.google.com; and http://www.brascanresidential.com.br, www.luxner.com/cgi-
bin/view_article.cgi?articleID=31; r16.01.2008 
545 Cf. Visita Especial: Alphaville Urbanismo, http://www.abrarec.com.br/06_visitas_especiais_191006.asp; r14.07.2008 
546 Personal interview with project staff in March 2006; Cf. Abrarec 2006 
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whether that be the design, finance or the construction sector. These are characterised by 
highly flexible and open organisational set ups.547 
Business-oriented evolution model 
The companies themselves are characterised by a large base of professional and interdis-
ciplinary know-how, be it in economics, marketing or politics. Keeping a broad view on 
things, most of the entrepreneurs maintain close contacts to local NGO’s and institutions 
of higher education. This combination of intellectualism, professionalism and curious 
openness results in a strategy referred to as a ‘business-oriented evolution model’548 
Important parts of the ‘game’ are progressive management principles. These imply an 
emphasis on the whole process of production instead just on the bare product. This fac-
tor requires frequent adjustments of the set-up of the enterprise in order to make it able 
to address the rapidly changing needs of particular periods. AlphaVille portrays this 
trend as it started as a two-man partnership, continued as a limited corporation, before it 
became incorporated and finally taken over by a large corporation. 
Gafisa’s shopping tour 
Both takeovers, the one of AlphaVille by Gafisa, and also Tamboré by Brascan, are rep-
resentative of an important trend of maturation and consolidation of the Brazilian real 
estate sector.549 With AlphaVille on board, Gafisa will be able to cover a wider spectrum 
of the market from luxury condominiums to prefabricated housing models for lower 
middle classes. To improve the efficiency of supplying the respective markets, the firm 
operates with five major subsidiaries/brands: Gafisa, AlphaVille, FIT, Bairro Novo and 
Cipesa550. In addition Gafisa Vendas551 was established for the purpose of marketing and 
selling the products. While Gafisa continues to target the luxury slice of the pie, Al-
phaVille will cater to the middle-income classes, FIT residential (Tenda) and Bairro Novo 
will provide housing to the ‘entry-level’ lower income market segments (Cf. IBGE).552 
Box 41: Bairro Novo – Another brand of gated communities for the lower income sector553 
Bairro Novo is a particularly interesting subsidiary of Gafisa. The firm specialises in de-
veloping large scale standardized and fully integrated communities in the environs of 
                                               
547 Marcelo Takaoka’s MVT for example collaborated in several schemes with John George De Carle Gottheiner (financial 
expert), Victor Rebouças (Mesidia Expert), and Reinaldo Pestana (Architect, Urban Designer) (Cf. above: Projeto Gênesis). 
Tamboré SA collaborated with Rodobens Real estate Businesses and the MPD-KC Real estate Enterprises in its five residential 
schemes (Cf. Tamboré Website). 
548 AlphaVille.com.br, Historia, r12.06.2008. 
549 Notably this maturation is paralleled by a growing availability of household credit for Brazilian people (Cf. below: Fi-
anance, Affordability). 
550 Cipesa is a 70/30 percent joint venture among Gafisa with Tércio Wanderley, an important Brazilian conglomerate with a 
focus on agricultural products and technologies, such as producer of sugarcane and ethanol, yet also with a broad experi-
ence in civil construction. The firm is based in Maceló (state Alagoas) and operates mainly in the North Eastern region of 
Brazil. It is mainly orientated towards the middle and upper income market segments, building vertical as well as horizontal 
condomínios. Significantly, the firm advertises a new project in the seaside neighbourhood of Jatiúca (Trade residence) as a 
big opportunity to dwell in a first world complex (“A grande opportunidade de viver á beira-mar de Jatiúca. Em um com-
plexa de primeiro mundo”). Yet, FIT appartments are also on sale. (www.cipesa.com.br/; http://www.cipesagafisa.com.br, 
r12.02.2009).  
551 Gafisa Vendas was founded in in September of 2006 in São Paulo and is planned to widen its operations gradually to the 
whole country (www.gafisa.com,br, r12.01.2008). 
552 FIT residencial (Tenda) was established in March of 2007 to focus at the market of units in a price range between BRL 
50,000 to BRL 150,000 (US$ 20.000 to 60.000) Gafisa.com.br, r12.02.2009). The firm was merged with Construdora Tenda 
SA in November 2008, which is also under majority control of Gafisa (Cf. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=axFaawz2lZe4&refer=latin_america, r15.02.2009). 
553 The following paragraph contains selected Qoutes from Gafisa’s information sheet on Bairro Novo, 2007 
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large metropolitan areas554 Its objective is to develop a new concept of lifestyle real es-
tate products for the affordable low entry level (“AEL”) housing market in Brazil (Gaf-
isa.com.br, r12.02.2009). 
The firm is a 50/50 joint venture of Gafisa and the construction firm Odebrecht empre-
endimentos, a further 120-year-old Brazilian developer. As much as Albuquerque’s 
product VilasAlpha, Bairro Novo is focused on developing large scale standardised and 
fully integrated communities close to metropolitan areas. In order to achieve economies 
of scale, Bairro Novo has designed three standard units that can be adapted to any pro-
ject: two- and three-bedroom houses and two-bedroom apartments ranging in size 
from 43 to 68 square meters. The projects will be standardised, ranging from 1000 to 
10.000 units per development, and may be either vertical or horizontal. The neighbour-
hoods are divided into smaller sections of approximately 500 units, which will be part of 
an association responsible for preserving the common areas and standards of each de-
velopment. The venture is working with both Caixa Econômica Federal and commercial 
banks to develop mortgage solutions. 
First model projects are under development in Camaçari (Bahia), Porto Velho 
(Rondônia) and Cotia (São Paulo). Bairro Novo Cotia will serve as an important test pi-
lot. It is being developed on a roughly 110-acre land parcel in the city of Cotia, located 
45 minutes from the centre of São Paulo. The floor plan sizes of the row house and 
apartment typologies range from about 30 to 60 square metres. The project will com-
prise 2.386 units, will have a potential sales value (PSV) of around R$170 million, and 
will be developed in five phases. A first phase with 464 units was launched in December 
8th 2007 and produced R$ 32 million of pre-sales while 2.000 potential clients have reg-
istered. The units are supposed to be delivered within one year. 
Noteworthy elements of Bairro Novo Cotia’s business model are the financing options 
that Bairro Novo has developed in partnership with ABN AMRO. Families targeted for 
this product typically have a monthly income between 3 and 10 times the minimum 
wage. This target customer has historically been underserved in terms of mortgage and 
financing options for homebuyers. (www.bairronovo.com.br; r08.02.2009) 
 
Development strategy 
“Entrepreneurial, Opportunistic, Intrepid, Forward, Institutional, Strategic, 
Leading”555  
Yojiro Takaoka’s and Renato Albuquerque’s type of guarded condominium became a 
benchmark product in the entire Brazilian market. AlphaVille Urbanismo, in the posses-
sion of one of Brazil’s largest land banks556, planned to launch 46 new projects between 
2006 and 2010 only. This success can be traced back to a combination of several ‘right-
place-at-the-right-time’ and intuition factors: The developers purchased the land before 
the highway (Castello Branco) was implemented, blending crucial strategies, which ex-
isted before into a new product.557 
An additional facet of AlphaVille’s success is represented by the firm’s intrinsic ability 
to find the right blend between robustness and flexibility. At the core of the enterprise 
                                               
554 A comparable model, the Vilas Alpha was developed by AlphaVille’s boss Renato Albuquerque. (Cf. above: Context, 
Predecessors and Peers) 
555 Prophetic self description by Equity International, the firm that owns about 20 percent of Gafisa (AlphaVille’s mother 
company) and which facilitated the IPO on the New York Stock Exchange, NYSE. (Cf.: www.equitynternational.com, 
r12.03.2009) 
556 Amounting to 900 hectares, with a worth of BRL 2 billion (840 million US$) and space for 15.000 units 
557 These are represented by the legacy of São Paulo’s elite neighbourhoods, the context of local leisure communities, as 
well as the novel the North American typologies of the Edge Cities, gated communities, and the practices of lifestyle market-
ing and self-governance by resident associations. 
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stands a ‘serious and honest management model’ based on an open business concept and 
good quality management, resulting in a robust yet also flexible product. While the pro-
fessionalism accounts for the robustness of the undertaking, the firm and its products 
have always been open for adaptation and change. Renato Albuquerque describes ac-
cordingly: “With the time, we were improving our concept, improving our contracts, and 
created our model of self management philosophy that guides the AlphaVille enter-
prises.”558 The firm’s self description writes in addition: “The capability of renewing it-
self bringing new experiences, technologies and environmental care to each project, as 
well as the capability of adapting to each market’s characteristics, has made the brand 
AlphaVille synonymous with superior lifestyle all across Brazil.” (Cf. AlphaVille.com.br, 
23.08.2008) 
A further key element of success is certainly the right balance between outsourcing 
and autonomy. And while the Albuquerque and Takaoka worked in the right networks 
of partners, all fundamental keystones of the core business process have remained with 
the core company. AlphaVille carries out all steps, from the parcelling of the land, the 
approval and licensing together with the public sectors, to the implementation of the 
project: from the establishment of community master plans to the construction of state-
of-the-art infrastructure and the delivery of the complex.559 As the AlphaVille model 
spreads to the whole country and beyond, the schemes are developed either in partner-
ship with individual land proprietors, or after the 100 percent acquisition of the land.560  
The brand of the AlphaVille ‘residencial’ 
The physical concept of an AlphaVille ‘residencial’ can be compared to a floor plan of a 
private house that was zoomed up to the scale of a neighbourhood. At the core of the 
concept of AlphaVille’s ‘loteamento fechado horizontais’ are seven elements:  
1. A large perimeter wall that demarcates a new internal semi-private space;  
2. A representative entrance organising and controlling access;  
3. An interior marked by a highly standardised homogeneous pattern of singly fam-
ily dwellings;   
4. Service facilities and infrastructure of highest standards (Centro do Apoio) 
which are kept on the outside;561 562 
5. Maybe most crucially: The whole form and its function being harmonised by le-
gal contracts and self-managed by residents associations;  
6. The developer being allowed to withdraw after completion of one neighbour-
hood module; (Cf. below ‘automanagement’)  
7. At the end, the handling of each of the ‘residencials’ as its own enterprise. 
Indeed the model thrives on the fact that that practice of gating and walling is particu-
larly valuable and applicable when suburban farmland is under development pressure. 
                                               
558 “Com o tempo, fomos aprimorando o nosso conceito, melhorando nossos contratos, e criamos o nosso modelo de 
autogestão, filosofia que norteia os empreendimentos AlphaVille.” Albuquerque, In : AV Historia at www.alphaville.com.br, 
r20.02.2009. 
559 Cf. www.alphaville.com.br, r20.02.2009; and also Fiedler 2001 
560 Cf. Gafisa 2007: 5; also: www.alphaville.com.br, r12.01.2009. 
561 The same is true for the ‘AlphaVille Clube’, which is a very important element found in every project. 
562 When a new residential condominium is developed, the company does all the basic civil works for supporting the con-
struction on the lots, such as electrical, telephone and data communications cabling, hydraulic (water and sewer) mains and 
treatment facilities, landscaping and gardening, lighting and paving of internal avenues and streets, perimeter walling and 
security fencing, supporting buildings for security, services, etc. In most of the developments, a social and sports club for the 
residents is also built, with soccer, golf and tennis fields, jogging and bicycle treks, sauna, swimming pools, ballrooms, 
restaurants and bars, etc. (Wikipedia’s account on Alphaville at www. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alphaville,_S%C3%A3o_Paulo, r12.12.2008) 
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Studies have confirmed that people are willing to spend significantly more for the ameni-
ties and benefits of common open space with smaller individual lots in clustered commu-
nities as opposed to larger plots in open land subdivisions.563  
A certain amount of delineated sovereignty is guaranteed as everyone can hire their 
own individual architect, while at the same time the main land uses as well as the build-
ing envelopes are strictly regulated. This then results in an ideal, ethereal ‘deep-freezing’ 
of the quarter’s image. As we have seen above564: Perimeter walls are allowed on the 
backsides only, it is not permitted to merge lots, the building height is restricted to 1,5 
stories, buildable floor space amounts to a ratio of 1 etc.  
Indeed, AlphaVille’s quest for perfection resulted in a drive to become the golden-
child in the real estate business. The company was the first Brazilian company to intro-
duce environmental impact guidelines without any pressure from the public hand. The 
company’s planners even provided capacity building and training services to public offi-
cials in this respect. This, along with the elaborate codes, underlines the argument that a 
private sector company is not only interested in short term profits, but, under certain 
circumstances, is also capable of developing high quality environments while the public 
sector is left behind. (Cf. Fiedler 2001)  
Gafisa’s corporate strategy –Growth, Diversification and Standardisation 
In contrast to AlphaVille’s set of strategies, which originate in one locality and are 
mainly geared to one brand (the AlphaVille ‘residencial’) the corporate strategy of Gafisa 
reflects the rationales of large corporate businesses. The firm’s concept rests on six pil-
lars: 1) “Leadership and strong brand recognition”, 2) “Professional management and 
established organisation”; 3) “World-class shareholders and high standards of corporate 
governance”; 4) “Efficient business models and strategic land banks”; 5) “Geographic 
diversification”; and 6) “Robust growth in housing”565  
1. Gafisa seeks to be a market leader of real estate business in Brazil with products 
of the best possible reputation and a solid standing among all partners and cli-
ents such as property buyers, agents, financers and landowners.  
2. To reach these goals it has acquired a range of companies and created as set of 
strong and well defined brands, such as Gafisa, AlphaVille, Fit, or Bairro Novo 
representing a diversified basket of products for specific customer groups. 
3. On the other hand the financial diversification of the firm’s financial input as 
represented by the IPOs at the national and US markets, has also resulted in the 
introduction of new transparent governance structures, as well as new codes, 
techniques and management standards.566 Significantly most of these standards 
go beyond local requirements. 
4. Gafisa employs a strategy of economies of scale in building up of an enormous 
strategic land bank (currently totalling 7,3 million square metres). In addition 
the tactic of outsourcing of risks is applied in a strategy of land swapping. Here 
partnerships with local landholders are established. These make land available 
for the developer and obtain a certain share of the finished product in ex-
change. 
                                               
563 Amato and Takaoka 2004 are quoting a study by Jeff Lacy about the Centre for Rural Massachusetts 
564 Cf. above: Structure: Blocks and Buildings 
565 Cf. Gafisa Fact Scheet 3Q08 at: www.gafisa.com, r12.02.2009. 
566 Such as the introduction of SAP, the application of the United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 
and the full compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
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5. The tactics of geographic diversification represents dynamics of scope. Here Gaf-
isa seeks to shift its efforts from the classical centres towards rapidly develop-
ing ‘young’ urban centres in the whole nation. It currently operates in 66 cities 
covering all states.567  
6. Above all Gafisa’s 54 year success is based on the consistent growth of the de-
mand for housing related to the demographic and socio-economic trend of a 
constantly growing and increasingly affluent population seeking to fulfil the 
dream of owning a house. 
 Illustration D-27: Gafisa’s subsidiaries 
 Illustration D-28: Gafisa’s regional diversification 
Implementation strategy – Careful phasing and ‘automanagement’ 
AlphaVille Urbanismo’s firmly standardised and phased production process is an essen-
tial element of its extraordinary accomplishment. Each project consists of six major 
phases and as well as a consecutive ‘automanagement’ level. These are: 1) Strategic 
Analysis, 2) Acquisition, 3) Master planning, 4) Marketing and Sale, 5) Construction, 
and 6) Occupation.  
The analytical phase contains the selection of the site, the elaboration of the legal 
framework, the definition of a project team and the development of a preliminary con-
cept for the project. The next level comprises the purchase of the site as well as the clos-
ing of contracts with partners and owners, and in turn the master plan is elaborated and 
brought forward for official approval568. When the project is formally approved the mar-
keting and sales phase begins569 then implementation starts. The product is formally 
handed over to the residents via the respective associations which embark on elaborate 
legal contracts. (Cf. Gafisa 2007: 5)  
This transfer of the project marks the start of what the developer calls the ‘automan-
agement’ phase. This means that from now the project is run by the new residents along 
a detailed set of codes and regulations (Cf. above): “...the Automanagement system 
transforms each residential complex into an autonomous community, as the owners un-
dertake the task of assuring safety, leisure, comfort, environmental considerations, man-
agement and maintenance”... “Every AlphaVille complex has a collection of rules regard-
ing construction and habitation which aims to preserve its urban quality and to increase 
the value of both the residents’ as well as the investor’s assets”. (Cf. alphaville.com.br, 
r.12.01.2009) 
 Illustration D-29: Gafisa’s ‘competitive strenghts’ 
 Illustration D-30: Private security 
A new buyer of a property in AlphaVille receives a buyer’s folder with all the details of 
the residential complex, such as registration data, distinctiveness of each territory, de-
scription and regulations. This material is an integral part of the purchase contract and 
contains: 1) The purchase contract (Promessa de compra e venda); 2) the statutes of the 
residents association in charge (Estatuto da Associação); 3) the building regulations 
                                               
567 “This gives the company added flexibility in developing properties in areas that will generate the highest returns at differ-
ent points in time.” (Cf. Gafisa Fact Scheet 3Q08 at: www.gafisa.com, r12.02.2009) 
568 This phase may take as long as 3 years and include lobbying and negotiations with governments at local, state and even 
federal levels 
569 In their first residential venture, the ‘residencial’ 1, Albuquerque Takaoka induced demand and created momentum by 
building the first 30 houses and providing subsidised constrution material for all buyers. (Gonçalvez: 164) 
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(Regulamento do loteamento); 4) a technical documentation of the present lot infrastruc-
ture (Memorial das obras do loteamento); 5) a description of the leisure areas in the 
neighbourhood (Memorial das obras da área de lazer); 6) a master plan document of the 
entire neighbourhood; 7) a detailed plan of the individual property (e.g. the respective 
lot); and 8) a registration document (Matrícula), which documents the public approval of 
the undertaking. 
Quality standards 
The developers in the AlphaVille-Tamboré area are an example for the rising weight of 
quality standards stemming from the industrial business world in the real estate markets. 
Indeed, it can be observed that these standards and codes, mostly represented by ISO 
norms and certifications, become strategic instruments of real estate firms operating un-
der circumstances of augmented competition and consolidating markets. 
Significantly Gafisa, the firm that has acquired AlphaVille in 2007 had implemented 
ISO 9000 standards570 for quality management as early as 2002.571 572 Today more and 
more ventures choose to implement the ISO 9001, but also increasingly for environ-
mental standards such as the ISO 14001 series. Moreover, as a side effect of Gafisa’s IPO 
in Brazil 2006 and at the NYSE in 2007 (Cf. below: Financial framework) was that the 
firm had to demonstrate a higher rate of accountability and reliability. As a consequence 
the firm started to implement SAP instruments573 as well as the SOX certification stan-
dards574 in 2008.  
While a notable forerunner in introducing the environmental ISO 14000 set of 
norms575 to the Brazilian real estate market was the private developer Sobloco576, some of 
the local firms in the AlphaVille-Tamboré area are also spearheading this trend.  
Marcello Takaoka’s MVT Ltda., for example, has received the ISO 14001 certificate by 
the BRTUV, the ISO 26.000,577 as well as being the first real estate company in the coun-
try to receive the green certificate of the FSC (Forest Stewardship Council) as578.  
                                               
570 The ISO 9000 series stresses the satisfaction of the end customers, focusing on the quality of the entire chain of produc-
tion instead on evaluating the final product only (no matter at what price it may have been achieved). 
571 Gafisa describes itself as one of the leading incorporators and leader constructors in the Brazilian market with reference 
of quality, innovation, efficiency and professionalism, currently controlling more than 10 percent of the national real estate 
market. It is claims that success was predominantly possible through the adaptation of professional business, financial, 
quality management and environmental standards. (Cf. website of Gafisa) 
572 Additional enterprises using these standards are Gafisa’s subsidiary Tenda, or Fal2 a real estate developer and a project 
management company closely associated with AlphaVille Urbanismo. 
573 SAP is a business standard and a widely used software package which helps to integrate (and standardise) business 
processes from Enterprise Resource Planning, Customer Relationship Management, to Customer Relationship Management 
(Cf. www.sap.com) 
574 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 
2002is a set of accounting standards that was introduced by the US Government after a series of large corporate scandals, 
such as the Enron scandal, in the year of 2002. 
575 ISO 14000 is the international specification for an environmental management system (EMS). It specifies requirements for 
establishing an environmental policy, determining environmental aspects and impacts of products/activities/services, plan-
ning environmental objectives and measurable targets, implementation and operation of programs to meet objectives and 
targets, checking and corrective action, and management review. This series of norms introduced important environmental 
standards within industrial processes and is increasingly being applied by service industries and other businesses. (Cf. 
www.iso.org) 
576 Cf. above: Context, Predecessors, Rivera do São Lorenço 
577 The ISO 26000 standard, also referred to as the ethics norm, stresses aspects of corporate social responsibility and are 
often part of the firms CSR packages. While the ISO 26000 has to be seen in relation to the 9000 and 14000 norms it is 
more a set of guidelines than a certification. In contrast to the Certificates such as the only by the FSC are distinctions for 
achievements in forest preservation (cf to www.iso.org). 
578 Cf. www.takaoka.com.br, r24.06.2008; Cf. above Project Timeline; Genênesis 
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The various prices and awards AlphaVille received for its product management in re-
cent years confirm the success of its quality management approach.579 In the context of 
voluntary obligations AlphaVille Urbanismo has signed the ‘pacto global’ in 2008. This 
“Global Contract” was designed by the United Nations and is geared towards interna-
tionally operating businesses addressing various issues of corporate social and environ-
mental responsibility issues such as anti-corruption, responsible investment, peace, 
womens’ rights, etc.580  
The above examples demonstrate that while the Brazilian real estate industry grows 
and consolidates, undoubtedly a process of standardisation in the real estate sector is 
underway. The new norms and quality management techniques have a profound impact 
on the way customers are handled and on the form of the emerging urban typologies and 
spaces. Among the important effects is the increasing focus towards the whole process of 
product development, from finance to the planning and implementation stage, to the 
final satisfaction of the customer. Significantly Gafisa describes their customer oriented 
service approach as follows: “In our industry, customer satisfaction is based in large part 
on our ability to respond promptly and courteously to buyers before, during and after 
the sale of our properties.”581  
The renewed focus on customers includes several innovative and personalised cus-
tomer service techniques. Owner’s guides contain all documentations of the unit deliv-
ered. Developers pamper their customers with breakfasts at construction sites, monthly 
photos of the progress of the project. In addition pre-delivery inspections are undertaken. 
Regular contact is also maintained by sending magazines such as “Revista Living News,” 
“Revista Vero Alphaville” to potential customers. Clients receive a monthly status report 
on the construction of their unit and regular satisfaction surveys serve as a base for moni-
toring and self-evaluation of the firms various departments (customer services, construc-
tion and title services). (Ibidem) 
Goals and deliverables of the developers 
 “If you want to build a ship, don't drum up the men to gather wood, divide 
the work and give orders. Instead, teach them to yearn for the vast and end-
less sea.”582  
Saint Exupery’s quote above points to the fact that the visions as well as the goals of the 
main stakeholders are among the most critical elements of a project’s success. AlphaVille 
displays a set of visions and general principles, which constitute the major basis of the 
elasticity, resilience and flexibility of the project. In this context the developers aim to 
produce nothing less than “A better world for you”.583 The undertaking seeks to repre-
sent an alternative environment that is radically different from the norm. While the de-
velopers aim to retain a Brazilian identity, they intend to create a city without slums, 
chaos, or crime – different from other elite quarters such as Morumbi (Cf. Gonçalves 
1998). 
                                               
579 For example the “Prêmio Destaque no Marketing 2008” by the Brazilian Association of Marketing and Negotiations 
(ABMN). (From http://www.folhavitoria.com.br/site/?target=coluna&cid=32&pagina=1&post=8605, r12.03.2009) 
580 Cf. www.alphaville.com.br/pages.php?recid=206; www.unglobalcompact.org/, r12.02.2009. 
581 This data stems from statement that Gafisa released on the occasion of its US American public offering in late 2007 (Cf. 
http://sec.edgar-online.com/gafisa-sa/20-f-annual-and-transition-report-foreign-private-issuer/2008/06/18/Section6.aspx, 
r12.03.2009). 
582 Antoine de Saint-Exupery 1948: The Wisdom of the Sands (La Citadelle); Paris; [free translation by the author]. 
583 “Um Mundo Melhor para você” (Slogan of AlphaVille Urbanismo SA. (Cf. www.alphaville.com.br, r22.02.2009) 
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Consequently AlphaVille’s benchmark products seek to provide house buyers with the 
means to fulfil their dreams of a secure life in an environment that facilitates the repro-
duction of their status quo (Cf. above: Population). Going beyond the scope of the aver-
age, the project is supposed to become a benchmark city – in regard to its urban forms as 
well the lifestyles it makes possible.584 Accordingly: “The freedom of walking in the 
streets and the sense of tranquillity in the home characterize and typify each AlphaVille 
model. Safety has always been one of the priority areas, since the first AlphaVille was 
launched, in the early 70’s.”585  
In the awareness that to achieve ideals of this calibre it needs more than simply a 
technical strategy, the developers have placed values as well as a corporate ethos at the 
centre of the company’s strategy: “The “AlphaVille concept” is, in fact, a philosophy 
that has as its main values honesty, reliability, objectivity, safety and respect.”586 587 
This underlying business ethos is supposed to underlie the enterprise’s quality-control 
policy and the interaction of all stakeholders – from employees, collaborators, house 
owners to investors. The company is aware that value has to be added beyond the capital 
in various ways, such as institutional credibility, delivery of best practices, commitment 
to the highest corporate standards, a unique operating perspective and active and flexible 
managing style. This ethos is supposed to penetrate the final products, reverberating in 
the role of conduct in the communities or the trustworthiness of the firm’s shares. A pa-
per by the Brazilian Association of Enterprise-Client Relationships (Abrarec) states: "The 
mission of the AlphaVille Urbanismo is to develop and to implant urban enterprises of 
great quality, achieving a simultaneous, economic, social and environmental sustainabil-
ity as well as a permanent satisfaction of all stakeholders.” 588  
Design-process and communication 
Actuality 
While real estate developers are certainly among the major stakeholders in the generation 
of Neo Towns, another ‘species’ remains central to the process. These are the people 
conceiving the physical design of the schemes. The practice of design remains important, 
despite new economic regimes and altered hierarchies and command structures. Thus the 
subsequent section seeks to elucidate the role of planners, architects, engineers and de-
signers in a context that is largely dominated by private developers and the placeless dy-
namics of project management standards. Moreover it seeks to describe their functions, 
strategies and self-images in the complex process of conceiving the ‘products’ at hand 
whilst also exploring the major differences to earlier times. 
                                               
584 Cf. Davidson 2004 referring to AlphaVille’s chief architect Marcello Willer. 
585 Cf. AlphaVille Urbanismo at www.alphaville.com.br 
586 Ibidem 
587 This underlying business ethics can be traced back to Anglo-Saxon business and management models. The reader is 
invited to trace this hypothesis back to Max Weber’s “Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism” (1921), or to the global 
spread of the ethnics and principles as portrayed by the Project’s Management Institute’s annual Handbook – with annually 
2 million copies sold it is the global manager’s bible (Cf. www.pmi.org, 423.03.2009). A more detailed elaboration tran-
scends the scope of this work. 
588 “A missão da AlphaVille Urbanismo é desenvolver e implantar empreendimentos urbanísticos de grande qualidade, 
alcançando, simultaneamente, sua sustentabilidade econômica, social e ambiental e a permanente satisfação de todos com 
os quais se relaciona.” (Abrarec 2006) 
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Who are the designers?  
Role of own planning and design departments 
While the finances and management aspects make up more than 50 percent of the Al-
phaVille Urbanismo, planning and implementation departments make up the remainder. 
Indeed this demonstrates an immense relevance of the discipline. Accordingly Jacky Del-
mar, the ‘big boss’ of Brascan, confirmed in an Interview in 2000 that "Today, you have 
to have certain levels of quality and aesthetics". While external consultants and archi-
tects, among them many star designers, are regularly consulted for the input of fresh 
ideas and for polishing the public image of a project, engineering and design aspects play 
an enormous role in the interior of the firms. 
In this context AlphaVille Urbanismo runs a small but forceful team of  its own plan-
ners, architects, and engineers. This setup allows the sustaining of close contact to the 
final product, the maintenance of an efficient communication structure, the enhancement 
of synergies among the departments (marketing, finance, planning, implementation) and 
the development and testing of innovative ideas related to AlphaVille’s residential brand. 
However, larger processes are outsourced, mostly to well-known small and medium sized 
enterprises and consultants with a long tradition of collaboration with the company. 
The firm’s state-of-the-art planning and design team is a powerful force. The troop is 
also known for its professional seminars on sustainable real estate development. On the 
19th and 30th of September 2005, for example, a professional seminar on Environmental 
Licensing for Urban Real Estate Developers was arranged. Among the partners of this 
workshop were the Brazilian Environmental Ministry, the Brazilian Network of State 
Environmental Agencies (Associação Brasileira do Ministério Público de Meio Ambiente, 
ABRAMPA), the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development (Asso-
ciação Brasileira de Entidades Estaduais de Meio Ambiente /ABEMA).589  
Consultants 
While the attention of the developers is increasingly geared towards a holistic develop-
ment process (cf. to our discussion of ISO Norms) as opposed to the mere product, the 
processes become increasingly more complex. In this context the role of external special-
ists and consultants becomes important. The result is that Tamboré SA, AlphaVille Ur-
banismo and Takaoka’s MVT work with various partners from the consulting business, 
research, governmental and non-governmental institutions as well as academia.  
Marcello Takaoka appears to be a forerunner in this respect (cf above: Project Mile-
stones and also Developers, Strategies). The Gênesis project, for example, embarks on 
synergies with NGO’s, research institutions and academia. Among these are the Institute 
for Sustainability (IPSUS), the Brazilian Foundation for Sustainable Development (FBDS) 
São Paulo, the Polytechnic School at the University of SP and the Paulista Forum on 
Global Climate and Biodiversity or the Institute for Sustainability (IPSUS). (Cf. Takaoka 
et al 2004: 6) An additional benefit of the approach is the improved public image of the 
project. 
Paisagismo 
Brazil is famous for a successful regional contribution to the modern architecture move-
ment. Architects such as Lucio Costa, Oscar Niemeyer, Lina Bo Bardi, or Paulo Mendes 
da Rocha, to name only the first league, are well known globally. Moreover, in the coun-
                                               
589 For a complete outline see: http://www.alphaville.com.br/modules/index.php?id=seminario, r23.05.2008. 
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try whose climate ranges from sub-tropical to tropical conditions, landscape design in 
particular enjoys a special status. In this context the Brazilian modern architectural 
movement has produced one of the most famous Landscape Architects in the world – 
Roberto Burle Marx (*1909, †1994).  
To the same extent as AlphaVille and its peers seek to be associated with state-of-the-
art design, they like to be allied with renowned landscape architecture. The discipline is 
essential, as it is able to integrate the trend towards green and eco-friendly projects 
within design culture. AlphaVille’s 2006 project carrying the label of Burle Marx 2006 is 
a good example of this approach. While Reinaldo Pestana prepared the master plan and 
Königsberger Vanuchhi designed the clubhouse, the landscaping was prepared by the 
office of the famous landscaping icon. As a consequence the project successfully achieved 
all target lines as set by the marketing.590 Nonetheless not many features on the ground 
point to the true genius of the founder. 
The project obviously dwells on strategies of the Genêsis project by Marcello Takakoa 
(cf. above), including its own interpretation of the “EcoGênesis” concepts developed by 
the renowned Brazilian landscape designer Fernando Chacel.591 Indeed AlphaVille Urban-
ismo even hired this famous landscape architect for its Barra project in Rio de Janeiro 
(Cf. above).  
Actual landscaping strategy 
In contrast to the promotion of some projects by the means of star designers, for a long 
time the mainstream approach of landscaping followed a more problematic path. Indeed, 
for many years the practice of tabula rasa clearing of the site was a common practice. As 
this practice resulted in the levelling of much of the topography and the removal of the 
entire original vegetation, the method was anything but environmentally sound (cf. 
Lemos 2004: 7). Clearly this reflects a desire to create an empty space on which a new 
and (better) world, the AlphaVille, might be erected from scratch. Consequently the ex-
isting vegetation was regarded as just weeds and the land as wasteland, which then the 
heroic developers transformed into a civilised landscape.592  
As a matter of fact the new generation of eco-condominiums, such as the Genêsis or 
Burle Marx projects, are proceeding along the same rationale, yet only on a small frac-
tion of the site, while the rest is preserved. (Cf. above: Structure) 
Master planning void 
AlphaVille does not have any visionary master planner, at least in a traditional sense. 
The structure developed in a bottom-up manner. The chapter on the project’s structure 
above described how AlphaVille is a cluster of planned and highly controlled modules, 
which result in a higher degree of (urban) complexity. The entire complex does not have 
the legal status of a city and neither the developer, nor any of the municipal governments 
in charge have developed a guiding master plan. (Cf. below: Control) 593 In contrast it 
                                               
590 A Google search for ‘Burle Marx’ results in AlphaVille’s project taking the top ranks. (Cf. Google search performed at 
12.02.2009) 
591 “EcoGênesis attempts to compensate for damage to natural habitats caused by human activities such as the develop-
ment of buildings and roads, mining, and logging. This process primarily consists of reintroducing native flora and plant 
communities, reestablishing natural habitats and extirpated plant communities, restoring their biological associations 
through ecological succession, and helping protect remnants of local fauna.” 
(http://archives.asla.org/lamag/lam06/march/feature2.html, r23.02.2009) 
592 Cf. Takaoka quoted by Cruz 2003: No começo era só mato. Cinco milhões de metros quadrados, ou 600 Macaranãs, de 
mato – que por obra de Albuquerque e Takaoka deu lugar a alamedas arborizadas, mansões cinematográficas, jardins sem 
muros, duas mil empresas e um potencial de consumo de R$ 1,4 bilhão ao ano. 
593 As a matter of fact the developers never had any authority to develop a master plan. 
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seems to be the entrepreneurial spirit of the founders such as Yoshiro Takaoka, Renato 
Albuquerque as well as their heirs that makes up the genuine organisational force of the 
scheme. AlphaVille appears to be driven by the structural logic of business ventures, as 
well the dynamics of what is commonly referred to as ‘the invisible hand of the market’.  
Urban design matters 
The situation is different as far as urban design is concerned. Now AlphaVille can serve 
as a model rejection of the hypothesis that the private sector always leads to chaotic de-
velopment incapable of generating higher quality urban spaces. Indeed, AlphaVille-
Tamboré demonstrates that ‘design’, including urban design, emerges as an important 
factor when markets become tight and competitive. This fact that design does matter was 
underlined when in the mid 1990s developers and property holders decided to redesign a 
majority representative spaces of AlphaVille’s downtown. The endeavour also underlines 
the capability of the private sector to act on behalf of itself.594  
Nonetheless, despite the fact that renowned landscape architects and urban designers 
have been invited to co-author several of the clusters, the developers of AlphaVille-
Tamboré rarely prefer to market their products as oeuvres of international star designers. 
The concept of the ‘residencial’ is rather handled as much as a commercial innovation, 
based on the combination of technical (engineering) and entrepreneurial (business) inno-
vation. In this context, the product-brand of the AlphaVille ‘residencial’ has undergone 
constant optimisation and improvement, as much as any electronic device or a car 
would. The process was largely executed in secret by their own staff and a few trusted 
consultancies. In contrast Star designers were rather significant at the level of the singular 
architectural object.595  
Among the few confidential partners with exclusive contracts are the offices of São 
Paulo architect and urban designer Reinaldo Pestana and recently also the Curitiba office 
of Alfred Willer. While the former is a key figure behind the scenes of AlphaVille’s his-
tory in the São Paulo location, the latter emerges as a crucial stakeholder in AlphaVille’s 
national (as well as international) success. 
Reinaldo Pestana: The grey eminence behind the scenes 
In accordance with the attitude of close collaboration with a few trusted partners and the 
downgrading of planning and urban design to service disciplines, AlphaVille has an ur-
ban design star who prefers to work silently from behind the scenes and without much 
publicity. Without a doubt Reinaldo Pestana is the grey eminence and unseen innovator 
of AlphaVille. A close entrusted friend of Renato Albuquerque and Yoshiro Takaoka 
from the beginning, his office, in different constellations, has authored by far the most 
schemes in the environs of AlphaVille-Tamboré and Aldeia da Serra. Today the architect 
is working on several of the projects across the entire nation. Even the name ‘AlphaVille’ 
originated at Pestana’s office.596 AlphaVille’s saga says that it was suggested by his part-
ner José Almeida Pinto in the 1970s.597 
                                               
594 In the year 1996 the public and green spaces along the main Avenida Rio Negro have been entirely revamped and more 
than 30000 square metres of new pedestrian walks and pocket parks were installed. (Cf. Gonçalvez 1998, p 170, fig 107; 
Cf. Above: Context, Project Milestones) 
595 A notable exemption, which was never repeated however, was the involvement of Jamie Lerner in the first scheme for 
Tamboré. (Cf. above: Structure, Examples) 
596 Reinaldo Pestana has collaborated with his partner José de Almeida Pinto since the formation in the Architecture and 
Urbanism faculty at the University of São Paulo (FAU-USP) in 1959. As partners they ran the firm Proplanco-Projetos, Plane-
jamento e Consultoria S/C LTDA between 1972 and 1999. In September 1999 Pestana they founded a new enterprise, the 
Reinaldo Pestana Architecture and Urbanism (RPAU) with Kátia Bomfim Pestana as a partner. (Cf. 
www.smarthouse.arq.br/associados3.asp, r29.01.2009) 
597  Cf. History of AlphaVille at: www.alphaville.co.br, r16.03.2008. 
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WAA and AlphaVille-Graciosa – a testing ground for and the eco-sustainable ap-
proach 
When AlphaVille Urbanismo was starting to disseminate its products throughout the 
county by the mid 1990s, the implementation of a project in the environs of the sustain-
able model city of Curitiba was regarded as particular challenge. As a matter of fact, 
AlphaVille Graciosa, as the project in the suburban municipality of Pinhais was called, 
became one of the landmark projects and a precursor of a new generation of AlphaVille’s 
brand. While, the developers preferred to collaborate with several local partners with 
profound experience of local conditions and requirements, the local urban design firm 
Willer Arquitectos Associados (AWW) played a particular role. Its owner Alfred Willer is 
a renowned local architect of the same generation as Albuquerque and Takaoka.598 He 
drafted the AlphaVille Graciosa project in partnership with his son Marcello in 1997 and 
1998.599  
AlphaVille Graciosa is notable for having set new regional standards in environmental 
design. The project was implemented in 2002. It was the first of its kind that integrated 
various environmental planning strategies600 in addition to the usual master planning 
process. The strategies of the project are summarised in the project statutes of the resi-
dents association:601 every building structure set up in the area has to comply with certain 
environmental standards, at least 50 percent of the lots have to remain unsealed, the 
flora has to encompass local species, and finally an independent organisation, the Insti-
tuto Ambienal do Parana is supposed to monitor the process (Ibidem). As a consequence 
more than 1 million of Graciosa’s total 2,5 million square metres remain green. (Cf. 
www.alphaville.com.br, r12.02.2009). The area features one of the largest preservations 
of local pine forests (Araucaria Angustifolia) in the country, amounting to 300 thousand 
square metres.602 Leisure and recreation play a central role. An old system of agricultural 
paths was restored to serve as internal walking, jogging and biking tracks. In addition, 
the project’s lifestyle approach is being promoted in their own “Recista Estilo Alpha” 
Magazine.603 Graciosa’s innovations have been widely acknowledged, for instance  when 
the project received prestigious award by the Brazilian Chamber of the International Fed-
eration of Real Estate Developers (FIABCI) in 2002.604  
Due to this success Willer became one of AlphaVille Urbanismo’s exclusive architects 
and the office was commissioned to develop plans for AlphaVille Gramado (2001), Al-
phaVille Londrina (2000); AlphaVille Manaus (2004), AlphaVille Maringá (2001), the 
landscaping for AlphaVille Lagoa dos Ingleses, as well the Condominio Vile Sol in the 
Angolan capital Luanda (2005).605 The other far-reaching consequence was that Marcelo 
Willer became the head of the national planning operations of AlphaVille Urbanismo. 
                                               
598 Willer became famous for having planned and implemented the COBAH (Brazilian public housing Scheme) project of Vila 
Nossa Senhora da Luz in Curitiba in the 1960s and has designed a range of other significant projects in Curitiba, some of 
them with Jamie Lerner. The firm has received awards for the Capela of the Alphaville Graciosa and also for the Alphaville 
Flamboyant Club, in Goiânia. Other prizes went to the residence of José Buffo Filho and the headquarters of the Sembrae 
Company in Curitiba (Cf. http://www.arcoweb.com.br/arquitetura/arquitetura331.asp, r12.02.2009). 
599 In addition the office has collaborated with the architects Maria Regina Paludo on the master plan and Bóris Cunha on 
some of the particular projects such as the Alphaville Flamboyant Clube and several commercial buildings. (Ibidem) 
600 Including the Brazilian version of environmental impact statements: “Relatório de impacto ambiental” (RIA) 
601 Cf. Associação AlphaVille Graciosa Residencial, 2007: Regulamento de Projetos; at http://www.alphapr.com.br/, 
r12.03.2009. 
602 The area is also supposed to feature 42 other tree species as well as also several rare animals. (www.alphapr.com.br/, 
r12.03.2009) 
603 Which is downloadable from the project website: www.alphapr.com.br/, r12.03.2009 
604 Cf. Federação Internacional das Profissões Imobiliárias: 
http://www.fiabcibrasil.com.br/premioMaster2002/venc_alphaville_graciosa.asp; Cf. http://awiller.com.br/, r22.02.2009-02-
24. 
605 Cf. http://awiller.com.br/, r22.02.2009-02-24. 
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Architects 
With an emphasis on real estate and engineering and the absence of a holistic design ap-
proach, AlphaVille does not rely on renowned star designers and planners, neither of an 
international nor a local calibre. In contrast it thrives on a large pool of local expertise 
that is selected according to the specific needs of a particular time. Moreover, with many 
excellent consultancies at hand and a healthy scepticism towards the North American 
part of the continent, international architects and designers are largely absent. Conse-
quently the result could be rather dubbed a contemporary form of anonymous construc-
tion, rather than a holistic design.606 
Box 42: Background of Architects, Planners (local/ international) 
The majority of the architects, planners and engineers that played a part in AlphaVille-
Tamboré have a local educational background. The country has a well established sys-
tem of higher education up to advanced postgraduate levels and São Paulo is among 
the places with the best architectural and engineering faculties in the country, such as 
the University of São Paulo’s Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism (FAU-USP) or the Ar-
chitectural Faculty at the Presbyterian University of McKenzie. Indeed the country fea-
tures a well established local architectural and planning culture, represented by archi-
tects and designers such as Lucio Costa, Oscar Niemeyer, Burle Marx, or the so called 
Paulista School (Cf. ArchPlus 190). This local culture serves as a reference for most of the 
architectural and design offspring. Therefore there is also no legacy of re-importing 
knowledge and design cultures via students graduating at elite-universities abroad 
(such as is largely the case in other countries, from Indonesia to China to Chile). 
Client Architecture 
While we have seen that Architecture and Urban Design play only a subordinate role as 
AlphaVille’s developers disregarded the importance of a holistic design, scope for archi-
tectural design exists at the level of the individual object, and many renowned local 
names have authored remarkable projects. (Cf. chart below) AlphaVille has served as an 
important thriving ground for local architectural designers in the last four decades.607  
Four important factors supporting this trend are: 1) In the last three decades turn-key 
solutions have not been en vogue in the Brazilian context; 2) The middle classes sought 
the freedom to design and implement their own house; 3) The local market was full of 
architects willing and capable of providing the necessary services; And 4) the developers 
were determined to integrate this desire as an integral part of the neighbourhood codes 
and regulations while being open to support other freelancers and small to medium en-
terprises. While today ever more new people join the ranks of the middle classes, also in 
remote parts of the country, AlphaVille’s developers remain eager to preserve the high 
quality of design standards which help set its brand apart. In Cuiabá, for example, a 
course for buyers has been offered with the aim of  sensitising them to quality issues in 
the construction of their own house.608  
Indeed, as Alphaville-Tamboré accommodates affluent populations, it is a well-
established turf for renowned architecture offices and their offspring. And despite an 
enormous number of kitsch, the area features a variety of projects of high architectural 
                                               
606 Cf. Rainer 1977, Rainer contrasts the concepts of “anonymous building” and “contemporary architecture” in his intro-
ductory essay of his 1977 book on anonymous construction in Iran. 
607 Some observers claim that a significant amount of local faculty members and many young architects have been employed 
by the myriads of opportunities to design a house as presented by AlphaVille Barueri. (Cf. Personal interviews with local 
stakeholdes in São Paulo in March 2006) 
608 “Construindo Sua Residência em AlphaVille” 02/05/2005, 
http://www.alphaville.com.br/modules/content.php?recid=556, r24.02.2009 
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quality: The São Paulo site features masterpieces of residential architecture by: Marcos 
Acayaba (1981) Marcello Accioly Fragelli (1989), George Mills (1991), SPBR Arquitetos, 
MMBB Arquitetos (2001) and Gustovo Penna has recently designed a residence in the 
AlphaVille Nova Lima in the Belo Horizonte region. In addition Carlos Bratke has de-
signed the extravagant Bingo Club in 2005, and Bacco Arquitectos came up with an 
award winning school in the environs. Moreover, landmarks in the commercial sector 
have been designed by Lélio Machado Reiner e Juan Francisco Camps Andreu (1985), 
Paulus Magnus (1995) and Königsberger Vannucchi Arquitetos Associados (1999).  
A recent trend represents several commercial superblock projects in the planning 
stage. Resembling small compact towns, these projects impress more by their size than by 
their architectural qualities. They clearly point to the fact that certain locations of Al-
phaVille sites are bursting at the seams. The designers here are Botti Rubin Arquitetos 
Associados (iTower project by planned for 2010), the KOMarquitectura (Castello 
Branco Office Park), José Lucena609 (Brascan Century Plaza – Green Valley), Reinaldo 
Pestana (São Paulo Wellness), and not least the Miami based superstar office of Arquitec-
tonica (Tiner-Videolar Complex). The table below gives an impression of notable archi-
tectural landmarks in the area. 
Table 36: Choice of architectural projects in AlphaVille and environs610 
Architect Project Year Link 
Luiz Roberto 
Carvalho Franco 
Centro Administra-
tivo Comind 
1976 http://www.vitruvius.com.br/arquite
xtos/arq011/arq011_00.asp 
Marcos Acayaba Residência FM 1981 http://www.marcosacayaba.arq.br/lis
ta.projeto.chain?id=10 
Lélio Machado 
Reiner e Juan 
Francisco Camps 
Andreu 
Centro Administra-
tivo BCN 
1985 http://www.arcoweb.com.br/memori
a/ha-quinze-anos-o-bcn-questionava-
o-modernismo-13-08-2001.html 
Marcello Accioly 
Fragelli 
Residência Geraldo 
Aguiar 
1989 http://www.vitruvius.com.br/arquite
xtos/arq057/arq057_03.asp 
George Mills Residencia FM 1992 http://www.arcoweb.com.br/arquitet
ura/george-mills-17-02-2008.html 
Paulus Magnus Centro gráfico da 
Folha de São Paulo 
1995 http://www.educatorium.com/projet
os/projetos_int.php?id_projetos=157
; 
http://brasembottawa.org/cd/1arq_3.
34.folha_sp.htm 
Königsberger 
Vannucchi Ar-
quitetos Asso-
ciados 
Metrópolis Flat and 
Office 
1998 http://www.kvarch.com/, ; 
www.arcoweb.com.br 
Königsberger 
Vannucchi Ar-
“Stadium”(Hotel, Of-
fices and Flats) 
1999 http://www.kvarch.com/, ; 
www.arcoweb.com.br 
                                               
609 It seems that José Lucena, an architecture consultancy based in AlphaVille, became of the local matadors responsible for 
a large number of commercial projects in the area, the most important being Brascan Century Plaza – Green Valley by Al 
Xingú (proposal), LaReference, Monte Maggiore, Rio Negro, and the Applause (proposal) (Cf. www.joselucena.com.br 
www.emporis.com/en/wm/zo/?id=100284, r12.02.2009) 
610 If not noted otherwise the projects are in the Barueri/ Santana de Parnaíba location. The websites were visited on March 
10th 2009. 
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quitetos Asso-
ciados 
SPBR Arquitetos 
and MMBB Ar-
quitetos 
Residência Barueri, 
Aldeia da Serra 
2001 http://www.mmbb.com.br/, 
http://www.spbr.arq.br/ 
Reinach Men-
donça Arquitetos 
Associados 
Residência, Barueri-SP 2001 http://www.rmaa.com.br/br/index.ht
m 
George Mills Residência em Barueri 2001 http://www.arcoweb.com.br/;  
Márcio Mazza Residência Barueri 2002 http://www.arcoweb.com.br/; 
http://marciomazzahp.sites.uol.com.
br/ 
Ricardo Julião 
Arquitetura e Ur-
banismo 
Centro Administra-
tivo Rio Negro 
2002 http://www.arcoweb.com.br/; 
http://www.rjuliao.com.br/projetos.h
tm; 
http://produto.imovelweb.com.br/rio
negro/ 
Francisco Spado-
ni e Lauresto 
Esher 
Plano Diretor do 
Campus Tamboré (In-
stituto Presbiteriano 
Mackenzie) 
2002 
 
http://www.vitruvius.com.br/instituc
ional/inst60/inst60.asp 
Eduardo Crafig, 
Fernanda Neiva e 
Rita Martinussi 
Edifício DVR Al-
phaville 
2002 http://www.arcoweb.com.br/; 
http://www.architecture.blogger.com
.br/2004_06_01_archive.html 
Paula Zasnicoff 
Cardoso 
Residência Andréa e 
Rodrigo Scalon 
2003 http://www.vitruvius.com.br/instituc
ional/inst88/inst88_01_04.asp 
Studio Arthur 
Casas 
Residência 2004 http://www.arcoweb.com.br/; 
http://arthurcasas.com/en/ 
Estúdio 6 Ar-
quitetos 
Residência Yamada, 
Aldeia da Serra 
2004 http://www.vitruvius.com.br/instituc
ional/inst88/inst88_01_03.asp, 
www.estudio6.net, www.mdc.arq.br 
Carlos Bratke Bingo Circus Club 2005 http://www.arcoweb.com.br/; 
http://www.bratke.com.br/ 
Marcelo Barbosa 
e Jupira Corbucci 
(Bacco) 
Escola CEL-LEP n.n. http://www.bacco.com.br/, 
http://rvzein.googlepages.com/semin
ariodedoctorado,unr 
Gustavo Penna 
Arquitetos Asso-
ciados 
AlphaVille Residence 
in Nova Lima (MG) 
2007 http://www.arcoweb.com.br/; 
www.gustavopenna.com.br/ 
Botti Rubin Ar-
quitetos Associa-
dos S/C Ltda. 
iTower AlphaVille 2010 http://www.emporis.com/ge/wm/bu/?
id=itower-barueri-brazil 
José Lucena Brascan Century Plaza 
- Green Valley 
Plan http://www.joselucena.com.br, 
http://www.emporis.com/en/wm/bu/
?id=brascancenturyplazatorreoffices-
barueri-brazil; 
http://www.brascanresidential.com.b
r/sp/century_plaza/empreendimento_
century.htm, 
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http://www.omelhordedoismundos.c
om.br/ 
KOMarquitectura Castello Branco Of-
fice Park 
Plan http://www.komarquitetura.com.br/
castelobranco.html 
Arquitectonica 
(Miami) 
Tiner-Videolar Com-
plex 
Prop. http://www.emporis.com/ge/wm/cx/?
id=123067; 
www.arcuitectonica.com 
Reinaldo Pestana São Paulo Wellness Plan http://www.icone.jor.br/bodytaka.ht
m 
N.N. Green Valley Office 
Park 
Plan http://www.brascanresidential.com.b
r/sp/GV/index.htm 
 
On the ground: a dual rupture with art and nature 
Our examination of the rationales behind AlphaVille reveals that in contrast to other 
New Towns the undertaking does not seek to represent itself as a holistic work of art. 
Furthermore it does not attempt to integrate harmoniously with nature. While the ven-
ture is open to architectural highlights, it does not intend to be an environment that is 
coherently designed across all scales – from the doorknob to the urban layout – as was 
the case with many planned cities of previous eras.611 The architecture of the planned 
scheme is instead based on popular bourgeois taste and on the aesthetic fulfilment of the 
individual household (of course within strict boundaries). In this situation it is the city’s 
state-of-the-art infrastructure that, while it remains largely invisible, gives it its competi-
tive edge. The engineers equipped the new settlement with underground power lines, 
water and sewage pipes, and paved AlphaVille’s streets with high quality Western coat-
ings, while also bringing with them the know-how for moving immense masses of soil.612 
The project also thrives on its contradictory (and problematic) relationship with na-
ture. Here AlphaVille represents a process of destruction, abstraction and artificial recon-
struction of the natural environment. Like other suburbs before it613, the project is based 
on the idea of being positioned between city and nature, amidst the original landscape of 
the Atlantic Rainforest with its untamed hills and limitless fresh air. Yet curiously the 
city venture is actually neglecting the natural environment. Nature was neglected when 
most of the grounds were levelled, hills moved, and the surroundings fenced off by 4.5 
metre tall perimeter walls. Indeed, one might say that nature was colonised, abstracted 
and transformed into a pacified version of the same – a second artificial type of nature. 
The dream of a life in the middle of natural scenery was transformed to set of abstract 
representations and ideals. Engineering (and landscaping) serve as the major instruments 
in the actual realisation of this new ‘pacified’ environment. Moreover we will see below 
                                               
611 Most planned cities of previous generations were characterised by a coherent and multiscalar design approach: E.g. From 
the absolutist city foundations in the Middle Rhine Valley such as Karlsruhe, traditionalist Garden cities such as Letchworth, 
or modernist examples such as the Plan Voisin by Le Corbusier. 
612 Indeed the scheme thrives on a combination of entrepreneurial (real estate) spirit and engineering innovation. Both 
founders of AlphaVille, Yojiro Takaoka as well as Renato Albuquerque, are construction engineers by training. In addition 
both seem to have the right pragmatic sense for business (Cf. above: Context, Project Milestones). Also the fact that they 
have implemented several public works projects before commencing AlphaVille was competitive advance for this venture. 
(Cf.: Context, Milestones) 
613 Here we find a significant difference to modernist schemes such as Barra de Tijuca or Brasilia, as these schemes sought to 
define and design their relationship with nature: „No caso de AlphaVille e Tamboré, ao contrário do plano da Barra, há uma 
indesejabilidade do meio ao redor, daí destruir o relevo e a vegetação existentes e recriar esta mesma paisagem.“ (Campos: 
6) 
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that Imagineering and marketing largely facilitate the idealistic generation of this ‘second 
type of nature’.614  
Design strategy, concept 
Techniques of industrial prefabrication, customised design or ‘gold-plating’615, have not 
been a part of the mainstream strategies of AlphaVille-Tamboré’s developers so far. One 
major reason is that there is, and always was, a good supply of qualified local architects. 
In contrast to Jakarta or Mumbai, São Paulo is one of the most developed regions of 
Brazil, featuring a large base of qualified design and construction firms. Nevertheless 
today’s novel strategies of prefabrication and turnkey construction are on the rise, paral-
leled by a shift in popular taste616 as well as the arrival of new markets for lower middle-
income groups. 
Western models and their impact 
While AlphaVille-Tamboré relies on a large poll of local architects, the area is not safe 
from an invasion of international building typologies originating from the Western cen-
tres of advanced economies. Indeed the NeoTown project is an excellent showcase of the 
proliferation of Western urban models and their consequences. Many of our observations 
in this chapter underline the assumption that the operational logic of a global new econ-
omy, of which real estate is an increasing part, is essentially contributing to an abstrac-
tion of landscapes and to what is referred to as the ‘loss of place’.617  
In this context the general trend goes towards expanded efficiency, accountability and 
predictability while increasing control and minimising risks.618 While planning and inno-
vation are centralised, the respective steps of production tend to become more and more 
specialised and modularised. At the same time potential risks are outsourced. In this con-
text the risk-free universal typologies that have been tested and applied hundreds of times 
at many places worldwide tend to be preferred over locally tailored, uncertain solutions. 
As the real estate sector gets integrated into the global economic sphere, cities reflect 
their operational logic, resulting amongst other things in a reduced range of standardised 
typologies and the negligence of place. Centrally generated types, such as offices, toll-
roads, malls, hotels, supermarkets, gated communities, drive-in restaurants and high-rise 
apartments619 are more efficient, controllable, and accountable than remote local solu-
tions of unpredictable dimensions. The local context tends to be stripped away, because 
it is risky and incalculable. On the ground the reduced urban vocabulary results in a 
‘Sim-City’ type landscape.620  
The NeoTown AlphaVille portrays the trends described above, e.g. the neglect of the 
local context (and nature), as well as the popularity of standardised typologies, in an 
exemplary manner. Its fabric is characterised by shopping malls, office towers, super and 
                                               
614 As a matter of fact the new eco-sensitive projects such as Genêsis or Burle Marx are generally not changing this ap-
proach. While these projects are tackling a series of relative improvements and introduce several significant innovations, 
such as environmental management standards, corporate social responsibility packages, and an increased amount of green-
ery, most of the underlying principles and contradictions remain valid. The ventures represent highly secured and enclosed 
micro-utopias fencing out both the contradictions and complications of nature as well as ‘dangerous’ and complex urban 
culture.  
615 I.e. the final enhancement and valorisation of a base product (Cf. Sennett 2006) 
616 It seems that in the informational age people tend to identify increasingly with other status symbols such as cars and 
mobile phones, rather than their houses. 
617 Cf. Marc Augé’s 1992 concept of the ‘Non-Lieux’, or Zygmunt Baumann’s (2000) Liquid Modernity (See: Introduction 
Chapter) 
618 Cf. the discussion of advanced rationalisation referring to Max Weber and George Ritzer in the introduction chapter.  
619 E.g.: Not coincidently the same typologies that Augé (1992) associates with his concept of the ‘non-lieu’. 
620 A strategy that the author formerly discussed as a ‘global real estate toolbox’ (Cf. Gotsch 1991) 
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hypermarkets, gated communities, toll-roads and drive-in restaurants. The housing sector 
in particular is reduced to two chief typologies: the single family mansion and the univer-
sal apartment tower with nothing in-between. Indeed, the pattern of highly controlled 
and homogeneous enclaves greatly enhances the control, accountability and predictability 
of the ‘product’, thus maximising added value. The resulting urbanisation is significantly 
different from common types of planned cities – but also from common types of sprawl. 
Only the larger topography, the climate, the local flora and fauna and some customs 
such as the churrasqueira reflect the persistence of some specific local features. 
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Marketing 
“A healthy life... in unity with nature... with new concepts... for the best 
moments... in a reference project... with guaranteed quality... and valorised 
property...”621 
 
The case of AlphaVille demonstrates that marketing and sales attain an ever more signifi-
cant role in the production of contemporary urban spaces and Neo Towns in particular. 
As the relevance of the private sector in the production of urban space is constantly rising 
– produced along the logic of modern economic transactions – urban forms are being 
handled more and more as commercial products. Paralleling this, the identity of contem-
porary societies is increasingly being formed by a combination of direct peer relation-
ships and remote ‘non-face-to-face’ modes such as mass-media television channels, news-
papers and the Internet.622  
We can observe today the rising impact of middle class lifestyles, new media, and con-
sumer-oriented modes in everyday life on many emerging economies, including that of 
Brazil. This general context helps to explain the relevance of marketing and sales as one 
of the crucial aspects behind AlphaVille’s achievement. Indeed, it was largely marketing 
that transformed the scheme from being restricted to a specific location into an idealistic 
concept and brand synonymous of an alternative and distinguished lifestyle. The Brazil-
ian Association of Enterprise-Client Relationships agrees that AlphaVille’s triumph lies in 
the fact that the brand managed to become a general synonym for a different style of 
‘modern’ life in Brazil and beyond. (Cf. Abrarec 2006) 
To be successful in the contemporary market a product needs strong brand recogni-
tion. In Brazil AlphaVille was among the pioneers of this approach in the real estate sec-
tor. The developers state that “For 30 years, the AlphaVille concept has sustained its 
ideal, which is to create urban projects emphasizing quality of life”.623  
While the name evokes the "first among cities" concept, the reputation of the brand is 
based on its state-of-the-art infrastructure, its strict quality standards, the excellence in 
after-sale service, and its ability to sustain satisfaction (Cf. Ibidem). Notably, this particu-
lar status allows AlphaVille to sell its products for higher prices compared to other com-
petitors. As a result the average square metre of land in an AlphaVille community fetches 
30 to 50 percent more than land on projects in the environs. (Cf. above) 
Marketing strategies and novel tactics towards added value 
The marketing of AlphaVille, Gafisa and their peers exemplify a series of strategies trick-
ling down from the world of consumer products. This context includes the formula of 
‘dual’ transparency, the engagement of multiple brands and the combination of lifestyle 
branding and eco-strategies (cf. below). All of these are applied to enhance the level of 
recognition and popularity of the products. 
Firstly comes the policy of dual transparency: the transparent consumer, as well as the 
transparent firm. In this consumer-driven world, where customised mass products are in 
heavy demand and ever more detailed up-to-date information on the wants and needs of 
clients is crucial, the marketing departments are having to transform themselves into in-
                                               
621 From AlphaVille’s in-house magazine: Viver a vida AlphaVille; March 2005 
622 It was Herbert Gans (1967) who developed the notion that new middle classes were thinking and acting very differently 
from the ‘peer-directed’ working-class communities in which most of them had grown up. 
623 AlphaVille Urbanismo at www.alphaville.com.br/, r12.02.2009 
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telligence units. Yet, in addition to this quest for the ‘transparent customer’, the ‘smart’ 
real estate firm also seek to increase their own transparency, as they want to establish 
close and intimate relations with their client groups and a life-long loyalty towards their 
brands. In addition to this close enterprise-client relationship large firms such as Gafisa 
promote a diversified basket of brands geared at the taste of various customer groups. 
Novel product images are constructed on the basis of ‘lifestyle branding cum socio-
ecological awareness’ strategies, which emphasise corporate social and ecological respon-
sibility (cf. below).624 In addition, various combinations of the above strategies, such as 
eco-theming, are now of ever greater importance. 
Customer relations 
The fresh sales and marketing strategies embrace an atmosphere where clients are in-
creasingly treated as partners as opposed to ‘targets’. In this context the sales, marketing 
and customer relations departments act as the ‘sense organs’ of an enterprise. These ex-
plore the needs and requirements of the environment in order to gather information 
about how to adjust and refine the products accordingly. In addition they also work on 
the task of establishing customer communities with long-term brand loyalty. The devel-
opers of AlphaVille state correspondingly: “AlphaVille Urbanismo understands that 
credibility is an essential factor and is the foundation on which any commercial relation-
ship should be built on, particularly in the real estate market.625 Consequently, it adopts 
a strict administrative model, where honesty with clients, partners and suppliers, as well 
as efficiency in the working process, are permanent commitments emphasized within the 
company’s practices”.626  
Labelling, or a ‘basket of brands’ 
Gafisa, the company that took over AlphaVille in 2007, follows a strategy of product 
diversification. Yet, the developer has decided to pursue this goal not by throwing a vast 
range of projects onto the market, but by defining a set of reputable brands. These labels 
then are geared towards various market segments, in pretty much the same way as large 
car manufacturers offer their various models.627  
Combination of lifestyle branding with socio-ecological awareness 
Compared with Bumi Serpong Damai and Navi Mumba, AlphaVille stands out for its 
concepts of ecological lifestyle theming and branding and the role of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). Branded theming approaches are among the most important (and 
stylish) product development and marketing strategies. While the AlphaVille brand has 
traditionally addressed the educated bourgeois, it has embarked on a subtle marketing of 
lifestyles628 instead of a pure thematic branding. Yet direct forms of theming and brand-
ing have appeared in the last 10 years and are constantly on the rise (although their pres-
ence is rather modest when compared to some projects in Jakarta). Some examples of a 
                                               
624 A concept that is also known as Corporate Social Responsibility, or CSR 
625 The marketing people emphasise a highly transparent sales approach, in contrast to “traditional high-pressure sales 
techniques ... in order to build customer loyalty and to develop a sense of trust between customers and us: ”Gafisa’s mar-
keting team “is also responsible for gathering information on the needs and preferences of potential customers to provide 
guidance on our land acquisition and project design activities.” (Gafisa quoted at http://sec.edgar-online.com/gafisa-sa/20-f-
annual-and-transition-report-foreign-private-issuer/2008/06/18/Section6.aspx, r13.03.2009) 
626 Cf. www.alphaville.com.br, r11.11.2008 
627 A public minute on the merger of Gafisa and AlphaVille represents this philosophy in noting: "By combining two of the 
most respected and well-known brands in the Brazilian residential sector, Gafisa and AlphaVille will benefit from a more 
competitive national platform, well-defined and complementary brand identities, and a wider range of products. This com-
bination offers attainable synergies, and we expect it to be accretive to earnings over the next years." (Cf. bnet 2006) 
628 For example in its own Magazines (Cf. below) 
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historicist theming approach are Gafisa’s Notting Hill apartment towers and the 
Provence motif of Tamboré 11. 
It is interesting to observe that quality of life and the promotion of a different lifestyle 
plays a major role in the marketing efforts, while security plays only a minor role. While 
high security is seen as a natural standard, albeit with some negative connotations, it is 
the lifestyle market that is open for more innovations and additional added value. 
A very prominent trend among AlphaVille’s elite populations is the ecological theming 
approach, which is often combined with lifestyle branding. Among the neighbourhoods 
representing this strategy are Takaoka’s Genêsis I and II projects as well as AlphaVille’s 
Burle Marx. While these neighbourhoods claim to preserve large amounts of nature and 
educate their populations as rangers (Cf. Above: Example Genêsis), they also feature 
stylish labels. The Burle Marx club, for example is marketed as a Reebok fitness centre. 
Indeed, the key words appearing in AlphaVille’s own life style journal ‘Viver a Vida 
AlphaVille’ portray the set of lifestyle values that are important for the target population. 
The marketing department promises no more or less than: “a healthy life”... “in unity 
with nature and with our spirit” ... in “the ecological paradise of AlphaVille” ... that is 
“an international phenomenon” ... and “an exclusive project”... “with technologies” ... 
“for new concepts of life” ... “for the best moments of life”... and “a reference project of 
the market”... with “guaranteed quality”... “a valorised property” ... “valorised invest-
ments” and access to “education and work”.629 
Eco branding, theming, and CSR 
In a quest to develop an optimal reputation and a good public image real estate develop-
ers (as much as other industries), put an increasing emphasis on Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility (CSR).  
Environmental and social awareness increases the reputation of an enterprise, not only 
with potential clients, but also with all other potential key-persons, such as government 
officials, venture capitalists, banks, public sector officials, academics and the media.  
Significantly AlphaVille Urbanismo was one of the first Brazilian developers to build 
up its own environmental impact guidelines. This was done before any public regulations 
came into effect.630 As part of this strategy the company communicated its experiences to 
various, governmental, non-governmental, private and academic stakeholders. In 2005, 
for example, AlphaVille’s staff was co-organising a seminar on environmental regulations 
and urban development at Takaoka’s Millennium Convention Centre. The event was co-
organised with the Brazilian Environmental Ministry. Public servants, developers, NGO’s 
and students were among the target audiences.631 
An important instrument of executing the enterprise’s CSR strategy is the AlphaVille 
Foundation. This non-profit entity engages AlphaVille-Tamboré’s residents and their 
                                               
629 ... “uma vida mais saudável, em comunhão com a naturaleza e com nosso espirito ... Um Paraiso Ecologicco em 
AlphaVille ... um fenomeno international ... um projeto exclusivo ... com  technologia para ... novos conceitos de viver ... os 
melhores momentos de sua vida ... uma referencia de mercado ... garantem a qualidade ... valorizar seu patrimonio ... 
valorizaçau do seu investimento ... educaçau e trabalho” (Special Edition of the Journal “Viver a vida AlphaVille”; March 
2005) 
630 Notably the approach was tested and developed at neighbourhoods such as Aldeia de Serra, or Genêsis (which can be 
regarded the genuine innovators in this respect and was among the first to import international standards such as the 
ISO14001 into real estate products (Cf. above: Structure, Examples; also: Developers, Strategies; Cf. also: Designers: WAA 
and AlphaVille-Graciosa as a testing ground for and the eco-sustainable approach) 
631 The description of the seminar reads: “Visando fomentar o debate entre sociedade civil, empreendedores e poder 
público, o seminário tem por objetivo gerar subsídios e identificar alternativas mais eficazes de gestão ambiental e contribuir 
para a sustentabilidade ambiental de projetos urbanísticos, públicos e privados.  ... O seminário é dirigido a universidades, 
entidades de pesquisas, empresas e profissionais do setor imobiliário e de urbanismo, além de profissionais de órgãos 
governamentais, de entidades não-governamentais e empresas privadas que atuam na questão ambiental, e demais 
interessados.” (http://www.ecolnews.com.br/eventos/realizados.htm) 
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neighbours and carries out social as well as environmental projects in the area. For ex-
ample, the charity has undertaken several projects in ‘Vila Zumbi’, an adjacent slum area 
with one of the highest crime rates in the region. 
The Alphaville foundation was also the main organiser of an environmental week at 
the University of São Paulo titled “O Nosso Ambiente”. The event from 11 to 16 Sep-
tember 2005 was free of charge and attracted 15,000 people. It was a mix of lectures, 
workshops, cultural events and a fair.632 A specific focus was laid on the relation of envi-
ronmental matters and indigenous populations.633 Representatives of some tribes, for 
example the Xavante and Krahô, as well as important lobbyists of the matter, such as the 
actor Marcos Palmeira were invited to attend.634 
AlphaVille Urbanismo is not the only developer in the area that runs its own founda-
tion. Tamborè S.A runs an own environmental institute named the Instituto Tamboré. 
While this institute’s primary goal is the environmental preservation of the natural assets 
of the area, it carries out environmental education, social development and ecological 
research, and cooperates with the mayor of Santana de Parnaíba. (Cf. 
www.institutotamborè.org.br, r12.03.2009) 
Organisation of marketing department 
The organisational set-up of AlphaVille-Tamboré’s marketing departments reflects their 
relevance. Gafisa’s strategy is particularly notable. Here various internal and external 
teams compete for the best sales performance.635 While an internal team of 15 profes-
sionals represents Gafisa’s marketing efforts, 24 external independent brokerage compa-
nies are also contracted, making a combined sales force of more than 5,000 representa-
tives. In addition the firm has founded its own subsidiary Gafisa Vendas, which operates 
in parallel to the other brands of the firm and also offers services to their competitors on 
the market. Gafisa Vendas consists of 154 sales consultants and 8 sales managers.636 637 
Marketing instruments 
To increase the number of sales the developers in the area employ a wide set of tradi-
tional and innovative new marketing instruments. Marketing is done through sales of-
fices, word-of-mouth advertising, newspaper ads, direct mail advertising, leaflets, and 
increasingly also through telemarketing and websites. In addition, several of the develop-
ers publish their own journals. 
Marketing efforts are usually initiated with the first launch of a project. Normally a 
showroom is installed which is close to the construction site. This includes a model of the 
site and various information materials. Gafisa sometimes even provides a model apart-
ment unit with appliances and furniture. It summarises the approach it has in the follow-
ing way: “We leverage on our reputation for quality, consistency, on-time delivery and 
                                               
632 It was organised by AlphaVille Urbanismo the University of São Paulo (USP), and realised by the AlphaVille Foundation, 
the commission for environmental problems at USP (Cepa), the Associacion Xavante Warã and the USP campus administra-
tion.  
633 This is notable in particular, as the land of the Fazenda Tamboré once belonged to local indigenous tribes (Cf. above: 
Project milestones). 
634 Cf. www.cepa.usp.br; http://www.ecolnews.com.br/eventos/realizados.htm; r03.12.2008 
635 One is reminded of Sennett’s (2006) portrayal of competing teams developing software at Microsoft. 
636 Cf. http://sec.edgar-online.com/gafisa-sa/20-f-annual-and-transition-report-foreign-private-
issuer/2008/06/18/Section6.aspx, r23.09.2008 
637 The attitude of the firm is best portrayed in the following statement: “The creation of Gafisa Vendas was intended to 
establish a strategic channel for us to access our clients and to reduce our dependence on outside brokers for marketing. ... 
We will continue to utilize independent real estate brokerage firms as we believe the creation of Gafisa Vendas has created 
a healthy competition between our internal sales force and outside brokers.” (Ibidem) 
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professionalism to increase sales velocity.” (www.gafisa.org.br/; r07.12.2008) The fact that most 
of the apartments usually go before construction starts proves the success of the strategy.  
Accordingly Gafisa claims to sell 70 percent of the apartments in the forefront during 
the construction phase. In AlphaVille’s project in Natal, all lots had been sold in only 16 
hours; in Manaus, all of the AlphaVille lots were sold in one day; and in Salvador, all of 
the AlphaVille lots available were sold in 48 hours, before the launch of the sales activi-
ties even commenced.638  
Today the World Wide Web accounts for one of the most important marketing in-
struments. All of the developers examined here maintain professional Internet appear-
ances, addressing various groups of stakeholders. These contemporary business cards 
combine the potentials of conventional advertisements, with the ability to flexibly update 
and communicate seamlessly. Here all crucial information can be obtained on current 
projects, the firm’s financial performance, its profile, awards and the social activities it 
supports. Several sites are enhanced by sophisticated flash animations demonstrating the 
firms’ technical ability.639 Also the association of the residential associations run their 
own website, radio and television channels, mainly to keep the residents informed on the 
latest weather, security and traffic conditions. 
In addition to the Internet, Gafisa as well as AlphaVille bet on a wide range of adver-
tising and communicational media. The developers publish their own in-house lifestyle 
magazines named “Revista Living News” and “Revista Vero Alphaville”. Distributed to 
all customers, they offer a mix of self-promotion, new products, as well as various life-
style and health issues. In the own world of the developer “Vero AlphaVille is a bi-
monthly publication which discusses topics related to the clients’ lifestyle: behaviour, 
architecture, decoration, fashion, special articles, among other topics, as well as informa-
tion about our endeavours”.640 
The AlphaVille brand is also successful in making several appearances on various TV 
and broadcasting channels. AlphaVille Urbanismo has sponsored some episodes of a Bra-
zilian soap opera. The leading character and his partner visit Alphaville, where the char-
acters experience the safety, freedom and aesthetics of the place, comparing it to the 
neighbourhoods featured in US films. (Cf. Dark 2006) Not least, AlphaVille’s downtown 
area features its own radio and television station. While this is not directly related to the 
developer it surely helps to promote the brand.  
 Illustration D-31: PR: The built logo 
 Illustration D-32: Webpage of the Projeto Gênesis 
 Illustration D-33: Lifestyle journal as PR medium 
                                               
638 Cf. www.gafisa.org.br/; r07.12.2008 
639 Among the most important examples from the AlphaVille-Tamboré area are: www.alphaville.co.br; 
www.tambore.com.br/, www.protetogenesis.com.br, www.gafisa.com.br, www.takaoka.org.br, www.takaoka.com.br, 
r17.03.2009. 
640 www.alphaville.com.br, r23.01.2009 
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Maintenance 
 
One of the secrets behind a successfully planned city is how and by whom it is managed 
and maintained. When the completion of the project takes too long and/or the imple-
menting parties, whether developers or governments, do not withdraw in time, it’s as if 
money is being poured into a bottomless pit. AlphaVille’s management and maintenance 
of the project is divided in two parts.  
Thriving in a rich framework of historical precedents and best practices of private elite 
neighbourhoods in São Paulo (Cf. above: Predecessors) AlphaVille’s developers seems to 
have concluded the right strategies from the beginning. Firstly they decided to build up 
the area neighbourhood by neighbourhood. Secondly, the governance and maintenance 
of each of the projects was transferred to the local residents, represented by resident as-
sociations, as soon as a neighbourhood module was finished. In this way the developers 
avoid unexpected hidden costs. And indeed, this is a significant contrast to some experi-
ences made by their peers in Jakarta.  
Quality management” strategies 
We have seen above that the high standards of AlphaVille are based on a holistic quality 
management model. The developers refer to this model as an ethos, rather than a set of 
rules: „The ‘AlphaVille concept’ is, in fact, a philosophy that has as its main values hon-
esty, reliability, objectivity, safety and respect. These values guide a strict quality-control 
policy, in which AlphaVille Urbanismo’s employees, collaborators and suppliers must 
adhere to.” 641  
The total quality control philosophy bears a resemblance of a ‘religion’. The products, 
ergo the neighbourhoods, are supposed to represent this philosophy made concrete, thus 
also leading to a new elevated lifestyle. The developer’s Quality-Control Manual resem-
bles a bible. The guide is used to communicate the general concepts and to assure correct 
performance. In establishing quality standards for materials as well as procedures, it is 
aiming to transmit AlphaVille’s approach not only within the enterprise, but also to all 
external project partners. These must contractually comply with all the standards 
throughout the whole collaboration. (Ibidem)  
Evaluation and project monitoring are an integral part of the firm’s quality manage-
ment. All (infra)-structures put into practice are the subject of frequent check-ups and 
evaluations. This is supposed to lead to the best possible quality and to a higher level of 
customer satisfaction and loyalty.642 (Ibidem) 
After the completion of the scheme the evaluation and monitoring is outsourced to the 
hands of the individual residents. The approach is formalised in comprehensive regula-
tory frameworks and codes of the neighbourhoods. (Cf. Population: Resident groups) 
Developer 
                                               
641 AlphaVille Urbanismo Website at www.alphaville.com.br, r26.11.2008 
642 The developer claims that his infrastructure technology was so advanced that its environmental standards became part 
the local municipal codes in retrospect (Cf. www.alphaville.com.br, r23.11.2008). 
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Summary – Development and Design 
General 
The three major developers of AlphaVille-Tamboré are the firms AlphaVille Urbanismo 
S.A., Tamboré S.A, and the MVT Ltda. Engineering AlphaVille Urbanismo developed the 
majority of the enclaves, the business district as well as a light industrial park. Tamboré 
(S.A.) developed an individual town scheme with half a dozen enclaves as well a signifi-
cant shopping mall. MVT has developed the first green gated community (Gênesis) and 
plans to come up with the first mixed lifestyle superblock scheme (São Paulo Wellness).  
Visionary middle-class businesspersons, representing a dynamic entrepreneurial spirit 
as it characterises Brazil’s migratory milieu, founded all three companies. AlphaVille was 
the first start up in the area. Yorshiro Takaoka and Renato Albuquerque, two civil engi-
neers founded the firm in the early 1970s. 
After AlphaVille Urbanismo as well as Tamboré S.A. had been successfully developing 
the Barueri and Santana do Parnaíba site for more than 4 decades, both enterprises were 
taken over by two of Brazil’s largest corporate real estate developers in 2006. In this con-
text the firm Gafisa S.A. absorbed AlphaVille Urbanismo, while the enterprise Brascan 
Residential properties has bought Tamboré S.A. But even as the original ventures became 
subsidiaries of these larger conglomerates, they remain major stakeholders in the original 
area and beyond. 
Organisational structure 
AlphaVille Urbanismo S.A.’s headquarters are composed of 4 major divisions. Its struc-
ture reflects an equal focus on planning, implementation, marketing and managerial as-
pects. The developers of AlphaVille-Tamboré have been thriving along the spirit of a 
‘business oriented evolution model’. In this context, the visionary bosses of the main ven-
tures (if Albuquerque, Takaoka, or de Ulhôa) are embedded in a club of like-minded 
peers. In addition they distinguish themselves by their intellectualism, professionalism, 
curiosity and openness, combining economic and political talent. According to the devel-
opers it was this ‘determination’ that, combined with the impact of modern management 
principles, has produced openness towards necessary adjustments in respect to the de-
mands of specific times. And indeed, Takaoka’s and Albuquerque’s major achievement is 
primarily their ability to devise a new product through merging a set of previously exist-
ing ingredients with the right place and at the right time – as is the case with nearly all 
innovations. 
These days AlphaVille-Tamboré attracts increasingly large corporate stakeholders. 
The takeovers of AlphaVille by Gafisa, and of Tamboré by Brascan, represent a trend of 
maturation and consolidation of the entire Brazilian real estate sector. In this context the 
big players tend control the markets, as well as to diversify their products and financial 
risks. As AlphaVille became one of four subsidiaries of Gafisa, it empowers the mother 
company to cover a wide spectrum of the market, ranging from luxury condominiums 
for the rich (covered by AlphaVille) to prefabricated housing models for the lower middle 
classes (covered by other subsidiaries).643 
Strategy 
Before AlphaVille was taken over by Gafisa, its residential products had acquired a na-
tional benchmark status. In addition, the firm was planning for a major national expan-
                                               
643 Another particularly interesting subsidiary is Bairro Novo: It develops standardised, large scale and fully integrated com-
munities in the vicinity of large metropolitan areas along a model parallel to VilasAlpha. 
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sion with 46 new projects in the pipeline. This accomplishment can be traced back to a 
combination of several ‘ingredients of success’.644  
The fact that the firm’s ‘business oriented development model’, as described above, 
was based on open principles rather than fixed dogmatism is among most important rea-
sons for this triumph. This general context gave the firm the ability to balance solutions 
between tradition and progress, robustness and flexibility, and outsourcing and auton-
omy. At the same time as a great attention was laid on a ‘serious and honest management 
model’ based on business ethics, trust and firm principles, the firm’s structure as well its 
outputs remained open for a process of continual learning, improvement and transforma-
tion. Moreover the right balance between outsourcing and autonomy was achieved, as 
Albuquerque and Takaoka have worked with the right networks of trusted partners, yet 
at the same time all crucial steps of the business process (research, prototyping, testing 
etc) have remained with the core company. 
Without doubt AlphaVille’s main product innovation is represented by development 
of the ‘loteamento fechado horizontal’, the controlled low-rise residential enclave. Nota-
bly, the model is based on a highly controlled environment, a perfected security strategy, 
a set of elaborate codes and regulations, and the concept of automanagement (self-
government) through resident associations. Furthermore, the invention is physically de-
fined by a perimeter wall with only one opening that demarcates a semi-private interior 
of the highest standards, composed of individual properties (garages, single family villas, 
and swimming pools), while club and service facilities have been placed on the outside – 
a form that apparently achieves the highest added value possible in suburban contexts. 
Moreover, each of the neighbourhood enclaves (Residencial) is handled as its own enter-
prise. 
AlphaVille Urbanismo also became also known as the first Brazilian company to in-
troduce environmental impact guidelines without any pressure from the public hand – a 
framework of increased competition and consolidating land markets spurred the drive. 
Whereas AlphaVille’s strategies were geared towards the constant improvement of one 
product, Gafisa, the new owner of the firm, has embarked on a corporate strategy of 
growth, diversification, and standardisation: The quest for growth has resulted in the 
acquisition of a set of successful market players, (e.g. AlphaVille) and in the agglomera-
tion of one of Brazil’s largest land reserves; The strategy of spatial diversification has 
resulted in a country-wide spread of ventures; The search for financial diversification 
(e.g. its Initial Public Offering in 2007) has led to the introduction of new transparent 
governance structures, based on new technologies, codes and management standards; 
And last but not least, the quest for standardisation has resulted in a limited and highly 
typified range of products, geared towards diverse income groups. 
Implementation 
An integral part of AlphaVille’s achievement is also the strictly standardised and phased 
development process. Each project consists of six major phases: 1) Strategic Analysis, 2) 
Acquisition, 3) Master planning, 4) Marketing and Sale, 5) Construction, and 6) Occupa-
tion. In spite of that, the posterior ‘automanagement’ level, which implies that the resi-
dents run the project along an elaborated set of codes and regulations, is of utmost im-
portance. 
Indeed, the developers in the AlphaVille-Tamboré area are an example of the rising 
importance of international business quality standards for real estate markets in the Bra-
zilian context. The case of AlphaVille-Tamboré demonstrates that the adaptation of pro-
                                               
644 To adopt Garvin’s (1996) phrase 
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fessional business, financial, quality management and environmental codes from the in-
ternational corporate world has had tremendous effect on business cultures, production 
processes, the shape of the final products, and – since we are talking about the real estate 
sector – also on the shape of urban environments.  
The ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 guidelines account for the most important of these 
standards. While the former is a quality management norm calling attention to the entire 
process of production, the latter introduces guidelines for the environmental management 
of an enterprise. In this context, Gafisa, the firm that acquired AlphaVille in 2007, had 
been fully ISO 9000 certified in 2002. (When the firm went public on the NYSE in late 
2007, it also decided to implement SAP instruments as well as the SOX certification 
standards.) In addition, Marcello Takaoka’s MVT was among the first real estate com-
panies in the country to receive the ISO 14001 certificate.  
Among the important effects of the application of quality management standards is an 
ever-growing focus towards the whole process of product development – from finance, 
the planning and implementation stage, to the final satisfaction of the customer. Al-
phaVille’s core enterprises greatly reflect this approach to quality management. The vari-
ous prizes and awards the undertakings have received in the recent years confirm its suc-
cess. 
Indeed, the prevalent norms and codes significantly intervene in the production of ur-
ban space. Eventually the consolidation and ‘industrialisation’ of the real estate sector 
leads, among other things, to changing power hierarchies, modified roles of customers, 
an emphasis on short term profits, an increased relevance of representation and market-
ing, and the standardisation of typologies. At the same time as the customer becomes 
‘king’ and various developers compete for his brand loyalty. Sales departments distribute 
customised newsletters and organise breakfasts at construction sites. The profiling of 
customers emerges as a standard occupation of marketing and sales departments, and 
demand-inducing sales techniques become a norm. 
Ideology 
In addition to the more pragmatic world of goals and strategies, AlphaVille, as many 
other New Towns, also has an ideological side to it. The new town demonstrates a set of 
visions and principles, which constitute its identity, and at the same time add to the elas-
ticity, resilience and flexibility of the project. In this context the undertaking seeks to 
represent an alternative environment that is radically different from a ‘normal’ Brazilian 
city. This is best represented by the developer’s slogan claiming to produce nothing less 
than “A better world for you”. One of the results of this approach is that a strong corpo-
rate ethos is placed at the centre of the company’s strategy. In this context values such as 
honesty, reliability, objectivity, safety and respect are supposed to be infused in the final 
products, to resound in the communities conduct, and to echo in the credibility of the 
firms’ shares. 
Design 
Despite the fact that real estate entrepreneurs are the central figures driving the develop-
ment of contemporary Neo Towns, and their context is now increasingly dominated by 
the placeless dynamics of project management standards, the role of Civil Engineers, Ar-
chitects, Urban Designers as well as Planners in designing new urban spaces remains cen-
tral.  
The fact that planning and technical departments make up half of AlphaVille Urban-
ismo and reside at the core of the firm demonstrates a methodical weight of engineering 
and design disciplines. AlphaVille Urbanismo employs a small but forceful team of plan-
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ners, architects and engineers. This group is supposed to sustain a close contact to the 
final product, maintain an efficient communicational structure, enhance synergies among 
the departments (marketing, finance, planning, implementation), and privately develop 
and test new innovative ideas up to maturity. 
In addition, almost all developers, whether Tamboré, AlphaVille or Takaoka, work 
with external partners from the consulting business, research, governmental and non-
governmental institutions. Likewise, external design consultants are regularly commis-
sioned for their input of new ideas and to enhance the public image of a project. Some 
cases, such as Marcello Takaoka’s Gênesis project, have even seen the involvement of 
representatives from NGO’s, research institutions and academia. 
Landscape architecture 
Landscape architecture plays a particularly important role. This is the case as it facilitates 
the integration of an abstracted design culture and the local implementation of the pro-
jects. The high standing of the discipline is generated by the green and eco-friendly re-
quirements along with the advanced design ethos. Significantly, in 2006 AlphaVille Ur-
banismo has come up a new project carrying the label of Burle Marx (an internationally 
renown icon of Brazilian landscape architecture). In addition the locally renowned Fer-
nando Chacel, author of the EcoGênesis concept, was hired to produce AlphaVille’s Rio 
de Janeiro scheme. 
In the past high cultures of landscaping and design had remained an exception rather 
than the rule. AlphaVille’s developers, for the most part of the project history, have util-
ised a more pragmatic and radical ‘tabula rasa’ approach, which involved the destruction 
of large parts of the topography and the clearance of almost the entire original vegeta-
tion. As a matter of fact, the strategy reflects, the (more or less conscious) desire to create 
a blank canvas on which to create a new and better world from scratch. 
Planning 
One of the most interesting aspects about AlphaVille is the fact the project does not have 
a master planner. Neither the municipal government nor the developers have drafted a 
spatial development strategy for the scheme. Consequently the urban fabric has emerged 
as a result of the self-organised combination of individual neighbourhood modules, 
which have each been thoroughly planned. Whether it is the result of the complex dy-
namics of self-organisation or of the invisible hand of the market remains open for de-
bate. 
Design strategy 
Indeed, as AlphaVille appears far from chaotic and unorganised, the scheme, can serve as 
a model case for rejecting the hypothesis that the dynamics of the unregulated private 
sector must invariably lead to a disordered development without aesthetic qualities. In 
contrast, the case demonstrates that urban design emerges as an important factor in ex-
panding the area’s economic, social and cultural assets. Whereas the interior appearance 
of the neighbourhoods has played a crucial role from the very beginning, a particular 
paradigm shift can be observed to have occurred in mid 1990s, when most of the street-
scapes and pocket parks of the downtown were redesigned with high aesthetic standards 
and spectacular landscaping at the pedestrian scale. 
Despite a high emphasis on design and representation, the developers of AlphaVille-
Tamboré have rarely preferred to market their products as oeuvres of internationally 
renowned urban designers. In this context, the main product – the Residencial – has al-
ways been handled more as a commercial innovation (technically and commercially), 
than a piece of art. Indeed, the AlphaVille neighbourhood was rather seen as a product 
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that, as much as a Porsche car or a Nokia mobile phone, had to remain open to be opti-
mised and improved by the in-house team in close collaboration with a few trusted com-
panies. Today, novel strategies towards prefabrication and turnkey buildings are on the 
rise, as popular tastes change and new (lower-middle income) customers arrive.645 
Urban designers 
As far as urban design is concerned, the offices of Reinaldo Pestana and Alfred Willer 
represent two of these few trusted partners with exclusive contracts. While Pestana is a 
central figure behind the AlphaVille-Tamboré scheme, Willer became a crucial stake-
holder in the context of the brand’s national diversification. Pestana was a close friend of 
Renato Albuquerque and Yoshiro Takaoka from the beginning. His office has authored 
the majority of the projects at the Barueri/Santana do Parnaíba site (AlphaVille SP, Tam-
boré, Genêsis and Aldeia da Serra). It also invented the term AlphaVille.  
Alfred Willer is a renowned architect from Curitiba. He was invited to design Al-
phaVille Graciosa, AlphaVille’s local scheme in this ecological model city. The project 
was destined to evolve into a landmark model of environmental design and marketing in 
the context of AlphaVille’s national diversification and as a consequence Willer’s office 
was commissioned with several national schemes. His son Marcello, co-designer of the 
Graciosa scheme, became the head of AlphaVille Urbanismo’s national planning opera-
tions. 
Architects 
In contrast to its disregard of grand artistic schemes and its neglect of urban planning 
and city design in the last 35 years, AlphaVille emerges as a fertile ground for architec-
tural designers. Indeed, the popularity of architecture is less a result of a fascination by 
the developers than a noteworthy effect of the scheme’s philosophy and regulatory 
framework.  
Because AlphaVille attracted such a critical mass of projects and high value individu-
als, the area has also become a well-established turf for renowned architectural offices. 
As a result, landmark projects by Marcos Acayaba (1981), Marcello Accioly Fragelli 
(1989), George Mills (1991), and MMBB Arquitetos (2001), Carlos Bratke (2005), or 
Gustavo Penna dot the residential neighbourhoods. Likewise, several commercial projects 
operate with renowned designers, such as the São Paulo office of Königsberger Vannuc-
chi or the Miami based Arquitectonica. 
Twofold rupture 
AlphaVille seems to dwell on a twofold rupture – one with aesthetics and one with na-
ture. Despite its openness towards architectural highlights, the project neither aims to be 
a holistic work of art nor does it intend to integrate itself into nature. In contrast to 
many other ‘classical’ New Towns, this NeoTown’s architecture is rather based on a 
popular, bourgeois taste and on the aesthetic fulfilment of the individual household. The 
city’s exceptional quality is based on the neighbourhood codes, as well as the outstanding 
infrastructure. In this context the rationales of engineering, novel management tech-
niques and local statutes – which by no coincidence happen to be the core competencies 
of the developers – clearly dominate over architecture, design and planning ideals. 
A second notable fracture occurs with nature. At the same time as AlphaVille colo-
nises, abstracts and transforms nature into a pacified substitute of itself; it generates an 
eternal form of the same, which is indifferent to transformations on the other side of the 
                                               
645 The techniques of industrial prefabrication, customised design, or Goldplating, have remained relatively insignificant so 
far.  
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fence. Forms of thematic design (‘imagineering’) and marketing largely facilitate the ide-
alistic creation of of a synthetic nature. Engineering and landscaping serve as the major 
instruments in the actual realisation of this new ‘pacified’ environment. 
Critique 
Many of our observations in this chapter underline the assumption that the operational 
logic of a global new economy (efficiency, accountability, predictability, control and 
minimised risks), of which the real estate sector is an increasing part, is essentially con-
tributing to an abstraction of landscapes and to a phenomenon to that many authors 
refer to as the increasing ‘loss of place’. AlphaVille largely portrays the neglect of the 
local context (and nature), as well as the popularity of standardised typologies along 
these universal lines. 
Indeed, while AlphaVille does not rely on internationally renowned star designers and 
planners, either of an international or a local calibre, thriving instead on a large pool of 
local expertise, the result can be dubbed a contemporary form of anonymous construc-
tion, rather than an holistic architectural masterpiece (in spite of the few architectural 
highlights). In this context the pattern of AlphaVille’s highly controlled and homogene-
ous enclaves can be understood as the reverberation of a novel market logic in a local 
context. The resulting urbanisation pattern is significantly different from traditionally 
planned cities, as much as it is different from common types of sprawl. 
Marketing 
AlphaVille-Tamboré is a showcase of the rising importance of marketing tactics in urban 
development and design. Consumer oriented lifestyles are more and more penetrating 
into emerging economies (including Brazil) and establishing a fertile ground for the rising 
significance of modern advertising and sales techniques. The fact that AlphaVille was 
among the first real estate ventures in Brazil that embarked on modern commercialisa-
tion techniques plays a major role in the transformation of the local project into a uni-
versally recognised brand, and for the astonishing valorisation of its real estate products. 
In this context, techniques like ‘transparent’ enterprise, labelling, lifestyle branding and 
eco-theming are among the most fashionable strategies. The tactic of the ‘transparent 
consumer’ as well as the ‘transparent enterprise’ aim to enhance client/business relation-
ships and establish a life-long brand loyalty. Clients are increasingly thought of as part-
ners as opposed to business targets. Moreover, large firms such as Gafisa refine this con-
cept by serving the tastes of various customer groups through a diversified basket of 
brands. Novel product images are constructed via holistic strategies of ‘lifestyle branding 
cum socio ecological awareness’, and not least combinations of the individual strategies 
above, such as eco-theming, are becoming progressively more important. 
The rising importance of commercialisation is reflected by the momentous role that 
marketing and sales departments play in the corporate structures of AlphaVille-
Tamboré’s developers, Accordingly these may amount to 20 percent of the enterprise’s 
activities. Gafisa employs a particularly striking sales strategy – here internal and external 
teams compete for the best sales performance.  
The marketing specialists employ a wide set of traditional and new innovative instru-
ments: sales outlets, showrooms, real-estate fairs, word-of-mouth advertising, newspaper 
ads, direct mail advertising, leaflets, telemarketing, newsletters, websites, and also a spec-
trum of  their own journals. AlphaVille Urbanismo has even sponsored some episodes of 
a Brazilian soap opera. 
In this new context, where the ‘client is king’, the marketing and customer relations 
departments act as ‘sense organs’ of the enterprise. Notably, their main mission is the 
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exploration of the needs and requirements of the environment, in order to gather infor-
mation of how to adjust and refine the outputs. Commercialisation was the major driv-
ing force behind Gafisa’s strategy of diversification, when the company decided to create 
a set of reputable labels, the so-called ‘basket of brands’, instead of flooding the markets 
with a vast range of products.  
Geared to elite populations, AlphaVille has traditionally emphasised rather subtle 
forms of marketing. Branded theming approaches and the instrument of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) emerge as important (and stylish) commercialisation techniques 
from the last decade. Gafisa’s Notting Hill apartment towers and Tamboré 11 exemplify 
a historic/geographic theming approach.646  
At the moment, the ecological theming approach, in combination with lifestyle brand-
ing, represents a prominent trend among AlphaVille’s educated elites. New neighbour-
hoods such as the Gênesis I and II projects as well as AlphaVille’s Burle Marx represent 
this tendency, portraying a vast amount of green initiatives in combination with modern 
brands. Moreover AlphaVille’s own lifestyle magazine praises the concept as: “a healthy 
life... in unity with nature… with new concepts... for the best moments...in a reference 
project... with guaranteed quality... and valorised property...“ 
The developers of AlphaVille-Tamboré are also among the first stakeholders in the 
Brazilian real estate sector to employ the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR). This is intended to increase the general reputation of their enterprise. AlphaVille 
was one of the first Brazilian developers to build up its own environmental impact guide-
lines, before any public regulations came into effect. These and other social and envi-
ronmental programmes became bundled under the umbrella of CSR. While not-for-profit 
institutions such as the AlphaVille Foundation as well as the Instituto Tamboré under-
take the programmes, the spread of the brand’s name is a welcome side-effect in this con-
text. 
Maintenance 
The management and maintenance of AlphaVille is divided into two parts. While the 
developers run and maintain the place during the construction phase, resident associa-
tions take over all significant jobs after the completion. It seems that the rich framework 
of historical precedents and best practices of privately elite neighbourhoods in São Paulo 
stimulated this set up. Security in particular accounts for the largest share of the mainte-
nance cost, amounting to 80 percent of the extra fees. 
The standards of AlphaVille’s are based on a holistic quality management model. In 
this context AlphaVille Urbanismo’s employees, collaborators and suppliers are asked to 
comply with a basic set of values such as honesty, reliability, objectivity, safety and re-
spect. Accordingly an enormous Quality-Control Manual (or ‘Bible’) is employed to 
communicate the concepts and to assure correct performance. As AlphaVille’s 
neighbourhoods are supposed to represent a tangible result of this philosophy and aimed 
to stimulate new-elevated lifestyles. Regular evaluation and project monitoring are inte-
gral elements of the firm’s approach to quality management and in this context all (in-
fra)- structures are subject of frequent checks. 
 
                                               
646 Interestingly lifetyle issues are among the most popular topics of advertising strategies while the aspect of security, with 
its negative connotations, plays only a minor role. 
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Finance –  
Concentrated diversification 
Table 37: Selected financial indicators of AlphaVille-Tamboré 
Supply side finance  
Profit strategies Growth, diversification, increased effi-
ciency, joint ventures, own credit and 
mortgage schemes 
Impact of FDI Indirect, through urban infrastructure 
funds and international financial markets 
Subsidies no direct subsidies 
Profits Increasing relevance of joint ventures (lo-
cal land holders, or important brands), 
diversification, e.g. towards the lower 
middle income segment 
Planned annual return rates  30 percent 
Products Whole spectrum - from housing to land 
development to modern financial prod-
ucts (ordered by increasing relevance) 
Financial products Shares in Brazil and in the US 
Average increase of real estate values in AL-
phaVille from 2001 to 2005  
60 percent 
Total investment volume of AlphaVille Urba-
nismo in 2007 
> 500 million US$ 
Gafisa’s assets in 2008 (AlphaVille’s mother 
company 
~2,7 billion US$ 
Gafisa’s revenues in 2008 740 million US$ 
Value of projects launched by Gafisa in 2008 350 million US$ 
Annual return on average equity ~ 20 percent 
Number of land banks controlled by Gafisa 
in 2008 
247 different sites in more than 70 cities 
and 21 states (75 percent part of joint 
ventures) 
Value of land banks controlled by Gafisa in 
2008 
~ 8 billion US$ 
Amount of reinvestments 30-40 percent 
Demand side finance  
Required amount of prefinancing when buy-
ing a property 
~ 30 percent 
Monthly maintenance fees ~ 120 US$ (80 percent for security) 
Price of undeveloped hacienda land 10 BRL/ m2 (US$ 5) 
Price of serviced land (AlphaVille) 400 BRL/ m2 (US$ 200) 
Price of serviced land (Barueri. ‘Outside the 
walls’) 
200 BRL/ m2 (US$ 100) 
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Price of serviced land (São Paulo) 800 BRL/ m2 (US$ 400) 
Price of upscale apartment in AlphaVille > US$ 200,000  
Price of a lower middle class apartment out-
side 
US$ 25,000  
Estimated household income > 20 minimum salaries/ month (~US$ 
3600) 
Nominal Incomes (BRL)*  Santana de Parnaíba = 1800; São Paulo 
State = 1200; Carapicuiba = 624 
All Financial data quoted by google-finance, http://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE:GFA, r12.05.2009 
*Cf. IBGE 2007 
 
Introduction 
“The housing market in Brazil operates in a way which is beyond the wildest 
dreams of US homebuilders. The sector has very little leverage. A number of 
government programs help people obtain mortgages. The number of homes 
being sold is increasing by about two million a year.” (24/7 Wall Street on 
May 21, 2008; at: www.247wallst.com, r13.03.2009) 
Finance is one of the most fascinating yet often neglected aspects of planned cities. The 
question of whether New Towns are financially sustainable is the deciding factor in 
whether these typologies can be regarded as a success. This is valid in particular for pri-
vate sector schemes. The issue is even more interesting because planned cities that have 
managed to breach the threshold of profitability seem to be extremely rare – at least if we 
follow the findings of Alexander Garvin (1996). Garvin names Irvine as the only example 
on the North American subcontinent matching profitability criteria. He claims that all 
other planned cities failed, mostly because the private sector was overburdened by long-
term risks such as major recessions or financial crises. (Radburn, for example, was com-
pleted only to 50 percent.) In this context the question arises: Are 21st century NeoTowns 
truly examples of a superior more sustainable approach? 
Therefore the following subchapter aims present an overview of the financial profile 
of AlphaVilleTamboré.647 We will concentrate in particular on its economic profile and 
the financial strategies of AlphaVille Urbanismo as well as its new owner Gafisa. 
 
Demand side 
Housing cost 
“Despite the fact that the high quality of the projects in AlphaVille has its 
price, AlphaVille remains cheaper than living in an upscale São Paulo apart-
ment” (Davidson 2004) 
The financial success of the privately developed New Town AlphaVille-Tamboré is 
mainly founded on the principle that its products were exclusively geared to prosperous 
                                               
647 Due to the comprehensive character of this work as well as the background of the author, the examination at hand can 
only provide a general idea of the financial aspects. In other words it can only prepare the ground for detailed studies to 
come. 
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middle and upper income clients.648 This is in stark contrast to the social goals of many 
traditional New Town projects. 
AlphaVille’s precious lots cost 40 times more than undeveloped agricultural land in 
São Paulo’s hinterlands649 and at least twice as much as those in its environs. 650 A 503 
square metre lot in the hilly eco-neighbourhood Genêsis II, for example, sells for BRL 
306.830 or BRL 610 per square metre (~ US $280). In contrast developed lots in Barueri 
are available at around BRL 200 per square metre.651 
Condominium style apartments in the AlphaVille Tamboré area range from BRL 
200.000 to 500.000, or BRL 3000 to 6000 per square metre. Individual mansions are 
available from BRL 300.000 to 800.000 at square metre prices of BRL 6000 and 
above.652  
In contrast a lower middle class apartment with three bedrooms developed by Tenda 
in Garulhos the Periphery of São Paulo start at BRL 50,000 (or US $22.000).653  
Table 38: Property prices in AlphaVille-Tamboré and São Paulo compared 
Type m2 price in BRL (US$) 
Farmland in the Hinterlands 10 (4,3) 
Lot in Barueri 200 (86) 
Lot in AlphaVille 400 (174) 
FIT Apartment in Garulhos  625 (271) 
Gafisa Condominium in AlphaVille 3000 (1304) 
Apartment in Hygienópolis 5500 (2609) 
House in AlphaVille 6000 (2609) 
Own research based on real estate data 
 
Availability of mortgages 
One of the most significant aspects of consumer side finance is the availability of finan-
cial means. The availability of secured credit plays an important role in the development 
of a formal housing market for the mainstream population. Its non-availability explains 
the success of schemes such as AlphaVille-Tamboré. Facing this gap the developers, e.g. 
Gafisa, try to augment their sales by offering their own lending schemes to prospective 
customers via the bank of their choice. Each of the developments has custom tailored 
programmes. Gafisa’s customers can choose from two alternatives: Firstly a “short-term 
plan,” in which financing is extended up to the end of construction; and secondly, a 
                                               
648 A prime property in Brazil costs about 28 times the average annual per capita GDP (Cf. 
http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Latin-America/Brazil/, r.28.12.2008.) in other words it is out of reach for the average 
household. The average square metre prices of prime residential properties in the premier urban centres range at US$ 1891 
(Ibidem). This is the highest amount after Argentina’s US$ 2293. An entire home of 120 square metres ranges at US$ 
226.000. Rents for a prime 120-metre apartment range at US$ 1240. 
649 Farmland in SP state costs about BRL 10 per square metre (www.imoveisvirtuais.com.br/fazendassp.htm, r12.03.2009) 
650 For example 85.000 for a square 450 lot in the closed condominium of Tarumã, or BRL 26,000 for a 140 square metre 
lot in Berueri’s Jardim Graziela (Cf. http://comprar-terreno.vivastreet.com.br/vender-terreno-sitios-fazendas+barueri/terreno-
em-condominio-fechado-santana-do-Parnaíba/12167946; or at www.adoosbrasil.com; r12.03.2009) 
651Cf.:www.achaja.com.br/imoveis/?page=classificados_anuncio&id=9146&tit=sao.paulo.sp.terreno.para.venda.em.alphavill
e.condominio.genesis.2.quadra.14.lote.01., r12.03.2009 
652 Cf. www.carlosfernandes.com.br/, r12.02.2009 
653 Cf. http://brasil.trovit.com/imoveis/casa-alphaville, http://brasil.trovit.com/imoveis/apartamento-3-dormitorios-alphaville, 
r12.03.2009 
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“long-term plan,” in which the developer provides a loan for up to 120 months after the 
end of the construction.654  
Box 43: Brazils mortgage market 
Brazil’s market does not have a fully developed a housing mortgage tradition like for 
example the US with its Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and 
the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). New programmes are just 
underway. 655 Even today the mortgage market is smaller than 2 percent of the national 
GDP.656 Prior to the reforms, most construction was financed by developer-financed in-
stalment loans657: 85 percent of all Brazilian homes were financed by the real estate sec-
tor. The high cost and high taxes of this procedure made it impossible for lower income 
segments to participate in this process, as the developers wanted to be paid for the in-
creased risk (Ibidem). 
Mortgage schemes for lower middle-income groups only start in the late 20th cen-
tury.658  In 1999 the benchmark interest rates were successively reduced from 42 percent 
to about 12 percent in 2007. Notably this enables a whole spectrum of middle income 
Brazilians earning between 1 and 15 minimum salaries per month659 to get a 20-year 
lending rate of about 8 to 12 percent, for a house of BRL 100,000 (US$ 50.000). The 
government-backed Caixa Economica Federal supplied the funding. New home mort-
gages surged an average of 49 percent a year in 2005 and 2006 after president da Silva 
announced a plan to subsidise materials and increase government- backed mortgage 
loans. The programme allowed workers to automatically deduct mortgage payments 
from their pay cheques, raising demand for housing in 2006 and 2007. As a conse-
quence property sales in São Paulo rose by percent in 2006 to a record 28,324 units. (Cf. 
Ragir 2007) 
Supply side 
Value of the undertakings 
In contrast to the situation that was described in India as well as Indonesia, where grand 
corporate- or state institutions have controlled the development of BSD and Navi Mum-
bai660, both Alphaville as well as Tamboré began as small ‘garage ventures’ gradually 
developing into prosperous middle class enterprises. Indeed, it seems that here in the 
suburbs of São Paulo, our self-made private-sector entrepreneurs, Renato Albuquerque, 
Nuno Alves, Yoshiro and Marcelo Takaoka, Arthur Rodrigues, Fábio Ulhôa and others 
(Cf. above: Developers) have tapped into a gold mine leading to irreversible exploration 
of the housing and lifestyle needs of the rising middle classes. In 2007 the total invest-
                                               
654 The “short-term plan” consists of a down payment of 20-30 percent and financing of the balance on monthly instal-
ments up to the delivery of the unit. The “long-term plan” for finished units requires a down payment of 30 percent and 
financing of the remaining balance in up to 120 monthly instalments. The “long-term plan” for units under construction 
requires a down payment of 10 percent and provides financing of 20-30 percent in up to 30 monthly instalments until 
delivery of the unit and financing of the remaining 60-70 percent in up to 120 additional monthly instalments. (Cf. 
sec.edgar-online.com/gafisa-sa/20-f-annual-and-transition-report-foreign-private-issuer/2008/06/18/Section6.aspx, 
r12.01.2009) 
655 This fact is credited to be one of the major factors behind the country’s housing shortage of about 9 million units by the 
turn of the century. 
656 Financial Analysts confirm that before the Plano Real in 1994, mortgage lending was not possible. This was mainly due to 
the context of hyperinflation and exorbitant interest rates (Cf. Dubitsky 1998:1). 
657 E.g. it was common that the private sector real estate developers and builders financed construction with pre-payments 
(Cf. Dubitsky 1998:2, Cf. above: Developers). 
658 The reforms are largely based on the passage of the law 9514 in November 1997: “Law 9514 established a comprehen-
sive legal framework for changing the face of the Brazilian mortgage industry, principally through the introduction of a new 
securitization vehicle that will improve liquidity in the mortgage market.“ (Cf. Dubitsky 1998:1) 
659 E.g. BRL 350 (US$ 181) and BRL 4.900 (US$ 2.500) 
660 Sinar Mas in the case of BSD and the state of Maharashtra the case of Navi Mumbai 
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ment volume of AlphaVille had broken the billion BRL mark.661 It was in the same year 
that both of the firms, as we know, fell prey to an increasingly maturing and consolidat-
ing national (and global) real estate market. This was not coincidently the same time, 
when Brazil became a real and self-proclaimed middle class country.662 Huge publicly 
listed real estate conglomerates have acquired both AlphaVille and Tamboré. 663 Gafisa, 
the buyer of AlphaVille Urbanismo, was 7 times larger than the Barueri firm it acquired 
in late 2007.664  
The value of the projects launched by Gafisa in the third quarter of 2008 amounted to 
BRL 762 million (~ US$ 350 million). This number represented a 70 percent rise com-
pared to the same period of the previous year. The fact can be explained by the acquisi-
tion of AlphaVille, the formation of FIT, as well of course by Gafisa’s arrival on the US 
American stock market (cf. below). While almost two thirds of Gafisa’s products are 
usually pre-sold before construction starts, the two metropolitan regions of Rio and São 
Paulo made amounted to more than half (56 percent) of the total market.665  
Thriving on the process of consolidation and growth of the recent years Gafisa was 
able to assemble one of the greatest urban land banks of Brazil.666 By October 2008 the 
land in the company’s hands was valued at BRL 17.8 billion (US$ 7,8 billion). It con-
sisted of 247 different sites in more than 70 cities and 21 states. The capacity of the land 
had an equivalent of 115.000 housing units.667 
Revenues 
Gafisa became one of the largest real estate conglomerates in Brazil due to its ability to 
raise substantial funds on stock markets as well as its capability to diversify.668 In 2008, 
after having acquired the brands of AlphaVille and Tenda, Gafisa recorded net operating 
revenues amounting to BRL 1.7 billion (US $740 million).669 As a result the firm’s net 
income increased by 20 percent to BRL 110 million. At the same time, new project 
launches amounted to BRL 4,2 billion.670 While the Gafisa and Tenda brands comprised 
46 percent of the new schemes respectively, AlphaVille made up the remaining 8 per-
cent.671 Pre-sales amounting to BRL 2,4 billion created a relative independence from 
credit markets. Not least, the 2008 full year EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization) reached BRL 221 million at a 12.7 percent margin) and 
with a 61 percent increase compared to 2007. 
                                               
661 In the year 2005 alone AlphaVille Urbanismo SA increased its investment volume by 46 percent from BRL 750 Millions to 
BRL 1,1 Billions (Cf. Oliveira 2004). 
662 In this year 52 percent of the country’s population earned between BRL1064 and BRL 4561 a year. (Cf. The Economist 
2009: Bourgeoing bourgeoise; quoting the Brazilian Getulio Vargas Foundation; p 11) 
663 In addition Gafisa’s and Brascan’s shopping tour of 2007 was largely enabled by favourable framework of sinking interest 
rates. In 2005 alone, the official lending fell from 19 percent to 11.75 percent, while rates had been comparatively high for 
many years before. 
664 In 2007 AlphaVille was worth close to BRL 400 Million (US$ 147 Million). GAFISA’s Firm Value (FV) in 2006 was BRL 2,8 
Billion (US$ 1 Billion). Gafisa acquired 60 percent of AlphaVille’s shares at a discounted rate for BRL 201,7 million (88 Million 
US$). (Cf. GAFISA 2007: 6) 
665 Cf. Gafisa Fact Sheet 3Q08 at: www.gafisa.com.br/ir, r12.02.2009 
666 This represented an increase by almost 50 percent as compared to year before and was a direct result of the acquisition 
of AlphaVille Urbanismo. (Cf. Gafisa Fact Scheet 3Q08 at: www.gafisa.com, r12.02.2009) 
667 In contrast to the immense value represented by the land owned by the firm, Gafisa’s cash equivalents totalled only a tiny 
fraction. The enterprises cash reserves amounted to INR 790 million, while the value of completed units was estimated at 
BRL  $250 million (Cf. Gafisa Fact Scheet 3Q08 at: www.gafisa.com.br/ir, r12.02.2009). 
668 We have seen that this diversification occurs vertically in regard to the structure of the firm, horizontally in regard to the 
range of products offered, and geographically. 
669 This number was an increase by 45 percent as compared to the previous year. 
670 Increasing by 82 percent compared to 2007. 
671 This again is pointing to the rising importance of the lower income sector. 
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Eventually the revenues were mainly driven by the performance of the AlphaVille as 
well as the Tenda brands.672 AlphaVille remains one of the most profitable parts of the 
firm. The brand operated with profit margins at twice the rates that are typical for the 
real estate market. A typical AlphaVille neighbourhood has an EBITDA673 profit margin 
of 25 to 30 percent. The same number for the mother company amounted to 13 per-
cent.674  
Trends 
AlphaVille, its peers and the parent companies are thriving on the growth of Brazil’s 
middle classes – e.g. on the particular desire of these classes to appropriate private prop-
erty. AlphaVille earns most of its profits by selling one specific product. This ‘product’ is 
a ‘modern and enlightened’ lifestyle concept. It is represented by an innovative product 
brand, the AlphaVille ‘residencial’. This specific type of gated horizontal condominium is 
based on a set of principles such as autonomous governance by the residents, local codes 
with strict rules for zoning and behaviour, infrastructure of the highest international 
standards, availability of nearby service and infrastructure facilities, a large perimeter 
fence and a high quantity of private security personnel. The main output is the single-
family building unit with a garage for up to three cars. (Cf. Gonçalvez 1997: 168). 
With most of the available land developed by the end of the 1990s, the AlphaVille-
Tamboré area had reached a certain degree of saturation and consolidation. Yet at the 
same time the pressure for urbanisation remained high. Consequently the early 2000s 
have witnessed an extraordinary boom in real estate prices. In the five years between 
2001 and 2006 the value of an average real estate object in the AlphaVille area has in-
creased by 60 percent (Ramiro 2006). This recent valorisation leads to a new generation 
of projects. In the segment of guarded horizontal condominiums, for example, special 
products for niche markets such as Genêsis I and II, Burle Marx and Tamboré 11 become 
possible.675 In addition, AlphaVille’s downtown areas have experienced an increasing 
densification, paralleled by a recent boom of mixed superblock schemes (Cf. above). 
In the end the recent trend towards growth and consolidation as well as the desire to 
reduce risks has resulted in a whole basket of diversified products. Turnkey houses, verti-
cal condominiums, serviced land, and office and retail products increase the variety in the 
property market. In addition, a growing range of financial commodities obtainable on 
the financial markets augments the product range. 
Strategies 
The generation of major profits of AlphaVille across Brazil is based on the added value 
generated by the conversion of agricultural land into serviced urban land in well-
connected peripheral locations. Since AlphaVille’s site at Barueri in the meantime has 
reached a certain level of saturation, today the main profits are based on ongoing 
growth, densification and diversification of the products. 
                                               
672 The deal to acquire the majority Construtora Tenda SA was signed only in October 2008. It turned Gafisa suddenly into 
one of the market leaders in the dynamic lower middle class market for private properties. (All Cf. Gafisa’s financial report 
for 4Q08; March9th 2009, Rio de Janeiro; abailable at the company’s Website: www.gafisa.com.br/ir, r12.03.3009)  
 
673 E.g. Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortisation 
674 Cf. Gafisa’s financial report for 4Q08 at www.gafisa.com.br/ir 
675 Tamboré 11, a BRL 30 million investment, with the theme of the French region Provence, was referred to as one of the 
most modern and luxurious enterprises of its kind on the market. A property in the neighbourhood fetches BRL 10 million. 
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A factor that has greatly contributed to the profitability of the ventures is an environ-
ment of low leverage – a fact that is highly envied by peers in Western countries. Usually, 
a developer does not begin a project until 70 percent of the properties are under contract. 
A typical buyer puts down 25 percent to 30 percent of the total purchase price in cash. 
New dimensions of maximising returns and minimising risks 
AlphaVille’s and Gafisa’s strategies to maximise returns and minimize risks not only 
comprise a concentration on the improvement of the quality of the real estate products, 
they also comprise financial strategies towards growth and diversification at various lev-
els. This strategy of ‘economies of scale’ is represented by a pursuit to raise as much 
money as possible, to acquire enormous land banks, and to absorb up important com-
petitors – along the principle of ‘the winner that takes it all’. Furthermore, the drive to-
wards diversification comprises strategies to offer a diversified basket of products repre-
sented by a bunch of subsidiaries (some of them listed as independent corporations).  
An important part of the diversification strategy is the geographic spread of risks 
through investment across multiple locations. In this context Gafisa invests in promising 
future markets: 43 percent of all its land reserves are located outside of the classical cen-
tres of São Paulo and Rio. Most of the land is located in urban peripheries outside these 
traditional centres. Yet, as a matter of fact the developer owns only a quarter of the land 
it controls. The majority of 75 percent is comprised by land-swapping deals with local 
landowners. These then receive a certain amount of the finished product after the com-
pletion of the project.676  
Financial products 
The products brought to the market by AlphaVille, Tamboré, Gafisa and Brascan are not 
limited to the physical world, such as a single family home or an apartment, and are not 
bounded to limited group of clients. Today essentially everyone can buy a piece of Al-
phaVille and Tamboré, as the assets of Gafisa and Brascan are traded on national and 
international stock markets. Indeed, this is one of the advantages of ‘scale’ of large real 
estate conglomerates, which are intrinsically attached to a wide network of global opera-
tions.  
Gafisa is listed under GFSA at the Novo Mercado of São Paulo’s Stock Exchange 
BOVESPA since 2006.677 Only one year later the firm became the first Brazilian home-
builder to be listed at the New York Stock Exchange, NYSE (under the name ‘GFA’).678 
Construtora Tenda SA, the firm catering for the lower middle classes that is also con-
trolled by Gafisa is separately listed at the Novo Mercado segment of the BOVESPA un-
der TEND3. 
Box 44: Gafisa’s IPO 
When it offered its shares globally in 2007, Gafisa raised BRL 1,03 billion (US$ 493 mil-
lion). The company sold its shares in Brazil and also in the U.S. in the form of American 
Depositary Shares, or ADS. The investment Bank Merrill Lynch was the lead coordinator 
                                               
676  (Cf. Gafisa Fact Sheet 3Q08 at: www.gafisa.com, r12.02.2009). 
677 Brascan Residential Properties SA, the new owner of Tamboré SA, is listed as BISA3 at São Paulo’s stock exchange.  
678 Gafisa concluded its initial public offering of common shares in the United States by March 17, 2007 resulting in a public 
float of approximately 78.6 percent of our total share capital at the conclusion of the offering. The firms Equity International 
and GP beneficially remained the largest shareholders owning 14.2 percent and 7.3 percent of the company’s total capital 
stock. Gafisa’s stock at NYSE was offered for US $25, it peaked to almost US $50 in May 2008. By mid March 2009 it was 
selling for US$ 7.50. 
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of the operation. The Banks UBS, Pactual, Itau BBA, HSBC and Citigroup were among 
the main investors.679  
As a matter of fact, in 2006 and 2007 there was a wave of share offerings among Brazil-
ian real estate companies. This boom was strongly correlated with a decline in Brazil's 
benchmark Selic reference interest rate. From mid-2005 to earlier in 2007, more than 20 
real estate companies debuted on the capital market, among them Cyrela, Rossi Resi-
dencial SA (RSID3.BR), Company SA (CPNY3.BR), Abyara (ABYA3.BR), Brascan Residential 
Properties SA (BISA3.BR) and Klabin Segall (KSSA.BR). Significantly, in this period alone 
these developers have raised US$ 7.84 billion in initial and secondary Brazilian stock of-
ferings. Cyrela and Gafisa are the two largest Brazilian developers.680  
 Illustration D-34: Stock Quote GFA 
Lending bodies, investors, banks 
The fact that Gafisa’s products are handled by various subsidiaries has the effect of facili-
tating the exploitation of financial means from various sources. While the lower income 
project range of Tenda (formerly Fit) and Bairro Novo thrive on direct and indirect gov-
ernment subsidies, the presence at international money markets eases the inflow of global 
investments. Tenda has agreements with Caixa Econômica Federal and with private 
banks.681 
One of the result of Gafisa’s international public offering in New York was, for ex-
ample, that the Chicago based firm Equity International (EI) acquired a stake of about 
18 percent of the firm.682 Equity International was the firm that had organised Gafisa’s 
appearance on the international scene683 EI’s subsidiary Equity Residential is the largest 
apartment owner in the United States, Equity Office properties the largest office owner in 
the country.684 685 
Summary – Finance 
The examination of the financial aspects of NeoTowns is of particular interest, because it 
bears with it the question of whether a privately planned city of the 21st century can be 
more profitable than its 20th century equivalent. While AlphaVille is geared to prosperous 
elites and passes the profitability test with furore, it remains open how far this success is 
transferable to other locations and domains.  
The fact that in contrast to most other planned cities, the developers of the area began 
as small ‘garage ventures’ and then gradually developed into prosperous middle class 
enterprises can be regarded as one of the fundamentals of the project’s financial success. 
Evidently it was the tapping of the rapidly growing market of rising middle classes that 
led to self-propelling snowballing effects. The result was that the total investment volume 
of AlphaVille broke the billion BRL mark in 2007, and that both of the ventures, Al-
phaVille Urbanismo and Tamboré S.A. were absorbed by two real estate conglomerates 
                                               
679 Cf. www.wallstreet-online.de/diskussion/1119230-1-10/gafisa-gibt-sein-boerrsendebut-in-den-usa, 09.02.2009. 
680Cf. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=axj8kMQdhk8A&refer=latin_america, r03.05.2009 
681 Cf. www.tenda.com/en/history.aspx, r12.03.2009 
682 Cf. Gafisa Fact Sheet 3Q08 at: www.gafisa.com, r12.02.2009 
683 Cf. www.equityinternational.com 
684 The firm is chaired by Sam Zell, a Chicago billionaire and real estate entrepreneur who also owns the publishing company 
of the Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times as well as Chicago Clubs. Zell is also one of the founders and supporters 
of Wharton’s renowned real estate school (Cf. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sam_Zell, r12.03.2009). 
685 In addition to Gafisa, EI has also substantial stakes in BR Malls, Brazil’s largest retail property owner and operator 
(BZ:BRML3), Xinyuan (XIN), a fast-growing regional homebuilder in China, as well as Homex (HXM), Mexico’s leading home-
builder (This and more of Mr Zell’s whereabouts is listed at his profile at: 
http://www.equityinternational.com/team/team_zell.aspx, r12.03.2009) 
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of a multiple size, in the context of a consolidation of the entire national real estate mar-
ket. The purchaser of AlphaVille Urbanismo, Gafisa, for example, was seven times larger 
when it acquired the Barueri firm in late 2007. Gafisa had just extended its leading posi-
tion on the Brazilian market by going public and went on a shopping tour for smaller but 
powerful peers in order to inflate and diversify. The process was mainly facilitated by 
interest rates of unusually low levels since 2005. 
The character of the products created also reflects the shifting role of finances. Al-
phaVille’s basic product was a large single-family building unit with a garage for up to 
three cars. Gafisa, in contrast, has embarked a whole basket of diversified products as a 
reaction to recent trends of growth and consolidation, as well as the desire to reduce 
risks. Notably these new products range from the real markets of turnkey houses and 
Asian-style superblocks to an increasing array of ‘virtual’ merchandise, from mortgages 
to stocks, available on monetary exchanges. 
The financial success of the privately developed New Town AlphaVille-Tamboré is es-
sentially founded on the wealth of prosperous middle and upper income clients. The case 
AlphaVille demonstrates that a private developer can afford to concentrate on profitable 
customers – in contrast to the social goals of most public New Town ventures. In this 
manner AlphaVille’s developers were able to make the most of the appreciation of land 
values. A developed lot in AlphaVille sells for 40 times as much as agricultural land, and 
housing in the area fetches 5 to 10 times more than starter homes for the lower middle 
classes.  
Another notable advantage is that prosperous clients are relatively independent from 
credit markets. AlphaVille (and Gafisa), as much as their Brazilian peers, sell a high pro-
portion of their products for cash in advance and accept high down payments in cash – a 
fact that is highly envied by peers from developed countries. Furthermore, as Brazil’s 
market has not yet developed a housing mortgage tradition like for example the US, Al-
phaVille-Tamboré’s developers explore new customer financing instruments in order to 
reach new customer groups. In this context Gafisa came up with several own mortgage 
schemes in collaboration with the private banking sector. 
At the same time as the area of AlphaVille-Tamboré is gradually consolidating, more 
trends such as growth, consolidation, diversification, and increased instability are coming 
to the fore. The early 2000s have seen an extraordinary boom in real estate prices. In just 
the five years between 2001 and 2006, the value of an average real estate object in Al-
phaVille has increased by 60 percent. Whereas the wave of consolidation and valorisa-
tion has led to a new generation of projects, ranging from luxury eco-life style villa en-
claves to the formerly mentioned mixed use superblock schemes, the future of many pro-
jects remains highly uncertain, facing the 2009 financial crisis. 
While the complete market (whether real estate or automobile) undergoes a dual trend 
of growth and diversification, developers have entered an arms race. Accordingly, along 
the motto ‘the winner takes all’ they seek to raise the highest amount of money in the 
shortest time possible, to acquire the largest land banks, and to absorb the most impor-
tant competitors. In addition, risks are minimised and markets expanded by a diversified, 
but specific range of product types, and by the quest for geographical diversification. The 
strategies are refined even further, for instance by practices such as land swapping deals.  
In this manner Gafisa, AlphaVille’s new owner, was able to assemble one of the great-
est urban land banks of Brazil, with about 250 landed assets in more than 70 cities and 
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21 states, and an aggregated values of 8 billion USD. The firm emerged as one the big 
players, with net operating revenues amounting to USD 750 million.686  
While AlphaVille’s mansions were exclusively devoted to the affluent classes, Gafisa’s 
strategy of products and brand diversification facilitates the employment of financial 
means from various sources. While, for example, its low-income schemes (Tenda and 
Bairro Novo) thrive on direct and indirect government subsidies, the firms presence at 
international money markets eases the inflow of global investments. 
As a result fiscal products became an essential ingredient of the product range and 
practically everybody can buy a piece of AlphaVille or Tamboré. Indeed, with Gafisa’s 
(GFA) and Brascan’s (BIS) shares and bonds traded on national and international stock 
markets, AlphaVille became intimately connected to (and dependent on) the complex and 
enigmatic networks of global economic flows. Gafisa’s global IPO in 2007 resulted in 
about USD 500 million of fresh capital. 
 
                                               
686 In spite of that, AlphaVille has remained one of its most profitable parts. It operates with profit margins of 20 to 30 
percent in 2007, at twice the rates that were characteristic for the real estate market. 
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Control –  
AlphaVille as Brazil’s richest squatter settlement 
 
Table 39: Overview on Navi Mumbai’s stakeholders and regulatory framework 
Stakeholders  
Underlying power rela-
tions 
‘Informal elite-regimes’, pragmatic ‘nullum ius sine actione’ ap-
proach 
Relevance of interna-
tional lending institu-
tions’ guidelines 
NO (Only indirect through urban infrastructure funds) 
PPPs, Joint ventures YES (Increasing relevance of joint ventures on the private-private, as 
well as the private-civil nexus) 
Public-private nexus Emergence of parallel systems in the public and private spheres (ex-
ample: schools) 
Regulations  
Government approach 
during start of the 
project 
Strong hand, technocratic, liberal (laissez-faire approach to urban 
development) 
Important regulations 
at federal level 
Housing finance system (FSH) of the late 1960s, law of subdivisions 
(Lei 6766/1979), Edilício condominium (Law 4.591/ 1964), Lei da 
Responsabilidade Territorial Urbana (PL 3057/2000) Estatuto da 
Cidade (City Statues, 2001) 
Significant regulations 
at regional level 
1993: Lei de Vilas (11605/94), Plano Diretor Estrategico PDE (Mu-
nicipal law 13.430), Cidade Legal (2009), 
Major change of eco-
nomic paradigm 
1991 and 2006 (Plano Collor and Real; Lula’s socially oriented poli-
cy) 
Social goals NO (only in the CSR strategy) 
Own town status NO (AV-T is part of the municipalities of Barueri and Santana de 
Parnaíba) 
Regional planning 
framework 
1973 RMSP and Gegran as a regional planning institution, Grapho-
hab as controlling body for housing projects since 1991 
Master plan at start YES (1971 PDDI, yet the project was not a part of the plan) 
Allowable heights and 
densities (FAR) 
estimated FAR of 0,5 for the residential areas (privately set) 
Local master plan NO (Not even the developer has a master plan) 
Legal conflicts 18.000 residents are residing on illegally subdivided lands; the ty-
pology of the ‘residencial’ (loteamento fechado) is not foreseen by 
federal laws 
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Introduction 
The regulatory framework is the sixth and last of the key perspectives employed in the 
context of our investigation. AlphaVille-Tamboré seems to represent the ideal liberal 
model, as it develops without any direct government subsidies, based on entrepreneurial-
ism and the ‘pure’ quest for profit. 
So far, AlphaVille’s spatial context was examined in the framework of the project’s 
‘Predecessors and Peers’ (Cf. Context) as well as along multiple scales. The subchapter on 
the project’s population implicitly examined the framework of stakeholders, and the pri-
vate (corporate) sector was part of the investigation on the developers. Yet what is still 
missing is an understanding of the impact of the public sector. Consequently this sub-
chapter will be devoted to this matter. 
Indeed, it was one of the main initial points of this thesis that in addition to the civic 
and the corporate sector, the public sphere plays a decisive role in the process of produc-
tion of space and thereby also the generation of contemporary cities.687 In addition to 
some fundamentals examined in the context section688 this part aims to delineate the par-
ticular relationship (or non-relationship) of the AlphaVille-Tamboré venture to the public 
sphere. In this context the specific role of public institutions as well as of important regu-
lations will be elucidated. The inquiry will proceed along various scales (national, re-
gional, local) and subjects (land use regulations, spatial development plans, subsidies and 
programmes, public-private ventures). A specific emphasis will be put on the legal stand-
ing of AlphaVille-Tamborè’s residential enclaves, as this topic is at the core of some of 
the central contradictions of the scheme. 
The examination of AlphaVille-Tamboré’s legal status and its regulatory framework 
brings to the fore many remarkable contradictions and ambiguities. The private town 
undertaking appears as a new terrain in penetrating various traditional definitions of the 
‘city’ and traditional concepts of the urban (civilisation) versus the peripheral (wilder-
ness), formal versus informal and public versus private. 
Stakeholders 
National 
Role of the state 
The ‘Milestones’ section of this chapter demonstrated that AlphaVille developed in a 
context of a strong state, but with a low impact on spatial planning. The regulatory 
planning void can be linked to the overall status of a developing country (economical, 
social, demographic). Yet, in addition there is a strong linkage to a liberal, e.g. business 
friendly, disposition of the dictatorial regime of the period, with its minimal regulatory 
intervention. While the efforts of the autocratic government sought to revitalise the na-
tional economy along a liberal techno-bureaucratic method, the same liberal approach 
has resulted in a laissez-faire approach to public intervention, at least as far as planning 
and urban management are concerned. The introduction of the housing finance system 
(FSH) and the reformation of the national housing bank emerged as the most important 
milestones in this regard.  
                                               
687 This understanding is fundamentally orientated along models developed by Henri Lefebvre (1979). (Cf. the Introductory 
Chapter) 
688 Cf. above: Context, São Paulo Stakeholders and driving forces in regional development and planning 
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In this context it can be supposed that the liberally minded regime supported the de-
veloper’s strategies of consolidating and developing the site, disregarding any legal ambi-
guities and former occupants.689  
Regional 
Regional planning institutions had little impact on the AlphaVille scheme. When São 
Paulo’s administration started to recognise the necessity of organising growth at a re-
gional scale it initiated planning institutions on a regional level. Yet while these inspired 
colleagues and decision makers, they largely lacked the necessary legal power. 
Crucially, on June 8th in 1973 the Região Metropolitana de São Paulo (RMSP) was 
created by the first regional planning institution named Gegran – as the city was busting 
out of all seams (Cf. Bogus 2004: 10).690 The resulting ‘Macrometrópole’ combined 39 
municipalities and created an important setting for the economic and demographic 
growth to come. Yet, since the RMSP has never managed to a set up a Development 
Council, it was incapable of orchestrating the development process of the region (Cf. 
Rolim 2006: 6).691 The city’s regional development became increasingly driven by indi-
vidual sectoral initiatives.692 
It is highly symptomatic that the formalisation of urban planning became possible in 
Brazil only at the beginning of the 1990s, when most of the region became urbanised 
(and also AlphaVille-Tamboré was largely completed) and when the time was ripe for a 
new process of democratisation.693  
Graprohab 
The tabula rasa situation in the periphery changed only after 1991 when GRAPROHAB, 
the Grupo de Análise e Aprovação de Projetos Habitacionais was founded. This is São 
Paulo State’s council of approvals for residential projects. Since then any developer plan-
ning to realise a new residential subdivision has to consult this agency.694 Graprohap’s 
manual is standard literature for real estate developers and planners (Cf. Governo Do 
Estado De São Paulo 2007). This institution makes sure that land subdivisions comply 
with the general rules and regulations – for example: whether 35 percent of the area was 
reserved for circulation and infrastructure; whether lots have a minimum size (of 125 
                                               
689 While the developers gradually sought to acquire more pieces of the land, major leaseholder farmers occupied pieces of 
the Fazenda Tamboré. According to Albuquerque and Takaoka long negotiations were necessary, particularly in regard to 
the area, which was supposed to become AlphaVille’s downtown. Central parts of the land were acquired only by the 1980s 
(Cf. Story of the Project at: www.alphaville.co.br, r16.03.2008). 
690 The federal government institutionalised nine metropolitan regions in 1973. (Cf. Rolim: 2006, 1) 
691 Csaba Déak (2001) professor and critic at University of São Paulo’s architecture school, describes that the half-
institutionalised Metropolitan Authority – the Gegran – never became an elected body, such as the Greater London Council 
for example and it was renamed Emplasa and became a half-forgotten body within the administrative structure of São Paulo 
State. Rolim (2006) writes that a bill to the Legislative Assembly regarding the reorganisation of the RMSP in accordance 
with the new legislation in force was only submitted in 2006. 
692 The chief of São Paulo’s Empresa Paulista de Planejamento Metropolitano, Eloisa Rolim (2006) states that public policies 
are still strongly dependent on individual approaches. Sectoral plans are implemented in isolation from each other and most 
frequently in only a part of the agglomeration. The jurisdictions of administrative structures, such as municipal boundaries 
(Map 5), and the regionally structured bodies like the water and sewage (Sabesp), power supply (Eletropaulo) and telecom-
munications authorities (Telesp), overlap and none correspond to the effective urban area (Cf. Déak 2001). 
693 The federal constitution of 1988, and the state constitutions of 1989 created a legal framework for urban management 
(cf. Rolim); In 1992 the federal law of City Statutes required cities of more than 20.000 inhabitants (40 percent of all Brazil-
ian municipalities) to rewrite their master plans according to new directives; São Paulo came up with the Lei de Vilas in 1994 
(A law that among other things allowed for a further densification of inner city areas); 2001: Estatuto da Cidade (City Stat-
ues) institutionalised civil society participation at the basis of master plans – to name but a few milestones (Cf. above: Con-
text: São Paulo; Milestones). 
694 Graprohab was institutionalised with the Decreto Estadual Nº 33.499, of the 10th of July 1991; 
https://lamp.habitacao.sp.gov.br/graprohab/index.php, r18.03.2009). 
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square metres); or whether the scheme complies with the necessary environmental stan-
dards, etc. 
Local government 
Our investigation in the first section of this chapter demonstrates695 that São Paulo’s 
growth during the peak time of industrialisation occurred largely in a spontaneous and 
uncontrolled manner.696 In this context São Paulo’s government and in particular the 
adjacent municipalities were unprepared to master the city’s growth beyond the bounda-
ries of the municipality. They lacked the necessary planning power, the manpower, as 
well as the expertise.697 
The antagonism of democracy and planning 
Entrepreneurs of all colours and magnitudes, and not the local Governments, emerged as 
the main stakeholders and drivers of regional development, providing for the subdivision 
of the land, as well as the installation of local infrastructure. All of these were unified by 
the quest for secure housing and the common interest of a positive development in real 
estate values. Up until the late 1980s São Paulo’s peripheral growth had occurred in a 
legal void. The ‘periferia’ was synonymous with a non-serviced, non-civilised space, out-
side of the urban sphere, to be occupied, appropriated and colonised. The majority of 
new settlements, independent of income emerged in a bottom-up manner, mostly along 
the practice of illegal subdivisions as loteamentos, clandestinos, subúrbios, ocupações, 
and favelas.698  
Indeed we find in this framework an antagonism of planning and democracy, as in the 
context of Brazil urban development and formal planning processes tend to represent 
power instruments of elites, and the emergence of democracy is associated with the grad-
ual bottom-up emancipation in the peripheries.699 Indeed, statements that "zoning has 
nothing to offer for the majority of residents" must be understood from this perspec-
tive.700 Accordingly, for a long time, the city’s development controls, zoning regulations 
and master plans predominantly served the rich and powerful.701 702 Indeed, the fact that 
the residents manage AlphaVille’s neighbourhoods by the instrument of neighbourhood-
associations completely complies with this tradition. 
Local 
AlphaVilleTamboré does not have its own municipal administration. It belongs to two 
distinct local Municipalities. While the southern two-thirds of the project belong to the 
municipality of Barueri, the Northern third of the territory is a part of Santana de Par-
naíba. 
It can be assumed that while the developers benefitted from this situation of having al-
ternative administrative partners to negotiate with, the two municipalities profited from 
                                               
695 Cf. for example to Context: São Paulo 
696 Cf. in particular the discussion of the ‘Peripeheria’ in the São Paulo section 
697 Cf. personal Interview with Pablo Villaça in March 2006 
698 Interestingly the general mindset tends to prefer to sooner classify poor neighbourhoods as illegal than some richer types 
(Cf. above: Context: São Paulo) 
699 Cf. our discussion of Holston’s and Caldeira’s arguments above 
700 Personal Interview with Flavio Villaça in March 2009 
701 He states that for example only the upper classes had enough power to enforce regulations such as the Z1 zoning laws 
of the early 1970s. (Ibidem) 
702 The year of 2009 seems to bring a small revolution. During the writing of this thesis, in March 2009 the State govern-
ment of São Paulo confirmed ‚Cidate Legal‘. This programme between the Ministry of Housing and 47 municipalities is 
supposed lead to the legalisation of more than 830,000 illegal properties in the Greater Region of São Paulo. 
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new jobs and taxes. Indeed, while AlphaVille-Tamboré’s affluent settlers and entrepre-
neurs elevated Barueri as well as Santana de Parnaíba into the top league of rich munici-
palities of the country, the public hand tended to employ a laissez-faire approach. In this 
context it has absorbed the legal ambiguities represented by the closures and the semi-
private use of public spaces in granting concessions to the neighbourhood associations of 
AlphaVille-Tamboré. Apparently it was of minor relevance whether a new neighbour-
hood for the rich provided the necessary amount of public facilities. Mutual growth and 
monetary flows pacified the frontier between the new settlers and local heirs.703 704 Yet, a 
real dialogue with representatives of the local government was missing and the municipal 
governments were physically almost absent from the project’s area. Only several police 
posts represented the local power. 
However the traditional laissez-faire context of politics at a local level does not imply 
a lack of a regulatory framework; it only points to an overburdened system as well to-
wards a selective, instrumental and often also politically motivated enforcement of the 
law. 
While nowadays the typology of closed subdivisions becomes an increasingly popular 
practice of developing habitable land, an increasing number of stakeholders and regula-
tions is triggering a remarkable dynamic of growth and consolidation. While more and 
more stakeholders join and more rules are implicated, the exercise becomes a risky en-
deavour for a developer. As a consequence a tendency towards growing size and agglom-
eration emerges. This is triggered by the need to endure an approval process that goes 
through all government levels (federal, state, municipal) and that can sometimes take 
more than three years. Of course large and diversified corporations with huge assets are 
better prepared to face this situation than smaller ‘garage ventures’. The consequence is 
that the entry barriers for developers in the market segment of ‘loteamentos fechados’ is 
constantly increasing – “Developers need a certain size, as well good lawyers.” (Cf. 
www.gafisa.com.br, 2007) 
Hybrid forms of collaboration between the public, private and the civil sectors 
While this work is examining the roles of the public, private and the civil sectors, it is not 
just important to delineate the specific part of each of these dimensions. It is also neces-
sary to examine these new hybrid forms, their overlap and interrelations.  
Notably joint ventures of the private and the civil sector, also known as Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) are virtually irrelevant for the project of AlphaVille.705 In Alphaville’s 
context, as much as in the Brazilian context, processes tend to be entirely privatised. The 
result then is the existence of parallel public and private systems. It can be observed that 
in addition to a huge amount of private schools, new toll roads or private cemeteries, all 
significant public options prevail.706  
Yet, in contrast to the lack of PPPs, various forms of collaborations among the private 
entrepreneurs and the civil sector exist. These emerge as a result of the initiative of the 
private sector – for example when the developers set-up the resident associations as non-
                                               
703 It can be supposed that many public officials personally benefitted from bribes and informal payments, as was demon-
strated in the context of the struggles on the land disputes with the Union above.  
704 The rationales (and results) and of the operation of Brazilian governments, in particular local governments, can only be 
fully understood when taking the dimension of corruption into regard. As was stated above (Cf. Context: Brazil, Culture), in 
many developing countries, including Brazil, it is not the existence of laws and regulations that is a problem, but their accep-
tance and enforcement. Brazil’s political sphere, in particular is characterised by practices such as ‘jeitos’ or Clientelism, and 
as well as many other forms of abuse of power largely subsumed as ‘corruption’. 
705 In contrast to India, as we have seen in the chapter on Navi Mumbai. 
706 In Brazil’s general context, several of the previously public urban services have been completely privatised, while most 
remained public (Cf. the context subchapter). 
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profit organisations. Various hybrid and nested sub-structures emerge, as these organisa-
tions in turn subcontract certain tasks, such as security services or gardening etc. to the 
private sector. 
 
Legislation 
Legislation is the corresponding element to the geography of stakeholders (and their 
power relations). It is needed to discern the regulatory framework of our project. While 
this section is not able to elaborate a holistic legislative basis, it focuses on a number of 
relevant aspects of high relevance to our topic. Among these are the legal standing and 
the political boundaries of the project area as well as the context of master plans. Par-
ticular attention is given to a feature that is unique for this Brazilian case – the unre-
solved legal status of AlphaVille-Tamboré’s residential typology, the ‘loteamento 
fechado’. 
Legal status 
Town without town hall 
The development of AlphaVille-Tamboré took place principally in a regulatory void. It 
has triggered a series of significant contradictions and political challenges. While the pro-
ject’s structure and functionality corresponds to a fully-fledged town, politically it does 
not enjoy the status of a city. It is part of two distinct municipal areas. Another notable 
contradiction is represented by the fact that the neighbourhoods are handled in the form 
of closed condominiums, while legally they correspond to open subdivisions. It remained 
vague for a long time how much the public hand could enforce in the area. Public census 
collectors, for example, were habitually denied access to most of AlphaVille’s residential 
communities707  Only as late as in April of 2008 almost of the master planned communi-
ties have been inventoried and regularised during a reorganisation of Barueri’s municipal 
structure – the previous structure was based on the founding statutes of the municipality 
dating back to 1949.708  
Who owns the place? 
Indeed, one might provocatively claim that the undertaking is an informal settlement. 
This could be the case because large parts of it have been developed along an ambiguous 
process without the formal backing of land rights or development plans. While the total 
area lacks its own administrative body, the actual local power is mainly exercised by the 
developers and the landholders via the respective residents associations. The fact that the 
developers marketed this approach as an integral part of the brand and dubbed it ‘auto-
management’ must be seen as part of the innovatory achievement.709 
                                               
707 This has also resulted in a deficit of publicly available information on the area, as well as a skewed representation in 
statistics and maps. For example, maps of the spatial distribution of incomes in the metropolitan region do not reflect the 
real incomes of the area. Cf. http://www.usp.br/fau/docentes/depprojeto/c_deak/CD/5bd/1rmsp/m06-ren/index.html, 
r24.04.2009; Cf. www.ibge.gov.br, r27.02.2009 
708 “A Câmara Municipal aprovou na sessão de terça-feira, 15, a Lei nº 1.709 de 17 de abril deste ano (Lei de 
Abairramento), de autoria do prefeito da cidade, dispondo sobre a oficialização dos bairros do município de Barueri.” 
(http://www.barueri.sp.gov.br/sistemas/informativos/informativo.asp?id=8095) 
709 Indeed, this situation is not unique. As a matter of fact most of São Paulo’s urban growth of the industrial era occurred 
by illegal land divisions (Cf. above: Context, São Paulo; Cf. Holston and Caldeira 2008: 22, Bogus 2004) As in other rapidly 
developing contexts (Cf. Indonesia, India) the official reaction always came only after the public had been confronted with 
the fait accompli. 
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São Paulo’s richest squatter settlement 
AlphaVille exemplifies the fact that this category of informal settlements is not reserved 
for poor neighbourhoods only. The NeoTown counts as an unofficial settlement in a 
number of ways: The area is not organised as an own district, or municipality. Moreover, 
from the perspective of the administration, several of its neighbourhoods exist on ille-
gally appropriated grounds, obscuring the legal status of some neighbourhoods. 
In this context, representatives of the federal government (e.g. the regional national 
heritage office) claim that 18,000 residents, mainly from the richest sections, were own-
ers of illegal subdivisions. 710 It is argued that large sections of the Penteado farm, origi-
nally indigenous lands, were re-appropriated on the basis of an unlimited lease and not a 
sales contract (Cf. Badadobulos 2006; Duram 2006; Cf. above).711 Consequently from 
the point of view of Humberto Natal, a federal lawyer, Alphaville and Tamboré were 
born on the basis of false documents.712 The government thus demands that the land 
should be regarded as a part of a national patrimony. It accuses the developers of having 
subdivided and sold the land illegally. This was happening mainly during the 1980s real 
estate boom while most of the local Governments were overburdened. 
This is the reason why these days the federal government seeks to legalise the area and 
to get hold of a large backlog of fees and taxes.713 Yet, so far the residents refused to ac-
cept the allegations by the government.714  The case entered a next stage by 2006, as it 
was handed over to federal lawyers (Cf. Babadobulos 2006, Duran 2006).715  
Impact of master planning 
AlphaVille-Tamboré developed in the framework of a master plan: the 1971 Plano Dire-
tor de Desenvolvimento Integrado (PDDI). Yet while this plan, as well as other urban 
legislations, lacked implementation and enforcement at a local level, the incremental and 
bottom-up development of the scheme portrays an archetypical (neo) liberal progress. 
The emergence of the 20 million macrometrópole of São Paulo is devoid of any effi-
cient general plan (Cf. above, Cf. Somekh 2002, 2005). This is true in particular for the 
period that marks AlphaVille’s development from the 1960s to the 1990s – a time when 
the metropolis doubled in size. (Cf. above Milestones, Cf. Rolim 2006) 
São Paulo does have a tradition of strategic documents and plans guiding regional de-
velopment (Cf. above: Context, Milestones). Initial efforts date back to the ‘Plano das 
Avenidas’ of the 1930s. Yet, it was mainly the period from the mid Sixties to the end of 
the Seventies which demonstrated a high inclination towards large integrated regional 
master plans. This peak time of authoritarian modernisation saw the emergence of São 
Paulo’s Plano Urbanistico Basico (PUB, 1968), as well as the Plano Diretor de Desen-
                                               
710 The journal Isto É reported in July 2005 that 18.000 thousand residents (about a quarter of the population) live on lands 
of the former Tamboré Farm on lands for BRL 400 thousand each (US $180,000) without legal property rights. The debated 
neighbourhoods lie in the Southern and Southwestern part AlphaVille Tamboré. They comprise: Alpha Zero, Alpha 4, the 
Tamboré area, the Conde, 18 do Forte, Melville, Alpha Plus, the Resort Tamboré and the whole commercial and industrial 
areas of AlphaVille and Tamboré (Cf. Babadobulos 2006). 
711 Duran 2006 writes: “A questão de AlphaVille remete a 31 de maio de 1739, quando Bernardo José Leite Penteado 
ganhou, do governo, os direitos irrestritos (aforamento) das terras da então Fazenda Tamboré, uma gleba de 2,2 milhões de 
m2. Para mantê-los, Penteado devia apenas pagar o foro - 0,6% do valor venal do terreno - anualmente à União, e, em caso 
de venda ou transmissão desse direito, o laudêmio de 5% do valor venal da transação. A prática é comum no litoral, entre 
moradores das chamadas 'terras de Marinha’. 
712 “Alphaville e Tamboré nasceram em cima de documentos falhos” (Isto È) 
713 In this context the administration also aims to update the affected land registers by utilising satellite maps. 
714 They refused to pay the related taxes. These amount to 0,6 percent of the property value and sales taxes amounting to 5 
percent. (Cf. Isto É 2005) 
715 Accounts in this land dispute are presented in a 2005 article of the journal Revista Isto É, SP, 27/7/05. Seção Economia & 
Negócios, p.76 a 77; online at; http://www.terra.com.br/istoe/1867/economia/1867_ocupacao_luxo.htm; r16.01.2008. A 
copy is available at http://geodesia.ufsc.br/wiki-ctm/index.php?title=Posseiros_de_Luxo&redirect=no, r16.01.2008.  
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volvimento Integrado (PDDI, 1971). The first defined a general development framework 
for a multiplex urban region. It became São Paulo’s first legally approved master plan-
ning document, facilitating the inflow of essential government funds. It also initiated 
substantial zoning laws.716 In addition, on June 8th in 1973 – the year when building 
started in AlphaVille-Tamboré – the Região Metropolitana de São Paulo (RMSP) was 
founded. It aimed to combine São Paulo and 39 municipalities in the hinterlands (Cf. 
Bogus 2004: 10).717  
Nonetheless, none of the documents were powerful enough to fix the city’s immense 
development pains. The region of São Paulo, as much as many other Brazilian metropo-
lises, developed along a process of ‘autoconstruction’718 This lets the master plans appear 
more as effects of the general boom, than as a cure for the same.719  
In contrast to the situation in informal settlements, the void in efficiency of public 
regulations has triggered the emergence of private zoning codes and regulations. As a 
consequence AlphaVille’s neighbourhoods are shaped and governed by elaborate legal 
contracts, strict local codes and design guidelines, leading to harmonious single family 
landscapes as an integral part of the ‘regulatorios’. 
Box 45: Debate on the impact of planning in shaping urban development 
There is a stimulating debate about the impact of urban planning in the development 
of São Paulo. On one side Rachel Rolnik (2008: 1), former head of the Brazilian Ministry 
of Cities, states that the development of the metropolis neither occurred in a chaotic 
manner, nor without a plan, and that conscious planning decisions are having a tre-
mendous impact on the city’s urban form to date. Moreover the architect and urban in-
frastructure expert Renato Anelli claims that transport planning in combination with 
urban design played a pivotal role in São Paulo’s history (Cf. 2008: 17).  
The Chilean scholar Francisco Sabatini, on the other hand, is convinced of the role of 
large urban infrastructure and disagrees on the impact of planning: “The design and 
implementation of these types of works [land liberalisation, economic incentives, infra-
structure development], particularly urban roads have more influence on the evolution 
of urban form than actual urban planning.” (P.105).  
The former lead planner of São Paulo’s municipal planning authority Flavio Villaça on 
the other hand discusses the ‘illusions of the master plan’. He argues in great depth 
that so far that all efforts of master planning the city have been without significant re-
sults and that the city is predominantly shaped by socio-economic forces.720 
PDDI 
The Plano Diretor de Desenvolvimento Integrado (PDDI) of 1971 was the actual master 
plan in place when AlphaVille was started.721  Yet, Alphaville-Tamboré was neither a 
direct component of this plan, nor of other major public interventions.722 Of course the 
project thrived on some of the repercussions. While the direct ‘power’ of the plan for 
                                               
716 Cf. Deák 2001, Anelli 2008; Cf. also above: National Milestones 
717 The federal government in 1973 institutionalised nine metropolitan regions (Cf. Rolim: 2006, 1) 
718 Cf above; Cf. Holston and Caldeira 2008 
719 The major formal problem was the fact that the Municipal Council did not approve any but two of the proposals (1971 
and 2001). 
720 Indeed Villaça has devoted a significant part of his work and the 2005 book “As ilusões do Plano Diretor” to this topic 
(Cf. his articles at http://www.flaviovillaca.arq.br/, r07.01.2008; Cf. also to Somekh, 2002, 2005 
721 As a matter of fact this plan is among the two legally binding plans that ever existed in São Paulo. The other document is 
the 2001/2002 document (Cf. Somekh 2002, 2005) 
722 This, indeed, is a major difference of the development framework. From the Neo Town examples, Navi Mumbai, BSD and 
Piedra Roja / La Reserva (amongs others) are all deeply embedded in regional master plans (Cf. above: Predecesors). 
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steering regional development was small723, its indirect effects were manifold. Among 
other things, the plan as well as the new zoning codes contributed to an increasing valor-
isation and segregation of inner city areas and triggered additional migration towards the 
suburbs, including the middle classes. In this context AlphaVille’s developers managed to 
benefit in a two ways as: a) land markets in the peripheries became highly valorised and 
as b) a new regulation for residential condominiums in the inner city came forth.724 (Cf. 
Predecessors, Ilha do Sul) 
Prototype of liberal self-organisation 
Still, while AlphaVille was thriving on the economic boom and urban expansion of the 
time, the legal development framework of this planned city rather represented a regula-
tory void. The military regime was prioritising economic growth by all means and the 
urban fabric exploded, leaving the enforcement of urban laws a neglected matter. Indeed, 
it was in particular this situation that provided the ‘Unterbau’ for the emergence of this 
liberally minded Neo Town along an incremental bottom-up process. Notably this re-
sulted in a New Town driven by 1) a maximum amount of entrepreneurial spirit (and 
also bottom-up demand), 2) minimal regulation, and 3) the quest for highest individual 
‘happiness’ (e.g. freedom and property), AlphaVille-Tamboré appears as the perfect lib-
eral development model.725 And likewise, on top of this ‘classical’ process, we can detect 
a ‘spirit of a new capitalism’ represented by the appropriation of innovative strategies 
from the ‘other’ – here in the form of semi-legal occupation and land division practices.726 
Legal status of the clusters  
One of the most stirring legal topics in the context of AlphaVille-Tamboré is the legal 
status of its neighbourhoods. The closed neighbourhoods in the area represent the earli-
est typologies of ‘loteamentos fechados’ in Brazil. Yet the legal status of this ‘construc-
tion’ remains unresolved to date. The fact that the interior street space of ‘loteamentos’ is 
legally public but access is restricted is one of the main problems of this typology. An-
other difficulty is that the ‘residencials’ do not provide spaces for public services. Nota-
bly, despite intense debates, Brazil’s legal system has still not been able to devise a viable 
solution. 
Loteamento vs Condominio and some forms in-between 
Our list of ambiguities and contradictions represented by the unusual and robust struc-
ture of AlphaVille-Tamboré is far from closed. Another of its legal antagonisms embraces 
the sphere between the public and the private.727 AlphaVille’s neighbourhoods are among 
the first examples of the typology of the ‘loteamento fechado’in Brazil. This typology 
leaves behind many classical notions (and ideals) of a city, in a legal as well as an urban 
sense. 
The problem is however that this typology does not appear in any Brazilian law. (Cf. 
Oliveira 2007)728 While the Brazilian ruling differentiates between the categories of 
                                               
723 Cf. Personal Interview with Pablo Villaça in March 2006 
724 In general our NeoTown also thrived on the strategy of decentralised growth and the emphasis of individual transport, 
represented for example by the construction of the Rodovia Castello Branco.  
725 Truly, these are the three main criteria of classical liberalism as discussed by Hackworth 2004: pp3. 
726 A characteristic for example explored by Cf. Boltansky and Chiapello 2003 
727 “A grande questão quer surge no loteamento fechado está, exatamente, nas vias de circulação e nos logradouros 
públicos.” (Marini 2000) 
728 “As leis existentes que tratam de parcelamento de solo, não tem por previsão, empreendimento com essas 
características” (Marini 2000) 
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‘loteamentos’ (open subdivisions) and condomínios (condominiums), ‘loteamentos 
fechados’ emerge as an unanticipated model. 729 
Accordingly, to comprehend the evolution of the horizontal closed (gated) condomin-
ium and its consolidation it will be necessary to take a look into history and the legal 
aspects at hand. It will also be significant to trace the differences between closed land 
divisions (‘loteamento fechado’) and horizontal closed or gated condominiums (con-
domínio). Whereas the formal differences between these two models are not significant, 
what is very different is the legal context.  
Major legal disputes among municipalities and the private companies have been held 
on the jurisdiction, construction and maintenance of road systems, the upholding of the 
urban services, and regarding access to the community. (Cf. Santos 2002) Legal ambigui-
ties in regard to ‘loteametos fechados’ are also expressed between the federal and the 
local levels, as several existing state and municipal laws authorise the closure of subdivi-
sions without the backup of federal laws.730 
The pragmatism of the closed land subdivision 
The difference between ‘condomínios’ and ‘loteamentos’ is that in ‘loteamentos’ the cli-
ents buy only the part of their individual lot, while in ‘condomínios’ they obtain a share 
of the whole. A ‘loteamento’ is an agglomeration of individual properties while a ‘con-
domínio’ represents a collective form of property.731 
Thus AlphaVille’s neighbourhoods exist in a grey sphere inbetween legality and ille-
gality. They adhere to a principle of ‘nullum ius sine actione’ (no compliant without re-
dress). Indeed, this approach can be described as being pragmatic at its best. Obviously it 
was easier for the developers to register each of the projects as ‘loteamentos’. Moreover 
many municipalities tolerated the practice. Once completed, the clients requested 
guarded entities with controlled access. In this context the developers did no more nor 
less than just to provide each of the parties with what it desired – at least as long as this 
represented the most profitable solution. Eventually the entire suburbia of São Paulo’s 
emerged according to such dubious land development practices. Hence the practice of 
constructing private streets was nothing new. (Cf. Holston 2004: 414) 
The critical point however is that this ‘pragmatic’ result is technically illegal. The offi-
cial ‘loteamento’ foresees public streets (and other facilities) that are open to all.732 Yet, 
when this legal loophole became apparent, another ‘pragmatic’ fix followed. SIA, the 
umbrella organisation of the resident associations in AlphaVille agreed with the local 
governments on individual concessions for the use of the gates and the public spaces in 
the closed neighbourhoods.733 (Cf. Marini 2000) As a consequence the question of how 
                                               
729 The common names ‘loteamentos fechados’, ‘loteamentos em condominio’ or ‘loteamentos integrados’ represent the 
ambiguity of these urban typologies. AlphaVille was indeed one of the earliest pioneers representing this typology. The 
phenomenon is increasingly common all around Brazil. It still awaits legal consolidation on a federal level and causas intense 
debates among legal experts and urbanists (Cf. Oliveira 2007: 4). 
730 Some municipal laws have foreseen closed land divisions as part of the Federal Law n.º 6,766/79, whose internal ways 
and public areas are object of concession, permission or authorization of use granted by the municipal Public Power to an 
association constituted of the inhabitants. They are example: Municipal law n.º 8,736/1996, of the City of Campinas (SP); 
Municipal law n.º 3,270/1999, of the City of American (SP); Municipal law n.º 2,668/2003, of the City of Paulínia (SP); 
Municipal law n.º 9,244/2003, of the City of Native of London; Municipal law n.º 2,047/2004, of the City of Capon of 
Canoa (RS); Municipal Complementary law n.º 12/2005 of Xangri-Lá (RS); Municipal law n.º 2,351/2005, of the City of Lawn 
(RS); Municipal law n.º 2,253/2004, of the City of Gravataí (RS); Municipal Complementary law n.º 246/2005, of the City of 
Caxias of Sul (RS); among others. (Cf. Oliveira 2007: 8) 
731 Cf. Personal interview with Flavio Vilaça in March 2006 
732 The greater legal uncertainty that usually arises is the question of who collects the taxes and pays the bills for common 
public services such as electricity or the police. 
733 “A SIA é também a principal responsável pela concessão pelas prefeituras de Barueri e Santana de Parnaíba do Direito 
Real de Uso das portarias, prédios administrativos e áreas de lazer localizados no interior dos Residencial, o que contribui 
para aumentar o nível de segurança em nosso bairro.” (SIA Website: www.sia.org.br, r12.11.2008) 
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to handle these new closed subdivisions has been engaging Brazilian legal experts for 
years now without resolution. (Cf. Marini 2000) (Cf. Interview with Flavio Vilaça in 
March 2006). 
 Illustration D-35: Between the walls 
 
Box 46: Context of federal land use regulations in Brazil 
Subdvision laws (Lei 6766/79 and PM 3057/00) 
The regulatory framework of land subdivisions in Brazil are the Lei 6766/79 and the 
planned PL 3057/00. The Lei 6766/79, commonly known as the ‘law of subdivisions’, is 
among the most important laws in urban development. For the last 30 years this regu-
lation was the legal base for the parcelling of peripheral land in Brazil. In time more 
and more loopholes emerged, for example the lack of environmental regulations, or as 
well in our case, insufficient statutes regarding closed subdivisions (‘loteamentos 
fechados’). A new law, the PL 3057/00 is supposed to close many of these gaps. 
Parcelamento do Solo (Lei 6766/1979) 
The law of subdivisions was enacted in 1979 (5 years after the development of the first 
neighbourhoods in AlphaVille). The law distinguishes only between two parcelling 
categories: ‘desmembramentos’ and ‘loteamentos’. While ‘desmembramento’ relates to 
a breakdown of areas that are already serviced by public networks (cf. Art 2, §2), 
‘loteamento’ refers to the development of new land, making necessary the extension of 
public infrastructure, space and circulation systems (Cf. Article 2, §1).734 Among the basic 
infrastructures the law mentions are: rain water drainage, public illumination, sewer 
and water supply systems, electric energy networks and the road system.735  Principally 
the article 2 §5 of the law regulates the duties of the developers, e.g. minimum stan-
dards for the lot sizes and for the infrastructure. The law also prescribes that a mini-
mum area of 15 percent of non-circulation open space has to be devoted to public ser-
vices and facilities. Apparently both of these regulations have been problematic for Al-
phaVille’s neighbourhoods.  
 
Edilício condominium (Law 4.591/ 1964) 
As opposed to the ‘loteamento’, the articles 1.331 the 1.358 of the Brazilian Civil Code 
and the Law 4.591 of 16 December 1964 define the framework for condominiums in the 
real estate and construction sector. A condominium is defined as a property that is 
jointly owned. Each owner possesses a virtual share of the total. Condominium literally 
means ‘joint sovereignty’ of a communal domain (estate).736 The civil code defines that 
each owner is assigned an ideal and not a physical share of the property. All owners are 
obliged to manage the property jointly and to draw up an internal set of codes. 
‘Loteamentos’, in contrast, consist only of private property and a public domain. 
A condominium in the real estate sector is referred to as an Edilício Condominium. 
These can be a building or an ensemble of buildings under joint and autonomous own-
ership.737 Here the difference is that each owner is entitled to a share of the property 
that he can use privately. Hence real estate condominiums generally consist of a unit 
devoted to a private use (such as a house or an apartment) as well as an ideal part of 
communal ownership (the roof of a building, common areas, etc). Nonetheless a con-
                                               
734 Article 2, §4 prescribes the necessity that all elements of the planned project have to comply with local standards and 
regulations, e.g. the master plan and municipal laws. 
735 Since the law was enacted debates have arisen as to whether the public lighting or paved streets should be a basic stan-
dard in Brazil. 
736 Cf. www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=condominium, r23.03.2009 
737 Some state regulations (E.g. São Paulo‘s state degcree No. 52.053, of August 13th 2007) distinguish between three types 
of condominiums: horizontal (houses), vertical (apartments), and mixed condominiums. (Cf. Governo Do Estado De São 
Paulo 2007). 
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dominium usually consists of only one lot.738 It has to be noted that the respective regu-
lations do not distinguish between closed or open types of condominiums. Because a 
condominium is a form of shared property a ‘condomínio fechado’ is not a subject of 
the laws that govern this category. (Cf. Oliveira 2008: 10) 
Prima facie the ‘edilício condomínio’ appears as the most appropriate form of legalising 
‘loteamentos fechados‘.739 This has not worked in reality for several reasons:  
The maximum size of a ‘condomínio’ is principally limited.740 Most of the closed subdivi-
sions, in contrast, reach a ten-fold size.741 It seems that this dimension is economically 
predetermined, and that peripheral locations make larger ventures more profitable. 
Most Municipalities require a significant proportion of public spaces to be set aside by 
the developers. (Cf. Oliveira 2008: 12) 
In addition, the legal form of the ‘condomínio’ implies significantly higher operational 
costs, as the average share is larger than the usual private lot. 
At the same time individual property remains theoretic. When, for example, an owner 
seeks to sell his land, he has to get an official approval by the association of all owners. 
Hence this option is unattractive for buyers as well as consumers, as long as affordable 
alternatives exist. 
 
Lei da Responsabilidade Territorial Urbana (PL 3057/2000) 
An important new version of the Lei de Parcelamente de Solo is the Projeto de Lei 
3057/2000. This draft law has been in planning since 2000.742 The PL 3057/00 is supposed 
to replace the ‘law of subdivisions’ and addresses many of the problems and legal gaps 
that emerged in the last 30 years of urban growth and development. Whenever it be-
comes enacted it will bring major changes to the handling of gated communities in 
Brazil.  
In the final analysis the regulation is of highest relevance for many other countries with 
lagging legislation and high amounts of informal subdivisions and unregulated urban 
growth (be that in the luxury, middle class or no-income segments).743  
The nine general principles represented by the  “Urban Responsibility Law” (Art. 2) are: 
1. Social function as one of the primary functions of a city 
2. Guaranteed right to housing and sustainable development of human settlements 
3. Urbanism serving public purposes and with respect for public order 
4. Prioritisation of public order over private interests 
5. Prioritised development of vacant urban land and the respect of particularly sensitive 
and protected terrains 
6. Recuperation of the status/ acceptance of public power and its effects 
7. Universal access of public goods for all people 
8. Guarantee of balancing public goods with environmental requirements 
9. Protection of the consumer. 
Notably the PL 3057 de-bureaucratises many aspects of urban developments and intro-
duces various innovations in environmental regulations. The new regulation seeks to 
ease the life for municipalities and developers in integrating and mainstreaming urban 
as well environmental licensing elements (Cf. Art 3, §23). Among these important 
measures are a minimal area for permanent preservation (‘Áreas de Preservação Per-
                                               
738 Each joint owner is a ‘titular’, with exclusiveness of the independent unit (apartment, office, room, store, mezzanine, 
garage) and bearer of the ideal parties of the common areas: land, structure of the building, roof, general net of water 
distribution, sewer, gas and electricity, calefação and refrigeration central offices, corridors of access to the independent 
units and the public areas etc. (CC, Art. 1.331; of the Brazilian civil law; volume V: property law, São Paulo). 
739 Indeed these simulate many conditions that are characteristic for joint properties: controlled access, private streets, semi 
private communal services, autonomous governance etc. 
740 The maximum size of a condominium in Rio Grande do Sul, for example, was set at 30 thousand square metres. 
741 We have seen above that a characteristic AlphaVille Residencial, for example, amounts to 50 hectares; these are 500.000 
square metres. (Cf. above: Structure) 
742 The 2007 version of this law PL 20/2000, became known as the ‘Lei da Resposibilidate Territorial Urbana’.  
743 Despite the fact that the PL brings major reforms for hitherto unregulated land subdivisions, this law is remarkable in 
general for acknowledging that the country has reached a watershed in regard to urbanisation. Indeed, it represents a new 
era which accepts that from now on questions of conservation and preservation will be increasingly important. The law in 
particular emphasises the importance of social and environmental dimensions by placeing public interest and the preserva-
tion of the environment before private concerns and putting the consolidation of inner urban areas before the development 
of new territories. These values are presented in a list of statutes and principles that are part of the 2nd article of the law. 
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manente’ or APP) comprising 15 percent of the land, prescription on locally appropriate 
vegetation, and soil sealing limits. (Cf. Articles 13 to 20 of the law) The regulation al-
lows the combination of social (recreational) uses and environmental concerns. It also 
allows the total of the preservation area to be included in the calculation of general 
public space (Cf. Art 14 §3 of the law). Art 15 generally frees all developments under 
100 hectares from the requirement of additional environmental impact statements 
(upon confirmation by the respective authority). 
 
The condomínio urbanístico – gated communities as a form of added urban value 
The PL 3057 is also highly relevant for the future of gated communities in Brazil: To ‘re-
solve’ the problem of gated communities in Brazil the PL 3057/00 not only introduces a 
new legal typology, the ‘condomínio urbanisctico’, in addition it also attempts to in-
crease the general public value of residential encalves. 744 
Most notably the PL 3057/00 introduces the new model of the ‘condomínio ur-
banístico’745 as a valorised form of the ‘loteamento’. In contrast to previous forms of 
subdivisions the regulation foresees that the interior streets can remain closed. Yet at 
the same time it requires the setting aside of 15 percent of the total land for public fa-
cilities outside of the undertaking (Cf. Art 11).746 As a matter of fact municipalities get a 
high amount of autonomy regulating closed land divisions, as long as they operate with 
a comprehensive urban management system.747 Notably the regulation intends to en-
able the municipality to control the size, dimension, total number and the interrela-
tions of the respective gated communities under their jurisdiction.748  
Ongoing discussions, PL 20/2007 
While closed land subdivisions become increasingly prominent throughout Brazil, their 
regulation continues to be a highly debated subject. For the time being the various 
stakeholders use their own interpretations of the law.749 In this situation true solutions 
become delayed, as long as any law becomes approved. The latest update of the Pro-
jeto de Lei 3057/00 ‘lei de responsibilidate urbana’, dubbed 20/2007 foresees that in the 
future750 ‘loteamentos fechados’ must gain approvals as horizontal condominiums. (Cf. 
Oliveira 2008) In addition the law envisions that the ‘closed’ status will only be granted 
for periods of five years, then the residents will have to apply for a renewal.751 
 
 
 
                                               
744 The PL 3057 institutionalises several new typologies of subdivisions in addition to the existing ‘desmembramentos‘ and 
‚loteamentos‘. Among the new types of subdivisions that the law includes are: urban condominiums (‘condomínios urbanis-
ticos’), various forms of integrated parcellations, subdivisions and condominiums, as well as small forms of allotments. A 
‘condominio urbanistico’ is defined as a shared property consisting of autonomous units, including ideal shares of common 
areas. A small subdivision is a project of less than 10’000 square metres, or less than 5 units. (Cf. the 5th Article of the law). 
745 “XII — condomínio urbanístico: a divisão de imóvel em unidades autônomas destinadas à edificação, às quais 
correspondem frações ideais das áreas de uso comum dos condôminos, sendo admitida a abertura de vias de domínio 
privado e vedada a de logradouros públicos internamente ao perímetro do condomínio.” (Official definition of the 
condomínio urbanistico by the PL 3057/2000). 
746 A placement of the public facilities is even allowed at totally different locations, as long as these are within the boundary 
of the municipality. 
747 “Município com Gestão Plena” 
748 Cf. Art 12; Cf. Saboya Renato 2007: Condomínios Fechados; at http://urbanidades.arq.br/2007/07/condomínios-
fechados/, r20.03.2009. 
749 Such an attempt, for example, is the definition of a horizontal condominium of lots. (‘condominio horizontal de lotes’, 
Cf. Oliveira 2008) 
750 The law plans for a transitional period of 5 years. 
751 Cf. the Art. 3º, XI, of the Project of Law n.º 20/2007 quoted by Oliviera 2008: 12) 
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Summary 
Stakeholders 
Despite a fundamental shift of powers to the civic and the corporate sectors, which is an 
important underlying theme of this thesis, the public sphere undeniably continues to play 
a fundamental role in the process of production of contemporary space. Accordingly it 
becomes important to explore the relevance of the public sector for our case. Indeed, the 
examination of AlphaVille-Tamboré’s legal status and its regulatory framework brings to 
the fore many contradictions and ambiguities. In this context the private city appears as a 
new terrain, challenging various traditional definitions of ‘the city’ and calling into ques-
tion traditional concepts of urban (civilisation) versus peripheral (wilderness), formal 
versus informal, and public versus private. In essence the ambiguities of AlphaVille-
Tamboré are represented by the absent town status of the scheme (The urban structure of 
90.000 residents has no own municipal rights), by the autarchic governance practices of 
the neighbourhoods (automanagement), and by the ‘off the record’ status of the public 
spaces in the neighbourhood enclaves.  
Indeed, it could be claimed, albeit with a provocative undertone, that the NeoTown of 
AlphaVille-Tamboré is an informal settlement. As the scheme developed in a formal void 
that is characteristic of the evolution of São Paulo’s periphery, the area counts as an in-
formal settlement in at least three ways: 1) Power is mainly exercised by the land holders 
along a system of ‘automanagement’; 2) An enormous share of the land is considered to 
be squatted; 3) formal acknowledgement by the authorities has been incomplete for a 
long time (until 2006).  
As matter of fact a serious land dispute has been underway for several years. The fed-
eral administration is claiming that nearly 20,000 of AlphaVille’s residents are owners of 
illegally subdivided territories. In addition, the matter becomes more complex: the subdi-
vision, which occurred during a real estate boom of the 1980s, was apparently tolerated 
by the overburdened (and corrupt) local authorities. Furthermore, the fact that Al-
phaVille-Tamboré developed in a self-organised manner, is not only related to the lack-
ing capacities of a developing country; it must also be closely related to the liberal incli-
nation of the military regime at the time of the project’s founding. While AlphaVille 
largely thrived in a context of immense infrastructure projects (such as the Castello 
Branco Highway), and private sector subsidies, it must also be supposed that the regime 
of that time tolerated (indeed likely supported) the developer’s strategies of consolidating 
and developing the site, disregarding any legal vagueness on one hand and the reality of 
the existing settlers on the other. 
At the same time as Brazil’s industry was booming as the result of the tremendous 
economic initiatives of the military regime, the public government was unprepared to 
master the urban escalation beyond the boundaries of the centre. The smaller adjoining 
municipalities in particular, such as Barueri and Santana do Parnaíba, lacked the neces-
sary manpower, basic infrastructure and vital expertise. For this reason the industrialists, 
entrepreneurs, developers, and the masses of new settlers (including AlphaVille’s middle 
classes) became the main drivers of change. 
At the least municipal boundaries exist, constituting a baseline structure of public or-
ganisation. However, the fact that AlphaVille transcends these supports the notion of an 
independent and self organised construction that has its own dynamics. Thus, it can be 
assumed that the developers benefited from two alternative administrations to bargain 
with, when AlphaVille expanded from Barueri to Santana do Parnaíba along the major 
traffic artery. Moreover it can be assumed that as the two municipalities were elevated 
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into the prime economic league of the nation, they benevolently absorbed the legal ir-
regularities of the scheme.752 Consequently, reciprocal progress and additional sorts of 
monetary flow pacified the frontier between the new settlers and the local political heirs. 
Yet, at the same time the boundaries between the two parties remained too deep to 
stimulate a true ‘dialogue’. Undeniably, the rationales of government institutions in Bra-
zil (as well as their operational logic) can only be understood when dimensions of irregu-
lar behaviour, such as corruption, or practices such as ‘jeitos’ or clientilism, are taken 
into regard. 
The traditional laissez-faire context of local politics surely does not imply a lack of 
regulatory frameworks; the practices observed point to a highly selective, instrumental, 
and politically motivated enforcement of the law (in addition to an overburdened sys-
tem). Today developers seeking develop closed subdivisions are facing a fundamentally 
altered situation. The tendency of bureaucratisation in combination with particular po-
litical interests has greatly increased the risks they have to take. This situation largely 
supports a trend towards of consolidation. 
Public-private partnerships have played a rather insignificant role in the development 
of the area. While some areas, such as education or transport (and even funerals) feature 
high rates of privatisation, a parallel system of public options prevails at all times. The 
resident associations are by far the most interesting hybrid form of collaboration of Al-
phaVille, as these operate as non profit-making corporations between the private sector 
and the civil society.  
Legislation 
Land use 
One of the most stirring legal topics in the context of AlphaVille-Tamboré is the legal 
status of its neighbourhood enclaves. The closed neighbourhoods of the area are among 
the earliest typologies of ‘loteamentos fechados’ in Brazil. In spite of the popularity that 
this model has attained in the country, the federal laws did not foresee this typology. Its 
legal status remains unresolved to date.  
Indeed, AlphaVille’s controlled enclaves or Residencials leave behind many classical 
notions and ideals of a city, in a legal as well as an urban sense. As this typology extends 
the category of communal space from the scale of the building to the scale of the 
neighbourhood, it re-introduces an archaic hierarchy between the public (city) and the 
private (building). Notably it is this arrangement that is greatly challenging the conven-
tional order of the modernist ‘enlightened’ city. 
The closed land subdivision never existed in the Brazilian law. It is thus technically il-
legal. Notably, the Brazilian law differentiates only among the categories of ‘loteamento’ 
(subdivisions, Law 6766/79) and the ‘edillício condominium’ (a condominium in the real 
estate sector, Law 4.591/64), but does not foresee any privatisation of public spaces on a 
neighbourhood level. The major difference among ‘condomínios’ and ‘loteamentos’ is 
that in the former the clients buy only their own individual lot while the rest must remain 
public, while in the latter the buyers obtain a share of the whole. The Brazilian law also 
limits the ‘condomínio’ to a size of 5 hectares; this generally amounts to less than 10 per-
cent of the average ‘loteamento fechado’. 
Indeed it is quite remarkable that, despite this context, the model of the ‘loteamento 
fechado’ was able to become so popular. It seems that the model thrives on the basis of 
                                               
752 The municipalities regulated the practice of closing land subdivisions by granting concessions to AlphaVille’s neighbour-
hood associations; they tolerated that AlphaVille’s neighbourhoods feature insufficient public spaces; and they accepted the 
semi-legal operations of the project’s private security services. 
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major trends and an unrestrained demand – not in a legal void, but as we have already 
seen above, enabled by a context that lacks enforcement. 
As a consequence of the dilemma of being one of the most prominent urban develop-
ment typologies and at the same time being left behind the official regulatory framework, 
the ‘loteamento fechado’ has been the object of legal controversies engaging experts for 
years. Many states and municipalities (including Barueri and Santana do Parnaíba) are 
facing a dilemma of the popularity of this model. In a context that can best be described 
as pragmatic they authorised the closure of subdivisions on the basis of their own studies 
and interpretations. At the same time the developers, facing a highly profitable market, 
followed the principle of ‘nullum ius sine actione’ (no compliant without redress), as they 
were familiarised with semi-legal land development practices as the norm, and not the 
exception. 
As Brazil has seen a context democratisation and political decentralisation several new 
laws are in the pipeline, which are relevant for our situation. Consequently the condi-
tions that were characteristic of the last 40 years may be about to change.  
Notably, the new draft of the law of subdivisions (‘Lei de responsabilidade urbana’, 
PL 3057/00), among other things, foresees the introduction of a new legal typology, the 
‘condomínio urbanístico‘. In addition this law compels municipalities to establish com-
prehensive urban management schemes, which also regulate the permissible amount of 
closed land divisions. In addition, the latest update this law (PL 20/07), foresees that in 
the future 753 ‘loteamentos fechados’ must gain approvals as horizontal condominiums, 
while at the same time approvals be granted only for 5 years (cf. Oliveira 2008).  
Whereas the whole debate of neighbourhood closures in Brazil is challenging tradi-
tional nations of ‘the city’ and stimulating numerous academic and political debates, the 
new regulations mentioned above are of highest relevance for many other countries fac-
ing lagging legislation and high levels of unregulated urban growth. 
Master plans 
AlphaVille developed in the framework of a legally binding master plan, the Plano Dire-
tor de Desenvolvimento Integrado (PDDI) of 1971. Nonetheless, the project was neither 
a direct component of this master plan, nor an element of other direct public incentives. 
Of course it thrived on the repercussions of the enormous investments in infrastructure 
and the booming economy of the era and profited in particular from the generous con-
struction of highways.  
In spite of this, while the military regime prioritised economic growth by all means 
possible, the enforcement of urban laws remained a neglected matter, and the municipali-
ties in charge lacked the necessary means. AlphaVille’s developmental framework in the 
1970s was mainly defined by a regulatory void.754 Indeed, from this perspective Al-
phaVille-Tamboré appears as the perfect model of liberal progress that emerged on the 
basis of entrepreneurialism and the ‘pure’ quest for profit along an incremental a bottom-
up process. In this context, the scheme impersonates the basic characteristics of liberal-
ism, as it is driven by: 1) a maximum amount of entrepreneurial spirit and demand, 2) 
minimal regulation, and 3) the quest for highest individual ‘happiness’ (e.g. freedom and 
property). The fact that AlphaVille’s developers also appropriate strategies of land devel-
                                               
753 The law plans for a transitional period of 5 years 
754 Gonçalves accuses the state of not having fulfilled its duties when he writes: “The state is one of the actors in the process 
of urban space production and, doubtless, the one that has the duty and the ways to enforce it, although it has not done so 
far” …“the lack of control in the process of urban space production causes problems, damage, waste of public land and 
private resources, punishes the society and risks the future of the city environment.” (Gonçvales 1998: 4) 
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opment from the ‘other’ informal sector, exemplifies further attributes characteristic of 
this ‘new economy’. 
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Epilogue –  
“Mas os assaltos continuaram” 
The following text by the Brazilian satirical writer Luis Fernando Veríssimo755 demon-
strates that the increasing prevalence of gated communities is an actual topic of discus-
sion in Brazilian society.756 
 
The strongest sales argument of the neighbourhood was its security. 
There were beautiful houses, gardens, playgrounds, swimming pools, but there was, above all, security. 
A high wall surrounded the entire area. It had a main gate with many guards who oversaw everything via 
closed circuit TV. Only the proprietors and visitors duly identified and checked were allowed to enter the 
area. 
But the assaults had started anyway. Thieves jumped the walls and attacked the houses. 
The joint-owners decided to place towers with guards in each of the four sides of the high wall. The inspec-
tions at the entrance gate became more rigorous. Now not only the visitors were obliged to use identifica-
tion badges, but the proprietors and their families as well. Nobody could pass the gate without identifica-
tion – not even the nannies or the babies. 
But the assaults continued. 
They decided to electrify the walls. There were protests, but in the end everyone agreed. Security was most 
important. Whoever touched the high-voltage wire on the wall would be fatally electrocuted. If he did not 
die, he would attract a battalion of guards with orders to kill. 
But the assaults continued. 
Bars were put in the windows of all the houses. This was the ingenuity. Even if the thieves mastered the 
high walls and the high-voltage wire and the patrols and the dog, and the second fence of barbed wire 
raised inside the premises, they would not be able to enter the houses. 
All the windows were barred. 
But the assaults continued. 
Appeals were made asking the people to leave their house only for the minimum amount possible. 
Two thieves had entered in the condominium in the rear bank of the car of a proprietor, with a gun 
pointed at his neck. They had invaded the house and later left in the stolen car with stolen identification 
badges. As a consequence, rigorous control of the exits was introduced in addition to the entrance controls. 
It was only possible to leave the area after a careful examination of the identification badge and with the 
express authorisation of the guard. These neither wanted to talk nor to accept bribes. 
But the assaults continued. 
The fortification line was strengthened. They had constructed a third fence. The families with the most 
possessions, with most things that could be stolen, called for maximum security. It was taken to an ex-
treme. 
Nobody could enter in the condominium anymore. Nobody. Visits were allowed only in a place predeter-
mined by the guard, under his severe monitoring and for short periods. 
And nobody can leave. 
Now, the security is complete. 
It has not had any more assaults. 
Nobody needs to fear for his property. The thieves who pass on the sidewalk can only watch through the 
big iron gate and perhaps get a sight of one or another of the owners, who looks melancholically out 
through the iron bars of his house on the street. 
But another problem appeared. 
Escape attempts. And the constant riots of joint owners who try by all means to reach freedom. 
The guard has been obliged to act with force. 
  
                                               
755 Luis Fernando Veríssimo 2001: Securança; pp97; In “Comédias para se ler na escola”; Rio de Janeiro: posted as the first 
comment in relation to Renato Saboya 2007 (http://urbanidades.arq.br/2007/07/condomínios-fechados/, r20.03.2009) 
756 Translation by the author 
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O ponto de venda mais forte do condomínio era a sua segurança.  
Havia as belas casas, os jardins, os playgrounds, as piscinas, mas havia, acima de tudo, segurança.  
Toda a área era cercada por um muro alto. Havia um portão principal com muitos guardas que 
controlavam tudo por um circuito fechado de TV Só entravam no condomínio os proprietários e visitantes 
devidamente identificados e crachados.  
Mas os assaltos começaram assim mesmo. Ladrões pulavam os muros e assaltavam as casas.  
Os condôminos decidiram colocar torres com guardas ao longo do muro alto. N os quatro lados. As 
inspeções tornaram-se mais rigorosas no portão de entrada. Agora não só os visitantes eram obrigados a 
usar crachá. O s proprietários e seus fam iliares tam bém . N ão passava ninguém  pelo portão sem  se 
identificar para a guarda. Nem as babás. Nem os bebês.  
Mas os assaltos continuaram.  
Decidiram eletrificar os muros. H ouve protestos, m as no fim  todos concordaram . O  m ais im portante era a 
segurança. Quem tocasse no fio de alta tensão em cima do muro morreria eletrocutado. Se não morresse, 
atrairia para o local um batalhão de guardas com ordens de atirar para matar.  
Mas os assaltos continuaram.  
Grades nas janelas de todas as casas. Era o jeito. Mesmo se os ladrões ultrapassassem os altos muros, e o 
fio de alta tensão, e as patrulhas, e os cachorros, e a segunda cerca, de arame farpado, erguida dentro do 
perímetro, não conseguiriam entrar nas casas.  
Todas as janelas foram engradadas.  
Mas os assaltos continuaram.  
Foi feito um apelo para que as pessoas saíssem de casa o mínimo possível.  
Dois assaltantes tinham entrado no condomínio no banco de trás do carro de um proprietário, com um 
revólver apontado para a sua nuca. Assaltaram a casa, depois saíram no carro roubado, com crachás 
roubados. Além do controle das entradas, passou a ser feito um rigoroso controle das saídas.  
Para sair, só com um exame demorado do crachá e com autorização expressa da guarda, que não queria 
conversa nem aceitava suborno.  
Mas os assaltos continuaram.  
Foi reforçada a guarda. Construíram uma terceira cerca. As famílias de mais posses, com mais coisas para 
serem roubadas, mudaramse para uma chamada área de segurança máxima. E foi tomada uma medida 
extrema.  
Ninguém pode entrar no condomínio. Ninguém. Visitas, só num local predeterminado pela guarda, sob sua 
severa vigilância e por curtos períodos.  
E ninguém pode sair.  
Agora, a segurança é completa.  
Não tem havido mais assaltos.  
Ninguém precisa temer pelo seu patrimônio. Os ladrões que passam pela calçada só conseguem espiar 
através do grande portão de ferro e talvez avistar um ou outro condômino agarrado às grades da sua casa, 
olhando melancolicamente para a rua.  
Mas surgiu outro problema.  
As tentativas de fuga. E há motins constantes de condôminos que tentam de qualquer maneira atingir a 
liberdade.   
A guarda tem sido obrigada a agir com energia 
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Introduction –  
Identifying trends and typologies 
This research aims to contribute new insights to the question of the city as a venture, 
exploring the dynamics of privately driven urbanism. Broadly it seeks to reconfirm, up-
date, and furnish the concept of spatial production (which was mainly developed in the 
1960s and 1970s), in the context of global urbanisation as well as the framework of a 
new economy. It explores this general objective along actual sites that reflect the impacts 
of privatisation in a most direct and unfettered way. Young peripheral Greenfield sites 
represent optimal benchmark locations for the purpose of this investigation. In this con-
text the work localises a new generation of, privately planned cities, which currently 
emerge on a worldwide scale in the peripheries of large mega-city regions of developing 
countries. The term NeoTown (or NoT) was introduced as a hypothetic working defini-
tion, as the cases explored seem to represent a novel typology. The research has been 
made feasible by selecting three international examples, which basically allow tracking 
the changes of spatial production taking place in the last 30 years (from Keynesianism to 
the New Economy). 
Some of the main questions in this context were: What happens to space when the city 
becomes a venture? Are private developers doing a better job than governments? What 
are the basic features of a commoditised city, a NeoTown? 
The oil crisis of the early 1970s and the deregulation of global finance by the end of 
the Bretton Woods agreements, not only shook up the positivist world order, it also gave 
rise to an era of economic internationalisation, liberalisation, privatisation and deregula-
tion. In other words, the debt crisis engendered by the scarcity of oil, resulted in a de-
creasing role of the state and at the same time a rising relevance of the market, notwith-
standing the fact that the limits of growth had become apparent. Indeed, the ground-
breaking of our NeoTowns falls into this historical turning-point, marking the transition 
between Modernity and Postmodernity, or industrialism and consumerism, the national 
and the global, which also gives rise to a fundamental restructuring of the roles, as well 
as strategies, of architecture and planning. 
We see that private urban development is based on trends related to a generally in-
creasing division of labour such as standardisation, typologisation, and modular design. 
Importantly these trends generate counter trends of individualisation and differentiation 
leading to an increased weight of personal and collective identities. Consequently empha-
sis on exchange values, image generation, and representation is among the major effects 
regarding space. The processes of spatial development tend to deconstruct the local con-
text, while preferring to generate artificial environments which are of a highly controlled, 
predictable, secure and peaceful nature. 
The following chapter provides a (critical) evaluation of the three NeoTowns, com-
prising the formulation of trends as well as the documentation of the major experiences. 
The main body of this research presented holistic and comprehensive information on 
the production of the three selected NeoTowns. Comparison of the major aspects will 
highlight the general significance and value of the cases, confidently leading to the gen-
eration of new practical and theoretic insights. 
The methodology and selection of the cases was developed as part of the preliminary 
chapter.  In the previous three chapters a holistic inquiry of three contemporary New 
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Towns, in the context of developing economies of the South, was undertaken. Thereafter 
this chapter will provide a comparative perspective of the topic and thus advance the 
general objectives of the thesis. An additional aspect of this approach is that it may pro-
vide a quick overview of the findings for the fast reader.  
Accordingly the following subsections will extract and contrast the major findings 
originating in the main body of this research. The major commonalties as well as contra-
dictions of our three New Town cases of Bumi Serpong Damai, Navi Mumbai and Al-
phaVille will be emphasised in particular. A specific focus will be given to the presenta-
tion of the major innovations as well as problems represented by the respective cases. 
Crucially the juxtaposition of the three cases is aimed at describing the most significant 
general trends these contemporary NeoTowns apparently have in common. While ten-
dencies derived from a comparison of only three cases would have to remain hypothetical 
by their very nature, the theme presented here can then serve as a point of departure for 
ongoing case studies for further clarification and verification. In addition the assessment 
will also result in a reflection on the experiences made in the respective processes. This 
amassed experience can directly benefit the stakeholders on the ground. 
The above goals will be expanded along the holistic narrative-structure as used 
throughout this work: In this context the three cases will be contrasted on the basis of: 1) 
the general socio-spatial and historical framework (Context); 2) the regional and local 
morphological, physical and functional characteristics (Structure); 3) the comparison of 
the profile, motives and organisational forms of the residents (Population); 4) the ques-
tion of authorship and the respective development and design strategies (Developers and 
Designers); 5) the particular financial strategies; as well as 6) in the framework of the 
specific systems of regulation and control. 
Structure of the chapter 
The following titles and subtitles not only represent the structural fabric of this chapter, 
but also indicate the conceptual findings. In addition the subtitles point to a major dialec-
tical framework dominating the respective subject:  
1) Part one: “Peripheral modernisation – between autonomy and control”: All the 
cases emerge in the postcolonial context of developing peripheries struggling to define 
their harmony and identity in a volatile quest between central powers and decentred con-
trol (peripheral modernisation – between autonomy and control). 
2) The second subchapter is titled “Idealistic cluster cities – between the public and 
the private”, because ordered neighbourhood modules come out as the underlying struc-
tural elements of our NeoTowns, and in addition the trends discovered point to the re-
emergence of collective and personal spaces.  
3) Thirdly: “Dawn of the modern consumer – between progress and tradition” indi-
cates that the residents of our three New Towns belong to newly emerging middle classes 
in the respective countries. These thrive on modern consumer oriented life-styles and 
demand alternate spaces to develop, to preserve, as well as to pass on their assets. 
4) The developers of the contemporary New Towns all share a process oriented, mar-
ket driven and strategic approach. This stems from the world of industrial and commer-
cial products and has been transferred to the practice of real estate development. In this 
context they aim at coming up with standardised products while at the same time also 
serving distinct consumer groups. This explains the title of the forth subchapter: “Corpo-
rate urbanism – between dogmatism and populism”. 
4b) Spatial designers are also among the authors of Neotowns. This endeavour has 
also significantly contributed in updating their role. Indeed, the subtitle “Imagineering – 
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between the abstract and the concrete” reflects new emerging tactics. Although the term 
is usually used in reference to the Disney Company, in our context it points to a domi-
nance of abstracted design practices, the prominence of standardised typologies, a paral-
lel loss of context and an increasing role of representational values and synthetic envi-
ronments. 
5) The fifth subchapter: “Landscapes of opportunity, thin walled – between the stabile 
and the vaporous”, points to the fact that the moment of capital is increasingly impor-
tant for the New Town ventures. Yet, at the same time the products generated increas-
ingly diversify into a nonmaterial, and at the same time also unpredictable world of fi-
nance. 
6) The underlying motif of the sixth subchapter then is summarised by “Enclavic re-
gimes – between formal and informal”, for the basic power structures of the New Towns 
studied chiefly relate to distinct elite groups, and, as many of the spaces produced also 
portray novel legal typologies challenging the general formal status quo. 
 Illustration E-1: Structural diagram of chapter 
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Context –  
Peripheral modernisation,  
between autonomy and control 
National context 
History and political system 
A common feature of our three cases is that they all emerge in the postcolonial context of 
developing peripheries: struggling to define their congruity and identity in a volatile quest 
between central powers and decentred control. 
Our study cases: Bumi Serpong Damai, Navi Mumbai, as well as AlphaVille, are lo-
cated in mega-city regions of three dynamically growing emerging economies: Indonesia, 
India, and Brazil. While today all of these countries have parliamentary democratic sys-
tems, the start-up phase of all of our examples is characterised by strong, central, and 
developmentalist governments: In this context autarchic regimes dominate Indonesia and 
Brazil, whereas a democratic, but strongly centrally oriented government steers the de-
velopment of the Indian subcontinent. When BSD was founded in 1984 General Suharto 
controlled Indonesia, and  Brazil was under the command of a paternalist military regime 
with changing heads of state when AlphaVille starts in 1973, in addition the long period 
of Navi Mumbai’s planning until the project’s start in 1971 is characterised by the cen-
tral 5 year plans of India’s central Government. Indeed, the settings in which we find the 
origins of our three New Towns are characterised by postcolonial nations struggling to 
define an own identity. Navi Mumbai was founded only 24 years after India’s independ-
ence (1947) in a context which is defined by an increasing decentralisation towards the 
Indian states. Bumi Serpong Damai started in the 39th year of Indonesian sovereignty 
which was marked by two dictatorships, and AlphaVille was initiated after more than 
eight decades, or 84 years of Brazilian autonomy – a time period marked by several vola-
tile shifts between democratic-republican and militarist governments.  
Despite the stark ideological contrasts of the respective regimes – the dictatorship in 
Indonesia, India’s central government and Brazil’s military junta – all countries were 
dominated by politicians who considered themselves as an enlightened elite aiming to 
lead the modernisation of their respective countries. Indeed, our New Town examples 
have, more or less, to be seen as important model projects in this regard. While Navi 
Mumbai and Bumi Serpong Damai were openly declared to represent such milestones of 
modernisation AlphaVille was indirectly thriving on various government subsidies and 
programmes. Yet, crucially the New Towns examples examined in the previous chapters 
do not represent a supply driven approach of modernist New Towns, as it was character-
istic for many Keynesian central welfare states of the post-war era. While a political elite 
prepared the legal, financial, and political ground, major players of the private corporate 
sector were playing the main role in the realisation of the projects. Consequently, Bumi 
Serpong Damai, Navi Mumbai and AlphaVille emerged as early test sites of private ur-
ban development. As this process leads to novel spatial configurations and typologies this 
research suggests introducing the terminology of NeoTowns for the cases at hand. 
Despite a mutual quest towards emancipation and the common strategy of privately 
driven modernisation, these three countries demonstrate significant differences of devel-
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opment: With urbanisation rates of less than 30 percent and a national GDP per capita 
of 1200 US$ (at currency exchange levels) India seems to represent the least developed 
country; Indonesia ranges in the middle with urban populations at 43 percent and aver-
age incomes at twice the Indian levels; Brazil appears as the most developed nation in our 
context with urbanisation levels of 82 percent and an average annual GDP per capita 
amounting to 9.600 US$ (cf. Appendix: Comparative matrix). This range is confirmed by 
the role played by the tertiary sector (services) in each respective country: Its value added 
to the national GDP amounts to 22 percent in India, 32 percent in Indonesia, and 57 
percent in Brazil. Moreover it is further verified by a reverse order of poverty rates, or 
child mortality levels. The spectrum is further validated by respective car ownership 
rates, availability of personal credit and access to insurance systems (cf. Appendix: Com-
parative Matrix).  
Indeed the three countries demonstrate a powerful course towards a consumer ori-
ented and service based economy and society. Rapidly rising levels of consumption and a 
stark rise of populations with disposable income, e.g. middle class populations, confirms 
this. On the other hand a long way remains to reach western development levels. The US-
American GDP, for example, remains 5 times above Brazilian, 20 times above Indonesian 
and about 40 times above Indian levels. 
Moreover some of the experiences and indicators even point to more worrying scenar-
ios of inequality and stagnation, questioning whether Western levels of ‘development’, 
wealth, and equality can be achieved at all. In this context the developing nations at hand 
represent an ever rising socio-economic and spatial polarisation of society pointing to 
scenarios of dual societies, fragmentation and exclusion. This is illustrated, for example, 
by an enormous rise of informal economies, which seem to parallel the trend towards 
liberalisation and privatisation and which, on the ground, result in an increasing number 
of populations in informal settlements. This alternative, and worrying trend is repre-
sented by increasing income disparities: Significantly Brazil, as the richest of our coun-
tries, also features the highest income disparities with GINI levels of 60 (among the high-
est in the world), while the two other countries represent levels close to the US (of ±40). 
Notably all indicators demonstrate a strong inclination of increasing inequalities, gaps 
and disparities. While during the first half of the 20th century informality accounted for a 
marginal phenomenon in most developing countries, including our case countries, by the 
turn of the 21st century the informal sector comprised two-fifths of the population in 
Brazil, in Indonesia less than 20 percent of the population have an income stemming 
from the formal sector, and notably in India this amount is less than 10 percent. More-
over an increasing share of populations dwelling in informal settlements represents the 
rise of the informal sector. Here often 40 to 80 percent of the populations live on a small 
fraction of the land.1 Indeed the former numbers underline a framework for our 
NeoTown cases that is characterised by a bleak development scenario of inequality, 
fragmentation and exclusion, with only a fraction of a country’s population being able to 
secure a decent life in an affluent comfort zone. Brazil, in particular, seems to demon-
strate an example of an advanced economy which is however based on a dual society and 
increasing socio-economic marginalisation.2  
 Illustration E-2: Chart comparing the three countries 
                                               
1 In Mumbai, for example two-third of the populations reside in informal settlements, which occupy less than 5 percent of 
the city’s area. 
2 While Sloterdijk 2005 describes this phenomenon as an exclusive crystal palace of comfort, which is spanning the globe 
accommodating a rough third of the population, Fiedler (2001) has referred to this scenario as the Brazilianisation, as op-
posed to the Westernisation, of society. 
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Regional Context 
The data on the regional scale demonstrates that all three NeoTowns emerge in the larg-
est population and economic points of gravity of the respective nations. Notably they are 
also all among the top-ten megacity metropolitan areas in the world. While the greater 
region of Jakarta (also known as JABODETABEK) is estimated to have 21 million resi-
dents, the population of greater Mumbai (MMR) is estimated to be 19,4 million, and the 
greater region of São Paulo (RMSP) is estimated to include 18,1 million residents. In this 
regard Jakarta and São Paulo house more than a tenth of the respective national popula-
tions, while, Mumbai comprises 2 percent of all Indians (which is a lot given the vastness 
of the subcontinent). Notably the cities generate a disproportionate proportion of the 
national income: In 2005 Jakarta’s annual product of 100 million US$ amounted to 12 
percent of the national GDP, São Paulo’s product of 225 GDP amounted to the same 
share of the national product and Mumbai’s 126 billion US$ amounted to 5 percent of 
the national product. Importantly these outputs were projected to at least double by the 
year 2020. The contrast appears even starker when related to per capita outputs: a per-
son living in Mumbai generated a GDP about seven times higher than the national aver-
age, the Jakarta per capita income was 6 times higher than the national average, while a 
Paulistano’s output was valued twice the Brazilian average at GDP levels (cf. Chart be-
low). 
 Illustration E-3: Economic and demographic significance of the three regions 
 Illustration E-4: Maps comparing the three city-regions (1:1m) 
The mother cities of our three NeoTowns all have a long tradition of serving as interfaces 
between the respective national and the global economies. They feature an extensive his-
tory as posts of trade and exchange (of ideas, cultures, and populations) and display 
many characteristics of global cities – from a substantial share of international banking 
and corporate headquarters to the amount of AAA grade high rises.3  
Nevertheless on the reverse of the economic, demographic and spatial growth, socio-
economic problems loom, which include urban poverty, the rise of the informal sector, 
inequality, increasing polarisation, socio-spatial fragmentation and severe environmental 
problems. It seems to be characteristic of Megacities that growth and development sur-
passes the planners’ capacity to build sufficient infrastructure, and the system is also un-
able to produce a sufficient amount of housing. In combination with a frequent neglect 
of planning by liberally minded governments (laissez-faire context), the environments of 
our mega-city regions are characterised by rising risks, represented by traffic jams, pollu-
tion, environmental hazards and high levels of violence all of which result in a deteriorat-
ing quality of life. In our context of NeoTowns, the fact that megacities are environments 
of increased risk is certainly among the main reasons why developers come up with new 
‘solutions’ at the real estate markets and why populations who are able to afford it, opt 
to move to these ‘controlled’ environments. 
Despite the varying local histories, the diverse macropolitical frameworks, and the dis-
tinct levels of economic and social development, mega-city regions also share a list of 
mutual social, economic and spatial trends, which define an important context for the 
emergence of NeoTowns as investigated by this thesis. It can be observed that the centres 
of Jakarta, Mumbai and São Paulo cease to be power houses of industrial production in 
favour of becoming centres of advanced service industries, banking, power and innova-
                                               
3 According to the consultancy Emporis, this type of high-rises amounts to 500 in Mumbai, 1.200 in Jakarta, and more than 
6.000 thousand in São Paulo. 
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tion, etc. In the last 30 years, all Megacities at hand have undergone tremendous region-
alisation and decentralisation leading to an enormous restructuring of the urban regional 
fabric. One of the most important results of this is that in all of the cases studied the dual 
character of centre and periphery has given way to what Massy, 1984, describes as a 
multiplex urban region. Significantly this ‘new’ region represents a new urban landscape 
(cf. Gotsch Kohte 2007) which is characterised by a vibrant land fabric of edge cities, 
regional subcentres, specialised production facilities, new settlements, but also traditional 
villages, as well as that what remains of nature and topography. In addition to the above 
mentioned economic restructuring, from industrial to service oriented modes of produc-
tion, the development is largely based on new modes of mobility and accessibility, repre-
sented by the availability of vast regional infrastructural facilities and networks such as 
highways, ports, airports, power lines and also access to information and electronic 
spaces. 
 Illustration E-5: Three pictures from the peripheries 
In this context of growing decentralisation, but also diversification and specialisation, the 
general urban fabric has undergone a trend towards homogenisation and fragmentation 
of land uses. In this situation neighbouring land uses tend to become indifferent to each 
other. Nevertheless, it was also observed that most production and reproduction of 
wealth tends to concentrate in a few affluent sectors (although not exclusively), while 
slums, for example, tend to spread throughout the entire region. While these trends are 
only gradually starting to be seen in Jakarta and Mumbai they have reached a high de-
gree of maturation in São Paulo.4  
Importantly, in this post-industrial context, urban peripheries emerge as the most dy-
namic places of contemporary change, development and modernisation. While the ‘satu-
rated’ core cities are increasingly portraying exuberant costs, negative population growth 
rates and the above-mentioned risks, the urban peripheries naturally feature the highest 
rates of investment, growth and development. Significantly, all of our examples are char-
acterised by spatial growth rates largely surpassing the rates of economic growth and 
overtaking the amount of demographic growth. (It was the industrial era which featured 
the highest population growth rates, mostly spurred by interregional migration move-
ments as we have also seen in Indonesia, India, and Brazil in the course of this investiga-
tion). It is therefore not a coincidence that many new urban forms and typologies emerge 
in dynamically growing and rapidly modernising peripheries of mega-city regions at hand 
and that the three NeoTowns which are the object of this study emerge at these loca-
tions. 
Predecessors and peers 
Discussion in the previous chapters has demonstrated that, in addition to being deeply 
entrenched in a context of national, regional and global narratives and trends, our cases 
of Bumi Serpong Damai, Navi Mumbai and AlphaVille are also embedded in a local con-
text of predecessors of planned cities and New Towns (and that in addition they have 
already demonstrated a significant impact on peers driving contemporary urbanisation):  
Navi Mumbai was inspired by the idea of New Delhi as a new government centre, the 
modernist layout of Chandigarh, the decentralisation as well as the social strategies as 
embodied by Ebenezer Howard’s Town-Country Magnet. In addition, Asian success 
                                               
4 Caldeira (2000) has referred to the fragmentation of the city as the practice of walling, while scholars such as Villaça 
(2002) discuss new patterns of socio-spatial segregation and the formation of affluent sectors. 
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models such as Singapore, or Dubai, now largely stimulate the contemporary develop-
ment of the area. New projects in the area exist in a national context of Special Eco-
nomic Zones, Integrated Township programmes and a framework of market driven 
planning instruments. 
Bumi Serpong Damai is deeply rooted in the colonial town planning traditions of the 
European quarter of Bandung, the early Jakarta satellite city of Kebayoran Baru, the first 
privately sector driven suburb of Pondok Indah, as well as international predecessors of 
Irvine, Milton Keynes as well as Japanese New Town strategies. 
AlphaVille, as well, has to be seen as an integral part of a Paulista tradition of elite 
neighbourhoods and private urban development ranging from neighbourhoods Higie-
nopólis, the garden city of Jardim America, vacational new towns such as Granja Viana, 
or fully serviced vertical condominium types such as Ilha do Sul. In addition the São 
Paulo NeoTown demonstrates a close relationship to the US American typologies of edge 
cities, gated communities, while the Californian model of Irvine is outstanding in particu-
lar. The AlphaVille type of neighbourhood, the ‘residencial’, became a national bench-
mark for urbanisation and has highly influenced the development of thousands of middle 
class enclaves in the Brazilian context. 
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Structure –  
Idealistic cluster cities, between the public and the 
private 
Introduction 
The underlying structural elements of our NeoTowns are increasingly composed of 
highly controlled and ordered neighbourhood modules. In addition a renaissance of col-
lective and semi-public spaces can be observed. These form large buffer zones between 
the private domain of the houses and the public spaces of the cities. 
 Illustration E-6: Three characteristic pictures at neighbourhood level 
Regional context and urban form 
It has been described above that NeoTowns are children of urban peripheries in the 
mega-city regions in the South. Yet, far from being classical satellite settlements highly 
dependent on the traditional core, Bumi Serpong Damai, Navi Mumbai and also Al-
phaVille emerge as new regional nodes reinforcing multiplex patterns of regional urbani-
sation. Amounting to a superlative of 33.400 and a planned population of more than 2 
million residents, since 1971 Navi Mumbai emerges as an enormous parallel city on the 
main land of the Indian state of Maharashtra at a distance of about 45 kilometres from 
central Mumbai. A recent number of internal and external SEZ and Integrated Township 
projects adds up to an additional 5.000 hectares adding to the size and complexity of the 
Indian scheme.5  
Bumi Serpong Damai has emerged in Jakarta’s southwestern periphery since 1984 
with a planned size of 6.000 hectares and an envisioned population of 800.000 as the 
oldest and largest of a number of regional New Towns in Jakarta’s environs. Notably the 
city emerges as one of the largest planned cities by population, driven by a single private 
developer. Since 1973 AlphaVille-Tamboré represents a dynamically emerging NeoTown 
in the São Paulo urban region, which has reached a size of 3.000 hectares and comprises 
a total population of about 80.000 residents as well as a floating population of twice that 
number. It has also to be accounted for one of the most successful New Town develop-
ments world wide, as it has constantly made profits emerging in a bottom-up manner 
along a market oriented and process driven, rather than a formally inspired, development 
strategy. 
All of the examples are part of a regional fabric of infrastructure networks, such as 
highways, airport nodes, or novel typologies of service centres. Regional shopping malls6 
as well as major toll-roads, are among the characteristic features in the environs of our 
examples. While public transport (e.g. trains and busses) remains the main mode of mo-
bility to and from Navi Mumbai, BSD as well as AlphaVille are greatly dependent on 
individual motorised traffic.7  
                                               
5 Its size allows Navi Mumbai to be described as the largest planned city on the globe. The project surpasses the 31.000 
hectares of Milton Keynes and Irvine’s 21.000 hectares. 
6 Today Navi Mumbai features six regional Malls, BSD two, and AlphaVille three. 
7 Walking and cycling remain the major means of getting around the interior of the Indian example. The car dominates the 
other cases. 
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 Illustration E-7: Regional access 
Local context 
A modular structure of townships, nodes and neighbourhoods connected by major trans-
port spines, comes into view as a common underlying feature of all three planned cities. 
In this context Navi Mumbai emerges as a macro structure of 14 independent townships, 
Bumi Serpong Damai is a series of neighbourhood clusters and enclaves in a loose struc-
ture of public transport arteries, and AlphaVille-Tamboré has developed along a central 
spine that accommodates important services and which connects the enclavic neighbour-
hood modules. Our cases represent a variation of modular growth and development 
strategies: While AlphaVille represents a modular and phased development, growing 
neighbourhood by neighbourhood without the framework of a general master plan, 
Bumi Serpong Damai’s development has been part of a phased master plan and many of 
the neighbourhood and infrastructure facilities have been developed in parallel as part of 
the first level8 and Navi Mumbai has grown incrementally along the development of ma-
jor infrastructure networks (e.g. railways) as well as a phased development approach 
centred on a revolving fund, in the context of a regional master plan as well as its own 
development framework. 
Notably all of the examples deserve to be called Towns (as opposed to dormitory set-
tlements) as they represent a high degree of autonomy featuring the whole range of land 
uses from housing to offices, commerce and recreation, supported by a wide array of 
services including schools, hospitals and educational institutions (including universities). 
Nevertheless residential land use dominates the scene: it amounts to more than 40 per-
cent of land use in Navi Mumbai, more than half of BSD’s area and more than 60 per-
cent in AlphaVille and it becomes increasingly relevant. At the same time the share of 
open spaces tends to decrease from more than 40 percent in Navi Mumbai and Bumi 
Serpong Damai to a lesser amount in the entirely private scheme of AlphaVille-Tamboré. 
In addition all of our NeoTowns are characterised by their exceptional infrastructure 
networks well beyond local standards. They provide full access of tapped water, sewage, 
sophisticated garbage collection systems, a 24 hour power supply, as well as comprehen-
sive security services, amenities which were previously only known in western cites. This 
mix of land uses and quality of services distinguishes BSD from most of its peers in the 
Jakarta periphery, it also makes Navi Mumbai one of the best serviced cities in India, 
and also characterises the highly secured benchmark environment of AlphaVille-
Tamboré. Navi Mumbai is the example with an exceptional amount of public infrastruc-
ture including outstanding railway networks, and vast train-station office-parks. Bumi 
Serpong became known as the location of a Swiss-German University and business cen-
tre, for it’s golfcourse of international standards and recently for a major regional theme 
park. AlphaVille has emerged as a regionally significant edge city accommodating several 
international corporations and TV stations. 
Indeed, all three NeoTowns emerge as outstanding economic centres and, far from be-
ing dormitory suburbs, AlphaVille and BSD represent exceptional areas, competing with 
the mother cities and featuring average GDP rates of twice the amount of core cities. At 
the same time Navi Mumbai keeps a significant distance of 50 percent of the average 
GDP of Mumbai’s, which is highly exceptional by Indian standards. In addition all of the 
places feature urban densities which mostly surpass suburban standards. Here BSD 
stands out with average densities of 100 residents per hectare and more, Navi Mumbai 
                                               
8 High rates of undeveloped lots in some of the neighbourhoods can be seen as one of the consequences of this approach. 
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follows with 63 residents per hectare, while AlphaVille-Tamboré has a total density of 30 
persons per hectare (albeit some of its neighbourhoods, as well as the downtown area, 
feature densities of 120 persons per hectare and more). 
 Illustration E-8: Demographic and economic relevance of the schemes 
 Illustration E-9: Population densities 
 Illustration E-10: Proportion of jobs to residents 
 Illustration E-11: Planned versus unplanned population 
Illustration E-12: Major indicators compared 
 
Contradictions 
However, when comparing the realities on the ground to the original plans, e.g. comple-
tion of projects, important contradictions and dissimilarities emerge: Navi Mumbai 
lagged behind its plan until almost the turn of the century. Nowadays, however, sup-
ported by a flood of private investments9, the scheme is approaching 80 percent of the 
capacity projected in the beginning.10 Bumi Serpong Damai features the greatest contrast 
between plan and reality in terms of the target population and the completed area. While 
the macroeconomic framework has experienced several political and financial crises, and 
the management of the planned city has changed several times, today only 1.200 of the 
planned 6.000 hectares have been completed and just 120.000 out of 800.000 planned 
residents are on the ground. Despite the fact that significant portions of the first phase 
remain vacant, the second phase has commenced. It has to be regarded as highly critical 
that most of the undeveloped land has for decades remained under the control of devel-
opers who then use this land as part of a speculative land bank. Yet, given Jakarta’s 
enormous prospects of economic and demographic development it can be predicted that 
sooner or later the project will be completed. In contrast to the first two examples the 
contradiction of the planned and real is alien to AlphaVille-Tamboré. As the project de-
veloped without a target population or a classical master plan, it was constantly being 
adjusted to the market requirements of the time. Yet, even so the scheme has successfully 
evolved displaying enormous levels of growth throughout the recent three and a half dec-
ades. 
A stark contrast between the planned and the existing is also true regarding availabil-
ity of jobs in some of the NeoTowns. In this respect AlphaVille again emerges as the 
most successful candidate featuring as many as two jobs per resident, und thus under-
mining its position as an emerging edge city in the region. Nevertheless, as is normal for 
highly specialised urban economies, many residents continue to commute to other parts 
of the city. Navi Mumbai emerges as a balanced case with half as many jobs as residents. 
After years of delay and stagnation because of the government’s reluctance to relocate to 
the area, the recent phase of privately dominated development has produced a large 
number of service oriented blue collar jobs as well as jobs in the construction sector. 
In contrast Bumi Serpong Damai once more represents the most problems regarding 
the availability of jobs. The reality is that the project is lagging behind its goals regarding 
jobs as much as its other development targets. It features only a small number of jobs for 
less than 20 percent of the residents. The envisioned synergies between local universities 
(ITI-Serpong) and new technological parks have not yet emerged. Neither has the devel-
                                               
9 These are mainly represented by the prospect of a new international airport, another cross-harbour link, and plans for 
enormous Special Economic Zones. 
10 Despite this fact the area, featuring average densities of 63 people per hectares has the capacity to accommodate at least 
another million residents by western standards and many more by Indian values. 
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opment of a new central business district gained significant momentum. It remains to be 
seen if a new plan for a new city core with 6 interconnected regional super malls and a 
large amount of office space can come to the fore as part of the second phase of the pro-
ject. 
Another important contradiction in all our cases is the fact that none of them take 
place on an empty Greenfield site which is usually imagined as the ideal environment for 
a New Town or satellite city. Indeed all the examples illustrate that virgin land barely 
exists in the peripheries of rapidly growing mega-city regions and hence a tabula rasa 
scenario remains an illusion of the planning boards. Significantly Project affected Popula-
tions (PAPs) had to be coped with from the beginning. In this context Navi Mumbai was 
forced to come up with solutions to accommodate more than 80 on-site villages and to 
develop spatial as well as socio-economic programmes of integration. Moreover the plan 
had also to accommodate itself in a context of industrial areas, urban agriculture, rapidly 
developing suburban towns, dumping grounds, coastal preservation zones, ports, new 
highway corridors, and many other kinds of rapid informal growth in the surroundings. 
In addition, the successful city today attracts a significant amount of informal settlements 
in the environs. As a consequence unplanned populations (villagers as well as slum 
dwellers) account for 800.000 additional residents. The developer handled the challenges 
positively and was able to come up with innovative solutions. 
 Illustration E-13: Mishmash of surrounding urban fabric and on-site villages 
Bumi Serpong Damai, despite having been implemented on large former plantations, is 
facing similar problems. Despite the exclusive right for the land, about 15 percent of the 
area of phase 1 remains occupied by 30.000 on-site villagers, who have so far resisted 
moving. Their share in the unplanned areas of phase 2 and 3 is estimated at 120.000. It 
is holding half of the land and rapidly growing. Unfortunately the developer is using 
more problematic methods of indirect discrimination and eviction. Again it is only Al-
phaVille-Tamboré that enjoys the advantage of having been implemented on a large 
farm, the Facenda Tamboré.11 In addition, as with the other two examples, the scheme is 
not evolving as a satellite in the green, but as an elemental module of a rapidly urbanis-
ing (and highly fragmented) peripheral urban fabric. 
Among the common problems faced are the existence of cultural facilities and public 
spaces. While all contain an impressive amount of services such as schools, hospitals, 
shopping and entertainment areas, institutions of higher cultural value are strikingly ab-
sent. Only Navi Mumbai, as a quasi-public project, features some theatres, public swim-
ming halls, and public parks. The semi-private urban spaces of Bumi Serpong Damai and 
AlphaVille are rather antithetic to these types of public facilities. Despite the fact that the 
NeoTown as such remains publicly accessible to a greater clientele, it seems that Alexan-
der Garvin’s statement that “the public sphere is more of a problem in suburbs than the 
private market...” (Garvin 1996: 284) has to be confirmed, the problem remains a puzzle 
for public governments, developers, planners, and architects of the coming generations. 
Neighbourhoods 
Neighbourhoods (residential and commercial) clearly emerge as a fundamental module 
on which the development of all of our cases of NeoTowns takes place. In this context 
our new towns emerge along a hierarchical and modular model: Navi Mumbai consists 
                                               
11 Neither on-site settlements, nor informal settlements exist in the area. Yet various sources confirm that local settlers were 
moved from the area before the development process started. 
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of 14 nodes and 200 sectors, BSD of three phases and 80 residential enclaves, and Al-
phaVille-Tamboré of about 45 residential neighbourhoods, divided up in two larger and 
several smaller schemes which are controlled by various developers. While Navi Mumbai 
largely emerges on the basis of an open nodal structure, Bumi Serpong Damai, as well as 
AlphaVille, are based on systems of closed enclaves.12 While the size of a typical 
neighbourhood may vary between 20 and 100 hectares and a population of 500 to sev-
eral thousand, the average species contains about 2.000 residents and 50 hectares.13  
 Illustration E-14: Neighbourhood level maps 
The Indian case represents an example of modernistic design along a hierarchy of sectors 
and neighbourhoods and along a hierarchical and open road network from highways to 
streets, alleys and also a pedestrian system of paths. While the system certainly has been 
inspired by predecessors such as Chandigarh, the sectors of Navi Mumbai’s (despite rep-
resenting an extreme variety of solutions) tend to follow a more pragmatic approach. 
Commercial areas, for example, generally face the streets and intersections, rather that 
the cores of the blocks.  
Bumi Serpong Damai’s structure is founded on a modern base structure of a network 
of main arteries providing public access to the area, yet while the development of the first 
neighbourhood started in an open manner, in the meanwhile closed enclaves dominate 
the project to a great extent. Significantly, even most of the neighbourhoods of the early 
stages have been retrofitted in this way. BSD thus demonstrates how a modernist princi-
ple of sectors, neighbourhoods and a hierarchical street system was ‘successfully’ and 
successively appropriated and transformed by the requirements and principles of private 
development.14  
Finally, AlphaVille represents a pragmatic logic of the highly controlled private en-
clave from the beginning without any reference to formal modernistic ideals. As a matter 
of fact the Brazilian project re-introduces a new hierarchy between the private and the 
public sphere. Hence AlphaVille, as well as BSD, more or less neglect the ideal of the 
private house surrounded by a sea of public space which represents the ideal of the 
enlightened European city and which peaked as a part of modernist culture. 
All of the new cases of enclaves, and gated community typologies, (mainly in Al-
phaVille and in Bumi Serpong Damai, as well as some new parts of Navi Mumbai) are 
characterised by an enormous perimeter fence, access through only one entrance, as well 
as a highly homogeneous interior. This interior is composed of a generic landscape of 
turnkey houses (BSD) or owner-driven architectural designs (AlphaVille). While the pe-
rimeter fence remains a dominant spatial element, often reaching a height of 4 to 5 me-
tres, it stays surprisingly disregarded and accepted as a pragmatic necessity and compro-
mise in regard to security. Consequently walling, even in areas with beautiful natural 
surroundings, results in a totally introverted and insular character. The outer world, 
whether it is the Atlantic Rain forest, a former village, or the shopping mall, remains 
entirely excluded. Yet, notably in this manner the synthetic character of the local world, 
as an alternative reality is also reinforced. Outside of the walled neighbourhoods spa-
tially absurd situations often emerge, in particular where two or more enclaves face each 
                                               
12 Nevertheless, recent developments, in particular those centred on the middle and upper classed, also portray a strong 
trend towards closed enclaves in Navi Mumbai. 
13 Interestingly these numbers come close to what already Platon had imagined for the ideal Greek Polis: 5040 people 
Politeia: §5737d_738a. 
14 In this regard the project shows many parallels to the example of Barra do Tijuca in Rio de Janeiro as discussed in the 
AlphaVille chapter. 
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other divided only by an access road.15 A particular feature in Bumi Serpong Damai is 
that walls are not just used to enclose the newly developed enclaves, but that the existing 
villages are also usually walled off and camouflaged by the developers. 
Cultural differences regarding walls and other security features exist (and need further 
investigation). While the walls are highly important and ‘sacred’ security features in the 
Brazilian context, their relevance in the Indonesian and Indian context remains more 
relaxed and symbolic. In particular in the lower-middle class areas life remains rather 
Indian, or Indonesian: In Indonesia access for pedestrian visitors is rather easy and fortu-
nately school children frequently cross the walled neighbourhoods. In addition street 
vendors, also serve many of the places. 
In contrast to the walls, which are (dis-) regarded as necessary infrastructures, the en-
trance points of the neighbourhoods are highly symbolic and celebrated features. While 
each of the neighbourhood has only one main “door”, the gates carry many idealistic 
and representational features. They display a logo and a name, as well as further sym-
bolic elements representing the neighbourhood. While Bumi Serpong Damai’s gates are 
often designed to represent the main thematic language of the place, AlphaVille’s gates 
put forward a more pragmatic approach. AlphaVille’s gates often feature significant 
sizes, as it is common to feature up to three different control points: for residents, visitors 
and for services and delivery respectively. This feature is locally known as the ‘portaria 
criteriosa’. In addition gates at all locations are often constructed as ensembles in combi-
nation with grand representational entry plazas that frequently account for the largest 
open spaces on the neighbourhoods. 
While, accordingly Navi Mumbai’s neighbourhoods demonstrate the least amount of 
homogeneity, featuring open access and in many cases small scale services and commer-
cial activities, the trend, however, in BSD as well in AlphaVille (as well as in Navi Mum-
bai’s new neighbourhoods) is to increase homogenisation and monofunctional land uses 
and even a limited amount of building typologies within the neighbourhoods. These are 
increasingly landscapes composed of single-family villas of a similar size, or of groups of 
residential high-rise condominium’s, or of quarters containing commercial office parks. 
Thus, the main observation is that while the larger scale of the Town represents an urban 
mix and complexity, the scale of the neighbourhoods is rather uniform and homogene-
ous.  Additional locally distinct structural and functional features of the neighbourhoods 
examined are neighbourhood clusters. These can be observed in the Indonesian case. 
Here in neighbourhoods such as “Latinos”, or “The Green” several enclaves are grouped 
under one theme and served by a joint local centre, which lies at the outside of the re-
spective enclaves but at the inside of another common (and fenced) area. At the same 
time AlphaVille’s ‘residencial’, as the main distinctive product and brand of the scheme, 
are served by external service and commerce centres (Centros de Apoio), which are 
grouped along the main access spine. 
Vacancy rates in the neighbourhoods differ greatly from case to case depending on the 
stage of completion, the income of the target population and the local culture of en-
forcement: In particular in BSD high rates of vacancy are a notable feature and problem-
atic. Some of these neighbourhoods feature 30 to 80 percent empty lots, resulting largely 
from a high rate of land speculation. Usually the vacancy levels rise, as the neighbour-
hoods get richer. While many lots were bought for speculative purposes, a firm enforce-
ment of the obligation to build was neglected both by the municipality and the developer. 
Therefore the visitor can find himself surrounded by grazing goatherds and strange land-
                                               
15 Only some new neighbourhoods in AlphaVille, such as Burle Marx, started to introduce a transparent fence instead a wall. 
It remains to be seen, though if the clients will accept this feature. 
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scapes of compartment walls instead of the expected suburban garden-city environs in 
some of the places. Such a pattern is unimaginable in AlphaVille, where the code for 
building structures is strictly enforced and controlled by the developed as well as the 
resident associations. Vacancies and land speculation in Navi Mumbai are minimised by 
the facts that: 1) the developer Cidco is a non-for profit agency, 2) the land is tradition-
ally leased, and 3) because the demand is very high – in particular in the subsidised parts 
of the project.16  
Recent trends 
In Navi Mumbai and its environs a new boom of gated communities, novel forms of Spe-
cial Economic Zones, as well as Integrated Township typologies represents new tenden-
cies on the neighbourhood level. In this context an entire node, Dronagiri, has been con-
verted into an SEZ and now serves as a model project. Among the recent trends of BSD 
are the above-mentioned clustered neighbourhood enclaves which combine several 
neighbourhoods into a thematic area and which feature a joint service zone. At the same 
AlphaVille is increasingly frequented by holistically developed and ‘monolithic’ turnkey 
neighbourhoods. In addition ever larger super-block schemes of an Asian style are mak-
ing an appearance in the down town area.17 
 Illustration E-15: Trends at building level: SEZ, Superblocks, Cluster-enclaves, Turnkey-
buildings 
 
Blocks and Buildings 
Without doubt the building has a tremendous significance. ... The building 
represents on one hand a physical reality; on the other hand it is a property. 
... The house enables the family to settle down and it represents a symbol of 
success and personal achievement.“ (Gans 1969: 243) 
What Herbert Gans describes above for Levittown, seems to remain valid for the places 
that are part of this work. While from the perspective of the developers and planners the 
neighbourhood remains a major modular element of the planned cities, from the point of 
view of the household the own building, as well as the surrounding block, is the most 
important physical element. Our three cases comprise a huge amount of completed build-
ing structures. It can be presumed that these are of a similar relevance for the Indian, 
Indonesian, and Brazilian middle class populations as Levittown was for the increasingly 
nuclear suburban households of post-world-war two US. The sheer number of dwellings 
our NeoTowns feature is enormous: Navi Mumbai leads with 380.000 housing struc-
tures, Bumi Serpong Damai plans to accommodate 140.000 households, and AlphaVille 
accommodates 22.000 housing structures. While these numbers demonstrate large differ-
ences among the size of the three NeoTowns at hand, it has to be stated that the 22.000 
households and 3600 hectares of AlphaVille-Tamaboré remain a huge planned city 40 
percent the size of Paris and with a population seven times larger than Ebenezer How-
ard’s Town-Country Magnets. 
 Illustration E-16: Projects compared to Howard’s Town-Country Magnet 
                                               
16 In addition many Indian laws are aimed to discourage land speculation. 
17 Such as the projects Tiner Videolar, or São Paulo Wellness etc.. 
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Navi Mumbai alone, due to its sheer size, offers the largest variety of typologies, with the 
residential walk-up as the most common and typical of the residential typologies. This 
typology has been the most efficient means to house the vast majority of lower-income 
and middle-income groups, and to represent the ideal of communal administration. 
High-rise apartment buildings seem to be the most popular typologies for upper middle 
and high income groups as can be seen, for example, along the Palm Beach Road. In con-
trast, low-rise typologies have so far mostly been popular among the populations of the 
villages as well as informal settlers. Interestingly, the detached villa-typology, represent-
ing the middle-class status in suburban locations around the globe, including Bumi Ser-
pong Damai and AlphaVille, has so far not found its way into the Indian suburbs. One 
explanation is that the infrastructure of roads, an integral part of this typology, is not yet 
available in the Indian context. Another aspect is that the share of middle classes in the 
country has not yet reached a decisive momentum. Nevertheless the development of first 
gated communities and villa type neighbourhoods is underway, as represented by Cidco’s 
Khargar Hills Plateau project, or other schemes along the Mumbai Pune Highway. 
In contrast to Navi Mumbai, the detached villa typology including a garden and car-
port is the most prominent residential typology both in Bumi Serpong Damai as well as 
in AlphaVille. It dominates the landscape of Bumi Serpong Damai in the form of the-
matic turnkey buildings. At the same time, a huge mass of individually fabricated subur-
ban mansions straddles the hills of AlphaVille-Tamboré, which, despite many architec-
tural highlights, appears as an anonymous architecture. With the residential high-rise 
tower – despite the suburban setting – representing the other popular housing typology, 
the residential fabric is increasingly reduced to two typologies. Importantly, the 
neighbourhoods are zoned and regulated in such a way that no other land uses or build-
ing typologies are permitted and the prescribed fabric therefore has something eternal 
built-into it. This is truly antithetical to the dynamic megacity-landscapes that character-
ise most of the surrounding areas. 
The three examples represent enormous urban densities which are significantly higher 
that most Western type suburbs and gated communities. Accordingly most of the Bumi 
Serpong Damai’s lot sizes vary between 250 and 500 square metres (the low income 
range starting at 80 square metres) and in this context the gardens are often reduced to 
symbolic amenities. While the street frontages remain open with front gardens, perimeter 
walls at the rear of the individual lots are integral elements of the schemes and secure a 
certain amount of individual privacy on the small lots. As a consequence these urban 
patterns can easily reach urban densities of 100 people per hectares or more (numbers 
that if required could support a regular public transport system). Moreover several local 
features can be observed in each local situation: AlphaVille, for example, features the 
Churasqueria, a small swimming pool with a sealed roman style floor design.  
Among the most outstanding typologies, which represent the local context of the re-
spective schemes, are Navi Mumbai’s various low-income schemes (most notably Charles 
Correa’s projects in Vashi’s Sector 1, The World Bank sponsored site-and-service projects 
in the Kopar Khairane node, or the ‘domino’ style houses in the Khagar area). Out-
standing examples of local typologies and experiments in the Indonesian case are the 28 
square metre minimal starter houses, the prevalence of the shop-house model (which 
accounts for the most successful real estate format in Indonesia), as well as the recent 
experiments with work-and-life layouts. Among the novel and exceptional of Al-
phaVille’s species are the afore-mentioned turnkey villas and Asian style superblock de-
velopments.  
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 Illustration E-17: Up-to-date low income projects 
The trend at all three cases seems to be towards an increasing size of developable areas 
and towards extended private boundaries.18 At the same time the amount of building 
typologies is decreasing with the villa typology and the residential high-rise tower emerg-
ing as the two most prominent forms of housing. Nevertheless, the examples studied by 
this work also indicate that a certain hybridisation and adaptation of the models does 
take place which gives them an India, Indonesia, or Brazil appearance. 
Conclusion: The NeoTown as an emerging structure 
Indeed, the organisation of AlphaVille, as well as that of the new parts of BSD’s phase II, 
resembles a quasi-organic arrangement in which a cellular structure of neighbourhood 
modules is served by a central access spine. And interestingly we find here an order, 
which fully complies with the criteria of self-organised complexity: namely modularity, 
hierarchy and self-similarity (cf. Batty 1994). While houses, blocks, and neighbourhoods 
comply to a modular order, the transition from private to public undergoes several hier-
archical stages, from the private dwelling, to the semi-private neighbourhood, in some 
cases, such as BSD’s new schemes, to the neighbourhood cluster, to the public town-
structure. Moreover, elements such as doors and access points are replicated in a self-
similar manner throughout the hierarchical system. The resulting urban landscape is 
composed by an anonymous ‘architecture without architects’ and follows this pattern. 
 Illustration E-18: En vogue neighbourhood structures 
Fascinating however as this model may be, it has to be stressed that this perspective on 
the NeoTown as an emerging structure does not seek to impose a determinist and abso-
lutist worldview on the issue, rather it intends to provide a new perspective on a matter 
which, at least to the knowledge of the author, has so far been was underrepresented. 
Thus, while the model should not lead to the neglect of problems such as segregation, 
polarisation and socio spatial fragmentation, which the private development of the struc-
tures also entails, it can serve as an example of resilient, flexible, e.g. ‘successful’ bottom-
up strategy of urban planning and development with many extraordinary aspects to learn 
from (cf. to the discussion of the strategies part below). 
                                               
18 This is represented, for example, by the AlphaVille’s new superblocks, Navi Mumbai’s SEZ projects and integrated town-
ships, or BSD’S new clustered neighbourhoods. 
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Population – 
Dawn of the modern consumer, between progress 
and tradition 
 “...the buyer does not envision the own house, the garden, the house of the 
neighbour,..., as much as his own family, the neighbours family, the commu-
nity of denomination, his daily way to work, the schooling system for his 
children and his aspirations.” (Gans 1969: 9)19 
 
Introduction 
The formal populations of our NeoTowns are largely composed of the newly emerging 
middle classes of the emerging countries. As these new societal segments conform to new 
consumer-oriented life styles, NeoTowns represent alternative environments, enabling 
these populations to develop, preserve and to pass on their material and cultural values 
and assets. 
This brings us to the question of how the residents and buyers of Navi Mumbai, Bumi 
Serpong Damai, and AlphaVille-Tamboré compare. The main chapters presented a de-
tailed profile of the respective resident populations, their aspirations and motives. All 
resident populations represent a new generation in their respective countries. This seeks 
to carve out, secure, as well as inherit its spaces of life and representation. A majority of 
the residents belong to what is largely referred to as the middle classes, i.e. populations 
with a certain amount of disposable income, which, makes them predisposed to a life-
style based on appropriation through consumption. At the same time it can be observed 
that a large majority of our populations thrive on the tertiary sector, e.g. the informa-
tional economy, and a part of white-collar societies. While this is a significant difference 
from the Keynesian and Modernist post-WW2 settlements in Europe and in the US 
(though these as well represented the dawn of the modern consumer in the Western 
hemisphere), it appears to compare better to the arrival of bourgeois suburban communi-
ties in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Population Profile 
Returning to the presentation of data, it can be said that Navi Mumbai presents by far 
the largest and most diverse populations of our three examples. This population, of what 
can be considered the largest planned city in the world, is today estimated at 1,7 million 
residents. The populations of Bumi Serpong Damai of 120.000 thousand and the 80.000 
residents of AlphaVille-Tamboré are more comparable to one of Navi Mumbai’s nodes 
than to the whole. Nevertheless they represent autonomous New Towns of an enormous 
size and an additional set of superlatives. As far as jobs are concerned, and they must be 
a good measure of a New Town’s success to achieve autonomy, AlphaVille can be named 
as the most successful case, as it was able to generate almost twice as many jobs as resi-
                                               
19 “Nicht das eigene Haus, der Garten, das Nachbarhaus, ... liegen vor den Augen des Erwerbers, sondern seine Familie, die 
Nachbarsfamilie, die Denominationsgemeinde, der Arbeitsweg, das Schulsystem in Beziehung auf seine Kinder und seine 
Hoffnungen”. (Aus der Einleitung von Lucius Burghardt zu Herbert Gans’ “Die Levittowners”: 9) 
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dents, namely an estimated number of 140.000; Navi Mumbai was successful in generat-
ing 800.000 jobs, which in theory would cater for half of its population. Notably the fact 
that Bumi Serpong Damai lags behind with an estimated number of 22.000 jobs (making 
up for less than 20 percent of the residential population) points to one of the most seri-
ous “to do’s” the developers have to solve as part of the next phases. The goal may be 
attainable, given the fact that the gap between the target and the realised part of the new 
town is greatest in BSD, as today less than 20 percent of the plan has been realised, while 
Navi Mumbai is 75 percent completed with only a tiny ‘virgin’ area remaining to be de-
veloped AlphaVille, which entered a stage of consolidation and densification. 
An important feature of all of the NeoTowns discussed as part of this work is their 
significant numbers of unplanned populations, e.g. the residents of on-site villagers and 
informal settlements. This indeed is another large and notable contrast to the classical 
Keynesian New Towns as known from the Western hemisphere. Here Navi Mumbai 
stands out with an unplanned population of 800.000 residents (a number totalling al-
most half of the formal population!); In BSD the new populations have been joined by 
30.000 ‘unplanned’ residents, mostly preexisting village populations, but also new mi-
grants seeking work. The statistics appear ‘cleanest’ in AlphaVille-Tamboré as no indige-
nous villagers remained in the area. However it can be estimated that a stealth army of 
30.000 servants, maids and security guards are employed, if we assume only one maid 
per household. While unplanned populations appears as integral elements of NeoTowns 
in the South, in contrast to western New Town typologies, the politics and the attitudes 
towards these, are quite different in the three cases. (Cf. the developer section below) 
In addition, it can be easily seen, that the setting of all of our cases is characterised by 
a fragmented fabric of formal and informal settlements. These are more interwoven with 
our cases and their economies than is presented by the official numbers. (This is an inter-
esting feature in itself, which needs further examination and study).  
Returning to the profile of the new and ‘formal’ residents, it appears that in the ma-
jority of cases belong to privileged segments of society and that consequently our 
NeoTowns emerge as economic powerhouses of the regional economy. Indeed, the eco-
nomic relevance of NeoTowns tends to be higher than the ability of accommodating 
large population numbers. While the populations of AlphaVille-Tamboré and BSD make 
up less than 0,5 percent of the metro populations, their average portion to the metropoli-
tan economy only amounts to 2,4 percent in BSD and 3,2 percent in AlphaVille. Navi 
Mumbai, in contrast, appears different, as it accommodates almost every 11th resident of 
the region, while so far contributes less than 1/20 of the regional product.  
Our three NeoTowns represent an increasing departure from the modern ideal of an 
open city that was actively (sometimes even technocratically) mixing ethnicity, religion 
and class, along with its ideal of the enlightened modern citizen, towards systems based 
on bottom-up demand, individualisation and profitability. This combination of the con-
sumers’ freedom of choice (liberalism) as well as a commercial logic (capitalism), results 
in trends of self-segregation in homogeneous neighbourhoods. While income seems to 
plays the most decisive role, in some places ethnicity and religion remain important fac-
tors along which the lines of clustering, exclusion and segregation are drawn.  
The 30 to 40 year history of the places studied shows that the most accessible places 
emerge as central nodes – resulting in the highest land values and also some of the richest 
populations. In a majority of the cases these places are different from the centres envi-
sioned by the master plans. Navi Mumbai node of Vashi clearly represents this tendency. 
In addition it was also observed that, in contrast to the early intentions of top-down 
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planning and ‘social engineering’, in the long-term, populations tend to align themselves 
along ethnicity and religion in their own neighbourhoods. 
Again Navi Mumbai demonstrates considerable tendencies of clustering along the 
lines of class and ethnicity and religion in particular in regard of minority groups such as 
Muslims and Christians (cf. Ananthakrishnan 1998). Ethnicity also plays a role in Bumi 
Serpong Damai, where some of the neighbourhoods are populated by a majority of Sino-
Indonesians (Chinese minorities), despite the fact that this population accounts for less 
than 5 percent of the greater Jakarta region. ‘Only’ in AlphaVille do class divisions along 
income alone seem to dominate the composition of the neighbourhoods. All cases though 
demonstrate a strong tendency towards these new forms of homogenised neighbour-
hoods, segregated patterns on a larger scale, while income emerges as the major driving 
factor – reflecting an increasingly complex and polarised postmodern society at large. (Of 
course the above-described trends are based on secondary data and subjective observa-
tions. Hence they must be seen more as hypotheses than as results, pointing to a need for 
more empirical studies and validated results.) 
Despite these novel trends Navi Mumbai features the greatest spectrum of residents 
from Lower Income Classes (in the local jargon, the LIC’s), to Middle Income Popula-
tions, to the Higher Income Classes (HIC’s). Notwithstanding that the ideal goal of re-
solving the housing problems of the Indian society and in particular of finding a solution 
for the no-income populations was not achieved, the parallel city managed to come up 
with many innovative solutions. For example it was successful in attracting large num-
bers of lower class populations, and in providing exceptional infrastructure, at least as 
compared to the local context. However, recent reforms towards privatisation and de-
regulation have been much blamed in this regard, as they seem to imply that Navi Mum-
bai today is targeting an increasing number of middle and high-income residents. This 
tendency is represented by the fact that high-end projects such as the Khargar Hills Pla-
teau (a mix of a theme park and gated enclaves), the Seawood Estates (fully serviced high 
rise condominia geared at affluent Indians from abroad), or the new Khargar Golf 
course, officially represent the flagship projects of Navi Mumbai’s developer Cidco.  
On the other hand Bumi Serpong Damai, as well as AlphaVille, are more inclined to-
wards profitability and the logic of the private market: Indeed, providing a social mix 
and “housing for all” has played an important role during the initialisation of the Indo-
nesian project, justifying public approvals, credits and claims on the land. The social ap-
proach was also reflected in the open layout of the first sectors of the project and low-
income populations played a major role as the pioneers of the scheme. However, the 
‘private’ project was measured by the benchmarks of market success. It was shaken by 
several macroeconomic crises and major political reforms and it became challenged by 
strong competition from more than a dozen other new town peers. All this resulted in 
many of the early social goals being surrendered in favour of catering to profitability and 
the market. As a result, today Bumi Serpong Damai displays a strong inclination to mid-
dle income and higher income groups, even though minimal solutions for lower-income 
classes remain on the agenda.  
Again AlphaVille represents the example that was, from the beginning, solely driven 
by the logic of market-efficiency. It consequently catered exclusively to middle and high-
income earners as the largest profits could be achieved from such a strategy. Fortunately 
however, trends and markets change and, interestingly, a recent focus aiming at lower 
income populations can be observed. These are less profitable individually, yet with the 
marketplace for the upper middle classes becoming saturated, the lower middle classes 
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constitute an enormous clientele in the context of Brazil (and many other emerging na-
tions), which is only recently beginning to be explored.20  
Motives 
In the above context the trends and observations our NeoTowns have to be seen pre-
dominantly as cradles of middle class, bourgeois populations, which are emerging in 
large numbers in the context of developing countries and the emerging economies. All 
these seems to have similar motivations independent of the national context at hand and 
only their prioritisation seems to differ from case to case. The principal reasons involved 
are mainly security, life-style, economic development, and decongestion (e.g. a quest for 
increased space). As a really important prerequisite to understanding these goals we have 
to appreciate the needs and desires of middle class starter families in third world settings. 
Notably all of these have a strong desire of appropriation, conservation, and tradition of 
material and ideal values to the next generation. Consequently in the context of São 
Paulo, which for a long time was one of the most violent urban environments in the 
world, security emerges as the primary motive of families seeking alternate environments 
to establish their lives and to raise their children. Improving one’s quality of life as well 
as one’s status (e.g. life-style) is the second major reason of making the decision to move. 
The motive of a secure investment which can serve as a back up for one’s retirement and 
which can be inherited by the next generation is another major trigger.21  
In contrast, in Bumi Serpong Damai, investment and economic potential seem to be of 
major concern before security issues and the desire for an alternative lifestyle. The pre-
dominance of the longing for stable investments is underlined by the large number of 
undeveloped lots in the area, which represent the need for alternative investments in an 
environment that proved quite unstable and volatile during some of the previous crises 
(e.g. the 1997 Asian financial crisis). Still, the Indonesian inclination towards Dis-
neyesque theming and branding points to a strong desire among the newly emerging 
middle class to find new and alternative representations.22 Security concerns are also se-
rious motives as most of the buyers belong to the upper fifth income segment of society. 
Security is important for the Chinese minorities in particular, as these populations have 
been the targets many persecutions, pogroms and outbreaks of public violence in the 
past. 
Finally, in the case of Navi Mumbai the motive of space and decongestion appears to 
remain the most important trigger, before the desire for economic development, the quest 
for life-style and representation, and security. This relates to the fact that density is a 
major issue in Mumbai, as the central city, being located on a peninsula, is among the 
cities with the highest population densities and the least amount of public space in the 
world. In this context Navi Mumbai was developed as part of a classical decongestion 
strategy. Moreover the amount of space the new city provides (30 percent of public 
spaces, playground and parks in contrast to less than 3 percent on the peninsula) repre-
                                               
20 The trend is represented by the models of VilasAlpha as developed by AlphaVille, as well as the products generated by 
Tenda, one of the subsidiaries of AlphaVille’s mother company Gafisa. A decisive role in this context is the availability of 
cheap housing credits for the target populations, which must be provided by the central governments. While Mexico is seen 
as one of the worldwide models in this regard, and Brazil has made important steps towards this direction, India as well as 
Indonesia, still have a long way to go. 
21 Interestingly in the context of the public the motives of security and financial investments are set apart as taboo while the 
life-style motives dominate the marketing campaign of the projects. Most probably it can be explained by the potential of 
the latter to produce positive feelings and expectations. 
22 What is interesting in the Indonesian case, though, is the fact that many of the western style facilities such as sports clubs, 
or jogging tracks are abandoned. They seem to be serving purely representational purposes. 
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sents a highly valued asset by populations choosing to relocate. More than 50 percent of 
the project’s population originate at the peninsula, and only a small share comes from 
the rural areas of the state (Maharashtra).  
The motive of investment and economic development comes second: While for a long 
time a large part of the housing projects was subsidised, and therefore seen as a good 
investment opportunity, today many realise that development has reached a significant 
momentum and seek to participate in the rapidly rising valorisation of the land. Life-style 
may play a role when relocating to Navi Mumbai, in particular the upper income popu-
lations will select their neighbourhoods along this criterion. The names of numerous 
novel projects (such as Hiranandani Palace Gardens) point to the dreams and aspirations 
of the target populations. In contrast the issue of crime plays a minor role when com-
pared to the relevance it has to the residents of AlphaVille or for the Chinese minorities 
of BSD. 
At the baseline, it is safety, security and tradition which represent a common baseline 
for all of the middle class residents of the three examples. We observe that the predomi-
nant set of values as represented by our NeoTowns is not solely dominated by consumer-
ist ideals geared to rapid turnover rates, frequently changing fashions, the flickering, su-
perficial and the representative, amongst others, notably it remains embedded in a setting 
of traditional and conservative ethics which are characteristic of suburban middle class 
life-styles. Our NeoTowns thus emerge as a hybrid of consumerist ethics and traditional 
values – a third alternative that is neither urban nor rural. 
Organisations 
The population in a newly planned settlement is more than the sum of individuals. An 
important aspect relating to the life of residents of planned cities is the question of social 
organisation as well as the question of local governance and control. What is specifically 
new (and exciting) in the case of planned settlements is that at the beginning all of the 
residents are foreigners and new to each other, that social networks, bonds and organisa-
tions have to emerge in time or have to be imposed by the developers of the state. In ad-
dition, in respect of large-scale planned settlements with hundreds of thousand of resi-
dents, certain resident organisations may be forming, while new populations continue to 
move in for decades.23  
While this work was not able to provide empirical insight of the bottom-up formation 
of societies and clubs, some important qualitative observations could be made: It is easy 
to observe that Navi Mumbai relies on a huge amount of self-organisation in clubs, so-
cieties and associations – indeed these seem to be an integral part of Indian urban life. 
Moreover, what is important from our perspective is that the entire social housing cos-
mos (e.g. all projects by Cidco implemented for lower and middle income classes) of 
Navi Mumbai is based on a system of co-operative societies (These are an integral part of 
Indian social housing tradition in general, and comply to a well established framework of 
public laws and regulations). While every household is obliged to become a member of 
the society in his block or sector, the organisations take care of governance issues, ser-
vices and of the maintenance at a micro level. From this perspective Navi Mumbai is the 
example, which most closely represents Ebenezer Howard’s ideas of communal govern-
ance and joint land ownership. The very forceful and influential form of contractual self-
                                               
23 Herbert Gans was interested in this aspect while he has described the formation, reformation and impact of various of 
Levittown’s organisations, as well as the spirit of the key individuals and institutions driving the process (Cf. Gans 1969: 
pp71). Yet, naturally it was not possible to cover these aspects in the depth carried out by Gans. 
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organisation of resident associations is also one of the major characteristics of Al-
phaVille-Tamboré. The practice is referred here as ‘‘automanagement.’’ All owners of 
land are obliged to participate.24 
Yet, in contrast to Navi Mumbai, the system is entirely privately driven and was initi-
ated by the developers. Notably the share someone has in the resident association is 
mostly not determined on a personal basis, but by the size of his property. The resident 
associations can be seen as one of the major components of AlphaVille’s success (in addi-
tion to the high quality standards of its infrastructure and of its security). They handle 
the approvals of new projects, co-ordinate maintenance, provide security and form a 
lobby which protects the interest of the residents vis-à-vis relevant governmental institu-
tions and groups (which is very important in the Brazilian context). Interestingly, it is 
also in AlphaVille where even an umbrella organisation of several resident organisations 
emerged: This Sociedade AlphaVille Tamboré, or SIA, takes care of the maintenance and 
security of the larger area, and was also an important lobby group for the area. The 
Resident Associations are particularly efficient from the developer’s perspective, who is 
then able to withdraw from the development process as soon as a viable basis of owners 
has been established in a neighbourhood, which can sustain resident associations. 
Indeed, this very aspect constitutes a major problem and burden in Bumi Serpong 
Damai. As the developers here were not able to set up resident associations, the burden 
of subsidising a large part of the maintenance costs ate up a significant amount of their 
profits. In this context BSD developers find themselves in a vicious circle, as they have to 
provide for a high level of maintenance if they want to stay competitive in the market. 
An additional dilemma is that both the residents, as well as the developers, are not inter-
ested in the completion of their New Town, as according to public regulations the city 
goes into public hands when completed. (Today BSD developers have started major ini-
tiatives to improve the level of self-organisation by the residents). 
Conclusion population 
In conclusion Navi Mumbai emerges as the most diverse of the NeoTowns studied. Al-
phaVille represents the most radical case of private urban development (based on a com-
bination of individual freedom and entrepreneurial dynamics). Bumi Serpong Damai 
emerges as the case in-between, with a social start and a private ending. The Indian con-
text has not (yet) been the place to fulfil the ‘classical’ dream of the villa in a romantic 
green landscape (at least not in a western sense). For the average Indian mind, the notion 
of a suburban lifestyle does not exist so far. Nevertheless, as all of the places represent a 
strong bias towards middle and high-income populations the term of NeoTowns seems 
justified. 
Notably, our three NeoTown cases have also demonstrated evidence for surprise and 
the unexpected. Among some trends, which neither the planners nor the developers envi-
sioned, are Navi Mumbai’s patterns of economic and ethnically inspired self-segregation 
and clustering. The harmonious environment of SE Asia also seems to provide opportu-
nity for the unexpected as is confirmed, for example, by the increasing informal conver-
sions of family mansions to student apartments. In AlphaVille the organisation of resi-
dents in associations seems to have led to new forms of collective consciousness, which 
was a driving point of the resistance against the closure of the access to the public high-
way when a new tollroad was built. 
                                               
24 This is an integral part of the sales contract – an extensive book of dozens of pages, also referred to as the ‘regulamento’.  
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The high level of resistance by the unplanned populations represents an unexpected 
element. The tendency that can be observed is that they have increasingly gained social, 
political and cultural power during the long-term development process. As far as Reset-
tlement and Rehabilitation is concerned, Navi Mumbai in particular evolved from a 
problematic experience to a best practice model. While the situation remains problematic 
in Indonesia, the time speaks for the unplanned populations. First cases of discrimination 
have been brought to the human right courts25 Consequently developers will have to 
learn and to take the issue more seriously unless they want to ruin their credibility. 
While the problem of on-site resistance of local villagers does not apply for Al-
phaVille, the Brazilian NeoTown has to cope with a set of their own self-generated prob-
lems. The extremely controlled environments have apparently triggered other unwanted 
internal effects. Among these are unbelievable levels of car accidents in the interior of the 
neighbourhoods, as well as increased levels of drug abuse and youth criminality, which 
both seem to arise from boredom and despair (As for example Theresa Caldeira 2001 
describes in detail).26  
                                               
25 Cf. http://www.vhrmedia.com/A-Camp-at-Bumi-Serpong-(1)-story281.html ; http://www.vhrmedia.com/A-Camp-at-Bumi-
Serpong-(2)-story282.html, r10062009) 
26 A bright spot, though, is represented by the appropriation of AlphaVille’s hilly streets by communities of skateboarding 
youth. A phenomenon, which is also featured in YouTube (For example at: http://de.truveo.com/carveboard-hawaii-
alphaville/id/2348016481, r12.06.2009) 
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Developers–  
Corporate urbanism, between dogma and popu-
lism 
Introduction 
Entrepreneurs and developers emerge as the main driving forces of the production 
NeoTowns. These share process oriented, market driven tactics. The transfer of this ap-
proach from the world of international business to the practice of real estate can be re-
garded as the most important innovation achieved. Significantly this approach focuses on 
processes instead of products.  
The larger originating context portrays rising levels of specialisation, an increasing di-
vision of labour, as well a growing relevance of management, innovation and representa-
tion. This results in the domination of three major trends: standardisation, modularisa-
tion and diversification. In this context the products (as well as the steps of the develop-
ment process) are increasingly standardised, and building structures, as well as urban 
neighbourhoods consist of modularised components. The process is diversified, as in par-
allel the developers seek to reach an ever-increasing social and spatial range of customers 
and in addition sell different variations and components of the merchandise (from lots, to 
turn-key houses, to shares). 
Whereas the spatial form, as well as the population dynamics are the two core com-
ponents needed to describe urban spaces in general, in the case of planned cities the ques-
tion of authorship plays a particular role. Indeed, it is a central characteristic of planned 
cities, as these are societal, political, or economic projects, that they are driven by the 
vision of some authority. As a result, planned cities represent the ideology, power and 
vision as well as specific concepts of design and planning, of a specific time. 
As this work seeks to provide a thorough analysis of this novel typology as an epitome 
of the private city, and as it seeks to understand better the role of the private sector pro-
duction of contemporary urban space, it becomes fundamentally important to under-
stand the role, the visions, strategies and ideologies of entrepreneurs and developers 
which emerge as the main driving forces of the production NeoTowns. In this context we 
want to understand whether the private sector is doing a better job in producing new 
cities than is the public, but also to comprehend the impact the structural and organisa-
tional logic of the new economy has on contemporary spaces. Notwithstanding the new 
role of entrepreneurs as masters of the process, experts are needed to put plans on the 
ground. Hence it will remain important to realise the roles and strategies of planners and 
architects in this new context (and how these have changed in contrast to previous eras). 
 
Developers 
They perceived clearly that all that he [Levitt, the private developer] foresaw, 
was far superior to what exists, and possibly would even be better than what 
would be built with public funds ...  
(Gans 1968:45) 
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Profile 
What the developers of the three NeoTowns of this investigation all have in common is 
an underlying entrepreneurial logic. At the same time the organisational set up, as well as 
the history of the respective organisations varies widely: while Navi Mumbai was devel-
oped by a public non-for profit company, Bumi Serpong Damai was permanently in the 
hands of a large industrial conglomerate and AlphaVille was driven by a private middle 
class entrepreneur. All three examples represent an individual colourful history of 25 to 
35 years of development and planning experience. Each project has survived socio-
economic transformations from industrial to a service based system, large political trans-
formations (end of the Cold War in 1989), major crises (1974 oil crisis), structural ad-
justment programmes and changes in macroeconomic policy towards deregulation and 
liberalisation (1991, Washington consensus), major transformations from supply driven 
systems (driven by authoritarian, or central planning regimes) to the rise of consumer 
societies, to increasingly decentralised, and market driven tactics based on demand. In 
this context the characteristics of Navi Mumbai’s developer, Cidco, changed from that of 
a public housing agency to a private developer; the consortium developing BSD has also 
undergone several reconfigurations, and AlphaVille’s developers developed from a garage 
venture to a real estate heavyweight. 
AlphaVille’s developers started as a small garage venture of two engineering gradu-
ates, the firm Albuquerque and Takaoka Empredimentos. With the development of the 
AlphaVille project, the firm rapidly developed into one of the largest and most profitable 
players in the Brazilian real estate sector. Notably by the year 2007 AlphaVille, as well as 
its peer Tamboré S.A., were bought by two of the largest Brazilian real estate conglomer-
ates, Gafisa and Brascan. Bumi Serpong Damai started as a consortium led by a group of 
ten influential real estate conglomerates, arranged by the state. After several crises and 
waves of restructuring, the firm BSD PT is today led by a subsidiary of one of Indonesia’s 
largest industrial conglomerates. Not least Navi Mumbai was developed by a state 
owned enterprise, the City and Industrial Corporation of Maharashtra (Cidco). Cidco 
can be seen as an example of a hybrid public-private organisation. Despite major shifts of 
supply driven to demand driven systems of housing production, the organisation remains 
in power to date. While it was backed up by the state of Maharashtra, the organisation 
was seen as an experimental vehicle to explore strategies of privatisation and market 
driven urban development. Thus, from the beginning it had to comply with the rules of 
profitability and the market, although in the non-profit framework. Today, Cidco, repre-
senting the state of Maharashtra, remains the dominant developer of Navi Mumbai and 
its environs. The issue of privatisation continues to be explored in the form of multiple 
joint ventures with major national and international players of the private sector, such as 
DLF, Reliance, Al Nakheel (Dubai), or Jurong (Singapore). 
Vision and ideological moment 
The initial ideologies and strategies of the respective projects varied between collectivist 
dreams, individual utopias and hybrid forms in-between. Today, the tactics and ideolo-
gies of liberalisation and privatisation leading to practices of ‘market-driven strategic 
planning’, have become increasingly important. In this context NeoTowns emerge as 
liberalist versions of utopia, driven by the dual ideology of the happy individual and the 
free market. 
Navi Mumbai, and Bumi Serpong Damai in particular, emerged in a context of high 
public attention and were seen as important milestones of postcolonial modernisation 
Three Neotowns compared   557 
that could contribute to solving some of society’s central problems. Significant govern-
ments have played central roles in setting up the projects: While Navi Mumbai was to 
become a national landmark project of national dimensions representing a new approach 
of city building in India, Bumi Serpong Damai was to become the ‘best city after inde-
pendence’. AlphaVille, in contrast, was driven by the entrepreneurial energy and motiva-
tion of its two founders who wanted to come up with a national benchmark product 
from the very beginning. 
Navi Mumbai and BSD embarked on significant collectivist tactics, while the logic of 
excellence, individual happiness and market efficiency has dominated AlphaVille from 
the initial stages. Nevertheless, as becomes clear in the main part of this work, both Navi 
Mumbai and BSD eventually embarked on the maxims of privatisation and liberalisation. 
Still, the early stage is represented by the mass of public housing projects in Navi Mum-
bai, the mixed 1:3:6 development approach in BSD, as well as the concentration on mid-
dle and higher income classes in AlphaVille. The significant difference between Navi 
Mumbai and Bumi Serpong Damai was that in the first case the social housing schemes 
were seen as prestigious landmark and flagship projects, while in BSD social housing for 
the lower classes was implemented for better or worse.27  
In contrast today the visions of all three cities are more geared on ideals economic per-
formance and technological excellence: In contrast to the social utopia along a Gandhian 
dream, today Navi Mumbai markets itself as a “World Class Economic Node” and “In-
dia’s new Supercity” and the main motto of Cidco, the agency developing Navi Mumbai, 
is “We make cities”; BSD is marketed as a “Big City, Big Opportunity”, firmly pointing 
to the economic potentials the project is supposed to represent. In contrast, less things 
are new with AlphaVille, while the concept became a national benchmark, standing on 
the three pillars of “Quality, Security, and ‘Automanagement’.” 
We have to note that initially a utopian moment and a central vision were highly es-
sential to gain the necessary ideological support required for the momentum needed for 
the projects. Hence, Navi Mumbai (The new Mumbai), Bumi Serpong Damai (Peaceful 
land), as well as AlphaVille (The supreme Alphacity) share the existence of a strong ideo-
logical moment, and all embody the promise of an alternate society28: In this context, the 
developers (e.g. the state government) of Navi Mumbai dreamt of developing an equal 
city which would solve all housing problems along a mix of modernistic and Gandhian 
ideals, and which would also solve Mumbai’s urbanisation problems along the idea of a 
counter-magnet; AlphaVille’s authors, two engineers, and entrepreneurs sought to create 
a benchmark environment for modern living, the Alphacity, and BSD’s producers em-
barked on a parallel strategy of a private development with social goals.  
Needless to say, all developers want their projects to become a benchmark environ-
ment of modernisation in the respective contexts. While Navi Mumbai is envisioned as a 
mix of a modern, equal and enlightened city and Bumi Serpong Damai represents a mix 
of modern and corporate ideals AlphaVille comes closest to the ‘spirit of the new capital-
ism’. In this context, Navi Mumbai’s developer plays the role of the extended hand of the 
state, in BSD he represents the enlightened patron, who in partnership with the state 
knows how to guide society in a new modern era, while in AlphaVille he is a model en-
trepreneur, who has the right sense for the trends of the time and who performs in an 
exceptionally successful way.  
                                               
27 It is documented that many of the private developers in Jakarta’s periphery shifted the social housing projects they were 
obliged to do to other locations out of the terrain of the main projects. 
28 A major characteristic of all planned cities and new towns (Cf. Chapter one) 
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An interesting commonality in the context of visions is the fact that all three cities 
seek to emerge as slum free environments. And while the approaches and solutions to 
attain these goals are quite distinct, it can be observed (with a portion of cynicism) that 
the results on the ground are not as diverse, all the environments thrive on the presence 
of informal economies and all attract new informal settlements: While Navi Mumbai has 
without a doubt produced the greatest amount of social housing, its plan to eliminate 
slums has turned out to be ambitions and illusory. The fact that local statistics are in-
clined to conceal the real numbers of informal settlements seems even doubtful. Never-
theless the reader has to judge whether the outspokenly exclusionary approach of Al-
phaVille and BSD, and their corporate social responsibility programmes, can be regarded 
as more and sincere. Indeed, while it remains difficult to compare the three approaches, it 
can be ascertained most policies must take the presence of unplanned populations and 
informal developments into account. 
Hence, while Navi Mumbai appears as the ‘City of social visions’ with a modernistic 
and social approach, the ideological quest of becoming comfortable, peaceful and highly 
controlled environments is what drives Bumi Serpong Damai’s and AlphaVille’s ideologi-
cal goals.29 These projects represent a longing for alternate worlds and other visions, 
which are radically different from the complex, dangerous and uncontrollable urban 
worlds on the ground. This in itself would be not much different from the proposals of 
Thomas More’s Utopia, Ebenezer Howard’s Town Magnet, or Frank Lloyd Wright’s 
Broadacre City etc, were there not a second important driving ideological goal repre-
sented by the belief in individual happiness, and the supremacy of the market. Interest-
ingly, the first aspect of this hybrid ideology (that of an alternate world) dominates the 
physical reality of Bumi Serpong Damai, while the second aspect characterises Al-
phaVille. Accordingly Bumi Serpong Damai represents an environment that is obsessed 
by the quest for alternative ‘synthetic’ identities, and is beset with surfaces, images, and 
representational strategies, while AlphaVille stresses the employment of ‘invisible’ codes, 
norms and ethics. 
Implementation Strategies 
When it comes to the question of implementation we find a range of common overlap-
ping strategies: The strategies of Navi Mumbai and Bumi Serpong Damai are largely 
based on the spatial development approach of formal master planning (at least initially). 
In contrast AlphaVille follows an approach which is rather based on processes. In this 
context secured land rights, an integrated master plan, the operation along a revolving 
fund, as well as the development of major infrastructure, have formed the core of Navi 
Mumbai’s implementation strategy; BSD worked on the basis of a similar strategy which 
constituted the secured access to a major land bank, a master plan (in contrast to Navi 
Mumbai private), the objective of a balanced land use, a strategy of phased development 
(in time and in space), and the application of modern corporate management mecha-
nisms. It stands out in particular for the attraction of low-middle class pioneer popula-
tions at the beginning, and more recently, for the widespread application novel strategies 
of theming and branding.30 
AlphaVille, in contrast, operated along principles of security, quality, control, (and re-
cently also ecology). Its tactics of modularisation and phased development represent a 
                                               
29 It is interesting to observe, in this context, that while Bumi Serpong Damai shared many collectivist goals on paper with 
Navi Mumbai, it revealed a different ideology on the ground. 
30 Despite the fact that BSD offers the least number of jobs of the three NeoTowns, its state of the art service and infrastruc-
ture facilities highly stand out in the context of other competing new towns and planned settlements in Jakarta’s periphery. 
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process-based approach. Notably strategies of comprehensive spatial plans were re-
nounced in favour of an open development strategy.31 The tactic, for example, was not to 
plan educational and service facilities, yet to provide the necessary framework for their 
accommodation upon demand. AlphaVille therefore represents a system based more on 
codes and principles than a formal idea. It operates along the motives of innovation, 
profitability and delivery of benchmark products. Founded on a corporate ethos of excel-
lence, the strategy results in a high degree of attributes such as resilience, openness, elas-
ticity, adaptability and flexibility in the context of ever faster changing market condi-
tions. This seems to represent some significant advantages as compared to the traditional 
master planning tactics. 
Quality standards 
Our NeoTowns portray the increasing impact of international business quality standards 
and corporate management norms in the production (and appearance) of contemporary 
urban environments. Nowadays, a firm seeking to grow, to diversify its products and to 
raise money from national as well as international markets, is bound to strict standards 
of accountability and quality management. In this context AlphaVille Urbanismo, Sinar 
Mas, and also Cidco, acted as early adopters and importers of professional business-, 
financial-, quality management- and environmental codes to the real estate sector of their 
respective countries. The ISO 9000 as well as the ISO 14000 norms are certainly the 
most widespread as well the most influential global business standards. While the first is 
a general quality management standard, the second comprises important environmental 
management guidelines. Notably these norms suggest a focus on processes of production 
as opposed to the final product; in addition they put the customer in the centre of the 
process, thus implying an entirely new relationship between enterprise and customer. 
This generally leads to a standardised and rationalised chain of production independent 
of context, as well as to an increased role in marketing and customer relations.32  
For space and design it means an increasing reliance on a reduced set of standardised 
typologies which are efficient, rational, controllable and predictable, and which feature 
minimised financial risks (represented, for example, by the reduction to the market of 
either villa, or high-rise typologies, or the increased application and spread of brands 
such as McDonalds, Staples, Hilton, or Starbucks). The typologies frequently portray a 
platform design which may be customised to various consumer segments, and their local 
implementation mostly occurs in a modular way (e.g. as portrayed by the combination of 
villas to gated communities). Tactics of entirely customised design, geared to specific 
context and situations (e.g. which form the perspective of design would be called contex-
tualism), on the other hand, are increasingly abandoned. 
AlphaVille Urbanismo, as well its peers MVT and Tamboré SA, have been pioneers in 
implementing the ISO 9000 as well as the ISO 14000 standards in the real estate sector. 
Also the five major departments of Bumi Serpong Damai PT have been modelled along 
international ISO 9000 standards. Moreover, in the previous 10 years, Navi Mumbai’s 
developer Cidco has been focusing mainly on quality management standards in the con-
struction and engineering segment. Its most recent project, dubbed Intelligencity, seeks to 
innovate in exploring synergies of several electronic management tools, business process 
applications and geographical systems software in combining GIS and SAP tools. 
                                               
31 In this context the temporal sequence of 1) Strategic Analysis, 2) Acquisition, 3) Master planning, 4) Marketing and Sale, 
5) Construction, and 6) Occupation acquired a greater role. 
32 Other significant norms comprise the US American International investment and accounting standards (Barnes-Oaxley), or 
general CPM and PERT techniques. 
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Innovations in real estate development 
All of the three cases have brought forward several novel, innovative and outstanding 
strategies: The developers of Navi Mumbai experimented with novel strategies of social 
redistribution of profits made along private market operations. One of the most interest-
ing financial innovations, which originated in Navi Mumbai, is Cidco’s system of differ-
ential land pricing based on a reserve price mechanism (e.g. the real development cost of 
the land). With this tactic (we call it: “the Robin Hood Strategy”) the developer transfers 
surplus revenues from the sales of commercial, as well as higher income projects, to the 
benefit of lower income customers. This indeed is an exemplary strategy for the social 
redistribution of wealth in the framework of market-based systems.  
BSD, as well as AlphaVille, have been the forerunners in the development and applica-
tion of so called ‘market driven strategic planning’. The innovation of the developers is 
the successful transfer of strategies from the world of services and commodities, ranging 
from optimised fabrication techniques, quality management standards, financing, mar-
keting, customer relations, etc., to the world of real estate. In other words, the developers 
have increasingly succeeded in handling the constructions of houses in the same way as 
other companies are delivering other commodities, and the provision of urban infrastruc-
ture and services in the manner of a consumer oriented service. Notably, the resulting 
‘market driven strategic planning’ tactics differ largely from conventional planning and 
design strategies. While the latter work along the vision of the final ‘product’, be it along 
social, or aesthetic ideals, the former are driven by a process driven and market oriented 
logic of growth, profit and survival of the fittest. Geared at tapping into the most profit-
able markets, they are also aimed at optimising efficiency, the delivery the highest qual-
ity, as well as standardisation and rationalisation of the processes at hand. Consequently, 
the drive to growth, diversification, and standardisation emerges as a major force inher-
ent to the whole process, with deep reverberation on the spaces produced. Truly, the 
spatial effects of this approach are a central part of the conclusions of this work.  
Complications and learning curves 
Without doubt each of the projects has experienced many contradictions and errors. A 
general flaw of privately driven projects, working along a shortsighted orientation to-
wards profit, is the negation of the social, as well as of the natural environment. The 
combination of private dynamics and inadequate public regulations has resulted in many 
serious flaws (such as environmental pollution and social injustice). In the beginning, and 
in the process of implementation, large populations have been displaced and a huge 
amount of natural assets have been destroyed without a proper compensation. On the 
other hand, our projects, as well as their environments, also represent steep learning 
curves. At the same time, social and environmental impact assessments became manda-
tory at most of the locations. As a matter of fact, the public became increasingly empow-
ered and informed.33 For example, significant parts of the Navi Mumbai’s plan (including 
the entire Ulve node), had to be altered when a new coastal protection law was promul-
gated in 1986.  
 On the other hand, developers came up with comprehensive Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility (CSR) packages. These included extensive social and environmental pro-
grammes, often in joint ventures with important not-for-profit institutions and non-
governmental and governmental organisations. And even if the underlying rationale of 
such programmes remains to be tied to business logic, many notable changes have been 
                                               
33 A result of an ongoing democratisation, decentralisation and, and at many places also the rise of popular peoples parties. 
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achieved compared to the initial phases. Navi Mumbai’s developer Cidco, in particular, 
has come up with exemplary Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) packages for Pro-
ject affected Populations (PAPs). While at the beginning of the development process the 
local villagers belonged to the most disadvantaged groups, and compensation was rather 
symbolic, after long years of protest, fights and demonstrations, affected people today 
can retain 12,5 percent of all developed land. In addition they can opt for monetary 
compensation, job programmes and vocational and educational packages. Now envi-
ronmental social impact statements are on the agenda and notably Cidco’s strategy has 
become a regional model applied by private developers in the environs (despite the fact 
that protests and resistance movements remain fierce).34  
As the developers of Navi Mumbai have developed exemplary Resettlement and com-
pensation schemes, so have the authors of AlphaVille-Tamboré innovated with environ-
mental standards and regulations. Projects such as Aldeia da Serra, AlphaVille Graciosa, 
or the Projecto Genêsis have set national benchmarks in exploring strategies of environ-
mental budgeting and eco-sustainable design, novel to the Brazilian context.35  
 
Marketing 
“As the products and lifestyles become more and more similar... the decision 
about which cut-price product to buy turns on global imaging and market-
ing.” (Sennett 2006: 134) 
 
We live in a age where economy and demand govern the existence of every 
creation. Marketability and profit are the prime objective of every product... 
Architecture in the present day is shaped by market demand, real estate cal-
culations, zoning practices and municipal rules... (Prathima Manohar in 
Hafeez 2006: pp21) 
Our three examples demonstrate that marketing emerges as a central discipline in the 
context of the production of NeoTowns. Indeed the practice of promoting and selling 
products become a significant part of the identity of the projects. Truly, it could be 
claimed that a NeoTown is only a NeoTown because it is constantly marketed, and sold, 
as a fundamental basis of the experience of consumerism. In this context the NeoTown 
produces new dimensions of the mutual relationship of consumer and consumed: Its in-
habitant is the postmodern consumer who is because he buys. While buying emerges as 
the existential experience in the consumer age, the NeoTown defines itself along its po-
tential of being sold. 
Notably, this is an important departure from the New Towns of a generation of cen-
tral planning. Whereas techniques of distribution dominated in the context of supply 
driven systems, in a postmodern world of enhanced choices, of mass customised products 
and lifestyles, featuring an overload of information, the discipline of marketing and sales 
emerges as a crucial part of process oriented techniques of production (e.g. construction). 
Here marketing emerges as a crucial interface mediating between processes of production 
                                               
34 In contrast the condition in BSD seems to remain more critical: conflicts among villagers and the developer are on the 
increase, the local populations become more populous and more powerful, and transparent compensation schemes, like 
those in Navi Mumbai, are lacking. 
35 While this type of innovation remains an integral feature of the subsystem of planned middle class settlements, it may not 
solve problems of another level or scale. On the other hand it is difficult to blame the agents of the subsystem for the inno-
vation. E.g.: Green gated communities neither resolve the problem of segregation, not do they contribute to more urban 
density and less traffic. They are not more, or less, than a better alternative to non-green-gated communities. 
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and consumption, and catering for a collective individualisation. Significantly the 
NeoTowns examined in this work clearly illustrate the above trends. They represent par-
ticularly interesting cases of a direct transfer of marketing techniques from the corporate 
world to the real estate sector, e.g. to the production of contemporary space. 
Navi Mumbai 
If we look at the three locations we see that marketing played only a minor role when 
Navi Mumbai was initiated in 1971. Indeed, as for a long time Cidco was constructing 
housing projects along the monopolistic strategies of a public housing agency, and while 
it had the privilege of offering subsidised products, questions of distribution remained 
prominent for a long time.36 In the case of Navi Mumbai marketing became prominent 
with the advent of massive privatisation (it also seems to be related to the income of the 
target population): when, for example, the state run development agency started to seek 
partners for the implementation of the Navi Mumbai SEZ in 2002 it launched a huge 
international advertising campaign (for example in the weekly magazine: The Econo-
mist). In combination with Cidco’s “We make Cities”, the slogan asked: “Do you want 
to plan a city for a majority of the world’s population?” Another sign of the rising rele-
vance of marketing is represented by a presence of the projects in the World Wide Web, 
as well as the plan to build a Cidcoseum, a museum documenting the emergence of the 
parallel city. After all, while Navi Mumbai reflects the rising relevance of marketing, and 
despite the fact that Cidco started to introduce the terminology of Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM), compared to our other two cases, Navi Mumbai’s agency was so 
far certainly not the hotbed of innovation of this domain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BSD 
In contrast to Navi Mumbai, BSD strongly emphasises marketing. This clearly indicates 
how much more this NeoTown is dominated by private sector logic. BSD’s management 
came up with a concept of demand inducing strategies at a time when it was facing signs 
of a saturated market and increasing competition by the mid 1990s (In 1995 the compet-
ing scheme of Lippo Karawaci was launched). Significantly these were chiefly based on a 
triple strategy of theming, life-style branding, and festivalisation: in this context the mar-
keting departments became a mix of research lab and intelligence agency, with the aim of 
not only identifying the needs and desires of potential target groups, but also with the 
mission of helping these desperate seekers to actively achieve their dreams.  
Interestingly, this revisiting of the very essence of marketing leads to the construction 
of Disneyesque, and festivalised environments of branded neighbourhoods and thematic 
villas touching the heart of the prospective Indonesian middle class consumer. Their form 
is revolutionary and entirely new (aberrant) to everything that previously existed in the 
Indonesian, but also in a global urban environment. Instead of being grounded in the 
spatial context and the histories of a place, they seem to represent a blending of global 
image worlds and mediascapes. Durkheim’s criteria of Anomaly could serve as a good 
                                               
36 And indeed Cidco innovated also in this respect, coming up, for example with a book-building process. 
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conceptual framework to unravel the phenomenon, as these forms suggest a radical de-
parture of the target groups from traditional norms and cultures. While North Americans 
and Europeans had so far utilised theme parks as heterotopias of spectacle and tempo-
rary breakout from daily routines37, South-East Asia’s (e.g. Indonesia’s) middle classes 
decided to stay, moving in and turning them into habitual38 living places. 
As thematic orientation became a brand of BSD’s developers, neighbourhoods such as 
the Latinos, the Green, Virginia, or Neo Catalonia were marketed as the ultimate West-
ern life-style environments for the diverging middle classes39. Not least, the strategy of 
festivalisation plays a crucial role in the developer’s tactics for valorising their products 
in BSD. The practice implies that that the image of marketing is ritualised, and while it is 
combined with theming and life style schemes, the discipline of marketing marries the 
discipline of design. In this context this planned city presents itself as a continuous chain 
of events, betting on a narrative approach to the product and largely enhancing the 
above strategies of life style theming and branding.  
AlphaVille 
If BSD appears as the ultimate case exploring all imaginable aspects related to marketing 
and the production of cities, it will be interesting to see what remains to be added by 
AlphaVille. Indeed, while the developers of the São Paulo NeoTown came up with their 
own set of sophisticated solutions underlining and reconfirming the importance of mar-
keting in their context, their concept seems to have been even more mature and profes-
sional. This also implies that AlphaVille’s strategy perfectly transferable – in contrast, for 
example, to BSD’s unique exotic approach. 
Moreover, client-customer relationships have been brought to a new level, referred to 
as a strategy of ‘dual transparency’ (e.g. the transparent enterprise as well as transparent 
consumer) where the firms seek to transport an image of security, corporate ethics, as 
well as reliability, while also seeking to become the consumer’s ‘best buddies’. A life-long 
brand loyalty, not the purchase of only one product, is their goal. In this context some-
one who decides to buy a house at AlphaVille is supposed to join a club and acquire a 
life-style, instead of just making a simple purchase. On the other hand, as in BSD, mar-
keting departments increasingly become intelligence agencies, aiming to understand the 
buyer’s psyche in the best possible and holistic way. 
Among AlphaVille’s major achievements are strategies of urban branding, as well as a 
novel eco-theming in particular. These are mainly geared at the sophisticated urban 
buyer. The tactics developed from a single brand approach to a modus of diversification. 
AlphaVille’s developers had centred all their efforts on the generation and optimisation 
of one single product, that of the residential enclave (Residencial), which then became a 
national brand. Its mother company Gafisa, as part of a story of growth and evolution, 
now relies on the success of multiple brands, thus diversifying the risks. It works with 4 
major brands which are formed by subsidiary enterprises and cater for four various cus-
tomer groups, i.e. (AlphaVille, FIT, Bairro Novo, Gafisa). The fact that an own subordi-
nate, namely Gafisa Vendas, was formed to handle the issue of marketing again under-
lines the relevance of the subject. This demonstrates that a strategy of ‘redundant market-
ing’ and in-house competition is applied as this branch competes with other internal and 
external teams for the sales and promotion of the same products. 
                                               
37 Starting with the world exhibitions and being institutionalised in Coney Island, as Koolhaas 1978 describes. 
38 In German: “gewohnt” 
39 Simas Red first developed and tested the concept in some alternate projects such as Kota Legenda, or Kota Wisata. 
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The other important brainchild of AlphaVille-Tamboré’s developers is the invention 
of eco-theming. Here, in particular the firm of Marcello Takaoka, the son of one of Al-
phaVille’s founders, was among the first to identify a profitable demand as well as the 
need for innovation. Emphasising a sensible life style in the green, its Aldeia da Serra 
(1980) and Genêsis (1997) projects evolved as exceptionally successful benchmark 
schemes, soon to be copied by others. AlphaVille Urbanismo stands out for having main-
streamed and advanced the approach, mainly in its AlphaVille Graciosa project (Cu-
ritiba, 1996) and the Burle Marx neighbourhood (2007). Indeed, while the strategy is 
generally criticised as green-washing, it has to be acknowledged that AlphaVille-
Tamboré’s developers have delivered a series of significant improvements to the typology 
of ‘controlled’ neighbourhoods. As opposed to others who have only concentrated on the 
marketing aspects40, they have planted additional trees, compensated the environment, 
trained residents, installed new waste collections systems and organised the building of 
new sewage plants. 
A further important achievement of AlphaVille’s developers is the introduction and re-
finement of procedures of Social Corporate Responsibility (CSR) in the real estate sector. 
Early on entrepreneurs noticed that, in the consolidated markets of today, projects that 
are neither social nor ecological have a much lesser chance of success. They consequently 
decided to join the goals of development with the objectives of environmental and social 
development. Thus all of the major enterprises, AlphaVille Urbanismo, Tamboré SA, as 
well as MVT, are running their own not-for-profit foundations and environmental insti-
tutes.41 Notably, these foundations thrive on a network of joint ventures with not-for 
profit groups and independent research institutions, as well as government bodies. MVT, 
for example has obtained a ranking by the renowned Instituto ETHOS, it cooperates 
with the Brazilian branch of Transparency International, and has presented a series of 
papers on sustainable development at scientific workshops and conferences. Alpha Ville’s 
foundation organises a significant number of social, as well as environmental projects, 
mainly geared at the residents in the environs. Not least, Tamboré S.A. focuses mainly on 
the preservation of the environment, as a large protection zone, the Reserva Biológica 
Tamboré, is part of its land. 
Conclusion: Leading trends 
Growth and consolidation, efficiency and diversification 
As the developers of the new towns examined are increasingly integrated into a larger 
corporate sector they are also subjected to general trends such as growth, consolidation, 
efficiency and diversification. The recent purchase of AlphaVille-Tamboré’s developers 
by some of the largest Brazilian real estate magnates (Gafisa and Brascan), the size of 
BSD’s enormous mother company (Sinar Mas), or the influence of Reliance one of the 
largest Indian conglomerates in Navi Mumbai, represents this tendency. More subtly, the 
increasing number of public-private, and private-private partnerships and joint ventures 
also portray the trend. It is represented by: Navi Mumbai’s Special Project Vehicles, as 
joint ventures of national and international companies with the task of developing and 
running the newly emerging Special Economic Zones; By the public-private-private joint 
                                               
40 E.g. A notable example of the second kind of strategy is Eco-Vila. Notably this small scheme in the vicinity of AlphaVille in 
among the projects that deliberately confuse a green setting with ecological design. 
41 AlphaVille is running the Fundação AlphaVille (www.fundacaoalphaville.org.br, r12.05.2009), Tamboré S.A. the Instituto 
Tamboré (www.institutotambore.org.br/, r12.05.2009), MVT has set up the Instituto Takaoka (cf. 
http://www.takaoka.eng.br, r12.05.2009). 
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venture among the developers of BSD and Bintaro Jaya which developed and operates 
the new toll road connecting the area to South Jakarta; Or by the private-private joint 
ventures developing new superblock schemes in AlphaVille’s downtown.42 
These enormous mixed-use structures composed by large a commercial base which is 
topped by enormous office towers, represent the most impressive spatial materialisation 
of the recent drive towards increasing growth, consolidation and efficiency in the real 
estate sector. It is also impressive to observe how the superblock schemes – enclavic cit-
ies, based on size on one hand and on a maximal mix of uses on the other – and cur-
rently emerging in AlphaVille, resemble Navi Mumbai’s integrated township projects as 
well as the Jakarta style superblocks.43  
Internationalisation 
The increasing complexity and internationalisation of the firms is a significant aspect of 
growth and diversification as well. In this context many firms open up new corporations 
and project vehicles with almost any new part process. Operating with dozens of subsidi-
aries and firms, Sinar Mas, for example, was dubbed a Corporate Brezel Palace. Simas-
Red, the property and real estate division of Sinar Mas is one of the leading real estate 
developers in Indonesia and the SE-Asian region with links to more than 80 international 
companies and hundred of projects around the world. At the same time AlphaVille’s 
mother company Gafisa is 30 percent owned by the international conglomerate Equity 
International and its shares are traded on Wall Street.  
Internationalisation has also a deep impact on Navi Mumbai and its environs. Many 
of the projects are composed of international consortia (such as Parsons Brinckerhoff, 
Jurong, or Al Nahkeel).  Moreover international money markets are of increasing impor-
tance.44  
The tendency towards diversification then is most clearly represented by the 
strategic framework of AlphaVille’s mother company Gafisa.45 In the Indonesian 
case diversification is less bound to a BSD brand, than to a certain range of 
branded typologies that the BSD’s mother company SinarMas has developed: e.g. 
Shop-house typologies and thematic clusters of gated enclaDesigersigners: Imagi-
neering – between the abstract and the concrete 
By altering the arrangement of lots, houses, and open space, the designers of 
Back Bay and Radburn changed the pattern of daily life. (Garvin 1996) 
 
These institutions, we have seen, benefit the kind of mental life embodied by 
consultants, moving from scene to scene, problem to problem, team to team. 
(Sennett 2006: 121) 
                                               
42 iTower, the AlphaSquare, the Brascan Plaza, the Castello Branco Office Park, as well as the Tiner-Videolar are mostly joint 
venture projects of national and international investors and brands (such as Iquatemi, Marriott, Brascan, JAG, or Odebrecht. 
43 The growth trend is also represented by the increasing size of BSD’s neighbourhoods (including their novel clustered 
typologies) and the constantly increasing lot-sizes in Navi Mumbai. 
44 Prior to the 2009 financial crash, the investment bank Wachovia had heavily invested in some of the projects. In addition 
Hirco, the developing arm of Hiranandani, one of the developers of luxury Townships in the vicinity, started to raise a signifi-
cant amount of start-up money on the highly speculative London Alternative Investment Market. 
45 Here, not less than three different types of diversification can be identified, 1) a geographical, 2) a functional, and c) a 
social approach: The first is represented by the quest to distribute the products and brands on a multitude of national (and 
possibly also international) markets; Functional diversification is represented by a basket of various products on sale, ranging 
from the classical residential mansion to shares on the financial markets; And last, but not least, social diversification is 
represented by the desire to broaden the range of products to a wider range of income classes. 
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The design strategies inherent in the examples of private urbanisation, as looked at in 
this work, can be characterised by a practice of ‘abstract localisation’ and imagineering. 
The stategy points to a dominance of abstracted design practices, the prominence of 
standardised typologies, an increasing role of representational values and synthetic envi-
ronments and a parallel loss of the context. 
Context of change – of macrostructural changes, heroes and team players  
Despite the fact that developers have come to play a fundamental role in the production 
of NeoTowns, the entire process from inception to design and implementation cannot be 
carried out without the input of expert disciplines such as planning, engineering or de-
sign. A closer look at the relationship of the developers with these ‘space making’ profes-
sions highlights the new roles and impacts of architects, designers, planners, landscape 
architects and engineers in the context of privately driven urban development. The depar-
ture from the ‘safe harbour’ Keynesian state leads to a redefinition of their role as well as 
the nature of the professions.  
Our examples illustrate that, hyped by the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s, 
the developmentalist governments of the time, socialist and capitalist alike, believed that 
social development could be engineered in a technical and positive manner. In those hey-
days of spatial determinism, modernism became mainstream and architects and planners, 
as well as engineers, were seen as the heroic masterminds of the modernisation process.46 
For the author the squatting of the Carlos Raúl Villanueva’s Enero 21 housing blocks in 
Caracas symbolises the end of this zenith of functional modernism47.  
Indeed, are able to observe that the rise of the corporate sphere into the prime posi-
tion of urban development, compelled architects and planners to step back from their 
heroic positions. While the business of urban production was corporatised, they had to 
get accustomed to a new role. This role implies a greater integration into the system – 
from being a hero to being a partner, team-player or consultant. Moreover, the practices 
and strategies of planning and design have also undergone a radical reconfiguration. De-
sign processes based on aesthetics and form, and often also place (modern functionalism 
and contextualism), increasingly give way to the design of abstract processes, branded 
typologies and representational wrappings.  
The application of abstract symbols and codes, replaces a work along aesthetic ideals, 
or local narratives. As this often leads to the emergence of what was referred to as new 
forms of anonymous construction, remedy is then sought by the construction of second 
natures and synthetic landscapes. Context, distinctiveness and profile are then created by 
the elements of iconic architecture, by a combination of thematic landscapes and also 
new types of supermonuments. While we have called this design approach “abstract lo-
calisation”, the resulting urban landscapes are driven by their marketability, resembling 
media events in a meticulously orchestrated setting. 
 Illustration E-19: Main stakeholders of contemporary urban development 
                                               
46 The process is represented by the series of CIAM congresses as well as by Le Corbusier’s Chandigarh (1953), Niemeyer’s 
Brazila (1960), or Rober Moses’s era in New York. It culminates in Constantino’s Doxiadis ‘science’ of Ekistics (1948) and his 
vision of a world-spanning Dynapolis (1968). An end comes into sight by the founding of Team X at the 1953 CIAM con-
gress in Aix La Provence. 
47 Charles Jenks (1977), in contrast proclaimed that “the day Modern Architecture died” was March 16th 1972, the day of 
the destruction of Pruitt Igoe project in St. Louis (US). 
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Changing role of architecture 
The meta-framework described above is largely represented by our three examples: Navi 
Mumbai represents an evolution from self-design to subcontracting, and from competi-
tions to direct commissions. In the beginning (1970s to 1985) most of the projects in 
Navi Mumbai had been designed by Cidco’s own in-house staff in a supply driven man-
ner48. With the major shift towards demand driven schemes by the mid 1980s, a signifi-
cant share of the projects was outsourced. At that time the developers sought to promote 
innovation (in construction and design) by organising public competitions with freelance 
architects and developers. Yet, while the results of most of the competitions were seen as 
rather meagre and while a strong corporate real estate and construction sector was 
emerging, from the early 1990s Cidco embarked on the practice of direct commissions.  
Parallel to the changing of broad paradigms, the different phases of Navi Mumbai are 
characterised by different designers: The early conceptual phase is driven by the Modern 
Architecture Research Group (MARG) composed of the young architect Charles Correa, 
the architect Pravina Mehta, as well as the engineer Shirish Patel who come up with the 
innovative contextual design scheme; the launch and realisation of the project is carried 
out by the in-house team of the state planning agency Cidco; and today the advice of 
well-known designers is mostly sought when developing large, and/or publicly significant 
projects: Balkrishna Doshi, for example was asked to prepare the plan for the master 
new node of Khargar, while the consultancy McClier prepared the underlying scheme for 
the Navi Mumbai SEZ. When it comes to contemporary architecture, the firm Hafeez 
Constructor, one of the busiest contemporary Indian design consultancies, emerges as the 
most popular of Cidco’s in-house architects. 
Bumi Serpong Damai embarks on a strategy of development and innovation by exter-
nal consultants who are often star representatives of international stature, while local 
teams carry out the implementation. Names such as Doxiadis, Portman, and SOM as 
well as EDAW are some important master planners. New branded products, which re-
quire a profound knowledge of the local conditions and markets, are developed and im-
plemented under the guidance of SimasRed, the real estate arm of Sinar Mas. 
In contrast, AlphaVille works like an automobile, or electronics manufacturer: The 
concept of the ‘residential’ is handled as much as a commercial innovation, based on a 
combination of technical (engineering) and entrepreneurial (business) knowledge. In this 
context, the Residencial brand has undergone constant optimisation and improvement. 
As technological perfection dominates over artistic expression, a team of in-house experts 
mostly does the firms’ product development and optimisation. External consultants and 
specialists are asked to join in when required. In this context the developers have a team 
of trusted partners who work in the background. The office of São Paulo based architect 
Reinaldo Pestana, indeed can be called an éminence grise. He has designed the majority 
of the schemes in AlphaVille’s environs.49  
A new era was inaugurated by the collaboration with the Curitiba based Alfred 
Willer, introducing environmentally friendly urban schemes in Curitiba.50 Yet, whereas 
AlphaVille’s developers principally shun the formalism and aesthetic individualism of big 
name planners51, the situation is different with the discipline of landscaping: here the 
                                               
48 Notably the strategy is also related to the lack of expertise available on the private market. 
49 His office is also credited with having authored the name AlphaVille.  
50 Significantly, after this project, in accordance with the firm’s in-house approach described above, Willer’s son Marcello 
was appointed as the director of AlphaVille’s planning department. 
51 Indeed the strategy seems to be based on local experiences instead of beliefs. When by the end of the 1980s Arthur de 
Ulhôa of Tamboré S.A. made an early attempt to design a ‘Cidade de 21. Millenio’ scheme, with the advice of Jamie Lerner 
and José Molalez (Placedesign), a large majority of the planner’surbanistic ideas failed. 
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offices of Burle Marx as well as Fernando Chacel, were appointed to design some land-
mark schemes.52 
It seems though that with the advent of Asian style mixed superblock projects, the 
contributions of big-name architecture consultancies has become a prominent element in 
the development (and marketing) process, as for example Miami based group Arquitec-
tonica was invited to work on a proposal for the vast TinerVideolar scheme. 
Planning 
When we look at the existence and relevance of large-scale master planning, we find that 
the state agencies of Cidco and the Mumbai Metropolitan Development Corporation 
dominate Navi Mumbai’s environment; that BSD’s master planning was done by in-
house architects and planners prior to it being integrated into the official master plan; 
and that master planning did not play any role in AlphaVille. The scheme developed in a 
tabula rasa environment outside of São Paulo’s municipal boundaries. The developers 
never ‘officially’ intended to interfere on a larger scale and limited their attention up to 
the level of the neighbourhood. 
Visions, Strategies, Practices 
In addition to looking at the organisational structures and some of the stakeholders of 
planning and design, it becomes important to explore some of the underlying visions, 
strategies and trends regarding the space-shaping disciplines. As much as the govern-
ments, politicians and developers, the designers have had their own visions when crafting 
the schemes. A juxtaposition of these original intentions with the status of the projects 
today may tell us about these achievements and their relevance.  
Navi Mumbai was designed on an impressive ‘grand vision’ of a twin city on the sea, 
Bumi Serpong Damai intended becoming an idiosyncratic version of an Indonesian New 
Town, while, in contrast, AlphaVille emerged chiefly as a business oriented real estate 
strategy (while implicitly dreaming of becoming a mixture of a Garden and Edge City). 
Indeed, what unites all three examples is that they seek to represent a radical departure 
from the traditional city which was stigmatised as an aberrant dead-end environment. 
Furthermore, also traditional (vernacular, pre-colonial) strategies were mostly disre-
garded in favour of state-of the art technologies.53  
In particular Bumi Serpong Damai, as well, as AlphaVille represent the vision of pro-
ducing alternate worlds along these lines. BSD’s dream starts with the dogma of central 
planning which gradually becomes dominated by the belief in the supremacy of the mar-
ket.54  
AlphaVille, works on a market based ideology. Eventually both portray the ideal of an 
alternative life, remote from the daily complexities and hassles of a post-industrial third 
world metropolis and based on the notion of difference and contrast. The resulting en-
clavic environments represent these ideals. 
                                               
52 Burle Marx’s office has designed a neighbourhood in AlphaVille São Paulo with the same name, while Chacel’s bureau 
was appointed to design the scheme in Rio de Janeiro. Chacel, in particular, became known for his concept of eco-
sustainability, which has left a big mark on various projects of AlphaVille’s developers. 
53 Our examples represent the dream of many designers of planned cities. In particular Ebenezer Howard’s system of Town-
Country Magnets was intended to trigger dissolution of the morbid metropolis of London. Accordingly he believed that: 
“the old, crowded, chaotic slum towns of the past – will be effectively checked, and the current of population set in pre-
cisely the opposite direction – too the new towns, bright and fair, wholesome and beautiful. (Howard 1898 (1946): 111) 
54 Initially BSD was part of a holistic vision of satellite towns for Jakarta, driven by Dutch planning expertise. Yet, the idea 
was lost due to a lacking enforcement and the irrational land speculation and New Town boom in the City’s periphery. 
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Navi Mumbai, in contrast, presents an interesting alternative.  It’s design approach is 
contextual and place based whilst it also joins the disciplines of city planning and urban 
design. The designers of this parallel town share the belief in the power of the modern 
plan and a technical modernisation of society (with influences from New Delhi, and 
Chandigarh). Their set up for a twin-city on the sea, portrays a holistic and integrated 
future scenario for the whole region. In a combination of planning and urban design, 
Correa, Mehta and Patel as well, seek to define a new city centred around the bay and 
morphologically based on a chain of grand public spaces. The underlying rationale is not 
one of isolation and exclusion but one of upgrading and integration, seeking to produce 
a whole city that is larger than the sum of its parts. So the early design of the MARG 
group is an important example of the departure from a functional modernism to a con-
textual place based design approach – notably on the scale of a city and not at the level 
of an architectural object.55  
Indeed, Navi Mumbai’s initial approach is largely antithetical to a liberalist rationale 
underlying the strategies of the private sector (in our case most radically represented by 
AlphaVille). While the first method believes in higher communal values such as the 
power of planned aesthetics, in the cultural value of architecture and the relevance of 
place, as well as the collective nature of basic resources, the later is based on individual 
ideals: subjective representation, the relevance of strategic locations, the productivity of 
standardisation and in the efficiency of the market in allocating resources and structuring 
terrain. 
In this context AlphaVille’s urban design strategy, could be dubbed ‘anti urban’.56 
While the project thrives on the strategies of a seamless process driven optimisation, and 
is driven by an entrepreneurial logic of market-based competition, it can be perceived as 
anti-spatial, non-formalistic and individualistic, as it is based on a bottom-up logic of 
processes, standards, and regulations.  
BSD’s urban design tactics, in contrast, display a history that went from the modern 
grid to postmodern theming, and festivalisation. Interestingly, and in contrast to Al-
phaVille, in BSD the impact of traditional planning and the relevance of holistic master 
plans remain strong. Nonetheless, the underlying basis is a classical functionalist ap-
proach that could be termed ‘typological new town design’. The design strategy is mainly 
based on the universal principles of New Town and Garden City design such as modern 
zoning, a hierarchical network of roads, a system of tree lined boulevards and a structure 
based on neighbourhood clusters, etc.  
Navi Mumbai’s urban concept on the other hand, in addition to the system of grand 
public spaces as discussed above, is grounded in a combination of density and transport. 
The new city was organised along a system of individual nodes, which were connected by 
a modern system of mass transport. Zoning densities increasing towards the centres high-
lighted the resulting fabric. (Cf.  E-15) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
55 It must be noted that (tragically and symptomatically) almost none of MARG’s initial ideas was realised. Generally the 
system of public spaces proposed was regarded as too bourgeois by politicians and the state, who saw it as contradicting 
the social ideals of the city. Hence, the series of open spaces along the sea became an early victim of cost efficiency; later on 
the option was killed by federal coastal zone regulations. The concept of urban cores with increased densities at the central 
nodes fell prey to India’s monolithic zoning regulations. 
56 Of course serious urbanists would dispute whether urbanism can be founded on such formal characteristics. 
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Conclusion Design 
Imagineering urban space 
The above mentioned ideologies and strategies give rise to a series of important spatial 
trends represented by building typologies as well as the handling of public space.  With a 
cultural context that became too complex to be based on local congruity alone, the (self-) 
image of a city has to be constructed in an ‘artificial’ way. Consequently the designers of 
all of our examples have to engage in the (pro) active generation of identity. We have 
called this strategy imagineering.57 While the increasing emphasis on the process goes 
along with a recurring focus on the value of representative architectural forms, theming 
and branding, adapted from the media and advertising industries, emerge into state-of-
the-art architectural and design strategies. And consequently, while representational 
spaces boom, building structures are ever more characterised by a prominence of iconic 
architecture. Examples of both nostalgic and futuristic worlds have gained a new signifi-
cance in generating urban images and as demand inducing instruments. In addition, the 
rising relevance of marketing and image generation leads to a ‘deja vu’ experience with 
the urban which reappear as ‘supermonuments’, or ‘monuments of monuments’ serving 
as a way to valorise increasingly homogeneous urban landscapes. (Cf. the discussion of 
Marc Augé’s concept of the ‘non-lieu’ in the introductory chapter)  
Accordingly, an eclectic mix of historical, postcolonial, neo-traditionalist and modern 
styles tends to dominate Navi Mumbai’s formerly functionalist fabric. Iconic landmark 
shapes, themed worlds and symbolic architecture are, for example, represented by the 
Spaghetti housing complex in Khargar. Yet, in contrast to the largely homogeneous 
neighbourhoods of Bumi Serpong Damai and AlphaVille, most of Navi Mumbai’s 
neighbourhoods display an electric mix of styles (among the few homogeneous examples 
are only some enclaves of the super rich, such as Seawoods Estates). 
The changing role of Navi Mumbai’s railway stations is an interesting indicator of 
some of the new spatial trends. In the first 20 years of development the city’s railway-
cum-commercial complexes, portrayed important landmarks and ‘cathedrals of industrial 
modernisation’. The combined stations and Infotech parks at Vashi and Belapur resem-
bled the out-of scale structures of monolithic super tankers. In contrast, the present plan 
for a new Seawoods Railway Station displays a thematic and functional mix of railway 
station, shopping landscape and Theme Park.58  
Along the same rationales, Bumi Serpong Damai’s public space is gradually more rep-
resentational and synthetic. There are a large number of statues and 'plastic' monuments 
                                               
57 The term is usually closely associated with the World Disney Imagineering. WDI’s employees are known as Imagineers. We 
use it because its direct meaning also perfectly conveys the spirit of a novel combination of marketing and design. 
58 Other prominent ‘classical’ monuments of the time are Khargar’s Utsav Chowk and Vashi’s Shivaji Chowk. The first is a 
circular fountain and arcade in Greek-Roman style that features an enormous media presence and emerged into one the 
most prominent icons of Navi Mumbai. The second is a populist monument featuring a local hero serving the longing for 
nostalgia and identity and the needs of the populist parties. 
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the theming, staging and festivalisation strategies of the respective neighbourhoods. Yet, 
most of these are reduced to the visual and representative.59  
Bumi Serpong Damai and AlphaVille are exceptional examples of the current rele-
vance of theming and branding strategies. Their neighbourhoods exemplify the trend that 
today’s developers (as well as their clients) prefer the homogeneity of synthetic worlds, to 
the complexity of place. While the first seems highly predictable, controllable and secure, 
the second is regarded as an unpredictable, complex, and risky condition. Architects and 
designers are rather asked to develop successful and efficient typologies and brands based 
on a modular design in order to be replicable. Extreme cases and irregularities are out-
sourced to social, technical, and legal experts (who, for example, negotiate problems 
with the environment or with the local population). Consequently the unpredictable con-
text is fenced out. The site is then bulldozed to create a tabula rasa environment on 
which the abstracted models can be efficiently implemented. Because the naked synthetic 
and mass produced structure would remain highly unpopular, it is then valorised by the 
means of theming and branding strategies, introducing distinct life styles and identities 
upon demand. (When this landscape remains bare, it becomes the famous corporate of-
fice park).60  
Bumi Serpong Damai’s neighbourhoods represent this approach with particular 
strengths on the theming of the neighbourhoods: The gates and representative public 
spaces are individually designed and cater to the identity of the respective neighbourhood 
(be it Latino, French, Japanese, or European). The mass of turn-key villa’s, on the other 
hand, is highly rationalised and standardised. The construction process was streamlined 
to low-skilled workers and a limited set of surface designs can be attached to the modu-
lar platform basis. The strategy therefore resembles techniques of gold-plating, modulari-
sation, and typological combination, as they are known from the production of com-
modities such as cars or mobile phones. Nevertheless, apparently the times of the wildest 
thematic designs61 seem to be over, and moderate thematic designs, along half a dozen of 
recurring motives, dominate the scene. These neoclassical, or modernistic motives are 
increasingly independent of the underlying theme.  
AlphaVille’s strategy, in contrast, follows an approach based on rules and codes. It is 
this context, which explains why design in AlphaVille focuses on the single architectural 
object (and why is it not important at larger scales). In contrast to BSD’s holistically 
themed neighbourhoods, AlphaVille’s developers set strict regulations, but outsource the 
construction process, as part of the whole strategy of ‘Automanagement’, to the individ-
ual buyers. For this reason, the design of the personal house is one of the remaining free-
doms of this highly controlled context. The concept thrives on the existence of a large 
pool of extremely well qualified architects that exist in São Paulo, something unimagin-
able in Indonesia or India. The result is a hybrid landscape of individually designed villas 
between the diverse and the homogeneous. While it features many exceptional designs 
the fabric actually resembles a form of anonymous construction (as opposed to a con-
sciously designed structure). As in BSD an urban fabric emerges only at a larger scale of 
the town. 
                                               
59 Symptomatically a thematic playground of “The Green” with some of Disney’s characters, displays a sign that play is 
prohibited (The place was visited by the author in 2007 during a major marketing initiative. The playground was apparently 
closed until a large part of the neighbourhood had been sold).  
60 Durkheimer would refer to the phenomenon as the paradox of a boom of individualisation in a world which is dominated 
by an increasing collectivisation of production and consumption, represented by an augmenting division of labour along the 
standardisation of products. 
61 As for example represented by the Kota Legenda schemes, built by the same developer in South Jakarta. 
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Whereas our NeoTowns emerge as thematic landscapes, the break with nature and the 
environment emerges as one of their major characteristics. While the process dominates 
in BSD and AlphaVille-Tamboré, it is increasingly present in Navi Mumbai. Interestingly, 
AlphaVille’s negation is most radical as it is also cultural and aesthetic. This project re-
jects subordination to universal design and instead favours the fulfilment of the individ-
ual household. 
In this context, landscaping emerges as one of the most prominent disciplines. On the 
one hand its boom can be explained because it controls the construction of new artificial 
terrain and topography, whereas on the other hand it has the role of localising (imple-
menting) the abstract spatial typologies and forms. Landscape architects have played an 
important role in recent product innovations. While the tradition of bulldozing and 
tabula rasa clearing was particularly widespread in Brazil, an increasingly saturated mar-
ket, in combination with rising public criticism and new groups of ecologically minded 
customers, has led to the spread and innovation of novel concepts of eco-sustaibanle de-
sign. Here the most influential concept is Fernando Chacel’s eco-sustainability tactics 
which works along the compensation of natural resources (cf. above). 
A role for design in the process of privatisation 
If NeoTowns increasingly emerge along a rationalised logic of spatial production with 
the motto of maximum efficiency, accountability, predictability, control and security, the 
question emerges if, and what role remains for design in this process? 
We find that even as the privately developed NeoTowns examined in this work repre-
sent a radically different approach to design, the relevance of the issue in general is highly 
assured. AlphaVille, Bumi Serpong Damai, as well as some of Navi Mumbai’s new 
neighbourhoods, demonstrate that today design is a highly important and needed tool of 
valorisation. The examples show that privately driven urban development does not nec-
essarily lead to chaos and degradation. Even in tabula rasa environments characterised 
by the absence of public planning mechanisms, the quality of architecture and public 
spaces (in addition to state-of-the art infrastructure and services) becomes an important 
and value adding feature, in particular in a context of consolidation and increased com-
petition. The recent efforts of upgrading, pedestrianisation and installation of public 
parks in AlphaVille, as well as in BSD, may illustrate one aspect of this trend. When 
highly controlled and monolithic environments, such as BSD’s thematic neighbourhoods, 
are produced, design is actually needed, more than before.62  
Thus we see that private urban development is able and inclined to produce an urban 
‘Gestalt’ of a higher aesthetic order (Even in AlphaVille, the example that seems to be 
most radically driven by the ‘invisible hand of the market’, is that design is a highly im-
portant element of representation, valorisation) – albeit the underlying paradigms of 
which are essentially different from the Leitmotifs of modern functionalism, the enlight-
ened European city.63  
It becomes clear that contemporary designers and planners need to draw on a new set 
of talents (which address the requirements posed by the trends of standardisation and 
modularisation on one hand and the generation of identities on the other). Therefore the 
designers of our NeoTowns need to combine the capabilities of process managers, prod-
                                               
62 Of course the political and social problems of these neighbourhoods are another topic to be discussed. 
63 The question of the pro’s and con’s of these different systems, and the questions whether and how the spatial logic 
represented by the private sector needs to be constrained and regulated, emerges as an important topic, which needs ongo-
ing debate. 
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uct designers, stage designers, event managers, and ecologists. In contrast to the formal 
heroes of modernism, they must be highly capable of working in teams.64  
The above discussion of the role of planning and design illustrates that contemporary 
design practices increasingly need to engage in the development of abstracted typologies 
on one hand, and to cope with imagination, dreams, constructed life-styles and potenti-
alities on the other. In this context the actual assignment is not represented by the final 
form, but by the open process of generating life styles and their representations. It is 
therefore proposed to refer to this new set of requirements as imagineering. 
                                               
64 Notwithstanding the urgent need maintain an edge of criticism and self-reflection. 
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Finance –  
Landscapes of opportunity, thin walled 
Developers are successful by offering products that are either cheaper than 
the average or provide more quality of certain aspects or both. (Garvin 1996) 
 
The availability and cost of capital is critical. Developers need capital to pay 
for property acquisition, planning, site development, infrastructure installa-
tion, and the expense of carrying the property till development costs have 
been recouped. (Garvin 1996) 
 
The most difficult problem facing developers of residential suburb, though, is 
financial security over the life of the project... the worst disaster is an eco-
nomic downturn. (Garvin 1996) 
 
Examination of the NeoTowns as examples of privately driven urbanism indicates that 
the moment of capital is increasingly important. Our three urban undertakings tend to 
diversify into a nonmaterial world of finance. In this context tremendous new markets 
are explored. The enterprises become part of an increasingly complex web of financial 
flows, corporate organisations and mutual regulations. Yet this new situation also leads 
to new dimensions of uncertainty and volatility. 
Capital is the eponym of capitalism. Money is the crucial medium of market-based 
systems. It facilitates appropriation and exchange. In this context the perspective of fi-
nance becomes a central component of an examination of the nature of private urbanisa-
tion. While planned cities become economic ventures, financial strategies come out as 
crucial tools of contemporary private urban modernisation. In this context we investi-
gated how our privately developed NeoTowns managed to develop, survive and thrive, 
also whether, and how, tendencies of the finance world affect spatial forms and typolo-
gies and whether a privately planned city of the 21st century is more profitable than its 
20th century peers. Examination of the financial aspects was done for both the demand 
side and for the supply side. 
It was observed that AlphaVille passes the profitability test with flying colours as it is 
geared to prosperous elites while remaining open as to how far this success is transferable 
to other locations. BSD, in contrast, displays a history of a constant struggle for survival. 
Despite the fact that it controls one of the largest land banks in the region, the project 
was only able to survive with massive backups from the government as well as from its 
mother company Sinar Mas. BSD thus demonstrates that the construction of New Towns 
remains a risky business. On the other hand a constant crisis represents an important 
driving force to innovate. Navi Mumbai then has, for most of its history, represented an 
impressive model of social redistribution, along a non-for profit scheme. Here, as well as 
in the other cases the continuous investment in infrastructure was among the most deci-
sive factors of success. The developers have continuously reinvested 30 to 40 percent of 
the profits in infrastructure. 
The examination of finances, financial mechanisms and the products created, also 
helps to track important tendencies. The fiscal landscape of our examples is more and 
Three Neotowns compared   575 
more dominated by the effects of an increasing diversification of products, the interna-
tionalisation of investments and the deregulation of markets (as is the case in many other 
places). In this context the undertakings at hand seek to increase investment and reduce 
risks, to tap international expertise and additional markets so the organisational geogra-
phy of enterprises becomes increasingly elaborate and complex, as in ‘Brezel Palace’, 
which is increasingly hard to understand, even for insiders. At the same time urban space 
is more-and-more moulded by a synchronising logic of international codes and regula-
tions, often in relation to credit and accountability standards. In other words: While the 
money, and its internal dynamics, plays an ever-increasing role, the production of cities it 
more-and-more dependent on worldwide economic cycles. 
Demand side 
An investigation from the demand side confirms that our NeoTown examples are not 
only based on the economic logic of the private sector, but also on various fundamental 
demand side dynamics. Indeed the demand side of our cases is mainly represented by 
rising numbers of middle class population in the respective countries with climbing dis-
posable incomes. In addition, almost all of the projects, with some minor exceptions in 
Navi Mumbai, are geared to a buyer’s market. The fact that a house in AlphaVille may 
cost US$ 200.000 and more indicates that the project caters primarily for an elite seg-
ment of 15 percent of the total population earning at least 20 minimal Brazilian incomes. 
While prices in BSD range between 12.000 and 200.000 US$ a wider scope of the target 
populations is included. However, a strong trend to marginalise the poor can be ob-
served. Not least Navi Mumbai’s price category of US$ 20.000 to USD$ 50.000 points to 
a strong focus on middle and low middle classes, though the scheme also represents the 
highest share of low income projects. We also see that prices fluctuate among the differ-
ent nodes – largely as a result of the accessibility of some places and not of master plan-
ning measures. 
The development and maintenance of first class standards in third world contexts 
raises the question of how the extra costs are covered. The experiences made in the three 
examples demonstrate the importance of decentralisation and local finance in this regard. 
The fees raised by the co-operative societies cover a significant part of the maintenance 
costs of Navi Mumbai’s neighbourhoods. Also in AlphaVille residents pay for the entire 
maintenance of their neighbourhoods via their neighbourhood associations. In contrast, 
the fact that no bottom-up solution exists in BSD created a problematic situation of un-
sustainable cross-subsidies, as it forced the developer to cover most of the running costs. 
Supply side 
The fact that in AlphaVille the price of a house basically equals the amount to be paid 
for an apartment in inner city locations while projects in surrounding areas are available 
for half of the sum, indicates the status and reputation achieved by the brand, which has 
become the Mercedes-Benz of middle class housing in Brazil. Nevertheless, given an in-
creasingly saturated market, new trends point to a diversification and an augmented fo-
cus on lower income, as well as in parallel, on the luxury segment. While the first seg-
ment is predominantly supplied with basic turnkey products, the later is served by so-
phisticated eco-lifestyle schemes.65  
                                               
65 Disproportional high levels of return confirm the financial success of the ventures. These amounted to 30 percent per year 
in AlphaVille in 2007 (while the mother company achieved 10 percent in the 1Q of 2009) Earnings in before Interest, Tax, 
and Depreciation. BSD achieved a profit margin of 31 percent in 2008 (cf. www.reuters.com). 
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The data and observations confirm that privately driven urbanism depends largely on 
revenues and profits and therefore, to date, it has preferred to cater for middle and high 
income populations. Consequently few solutions have been developed for low-income 
populations and the no-income populations have basically remained marginalised. 
The fact that for a long time most of the projects focused on affluent target groups is 
also connected to payment methods and the availability of credit. Traditionally, a large 
part of payments had to be made in advance while public mortgage schemes did not ex-
ist. In some cases the private sector innovated by individual credit schemes, often in col-
laboration with private banks. (Yet the dilemma was that even the fees of these mort-
gages exceeded the incomes of low-income populations). 
Finance and low-income housing 
Interestingly the situation is increasingly changing. Nowadays, new federally insured 
mortgage markets serve more lower middle classes and developers come up with a grow-
ing range of products geared to this sector. Yet, still, we see that privately driven urban-
ism is only capable of producing housing for populations with some regular income. It 
fails to cater for no-income populations, unless forced to by the public. Hence the prob-
lem of housing the poorest remains unresolved. 
Bumi Serpong Damai as well as Navi Mumbai had to fulfil specific housing quotas for 
the lower middle classes and the poor. Significant numbers of lower income schemes 
were built in both of the projects. In this context (e.g. the 1:3:6 guideline) BSD produced 
a large number of minimal housing typologies. Tight profit maxims have resulted in 
‘nanohouses’ (e.g. extremely small houses), starting at 24 square metres - even below 
federal guidelines. In the beginning this strategy attracted a significant number of lower-
income pioneer populations and it continues to be relevant today. Nevertheless, a strong 
inclination towards the exclusion and segregation of low-income populations can be ob-
served. While initially the housing for lower income populations had been integrated at 
the centres of the first neighbourhoods, today they are being placed in peripheral en-
claves. It seems that the obligation to include lower income populations is seen largely as 
a despised burden rather than an important future asset. (Cf.  E-17) 
Navi Mumbai remains the example which has managed to produce the largest number 
of lower income schemes, and the one which came up with the most interesting innova-
tions. Indeed, this fact has to be associated with its not-for profit character as well its 
general public mission to become a city for all. The developing agency Cidco has impres-
sively demonstrated that it is possible to cross-subsidise development by skinning-off 
profits from profitable developments geared to the rich, and to redistribute these for the 
benefit of the general public and the poor. This was mainly done in particular along the 
innovation of differential land pricing mechanisms – the method operates with the re-
serve price versus the market price of developed land. We have dubbed this tactic the 
“Robin hood strategy” as it exploits market dynamics to leverage and cross-subsidise 
urban development that would otherwise be impossible under purely market-dominated 
conditions. An additional important component of the effort to tame the markets, is the 
fact that the land of Navi Mumbai remains in public hands, it is leased and only the built 
up structures become private property.  
Consequently, in the first 15 years a large number of low-income housing has been 
produced in a supply driven manner through federally subsidised schemes. The node of 
Kopar Khairane has been a notable experimental field for an enormous site-and-services 
World-Bank project by the mid 1980s. When the general housing policy shifted to a sup-
ply driven system, Cidco was among the first to offer buyers a choice of direct payments 
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or own mortgaging schemes. Nevertheless here too, in the context of a general liberalisa-
tion and privatisation, poorer populations have been increasingly marginalised. Many 
critics lament that Cidco betrayed its early social goals. In the meanwhile middle and 
higher income populations dominate the project by 75 percent, a share that is well be-
yond Indian ‘norms’, while solutions for the poor have been reduced to tiny model pro-
jects or outsourced. (It has also to be stated, that in the 35 years of development, a large 
proportion of Navi Mumbai’s residents have thrived on the rising real estate prices and 
managed to climb the ladder of wealth). The fact that the ‘only’ rental market in Navi 
Mumbai’s on site villages is regarded as one of the few successful strategies for lower 
income populations in place today, is also a declaration of bankruptcy in regard to the 
current achievements of the developer. 
Government incentives and financial subsidies have always played a significant role in 
the provision of low-income housing. In particular Navi Mumbai, as well as BSD, have 
gained from generous subsidies and exclusive rights. Yet, while the relatively unfettered 
AlphaVille again emerges as the most profitable undertaking, the question arises whether 
long-term subsidies will be unsustainable and distorted. 
A start up fund (to be used along a revolving fund principle), important land permits, 
as well the general advantage of being a semi-public agency, were significant parts of 
Navi Mumbai’s starting package. BSD received easy credits, the guarantee to buy the 
entire land (land permits), exclusive development rights, as well as comprehensive bailout 
packages after the 1996 financial crisis. AlphaVille, on the other hand, was nurtured only 
indirectly by the state: in the form of significant infrastructure programmes in the envi-
rons (e.g. highways), as well as by a macroeconomic and political environment, which 
was highly favourable to private sector development. 
Internationalisation 
Direct foreign investments played a surprisingly minor role during the start up phase of 
our projects. On the other hand, international credit institutions tended to display a big-
ger relevance. While The World Bank co-financed most of Navi Mumbai’s site-and-
services schemes, the progressing Navi Mumbai SEZ is co-financed by momentous na-
tional as well as international banking institutions such as the ADB, the IFZ, as well as 
the IDBI. At the same time a significant amount of BSD’s infrastructure was funded by 
the Asian Development Bank, while the infrastructure in São Paulo’s periphery was co-
financed with World Bank and IMF money.  
In the meanwhile also a notable number of international companies has entered the 
real estate market through joint venture operations. Firms from the US, Dubai, Singapore 
etc., can be found on the boards of most of the so called Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) 
in Navi Mumbai and its environs. Non-Resident-Indians (NRI) play a significant role in 
investments. 
Additional investments come from an increasing number of large industrial corpora-
tions, which started to diversify into the real estate sector in the context of the ongoing 
economic expansion. In Navi Mumbai firms such as Reliance Industries (India’s biggest 
private sector company) represent this trend. Both branches of the firm invested in many 
ongoing ventures, established its own headquarters in the area, and also plans an enor-
mous 5.000-hectare SEZ to the South of Navi Mumbai. At the same time BSD became an 
integral part of the corporate galaxy of Sinar Mas, one of the largest and most diversified 
Indonesian conglomerates. AlphaVille Urbanismo remained confined to the real estate 
sector, while Gafisa indulged it, one of the four and one of the largest real estate ventures 
on the country. 
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Diversification 
The fact that our NeoTowns tend to be run and operated by large and diverse corpora-
tions not only underscores the success of the projects as business ventures, it also con-
forms to some major economic trends, such as standardisation, growth, consolidation, 
diversification as well as the spreading of risks.  
Among the predominant trends that of diversification primarily aims at the augmenta-
tion of markets. It operates at three major levels: 1) geographical diffusion (targeting the 
peripheries of other rapidly growing large cities), 2) social extension (seeking to reach an 
increasing number of societal groups), and 3) functional expansion (increasing the range 
of products in relation to the development process). The third of these strategies com-
prises a diversified basket of products, which range from the original villa, turnkey 
apartments, land development schemes, the neighbourhood life style brand, and the 
novel mixed-use superblock typologies.66  
Nowadays, the spectrum of products is increased even further as our NeoTowns rep-
resent a vast amount of financial products such as bonds, convertible bonds, share offer-
ings, loans, or futures covering primary and secondary markets. Many of NeoTowns 
developers, or their mother companies, trade these products on financial markets, locally 
and globally; today everybody can buy a piece of AlphaVille-Tamboré, BSD, or Navi 
Mumbai’s SEZ. Convertible bonds of BSD PT have been traded since 2003; shares of the 
firm (JAK: BSDE) have been available since 2008 (not to mention the vast number of 
financial products generated by Sinar Mas, the mother company).  
In Navi Mumbai, the ambitious investor will look in vain for shares in the non-for-
profit agency Cidco, yet he will find no difficulty in participating in the area’s boom by 
obtaining shares of Hirco’s67 Urban Infrastructure Opportunity Fund.68 He can also opt 
for shares of the company, with a base on the offshore centre on the Isle of Man, on 
London’s highly speculative Alternative Investment Market (AIM), alternatively he can 
opt for the shares of Dubai’s developer of Al Nakheel, or the Indian Reliance, or Jaicorp 
groups. In AlphaVille, then, he can opt for Gafisa’s (GFSA) and Brascan’s (BIS) shares.69  
On the other hand, international integration also brings dependency on the volatility 
of currency markets. While these had the function to tap the overblown pre-October-
2008 international money, the more and more complex webs of international financial 
flows are impossible to map or even control.70 BSD was exposed to such risks as early as 
1997, when unsecured credits were a major trigger of the SE Asian financial crisis. 
Importantly the increased exposure to international finance resonates on the ground 
by reconfirming and enhancing many of the trends that drive private urban development. 
As the far off investors expect accountable, planable, and maximum returns, growth and 
diversification, as well as standardisation, are encouraged. The fact that our local firms 
have to comply with the accountability standards of international finance (for example 
                                               
66 BSD’s own description illustrates the scope and the diversification of the firm: “The Company is also engaged in the 
construction of residential properties, commercial areas, industrial estates, shopping centres, schools, sports centres, recrea-
tional centres, golf courses and education facilities. Its business segments are divided into land, industrial building, houses, 
shop houses, shopping mall and office. The Company’s projects under the name Bumi Serpong Damai are located in Ser-
pong District, Legok District, Cisauk District and Pagedangan District, Tangerang Regency, Banten Province.” 
(http://www.google.com/finance?q=JAK:BSDE, r12.0.2009) 
67 Hirco is the financial arm of the Hiranandani Group, a developer which develops Integrated Townships. 
68 Among the major stakeholders are Liberty Hedge Ventures Limited (2,526,984 shares), the Credit Suisse Client Nominees 
UK Limited and Vidacos Nominees Limited on behalf of funds under the discretionary management of Laxey Partners Limited 
(4,647,155 shares), as well as HSBC Global Investment Funds (4,950,000 shares). 
69 Since 2006 Gafisa has been listed under GFSA at the Novo Mercado of São Paulo’s Stock Exchange BOVESPA. One year 
later Gafisa pioneered as the first Brazian homebuilder to become listed on the New York Stock Exchange, NYSE (under the 
name ‘GFA’). 
70 Yet the time of writing this thesis is too early to speculate on the effects of the financial crash. 
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the US American Barnes Oaxley Act) underlines the drive to standardise, modularise and 
typologise even more. In addition the sudden arrival of large amounts of international 
money may led to the abrupt appearance of ever larger projects such as the observed 
mixed use superblock schemes. 
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Control –  
Enclavic regimes, between formal and informal 
 
 It is not the type of developer that is significant [public, non-profit, for-
profit]; it is the financial and regulatory market in which they operate. 
(Garvin 1997) 
 
The administration becomes an instrument of defence, instrumentalised used 
by one group to protect itself against another group. (Gans 1969)71 
 
To conclude the juxtaposition and evaluation of the three NeoTowns being looked at, 
and to wrap up our generalisation of significant attributes and hypothetical trends, one 
element is missing: This component relates to the question of public government and 
control. The terminal part of this subchapter seeks to summarise and to compare the 
politics and power structures, as well as the public regulations underlying the emergence 
of the three NeoTowns. This analysis leads to the observation that the ventures are gen-
erally controlled by distinct elites. Moreover, the spaces and typologies produced gener-
ally represent offbeat typologies outside of the formal (public) status quo. Yet, it also 
becomes clear that, despite the fact that the projects appear as ultra liberal cradles, the 
public hand remains a crucial element of the process. 
Framework of control 
The domination of urban development by the corporate sector is among the major 
themes of this work. Yet, on the other hand many of our observations underline the as-
sumption that the power of politics (and the government) has not vanished. Indeed, our 
story illustrates a dramatic transformation of the equilibrium between the public, the 
private and the civil sectors, which characterises the shift from the Keynesian welfare 
state to new-economic (e.g. neoliberal) rationale. In this regard NeoTowns are important 
results of a storyline that believed that the state apparatus had become inefficient, 
clogged by a top-heavy of bureaucracy and overwhelmed by too much economic and 
political power, and that development could be handled more efficiently by the private 
sector as well as civil society.72  
                                               
71 „Die Verwaltung wird zu einem Instrument der Verteidigung, das von einer Gruppe benutzt wird, um sich selbst gegen 
andere Gruppen zu schützen“. (Gans 1969: 353, transl. by the Author) 
72 E.g.: The financial crises triggered by the oil shock of 1973 and the liberalisation of financial exchange marked by the 
termination of the Bretton Woods Agreements of 1974 can be seen as two fundamental economic milestones in this con-
text.  
As a result, state run enterprises (and in some cases utilities and resources) have been privatised, markets have been deregu-
lated and political powers have been decentralised. At the same time the impact of transnational corporations and global 
financial markets was largely augmented, while the relevance of states has decreased. The advent of the information age, 
and parallel shifts from an industrial to a consumer-based society, add to the complex framework of contemporary change. 
The spirit of the time is illustrated by John Turner (1976) who describes the inefficiency of central bureaucracies in the con-
text of developing countries "The alternation of everyday life by organisations that reify activities and institutionalise their 
values deprives the vast majority of us..." (12)... „The absurdity of excessively costly, centrally administered supply systems 
for personal services becomes monstrous in countries where earnings are low and controlled by foreign powers.“ (36) 
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This thinking resulted in models which suggested shifting the execution and imple-
mentation of development to the private sector, and transferring the powers of self-
determination, local control and planning to civil society.73 Therefore during the last 35 
years, decentralisation, as well as privatisation, have been the dominating themes of po-
litical and economic restructuring in many countries-world wide. 74 75 76 
Our examples clearly reflect the transformations described above. The development of 
Navi Mumbai, Bumi Serpong Damai, and AlphaVille is deeply embedded in the ad-
vanced postcolonial settings of the three countries.77 NeoTowns play the role of experi-
mental models for housing production and urban regional decentralisation implemented 
by the private sector.  
Notably, the enforcement of all models, whether socialist or liberalist, has always re-
mained skewed by ideologies, politics and the interests of specific groups on the ground. 
Notwithstanding the fact that our NeoTowns have emerged in different ideological set-
tings and power constellations – from India’s democratic social, to the Indonesian and 
Brazilian authoritarian liberalist models – all these relatively young nation states share 
the characteristics of being dominated by powerful elite groups. In the liberalist context, 
the transfer of power to the agents of the private economy has dominated while the em-
powerment of the civil sector has lagged behind.  
At the same time our examples affirm that the state maintains an important (and con-
troversial) double role. It remains a crucial element of power and control, defining a vital 
framework and enabling system during all stages of the projects. While state powers con-
trol the stage by setting rules for the game (regulations), government elites emerge as 
major players in the process (politics, governments).  
The macro framework of our NeoTowns is composed of two major political-
ideological stages: 1) The groundbreaking phase of the 1970s or early 1980s is domi-
nated by centrally oriented developmentalist regimes; 2) The stage of maturation is char-
acterised by democratising and decentralising powers. Specific landmark reforms of eco-
nomic liberalisation mark each of the phases. 
1970s Developmentalist experiments 
Indeed, when we adopt a macro political perspective, the 1971 Navi Mumbai, the 1973 
AlphaVille, as well as the 1984 Bumi Serpong Damai emerge as early laboratories and 
testing grounds of market based development strategies. Notably all are steered by strong 
developmentalist states. 
                                               
73 John Williamson’s Washington Consensus represents one of the most influential formulations of this rationale.  
74 The 1968 movement, and the critique represented by Institutions, such as the Frankfurt School, represent a political and 
cultural dimension of this critique. 
75 From decentralisation programmes in German spatial planning, to the 74th Amendment in India, or Brazilian community 
budgeting schemes, the British and US American Thatcher and Reagan governments of the 1980s, Chinese market oriented 
economic reforms, or the privatisation of the Japan Post in 2007. 
76 The belief in the almighty power of the economy was supported by enormous phases of growth and facilitated by a new 
international division of labour, as well as by the formation of global markets. It was ideologically promoted by influential 
schools of thought, mainly the Chicago School, and became known as Neo Liberalism. 
77 While the respective local (national) context was marked by an advanced search for an own status, profile and identity, 
the political framework was marked by that of the Cold War struggles between the First and the Second World, as much as 
it was part of great transformations from the collective to the individualist, from industrialism to consumerism, or from place 
to location, paralleled by an exceptional demographic development and urban growth. 
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Navi Mumbai emerges in 1974 in a centralist democratic country with the ‘strong 
hand’ of Indira Gandhi as the Premier in office78. India is governed in a central manner 
from New-Delhi along the lines of the socialist inspired 5-year plans. 
Bumi Serpong Damai develops in 1984 in a ‘second generation’ post-independence 
setting under the autarchic regime of the Indonesian General Suharto.79 The General 
rules the country for more than 30 years on an autocratic liberalist (and anti-communist) 
model.  
AlphaVille evolves in 1973 under the regime of the former Intelligence Service’s head, 
Emilio Garrastazu Medici. The time is known as one of the most politically oppressive 
periods, yet at the same time as the golden era of economic growth. Medici is part of an 
appointed military and business elite, who seeks to modernise the country along a top-
down technocratic approach.80  
1990’s Liberal reforms in a democratic context 
New liberal reforms of the early 1990s represent the other essential watershed, changing 
the face of our projects in hitherto unseen dimensions.81  The era from the early 1980’s to 
the early 1990’s is marked by a parallel combination of political democratisation as well 
as a liberalisation of markets on a worldwide scale. These trends reverberate on the ur-
ban surface, reinforcing tendencies such as typological standardisation and modularisa-
tion, spatial fragmentation, an emphasis on exchange values, the negation of contextual, 
iconic architectures, or branded landscapes, among others (as described above).  
In this context, by the early 1990’s India embarks on a substantial New Economic 
Programme (NEP) under Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao82, accepting enormous 
bail out packages, among others a US$ 2,5 billion by the International Monetary Fund.83 
Indonesia sees significant monetary and banking reforms in 1988 carried out by Su-
harto’s regime.84 Thereafter in 1998 the new democratic government under President 
Jusuf Habibie (Minister of technology and research, and of strategic industries under 
Suharto since 1978) embarks on a new version of liberal reforms (based on decentralisa-
tion and privatisation). 
Brazil, as well, experiences major socio economic reforms by the end of the 1980’s. 
The military regime is ripe for an ending in the framework of the macro events described 
above. The new democratic presidents, notably Fernando Collor de Mello, Tamar Franco 
and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, save the country by pushing through fundamental lib-
                                               
78 As the daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru, who was India’s fist president after the country’s independence and partition in 
1947/48, she is a member of an important political dynasty and a second generation of post-independence politician. The 
Nehru’s are an important dynasty of political leaders with a principal role in the Indian National Congress Party. 
79 Indonesia became independent in 1945. Suharto came into power in 1967. He is the country’s second leader after Su-
karno. Sukarno had followed a socially inspired nationalist model comparable to post-independent India. 
80 The power remained with the military junta from 1964 to 1989. The country became independent as early as 1889; yet, 
since then, it has not been able to find the right balance of power. Whereas the regime’s development strategy is marked by 
a strategy of import substitution, the private sector is aimed at becoming the main instrument of change. 
81 By the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s many governments worldwide faced a severe financial crisis, and 
in addition the Cold War came to an end, many embark on a massive wave of liberal policy reforms. The World Bank, the 
IMF and other Western trade and finance institutions promote these. 
82 India’s present Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, was the finance minister at the time and played a central role in imple-
menting these reforms. 
83 While the reforms (trade, banking, decentralisation, etc) are enormous by Indian standards, the country retains a signifi-
cant amount of autonomy, in contrast, for example to Eastern Europe. Its huge domestic market facilitates this. (Cf. “BRICs, 
emerging markets and the world economy”: In The Economist 20.06.2009: 60).  
84 By then it is not knowing that it is digging its own grave, as the subsequent chain of events – combination of easy credits 
with federal land permits, land speculation, New Town fewer, real estate bubble – trigger the 1997 financial crisis, which 
leads to the overthrow of the regime.  
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eral economics known as the Plano Collor, and the Plano Real. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
becomes known for his social and decentralisation programmes. 
Stakeholders and practices on the ground 
It is not only the macro framework, but also the local set up of power of control, that 
points to the emergence of our NeoTowns as elite regimes. The major stakeholders driv-
ing and controlling the process of construction of our NeoTowns on the ground range 
from public representatives to private entrepreneurs, groups of the wealthy and bountiful 
buyers, or hybrid constellations in-between. Notably, all of these belong to powerful 
social groups or are closely affiliated with them. 
Navi Mumbai is entangled in politics. Until today the project is marked by the strug-
gle of a slow, but constant, devolution of political power from federal to state and to 
local authorities. At the time of groundbreaking in particular, the parallel city across the 
Thane Creek was a direct echo of the new powers of the State. While the project is in-
creasingly marked by a rising impact of private corporate stakeholders as well as local 
Municipal Authorities, in the main it remains under the control of the state, through 
Cidco, a semi-public development authority.85 Nevertheless, the ongoing tendency of 
decentralisation is reflected by the transfer of finished nodes to Municipal Councils 
(1992), the rise of populist parties such as the Shiv Seena and the BPJ, and the renaming 
from Bombay to Mumbai (1995), as well as a gradual empowerment of village councils 
(Gran Panchayats).86  
In this context the parallel ascent of alliances and cooperation between the state and 
the corporate stakeholders in the form of Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs) and Special-
Project-Vehicles (SPVs), can be interpreted as an effort to counter the increasing loss of 
control. Here, vast new patches of urban land are increasingly withdrawn from the con-
trol of the public hand (development codes, master plans), as, for example, the thousands 
of hectares of the Special Economic Zones are controlled by ‘private’ Development 
Commissioners (DCs). 
The formation of Bumi Serpong Damai is also characterised by elite constellations. Al-
liances among big politics and the corporate sector drive the formation of the project, 
while local populations as well as the residents, remain relatively powerless. General Su-
harto in person endorses the project. He supposedly also provides the name. Yet, in con-
trast to Navi Mumbai, the corporate sector clearly drives the development on the 
ground. Whereas, initially a consortium of the ten biggest and most experienced real es-
tate developers of the country is entrusted with the implementation, the group eventually 
boils down to one agent (Sinar Mas). The development takes place in a ‘laissez faire’ en-
vironment. The Municipality in charge (Tangerang) is overwhelmed at having to control 
and supervise such a scheme (but it is placated by the flood of taxes). 
On the other hand, BSD also demonstrates that finally, local populations are gaining 
political ground. Despite 25 years of development, secured land rights and an exclusive 
mandate of development, significant numbers of ‘Project affected Populations’, villagers 
and guest workers, remain in the area. Many have endured decades of strain and dis-
crimination. With the rising size of the project, a growing public visibility and more fun-
damental rights in place, it is highly probable that their standing will invariably improve. 
                                               
85 Along with other state organisations such as it’s Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Planning Authority, the Maharashtra 
Industrial Development Corporation, or the State Industrial and Investment Corporation. 
86 Today villagers and slum representatives compose 60 percent of the Navi Mumbai Municipal Council. 
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After all, the empowerment of all citizens may become the essential prerequisite to a suc-
cessful completion of the entire project.  
Exclusive groups also dominate the situation in AlphaVille-Tamboré. The underlying 
power relations are marked by ‘informal elite regimes’ which work along a ‘nullum ius 
sine actione approach’ in combination with the practice of ‘‘Automanagement’’. In this 
context the project emerges in São Paulo’s periphery with a minimum impact of the state 
and with maximum impact of developers and residential elites.87  
Compared to Navi Mumbai and BSD, the private sector here works quite freely. Al-
phaVille is set up by the developers and maintained by the residents while, for most of 
the development process, the state’s impact remains marginal. After completion, the gov-
ernance of the neighbourhoods is then transferred, one by one, to the residents. On the 
other hand, a rising impact of big firms and joint ventures of corporate heavy weights 
can be observed. The country’s largest real estate undertakings have acquired most of 
AlphaVille-Tamboré’s enterprises. Enormous commercial projects such as the downtown 
new superblock schemes are more and more accomplished by gigantic joint ventures. 
Yet, in contrast to Navi Mumbai, as well as BSD, Public-Private collaborations remain 
insignificant. 
AlphaVille-Tamboré’s developers follow the approach of ‘nullum ius sine actione’ (no 
suitor, no judge) in combination with the strategy of ‘automanagement’. And while the 
project develops in parallel to informal land developments in the environs, the developers 
appropriate some of the informal land development strategies. Hence they act in a highly 
pragmatic way seeking to fulfil the desires of the main target groups in order to maximise 
profits, knowing the local governments are compelled to tolerate the process (as they are 
unable to enforce federal laws and regulations and as they are eager to receive taxes and 
funds). After all, it is only consequent, and also highly common, that in the context of a 
weak public, the local power is transferred to the residents. The strategy is also most 
efficient for developers. So, interestingly the developers of AlphaVille-Tamboré have in-
novated by institutionalising and mainstreaming a series of informal ‘best practices’. 
Practices of the ‘other’, such as of bottom-up land development and self-management, 
and have been shifted from the civic to the private sector, whilst the public remains out-
side. 
The above examination of stakeholders reveals that specific power groups and elite 
populations generally drive the development of our NeoTowns. It can be seen that cor-
porate developers play tend to play the most important roles and to drive the process. 
While in Navi Mumbai the state agencies still dominate the scene, the increasingly do so 
alongside of huge partnerships with corporate heavyweights. A single developer, then, 
almost exclusively controls Bumi Serpong Damai, while higher levels of government have 
actively facilitated and backed the project. Not least the nexus of private entrepreneurs 
and elite populations emerged as the main force underlying the power relations in Al-
phaVille-Tamboré. 
 Illustration E-20: NM, BSD and AV in the triangular model of civic-corporate-private 
 
Our examination of the stakeholder configurations also reveals two important com-
munalities: a) That governments at higher levels continue to play a significant role. Even 
AlphaVille would not have emerged without the comprehensive economic reforms, as 
                                               
87 Of course the liberal developmentalist approach of the military government plays an important ‘fatherly’ role, but it re-
main without any concrete personal interventions on the project. 
Three Neotowns compared   585 
well as the massive investments in infrastructure of the military government at that time; 
and b) That all the projects share a context of weak local governments (which is a main 
characteristic for the emerging peripheries of many mega-city regions). This ‘laissez faire’ 
environment then appears to constitute an important driving point for the formation of 
our NeoTowns. 
Regulations 
While the question of stakeholders represents one side of the coin when discussing the 
issue of governance and public control, the game is also controlled by a framework of 
rules and regulations. The next paragraph will therefore examine the commonalties and 
differences of the various regulatory settings in which our NeoTown ventures emerge. 
Federal level 
It was stated above that all of our planned cities emerge in a macro framework of big 
developmentalist states. While in the 1970s India was more inclined to the Socialist 
world, Indonesia and Brazil shared a predisposition to the Capitalist West.  
Navi Mumbai is spearheading many ideas as represented in the Indian Five Year 
Plans.88 89 In Indonesia Suharto’s right-wing authoritarian government is also employing 
Five Year Plans, through the national planning agency Bappenas.90 In this context BSD 
emerges during the Repelita VI91. Among the most important federal regulations is the 
Location Permit (Ijin Lokasi). While it is a significant part of the government’s ‘market 
enabling strategies’, it provides the Developer with the right to purchase and develop the 
entire land of a given project area. 
Among the central federal regulations which impact on AlphaVille, is the Federal 
Housing Finance Program (FSH) of the 1960s.92 Moreover, the country’s new democratic 
                                               
88 The third national Plan (1961-66) imposes norms for the development of urban land and housing, and also contains a 
funding package for the preparation of master plans and town planning legislation on a state level. Further, it facilitates the 
acquisition of large areas by the public. At the same time it also reflects an increasing decentralisation of planning powers 
from the national, to the state levels while the Third Plan leads to a formulation of development plans for the states, e.g. 
Maharashtra, as well as a master plan for Mumbai. In addition the fourth Plan (1967 – 1972) mandates a rational allocation 
of resources and a redistribution of industries from few urban centres towards the regions. It also recognises the need for 
housing and infrastructure in the cities. (cf. http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/welcome.html, 
r22.06.2009) 
89 Box: List of federal laws and regulations with superior impact on the Navi Mumbai and its vicinity since commencement.  
1) The Amendment of the Land Acquisition Act in 1984 dramatically changes the standing of the local land owning 
populations as it makes compensation and rehabilitation programmes mandatory; 2) The Environmental Protec-
tion Act of 1986 triggers the implementation of new coastal zone regulations in 1998 and results in the introduction 
of a 500 metre coastal protection zone in the area; 3) By 1993 the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments fore-
see the decentralisation of power to local governments. This leads to the establishment of the Navi Mumbai Mu-
nicipal Corporation in 1991 and to the empowerment of village councils; 4) In the new century, the federal SEZ 
and Township regulations, such as the 2000 SEZ regulations, the 2005 SEZ Act, the Maharashtra or the Ma-
harashtra Special Township Policy (2007), or Maharashtra’s SEZ Act (2008), etc., bring about a boom of Special 
Economic Zones and Integrated Townships, fundamentally reconfiguring Navi Mumbai’s standing as a global 
node along the World City Paradigm, and radically changing the practice of city building (urbanism) on the ground. 
The state’s Integrated Township policy, for example, supports the pooling of large amounts of land; streamlines 
the acquisition of land that is already in the public hands; excepts developers of Integrated Townships from exist-
ing land use regulations and it introduces floating FSI regulations. In addition the SEZ policies enable the SEZ’s to 
be developed by the private sector as fully-fledged real estate projects. Notably they also allow very large projects 
to withdraw from the city while the maintenance and governance of these schemes are internalised and privatised. 
90 The plans in the Indonesian context contain comprehensive state of the art analyses, projections, and broad guidelines of 
government spending. 
91 Repelita stands for Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun - Five-year economic development plan). This fourth Five Year 
Development Plan, 1984 to 1989, seeks to diversify the Indonesian economy (away from a one sided dependence on oil. It 
focuses on export oriented industrialisation, and also leads to the development of urban infrastructure 
(http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb020/is_/ai_n28809719/, r20.06.2009) 
92 This programme required municipalities to draft development plans in order to be eligible for federal loans, it also man-
dated the implementation of major housing and infrastructure projects by the private sector. The programme had a tremen-
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constitution of 198993 becomes the underlying basis for legal frameworks such as the 
Estatuto da Cidade (City Statues, 2001), the 2009 programme of Cidade Legal. 94  
Among the most significant regulations is the planned “Lei da Responsabilidade Terri-
torial Urbana” (PL 3057/2000). This law may bring major reforms for hitherto unregu-
lated land subdivisions, as it is the case in AlphaVille95. The law has the potential to be-
come an interesting reference case internationally.  
Regional and local level 
The regulatory framework described above generally affected a majority of the human 
settlements in the respective countries. A significant issue, however, which remains to be 
examined, is the relevance of local regulations. The question of master plans emerged as 
a pivotal, but not exclusive, topic in this context. Consequently it was of specific impor-
tance to examine: 1) whether master plans existed, and if yes, on which levels (regional, 
local, or private); 2) what impact they had on our projects; 3) and also whether the ex-
perience embodied by our projects has, in retrospect, affected any of the master planning 
strategies. Nevertheless, it was also significant to elaborate which other local regulations, 
such as building codes, corporate rules, or other informal contracts, were significant at 
the three projects. In this regard it was important to see what legal status our three 
NeoTowns, as well as their neighbourhoods, have in their respective Municipalities and 
also how the respective neighbourhoods are governed at a micro scale.  
Indeed, it turns out that, that on the ground, our NeoTowns are driven by a signifi-
cant amount of informal self-organisation. Yet, it also becomes evident that informality 
and self-organisation are the other aspects of regulatory frameworks, which are absent, 
or wrong, or not enforced. Consequently, it is the nexus between the official local regula-
tory framework (the planned) and of the unofficial informal self-regulation (the un-
planned), which emerges as the crucial model to understand the phenomena at hand.  
Indeed, the fact that two of our examples are not considered as towns by the law, 
points to a complex regulatory and political setting. Bumi Serpong Damai as well as Al-
phaville remain ‘stealth cities’ – albeit portraying significant morphologic and functional 
features of towns, and notwithstanding their marketing as world class international 
hubs.96 97 Bumi Serpong Damai is part of the regency of South Tangerang. The first phase 
of the project is located within the subdistrict (Kecematan) of Serpong.98 While BSD does 
                                                                                                                                         
dous, but indirect, impact on AlphaVille in three ways: 1) AlphaVille’s developers Takaoka and Albuquerque greatly bene-
fited from a flood of public projects; 2) At the same time the periphery was made more accessible by a massive investment 
in regional highway infrastructure, and 3) The inner city became more formalised and expensive and middle class residents 
opted for cheaper peripheral locations. 
93 The constitutional article 182, for example, defines a new framework for a ‘socially oriented and inclusive master plan-
ning’ along the axiom of ‘the right to the city’. 
94 The landmark legislation of Etstatudo da Cidade (Lei 10.257), enforced on July 10th 2001, stresses the social function of 
the city (including private properties) and the importance of environmental preservation. The programme, Cidade Legal, by 
the state of São Paulo, will lead to a legalisation of a major part of illegal properties in the Greater Region of São Paulo. 
95 In general the law emphasises social and environmental dimensions of urban development, aiming at a guarantee of a 
right to housing and sustainable development of human settlements, as well as universal access of public goods for all 
people. To ‘resolve’ the problem of gated communities in Brazil, the PL 3057/00, plans the introduction of a new legal 
typology, the ‚Condominio Urbanistico‘, which entrusts Municipalities with a high amount of autonomy regulating closed 
land divisions, foresees that ‘Loteamentos Fechados’ must gain approvals as horizontal condominiums, and that these ap-
provals will have to be renewed in a 5 year cycle. 
96 The population totals thousands residents and comprises a mix of regional malls, offices, universities and parks of enor-
mous economic relevance.  
97 A Google search of Serpong reveals 100 percent hits for BSD but almost none for the original town Serpong (carried out 
on June 23 2009). 
98 Until October 2008 the area was regarded as Kabupaten (principally a rural area). Thereafter the city (Kota) of South 
Tangerang (Tangerang Selatan) was spilt from Tangerang (http://wapedia.mobi/id/Kota_Tangerang_Selatan, cf. 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/01/15/tangerang-close-forming-new-city.html., r21.06.2009). 
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not have its own mayor or city government, the different phases of the project are even 
part of different districts.99 The same applies to AlphaVille-Tamboré which, as it belongs 
to two discrete municipalities, is actually divided: Whereas the larger southern part be-
longs to Baruerí, a smaller segment in the North is part of the Municipality of Santana de 
Parnaíba. AlphaVille-Tamboré’s population of 90.000 residents makes up for about a 
third of the combined residents of the Municipalities at hand. In addition the New Town 
contributed the highest amount of the local GDP. An effect of AlphaVille’s development 
was that Baruerí, as well as Santana de Parnaíba, joined the list of the richest Municipali-
ties in Brazil. 
So, of the three examples examined, Navi Mumbai is the only one with an own partial 
town status. Once completed, the nodes of the city are regularly transferred to the Navi 
Mumbai Municipal Corporation with their own municipal rights. So, in the meantime, 8 
of the 15 nodes have became politically autonomous. Though, here as well, this event 
was not programmed from the beginning – the NMMC is a relatively young organisation 
and only begun in 1991. It was born as a result of advancing decentralisation. 
An ever closer zoom-in on the ground reveals that Navi Mumbai is governed by the 
Municipality in combination with co-operative societies while Bumi Serpong Damai (of-
ficially ruled by the subdistrict governments) is unofficially run by the developers, and 
AlphaVille is informally run by autonomous Resident Associations. We also, however, 
have to note that today more and more enclaves are leaving the public framework and 
are being run by independent Development Commissioners). Nevertheless we can ob-
serve in all of the three cases that, as construction goes on, the developers – public or 
private – are generally the ones in control of the process (Cf. Above). 
Master plans 
The legal status of the projects brings us to the interesting question of master plans. In 
this context we find that while in all of the cases master plan have existed, their relevance 
for the projects is highly different. Master plans have been very central in Navi Mumbai, 
and have been formally important in BSD, but only of marginal relevance in the case of 
AlphaVille.  
Navi Mumbai is a highly integral and strategic part of the Bombay Metropolitan Re-
gional Development Authority’s master plan of 1973. Cidco as well drew up a Draft De-
velopment Plan that is closely correlated with the general planning framework. In con-
trast, in Bumi Serpong Damai, the team of the developers generated the local master plan 
in 1984, before it was integrated in to a regional planning framework of the RUTRK in 
1985 (Structure Plan for the Special Capital Province of Jakarta).100 Not least AlphaVille 
developed in the context of the Plano Urbanistico Basico (PUB) of 1969, as well as the 
São Paulo’s Plano Diretor de Desenvolvmento Integrado of 1991. While the Paulista 
NeoTown is heavily affected by both of the plans, it has not been an integral part of any 
of these.101 Notably AlphaVille-Tamboré remains without a local master plan. The local 
Municipalities, thriving on the new benefits of being central and affordable locations, do 
not have the power, the means or the interest to elaborate or to enforce local develop-
ment plans. In addition, the developers are also not interested in confronting local gov-
                                               
99 This is also a stark contrast from the Master plan at the time of foundation, which intended to install Serpong and BSD as 
a new regional anchor in the mid 1980s. 
100 The consultants were recruited from the developer’s team. 
101 The PUB had developed the idea of a polynuclear metropolis, the PDDI triggered a new demand in the peripheries, as it 
formalised the development of the inner city. 
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ernments with private spatial development frameworks (notwithstanding the fact that 
large aesthetic visions in general contradict the broad principles of the project). 
When we examine the fate of the ‘old’ master plans and look at the major prevalent 
trends today, we learn that the Mumbai experience demonstrates that while the 
MMRDA Master plan from 1973 is a very essential starting block at the beginning, it 
turns out to be too rigid to cope with the dynamic development on the ground. The first 
update of the plan occurs only 23 years after its enforcement in 1996 (and the next ver-
sion is planned for 2012). The same problem is true for Navi Mumbai’s master plan, 
while the Draft Development Document of 1973 remains the underlying planning docu-
ment today. 
On the other hand, from the early 1970s till today the city bursts at its seams. It de-
velops at unprecedented rates and grows in unexpected directions, a new service based 
economy emerges, and the urban system matures into an increasingly complex region. 
The result is a striking contrast of plan and reality. The first is oriented at ideals of a 
structured regional growth along the lines of satellite cities, also categorically negating 
the role of informality. The later represents the messy reality of megacity growth in a 
developing country. Most of the development occurs precisely outside of formal regula-
tions and plans, therefore informally. The city mushrooms as public spaces, green belts, 
natural preserves and the margins of major traffic arteries become urbanised. In short the 
actual development renders the classical (Western) planning ideas obsolete.  
The fact that Navi Mumbai’s own development plan of 1973 has not been updated till 
today, seems to confirm that the idea of an alternative satellite has been outpaced by the 
concept of a regionally integrated node. The fact that a new generation of mega projects 
is being implemented on the ground, independent of the development guidelines, seems 
to confirm this trend. 
The current generation of urban planners are embarking on a new spirit. The chain of 
experiences discussed in the respective chapters suggests that the idea of decentral con-
centration along satellite towns has expired and that new market oriented mechanisms 
are 'in'. The spirit is demonstrated, for example, by the proposal of Mumbai’s 1999 mas-
ter plan-update, as well as the draft of the 2012 plan. These documents are keen to ad-
just the planning framework to some crucial bottom-up dynamics of urban growth.102  
Mumbai’s experience is generally also valid for the Jakarta and São Paulo regions.103 
The experiences described verify how hard it is to enforce Master Plans, while the regions 
consist of competing political entities, different administrative levels and mostly compet-
ing peripheral municipalities.  
In Jakarta, as well, the dynamic development on the ground has destroyed the ideal-
ism of grand master plans and an unregulated boom of competing new town schemes 
also killed BSD’s role as a regional Town Magnet.104 On the other hand (and on another 
scale) BSD’s developers have demonstrated a greater ingenuity and resilience to handle 
their approach towards master planning. While the existence of a ‘grand’ physical plan 
                                               
102 The consciousness is represented by the acknowledgement of informal urbanisation, leading to new land use categories, 
as well as experiments with flexible market based planning tools and development guidelines. For example, a new U-2 
landuse class, addresses rapidly developing “zones in transition” in the entire region. While no formal development plan will 
be in place, the developers are encouraged to form joint ventures and to develop the necessary infrastructure in a self-
organised manner. 
103 More local examples can be found in the respective case study chapters. 
104 This role also formally became obsolete when, in the late 1990s, the Pantura model of regional growth was developed. 
This favours a linear development of the city along an East-West axis instead of a radio-concentric development with decen-
tralised nodes.  
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always remained important, the developers proved capable of adjusting their blueprints 
to the latest requirements on the ground.  
Indeed, the case of AlphaVille represents the most extraordinary and provocative con-
cept from a classical planner’s point of view. Traditional master plans are lacking. The 
project develops in a bottom-up manner along a set of principles and rules, whilst the 
developer adopts and mainstreams many strategies of the informal sector. AlphaVille 
represents a set of principles and concepts. The scale of the neighbourhoods emerges as 
the crucial modular element of the scheme. In contrast to the irregular sum of the parts 
the neighbourhood modules represent extremely controlled environments. They are 
based on a private set of rules (regulamento) and controlled by Resident Associations; 
and the enclaves portray novel typologies outside the existing land development laws. 
The fact that the developer also operates along his own set of principles, regulations and 
maxims, based on ISO norms, accounting standards, management principles etc, demon-
strates that AlphaVille represents a radical and fundamental case of private urbanism 
resulting in a unique way of non-formal urbanisation. 
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Introduction – From insights to visions 
 
We now arrive at the concluding section ‘NeoTowns’ – corporate cities’ of this research 
which explored privately developed cities from the perspective of three examples of what 
we named NeoTowns. In the main our study affirms that the urban models at hand rep-
resent a choice of paradigmatic spaces of the new economy. Hence it largely consolidates 
the hypothesis that the NeoTowns examined can be regarded as a new category of 
planned cities. NeoTowns. What general conclusions for the ‘production’ of contempo-
rary space can be drawn from the description of the above three cases, and which re-
search implications for further research can be developed?’ 
This section is structured in two major parts. First an executive summary of the major 
findings of the previous chapter is presented. The second part opens the door for the fu-
ture. We present perspectives for the scientific and practical knowledge generated by out-
lining a research agenda as well as presenting a list of innovations. 
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Synopsis –  
Cities of Demand 
"Architecture used to be driven by religion. Now it's driven by capitalism. 
That's what we believe. So there you are." (Herbert Muschamp)1 
 
The following section provides a synopsis of the previous chapter which assessed our 
findings on the three cases of Bumi Serpomg Damai (Jakarta), Navi Mumbai (Mumbai), 
AlphaVille-Tamboré (São Paulo). The structure applied represents the multi-perspective 
approach used throughout this work. 
 
Context – Nodes in the periphery 
National: Postcolonial quest of identity 
The settings in which we find the origins of our three New Towns are characterised by 
postcolonial nations struggling to define an own identity. While today, all of these coun-
tries have democratic parliamentary systems in place, the start-up phase of our examples 
was characterised by strong, central, and developmentalist governments. Autarchic re-
gimes dominated Indonesia and Brazil, whereas a democratic, but strong centrally ori-
ented government sought to steer the development of the Indian subcontinent. A com-
monality is that, in any case, politicians understanding themselves as enlightened elites, 
aim to lead the modernisation of their respective countries. And indeed, our New Town 
examples can be regarded as essential model projects in this regard.  
Regardless of this common pursuit towards emancipation and privately driven mod-
ernisation, the three countries demonstrate differing levels of development. The demo-
graphic, social, and economic facts portrays India as the least developed country; Indone-
sia ranges in the middle; and Brazil appears as the most developed of the three nations. 
While all share a powerful course of development towards a consumer oriented and ser-
vice based economy (and society), all cases also demonstrate a strong inclination to in-
creasing inequalities, gaps and disparities, pointing to worrying scenarios of inequality 
and stagnation.  
Urban: Central nodes of expanded risk 
Data on a regional scale demonstrates that the three NeoTown projects surface in the 
dynamic peripheries of post-industrial mega-city regions, as the most dynamic places of 
contemporary change, development and modernisation. The respective mother cities are 
among the top-ten megacity metropolises in the world, with a long legacy as nodes and 
interfaces between the national and global scales. Nevertheless, the locations entail high-
risk environments: severe socio-economic problems, massive urban poverty, informality, 
inequality, socio-spatial fragmentation, crime, environmental problems, etc. Notably, the 
                                               
1 Remark at the Cornell College's 125th anniversary symposium: 
http://www.news.cornell.edu/Chronicle/96/10.10.96/aap_anniv.html 
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dynamics of growth and development experienced, overburden the system to develop a 
sufficient amount of infrastructure and housing. Hence the fact that Mumbai, Jakarta, 
and São Paulo are environments of expanded risks is certainly among the main reasons 
why real estate developers come up with new ‘solutions’ and why populations that are 
able to afford it, opt to move to New Towns in the peripheries, as ‘pacified’ and con-
trolled environments.  
After all, the stage of the emergence NeoTowns is defined by a series of common so-
cial, economic and spatial trends. This is largely characterised by the transition from an 
industrial to a service based economy. In this context in the last 30 years all these places 
have undergone an enormous process of spatial reconfiguration and decentralisation re-
sulting in polarised and fragmented urban fabrics and multiplex urban regions. An im-
portant phenomenon observed was an ongoing process of clustering and concentration of 
prime businesses and affluent populations in particular sectors of wealth. Essentially in 
this post-industrial urban context, urban peripheries come into view as the most dynamic 
places of contemporary change, development and modernisation. Additional inquiry of 
local predecessors and peers demonstrates that Bumi Serpong Damai, Navi Mumbai and 
AlphaVille are deeply entrenched in a tradition of local and global predecessors. 
Form – Organic clusters 
Far from classical satellite cities in the green, Bumi Serpong Damai, Navi Mumbai, as 
well as AlphaVille, emerge as modern regional nodes. These are embedded in compre-
hensive infrastructure networks and close to modern terminals, thus reinforcing multi-
plex patterns of regional urbanisation.  
Nonetheless, the three schemes are also individually of enormous significance. Navi 
Mumbai represents one of the largest planned cities worldwide, Bumi Serpong Damai is 
among the biggest New Towns planned and implemented by a single developer, and Al-
phaVille stands out as an epitome of private urbanisation as a bottom-up process which 
is based purely on market logic. Moreover all three cases represent enormously different 
sizes. Even AlphaVille is huge at 40 percent of Paris. An important structural commonal-
ity of all three examples is their modular and hierarchical organisation. While Navi 
Mumbai represents a large grid-like open system, Bumi Serpong Damai, as well as Al-
phaVille, reveal the increasing relevance of highly controlled neighbourhood modules. 
Notably, all three cases stand out for their exceptional standards. Each surpasses the 
levels of the surrounding environments by far. 
From a functional, as well as from a cultural point of view, all examples deserve to be 
called urban. This is because in all of the locations the agglomeration of various 
neighbourhoods, infrastructures and services result at higher levels of complexity (that is, 
are more than the sum of the parts).  
Indeed, the arrangement of AlphaVille, as well as that of the new parts of BSD’s phase 
II, resemble a quasi-organic cellular structure. Here, as much as in a leaf, or a bunch of 
grapes, neighbourhood modules are served by a central access spine. Interestingly, we 
find an order here, which fully complies with modularity, hierarchy and self-similarity, 
the criteria of self-organised complexity  (cf. Batty 1994). 
Stagnation represents the major problems on the ground. Yet, given the prospects of 
the ongoing growth and expansion of all of the mother cities, it can be predicted that 
sooner or later all the projects will be completed. Navi Mumbai had stagnated for dec-
ades and only started to thrive in the last decade with the advent of private investments 
and the services sector. Bumi Serpong Damai displays the greatest contrast between plan 
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and reality as it was heavily exposed to financial crises and political twists. In contrast 
AlphaVille is the only case that displays a history of 35 years of uninterrupted boom and 
success.  
The surroundings of all cases demonstrate that NeoTowns emerge as integral parts of 
a rapidly urbanising (and highly fragmented) peripheral urban fabric. This demonstrates 
the difficulty of developing a contemporary new town on a tabula rasa Greenfield site. 
Indeed, significant numbers of onsite villages (and onsite populations) account for a 
problematic experience mainly in Mumbai and BSD. Slums surround AlphaVille. It is 
noteworthy that the privately dominated cases (BSD and AlphaVille) in particular, totally 
lack significant cultural facilities, public spaces and institutions of higher cultural value. 
While NeoTowns emerge along a hierarchical and modular model, the neighbour-
hoods (residential and commercial) in all three cases clearly embrace the fundamental 
elements of the structure. Novel forms of enclaves are generally characterised by a high 
perimeter fence, one exclusive entrance and a highly controlled homogeneous interior. 
The semi-private space of the neighbourhood re-introduces a new spatial hierarchy be-
tween the poles of the private and the public. The gates emerge as pivotal functional and 
symbolic elements. The main observation is that the larger scale of the Town represents 
an urban mix and complexity; however, at the same time the scale of the neighbourhoods 
is composed of self-similar clusters of uniform and homogeneous neighbourhood mod-
ules. The neighbourhoods are so regulated that no other land uses or building typologies 
are permitted. 
The three NeoTowns feature an enormous number of completed dwellings which 
stand out for their high quality at a comparatively low price. The typological spectrum 
varies among the three examples. Whereas Navi Mumbai mainly represents walk-up and 
high-rises the single-family villa is the basic element in BSD and AlphaVille. BSD first 
stands out with its thematic turnkey typologies and individually constructed and de-
signed residences are the basic modules of AlphaVille. The other popular housing typol-
ogy is the residential high-rise tower.  
Significantly, local characteristics, as well as the cultural meaning, tend to vary on the 
ground. An important contrast to gated communities in the West is that most of the 
neighbourhoods of our NeoTowns feature exceptional densities. The Indonesian ten-
dency of clustered enclaves, arranged along an onion-like structure from public to pri-
vate, or AlphaVille’s ‘portaria criteriosa’, a gated typology with distinct entrances for 
residents, guests and deliveries, are two examples of home-grown species. In addition, the 
significance of fencing varies from places to place, and while the Brazilian enclaves are 
sacred and impenetrable, vendors and school children may find access in most of BSD’s 
neighbourhoods. Not least among BSD’s main problems are high vacancy rates. In some 
of the neighbourhoods the visitor finds himself surrounded by grazing goatherds and 
landscapes of compartment walls instead of the expected suburban garden-city environs. 
In addition Navi Mumbai, as well as BSD, stand out for various innovative low-income 
schemes. 
A general tendency in all three cases points to an increasing size of developable areas, 
as well as to an extension of private boundaries. At the same time the number of building 
typologies is diminishing. The villa and the residential high-rise tower emerge as the two 
most prominent forms of housing, and their polarity dominates the respective urban fab-
rics.  
Among the most recent trends are a boom in gated communities, novel forms of Spe-
cial Economic Zones, as well as Integrated Township typologies in Navi Mumbai. Holis-
tically developed and ‘monolithic’ turn-key neighbourhoods as well as ever larger super-
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block schemes of an Asian flavour are found in AlphaVille’s downtown area, and we find 
the introduction of the above mentioned clustered typologies, as well as regional malls 
and theme parks in BSD. Despite the fact that Western urban models become wide-
spread, a significant adaptation and hybridisation takes place on the ground. Hence “In-
dia, Indonesia, Brazil is all written over it.” 
Population – Houses of comfort 
Middle classes principally compose the populations of our NeoTowns. Notably these 
new societal segments are surging forward in the respective countries and embark on 
consumerist life-styles. In contrast to many of the Western post WW2 New Towns, most 
of the residents are working in the white-collar sector. As a consequence they seek to 
carve out, secure, as well as inherit, individual spaces of life and representation. Indeed, 
these NeoTowns can be seen as environments which are streamlined to these functions.  
Among the examples, AlphaVille stands out as the most successful example of job 
generation. It has twice as many jobs as residents. At the same time the number of jobs in 
Navi Mumbai serves half of the population. However, with a population to jobs ratio of 
less than 20 percent BSD stands out as a problem. Nevertheless, the high profile of the 
residents, as well as the quality of the businesses transforms these NeoTowns into impor-
tant economic powerhouses of the regions. 
Notably, an integral element of NeoTowns in the South is the existence of ‘unplanned 
populations’ and informal jobs. Indeed, these are rarely discussed nor do they appear in 
the statistics. Nevertheless, in Navi Mumbai and in BSD, village populations as well as 
new migrants, make up between 30 and 50 percent of the inhabitants. We can also esti-
mate that in all of the cases low-key services make up for more than a third of all jobs. 
Significant trends visible in all three NeoTowns represent a departure from the mod-
ernistic ideal of an open city, towards systems based on bottom-up demand, individuali-
sation, and profitability. A (neoliberal) blending of the freedom of choice by the con-
sumer, as well as the commercial logic of the market, produces trends of self-segregation 
and results in homogeneous neighbourhoods.  
The 30 to 40 year history of the places allows the observation of substantial contra-
dictions between early intentions and the development on the ground. This is true in par-
ticular of the older nodes of Navi Mumbai and BSD, as places that were initially driven 
by the principles of top-down modernist planning and an open society. The most promi-
nent phenomena in this context is the emergence of new centres at the most accessible 
locations, as well as many cases of voluntary self-segregation and clustering along the 
lines of ethnicity and income. All three NeoTowns share these common trends resulting 
in a highly fragmented urban fabric that is composed of greatly homogenised groups 
(neighbourhoods) – reflecting an increasingly complex and polarised postmodern society 
at large. The criterion of income seems to emerge as the major driving force behind the 
trends described above. 
Stark contrasts also exist between the planned profile of the target populations and 
the current trends on the ground. Navi Mumbai features the greatest mix, as well as the 
greatest share of lower income residents. Bumi Serpong Damai also displays a notable 
variation of income segments. Nevertheless, the current trends in all three projects point 
to a focus on middle income and high-income populations. The question of creditability 
and a regularly formal income emerges as an important benchmark to be reached. 
While the three NeoTowns apparently represent the cradles of booming bourgeois 
communities in the respective countries, an overarching set of motives was identified. 
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The four central motives driving households to move to NeoTowns are: 1) security, 2) 
life-style, 3) investment, and 4) decongestion (quality of life). Only the prioritisation of 
these factors varies from place to place. An additional fundamental motive is the desire 
to acquire a spatial framework for the appropriation and preservation of material and 
ideal values, and after that to guarantee their tradition to the next generation. NeoTowns 
thus emerge as a hybrid mixture of consumerist ethics and traditional values – a third 
alternative that is neither urban nor rural. They are not solely focused on the new, flick-
ering, and the fashionable, 
However, the new environments bring about new and unanticipated problems. In 
many instances the extremely controlled milieus have triggered unwanted internal effects. 
For example displays such as high levels of car accidents in the interior of the neighbour-
hoods, as well as increased levels of drug abuse and youth criminality have been reported 
from AlphaVille. 
Planned cities are not only composed of individuals. The emergence of societal and 
political groupings is an important pillar on which the success or failure of the NeoTown 
examples rest. In our context Navi Mumbai, as well as AlphaVille, both show success-
cases of bottom up-self organisation, while BSD lags behind. Co-operative Societies drive 
the process in the Indian case, and Resident Associations in the Brazilian example. The 
developers have actively promoted both of these. 
Developers – Cities of demand 
Entrepreneurs and developers emerge as the main driving forces of the production of 
NeoTowns. The strategy of market driven development unites them. They excel by hav-
ing transferred this approach from the world of commodities to the real estate sector. 
Indeed, this is one of the most crucial innovations achieved. Significantly the approach 
focuses on processes instead of products. Moreover it brings along the overarching trends 
of standardisation, modularisation and diversification to the urban fabric. Several of the 
urban phenomena observed within this work indicate an increased impact of these trends 
on contemporary urban space. 
In our case, the thee organisations driving the respective processes have experienced 
different beginnings. Navi Mumbai was driven by a semi-public development authority 
(Cidco), Bumi Serpong Damai was a joint venture of some of the largest of Indonesia’s 
industrial conglomerates, and AlphaVille originated as a middle class business. Neverthe-
less, all developers shared a specific entrepreneurial logic. This can be regarded as one of 
the main factors underlying the flexibility and resilience of the undertakings. All have 
survived significant social, economic, political, as well as cultural shifts in the last dec-
ades. In the context of this change the character of Navi Mumbai’s developer Cidco 
changed from that of a public housing agency to a private developer. In addition, the 
consortium developing BSD has undergone several reconfigurations and became the sub-
sidiary of an industrial corporation (Sinar Mas). At the same time AlphaVille became 
part of one of the largest Brazilian real estate conglomerates. 
Whereas the initial ideologies of the projects varied between collectivist dreams and 
individual utopias, today’s NeoTowns emerge as liberalist versions of Arcadia driven by 
a dual ideology of the happy individual and the free market. Notably, Navi Mumbai and 
Bumi Serpong Damai were set up as landmark projects of national relevance aiming at a 
modernisation of society. Here governments played an important role in initiating the 
processes, setting ambitious social goals. AlphaVille, in contrast was a bottom-up entre-
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preneurial undertaking from the beginning aiming at coming up with the highest quality 
at the lowest price to fulfil the dreams of its target populations.  
Nevertheless a strong ideological moment is shared by all of the ventures. Even their 
names suggest that they all embody the promise of an alternate society: Navi Mumbai 
(the new Mumbai), Bumi Serpong Damai (peaceful land), AlphaVille (the AlphaCity). 
One notable result is that all three cities have sought to emerge as slum free environ-
ments. The developers share the vision of representing a benevolent power that drives 
forward the modernisation of society in the respective contexts. Navi Mumbai’s devel-
oper acts in the role of the extended hand of the state, in BSD he represents the enlight-
ened patron who, in partnership with the state, knows how to guide society in a new 
modern era, while in AlphaVille he is an exceptional model entrepreneur guided by excel-
lence, intuition and the invisible hand of the market. 
Yet only Navi Mumbai appears as the ‘City of social visions’ combining a modernistic 
and social approach. Bumi Serpong Damai’s and AlphaVille’s ideological moment is 
driven by the dream of comfortable, peaceful and highly controlled environments, as well 
as by the belief in individual happiness and the supremacy of the market.2  
Implementation 
Common strategies dominate the process of implementation. All projects share four cru-
cial elements: 1) a secured access to land, 2) the objective of a balanced land use, 3) a 
strategy of phased development (in time and in space), and 4) the application of modern 
corporate management mechanisms. What varies, on the other hand, is the approach 
concerning master planning: Navi Mumbai and Bumi Serpong Damai rely on spatial de-
velopment plans, while AlphaVille follows a process-based approach based on rules and 
codes. 
Furthermore, our NeoTowns also represent an increasing impact of international 
business quality standards, and corporate management norms in the production (and 
appearance) of contemporary urban environments. AlphaVille Urbanismo, BSD PT, and 
also Cidco, have been pioneering the application of professional business-, financial-, 
quality management- and environmental codes to the real estate sector in their respective 
countries. Norms such as the ISO 9000 as well as the ISO 14000 represent a focus on 
processes of production as opposed to the final product and, in addition, they put the 
customer in the centre of the process. They are significant for driving the process of stan-
dardisation and modularisation, and the abandonment of custom tailored design. 
Role of marketing 
NeoTowns are fundamentally based on the experience of consumerism. As much as the 
postmodern consumer is, because he buys, a NeoTown is only a NeoTown as it is con-
stantly marketed and sold. In this context marketing emerges as one core discipline of 
private urbanism. It also emerges as a crucial interface mediating between processes of 
production and consumption, and catering for a collective individualisation. The 
NeoTowns examined in this work very clearly illustrate these trends. Developers seek to 
achieve a life-long brand loyalty instead of the purchase of just one product. Marketing 
departments become a mix of intelligence agency, research institute and event office.  
In Navi Mumbai marketing became prominent with the advent of massive privatisa-
tion: Cidco, the developer, recently stands out for the employment of worldwide market-
ing campaigns, and its Customer Relationship Management (CRM) strategy. At the same 
                                               
2 Interestingly the first aspect dominates the urban spaces of BSD, while the second becomes best visible in AlphaVille. 
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time BSD’s developer is remarkable for bringing forward demand inducing strategies as 
well as the triple tactic of theming, life-style branding, and festivalisation. AlphaVille’s 
authors are distinguished by advanced strategies of eco-theming geared at the sophisti-
cated urban buyer, as well as by the introduction of Social Corporate Responsibility 
(CSR) tactics to the real estate sector. 
The examination of the dynamics of the developers of our NeoTowns brings some 
outstanding trends to the fore: As the real estate sector, including the developers of the 
projects examined, becomes increasingly integrated in the operational dynamics of a lar-
ger corporate sector, growth, consolidation, effectiveness and diversification emerge as 
the dominant tendencies of the time. 
Outstanding innovations and problems 
All of the three developers have brought forward a series of innovative and outstanding 
strategies. The authors of Navi Mumbai applied bright strategies of social redistribution 
of profits (differential land pricing); BSD as well as AlphaVille emerge as the forerunners 
in the development and application of ‘market driven strategic planning’. While each of 
the projects also displays many contradictions and mistakes, most of the undertakings 
also shine by presenting steep learning curves.  
The negation of the social, as well as of the natural environment, emerges as an out-
standing problem/contradiction of the privately driven projects. In particular, in the early 
stages, environmental pollution and social injustice was ‘the norm’. In many instances 
large populations were evicted and a huge amount of natural assets were also destroyed. 
On the other hand the projects demonstrate an enormous capability of transformation 
and progress for the better. In this context the developers of Navi Mumbai stand out for 
their handling of the Project Affected Populations. At the same time AlphaVille’s devel-
opers are jumping forward with exceptional environmental solutions. 
Designers – Abstract localisation and ‘Imagineering’ 
In the context of privately driven urbanisation the practices of ‘abstract localisation’ and 
‘imagineering’ emerge as the most important tactics of spatial design.  
Abstract localisation stands for the practice (and desire) to neutralise the existing con-
text. Imagineering stands for the essential capacity to generate a new distinctive profile 
by elements such as iconic architecture, a combination of thematic landscapes and also 
by the introduction of new types of super monuments. In other words, it stands for the 
need to create a meticulously orchestrated setting in environments which more and more 
resemble media events, and which are increasingly driven by their marketability. In this 
context ‘imagineering’ refers to a set of design practices which is related to the require-
ment to develop abstracted typologies on the one hand, and to cope with imagination, 
dreams, constructed life-styles and potentialities on the other. Notably, the actual as-
signment is not geared at a final form but at the generation of processes, e.g. open life 
styles and their representations. 
While the ‘space making’ professions remain central stakeholders in the production of 
cities, the privatisation and the corporatisation of urban development imply fundamental 
changes of strategies and stakeholder configurations. Planners and architects acquire new 
roles and the practices and strategies of planning and design undergo radical reconfigura-
tions.  
Whereas in the heydays of Keynesianism, architects and planners (as well as engineers) 
accounted for the heroic masterminds of the modernisation process, the new situation 
brings about a need for a greater integration into the system. The role of the planner 
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changes from a hero to a team player and partner. In addition, the need to develop ab-
stract modules, branded typologies and representational envelopes supersedes the func-
tionalist and contextualist design approach of the modernist era. The application of ge-
neric symbols and codes replaces a work along aesthetic ideals, or local narratives. 
Our cases demonstrate that advancing corporatisation brings along a shift in the or-
ganisational structures among developers on one hand and designers and planners on the 
other. This is represented by the growing relevance of ever larger national and interna-
tional consultancies: Hafeez Constructor, Jurong, or McClier in Navi Mumbai; Doxiadis, 
SOM, EDAW or Portman Associates in Bumi Serpong Damai, or Arquitectonica and 
Königsberger Vannucchi in the AlphaVille area. 
Designer’s visions 
As far as designer’s and planner’s visions are concerned, all of the examples are based on 
a radical departure from the traditional as well as a stark negation of the existing and on 
the quest for excellence. Albeit, we uncover quite different strategies to achieve these 
goals: The designers of Navi Mumbai dreamed about a ‘grand vision’ of a twin city on 
the sea, Bumi Serpong Damai’ planners sought to shape an indigenous Indonesian New 
Town Typology, while AlphaVille’ designers wished to create landmark neighbourhoods 
of a hitherto unknown quality in Brazil. 
While Bumi Serpong Damai as well as AlphaVille clearly represent the vision of pro-
ducing alternate artificial environments, Navi Mumbai’s initial design approach is con-
textual and place based. The plan for a twin-city on the sea essentially portrays a holistic 
and integrated future scenario for the whole region. It marries the disciplines of planning 
and urban design. 
Indeed, Mumbai’s parallel city and São Paulo’s private NeoTown emerge as systemic 
antipodes. The first departs from a belief in higher collective values, the power of aesthet-
ics in the cultural value of architecture, the social relevance of place and the communal 
nature of basic resources, etc. The later is based on individualist ideals of subjective rep-
resentation, the relevance of strategic locations, the productivity of standardisation and 
the efficiency of the market in allocating resources and structuring terrain. (It delivers a 
built-in capability of flexibility and instantaneous optimisation in rapidly changing envi-
ronments in a context that is struggling to re-define questions of collective values.) The 
case of Bumi Serpong Damai then makes clear that a dream of a collectivist future can 
turn out to be shaky and uncertain. The scheme started with a real world scenario of 
social mix and modernist new town design, which was then rapidly taken over by market 
based rationales. 
Theming and branding 
The environments of our NeoTowns represent urban and cultural context, which be-
came too complex to be based on local congruity alone. In this situation designers are 
bound to engage in a (pro) active generation of identity. While imagineering emerges as a 
central method, the strategies of theming and branding are two of its most important 
elements. 
The urban landscapes of our examples portray an eclectic mix of styles and rapidly 
changing fashions. Visual and representational values of spaces are emphasised, iconic 
landmark shapes, themed worlds, super monuments, and a symbolic architecture are 
booming. In this context the tactics of theming and branding, adapted from the media 
and advertising industries, emerge into the state-of-the-art architectural and design 
strategies. Architect and designers are asked to develop successful and efficient typologies 
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and brands, based on a modular and replicable design rather than to design customised 
solutions.3 The abstract typologies must then be valorised. Notably this occurs by the 
means of theming and branding strategies, introducing distinct life styles and identities 
upon demand.  
The star of landscaping 
Despite the fact that a rupture with the local environment, emerges as one major charac-
teristic of the new planning a design approach, landscaping comes forward as one of the 
most prominent disciplines. It becomes is the master discipline, which controls the con-
struction of new artificial terrains and topographies. Moreover it has the specific role of 
localising (implementing) the abstract typologies and forms.  
Design 
The strategies and concepts as discussed above demonstrate that design remains a highly 
important ingredient in private urbanism. This indeed contrasts with the common as-
sumption that urban development led by the private sector is bound to produce chaos 
and fragmentation. While the role of design is highly different today to that of 30 years 
ago, the quality of architecture, public spaces, state-of-the art infrastructure and services, 
remains an important feature. This observation seems to be valid in particular in the con-
texts of advanced maturation, consolidation and increased competition. Our cases have 
demonstrated this by presenting various efforts of spatial upgrading, pedestrianisation 
and the installation of public parks. We see that private urban development is capable, 
and inclined to of produce an urban ‘Gestalt’ of a higher aesthetic order. Even an aspect 
of subversion comes in here, as in the highly controlled monolithic environments design 
is needed more than before. 
The context described above makes it clear that contemporary designers and planners 
need to draw on a new set of talents. The requirements posed by the trends of standardi-
sation and modularisation on one hand, and the need to generate artificial identities on 
the other, ask for the capabilities of process managers, product designers, stage designers, 
event managers, ecologists and team players.  
Finance – Landscapes of opportunity 
At the same time that capital is at the core of market-based systems, finance emerges as 
one of the key ingredients of corporate urbanism. Our examination demonstrates that its 
expanding impact reinforces the existing tendencies of growth, standardisation and di-
versification and derivatives of money facilitate the penetration of ever increasing mar-
kets. The tapping of remote financial pools also brings a greater security of investments. 
On the other hand integration in a global space of financial flows also brings about new 
risks involving increasing complexity and decreasing transparency. 
Indeed, the NeoTown experiences examined appear to be more successful than their 
publicly driven ancestors. In contrast to many New Towns and satellite cities of the post-
World WarII era, the cases of Navi Mumbai, BSD, and AlphaVille stand out for their 
resilience and adaptability, a continuous (re-) investment in infrastructure, and the capac-
ity to attract the right urban blend. Likewise the profitability levels achieved by most of 
the projects generally surpass most of the local benchmarks.  
AlphaVille and Navi Mumbai present a successful example and embarked on decen-
tralised structures of bottom-up finance and ‘automanagement’ to cover the extra cost 
                                               
3 Extreme cases and irregularities are outsourced to social, technical, and legal experts and other consultants. 
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related to the exceptional standards. In contrast, BSD’s history of struggle of survival 
highlights that private development is not a free ticket to success, but that it depends on 
the right setting of a successful combination of other factors (such as the greater political 
and economic context, the right regulatory framework and good management with the 
right strategy).  
Navi Mumbai teaches us an alternative lesson of a market oriented not-for profit 
scheme and interesting strategies of social redistribution. It is this example which has 
managed to produce the largest amount of lower income schemes, and the one that came 
up with the most interesting social innovations. The developing agency Cidco has im-
pressively demonstrated that it is possible to cross-subside development by a method of 
differential land pricing mechanisms. 
In any case, we can see that private urbanism depends largely on revenues and profits. 
Our examples confirm that it structurally fails to provide housing to no-income popula-
tions, unless the public compels it. Yet even here, the success stories appear moderate. 
Unfortunately Navi Mumbai’s innovative schemes were depended largely on external 
subsidies and were thus restricted to specific periods. Since the privatisation and liberali-
sation boom of the early 1990s the developer has failed to keep up providing a signifi-
cant number of low-income schemes. On the other side of the Indian Ocean the drive to 
profit maximisation resulted in BSD’s sub-standard ‘nano schemes’ at remote locations, 
while older integrated schemes have been phased out. 
The price of privatisation and profit orientation seems to be exclusiveness and segre-
gation. The dominant share of middle class populations in all of the projects underlines 
this general inclination and is best represented by AlphaVille. Even in the socially ori-
ented project of Navi Mumbai middle classes dominate the scene, making up 75 percent 
of the population. Only today a tendency to broaden the ‘services’ towards lower middle 
classes can be observed. The underlying reason for this development is an improved ac-
cess to consumer credit for the masses of lower income populations (as well as a consoli-
dation of the middle income markets). 
The examples examined demonstrate the importance of indirect subsidies. They 
thrived when the macroeconomic and political environment was highly favourable for 
private sector development. In this context a large amount of the external infrastructure 
was co-financed by federal banks and international credit institutions.  
On the other hand direct government incentives and financial subsidies appear more 
questionable. BSD is the project which was nurtured by enormous public grants. At the 
same time it displays most of the problems. The question arises whether the subsidies 
have produced distorted conditions of monopolised land markets and sponsored elite 
populations, and whether general vulnerability regarding future irregularities and crises, 
was negatively effected.  
In the case of our examples direct foreign investments tend to play a minor role. On 
the other hand various forms of national and international joint venture operations are 
booming. In addition, the NeoTown ventures progressively represent investment targets 
of large corporations, which started to diversify into the real estate sector (from Reliance 
in Navi Mumbai, to Sinar Mas in BSD, to Gafisa and Brascan in AlphaVille and Tam-
boré).  
The fiscal landscape of our examples is dominated more and more by the effects of an 
increasing diversification of products and the internationalisation of investments, as well 
as the deregulation of markets. In this context the undertakings at hand are seeking to 
increase investments and reduce risks, to tap international expertise and additional mar-
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kets. Nowadays everybody can buy a piece of AlphaVille-Tamboré, BSD or Navi Mum-
bai’s SEZ by obtaining one of the financial derivatives of the undertakings. 
The increased exposure to international finance leads to significant impacts on the 
ground. Urban space is moulded more-and-more by a synchronising logic of interna-
tional codes and regulations, mainly in relation to credit and accountability standards. 
The codes and rules of financial business seem to reconfirm and enhance most of the 
trends which drive private urban development. The collective of remote investors expects 
even more accountability as well as planability of returns. As a result, the trends of 
growth and diversification, as well as standardisation, are reinforced and driven while 
the production of cities is closely interlinked (and dependent) on volatility of worldwide 
economic cycles. 
Control – Power compounds 
NeoTowns are usually controlled by distinct elite groups. The cases being looked at rep-
resent urban forms and typologies which are radically different from the official legal 
status quo. Many instances include informal strategies and typologies. However, despite 
all the offbeat, neoliberal, and informal qualities, public stakeholders and regulations 
continue to play a crucial role in the process. Our examination demonstrates that the 
state remains a crucial element of power and control, defining a vital framework and 
enabling the current system. 
Macro level 
In general the examples of planned cities, as discussed in this work, come about in a con-
text of two greater processes: 1) The macro economic framework is defined by the dra-
matic shift from the Keynesian welfare state to a new-economic thinking which has 
dominated a worldwide scale in the last 35 years; 2) At the same time, the underlying 
political context is determined by an impressive transformation from centralist and elite 
driven systems of control to decentralised and democratised power geographies. (After 
all, both trends are effective in the postcolonial settings of the respective nations.)  Nota-
bly the above described processes are marked by two fundamental watersheds, firstly the 
events around the oil crisis and the deregulation of the world financial system in the early 
1970s, and secondly the effects of the end of the Cold War by the beginning of the 
1990s.  
Indeed, the histories of our projects are divided in two major phases along these mile-
stones which have fundamentally changed the face of our projects. Our planned cities 
emerged in the 1970s and early 1980s in relatively young nation states which had all 
embarked on a centrally driven developmentalist approach of modernisation. Thus, in 
their early stages, Navi Mumbai (1971), AlphaVille (1973) and also Bumi Serpong 
Damai (1984), served as pioneering laboratories of an elite driven modernisation, testing 
the dynamism of market based instruments. The new wave liberal and democratic re-
forms of the early 1990s represent a fundamental watershed. The interconnected break-
through of private urban development changes the face of the projects at unforeseen di-
mensions.4 
                                               
4 The 30-year process of neoliberalisation described above can also be circumscribed by a balance between the public, the 
private and the civil spheres which is shifting towards the private sector. The NeoTown examples remain dominated by the 
private part. The role of the civil-society is rather passive. 
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Stakeholders 
At the same time the change was highly biased, ideological and political, as it was domi-
nated by powerful societal elites. Indeed our three cases demonstrate in an exemplary 
way that particular interest groups, made up by public representatives, private entrepre-
neurs, groups of the wealthy and bountiful buyers, or hybrid constellations in-between, 
control the processes on the ground. While civil society in general, and the locally af-
fected populations in particular, tended to lag behind, the state maintains an ambiguous 
role as on the one hand it defines the rules and, on the other hand, also acts as a major 
stakeholder. 
Our three cases are strongly entangled in alliances and conflicts among distinct elites. 
Navi Mumbai is dominated by the public sector along strategic alliances with the corpo-
rate world.5 Bumi Serpong Damai displays a power geography that largely leans towards 
the public-private nexus. In contrast to Navi Mumbai, here the corporate sector domi-
nates the scene while distinguished government elites serve as strategic partners.6 The 
situation in AlphaVille-Tamboré is clearly dominated by a strong political bond between 
the developers and the new landowners, which is represented by the system of ‘Auto-
management’.7  
Notably, what the stakeholder configurations and power geographies of all the pro-
jects have in common is: a) the essential importance of governments at higher levels 
(states and federal levels), and b) a context of weak local governments.8 This combina-
tion of public elites and a local ‘laissez faire’ environment, then, appears to constitute a 
significant variable for the formation of our NeoTowns. 
Regulations 
In addition to the political geography of stakeholders, rules and regulations represent an 
important setting, which controls the organisation of societies in general, and also our 
NeoTowns in particular. We have seen that all of our planned cities emerge in a macro 
framework of strong developmentalist states. Navi Mumbai, for example, spearheaded 
many ideas as represented in the third and fourth Indian Five Year Plans, which, by the 
end of the 1960s was asking for increasing public intervention in urban development. 
Likewise, federal laws and regulations, such as the Amendment of the Land Acquisition 
Act (1984), or the 73th and 74th Constitutional Amendments of 1993, have had a pro-
found impact on the project and its vicinity. BSD emerged in the context of an Indone-
sian liberalist version of such plans (Repelita), and thrives on federal regulations such as 
the Location Permit (Ijin Lokasi). AlphaVille’s developers were nurtured by the benefits 
of new Federal Finance Programmes geared to the development of housing and infra-
structure. At the same time today the project is essentially confronted with various regu-
lations originating with the new democratic constitution of 1988, such as the “Estatuto 
da Cidade” of 2001, or the planned “Lei da Responsabilidade Territorial Urbana” (PL 
3057/2000). 
                                               
5 The context is marked by the struggles of a slow, but constant, devolution of political powers from federal, to state to local 
authorities. Hence a constant friction exists with municipal governments, village councils and populist parties. 
6 While the project emerged in a context of weak regulations and powerless local governments, today the supremacy of the 
corporate landlords is challenged as daily protests are on the rise and the affected on-site populations gain political ground. 
7 The public sphere stays largely outside: While huge the developers have innovated in adopting and mainstreaming signifi-
cant ‘best practices’ of informal urbanisation. 
8 Indeed presumably a main characteristic for the emerging peripheries of many emerging mega-city regions. 
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When examining the local level it became evident that our NeoTowns thrive in a ‘lais-
sez faire’ context and develop a significant amount of informal regulations.9 The fact 
that 2 out of 3 of our cities do not have official town status, instances of private codes of 
the resident associations, examples of novel neighbourhood typologies which do not exist 
in common law, or cases of exclusive operations by developers and governments (such as 
land permits, or new SEZ laws), all have in common that they differ from the ‘orthodox’ 
public domain. Consequently, some of the cases, such as Bumi Serpong Damai and Al-
phaVille, represent stealth cities – albeit these portray the significant morphologic and 
functional features of towns notwithstanding the fact that they are marketed as world-
class international cities. 
Finally, the three NeoTown examples represent a highly stimulating experience with 
Master plans. While the relevance of master plans for each of the projects has been very 
different, most of the lessons and experiences encountered, point to similar conclusions.  
Master plans have been very fundamental for Navi Mumbai and have been formally 
important in BSD but only of marginal relevance in the case of AlphaVille. Yet, it became 
clear that places with a high emphasis on Master plans had difficulty coping with the 
dynamic development on the ground, at least in the long run. Mumbai’s Master plan, for 
example, remained valid for 25 years and resulted in a striking contrast between plan 
and reality. While the blueprint maintained ideals of a structured regional growth along 
Western models, propagating satellite cities and greenbelts and negating informal devel-
opment, the ground displays the ‘messy’ contradictory reality of megacity growth in a 
developing country. 
Indeed, the examples also confirm how hard it is to put master plans into practice, as 
the regions at hand comprise an increasing amount of competing political entities and 
divergent administrative levels. Moreover the enormous development and growth fun-
damentally changed the role of our NeoTown examples from alternate cities to inte-
grated regional nodes. 
Significantly, at a local level, our New Towns can be seen as forerunners of an ap-
proach which has departed from a formal master planning and mainstreamed to a more 
flexible and process oriented development.  
The cases demonstrate a greater elasticity and resilience of private urban development. 
While a physical plan remained important in Bumi Serpong Damai, the developers con-
stantly demonstrated an ability to readjust the blueprint to the latest requirements on the 
ground. AlphaVille in particular developed in a bottom-up manner along a set of princi-
ples and rules, while a guiding master plan did not exist at all. Indeed, the case represents 
a radical and fundamental case of private urbanism resulting in a unique way of non-
formal urbanisation. While the developers of Navi Mumbai adhered to the conventional 
approach, the development plan was scrutinised by the growing number of exceptions, 
amendments and alternations, as well as the introduction of the special development 
zones. 
Interestingly, today many of the municipal governments have started drawing their 
own conclusions. The idea of debundled concentration along satellite towns has expired 
and new process oriented and market oriented mechanisms are in vogue. In this context 
Mumbai experiments with new land use categories, market based planning tools, devel-
opment guidelines and public private partnership. Jakarta has embarked on a model of 
regional growth (Pantura), which favours a linear development of the city along an East-
West axis. São Paulo is also experimenting with market based tools such as the ‘paid 
                                               
9 Nevertheless, it became clear these unconventional operations are deeply entangled in, and even produced by, formal 
regulatory environments, which are absent, displaced, corrupt, or not enforced. 
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authorisation for the right to construct’ (outorga onerosa do direto de contruir) and the 
‘urban operations’ programmes. 
In conclusion 
1. NeoTowns come to the fore in the context of postcolonial peripheral modernisation 
representing a search of identity, a quest for control between central and ‘decentred’ 
powers and a major socio-economic-cultural shift from the public to the private and cor-
porate sectors. 
2. NeoTowns represent idealistic cluster cities of immense dimensions that are predomi-
nantly based on ordered neighbourhood modules, notably portraying a hierarchical re-
arrangement of spaces between the public and the private (a radical departure from open 
modernistic grid patterns). 
3. NeoTowns portray the dawn of the modern consumer as they are inhabited by a 
population of newly emerging consumer classes in the respective countries demanding 
alternative environments of life. 
4. NeoTowns are examples of corporate urbanism. They are developed by private sector 
developers who appropriate the rationales of the larger corporate sector. These are 
mainly process driven and demand oriented. Moreover they increasingly embody design 
practices of ‘abstract localisation’ and ‘imagineering’, leading to synthetic landscapes, 
standardised typologies, and a rise of themed and branded environments. 
5) NeoTowns portray landscapes of opportunity: featuring a rising importance of diverse 
forms of capital exchange and representational values and becoming part of complex 
transnational arrangements and flows (of money, people, products, and ideas). 
6) Last but not least, NeoTowns come to the fore as enclavic regimes engendered by dis-
tinct elite groups (mostly in collaboration with the government and private sector crème 
de la crème), along a bottom-up logic of pragmatism and profitability and in a context of 
weak local regulations. 
Indeed the characteristics described above largely validate the categorisation of the 
species described as NeoTowns. 
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Outlook –  
Components of a research agenda 
While this project has for the most part analysed and evaluated the phenomenon of 
NeoTowns, the following section seeks to provide a future perspective. In this context. 
we will present an outline of the major innovations and the focal points of a research 
agenda. 
Main innovations 
The following table summarises the major ‘innovations’ as represented by the three cases 
examined by this project 
 
City Pioneering Innovation Description, Note 
Bumi Ser-
pong 
Damai 
Life-style theming & festivalisa-
tion 
Themed residential landscapes 
Marketing, ,Customer Relationship Management’ 
Turn-key solutions Mass customised housing products 
New Finance Tools Private Credits, Bonds, Stocks 
Navi Mum-
bai 
Strong master plan Spatial vision, role of public infra-
structure 
PPPs, SEZs, Integrated Town-
ships 
New urban modules 
Resettlement and Rehabilita-
tion (R&R) 
Compensation strategies for locals 
Differential land pricing 
mechanisms 
Redistribution of profits to the poor 
AlphaVille Market driven strategic plan-
ning 
Process oriented, phased development 
Standardisation, Quality moni-
toring 
DIN 9000, DIN 14000, CSR… 
‘Automanagement’ Bottom-up governance by Resident 
Associations 
Eco-lifestyle-neighbourhoods First green gated communities 
Table 40: Innovations 
Four dimensions of a research agenda on NeoTowns 
The subsequent outline of a research agenda focuses on a priority list geared to the topic 
of NeoTowns in particular and private urbanism in general. We consider four compo-
nents as particularly important to develop and consolidate the core of NeoTown re-
search: I: studies of additional NeoTown examples; II: examination of other typologies of 
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private urban development; III: the integration of a historic perspective; And IV: support 
by evidence based explorations. 
I: Examine more NeoTown cases 
While the existing study starts by examining three cases of NeoTowns in order to iden-
tify trends and to generate hypotheses, the approach has to be broadened. Only the study 
of more examples can establish and authenticate the present results. While we have 
shortlisted 16 cases at a groundwork stage of our project, 13 of the cases wait for closer 
inspection. As the list if far from complete additional examples may be added.10 (Cf. 
Appendix: Comparative matrix table) 
II: Inspect more examples of private urban development 
We also propose to supplement the list of NeoTowns with additional typologies of pri-
vately developed urban schemes. Numerous other project-types can be studied with the 
same methodological framework designed for this work. This will not only contribute to 
a better understanding of private urbanism in general, but it will also facilitate the re-
finement of the NeoTown classification. While the databank generated in the back-
ground of this work lists more than 40 examples of Special Economic Zones, Integrated 
Townships and other privately planned neighbourhoods11, the list is also open ended 
and additional examples will contribute to the overall qualification of the topic. 
III: Include a historical thread 
The third important step to consolidate NeoTown research is the expansion of a histori-
cal perspective. The research at hand has made a deliberate choice to carry on a spatial 
investigation of three cases of NeoTowns because this was deemed the most important 
first move in the identification of major trends and the development of hypotheses con-
tributing to new theory formation. Although a chronologic narrative was integrated as 
part of the examination of the context and the maturity of the samples, at this point pro-
jects that focus entirely on the historic thread would produce an entirely new class of 
knowledge to the NeoTown debate. From our perspective a comparative study of historic 
and contemporary cases would be the most reasonable approach. For a start it would be 
of supreme relevance to compare two groups of planned cities to NeoTowns: Firstly, 
classical New Town examples from the ‘Keynesian’ era; and secondly, precedents of pri-
vately planned cities (cf. to the lists in the first chapter). Clearly the two paradigmatic 
cases of Howard’s Town-Country Magnet and the private city of Irvine embody excep-
tionally interesting aspects. 
IV. Explore supporting empirical research 
Because cities are a complex subject matter our holistic examination of NeoTowns has 
touched upon a wide spectrum of topics: whether the national context, a chronologic 
perspective, economic profiles, socio-cultural contours, political characteristics, or spatial 
dimensions. After this complete but ‘rough’ assessment, now, each of the topics repre-
sented by the integral diagnostics presents numerous opportunities for deeper evidence 
                                               
10 A systematic investigation of the entire context of contemporary NeoTown projects in Latin America is still an open pro-
ject. The Mexican ‘Valle de las Palmas’ and the Chilean ‘Ciudades Walladas’ mark a starting point. 
11 The authors think that, in parallel to NeoTowns the Indian SEZ and Integrated Township schemes are particularly promis-
ing objects of future study. Furthermore it is evident that the Chinese region presents scores of recently planned cities wait-
ing for an own contextualisation, analysis and critical assessment. 
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based studies: from demographic profiling, to the history of postcolonial (and peripheral) 
modernisation, to new urban typologies in mega cities, the rise of the third-world con-
sumers, market oriented urban development, the role of capital and the commoditisation 
of space, or political and regular dimensions. From our perspective the subjects of fi-
nance and law in particular have the greatest scope for expansion and development, as 
these now have been the most distant disciplines for us (as architects and urbanists). 
Synopsis of the hypothetical findings and related research questions 
The following list presents an outline of the hypothetical findings and research questions 
in relation to the urban debates presented in the context chapter. These suggest a focus 
on empirical research. 
 
Debate Finding Question 
Global City NeoTowns are important ter-
minals and interfaces of global 
economic and cultural flows. 
What role do NeoTowns play in the 
hierarchy of global nodes (as centres 
for the production and reproduction of 
globally oriented goods, classes, sym-
bols, classes, etc)? Which flows pass 
through? How is global culture pro-
duced here? 
Regional City NeoTowns are integral elements 
of post-industrial ‘multiplex ur-
ban regions’ 
How do NeoTowns as planned nodes 
drive and structure the process of re-
gionalisation? What is the mutual im-
pact of local and regional infrastruc-
ture systems – both for the region, as 
well for the NeoTowns? 
Megacity NeoTowns appear as genuine 
products of mega-city regions. 
Why NeoTowns emerge in the periphe-
ries of Megacities, and not in the West-
ern context? Which roles do practices 
of bottom-up planning and self-
organisation play? 
Sprawl NeoTowns emerge as new cen-
tres in the periphery. On the oth-
er hand they generate urban 
sprawl. 
Are NeoTowns an alternative to 
sprawl, or triggers of more of the 
same? 
Fragmentation Gated neighbourhoods, residen-
tial enclaves and their inherent 
organisational forms (i.e. Home-
owner Associations) are impor-
tant components of NeoTowns. 
Are NeoTowns a particular form of 
agglomerated gated-communities 
(Mega-enclaves)? What are the limita-
tions of bottom-up initiatives and self-
organised governance? 
Post colonial 
space 
NeoTowns originate in a context 
of postcolonial modernisation. 
To what extent are NeoTowns prod-
ucts of the ‘periphery’? Do NeoTowns 
represent unique forms of 'indigenous 
modernities'? 
Themed  
landscapes 
 
New Towns appear as archetypes 
of themed environments of daily 
life. Thematic architecture and 
branded neighbourhoods appear 
as the most important strategic 
How can the semiotic vocabulary of 
New Towns be described? Which spac-
es and typologies are produced? Are 
NeoTowns the places of the ultimate 
spectacle? 
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elements. 
Table 41 : Research implications of the seven urban debates 
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Selected singular topics 
In addition to the central research objectives listed above our research brings to the fore 
and validates the following quintessential topics as subject of further debate and in-
quiry.12 
 
Theme Topic Remark 
Space ’Indigenous supermodernisation in 
the periphery of the peripheries’ 
A blend of Weber, King, Augé and 
Fishman 
Supermonuments, Iconic architec-
ture, Festivalisation 
(Cf. Jameson, Augé) 
 
’Organic’ structural logic of de-
mand driven spaces 
Self-organisation and complexity 
(Cf. Batty) 
New indigenous typologies Asian-style superblocks, shop-
houses, thematic ‘green-enclaves’ 
Local adaptations, Hybrid forms  
People  ‘Cities of demand’ Space and ideology of consumer so-
ciety, Architecture of demand, New 
Economy and Populism 
Personal imagescapes and role- 
models  
(Cf. Appadurai) 
Automanagement Limitations? (Cf. Tönnie’s: ‘Gemein-
schaft vs. Gesellschaft’) 
Unexpected outcomes, appropria-
tions 
E.g. Self-segregation, youth crime 
Economy Impact of ‘advanced economic ra-
tionalisation’ on space 
(Cf. Weber, Ritzer) 
Market driven strategic planning How do Towns and Cityscapes 
compare as commodities with stan-
dard products? 
Impact of standardisation, mod-
ularisation and quality manage-
ment on urban form 
(ISO, DIN…) 
Role of Marketing CRM, CSR Cf. ‘Cities of Demand’ 
Contradictions inherent to the log-
ic of the private sector  
How to address the neglect of social 
and natural other? 
Relationship of financial and mon-
etary dynamics and spatial trends 
E.g. expansion and growth, stan-
dardisation, modularisation, mass 
customisation, diversification 
Design New process, rule, and image-
based planning and design practic-
es 
Abstract localisation’ and ‘Imagi-
neering’, Theming, Life-style brand-
ing… 
Control Interpretation of the ‘self-
reproducing impulse of global and 
local elite regimes’ through a sys-
(Cf. Niklas Luhman’s social systems 
theory, concepts of autopoiesis etc.) 
 
                                               
12 Note that although the topics have been allocated to a specific theme, they may also be relevant for other areas of inquiry 
and combinations of these. 
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tem theoretic approach 
Market driven planning and de-
velopment tools versus master 
planning strategies 
Tradable Development Rights, Flex-
ible Development Controls, New 
land use categories… 
Role of hybrid organisational spe-
cies (SPVs, PPPs, BOTs, DCs…) 
Special Project Vehicles, Private 
Public Partnerships, Build Operate 
Transfer, Development Commis-
sioners… 
Limits of privatisation, Future role 
of the public sector 
(Cf. Above: Automanagement) 
Evaluation of policies Brazilian experiences of “Lei da 
Responsabilidade Territorial Urba-
na” (PL 3057/2000) 
Mumbai’s experiences of U-2 land 
uses and TDRs 
Assessment of Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement (R&R) strategies 
Table 42: Singular research topics 
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Appendix - 20
Typologies of decongestion nodes (Cf. Galantay 1975)Illustration A-8: 
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Ville Radieuse and Garden CityIllustration A-10:  (www.medienarchitektur.at, r11.10.2009)
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A-11b: Tama New Town, Tokyo 
(http://web.mit.edu/11.304j/www/japan/tama.html, r03.09.2009)
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Comparative Chart 1 (Project Level)Illustration A-14: 
L: Framework matrixIllustration A-13: 
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A-15d: References of comparative matrix tables
[light] = Estimated Number
(**) Demographia World Urban Areas: Population Projections 2007 & 2015
(1) Own approximation (Demographia & Citymajors data combined)
(2) http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/richest-cities-2005.html
(3) Corruptions Perceptions Index von Transparency International
(4) WB, World development indicators 2007
(5) Jones Lang Lasalle
(6) DKNI Data for JOBODETABEK 2000
(7) ADB 2006
(8) Mercer 2006
(9) Economist Intelligence Unit
(10) http://skyscraperpage.com/cities/#notes
(11) Goldman Sachs (N-11 Economic Snapshot)
(12) WorldBank (Little Data Book 2004)
(13) WorldBank (Little Green Data Book 2006)
(14) UNHabitat2001
(15) UN? Human Development Report 2007/2008
(16) IMF Word Economic Outlook Database (2007)
(17) UN World Urbanisation Prospects 2003 (cities > 750.000)
(18) Goldman Sachs 2007:101  "Growth Environment Score"
(x) IMF: World Economic Outlook Report 2008
(19) www.emporis.com (finished as well as under construction, rounded figure)
(20) CIA
(21) http://bwnt.businessweek.com/interactive_reports/livable_cities_worldwide/index.asp?sortCol=rank_2007&sortO
(22) UN-Habitat GUO 1998
(23) Geocommons Database
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Structural diagram of the researchIllustration A-17: 
I. Contextualisation II. Conceptualisation III. Operationalisation
3. Cases
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Narrative panorama inspired by game theoryIllustration A-18: 
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Demand driven planning approach
Post-liberal Democratisation
Jakarta
BSD+
Indonesia
Appendix - 40
Villa in Bandung‘s European quarter (own picture 2007)Illustration B-5: 
Map Semarang-Oost // Postcard  Tjandi road Illustration B-4: (www.semarang.nl, r03.09.09)
NeoTowns - 41
Plan for Kebayoran Baru // Modern Dwellings in Kebayoran Baru in the 1950sIllustration B-7: 
(Cf. Surjomihardjo)
P.J.S. Moojen‘s plan for Menteng, 1910 (Cf. Surjomihardjo)Illustration B-6: 
Appendix - 42
Jakarta‘s industrial and elite quarters indicated by water-infrastructureIllustration B-9: 
(Cf. Douglas 2005)
Development of Kebayoran Baru from the 50s to the 60s (Cf. Surjomihardjo)Illustration B-8: 
NeoTowns - 43
New Towns before and after the 1997 crisis (Cf. Firman 2004)Illustration B-11: 
Map of Jakarta‘s New Towns (Cf. Firman 2004)Illustration B-10: 
Appendix - 44
Housing and land prices in selected New Towns (Cf. Firman 2004)Illustration B-13: 
Focus areas of Indonesia‘s real estate sector (Cf. Hoek-Smit 2006)Illustration B-12: 
NeoTowns - 45
On a Sunday in 2007 in BSD‘s vicinityIllustration B-15: 
Unﬁ nished highway bridge in 2005Illustration B-16: 
Access map to the German Centre (2006)Illustration B-17: 
BSD and its competitors (Cf. BSD PT 2006)Illustration B-14: 
Appendix - 46
Town level map: BSD‘s phase I (BSD PT, Promotional material, 2007)Illustration B-18: 
Bumi Serpong Damai / Jakarta / Town
10
1:50.000
2km
N
NeoTowns - 47
Building types from various periods (TL.: Sector-1, BL.: Sector-1; TR.: De Latinos, Illustration B-20: 
BR.: Early Commercial Centre)
Master Plan of the entire Project (BSD PT 2008)Illustration B-19: 
Appendix - 48
Parallel street systemsIllustration B-21: 
Camouﬂ aged villageIllustration B-22: 
Guest worker housing in a villageIllustration B-23: 
Villa adapted to student housingIllustration B-24: 
NeoTowns - 49
Neighbourhood-level structure and detail: Sector-1, 1989 (Google Earth, 2006)Illustration B-26: 
Neighbourhood-level structure and detail: The Green, 2004, Illustration B-25: 
(BSD PT promotional material, 2006)
N
BSD / Neighbourhood / Sector -1
N
BSD / Neighbourhood / The Green
Appendix - 50
BSD’s gate typologies (L: Formal, R: Informal)Illustration B-27: 
NeoTowns - 51
New Playground and corner dilemma (background)Illustration B-29: 
 Bricolage of vacant lots and ﬁ re wallsIllustration B-28: 
Appendix - 52
Block-level map: Monte Carlo (1:2 500)Illustration B-30: 
100
1:2500
20m
BSD/ Neighbourhood/ Monte Carlo
NeoTowns - 53
Matured lower income projects in Sector-1 Illustration B-32: 
L.: Show-house in timeless villa design, R.: Shophouse typologyIllustration B-31: 
Appendix - 54
 Festivalised landscape of ‚De Latinos‘ cluster (Mix of own images and PR material)Illustration B-34: 
Pavilion residence (BSD PT promotion material)Illustration B-33: 
NeoTowns - 55
Structural map of the ‚De Latinos‘ cluster (1:10 000)Illustration B-35: 
N
2000
1:10.000
400m
BSD / Neighbourhood / Latinos
Appendix - 56
Map of ‚The Green‘ cluster (1: 10 000)Illustration B-36: 
N
1000
1:10.000
200m
BSD / Neighbourhood / The Green
NeoTowns - 57
 L: ‚Modern‘ shop-houses featuring a live-work programIllustration B-38: 
R: Bird‘s eye view of a neighbourhood (model picture)
Images L: Column monuments as markers in the landscape, Illustration B-37: 
R: ‚Goldplated entrance‘ with ﬂ oral motives , 
Appendix - 58
Corporate brezel palace (Cf. Winarso 2002)Illustration B-39: 
Master plans from various stages (Cf. BSD PT 2007)Illustration B-40: 
NeoTowns - 59
R: Recent ‘organic’ pattern of Phase-II by V2i (Cf. BSD PT, PR material)
1996 Master Plan by Doxiadis Associates & John Portman (Detail of B-39)
L: 1985 Pre-study by the Paciﬁ c Consultants International Group (PCI) (Detail of B-39)
Appendix - 60
The other new typology: High-rise luxury condominia Illustration B-42: 
(Here from Kebayoran)
Tight arrangements portraying trends of rationalisation and prefabricationIllustration B-41: 
NeoTowns - 61
New generation of Illustration B-43: Supermonuments (The Green, Koty Wisata, Citra Raya)
(PR material BSD; Own picture; www.ciputradevelopment.com, r02.10.09)
Appendix - 62
Examples of standard villa typologies available in one neighbourhoodIllustration B-44: 
(BSD PR Material, 2006)
NeoTowns - 63
Inducing demand by overabundance of ‚Imaginaries‘Illustration B-45: 
(Various PR Material, 2006)
Appendix - 64
Marketing culture of festivals and events Illustration B-46: 
(T.: BSD PR material; M.: BSD Sales ofﬁ ce; B.: Flying the ﬂ ag at Kota Legenda (2006)
NeoTowns - 65
Stock quote BSDE.JK (Yahoo Finance, r30.10.09)Illustration B-47: 

Navi MumbaiC. 
Appendix - 68
Map of the Mumbai Region (1:1000 000)Illustration C-2: 
Map of India (www.cia.gov, r02.10.09)Illustration C-1: 
SEZSEZ
NeoTowns - 69
Mumbai‘s inner centres forming a pentagon (MMRDA 1999)Illustration C-4: 
Charles Correa‘s boiling frog (Cf. Correa 1989)Illustration C-3: 
Appendix - 70
Impression of the Mumbai-Pune highway (NH-4, 2008)Illustration C-6: 
Mumbai-Pune is one of India’s 17 new mega growth corridors. The map displays Illustration C-5: 
development potentials (Cf. www.cdac.in/HTML/geomat/projcomp.asp, r12.09.09)
NeoTowns - 71
Milestone chart for India, Mumbai, Navi MumbaiIllustration C-7: 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
launch maturation consolidation
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Central Planning, focusing on deconcentration and rural areas, 
supply driven approach
Decentral Planning, increasingly focusing on cities, 
demand driven approach
plan
Appendix - 72
Navi Mumbai‘s structure as conceived in Correa (1989)Illustration C-8: 
NeoTowns - 73
Navi Mumbai‘s land use plan (Cidco, 1993)Illustration C-9: 
Appendix - 74
Planned Darave station by Hafeez Contractor (r. hafeezcontractor.com 12.09.09)Illustration C-12: 
Juinagar Railway station by Shirish PatelIllustration C-10: 
International Technology Park (Vashi)Illustration C-11: 
NeoTowns - 75
L: Map of on site villages (dark spots, from: Raje 1991), 
R: Diwala village Belapur in 2005
Northern part of Vashi with Juhu and Kopri villages (Wikimapia, r01.10.09)Illustration C-13: 
Appendix - 76
L: Map of Navi Mumbai’s slums (NMMC 2001), R: Street-view impression from Turbhe
Turbhe stores, largest Slum in the vicinity; 1:5000 (Googlemaps, r12.09.09)Illustration C-14: 
NeoTowns - 77
L: Road access diagram (Ibidem) R: Model villa (magichillsresidences.com/, r12.05.09)
Magic Hills (Planned at the Mumbai-Pune highway)Illustration C-15: 
(www.sternon.com/current-india-magichills.htm, r12.05.09)
Appendix - 78
L: Gharkul and Spaghetti // R: Seawoods Estates (1: 10 000), (GoogleEarth, r02.07.09)
Neighbourhood types: L: Turbhe Stores // R: Kopar Khairane (1:10 000)Illustration C-16: 
(GoogleEarth, r02.07.09)
N
1000
1:5.000
200m
Navi Mumbai /Neighbourhood /Turbhe
N
1000
1:5.000
200m
Navi Mumbai /Neighbourhood /Khargar (Gharkul and Spaghetti)
N
1000
1:5.000
200m
Navi Mumbai /Neighbourhood /Kopar Khairane (Sector 1-4)
N
1000
1:5.000
200m
Navi Mumbai /Neighbourhood /Seawoods I
NeoTowns - 79
ML: Spaghetti houses (Hafeez, 2008, cf. hafeezcontractor.com, r01.12.09), MR: Ghansoli 
(Hafeez, 2003), BL: Millennium Towers (Cidco, 2003), BR: Seawoods Estates (Hafeez, 1996)
Housing types: TL: Artist Village (Correa, 1983; from Correa ‘99), TR: Belapur Illustration C-17: 
Housing (Rewal, 1997, archnet.org, r01.11.09), ML: Middle income Houses (Vashi, 1980s, cf. Cor-
rea ‘99), MR: Low income project Khargar (2000s)
Appendix - 80
Vashi map (1: 25 000) Illustration C-18: (Based on GoogleEarth, r12.09.09)
N
5000
1:25000
1000m
Navi Mumbai /Node/ Vashi
NeoTowns - 81
Kopar Khairane and above Ghansoli (1:25 000) Illustration C-19: (Based on GoogleEarth, r12.09.09)
N
5000
1:25000
1000m
Navi Mumbai /Node/ Kopar Khairane and Ghansoli
Appendix - 82
Khargar, Phase 1, 1: 25 000 Illustration C-20: (Based on GoogleEarth, r12.09.09)
N
5000
1:25000
1000m
Navi Mumbai /Node/ Khargar (Phase 1)
NeoTowns - 83
Structure diagrams: T: Vashi (Cidco 1973); M: Kopar Khairane (NN, 1986); B: Khar-Illustration C-21: 
gar (Doshi, 1995)
Appendix - 84
C-22b: Village protests against the Maha Mumbai SEZ in 2006
(Cf. www.hinduonnet.com/ﬂ ine/ﬂ 2312/stories/20060630003711300.htm, r12.06.2008)
Navi Mumbai SEZIllustration C-22:  (nmsez.com, r03.02.2008)
NeoTowns - 85
C-23b: Ground plan of a DRS housing scheme block (cf. Adusumilli 2001)
DRS scheme in Vashi‘s sector 26 (Centre of the image, 1: 10000)Illustration C-23: 
(based on Googlemaps, r03.10.2009)
N
1000
1:5.000
200m
Navi Mumbai /Neighbourhood /Kopar Khairane (Sector 27)
Appendix - 86
Reserve prices in the different nodes (own drawing based on Cidco 2005)Illustration C-25: 
Navi Mumbai‘s population (Cf. Cidco 2005, 1 lakh = 100 000)Illustration C-24: 
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NeoTowns - 87
Design for the Ulwe Node (Cf. Frampton 1997)Illustration C-26: 
MARG‘s 1965 conceptual drawings for Navi Mumbai (MARG, 1965)Illustration C-27: 
Appendix - 88
C-27b: MARG’s conceptual drawings (MARG, 1965)
Belapur Housing Project (Raj Rewal, Cf. archnet.org, r01.11.09)Illustration C-28: 
NeoTowns - 89
Selected projects of Hafeez Contractor in Navi Mumbai and vicinity (from left to Illustration C-29: 
right, top to bottom): Ghansoli LIC housing; British Gas ofﬁ ces Powai; Gharkul lower middle income 
scheme; Master plan for Hiranandani SEZ; Hotel Rodas Powai; D.Y. Patil Stadium Nerul; Turbhe 
Railway Station; Nahar‘s Amrit Shakti Powai (cf. hafeezcontractor.com, r24.11.09)
Appendix - 90
SEZ advertisement, Cidco 2002 Illustration C-30: (The Economist Vol. 364, No 8291, 13.07.2002: 21)
NeoTowns - 91
New era monuments: T. and M.: Khargar‘s Utsaw Chowk Illustration C-31: 
(Cf. Navimumbaipluses.com, r02.10.09)
C-31b: Blueprint of Cidco‘s new headquarters (hafeezcontractor.com, r02.10.09)
Appendix - 92
Floor Area Ratio (FAR) map of Mumbai (Cf. Bertaud 2004)Illustration C-33: 
Political boundaries of the Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation Illustration C-32: 
(nmmconline.com, r17.02.09)
NeoTowns - 93
MMRDA‘s plan of the Mumbai Metro Region illustrating growth Illustration C-35: 
patterns along major spines (MMRDA 1999)
Picture of Navi Mumbai‘s Draft development Plan which is valid to this date Illustration C-34: 
(Cidco, 1973)
[Text]Illustration 1-1: 
[Iext]Illustration 1-2: 
Appendix - 94
[Text]Illustration 1-3: 
[Iext]Illustration 1-4: 
NeoTowns - 95
Aerial picture of ﬁ nished areas from Ghansoli to Belapur, 1:25 000C-36: 
(based on Googleearth, r30.10.2009)

AlphaVilleD. 
Appendix - 98
Distribution of income in Santana de Parnaíba and São Paulo (IBGE 2002)Illustration D-2: 
Map of Brazil (Cf. cia.gov, r27.10.10.09)Illustration D-1: 
NeoTowns - 99
B. Socio-spatial fragmentation by the example of Paraisópolis and Morumbi SP 
(Photo: Tuca Vieira, fototucavieira.com.br, r19.09.09)
São Paulo‘s operative landscape: Illustration D-3: 
A. Infrastructure (cf. urban-age.net, r01.12.09)
Appendix - 100
AlphaVille-Tamboré’s strategic place in the São Paulo‘s region: Illustration D-4: 
dark = AlphaVille, transparent outline = municipal boundaries (1:1000 000)
N
AlphaVille / São Paulo / Region
200
1:1.000.000
40km
NeoTowns - 101
...and by educational levels. Note the clear demarcation of AlphaVille -TamboréIllustration D-6: 
(Cf. urban-age.net, r21.10.09)
São Paulo‘s ‘setor oeste’ indicated by ‚AAA‘ rated ofﬁ ces Illustration D-5: 
(Jones Lang Lasalle 2008)
Appendix - 102
Milestone chart: Brazil, São Paulo, AlphaVille-TamboréIllustration D-7: 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
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Privately developed utility lines in the 1920s Illustration D-9: (from Anelli 2008b)
CIA. City: L: Advertising suburban life, R: Project map Illustration D-8: 
(cf. ciacity.com.br, r26.10.09)
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AlphaVille‘s residential 12 and Irvine‘s Sierra Broadmoor Illustration D-11: 
(own drawing and ULI 1974)
Map of Granja VianaIllustration D-10:  (cf. granjaviana.com.br, r07.11.09)
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AlphaVille-Tamboré: Site and surroundings Illustration D-12: (Google Maps, r28.10.09)
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‚AlphaVille sem padágio‘ (alternative access map) Illustration D-14: (Cf. SIA.org.br, r19.10.09)
Images of urban landscape in the vicinity Illustration D-13: 
(cf GoogleEarth, Panoramio, r19.11.09)
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Town-scale map of AlphaVille-Tamboré (1:50 000)Illustration D-15: 
Alphaville / Sao Paulo / Town
10
1:50.000
2km
N
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A dual landscape of villas and high rises (2008)Illustration D-17: 
Bunch of grapes vs the Manhattan grid Illustration D-16: 
(cf. sar8.org.br, r05.08.09 and lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/manhattan_upper_1920.jpg, r05.08.09)
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Secluded location of the Parque Ecológico Tietê Illustration D-19: (Google Earth, r10.10.09)
Example of a ‚portaria criteriosa‘ Illustration D-20: (Tambore.com.br, r18.11.09)
AlphaVille-Tamboré‘s planned superblock schemes Illustration D-18: 
(various promotional mat. from 2009)
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Examples from AlphaVille‘s guideline brochure illustrating ‚private’ norms of build-Illustration D-21: 
ing and design (Alphaville Urbanismo, PR material, 2007)
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Samples of block structures (from right to left and top to bottom): Turn-key Illustration D-22: 
houses; individual middle class villas completed; luxury villas under construction, high-rise apart-
ments in the nowhere; commercial centre; old commercial centre; block structures in the vicinity of 
AV; commercial and industrial park (based on Google Earth 2009)
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Characteristic housing typologies from various ‘residencials’, displaying a variaty of Illustration D-24: 
styles and increasing degrees of pre-fabrication (PR and own material, 2009)   
Characteristic urban pattern with main spine in the centre Illustration D-23: (GoogleEarth, r02.10.09)
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... D-24 cont.: More examples of architectural individualism between nostalgia and modernism (PR 
and own material, 2009, cf. table 36 in the main text)
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D-25b: Baroquish entrance ensemble of Tamboré 11 (cf. www.tambore.com.br, r02.10.09)
D-25c: Jose Moralez’ and Jamie Lerner’s initial design of Tamboré‘s main 
axis as an urban boulevard (cf. placedesign.com.br, r28.11.09)
Map of Tamboré Illustration D-25: (cf. www.tambore.com.br, r02.10.09)
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AlphaVille‘s skateboarding culture Illustration D-26: 
(cf. youtube.com/watch?v=DSdb64Vwvt4&feature=related, r12.12.09)
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Regional diversiﬁ cation Illustration D-28: (gaﬁ sa.com.br/, r21.05.2009)
Gaﬁ sa‘s subsidiaries Illustration D-27: (gaﬁ sa.com.br/, r21.05.2009)
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Private security as an important strategic element Illustration D-30: (sia.org.br, r22.05.09)
Diagram of Gaﬁ sa‘s ‚competitive strengths‘ (Illustration D-29: gaﬁ sa.com.br/, r21.05.2009)
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Lifestyle journal as PR media (Revista Viva São Paulo,Illustration D-33:  
(cf. alphaville.com.br,, r03.12.09)
The Gênesis project as an example of eco-lifestyle-theming Illustration D-32: 
(projetogenesis.com.br, r02.11.09)
Built logo Illustration D-31: (cf. Darke 2005, at vertigomagazine.co.uk/articles/pdf/Alphaville.pdf, r02.09.09)
NeoTowns - 119
‚Between the walls‘, travelling the spine (2007)Illustration D-35: 
Stock quote GFA Illustration D-34: (Cf. Yahoo Finance, r02.12.09)
En route on the Castello Branco Hihgway (2007)
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Structural diagram of chaptersIllustration E-1: 
NeoTowns - 125
Economic and demographic signiﬁ cance of the three regions and Los AngelesIllustration E-3: 
(generated from A-14)
Comparing the three countries and the US (generated from A-14)Illustration E-2: 
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Maps comparing the regional context of Jakarta, Mumbai and São Paulo Illustration E-4: 
(same scale)
SEZSEZ
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Hustle and bustle in the peripheries of Jakarta, 2x Mumbai and São PauloIllustration E-5: 
Appendix - 128
Three pictures at neighbourhood level: Illustration E-6: 
T.: BSD-De Latinos
M.: Navi Mumbai-Seawoods
B.: AlphaVille-Tamboré 4 (2007-2009)
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Access maps: Illustration E-7: 
T.: Jakarta-BSD (bsdcity.com, r03.01.08)
M.: Navi Mumbai, Sewri Nhava Sheva Sea Link (Mumbai Mirror, May 21 2008)
B.: AlphaVille-Tamboré, Integration of central spine (alhaville.com.br, r02.08.09)
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Ratio of residents and jobsIllustration E-10: 
(all generated from A-15)
Demographic and economic relevance at metro levelIllustration E-8: 
DensitiesIllustration E-9: 
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Major indicators comparedIllustration E-12: 
(all generated from A-15)
Relation of planned versus ‚unplanned‘ populationIllustration E-11: 
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Neighbourhood level maps BSD: The Green (www.v2i.com.au/, r03.12.09)Illustration E-14: 
Mishmash of surrounding urban fabric and on-site villages:Illustration E-13: 
TL.: BSD, TR.: NM, M.: AV (all based on GoogleEarth, r01.11.09)
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E-14b: Navi Mumbai’s Seawoods Estates (Google Earth, r30.10.09)
E-14c: AlphaVille’s Residential 12 (own drawing based on Google Earth 07.2007)
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Major trends pictured: cluster-enclaves, supermonuments, iconisation, indigenous Illustration E-15: 
typologies, turnkey-buildings, life-style theming...
From right to left, top to bottom: Themed railway station in NM; Mall & entertainment complex in AV; ‘Supermonument’ 
in Citra Raya; Superblock development in AlphaVille, Rule-cased design in AlphaVille; BSD’s indigeneous Shophouses, 
AlphaVille-Tamboré’s ‘binary’ landscape; Cidco headquesrter planned as a Supermonument
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Cont. from right to left, top to bottom: 
Rationalised efﬁ ciency from BSD; Utsaw Chowk monument NM; Historicist theme Villa in BSD; Abstract monument of The 
Green, BSD; Planned Videolar superblock in AlphaVille; Genêsis as an life-style eco-gated community in AV;  Themed public 
space in Kota Wisata (Jakarta); Iconic design of Spaghetti housing in Khargar NM
(images based on PR material of the respective developers 2006-2009)
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Completed project size compared to Howard‘s Town-Country Magnet (2009)Illustration E-16: 
16 Townmagnets in 
Navi Mumbai
4 Townmagnets in 
BSD
6  Townmagnets in 
AV-Tamboré
Up-to-date low income projects. L: Khargar (2007), R: BSDIllustration E-17:  (bsdcity.com, r15.09.09)
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Nested structural logic of neighbourhoods compared to ManhattanIllustration E-18: 
TL.: BSD Phase II (bsdcity.com, r12.11.09), TR.: Hiranandani Panvel (hirco.com, r21.10.09)
BL: AlphaVille (Section from sar8.org.br, r05.08.09); MR.: Grapes (www.ﬂ abbynot.com/?attachment_id=55, 
r11.12.09); BR.: Manhattan (lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/manhattan_upper_1920.jpg, r05.08.09)
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Main stakeholders of the contemporary urban developmentIllustration E-19: 
(Masters thesis from JNTU Hyderabad, unpublished) 
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Placement of NM, BSD and AV in the triangular model of civic-corporate-privateIllustration E-20: 
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